

rch

A SHORT HISTORY
OF
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
AND POLAND.

By H. WICKHAM STEED,
Correspondent of *The Times* in Vienna;
WALTER ALISON PHILLIPS,
Lecky Professor of Modern History, Trinity College, Dublin; and
DAVID HANNAY.

ILLUSTRATED

*Reproduced from the 11th edition of the
Encyclopaedia Britannica,
by permission of the Publishers,
The Cambridge University Press*

UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

LONDON
THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA COMPANY,
LTD.

1914



LAST SIEGE
OF VIENNA
BY
THE TURKS,
RAISED
SEPT. 12,
1683.



This medal, struck to commemorate the relief of Vienna, by John Sobieski, shows on one side the camp of the enemy besieging the walled city, in which the cathedral of St. Stephen and another building, probably the Schottenhof, are visible. The other side shows the rout of the army before Vienna, while above the rising sun drives the crescent moon (the Turkish emblem) away into the clouds.

RECAPTURE
OF
TEMESVAR
IN 1716.



AFTER
159 YEARS
OF TURKISH
DOMINION.

The medal commemorates the taking of Temesvar by Prince Eugene of Savoy. In the foreground is Hungaria holding in her left hand a trident piercing a horse's head (the Turks carried a horse's tail as their standard). In the background is the town of Temesvar, the numerous mosques indicating its long subjection.



PEACE OF
CARLOWITZ
BETWEEN
AUSTRIA
AND
TURKEY,
1699.



This medal celebrates the conclusion of the peace which marked the turn of the tide of Turkish aggression in Europe and the permanent establishment of Austria on the lower Danube.

CONTENTS

CHAP.	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	I
1. EARLY HISTORY OF AUSTRIA	2
2. CHARLES V. TO LEOPOLD II.	7
3. THE TREATY OF VIENNA	14
4. THE REVOLUTION OF 1848	18
5. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DUAL MONARCHY	23
6. THE EASTERN QUESTION	26
7. INTERNAL REFORMS	29
8. THE CRISIS OF 1903	33
9. THE ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA	39
10. PARTY GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRIA	45
11. THE LANGUAGE QUESTION	54
12. THE COALITION MINISTRY OF 1893	59
13. FRANCHISE REFORM	63
14. MAGYAR CONQUEST OF HUNGARY	67
15. THE HOUSE OF ANJOU	72
16. THE RULE OF THE HUNYADI	76
17. THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY	81
18. RISE OF TRANSYLVANIA	85
19. HABSBURG REPRESSION	87
20. HUNGARIAN REVIVAL	92
21. THE INDEPENDENT KINGDOM	97
22. EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT	100
23. EARLY HISTORY OF POLAND	105
24. THE REFORMATION PERIOD	115
25. THE COSSACKS	123

CHAP.	PAGE
26. RUSSIAN ASCENDANCY	127
27. PRUSSIAN INTERVENTION	133
28. THE CONGRESS KINGDOM	136
29. PHYSICAL FEATURES	139
30. POPULATION	145
31. AGRICULTURE AND MINERALS	149
32. INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE	154
33. RELIGION AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS	159
34. GOVERNMENT	162
35. ARMY AND NAVY	168



AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

INTRODUCTION

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, or the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy (Ger. *Österreichisch-ungarische Monarchie* or *Österreichisch-ungarisches Reich*), is the official name of a country situated in central Europe, bounded E. by Russia and Rumania, S. by Rumania, Servia, Turkey and Montenegro, W. by the Adriatic Sea, Italy, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, and the German empire, and N. by the German empire and Russia. It occupies about the sixteenth part of the total area of Europe, with an area (1905) of 239,977 sq. m. The monarchy consists of two independent states: the kingdoms and lands represented in the council of the empire (*Reichsrat*), unofficially called Austria or Cisleithania, because its territories lie west of the river Leitha; and the "lands of St Stephen's Crown," unofficially called Hungary or Transleithania, *i.e.* across the Leitha. It received its actual name by the diploma of the emperor Francis Joseph I. of the 14th of November 1868, replacing the name of the Austrian Empire under which the dominions under his sceptre were formerly known. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy is very often called unofficially the Dual Monarchy. It had in 1910 a population of 49,454,385 inhabitants, comprising therefore within its borders about one-eighth of the total population of Europe. By the Berlin Treaty of 1878 the principalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina with an area of 19,702 sq. m., and a population (1895) of 1,591,036 inhabitants, owning Turkey as suzerain, were placed under the administration of Austria-Hungary, and their annexation in 1908 was recognized by the Powers in 1909, so that they became part of the dominions of the monarchy.

CHAPTER I

EARLY HISTORY OF AUSTRIA

THE empire of Austria, as the official designation of the territories ruled by the Habsburg monarchy, dates back only to 1804, when Francis II., the last of the Holy Roman emperors, proclaimed himself emperor of Austria as Francis I. His motive in doing so was to guard against the great house of Habsburg being relegated to a position inferior to the *parvenus* Bonapartes, in the event of the final collapse of the Holy Roman Empire, or of the possible election of Napoleon as his own successor on the throne of Charlemagne. The title emperor of Austria, then, replaced that of "Imperator Romanorum semper Augustus" when the Holy Empire came to an end in 1806. From the first, however, it was no more than a title, which represented but ill the actual relation of the Habsburg sovereigns to their several states. Magyars and Slavs never willingly recognized a style which ignored their national rights and implied the superiority of the German elements of the monarchy; to the Germans it was a poor substitute for a title which had represented the political unity of the German race under the Holy Empire. For long after the Vienna Congress of 1814-1815 the "Kaiser" as such exercised a powerful influence over the imaginations of the German people outside the Habsburg dominions; but this was because the title was still surrounded with its ancient halo and the essential change was not at once recognized. The outcome of the long struggle with Prussia, which in 1866 finally broke the spell, and the proclamation of the German empire in 1871 left the title of emperor of Austria stripped of everything but a purely territorial significance. It had, moreover, by the compact with Hungary of 1867, ceased even fully to represent the relation of the emperor to all his dominions; and the title which had been devised to cover the whole of the Habsburg monarchy sank into the official style of the sovereign of but a half; while even within the Austrian empire proper it is resented by those peoples which, like the Bohemians, wish to obtain the same recognition of their national independence as was conceded to Hungary. In placing the account of the origin and development of the Habsburg monarchy under this heading, it is merely for the sake of convenience.

The first nucleus round which the present dominions of the house of Austria gradually accumulated was the mark which lay along the south bank of the Danube, east of the river Enns, founded about A.D. 800 as a defence for the Frankish kingdom against the Slavs. Although its total length from east to west was only about 60 m., it was associated in the popular mind with a large and almost unbroken tract of land in the east of Europe. This fact, together with the position of the mark with regard to Germany in general and to Bavaria in particular, accounts for the name *Österreich* (Austria) *i.e.* east empire or realm, a word first used in a charter of 996, where the phrase *in regione vulgari nomine Ostarrichi* occurs. The development of this small mark into the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was a slow and gradual process, and falls into two main divisions, which almost coincide with the periods during which the dynasties of Babenberg and Habsburg have respectively ruled the land. The energies of the house of Babenberg were chiefly spent in enlarging the area and strengthening the position of the mark itself, and when this was done the house of Habsburg set itself with remarkable perseverance and marvellous success to extend its rule over neighbouring territories. The many vicissitudes which have attended this development have not, however, altered the European position of Austria, which has remained the same for over a thousand years. Standing sentinel over the valley of the middle Danube, and

barring the advance of the Slavs on Germany, Austria, whether mark, duchy or empire, has always been the meeting-place of the Teuton and the Slav. It is this fact which gives it a unique interest and importance in the history of Europe, and which unites the ideas of the Germans to-day with those of Charlemagne and Otto the Great.

The southern part of the country now called Austria was inhabited before the opening of the Christian era by the Taurisci, a Celtic tribe, who were subsequently called the Norici, and who were conquered by the Romans about 14 B.C. Their land was afterwards included in the provinces of Pannonia and Noricum, and under Roman rule, Vindobona, the modern Vienna, became a place of some importance. The part of the country north of the Danube was peopled by the Marcomanni and the Quadi, and both of these tribes were frequently at war with the Romans, especially during the reign of the emperor Marcus Aurelius, who died at Vindobona in A.D. 180 when campaigning against them. Christianity and civilization obtained entrance into the land, but the increasing weakness of the Roman empire opened the country to the inroads of the barbarians, and during the period of the great migrations it was ravaged in quick succession by a number of these tribes, prominent among whom were the Huns. The lands on both banks of the river shared the same fate, due probably to the fact to which Gibbon has drawn attention, that at this period the Danube was frequently frozen over. About 590 the district was settled by the Slovenes, or Corutanes, a Slavonic people, who formed part of the kingdom of Samo, and were afterwards included in the extensive kingdom of the Avars. The Franks claimed some authority over this people, and probably some of the princes of the Slovenes had recognized this claim, but it could not be regarded as serious while the Avars were in possession of the land. In 791 Charlemagne, after he had established his authority over the *Bajuwarii* or Bavarians, crossed the river Enns, and moved against the Avars. This attack was followed by campaigns on the part of his lieutenants, and in 805 the Avars were finally subdued, and their land incorporated with the Frankish empire. This step brought the later Austria definitely under the rule of the Franks, and during the struggle Charlemagne erected a mark, called the East Mark, to defend the eastern border of his empire. A series of margraves ruled this small district from 799 to 907, but as the Frankish empire grew weaker, the mark suffered more and more from the ravages of its eastern neighbours. During the 9th century the Frankish supremacy vanished, and the mark was overrun by the Moravians, and then by the Magyars, or Hungarians, who destroyed the few remaining traces of Frankish influence.

A new era dawned after Otto the Great was elected German king in 936, and it is Otto rather than Charlemagne who must be regarded as the real founder of Austria. In August 955 he gained a great victory over the Magyars on the Lechfeld, freed Bavaria from their presence, and refounded the East Mark for the defence of his kingdom. In 976 his son, the emperor Otto II., entrusted the government of this mark, soon to be known as Austria, to Leopold, a member of the family of Babenberg, and its administration was conducted with vigour and success. Leopold and his descendants ruled Austria until the extinction of the family in 1246, and by their skill and foresight raised the mark to an important place among the German states. Their first care was to push its eastern frontier down the Danube valley, by colonizing the lands on either side of the river, and the success of this work may be seen in the removal of their capital from Pöchlarn to Melk, then to Tulln, and finally about 1140 to Vienna. The country as far as the Leitha was subsequently incorporated with Austria, and in the other direction the district between the Enns and the Inn was added to the mark in 1156, an important date in Austrian history. Anxious to restore peace to Germany in this year, the new king, Frederick I., raised Austria to the rank of a duchy, and conferred upon it exceptional privileges. The investiture was bestowed not only upon Duke Henry but upon his second wife, Theodora; in case of a failure of male heirs the duchy was to descend to females; and if the duke had no children he could nominate his successor. Controlling all the jurisdiction of the land, the duke's only duties towards the Empire were to appear at any diet held in Bavaria, and to send a contingent to the imperial army for any campaigns in the countries bordering upon Austria. In 1186 Duke Leopold I. made a treaty with Ottakar IV., duke of Styria, an arrangement which brought Styria and upper Austria to the Babenbergs in 1192, and in 1229 Duke Leopold II. purchased some lands from the bishop of Freising, and took the title of lord of Carniola. When the house of Babenberg became extinct in 1246, Austria, stretching from Passau almost to Pressburg, had the frontiers which it retains to-day, and this increase of territory had been accompanied by a corresponding increase in wealth and general prosperity. The chief reason for this prosperity was the growth of trade along the Danube, which stimulated the foundation, or the growth, of towns, and brought considerable riches to the ruler. Under the later Babenbergs Vienna was regarded as one of the most important of German cities, and it was computed that the duke was as rich as the archbishop of Cologne, or the margrave of Brandenburg, and was surpassed in this respect by only one German prince, the king of Bohemia. The interests of the Austrian margraves and dukes were not confined to the acquisition of wealth either in land or chattels. Vienna became a centre of culture and learning, and many religious houses were founded and endowed. The acme of the early prosperity of Austria was reached under Duke Leopold II., surnamed the Glorious,

who reigned from 1194 to 1230. He gave a code of municipal law to Vienna, and rights to other towns, welcomed the Minnesingers to his brilliant court, and left to his subjects an enduring memory of valour and wisdom. Leopold and his predecessors were enabled, owing to the special position of Austria, to act practically as independent rulers. Cherishing the privilege of 1156, they made treaties with foreign kings, and arranged marriages with the great families of Europe. With full control of jurisdiction and of commerce, no great bishopric nor imperial city impeded the course of their authority, and the emperor interfered only to settle boundary disputes.

The main lines of Austrian policy under the Babenbergs were warfare with the Hungarians and other eastern neighbours, and a general attitude of loyalty towards the emperors. The story of the Hungarian wars is a monotonous record of forays, of assistance given at times to the Babenbergs by the force of the Empire, and ending in the gradual eastward advance of Austria. The traditional loyalty to the emperors, which was cemented by several marriages between the imperial house and the Babenbergs, was, however, departed from by the margrave Leopold II., and by Duke Frederick II. During the investiture struggle Leopold deserted the emperor Henry IV., who deprived him of Austria and conferred it upon Vratislav II., duke of the Bohemians. Unable to maintain his position, Vratislav was soon driven out, and in 1083 Leopold again obtained possession of the mark, and was soon reconciled with Henry. Very similar was the result of the conflict between the emperor Frederick II. and Duke Frederick II. Ignoring the privilege of 1156, the emperor claimed certain rights in Austria, and summoned the duke to his Italian diets. Frederick, who was called the Quarrelsome, had irritated both his neighbours and his subjects, and complaints of his exactions and confiscations reached the ears of the emperor. After the duke had three times refused to appear before the princes, Frederick placed him under the ban, declared the duchies of Austria and Styria to be vacant, and, aided by the king of Bohemia, the duke of Bavaria and other princes, invaded the country in 1236. He met with very slight opposition, declared the duchies to be immediately dependent upon the Empire, made Vienna an imperial city, and imposed other changes upon the constitution of Austria. After his departure, however, the duke returned, and in 1239 was in possession of his former power, while the changes made by the emperor were ignored. Continuing his career of violence and oppression, Duke Frederick was killed in battle by the Hungarians in June 1246, when the family of Babenberg became extinct.

The duchies of Austria and Styria were now claimed by the emperor Frederick II. as vacant fiefs of the Empire, and their government was entrusted to Otto II., duke of Bavaria. Frederick, however, who was in Italy, harassed and afflicted, could do little to assert the imperial authority, and his enemy, Pope Innocent IV., bestowed the two duchies upon Hermann VI., margrave of Baben, whose wife, Gertrude, was a niece of the last of the Babenbergs. Hermann was invested by the German king, William, count of Holland, but he was unable to establish his position, and law and order were quickly disappearing from the duchies. The deaths of Hermann and of the emperor in 1250, however, paved the way for a settlement. Weary of struggle and disorder, and despairing of any help from the central authority, the estates of Austria met at Trübensee in 1251, and chose Ottakar, son of Wenceslaus I., king of Bohemia, as their duke. This step was favoured by the pope, and Ottakar, eagerly accepting the offer, strengthened his position by marrying Margaret, a sister of Duke Frederick II., and in return for his investiture promised his assistance to William of Holland. Styria appears at this time to have shared the fortunes of Austria, but it was claimed by Bela IV., king of Hungary, who conquered the land, and made a treaty with Ottakar in 1254 which confirmed him in its possession. The Hungarian rule was soon resented by the Styrians, and Ottakar, who had become king of Bohemia in 1253, took advantage of this resentment, and interfered in the affairs of the duchy. A war with Hungary was the result, but on this occasion victory rested with Ottakar, and by a treaty made with Bela, in March 1261, he was recognized as duke of Styria. In 1269 Ottakar inherited the duchy of Carinthia on the death of Duke Ulrich III., and, his power having now become very great, he began to aspire to the German throne. He did something to improve the condition of the duchies by restoring order, introducing German colonists into the eastern districts, and seeking to benefit the inhabitants of the towns.

In 1273 Rudolph, count of Habsburg, became German king, and his attention soon turned to Ottakar, whose power menaced the occupant of the German throne. Finding some support in Austria, Rudolph questioned the title of the Bohemian king to the three duchies, and sought to recover the imperial lands which had been in the possession of the emperor Frederick II. Ottakar was summoned twice before the diet, the imperial court declared against him, and in July 1275 he was placed under the ban. War was the result, and in November 1276 Ottakar submitted to Rudolph, and renounced the duchies of Austria, Styria and Carinthia. For some time the three duchies were administered by Rudolph in his capacity as head of the Empire, of which they formed part. Not content with this tie, however, which was personal to himself alone, the king planned to make them hereditary possessions of his family, and to transfer the headquarters of the Habsburgs from the Rhine to the Danube. Some opposition was offered to this scheme; but the perseverance of the king overcame all difficulties, and one of the most important events in

European history took place on the 27th of December 1282, when Rudolph invested his sons, Rudolph and Albert, with the duchies of Austria and Styria. He retained Carinthia in his own hands until 1286, when, in return for valuable services, he bestowed it upon Meinhard IV., count of Tirol. The younger Rudolph took no part in the government of Austria and Styria, which was undertaken by Albert, until his election as German king in 1298. Albert appears to have been rather an arbitrary ruler. In 1288 he suppressed a rising of the people of Vienna, and he made the fullest use of the ducal power in asserting his real or supposed rights. At this time the principle of primogeniture was unknown in the house of Habsburg, and for many years the duchies were ruled in common by two, or even three, members of the family. After Albert became German king, his two elder sons, Rudolph and Frederick, were successively associated with him in the government, and after his death in 1308, his four younger sons shared at one time or another in the administration of Austria and Styria. In 1314 Albert's son, Frederick, was chosen German king in opposition to Louis IV., duke of Upper Bavaria, afterwards the emperor Louis IV., and Austria was weakened by the efforts of the Habsburgs to sustain Frederick in his contest with Louis, and also by the struggle carried on between another brother, Leopold, and the Swiss. A series of deaths among the Habsburgs during the first half of the 14th century left Duke Albert II. and his four sons as the only representatives of the family. Albert ruled the duchies alone from 1344 to 1356, and after this date his sons began to take part in the government. The most noteworthy of these was Duke Rudolph IV., a son-in-law of the emperor Charles IV., who showed his interest in learning by founding the university of Vienna in 1365. Rudolph's chief aim was to make Austria into an independent state, and he forged a series of privileges the purport of which was to free the duchy from all its duties towards the Empire. A sharp contest with the emperor followed this proceeding, and the Austrian duke, annoyed that Austria was not raised to the dignity of an electorate by the Golden Bull of 1356, did not shrink from a contest with Charles. In 1361, however, he abandoned his pretensions, but claimed the title of archduke, and in 1346 declared that the possession of the Habsburgs were indivisible. Meanwhile the acquisition of neighbouring territories had been steadily pressed on. In 1335 the duchy of Carinthia, and a part of Carniola, were inherited by Dukes Albert II. and Otto, and in 1363 Rudolph IV. obtained the county of Tirol. In 1364 Carniola was made into an hereditary duchy; in 1374 part of Istria came under the rule of the Habsburgs; in 1382 Trieste submitted voluntarily to Austria, and at various times during the century other smaller districts were added to the lands of the Habsburgs.

Rudolph IV. died childless in 1365, and in 1379 his two remaining brothers, Leopold III. and Albert III., made a division of their lands, by which Albert retained Austria proper and Carniola, and Leopold got Styria, Carinthia and Tirol. Leopold was killed in 1386 at the battle of Sempach, and Albert became guardian for his four nephews, who subsequently ruled their lands in common. The senior line which ruled in Austria was represented after the death of Duke Albert III. in 1395 by his son, Duke Albert IV., and then by his grandson, Duke Albert V., who became German king as Albert II. in 1438. Albert married Elizabeth, daughter of Sigismund, king of Hungary and Bohemia, and on the death of his father-in-law assumed these two crowns. He died in 1439, and just after his death a son was born to him, who was called Ladislaus Posthumus, and succeeded to the duchy of Austria and to the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia. William and Leopold, the two eldest sons of Duke Leopold III., and, with their younger brothers Ernest and Frederick, the joint rulers of Styria, Carinthia and Tirol, died early in the 15th century, and in 1406 Ernest and Frederick made a division of their lands. Ernest became duke of Styria and Carinthia, and Frederick, count of Tirol. Ernest was succeeded in 1424 by his sons, Frederick and Albert, and Frederick in 1439 by his son, Sigismund, and these three princes were reigning when King Albert II. died in 1439. Frederick, who succeeded Albert as German king, and was soon crowned emperor as Frederick III., acted as guardian for Sigismund of Tirol, who was a minor, and also became regent of Austria in consequence of the infancy of Ladislaus. His rule was a period of struggle and disorder, owing partly to the feebleness of his own character, partly to the wish of his brother, Albert, to share his dignities. The Tirolese soon grew weary of his government, and in 1446 Sigismund was declared of age. The estates of Austria were equally discontented and headed an open revolt, the object of which was to remove Ladislaus from Frederick's charge and deprive the latter of the regency. The leading spirit in this movement was Ulrich Eiczing (Eitzing or von Eiczinger, d. before 1463), a low-born adventurer, ennobled by Albert II., in whose service he had accumulated vast wealth and power. In 1451 he organized an armed league, and in December, with the aid of the populace, made himself master of Vienna, whither he had summoned the estates. In March 1452 he was joined by Count Ulrich of Cilli, while the Hungarians and the powerful party of the great house of Rosenberg in Bohemia attached themselves to the league. Frederick, who had hurried back from Italy, was besieged in August in the Vienna Neustadt, and was forced to deliver Ladislaus to Count Ulrich, whose influence had meanwhile eclipsed that of Eiczing. Ladislaus now ruled nominally himself, under the tutelage of Count Ulrich. The country was, however, distracted by quarrels between the party of the high aristocracy, which recognized the count of Cilli as its chief,

and that of the lesser nobles, citizens and populace, who followed Eiczing. In September 1453 the latter, by a successful *émeute*, succeeded in ousting Count Ulrich, and remained in power till February 1455, when the count once more entered Vienna in triumph. Ulrich of Cilli was killed before Belgrade in November 1456; a year later Ladislaus himself died (November 1457). Meanwhile Styria and Carinthia were equally unfortunate under the rule of Frederick and Albert; and the death of Ladislaus led to still further complications. Austria, which had been solemnly created an archduchy by the emperor Frederick in 1453, was claimed by the three remaining Habsburg princes, and lower Austria was secured by Frederick, while Albert obtained upper Austria. Both princes were unpopular, and in 1462 Frederick was attacked by the inhabitants of Vienna, and was forced to surrender lower Austria to Albert, whose spendthrift habits soon made his rule disliked. A further struggle between the brothers was prevented by Albert's death in 1463, when the estates did homage to Frederick. The emperor was soon again at issue with the Austrian nobles, and was attacked by Matthias Corvinus, king of Hungary, who drove him from Vienna in 1485. Although hampered by the inroads of the Turks, Matthias pressed on, and by 1487 was firmly in possession of Austria, Styria, and Carinthia, which seemed quite lost to the Habsburgs.

The decline in the fortunes of the family, however, was to be arrested by Frederick's son, Maximilian, afterwards the emperor Maximilian I., who was the second founder of the greatness of the house of Habsburg. Like his ancestor, Rudolph, he had to conquer the lands over which his descendants were destined to rule, and by arranging a treaty of succession to the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, he pointed the way to power and empire in eastern Europe. Soon after his election as king of the Romans in 1486, Maximilian attacked the Hungarians, and in 1490 he had driven them from Austria, and recovered his hereditary lands. In the same year he made an arrangement with his kinsman, Sigismund of Tirol, by which he brought this county under his rule, and when the emperor Frederick died in 1493, Maximilian united the whole of the Austrian lands under his sway. Continuing his acquisitions of territory, he inherited the possessions of the counts of Görz in 1500, added some districts to Tirol by intervening in a succession war in Bavaria, and acquired Gradisca in 1512 as the result of a struggle with Venice. He did much for the better government of the Austrian duchies. Bodies were established for executive, financial and judicial purposes, the Austrian lands constituted one of the imperial circles which were established in 1512, and in 1518 representatives of the various diets (*Landtage*) met at Innsbruck, a proceeding which marks the beginning of an organic unity in the Austrian lands. In these ways Maximilian proved himself a capable and energetic ruler, although his plans for making Austria into a kingdom, or an electorate, were abortive.

At the close of the middle ages the area of Austria had increased to nearly 50,000 sq. m., but its internal condition does not appear to have improved in proportion to this increase in size. The rulers of Austria lacked the prestige which attached to the electoral office, and, although five of them had held the position of German king, the four who preceded Maximilian had added little or nothing to the power and dignity of this position. The ecclesiastical organization of Austria was imperfect, so long as there was no archbishopric within its borders, and its clergy owed allegiance to foreign prelates. The work of unification which was so successfully accomplished by Maximilian was aided by two events, the progress of the Turks in south-eastern Europe, and the loss of most of the Habsburg possessions on the Rhine. The first tended to draw the separate states together for purposes of defence, and the second turned the attention of the Habsburgs to the possibilities of expansion in eastern Europe.

CHAPTER II

CHARLES V. TO LEOPOLD II.

At the time of the death of the emperor Maximilian in 1519 the Habsburg dominions in eastern Germany included the duchies of Upper and Lower Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and the county of Tirol. Maximilian was succeeded as archduke of Austria as well as emperor by his grandson Charles of Spain, known in history as the emperor Charles V. To his brother Ferdinand Charles resigned all his Austrian lands, including his claims on Bohemia and Hungary. Austria and Spain were thus divided, and, in spite of the efforts of the archduke Charles in the Spanish Succession War, were never again united, for at the battle of Monhács, on the 28th of August 1526, Suleiman the Magnificent defeated and killed Louis, king of Bohemia and of Hungary, whose sister Anne had married Ferdinand. By this victory the Turks conquered and retained, till the peace of Karlowitz in 1699, the greater part of Hungary. During most of his life Ferdinand was engaged in combating the Turks and in attempting to secure Hungary. In John Zápolya, who was supported by Suleiman, Ferdinand found an active rival. The Turks besieged Vienna in 1530 and made several invasions of Hungary and Austria. At length Ferdinand agreed to pay Suleiman an annual tribute for the small portion—about 12,228 sq. m.—of Hungary which he held. During Charles V.'s struggles with the German Protestants, Ferdinand preserved a neutral attitude, which contributed to gain Germany a short period of internal peace. Though Ferdinand himself did not take a leading part in German religious or foreign politics, the period was one of intense interest to Austria. Throughout the years from 1519 to 1648 there are, said Stubbs, two distinct ideas in progress which "may be regarded as giving a unity to the whole period. . . . The Reformation is one, the claims of the House of Austria is the other." Austria did not benefit from the reign of Charles V. The emperor was too much absorbed in the affairs of the rest of his vast dominions, notably those of the Empire, rent in two by religious differences and the secular ambitions for which those were the excuse, to give any effective attention to its needs. The peace of Augsburg, 1555, which recognized a dualism within the Empire in religion as in politics, marked the failure of his plan of union; and meanwhile he had been able to accomplish nothing to rescue Hungary from the Turkish yoke. It was left for his brother Ferdinand, a ruler of consummate wisdom (1556-1564) "to establish the modern Habsburg-Austrian empire with its exclusive territorial interests, its administrative experiments, its intricacies of religion and of race."

Before his death Ferdinand divided the inheritance of the German Habsburgs between his three sons. Austria proper was left to his eldest son Maximilian, Tirol to the archduke Ferdinand; and Styria with Carinthia and Carniola to the archduke Charles. Under the emperor Maximilian II. (1564-1576), who was also king of Bohemia and Hungary, a liberal policy preserved peace, but he was unable to free his government from its humiliating position of a tributary to the Turk, and he could do nothing to found religious liberty within his dominions on a permanent basis. The whole of Austria and nearly the whole of Styria were mainly Lutheran; in Bohemia, Silesia and Moravia, various forms of Christian belief struggled for mastery; and Catholicism was almost confined to the mountains of Tirol. The accession of Rudolph II.¹ (1576-1612), a fanatical Spanish Catholic, changed the situation entirely. Under him the Jesuits were encouraged to press on the counter-Reformation. In the early part of his reign there was hardly any government at all. In Bohemia a state of semi-

¹ Rudolph V. as archduke of Austria, II. as emperor.

independence existed, while Hungary preferred the Turk to the emperor. In both kingdoms Rudolph had failed to assert his sovereign power except in fitful attempts to extirpate heresy. With anarchy prevalent within the Austrian dominions some action became necessary. Accordingly in 1606 the archdukes made a compact agreeing to acknowledge the archduke Matthias as head of the family. This arrangement proved far from successful. Matthias, who was emperor from 1612 to 1619, proved unable to restore order, and when he died Bohemia was practically independent. His successor Ferdinand II. (1619-1637) was strong of will; and resolved to win back Germany to the Catholic faith. As archduke of Styria he had crushed out Protestantism in that duchy, and having been elected king of Bohemia in 1618 was resolved to establish there the rule of the Jesuits. His attempt to do so led to the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War. Till 1630 the fortunes of Austria brightened under the active rule of Ferdinand, who was assisted by Maximilian of Bavaria and the Catholic League, and by Wallenstein. The Palatinate was conquered, the Danish king was overthrown, and it seemed that Austria would establish its predominance over the whole of Germany, and that the Baltic would become an Austrian lake. The fortunes of Austria never seemed brighter than in 1628 when Wallenstein began the siege of Stralsund. His failure, followed by the arrival of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany in 1630, proved the death-blow of Austrian hopes. In 1632 Gustavus Adolphus was killed, in 1634 Wallenstein was assassinated, and in 1635 France entered into the war. The Thirty Years' War now ceased to be a religious struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism; it resolved itself into a return to the old political strife between France and the Habsburgs. Till 1648 the Bourbon and Habsburg powers continued the war, and at the peace of Westphalia Austria suffered severe losses. Ferdinand III. (1637-1657) was forced to yield Alsace to France, to grant territorial supremacy, including the right of making alliances, to the states of the Empire, and to acknowledge the concurrent jurisdiction of the imperial chamber and the Aulic council. The disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire was now practically accomplished, and though the possession of the imperial dignity continued to give the rulers of Austria prestige, the Habsburgs henceforward devoted themselves to their Austrian interests rather than to those of the Empire.

In 1657 Leopold I., who had already ruled the Austrian dominions for two years, succeeded his father Ferdinand and was crowned emperor in the following year. His long reign of 48 years was of great importance for Austria, as determining both the internal character and the external policy of the monarchy. The long struggle with France to which the ambitions of Louis XIV. gave rise, and which culminated in the War of Spanish Succession, belongs less to the history of Austria proper than to that of Germany and of Europe. Of more importance to Austria itself was the war with Sweden (1657-1660) which resulted in the peace of Oliva, by which the independence of Poland was secured and the frontier of Hungary safeguarded, and the campaigns against the Turks (1662-1664 and 1683-1699), by which the Ottoman power was driven from Hungary, and the Austrian attitude towards Turkey and the Slav peoples of the Balkans determined for a century to come. The first war, due to Ottoman aggression in Transylvania, ended with Montecuculi's victory over the grand vizier at St. Gothard on the Raab on the 1st of August 1664. The general political situation prevented Leopold from taking full advantage of this, and the peace of Vasvár (August 10) left the Turks in possession of Nagyvarad (Grosswardein) and the fortress of Érsekújvár (Neuhäusel), Transylvania being recognized as an independent principality. The next Turkish war was the direct outcome of Leopold's policy in Hungary, where the persecution of the Protestants and the suppression of the constitution in 1658, led to a widespread conspiracy. This was mercilessly suppressed; and though after a period of arbitrary government (1672-1679), the palatinate and the constitution, with certain concessions to the Protestants, were restored, the discontent continued. In 1683, invited by Hungarian malcontents and spurred on by Louis XIV., the Turks burst into Hungary, overran the country and appeared before the walls of Vienna. The victory of the 12th of September, gained over the Turks by John Sobieski, not only saved the Austrian capital, but was the first of a series of successes which drove the Turks permanently beyond the Danube, and established the power of Austria in the East. The victories of Charles of Lorraine at Párkány (1683) and Esztergom (Gran) (1685) were followed by the capture of Budapest (1686) and the defeat of the Ottomans at Mohács (1688). In 1688 the elector took Belgrade; in 1691 Louis William I. of Baden won the battle of Slankamen, and on the 11th of September 1697 Prince Eugene gained the crowning victory of Zenta. This was followed, on the 26th of January 1699, by the peace of Karlowitz, by which Slavonia, Transylvania and all Hungary, except the banat of Temesvár, were ceded to the Austrian crown. Leopold had wisely decided to initiate a conciliatory policy in Hungary. At the diet of Pressburg (1687-1688) the Hungarian crown had been made hereditary in the house of Habsburg, and the crown prince Joseph had been crowned hereditary king of Hungary. In 1697 Transylvania was united to the Hungarian monarchy. A further fact of great prospective importance was the immigration, after an abortive rising against the Turks, of some 30,000 Slav and Albanian families into Slavonia and southern Hungary, where they were granted by the emperor Leopold a certain autonomy and the recognition of the Orthodox religion.

By the conquest of Hungary and Transylvania Leopold completed the edifice of the Austrian monarchy, of which the foundations had been laid by Ferdinand I. in 1526. He had also done much for its internal consolidation. By the death of the archduke Sigismund in 1665 he not only gained Tirol, but a considerable sum of money, which he used to buy back the Silesian principalities of Oppeln and Ratibor, pledged by Ferdinand III. to the Poles. In the administration of his dominions, too, Leopold succeeded in strengthening the authority of the central government. The old estates, indeed, survived; but the emperor kept the effective power in his own hands, and to his reign are traceable the first beginnings of that system of centralized bureaucracy which was established under Maria Theresa and survived, for better or for worse, till the revolution of 1848. It was under Leopold, also, that the Austrian standing army was established in spite of much opposition; the regiments raised in 1672 were never disbanded. For the intellectual life of the country Leopold did much. In spite of his intolerant attitude towards religious dissent, he proved himself an enlightened patron of learning. He helped in the establishment of the universities of Innsbruck and Olmütz; and under his auspices, after the defeat of the Turks in 1683, Vienna began to develop from a mere frontier fortress into one of the most brilliant capitals of Europe.

Leopold died in 1705 during the War of Spanish Succession (1702-13), which he left as an evil inheritance to his sons Joseph I. (d. 1711) and Charles VI. The result of the war was a further aggrandizement of the house of Austria; but not to the extent that had been hoped. Apart from the fact that British and Austrian troops had been unable to deprive Philip V. of his throne, it was from the point of view of Europe at large by no means desirable that Charles VI. should succeed in reviving the empire of Charles V. By the treaty of Utrecht, accordingly, Spain was left to the House of Bourbon, while that of Austria received the Spanish Netherlands, Sardinia and Naples.

The treaty of Karlowitz, and the settlement of 1713-1714, marked a new starting-point in the history of Austria. The efforts of Turkey to regain her ascendancy in eastern Europe at the expense of the Habsburgs had ended in failure, and henceforward Turkish efforts were confined to resisting the steady development of Austria in the direction of Constantinople. The treaties of Utrecht, Rastadt and Baden had also re-established and strengthened the position of the Austrian monarchy in western Europe. The days of French invasions of Germany had for the time ceased, and revenge for the attacks made by Louis XIV. was found in the establishment of Austrian supremacy in Italy and in the substitution of Austrian for Spanish domination in the Netherlands.

The situation, though apparently favourable, was full of difficulty, and only a statesman of uncommon dexterity could have guided Austria with success through the ensuing years. Composed of a congeries of nationalities which included Czechs, Magyars, Ruthenes, Rumanians, Germans, Italians, Flemings and other races, and with territories separated by many miles, the Habsburg dominions required from their ruler patience, tolerance, administrative skill and a full knowledge of the currents of European diplomacy. Charles VI. possessed none of these qualities; and when he died in 1740, the weakness of the scattered Habsburg empire rendered it an object of the cupidity of the continental powers. Yet, though the War of Spanish Succession had proved a heavy drain on the resources of the hereditary dominions of the Austrian crown, Charles VI. had done much to compensate for this by the successes of his arms in eastern Europe. In 1716, in alliance with Venice, he declared war on the Turks; Eugene's victory at Peterwardein involved the conquest of the banat of Temesvár, and was followed in 1717 by the capture of Belgrade. By the treaty signed at Passarowitz on the 21st of July 1718, the banat, which rounded off Hungary and Belgrade, with the northern districts of Servia, were annexed to the Habsburg monarchy.

Important as these gains were, the treaty none the less once more illustrated the perpetual sacrifice of the true interests of the hereditary dominions of the house of Habsburg to its European entanglements. Had the war continued, Austria would undoubtedly have extended her conquests down the Danube. But Charles was anxious about Italy, then in danger from Spain, which under Alberoni's guidance had occupied Sardinia and Sicily. On the 2nd of August 1718, accordingly, Charles joined the Triple Alliance, henceforth the Quadruple Alliance. The coercion of Spain resulted in a peace by which Charles obtained Sicily in exchange for Sardinia. The shifting of the balance of power that followed belongs to the history of Europe; for Austria the only important outcome was that in 1731 Charles found himself isolated. Being without a son, he was now anxious to secure the throne for his daughter Maria Theresa, in accordance with the Pragmatic Sanction of the 19th of April 1713, in which he had pronounced the indivisibility of the monarchy, and had settled the succession on his daughter, in default of a male heir. It now became his object to secure the adhesion of the powers to this instrument. In 1731 Great Britain and Holland agreed to respect it, in return for the cession of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla to Don Carlos; but the hostility of the Bourbon powers continued, resulting in 1733 in the War of Polish Succession, the outcome of which was the acquisition of Lorraine by France, and of Naples, Sicily and the Tuscan ports by Don Carlos, while the power of the Habsburg monarchy in northern Italy was strengthened by the acquisition of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla. At the same time Spain and Sardinia adhered to the Pragmatic Sanction. Francis, 11

dispossessed duke of Lorraine, was to be compensated with Tuscany. On the 12th of February 1736 he was married to the archduchess Maria Theresa, and on the 11th of May following he signed the formal act ceding Lorraine to France.

The last years of Charles VI. were embittered by the disastrous outcome of the war with Turkey (1738-1739), on which he had felt compelled to embark in accordance with the terms of a treaty of alliance with Russia signed in 1726. After a campaign of varying fortunes the Turks beat the imperial troops at Krotzka on the 23rd of July 1739 and laid siege to Belgrade, where on the 1st of September a treaty was signed, which, with the exception of the banat, surrendered everything that Austria had gained by the treaty of Passarowitz. On the 20th of October 1740, Charles died, leaving his dominions in no condition to resist the attacks of the powers, which, in spite of having adhered to the Pragmatic Sanction, now sought to profit from their weakness. Yet for their internal development Charles had done much. His religious attitude was moderate and tolerant, and he did his best to promote the enlightenment of his subjects. He was zealous, too, for the promotion of trade and industry, and, besides the East India Company which he established at Ostend, he encouraged the development of Trieste and Fiume as sea-ports and centres of trade with the Levant.

The accession of Maria Theresa to the throne of the Habsburgs marks an important epoch in the history of Austria. For a while, indeed, it seemed that the monarchy was on the point of dissolution. To the diplomacy of the 18th century the breach of a solemn compact was but lightly regarded; and Charles VI. had neglected the advice of Prince Eugene to leave an effective army of 200,000 men as a more solid guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction than the signatures of the powers. As it was, the Austrian forces, disorganized in the long confusion of the Turkish wars, were in no condition to withstand Frederick the Great, when in 1740, at the head of the splendid army bequeathed to him by his father, he invaded Silesia. The Prussian victory at Mollwitz (April 10, 1741) brought into the field against Austria all the powers which were ambitious of expansion at her expense: France, Bavaria, Spain, Saxony and Sardinia. Nor was the peril wholly external. Apart from the perennial discontents of Magyars and Slavs, the confusion and corruption of the administration, and the misery caused by the ruin of the finances, had made the Habsburg dynasty unpopular even in its German states, and in Vienna itself a large section of public opinion was loudly in favour of the claims of Bavaria. Yet the war, if it revealed the weakness of the Austrian monarchy, revealed also unexpected sources of strength. Not the least of these was the character of Maria Theresa herself, who to the fascination of a young and beautiful woman added a very masculine resolution and judgment. In response to her personal appeal, and also to her wise and timely concessions, the Hungarians had rallied to her support, and for the first time in history awoke not only to a feeling of enthusiastic loyalty to a Habsburg monarch, but also to the realization that their true interests were bound up with those of Austria. Although, then, as the result of the war, Silesia was by the treaty of Dresden transferred from Austria to Prussia, while in Italy by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 cessions were made at the expense of the house of Habsburg to the Spanish Don Philip and to Sardinia, the Austrian monarchy as a whole had displayed a vitality that had astonished the world, and was in some respects stronger than at the beginning of the struggle, notably in the great improvement in the army and in the possession of generals schooled by the experience of active service.

The period from 1747 to 1756, the year of the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, was occupied in preparations for carrying into effect the determination of Maria Theresa to recover the lost provinces. To give any chance of success, it was recognized that a twofold change of system was necessary: in internal and in external affairs. To strengthen the state internally a complete revolution of its administration was begun under the auspices of Count F. W. Haugwitz (1700-1765); the motley system which had survived from the middle ages was gradually replaced by an administrative machinery uniformly organized and centralized; and the army especially, hitherto patched together from the quotas raised and maintained by the various diets and provincial estates, was withdrawn from their interference. These reforms were practically confined to the central provinces of the monarchy; for in Hungary, as well as in the outlying territories of Lombardy and the Netherlands, it was recognized that the conservative temper of the peoples made any revolutionary change in the traditional system inadvisable.

Meanwhile, in foreign affairs, it had become clear that for Austria the enemy to be dreaded was no longer France, but Prussia, and Kaunitz prepared the way for a diplomatic revolution, which took effect when, on the 1st of May 1756, Austria and France concluded the first treaty of Versailles. The long rivalry between Bourbons and Habsburgs was thus ended, and France and Austria remained in alliance or at peace until the outbreak of the French Revolution. So far as Austria was concerned, the Seven Years' War in which France and Austria were ranged against Prussia and Great Britain, was an attempt on the part of Maria Theresa to recover Silesia. It failed; and the peace of Hubertsburg, signed on the 15th of February 1763, left Germany divided between Austria and Prussia, whose rivalry for the hegemony was to last until the victory of Königgrätz (1866) definitely decided the issue in favour of the Hohenzollern monarchy.

The loss of Silesia led Austria to look for "compensation" elsewhere. The most obvious direction in which this could be sought was in Bavaria, ruled by the decadent house of Wittelsbach, the secular rival of the house of Habsburg in southern Germany. The question of the annexation of Bavaria by conquest or exchange had occupied the minds of Austrian statesmen throughout the century: it would not only have removed a perpetual menace to the peace of Austria, but would have given to the Habsburg monarchy an overwhelming strength in South Germany. The matter came to an issue in 1777, on the death of the elector Maximilian III. The heir was the elector palatine Charles Theodore, but Joseph II., who had been elected emperor in 1765, in succession to his father, and appointed co-regent with his mother—claimed the inheritance, and prepared to assert his claims by force. The result was the so-called War of Bavarian Succession. As a matter of fact, however, though the armies under Frederick and Joseph were face to face in the field, the affair was settled without actual fighting; Maria Theresa, fearing the chances of another struggle with Prussia, overruled her son at the last moment, and by the treaty of Teschen agreed to be content with the cession of the Quarter of the Inn (Innviertel) and some other districts.

Meanwhile the ambition of Catherine of Russia, and the war with Turkey by which the empire of the tsars was advanced to the Black Sea and threatened to establish itself south of the Danube, were productive of consequences of enormous importance to Austria in the East. Russian control of the Danube was a far more serious menace to Austria than the neighbourhood of the decadent Ottoman power; and for a while the policy of Austria towards the Porte underwent a change that foreshadowed her attitude towards the Eastern Question in the 19th century. In spite of the reluctance of Maria Theresa, Kaunitz, in July 1771, concluded a defensive alliance with the Porte. He would have exchanged this for an active co-operation with Turkey, could Frederick the Great have been persuaded to promise at least neutrality in the event of a Russo-Austrian War. But Frederick was unwilling to break with Russia, with whom he was negotiating the partition of Poland; Austria in these circumstances dared not take the offensive; and Maria Theresa was compelled to purchase the modification of the extreme claims of Russia in Turkey by agreeing to, and sharing in, the spoliation of Poland. Her own share of the spoils were the acquisition, by the first treaty of partition (August 5, 1772), of Galicia and Lodomeria. Turkey was left in the lurch; and Austrian troops even occupied portions of Moldavia, in order to secure the communication between the new Polish provinces and Transylvania. At Constantinople, too, Austria once more supported Russian policy, and was rewarded, in 1777, by the acquisition of Bukovina from Turkey. In Italy the influence of the House of Austria had been strengthened by the marriage of the archduke Ferdinand with the heiress of the d'Estes of Modena, and the establishment of the archduke Leopold in the grand-duchy of Tuscany.

In internal affairs Maria Theresa may be regarded as the practical founder of the unified Austrian state. The new system of centralization has already been referred to. It only remains to add that, in carrying out this system, Maria Theresa was too wise to fall into the errors afterwards made by her son and successor. She was no doctrinaire, and consistently acted on the principle once laid down by Machiavelli, that while changing the substance, the prince should be careful to preserve the form of old institutions. Alongside the new bureaucracy, the old estates survived in somnolent inactivity, and even in Hungary, though the ancient constitution was left untouched, the diet was only summoned four times during the reign, and reforms were carried out, without protest, by royal ordinance. It was under Maria Theresa, too, that the attempt was first made to make German the official language of the whole monarchy; an attempt which was partly successful even in Hungary, especially so far as the army was concerned, though Latin remained the official tongue of the diet, the county-assemblies and the courts.

The social, religious and educational reforms of Maria Theresa also mark her reign as the true epoch of transition from medieval to modern conditions in Austria. In religious matters the empress, though a devout Catholic and herself devoted to the Holy See, was carried away by the prevailing reaction, in which her ministers shared, against the pretensions of the papacy. The anti-papal tendency, known as Febronianism, had made immense headway, not only among the laity but among the clergy in the Austrian dominions. By a new law, papal bulls could not be published without the consent of the crown, and the direct intercourse of the bishops with Rome was forbidden; the privileges of the religious orders were curtailed; and the education of the clergy was brought under state control. It was, however, only with reluctance that Maria Theresa agreed to carry out the papal bull suppressing the Society of Jesus; and, while declaring herself against persecution, she could never be persuaded to accept the views of Kaunitz and Joseph in favour of toleration. Parallel with the assertion of the rights of the state as against the church was the revolution effected in the educational system of the monarchy. This, too, was taken from the control of the church; the universities were remodelled and modernized by the introduction of new faculties, the study of ecclesiastical law being transferred from that of theology to that of jurisprudence, and the elaborate system of elementary and secondary education was established, which survived with slight modification till 1869.

The death of Maria Theresa in 1780 left Joseph II. free to attempt the drastic revolution from above, which had been restrained by the wise statesmanship of his mother. He was himself a strange incarnation at once of doctrinaire liberalism and the old Habsburg autocracy. Of the essential conditions of his empire he was constitutionally unable to form a conception. He was a disciple, not of Machiavelli, but of Rousseau; and his scattered dominions, divided by innumerable divergences of racial and class prejudice, and encumbered with traditional institutions to which the people clung with passionate conservatism, he regarded as so much vacant territory on which to build up his ideal state. He was, in fact, a Revolutionist who happened also to be an emperor. "Reason" and "enlightenment" were his watchwords; opposition to his wise measures he regarded as obscurantist and unreasonable, and unreason, if it proved stubborn, as a vice to be corrected with whips. In this spirit he at once set to work to reconstruct the state, on lines that strangely anticipated the principles of the Constituent Assembly of 1789. He refused to be crowned or to take the oath to the local constitutions, and divided the whole monarchy into thirteen departments, to be governed under a uniform system. In ecclesiastical matters his policy was also that of "reform from above," the complete subordination of the clergy to the state, and the severance of all effective ties with Rome. This treatment of the "Fakirs and Ulemas" (as he called them in his letters), who formed the most powerful element in the monarchy, would alone have ensured the failure of his plans, but failure was made certain by the introduction of the conscription, which turned even the peasants, whom he had done much to emancipate, against him. The threatened revolt of Hungary, and the actual revolt of Tirol and of the Netherlands together with the disasters of the war with Turkey, forced him, before he died, to the formal reversal of the whole policy of reform.

In his foreign policy Joseph II. had been scarcely less unhappy. In 1784 he had resumed his plan of acquiring Bavaria for Austria by negotiating with the elector Charles Theodore its exchange for the Netherlands, which were to be erected for his benefit into a "Kingdom of Burgundy." The elector was not unwilling, but the scheme was wrecked by the opposition of the heir to the Bavarian throne, the duke of Zweibrücken, in response to whose appeal Frederick the Great formed, on the 23rd of July 1785, a confederation of German princes (*Fürstenbund*) for the purpose of opposing the threatened preponderance of Austria. Prussia was thus for the first time formally recognized as the protector of the German states against Austrian ambition, and had at the same time become the centre of an anti-Austrian alliance, which embraced Sweden, Poland and the maritime powers. In these circumstances the war with Turkey, on which Joseph embarked, in alliance with Russia, in 1788, would hardly have been justified by the most brilliant success. The first campaign, however, which he conducted in person was a dismal failure; the Turks followed the Austrian army, disorganized by disease, across the Danube, and though the transference of the command to the veteran marshal Loudon somewhat retrieved the initial disasters, his successes were more than counterbalanced by the alliance, concluded on the 31st of January 1790, between Prussia and Turkey. Three weeks later, on the 20th of February 1790, Joseph died broken-hearted.

The situation needed all the statesmanship of the new ruler, Leopold II. This was less obvious in his domestic than in his foreign policy, though perhaps equally present. As grand-duke of Tuscany Leopold had won the reputation of an enlightened and liberal ruler; but meanwhile "Josephinism" had not been justified by its results, and the progress of the Revolution in France was beginning to scare even enlightened princes into reaction. Leopold, then, reverted to the traditional Habsburg methods; the old supremacy of the Church, regarded as the one effective bond of empire, was restored; and the *Einheitsstaat* was once more resolved into its elements, with the old machinery of diets and estates, and the old abuses. It was the beginning of that policy of "stability" associated later with Metternich, which was to last till the cataclysm of 1848. For the time, the policy was justified by its results. The spirit of revolutionary France had not yet touched the heart of the Habsburg empire, and national rivalries were expressed, not so much in expansive ambitions, as in a somnolent clinging to traditional privileges. Leopold, therefore, who made his début on the European stage as the executor of the ban of the Empire against the insurgent Liégeois, was free to pose as the champion of order against the Revolution, without needing to fear the resentment of his subjects. He played this rôle with consummate skill in the negotiations that led up to the treaty of Reichenbach (August 15, 1790), which ended the quarrel with Prussia and paved the way to the armistice of Giurgevo with Turkey (September 10). Leopold was now free to deal with the Low Countries, which were reduced to order before the end of the year. On the 4th of August 1791 was signed at Sistova the definitive peace with Turkey, which practically established the *status quo*.

On the 6th of October 1790 Leopold had been crowned Roman emperor at Frankfort, and it was as emperor, not as Habsburg, that he first found himself in direct antagonism to the France of the Revolution. The fact that Leopold's sister, Marie Antoinette, was the wife of Louis XVI. had done little to cement the Franco-Austrian alliance, which since 1763 had been practically non-existent; nor was it now the mainspring of his attitude towards revolutionary France. But by the decree of the 4th of August, which in the general abolition of feudal rights involved the possessions of many German princes *enclavés* in Alsace

and Lorraine, the Constituent Assembly had made the first move in the war against the established European system. Leopold protested as sovereign of Germany; and the protest was soon enlarged into one made in the name of Europe. The circular letter of Count Kaunitz, dated the 6th of July 1791, calling on the sovereigns to unite against the Revolution, was at once the beginning of the Concert of Europe, and in a sense the last manifesto of the Holy Roman Empire as "the centre of political unity." But the common policy proclaimed in the famous declaration of Pillnitz (August 27) was soon wrecked upon the particular interests of the powers. Both Austria and Prussia were much occupied with the Polish question, and to have plunged into a crusade against France would have been to have left Poland, where the new constitution had been proclaimed on the 3rd of May, to the mercy of Russia. Towards the further development of events in France, therefore, Leopold assumed at first a studiously moderate attitude; but his refusal to respond to the demand of the French government for the dispersal of the corps of *émigrés* assembled under the protection of the German princes on the frontier of France, and the insistence on the rights of princes dispossessed in Alsace and Lorraine, precipitated the crisis. On the 25th of January 1792 the French Assembly adopted the decree declaring that, in the event of no satisfactory reply having been received from the emperor by the 1st of March, war should be declared. On the 7th of February Austria and Prussia signed at Berlin an offensive and defensive treaty of alliance. Thus was ushered in the series of stupendous events which were to change the face of Europe and profoundly to affect the destinies of Austria. Leopold himself did not live to see the beginning of the struggle; he died on the 1st of March 1792, the day fixed by the Legislative Assembly as that on which the question on peace or war was to be decided.

The events of the period that followed, in which Austria necessarily played a conspicuous part, belong to the general history of Europe. Here it will only be necessary to mention those which form permanent landmarks in the progressive conformation of the Austrian monarchy. Such was the second partition of Poland (January 23, 1793), which eliminated the "buffer state" on which Austrian statesmanship had hitherto laid such importance, and brought the Austrian and Russian frontiers into contact. Such, too, was the treaty of Campo Formio (October 17, 1797) which ended the first revolutionary war. By this treaty the loss of the Belgian provinces was confirmed, and though Austria gained Venice, the establishment of French preponderance in the rest of Italy made a breach in the tradition of Habsburg supremacy in the peninsula, which was to have its full effect only in the struggles of the next century. The rise of Napoleon, and his masterful interference in Germany, produced a complete and permanent revolution in the relations of Austria to the German states. The campaigns which issued in the treaty of Lunéville (February 9, 1801) practically sealed the fate of the old Empire. Even were the venerable name to survive, it was felt that it would pass, by the election of the princes now tributary to France, from the house of Habsburg to that of Bonaparte. Francis II. determined to forestall the possible indignity of the subordination of his family to an upstart dynasty. On the 14th of May 1804 Napoleon was proclaimed emperor of the French; on the 11th of August Francis II. assumed the style of Francis I., hereditary emperor of Austria. Two years later, when the defeat of Austerlitz had led to the treaty of Pressburg (January 1, 1806), by which Austria lost Venice and Tirol, and Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine had broken the unity of Germany, Francis formally abdicated the title and functions of Holy Roman emperor (August 6, 1806).

CHAPTER III

THE TREATY OF VIENNA

AUSTRIA had to undergo further losses and humiliations, notably by the treaty of Vienna (1809), before the outcome of Napoleon's Russian campaign in 1812 gave her the opportunity for recuperation and revenge. The skilful diplomacy of Metternich, who was now at the head of the Austrian government, enabled Austria to take full advantage of the situation created by the disaster to Napoleon's arms. His object was to recover Austria's lost possessions and if possible to add to them, a policy which did not necessarily involve the complete overthrow of the French emperor. Austria, therefore, refused to join the alliance between Russia and Prussia signed on the 17th of March 1813, but pressed on her armaments so as to be ready in any event. Her opportunity came after the defeats of the Allies at Lützen and Bautzen and the conclusion of an armistice at Pleswitz. Between 200,000 and 300,000 Austrian troops were massed in Bohemia; and Austria took up the role of mediator, prepared to throw the weight of her support into the scale of whichever side should prove most amenable to her claims. The news of the battle of Vittoria, following on the reluctance of Napoleon to listen to demands involving the overthrow of the whole of his political system in central Europe, decided Austria in favour of the Allies. By this fateful decision Napoleon's fall was assured. By the treaty of Trachenberg (July 12, 1813) the Grand Alliance was completed; on the 16th, 17th and 18th of October the battle of Leipzig was fought; and the victorious advance into France was begun, which issued, on the 11th of April 1814, in Napoleon's abdication.

It was a recognition of the decisive part played by Austria in these great events that Vienna was chosen as the scene of the great international congress summoned (September 1814) for the purpose of re-establishing the balance of power in Europe, which Napoleon's conquests had upset. The result for Austria was a triumphant vindication of Metternich's diplomacy. He had, it is true, been unable to prevent the retention of the grand-duchy of Warsaw by Alexander of Russia; but with the aid of Great Britain and France (secret treaty of January 3, 1815) he had frustrated the efforts of Prussia to absorb the whole of Saxony, Bavaria was forced to disgorge the territories gained for her by Napoleon at Austria's expense, Illyria and Dalmatia were regained, and Lombardy was added to Venetia to constitute a kingdom under the Habsburg crown; while in the whole Italian peninsula French was replaced by Austrian influence. In Germany the settlement was even more fateful for Austria's future. The Holy Empire, in spite of the protests of the Holy See, was not restored, Austria preferring the loose confederation of sovereign states (*Staatenbund*) actually constituted under her presidency. Such a body, Metternich held, "powerful for defence, powerless for offence," would form a guarantee of the peace of central Europe—and of the preponderance of Austria; and in its councils Austrian diplomacy, backed by the weight of the Habsburg power beyond the borders of Germany, would exercise a greater influence than any possible prestige derived from a venerable title that had become a by-word for the union of unlimited pretensions with practical impotence. Moreover, to the refusal to revive the Empire—which shattered so many patriotic hopes in Germany—Austria added another decision yet more fateful. By relinquishing her claim to the Belgian provinces and other outlying territories in western Germany, and by acquiescing in the establishment of Prussia in the Rhine provinces, she abdicated to Prussia her position as the bulwark of Germany against France, and

hastened the process of her own gravitation towards the Slavonic East to which the final impetus was given in 1866.

In order to understand the foreign policy of Austria, inseparably associated with the name of Metternich, during the period from the close of the congress of Vienna to the outbreak of the revolutions of 1848, it is necessary to know something of the internal conditions of the monarchy before and during this time. In 1792 Leopold II. had been succeeded by his son Francis II. His popular designation of "our good Kaiser Franz" this monarch owed to a certain simplicity of address and *bonhomie* which pleased the Viennese, certainly not to his serious qualities as a ruler. He shared to the full the autocratic temper of the Habsburgs, their narrow-mindedness and their religious and intellectual obscurantism; and the qualities which would have made him a kindly, if somewhat tyrannical, father of a family, and an excellent head clerk, were hardly those required by the conditions of the Austrian monarchy during a singularly critical period of its history.

The personal character of the emperor; moreover, gained a special importance owing to the modifications that were made in the administrative system of the empire. This had been originally organized in a series of departments: Aulic chanceries for Austria, for Hungary and Transylvania, a general Aulic chamber for finance, domains, mines, trade, post, &c., an Aulic council of war, a general directory of accounts, and a chancery of the household, court and state. The heads of all these departments had the rank of secretaries of state and met in council under the royal presidency. In course of time, however, this body became too unwieldy for an effective cabinet, and Maria Theresa established the council of state. During the early years of the reign of Francis, the emperor kept himself in touch with the various departments by means of a cabinet minister; but he had a passion for detail, and after 1805 he himself undertook the function of keeping the administration together. At the same time he had no personal contact with ministers, who might communicate with him only in writing, and for months together never met for the discussion of business. The council of state was, moreover, itself soon enlarged and subdivided; and in course of time the emperor alone represented any synthesis of the various departments of the administration. The jurisdiction of the heads of departments, moreover, was strictly defined, and all that lay outside this was reserved for the imperial decision. Whatever was covered by established precedent could be settled by the department at once; but matters falling outside such precedent, however insignificant, had to be referred to the throne.¹ A system so inelastic, and so deadening to all initiative, could have but one result. Gradually the officials, high and low, subjected to an elaborate system of checks, refused to take any responsibility whatever; and the minutest administrative questions were handed up, through all the stages of the bureaucratic hierarchy, to be shelved and forgotten in the imperial cabinet. For Francis could not possibly himself deal with all the questions of detail arising in his vast empire, even had he desired to do so. In fact, his attitude towards all troublesome problems was summed up in his favourite phrase, "Let us sleep upon it": questions unanswered would answer themselves.

The result was the gradual atrophy of the whole administrative machine. The Austrian government was not consciously tyrannical, even in Italy; and Francis himself, though determined to be absolute, intended also to be paternal. Nor would the cruelties inflicted on the bolder spirits who dared to preach reform, which made the Austrian government a by-word among the nations, alone have excited the passionate spirit of revolt which carried all before it in 1848. The cause of this is to be sought rather in the daily friction of a system which had ceased to be efficient and only succeeded in irritating the public opinion it was powerless to curb.

Metternich himself was fully conscious of the evil. He recognized that the fault of the government lay in the fact that it did not govern, and he deplored that his own function, in a decadent age, was but "to prop up mouldering institutions." He was not constitutionally averse from change; and he was too clear-sighted not to see that, sooner or later, change was inevitable. But his interest was in the fascinating game of diplomacy; he was ambitious of playing the leading part on the great stage of international politics; and he was too consummate a courtier to risk the loss of the imperial favour by any insistence on unpalatable reforms, which, after all, would perhaps only reveal the necessity for the complete revolution which he feared.

The alternative was to use the whole force of the government to keep things as they were. The disintegrating force of the ever-simmering racial rivalries could be kept in check by the army: Hungarian regiments garrisoned Italy, Italian regiments guarded Galicia, Poles occupied Austria, and Austrians Hungary. The peril from the infiltration of "revolutionary" ideas from without was met by the erection round the Austrian dominions of a Chinese wall of tariffs and censors, which had, however, no more success than is usual with such expedients.² The peril from the independent growth of Liberalism within was

¹ Thus, while the number of recruits, though varying from year to year, could be settled by the war department, the question of the claim of a single conscript for exemption, on grounds not recognized by precedent, could only be settled by imperial decree.

² Forbidden books were the only ones read, and forbidden newspapers the only ones believed.

guarded against by a rigid supervision of the press and the re-establishment of clerical control over education. Music alone flourished, free from government interference; but, curiously enough, the movements, in Bohemia, Croatia and elsewhere, for the revival of the national literatures and languages—which were to issue in the most difficult problem facing the Austrian government at the opening of the 20th century—were encouraged in exalted circles, as tending to divert attention from political to purely scientific interests. Meanwhile the old system of provincial diets and estates was continued or revived (in 1816 in Tirol and Vorarlberg, 1817 in Galicia, 1818 in Carniola, 1828 in the circle of Salzburg), but they were in no sense representative, clergy and nobles alone being eligible, with a few delegates from the towns, and they had practically no functions beyond registering the imperial decrees, relative to recruiting or taxation, and dealing with matters of local police.¹ Even the ancient right of petition was seldom exercised, and then only to meet with the imperial disfavour. And this stagnation of the administration was accompanied, as might have been expected, by economic stagnation. Agriculture languished, hampered, as in France before the Revolution, by the feudal privileges of a noble caste which no longer gave any equivalent service to the state; trade was strangled by the system of high tariffs at the frontier and internal *octrois*; and finally public credit was shaken to its foundations by lavish issues of paper money and the neglect to publish the budget.

The maintenance within the empire of a system so artificial and so unsound, involved in foreign affairs the policy of preventing the success of any movements by which it might be threatened. The triumph of Liberal principles or of national aspirations in Germany, or elsewhere in Europe, might easily, as the events of 1848 proved, shatter the whole rotten structure of the Habsburg monarchy, which survived only owing to the apathy of the populations it oppressed. This, then, is the explanation of the system of "stability" which Metternich succeeded in imposing for thirty years upon Europe. If he persuaded Frederick William III. that the grant of a popular constitution would be fatal to the Prussian monarchy, this was through no love of Prussia; the Carlsbad Decrees and the Vienna Final Act were designed to keep Germany quiet, lest the sleep of Austria should be disturbed; the lofty claims of the Troppau Protocol were but to cover an Austrian aggression directed to purely Austrian ends; and in the Eastern Question, the moral support given to the "legitimate" authority of the sultan over the "rebel" Greeks was dictated solely by the interest of Austria in maintaining the integrity of Turkey.

Judged by the standard of its own aims Metternich's diplomacy was, on the whole, completely successful. For fifteen years after the congress of Vienna, in spite of frequent alarms, the peace of Europe was not seriously disturbed; and even in 1830, the revolution at Paris found no echo in the great body of the Austrian dominions. The isolated revolts in Italy were easily suppressed; and the insurrection of Poland, though it provoked the lively sympathy of the Magyars and Czechs, led to no actual movement in the Habsburg states. For a moment, indeed, Metternich had meditated taking advantage of the popular feeling to throw the weight of Austria into the scale in favour of the Poles, and thus, by re-establishing a Polish kingdom under Austrian influence, to restore the barrier between the two empires which the partition of Poland had destroyed. But cautious counsels prevailed, and by the victory of the Russian arms the *status quo* was restored.

The years that followed were not wanting in signs of the coming storm. On the 2nd of March 1835 Francis I. died, and was succeeded by his son Ferdinand I. The new emperor was personally amiable, but so enfeebled by epilepsy as to be incapable of ruling; a veiled regency had to be constituted to carry on the government, and the vices of the administration were further accentuated by weakness and divided counsels at the centre. Under these circumstances popular discontent made rapid headway. The earliest symptoms of political agitation were in Hungary, where the diet began to show signs of vigorous life, and the growing Slav separatist movements, especially in the south of the kingdom, were rousing the old spirit of Magyar ascendancy. For everywhere the Slav populations were growing restive under the German-Magyar domination. In Bohemia the Czech literary movement had developed into an organized resistance to the established order, which was attacked under the disguise of a criticism of the English administration in Ireland. "Repeal" became the watchword of Bohemian, as of Irish, nationalists. Among the southern Slavs the "Illyrian" movement, voiced from 1836 onward in the *Illyrian National Gazette* of Ljudevit Gaj, was directed in the first instance to a somewhat shadowy Pan-Slav union, which, on the interference of the Austrian government in 1844, was exchanged for the more definite object of a revival of "the Triune Kingdom" (Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia) independent of the Hungarian crown. In the German provinces also, in spite of Metternich's censors and police, the national movements in Germany had gained an entrance, and, as the revolution of 1848 in Vienna was to show, the most advanced revolutionary views were making headway.

The most important of all the symptoms of the approaching cataclysm was, however, the growing unrest among the peasants. As had been proved in France in 1789, and was again to be shown in Russia in 1906, the success of any political revolution depended

¹ In Hungary the diet was not summoned at all between 1811 and 1825, nor in Transylvania between 1811 and 1834.



VIENNA
OCCUPIED
BY
NAPOLEON,
1805.



The seated figure of Vienna mourns beside the arms of Austria. The striking portrait of Napoleon bears the titles, "Germanicus," "Ruthenicus" (Russian) in honour of his victory over the combined Austro-Russian forces in this campaign.

PRINCE METTERNICH, the greatest of Austrian statesmen, born 1773, died 1859. To his commanding position in European diplomacy is due the policy of stability which, after



the terrible convulsions of the Napoleonic wars, was so necessary for the peace of Europe and the re-establishment of the prosperity of Austria.

METTERNICH.



AUSTRIA
BECOMES
AN
EMPIRE,
1804.



Francis II., Archduke of Austria, seeing his title of Holy Roman Emperor reduced to an empty name, created himself Emperor of Austria to preserve the imperial title in his family, which had held it for 500 years.

TO THE
APPROPRIATE

ultimately upon the attitude of the peasant class. In this lies the main significance of the rising in Galicia in 1846. This was in its origin a Polish nationalist movement, hatched in the little independent republic of Cracow. As such it had little importance; though, owing to the incompetence of the Austrian commander, the Poles gained some initial successes. More fateful was the attitude of the Orthodox Ruthenian peasantry, who were divided from their Catholic Polish over-lords by centuries of religious and feudal oppression. The Poles had sought, by lavish promises, to draw them into their ranks; their reply was to rise in support of the Austrian government. In the fight at Gdow (February 26th), where Benedek laid the foundations of the military reputation that was to end so tragically at Königgrätz, flail and scythe wrought more havoc in the rebel ranks than the Austrian musketry. Since, in spite of this object-lesson, the Polish nobles still continued their offers, the peasants consulted the local Austrian authorities as to what course they should take; and the local authorities, unaccustomed to arriving at any decision without consulting Vienna, practically gave them *carte blanche* to do as they liked. A hideous *jacquerie* followed for three or four days; during which cartloads of dead were carried into Tarnow, where the peasants received a reward for every "rebel" brought in.

This affair was not only a scandal for which the Austrian government, through its agents, was responsible; but it placed the authorities at Vienna in a serious dilemma. For the Ruthenians, elated by their victory, refused to return to work, and demanded the abolition of all feudal obligations as the reward of their loyalty. To refuse this claim would have meant the indefinite prolongation of the crisis; to concede it would have been to invite the peasantry of the whole empire to put forth similar demands on pain of a general rising. On the 13th of April 1846 an imperial decree abolished some of the more burdensome feudal obligations; but this concession was greeted with so fierce an outcry, as an authoritative endorsement of the atrocities, that it was again revoked, and Count Franz von Stadion was sent to restore order in Galicia. The result was, that the peasants saw that though their wrongs were admitted, their sole hope of redress lay in a change of government, and added the dead weight of their resentment to the forces making for revolution. It was the union of the agrarian with the nationalist movements that made the downfall of the Austrian system inevitable.

The material for the conflagration in Austria was thus all prepared when in February 1848 the fall of Louis Philippe fanned into a blaze the smouldering fires of revolution throughout Europe. On the 3rd of March, Kossuth, in the diet at Pressburg, delivered the famous speech which was the declaration of war of Hungarian Liberalism against the Austrian system. "From the charnel-house of the Vienna cabinet," he exclaimed, "a pestilential air breathes on us, which dulls our nerves and paralyses the flight of our spirit." Hungary liberated was to become the centre of freedom for all the races under the Austrian crown, and the outcome was to be a new "fraternization of the Austrian peoples." In the enthusiasm of the moment the crucial question of the position to be occupied by the conflicting nationalities in this "fraternal union" was overlooked. Germanism had so far served as the basis of the Austrian system, not as a national ideal, but because "it formed a sort of unnational mediating, and common element among the contradictory and clamorous racial tendencies." But with the growth of the idea of German unity, Germanism had established a new ideal, of which the centre lay beyond the boundaries of the Austrian monarchy, and which was bound to be antagonistic to the aspirations of other races. The new doctrine of the fraternization of the Austrian races would inevitably soon come into conflict with the traditional German ascendancy strengthened by the new sentiment of a united Germany. It was on this rock that, both in Austria and in Germany, the revolution suffered shipwreck.

Meanwhile events progressed rapidly. On the 11th of March a meeting of "young Czechs" at Prague drew up a petition embodying nationalist and liberal demands; and on the same day the diet of Lower Austria petitioned the crown to summon a meeting of the delegates of the diets to set the Austrian finances in order. To this last proposal the government, next day, gave its consent. But in the actual temper of the Viennese the slightest concession was dangerous. The hall of the diet was invaded by a mob of students and workmen, Kossuth's speech was read and its proposals adopted as the popular programme, and the members of the diet were forced to lead a tumultuous procession to the Hofburg, to force the assent of the government to a petition based on the catch-words of the Revolution. The authorities, taken by surprise, were forced to temporize and agreed to lay the petition before the emperor. Meanwhile round the hall of the diet a riot had broken out; the soldiers intervened and blood was shed. The middle classes now joined the rebels; and the riots had become a revolution. Threatened by the violence of the mob, Metternich, on the evening of the 13th of March, escaped from the Hofburg and passed into exile in England.

CHAPTER IV

THE REVOLUTION OF 1848

THE fall of Metternich was the signal for the outburst of the storm, not in Austria only, but throughout central Europe. In Hungary, on the 31st of March, the government was forced to consent to a new constitution which virtually erected Hungary into an independent state. On the 8th of April a separate constitution was promised to Bohemia; and if the petition of the Croats for a similar concession was rejected, this was due to the armed mob of Vienna, which was in close alliance with Kossuth and the Magyars. The impotence of the Austrian government in this crisis was due to the necessity of keeping the bulk of the Austrian forces in Italy, where the news of Metternich's fall had also led to a concerted rising against the Habsburg rule. Upon the fortunes of war in the peninsula depended the ultimate issue of the revolutions so far as Austria was concerned.

The army and the prestige of the imperial tradition were, in fact, the two sheet-anchors that enabled the Habsburg monarchy to weather the storm. For the time the latter was the only one available; but it proved invaluable, especially in Germany, in preventing any settlement, until Radetzky's victory of Novara had set free the army, and thus once more enabled Austria to back her policy by force. The Austrian government, in no position to refuse, had consented to send delegates from its German provinces to the parliament of united Germany, which met at Frankfort on the 18th of May 1848. The question at once arose of the place of the Austrian monarchy in united Germany. Were only its German provinces to be included? Or was it to be incorporated whole? As to the first, the Austrian government would not listen to the suggestion of a settlement which would have split the monarchy in half and subjected it to a double allegiance. As to the second, German patriots could not stomach the inclusion in Germany of a vast non-German population. The dilemma was from the first so obvious that the parliament would have done well to have recognized at once that the only possible solution was that arrived at, after the withdrawal of the Austrian delegates, by the exclusion of Austria altogether and the offer of the crown of Germany to Frederick William of Prussia. But the shadow of the Holy Empire, immemorally associated with the house of Habsburg, still darkened the counsels of German statesmen. The Austrian archduke John had been appointed regent, pending the election of an emperor; and the political leaders could neither break loose from the tradition of Austrian hegemony, nor reconcile themselves with the idea of a mutilated Germany, till it was too late, and Austria was once more in a position to re-establish the system devised by her diplomacy at the congress of Vienna.

This fatal procrastination was perhaps not without excuse, in view of the critical situation of the Austrian monarchy during 1848. For months after the fall of Metternich Austria was practically without a central government. Vienna itself, where on the 14th of March the establishment of a National Guard was authorized by the emperor, was ruled by a committee of students and citizens, who arrogated to themselves a voice in imperial affairs, and imposed their will on the distracted ministry. On the 15th of March the government proposed to summon a central committee of local diets; but this was far from satisfying public opinion, and on the 25th of April a constitution was proclaimed, including the whole monarchy with the exception of Hungary and Lombardo-Venetia. This was, however, met by vigorous protests from Czechs and Poles, while its provisions for a partly nominated senate, and the indirect

election of deputies, excited the wrath of radical Vienna. Committees of students and national guards were formed; on the 13th of May a Central Committee was established; and on the 15th a fresh insurrection broke out, as a result of which the government once more yielded, recognizing the Central Committee, admitting the right of the National Guard to take an active part in politics, and promising the convocation of a National Convention on the basis of a single chamber elected by universal suffrage. On the 17th the emperor left Vienna for Innsbruck "for the benefit of his health," and thence, on the 20th, issued a proclamation in which he cast himself on the loyalty of his faithful provinces, and, while confirming the concessions of March, ignored those of the 15th of May. The flight of the emperor had led to a revulsion of feeling in Vienna; but the issue of the proclamation, and the attempt of the government to disperse the students by closing the university, led to a fresh outbreak on the 26th. Once more the ministry conceded all the demands of the insurgents, and even went so far as to hand over the public treasury and the responsibility of keeping order to a newly constituted Committee of Public Safety.

The tide was now, however, on the turn. The Jacobinism of the Vienna democracy was not really representative of any widespread opinion even in the German parts of Austria, while its loud-voiced Germanism excited the lively opposition of the other races. Each of these had taken advantage of the March troubles to press its claims, and everywhere the government had shown the same yielding spirit. In Bohemia, where the attempt to hold elections for the Frankfort parliament had broken down on the opposition of the Czechs and the conservative German aristocracy, a separate constitution had been proclaimed on the 8th of April; on March the 23rd the election by the diet of Agram of Baron Joseph Jellachich as ban of Croatia was confirmed, as a concession to the agitation among the southern Slavs; on the 18th of March Count Stadion had proclaimed a new constitution for Galicia. Even where, as in the case of the Serbs and Rumanians, the government had given no formal sanction to the national claims, the emperor was regarded as the ultimate guarantee of their success; and deputations from the various provinces poured into Innsbruck protesting their loyalty.

To say that the government deliberately adopted the Machiavellian policy of mastering the revolution by setting race against race would be to pay too high a compliment to its capacity. The policy was forced upon it; and was only pursued consciously when it became obvious. Count Stadion began it in Galicia, where, before bombarding insurgent Cracow into submission (April 26), he had won over the Ruthenian peasants by the abolition of feudal dues and by forwarding a petition to the emperor for the official recognition of their language alongside Polish. But the great object-lesson was furnished by the events in Prague, where the quarrel between Czechs and Germans, radicals and conservatives, issued on the 12th of June in a rising of the Czech students and populace. The suppression of this rising, and with it of the revolution in Bohemia, on the 16th of June, by Prince Windischgrätz, was not only the first victory of the army, but was the signal for the outbreak of a universal race war, in which the idea of constitutional liberty was sacrificed to the bitter spirit of national rivalry. The parliament at Frankfort hailed Windischgrätz as a national hero, and offered to send troops to his aid; the German revolutionists in Vienna welcomed every success of Radetzky's arms in Italy as a victory for Germanism. The natural result was to drive the Slav nationalities to the side of the imperial government, since, whether at Vienna or at Budapest, the radicals were their worst enemies.

The 16th of June had been fatal to the idea of an independent Bohemia, fatal also to Pan-Slav dreams. To the Czechs the most immediate peril now seemed that from the German parliament, and in the interests of their nationality they were willing to join the Austrian government in the struggle against German liberalism. The Bohemian diet, summoned for the 19th, never met. Writs were issued in Bohemia for the election to the Austrian Reichsrath; and when, on the 10th of July, this assembled, the Slav deputies were found to be in a majority. This fact, which was to lead to violent trouble later, was at first subordinate to other issues, of which the most important was the question of the emancipation of the peasants. After long debates the law abolishing feudal services—the sole permanent outcome of the revolution—was carried on the 31st of August, and on the 7th of September received the imperial consent. The peasants thus received all that they desired, and their vast weight was henceforth thrown into the scale of the government against the revolution.

Meanwhile the alliance between the Slav nationalities and the conservative elements within the empire had found a powerful representative in Jellachich, the ban of Croatia. At first, indeed, his activity had been looked at askance at Innsbruck, as but another force making for disintegration. He had apparently identified himself with the "Illyrian" party, had broken off all communications with the Hungarian government, and, in spite of an imperial edict issued in response to the urgency of Batthyáni, had summoned a diet at Agram, which on the 9th of June decreed the separation of the "Triune Kingdom" from Hungary. The imperial government, which still hoped for Magyar aid against the Viennese revolutionists, repudiated the action of the ban, accused him of disobedience and treason, and deprived him of his military rank. But his true motives were soon apparent; his object was to play off the nationalism of the "Illyrians" against the radicalism of Magyars and Germans, and thus to preserve his province for the monarchy; and the Hungarian radicals

played into his hands. The fate of the Habsburg empire depended upon the issue of the campaign in Italy, which would have been lost by the withdrawal of the Magyar and Croatian regiments; and the Hungarian government chose this critical moment to tamper with the relations of the army to the monarchy. In May a National Guard had been established; and the soldiers of the line were invited to join this, with the promise of higher pay; on the 1st of June the garrison of Pest took the oath to the Constitution. On the 10th Jellachich issued a proclamation to the Croatian regiments in Italy, bidding them remain and fight for the emperor and the common Fatherland. His loyalty to the tradition of the imperial army was thus announced, and the alliance was cemented between the army and the southern Slavs.

Jellachich, who had gone to Innsbruck to lay the Slav view before the emperor, was allowed to return to Agram, though not as yet formally reinstated. Here the diet passed a resolution denouncing the dual system and demanding the restoration of the union of the empire. Thus was proclaimed the identity of the Slav and the conservative points of view; the radical "Illyrian" assembly had done its work, and on the 9th of July Jellachich, while declaring it "permanent," prorogued it indefinitely "with a paternal greeting," on the ground that the safety of the Fatherland depended now "more upon physical than upon moral force." The diet thus prorogued never met again. Absolute master of the forces of the banat, Jellachich now waited until the intractable politicians of Pest should give him the occasion and the excuse for setting the imperial army in motion against them.

The occasion was not to be long postponed. Every day the rift between the dominant radical element in the Hungarian parliament and imperial court was widened. Kossuth and his followers were evidently aiming at the complete separation of Hungary from Austria; they were in sympathy, if not in alliance, with the German radicals in Vienna and Frankfurt; they were less than half-hearted in their support of the imperial arms in Italy. The imperial government, pressed by the Magyar nationalists to renounce Jellachich and all his works, equivocated and procrastinated, while within its councils the idea of a centralized state, to replace the loose federalism of the old empire, slowly took shape under the pressure of the military party. It was encouraged by the news from Italy, where, on the 25th of July, Radetzky had won the battle of Custoza, and on the 6th of August the Austrian standard once more floated over the towers of Milan. At Custoza Magyar hussars, Croats from the Military Frontier, and Tirolese sharpshooters had fought side by side. The possibility was obvious of combating the radical and nationalist revolution by means of the army, with its spirit of comradeship in arms and its imperialist tradition.

So early as the beginning of July, Austrian officers, with the permission of the minister of war, had joined the Serb insurgents who, under Stratemirowić, were defying the Magyar power in the banat. By the end of August the breach between the Austrian and Hungarian governments was open and complete; on the 4th of September Jellachich was reinstated in all his honours, and on the 11th he crossed the Drave to the invasion of Hungary. The die was thus cast; and, though efforts continued to be made to arrange matters, the time for moderate councils was passed. The conservative leaders of the Hungarian nationalists, Eötvös and Deák, retired from public life; and, though Batthyáni consented to remain in office, the slender hope that this gave of peace was ruined by the flight of the palatine (September 24) and the murder of Count Lamberg, the newly appointed commissioner and commander-in-chief in Hungary, by the mob at Pest (September 27). The appeal was now to arms; and the fortunes of the Habsburg monarchy were bound up with the fate of the war in Hungary.

Meanwhile, renewed trouble had broken out in Vienna, where the radical populace was in conflict alike with the government and with the Slav majority of the Reichsrath. The German democrats appealed for aid to the Hungarian government; but the Magyar passion for constitutional legality led to delay, and before the Hungarian advance could be made effective, it was too late. On the 7th of October the emperor Ferdinand had fled from Schönbrunn to Olmütz, a Slav district, whence he issued a proclamation inviting whoever loved "Austria and freedom" to rally round the throne. On the 11th Windischgrätz proclaimed his intention of marching against rebellious Vienna, and on the 16th an imperial rescript appointed him a field-marshal and commander-in-chief of all the Austrian armies except that of Italy. Meanwhile, of the Reichsrath, the members of the Right and the Slav majority had left Vienna and announced a meeting of the diet at Brünn for the 20th of October; all that remained in the capital was a rump of German radicals, impotent in the hands of the proletariat and the students. The defence of the city was hastily organized under Bem, an ex-officer of Napoleon; but in the absence of help from Hungary it was futile. On the 28th of October Windischgrätz began his attack; on the 1st of November he was master of the city.

The fall of revolutionary Vienna practically involved that of the revolution in Frankfurt and in Pest. From Italy the congratulations of Radetzky's victorious army came to Windischgrätz, from Russia the even more significant commendations of the emperor Nicholas. The moral of the victory was painted for all the world by the military execution of Robert Blum, whose person, as a deputy of the German parliament, should have been sacrosanct. The time had, indeed, not yet come to attempt any conspicuous breach with the

constitutional principle ; but the new ministry was such as the imperial sentiment would approve, inimical to the German ideals of Frankfort, devoted to the traditions of the Habsburg monarchy. At its head was Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, the " army-diplomat," a statesman at once strong and unscrupulous. On the 27th of November a proclamation announced that the continuation of Austria as a united state was necessary both for Germany and for Europe. On the 2nd of December the emperor Ferdinand, bound by too many personal obligations to the revolutionary parties to serve as a useful instrument for the new policy, abdicated, and his nephew Francis Joseph ascended the throne. The proclamation of the new emperor was a gage of defiance thrown down to Magyars and German unionists alike ; " Firmly determined to preserve undimmed the lustre of our crown," it ran, " but prepared to share our rights with the representatives of our peoples, we trust that with God's aid and in common with our peoples we shall succeed in uniting all the countries and races of the monarchy in one great body politic."

While the Reichsrath, transferred to Kremsier, was discussing " fundamental rights " and the difficult question of how to reconcile the theoretical unity with the actual dualism of the empire, the knot was being cut by the sword on the plains of Hungary. The Hungarian retreat after the bloody battle of Kapolna (February 26-27, 1849) was followed by the dissolution of the Kremsier assembly, and a proclamation in which the emperor announced his intention of granting a constitution to the whole monarchy " one and indivisible." On the 4th of March the constitution was published ; but it proved all but as distasteful to Czechs and Croats as to the Magyars, and the speedy successes of the Hungarian arms made it, for the while, a dead letter. It needed the intervention of the emperor Nicholas, in the loftiest spirit of the Holy Alliance, before even an experimental unity of the Habsburg dominions could be established.

The capitulation of Világos, which ended the Hungarian insurrection, gave Schwarzenberg a free hand for completing the work of restoring the *status quo ante* and the influence of Austria in Germany. The account of the process by which this was accomplished belongs to the history of Germany. Here it will suffice to say that the terms of the Convention of Olmütz (November 29, 1850) seemed at the time a complete triumph for Austria over Prussia. As a matter of fact, however, the convention was, in the words of Count Beust, " not a Prussian humiliation, but an Austrian weakness." It was in the power of Austria to crush Prussia and to put an end to the dual influence in the Confederation which experience had proved to be unworkable ; she preferred to re-establish a discredited system, and to leave to Prussia time and opportunity to gather strength for the inevitable conflict.

In 1851 Austria had apparently triumphed over all its difficulties. The revolutionary movements had been suppressed, the attempt of Prussia to assume the leadership in Germany defeated, the old Federal Diet of 1815 had been restored. Vienna again became the centre of a despotic government the objects of which were to Germanize the Magyars and Slavs, to check all agitation for a constitution, and to suppress all attempts to secure a free press. For some ten years the Austrian dominion groaned under one of the worst possible forms of autocratic government. The failure of the Habsburg emperor to perpetuate this despotic régime was due (1) to the Crimean War, (2) to the establishment of Italian unity, and (3) to the successful assertion by Prussia of its claim to the leadership in Germany. The disputes which resulted in the Crimean War revealed the fact that " gratitude " plays but a small part in international affairs. In the minds of Austrian statesmen the question of the free navigation of the Danube, which would have been imperilled by a Russian occupation of the Principalities, outweighed their sense of obligation to Russia, on which the emperor Nicholas had rashly relied. That Austria at first took no active part in the war was due, not to any sentimental weakness, but to the refusal of Prussia to go along with her and to the fear of a Sardinian attack on her Italian provinces. But, on the withdrawal of the Russian forces from the Principalities, these were occupied by Austrian troops, and on the 2nd of December 1854 a treaty of alliance was signed at Vienna between Great Britain, Austria and France, by which Austria undertook to occupy Moldavia and Walachia during the continuance of the war and " to defend the frontier of the said principalities against any return of the Russian forces." By Article III., in the event of war between Russia and Austria the alliance both offensive and defensive was to be made effective (Hertslet, No. 252). With the progressive disasters of the Russian arms, however, Austria grew bolder, and it was the ultimatum delivered by her to the emperor Alexander II. in December 1855, that forced Russia to come to terms (Treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856).

Though, however, Austria by her diplomatic attitude had secured, without striking a blow, the settlement in her sense of the Eastern Question, she emerged from the contest without allies and without friends. The " Holy Alliance " of the three autocratic northern powers, recemented at Münchengrätz in 1833, which had gained for Austria the decisive intervention of the tsar in 1849, had been hopelessly shattered by her attitude during the Crimean War. Russia, justly offended, drew closer her ties with Prussia, where Bismarck was already hatching the plans which were to mature in 1866 ; and, if the attitude of Napoleon in the Polish question prevented any revival of the alliance of Tilsit, the goodwill of Russia was assured for France in the coming struggle with Austria in Italy. Already the isolation of Austria had been conspicuous in the congress of Paris, where Cavour, the

Sardinian plenipotentiary, laid bare before assembled Europe the scandal of her rule in Italy. It was emphasized during the campaign of 1859, when Sardinia, in alliance with France, laid the foundations of united Italy. The threat of Prussian intervention, which determined the provisions of the armistice of Villafranca, was due, not to love of Austria, but to fear of the undue aggrandizement of France. The results to Austria were twofold. Externally, she lost all her Italian possessions except Venice; internally, her failure led to the necessity of conciliating public opinion by constitutional concessions.

The proclamation on the 26th of February 1861 of the new constitution for the whole monarchy, elaborated by Anton von Schmerling, though far from satisfying the national aspirations of the races within the empire, at least gave Austria a temporary popularity in Germany; the liberalism of the Habsburg monarchy was favourably contrasted with the "reactionary" policy of Prussia, where Bismarck was defying the majority of the diet in his determination to build up the military power of Prussia. The meeting of the princes summoned to Frankfort by the emperor Francis Joseph, in 1863, revealed the ascendancy of Austria among the smaller states of the Confederation; but it revealed also the impossibility of any consolidation of the Confederation without the co-operation of Prussia, which stood outside. Bismarck had long since decided that the matter could only be settled by the exclusion of Austria altogether, and that the means to this end were not discussion, but "Blood and Iron." The issue was forced by the developments of the tangled Schleswig-Holstein Question, which led to the definitive breach between the two great German powers, to the campaign of 1866, and the collapse of Austria on the field of Königgrätz, July 3.

CHAPTER V

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DUAL MONARCHY

THE war of 1866 began a new era in the history of the Austrian empire. By the treaty of Prague (August 23, 1866) the emperor surrendered the position in Germany which his ancestors had held for so many centuries; Austria and Tirol, Bohemia and Salzburg, ceased to be German, and eight million Germans were cut off from all political union with their fellow-countrymen. At the same time the surrender of Venetia completed the work of 1859, and the last remnant of the old-established Habsburg domination in Italy ceased. The war was immediately followed by a reorganization of the government. The Magyar nation, as well as the Czechs, had refused to recognize the validity of the constitution of 1861 which had established a common parliament for the whole empire; they demanded that the independence of the kingdom of Hungary should be restored. Even before the war the necessity of coming to terms with the Hungarians had been recognized. In June 1865 the emperor Francis Joseph visited Pest and replaced the chancellors of Transylvania and Hungary, Counts Francis Zichy and Nadásdy, supporters of the February constitution, by Count Majláth, a leader of the old conservative magnates. This was at once followed by the resignation of Schmerling, who was succeeded by Count Richard Belcredi. On the 20th of September the Reichsrath was prorogued, which was equivalent to the suspension of the constitution; and in December the emperor opened the Hungarian diet in person, with a speech from the throne that recognized the validity of the laws of 1848. Before any definite arrangement as to their re-introduction could be made, however, the war broke out; and after the defeats on the field of battle the Hungarian diet was able to make its own terms. They recognized no union between their country and the other parts of the monarchy except that which was based on the Pragmatic Sanction. All recent innovations, all attempts made during the last hundred years to absorb Hungary in a greater Austria, were revoked. An agreement was made by which the emperor was to be crowned at Pest and take the ancient oath to the Golden Bull; Hungary (including Transylvania and Croatia) was to have its own parliament and its own ministry; Magyar was to be the official language; the emperor was to rule as king; there was to be complete separation of the finances; not even a common nationality was recognized between the Hungarians and the other subjects of the emperor; a Hungarian was to be a foreigner in Vienna, an Austrian a foreigner in Budapest. A large party wished indeed that nothing should be left but a purely personal union similar to that between England and Hanover. Deák and the majority agreed, however, that there should be certain institutions common to Hungary and the rest of the monarchy; these were—(1) foreign affairs, including the diplomatic and consular service; (2) the army and navy; (3) the control of the expenses required for these branches of the public service.

Recognizing in a declaratory act the legal existence of these common institutions, they also determined the method by which they should be administered. In doing so they carried out with great exactitude the principle of dualism, establishing in form a complete parity between Hungary on one side and the other territories of the king on the other. They made it a condition that there should be constitutional government in the rest of the monarchy as well as in Hungary, and a parliament in which all the other territories should be represented. From both the Hungarian and the Austrian parliament there was to be elected a *Delegation*, consisting of sixty members;

to these Delegations the common ministers were to be responsible, and to them the estimates for the joint services were to be submitted. The annual meetings were to be held alternately in Vienna and in Pest. They were very careful that these Delegations should not overshadow the parliaments by which they were appointed. The Delegations were not to sit together; each was to meet separately; they were to communicate by writing, every document being accompanied by a translation in Magyar or German, as the case might be; only if after three times exchanging notes they failed to agree was there to be a common session; in that case there would be no discussion, and they were to vote in silence; a simple majority was sufficient. There were to be three ministers for common purposes—(1) for foreign affairs; (2) for war; (3) for finance; these ministers were responsible to the Delegations, but the Delegations were really given no legislative power. The minister of war controlled the common army, but even the laws determining the method by which the army was to be recruited had to be voted separately in each of the parliaments. The minister of finance had to lay before them the common budget, but they could not raise money or vote taxes; after they had passed the budget the money required had to be provided by the separate parliaments. Even the determination of the proportion which each half of the monarchy was to contribute was not left to the Delegations. It was to be fixed once every ten years by separate committees chosen for that purpose from the Austrian Reichsrath and the Hungarian parliament, the so-called *Quota-Deputations*. In addition to these "common affairs" the Hungarians, indeed, recognized that there were certain other matters which it was desirable should be managed on identical principles in the two halves of the monarchy—namely, customs and excise currency; the army and common railways. For these, however, no common institutions were created; they must be arranged by agreement; the ministers must confer and then introduce identical acts in the Hungarian and the Austrian parliaments.

The main principles of this agreement were decided during the spring of 1867; but during this period the Austrians were not really consulted at all. The negotiations on behalf of the court of Vienna were entrusted to Beust, whom the emperor appointed chancellor of the empire and also minister-president of Austria. He had no previous experience of Austrian affairs, and was only anxious at once to bring about a settlement which would enable the empire to take a strong position in international politics. In the summer of 1867, however (the Austrian Reichsrath having met), the two parliaments each elected a deputation of fifteen members to arrange the financial settlement. The first matter was the debt, amounting to over 3000 million gulden, in addition to the floating debt, which had been contracted during recent years. The Hungarians laid down the principle that they were in no way responsible for debts contracted during a time when they had been deprived of their constitutional liberties; they consented, however, to pay each year 29½ million gulden towards the interest. The whole responsibility for the payment of the remainder of the interest, amounting annually to over a hundred million gulden, and the management of the debt, was left to the Austrians. The Hungarians wished that a considerable part of it should be repudiated. It was then agreed that the two states should form a Customs Union for the next ten years; the customs were to be paid to the common exchequer; all sums required in addition to this to meet the expenses were to be provided as to 30% by Hungary and as to 70% by Austria. After the financial question had been thus settled, the whole of these arrangements were then, on the 21st and the 24th of December 1867, enacted by the two parliaments, and the system of dualism was established.

The acts were accepted in Austria out of necessity; but no parties were really satisfied. The Germans, who accepted the principle of dualism, were indignant at the financial arrangements; for Hungary, while gaining more than an equal share of power, paid less than one-third of the common expenses. On the other hand, according to British ideas of taxable capacity, Hungary paid, and still pays, more than her share. The Germans, however, could at least hope that in the future the financial arrangements might be revised; the complaints of the Slav races were political, and within the constitution there was no means of remedy, for, while the settlement gave to the Hungarians all that they demanded, it deprived the Bohemians or Galicians of any hope that they would be able to obtain similar independence. Politically, the principle underlying the agreement was that the empire should be divided into two portions; in one of these the Magyars were to rule, in the other the Germans; in either section the Slav races—the Serbs and Croatsians, the Czechs, Poles and Slovenes—were to be placed in a position of political inferiority.

The logical consistency with which the principle of Dualism was carried out is shown in a change of title. By a letter to Beust of the 14th of November 1868 the emperor ordered that he should henceforward be styled, not as before "Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, King of Bohemia, &c.," but "Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, &c., and Apostolic King of Hungary," thereby signifying the separation of the two districts over which he rules. His shorter style is "His Majesty the Emperor and King," and "His Imperial and Apostolic Royal Majesty"; the lands over which he rules are called "The Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy" or "The Austrian-Hungarian Realm." The new terminology, "Imperial and Royal" (*Kaiserlich und Königlich*), has since then been applied to all those branches of the public service which belong to the common

ministries ; this was first the case with the diplomatic service ; not till 1889 was it applied to the army, which for some time kept up the old style of *Kaiserlich-Königlich* ; in 1895 it was applied to the ministry of the imperial house, an office always held by the minister for foreign affairs. The minister for foreign affairs was at first called the *Reichskanzler* ; but in 1871, when Andrassy succeeded Beust, this was given up in deference to Hungarian feeling, for it might be taken to imply that there was a single state of which he was minister. The old style *Kaiserlich-Königlich*, the " K. K. " which has become so familiar through long use, is still retained in the Austrian half of the monarchy. There are, therefore, e.g., three ministries of finance : the *Kaiserlich und Königlich* for joint affairs ; the *Kaiserlich-Königlich* for Austrian affairs ; the *Királyé* for Hungary.

The settlement with Hungary consisted then of three parts :—(1) the political settlement, which was to be permanent and has since remained part of the fundamental constitution of the monarchy ; (2) the periodical financial settlement, determining the partition of the common expenses as arranged by the Quota-Deputations and ratified by the parliaments ; (3) the Customs Union and the agreement as to currency—a voluntary and terminable arrangement made between the two governments and parliaments. The history of the common affairs which fall under the management of the common ministries is, then, the history of the foreign policy of the empire and of the army. It is with this and this alone that the Delegations are occupied, and it is to this that we must now turn. The annual meetings call for little notice ; they have generally been the occasion on which the foreign minister has explained and justified his policy ; according to the English custom, red books, sometimes containing important despatches, have been laid before them ; but the debates have caused less embarrassment to the government than is generally the case in parliamentary assemblies, and the army budget has generally been passed with few and unimportant alterations.

For the first four years, while Beust was chancellor, the foreign policy was still influenced by the feelings left by the war of 1866. We do not know how far there was a real intention to revenge Königgrätz and recover the position lost in Germany. This would be at least a possible policy, and one to which Beust by his previous history would be inclined. There were sharp passages of arms with the Prussian government regarding the position of the South German states ; a close friendship was maintained with France ; there were meetings of the emperor and of Napoleon at Salzburg in 1868, and the next year at Paris ; the death of Maximilian in Mexico cast a shadow over the friendship, but did not destroy it. The opposition of the Hungarians and financial difficulties probably prevented a war-like policy. In 1870 there were discussions preparatory to a formal alliance with France against the North German Confederation, but nothing was signed. The war of 1870 put an end to all ideas of this kind ; the German successes were so rapid that Austria was not exposed to the temptation of intervening, a temptation that could hardly have been resisted had the result been doubtful or the struggle prolonged. The absorption of South Germany in the German empire took away the chief cause for friction ; and from that time warm friendship, based on the maintenance of the established order, has existed between the two empires. Austria gave up all hope of regaining her position in Germany ; Germany disclaimed all intention of acquiring the German provinces of Austria. Beust's retirement in 1871 put the finishing touch on the new relations. His successor, Count Andrassy, a Hungarian, established a good understanding with Bismarck ; and in 1872 the visit of the emperor Francis Joseph, accompanied by his minister, to Berlin, was the final sign of the reconciliation with his uncle. The tsar was also present on that occasion, and for the next six years the close friendship between the three empires removed all danger of war. Three years later the full reconciliation with Italy followed, when Francis Joseph consented to visit Victor Emmanuel in Venice.

CHAPTER VI

THE EASTERN QUESTION

THE outbreak of disturbance in the Balkans ended this period of calm. The insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately affected Austria; refugees in large numbers crossed the frontier and had to be maintained by the government. The political problem presented was a very difficult one. The sympathy of the Slav inhabitants of the empire made it impossible for the government of Vienna to regard with indifference the sufferings of Christians in Turkey. Active support was impossible, because the Hungarians, among whom the events of 1848 had obliterated the remembrance of the earlier days of Turkish conquest, were full of sympathy for the Turks. It was a cardinal principle of Austrian policy that she could not allow the erection of new Slav states on her southern frontier. Moreover, the disturbances were fomented by Russian agents, and any increase of Russian influence (for which the Pan-Slav party was working) was full of danger to Austria. For a time the mediation of Germany preserved the good understanding between the two eastern empires. In 1875 Andrassy drafted a note, which was accepted by the powers, requiring Turkey to institute the reforms necessary for the good government of the provinces. Turkey agreed to do this, but the insurgents required a guarantee from the powers that Turkey would keep her engagements. This could not be given, and the rebellion continued and spread to Bulgaria. The lead then passed to Russia, and Austria, even after the outbreak of war, did not oppose Russian measures. At the beginning of 1877 a secret understanding had been made between the two powers, by which Russia undertook not to annex any territory, and in other ways not to take steps which would be injurious to Austria. The advance of the Russian army on Constantinople, however, was a serious menace to Austrian influence; Andrassy therefore demanded that the terms of peace should be submitted to a European conference, which he suggested should meet at Vienna. The peace of San Stefano violated the engagements made by Russia, and Andrassy was therefore compelled to ask for a credit of 60 million gulden and to mobilize a small portion of the army; the money was granted unanimously in the Hungarian Delegation, though the Magyars disliked a policy the object of which appeared to be not the defence of Turkey against Russia, but an agreement with Russia which would give Austria compensation at the expense of Turkey; in the Austrian Deputation it was voted only by a majority of 39 to 20, for the Germans were alarmed at the report that it would be used for an occupation of part of the Turkish territory.

The active share taken by Great Britain, however, relieved Austria from the necessity of having recourse to further measures. By an arrangement made beforehand, Austria was requested at the congress of Berlin to undertake the occupation and administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina—an honourable but arduous task. The provinces could not be left to the Turks; Austria could not allow them to fall under Russian influence. The occupation was immediately begun, and 60,000 Austrian troops, under the command of General Philippovich,¹ crossed the frontier on the 29th of July. The work was, however, more difficult than had been anticipated; the Mahommedans offered a strenuous resistance; military operations were attended with great difficulty in the mountainous country; 200,000 men were required, and they did not succeed in crushing the resistance till after some months of obstinate fighting. The losses on either side were very heavy; even after the capture of Serajevo in August,

¹ Josef, Freiherr Philippovich von Philippsberg (1818-1889), belonged to an old Christian noble family of Bosnia.

the resistance was continued; and besides those who fell in battle, a considerable number of the insurgents were put to death under military law. The opposition in the Delegations, which met at the end of the year, was so strong that the government had to be content with a credit to cover the expenses for 1879 of less than half what they had originally asked, and the supplementary estimate of 40,000,000 gulden for 1878 was not voted till the next year. In 1879 the Porte, after long delay, recognized the occupation on the distinct understanding that the sovereignty of the sultan was acknowledged. A civil administration was then established, the provinces not being attached to either half of the empire, but placed under the control of the joint minister of finance. The government during the first two years was not very successful; the Christian population were disappointed at finding that they still had, as in the old days, to pay rent to the Mahomedan begs. There were difficulties also between the Roman Catholics and the members of the Greek Church. In 1881 disturbances in Dalmatia spread over the frontier into Herzegovina, and another expedition had to be sent to restore order. When this was done Benjamin de Kallay was appointed minister, and under his judicious government order and prosperity were established in the provinces. In accordance with another clause of the treaty of Berlin, Austria was permitted to place troops in the sanjak of Novi-Bazar, a district of great strategic importance, which separated Servia and Montenegro, and through which the communication between Bosnia and Salonica passed. This was done in September 1879, an agreement with Turkey having specified the numbers and position of the garrison. Another slight alteration of the frontier was made in the same year, when, during the delimitation of the new frontier of Montenegro, the district of Spizza was incorporated in the kingdom of Dalmatia.

The congress of Berlin indirectly caused some difficulties with Italy. In that country was a large party which, under the name of the "Irredentists," demanded that those Italian-speaking districts, South Tirol, Istria and Trieste, which were under Austrian rule, should be joined to Italy; there were public meetings and riots in Italy; the Austrian flag was torn down from the consulate in Venice and the embassy at Rome insulted. The excitement spread across the frontier; there were riots in Trieste, and in Tirol it was necessary to make some slight movement of troops as a sign that the Austrian government was determined not to surrender any territory. For a short time there was apprehension that the Italian government might not be strong enough to resist the movement, and might even attempt to realize these wishes by means of an alliance with Russia; but the danger quickly passed away.

In the year 1879 the European position of the monarchy was placed on a more secure footing by the conclusion of a formal alliance with Germany. In the autumn of that year Bismarck visited Vienna and arranged with Andrassy a treaty by which Germany bound herself to support Austria against an attack from Russia, Austria-Hungary pledging herself to help Germany against a combined attack of France and Russia; the result of this treaty, of which the tsar was informed, was to remove, at least for the time, the danger of war between Austria-Hungary and Russia. It was the last achievement of Andrassy, who had already resigned, but it was maintained by his successor, Baron Haymerle, and after his death in 1881 by Count Kalnoky. It was strengthened in 1882 by the adhesion of Italy, for after 1881 the Italians required support, owing to the French occupation of Tunis, and after five years it was renewed. Since that time it has been the foundation on which the policy of Austria-Hungary has depended, and it has survived all dangers arising either from commercial differences (as between 1880 and 1890) or national discord. The alliance was naturally very popular among the German Austrians; some of them went so far as to attempt to use it to influence internal policy, and suggested that fidelity to this alliance required that there should be a ministry at Vienna which supported the Germans in their internal struggle with the Slavs; they represented it as a national alliance of the Teutonic races, and there were some Germans in the empire who supported them in this view. The governments on both sides could of course give no countenance to this theory; Bismarck especially was very careful never to let it be supposed that he desired to exercise influence over the internal affairs of his ally. Had he done so, the strong anti-German passions of the Czechs and Poles, always inclined to an alliance with France, would have been aroused, and no government could have maintained the alliance. After 1880 the exertions of Count Kalnoky again established a fairly good understanding with Russia, as was shown by the meetings of Francis Joseph with the tsar in 1884 and 1885, but the outbreak of the Bulgarian question in 1885 again brought into prominence the opposed interests of Russia and Austria-Hungary. In the December of this year Austria-Hungary indeed decisively interfered in the war between Bulgaria and Servia, for at this time Austrian influence predominated in Servia, and after the battle of Slivnitsa the Austro-Hungarian minister warned Prince Alexander of Bulgaria that if he advanced farther he would be met by Austro-Hungarian as well as Servian troops. But after the abdication of Alexander, Count Kalnoky stated in the Delegations, that Austria-Hungary would not permit Russia to interfere with the independence of Bulgaria. This decided step was required by Hungarian feeling, but it was a policy in which Austria-Hungary could not depend on the support of Germany, for—as Bismarck stated—Bulgaria was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.

Austria-Hungary also differed from Russia as to the position of Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria, and during 1886-1887 much alarm was caused by the massing of Russian troops on the Galician frontier. Councils of war were summoned to consider how this exposed and distant province was to be defended, and for some months war was considered inevitable; but the danger was averted by the renewal of the Triple Alliance and the other decisive steps taken at this time by the German government.

Since this time the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary has been peaceful and unambitious; the close connexion with Germany has so far been maintained, though during the last few years it has been increasingly difficult to prevent the violent passions engendered by national enmity at home from reacting on the foreign policy of the monarchy; it would scarcely be possible to do so, were it not that discussions on foreign policy take place not in the parliaments but in the Delegations where the numbers are fewer and the passions cooler. In May 1895 Count Kalnóky had to retire, owing to a difference with Bánffy, the Hungarian premier, arising out of the struggle with Rome. He was succeeded by Count Goluchowski, the son of a well-known Polish statesman. In 1898 the expulsion of Austrian subjects from Prussia, in connection with the anti-Polish policy of the Prussian government, caused a passing irritation, to which Count Thun, the Austrian premier, gave expression. The chief objects of the government in recent years have been to maintain Austro-Hungarian trade and influence in the Balkan states by the building of railways, by the opening of the Danube for navigation, and by commercial treaties with Rumania, Servia and Bulgaria; since the abdication of King Milan especially, the affairs of Servia and the growth of Russian influence in that country have caused serious anxiety.

CHAPTER VII

INTERNAL REFORMS

THE disturbed state of European politics and the great increase in the military establishments of other countries made it desirable for Austria also to strengthen her military resources. The bad condition of the finances rendered it, however, impossible to carry out any very great measures. In 1868 there had been introduced compulsory military service in both Austria and Hungary; the total of the army available in war had been fixed at 800,000 men. Besides this joint army placed under the joint ministry of war, there was in each part of the monarchy a separate militia and a separate minister for national defence. In Hungary this national force or *honvéd* was kept quite distinct from the ordinary army; in Austria, however (except in Dalmatia and Tirol, where there was a separate local militia), the *Landwehr*, as it was called, was practically organized as part of the standing army. At the renewal of the periodical financial and economic settlement (*Ausgleich*) in 1877 no important change was made, but in 1882 the system of compulsory service was extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a reorganization was carried out, including the introduction of army corps and local organization on the Prussian plan. This was useful for the purposes of speedy mobilization, though there was some danger that the local and national spirit might penetrate into the army. In 1886 a law was carried in either parliament creating a *Landsturm*, and providing for the arming and organization of the whole male population up to the age of forty-two in case of emergency, and in 1889 a small increase was made in the annual number of recruits. A further increase was made in 1892-1893. In contrast, however, with the military history of other continental powers, that of Austria-Hungary shows a small increase in the army establishment. Of recent years there have been signs of an attempt to tamper with the use of German as the common language for the whole army. This, which is now the principal remnant of the old ascendancy of German, and the one point of unity for the whole monarchy, is a matter on which the government and the monarch allow no concession, but in the Hungarian parliaments protests against it have been raised, and in 1899 and 1900 it was necessary to punish recruits from Bohemia, who answered the roll call in the Czechish *sde* instead of the German *hier*.

In those matters which belong to the periodical and terminable agreement, the most important is the Customs Union, which was established in 1867, and it is convenient to treat separately the commercial policy of the dual state. At first the customs tariff in Austria-Hungary, as in most other countries, was based on a number of commercial treaties with Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, &c., each of which specified the maximum duties that could be levied on certain articles, and all of which contained a "most favoured nation" clause. The practical result was a system very nearly approaching to the absence of any customs duties, and for the period for which these treaties lasted a revision of the tariff could not be carried out by means of legislation. After the year 1873, a strong movement in favour of protective duties made itself felt among the Austrian manufacturers who were affected by the competition of German, English and Belgian goods, and Austria was influenced by the general movement in economic thought which about this time caused the reaction against the doctrines of free trade. Hungary, on the other hand, was still in favour of free trade, for there were no important manufacturing industries in that country, and it required a secure market for agricultural produce. After 1875 the commercial treaties expired;

Hungary thereupon also gave notice to terminate the commercial union with Austria, and negotiations began as to the principle on which it was to be renewed. This was done during the year 1877, and in the new treaty, while raw material was still imported free of duty, a low duty was placed on textile goods as well as on corn, and the excise on sugar and brandy was raised. All duties, moreover, were to be paid in gold—this at once involving a considerable increase. The tariff treaties with Great Britain and France were not renewed, and all attempts to come to some agreement with Germany broke down, owing to the change of policy which Bismarck was adopting at this period. The result was that the system of commercial treaties ceased, and Austria-Hungary was free to introduce a fresh tariff depending simply on legislation, an "autonomous tariff" as it is called. With Great Britain, France and Germany there was now only a "most favoured nation" agreement; fresh commercial treaties were made with Italy (1879), Switzerland and Servia (1881). During 1881-1882 Hungary, desiring means of retaliation against the duties on corn and the impediments to the importation of cattle recently introduced into Germany, withdrew her opposition to protective duties; the tariff was completely revised, protective duties were introduced on all articles of home production, and high finance duties on other articles such as coffee and petroleum. At the same time special privileges were granted to articles imported by sea, so as to foster the trade of Trieste and Fiume; as in Germany a subvention was granted to the great shipping companies, the Austrian Lloyd and Adria; the area of the Customs Union was enlarged so as to include Trieste, Istria and Dalmatia, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1887 a further increase of duties was laid on corn (this was at the desire of Hungary as against Rumania, for a vigorous customs war was being carried on at this time) and on woollen and textile goods. Austria, therefore, during these years completely gave up the principle of free trade, and adopted a nationalist policy similar to that which prevailed in Germany. A peculiar feature of these treaties was that the government was empowered to impose an additional duty (*Retorsionszoll*) on goods imported from countries in which Austria-Hungary received unfavourable treatment. In 1881 this was fixed at 10% (5% for some articles), but in 1887 it was raised to 30 and 15% respectively. In 1892 Austria-Hungary joined with Germany, Italy, Belgium and Switzerland in commercial treaties to last for twelve years, the object being to secure to the states of central Europe a stable and extended market; for the introduction of high tariffs in Russia and America had crippled industry. Two years later Austria-Hungary also arranged with Russia a treaty similar to that already made between Russia and Germany; the reductions in the tariff secured in these treaties were applicable also to Great Britain, with which there still was a most favoured nation treaty. The system thus introduced gave commercial security till the year 1903.

The result of these and other laws was an improvement in financial conditions, which enabled the government at last to take in hand the long-delayed task of reforming the currency. Hitherto the currency had been partly in silver (gulden), the "Austrian currency" which had been introduced in 1857, partly in paper money, which took the form of notes issued by the Austro-Hungarian Bank. This institution had, in 1867, belonged entirely to Austria; it had branches in Hungary, and its notes were current throughout the monarchy, but the direction was entirely Austrian. The Hungarians had not sufficient credit to establish a national bank of their own, and at the settlement of 1877 they procured, as a concession to themselves, that it should be converted into an Austro-Hungarian bank, with a head office at Pest as well as at Vienna, and with the management divided between the two countries. This arrangement was renewed in 1887. In 1848 the government had been obliged to authorize the bank to suspend cash payments, and the wars of 1859 and 1866 had rendered abortive all attempts to renew them. The notes, therefore, formed an inconvertible paper currency. The bank by its charter had the sole right of issuing notes, but during the war of 1866 the government, in order to raise money, had itself issued notes (*Staatsnoten*) to the value of 312 million gulden, thereby violating the charter of the bank. The operation begun in 1892 was therefore threefold: (1) the substitution of a gold for a silver standard; (2) the redemption of the *Staatsnoten*; (3) the resumption of cash payments by the bank.

In 1867 Austria-Hungary had taken part in the monetary conference which led to the formation of the Latin Union; it was intended to join the Union, but this was not done. A first step, however, had been taken in this direction by the issue of gold coins of the value of eight and four gulden. No attempt was made, however, to regulate the relations of these coins to the "Austrian" silver coinage; the two issues were not brought into connexion, and every payment was made in silver, unless it was definitely agreed that it should be paid in gold. In 1879, owing to the continued depreciation of silver, the free coinage of silver was suspended. In 1892 laws introducing a completely new coinage were carried in both parliaments, in accordance with agreements made by the ministers. The unit in the new issue was to be the krone, divided into 100 heller; the krone being almost of the same value (24-25th) as the franc. (The twenty-krone piece in gold weighs 6.775 gr., the twenty-franc piece 6.453.) The gold krone was equal to .42 of the gold gulden, and it was declared equal to .5 of the silver gulden, so much allowance being made for the depreciation

of silver. The first step towards putting this act into practice was the issue of one-krone pieces (silver), which circulated as half gulden, and of nickel coins; all the copper coins and other silver coins were recalled, the silver gulden alone being left in circulation. The coinage of the gold four- and eight-gulden was suspended. Nothing more could be done till the supply of gold had been increased. The bank was required to buy gold (during 1892 it bought over forty M. gulden), and was obliged to coin into twenty- or ten-krone pieces all gold brought to it for that purpose. Then a loan of 150 M. gulden at 4 % was made, and from the gold (chiefly bar gold and sovereigns) which Rothschild, who undertook the loan, paid in, coins of the new issue were struck to the value of over 34 million kronen. This was, however, not put into circulation; it was used first for paying off the *Staatsnoten*. By 1894 the state was able to redeem them to the amount of 200 million gulden, including all those for one gulden. It paid them, however, not in gold, but in silver (one-krone pieces and gulden) and in bank notes, the coins and notes being provided by the bank, and in exchange the newly coined gold was paid to the bank to be kept as a reserve to cover the issue of notes. At the same time arrangements were made between Austria and Hungary to pay off about 80 million of exchequer bills which had been issued on the security of the government salt-works, and were therefore called "salinenscheine." In 1899 the remainder of the *Staatsnoten* (112 million gulden) were redeemed in a similar manner. The bank had in this way acquired a large reserve of gold, and in the new charter which was (after long delay) passed in 1899, a clause was introduced requiring the resumption of cash payments, though this was not to come into operation immediately. Then from 1st January 1900 the old reckoning by gulden was superseded, that by krone being introduced in all government accounts, the new silver being made a legal tender only for a limited amount. For the time until the 1st of July 1908, however, the old gulden were left in circulation, payments made in them, at the rate of two kronen to one gulden, being legal up to any amount.

This important reform has thereby been brought to a satisfactory conclusion, and at a time when the political difficulties had reached a most acute stage. It is indeed remarkable that notwithstanding the complicated machinery of the dual monarchy, and the numerous obstacles which have to be overcome before a reform affecting both countries can be carried out, the financial, the commercial and the foreign policy has been conducted since 1870 with success. The credit of the state has risen, the chronic deficit has disappeared, the currency has been put on a sound basis, and part of the unfunded debt has been paid off. Universal military service has been introduced, and all this has been done in the presence of difficulties greater than existed in any other civilized country.

Each of the financial and economic reforms described above was, of course, the subject of a separate law, but, so far as they are determined at the general settlement which takes place between Austria and Hungary every ten years, they are comprised under the expression "Ausgleich" (compact or compromise), which includes especially the determination of the Quota, and to this extent they are all dealt with together as part of a general settlement and bargain. In this settlement a concession on commercial policy would be set off against a gain on the financial agreement; e.g. in 1877 Austria gave Hungary a share in the management of the bank, while the arrangement for paying the bonus on exported sugar was favourable to Austria; on the other hand, since the increased duty on coffee and petroleum would fall more heavily on Austria, the Austrians wished to persuade the Hungarians to pay a larger quota of the common expenses, and there was also a dispute whether Hungary was partly responsible for a debt of 80 M. gulden to the bank. Each measure had, therefore, to be considered not only on its own merits, but in relation to the general balance of advantage, and an amendment in one might bring about the rejection of all. The whole series of acts had to be carried in two parliaments, each open to the influence of national jealousy and race hatred in its most extreme form, so that the negotiations have been conducted under serious difficulties, and the periodical settlement has always been a time of great anxiety. The first settlement occupied two full years, from 1876, when the negotiations began, to June 1878, when at last all the bills were carried successfully through the two parliaments; and it was necessary to prolong the previous arrangements (which expired at the end of 1877) till the middle of 1878. First the two ministries had to agree on the drafts of all the bills; then the bills had to be laid before the two parliaments. Each parliament elected a committee to consider them, and the two committees carried on long negotiations by notes supplemented by verbal discussions. Then followed the debates in the two parliaments; there was a ministerial crisis in Austria, because the House refused to accept the tax on coffee and petroleum which was recommended by the ministers; and finally a great council of all the ministers, with the emperor presiding, determined the compromise that was at last accepted. In 1887 things went better; there was some difficulty about the tariff, especially about the tax on petroleum, but Count Taaffe had a stronger position than the Austrian ministers of 1877. Ten years later, on the third renewal, the difficulties were still greater. They sprang from a double cause. First the Austrians were determined to get a more favourable division of the common expenses; that of 1867 still continued, although Hungary had grown relatively

in wealth.¹ Moreover, a proposed alteration in the taxes on sugar would be of considerable advantage to Hungary; the Austrians, therefore, demanded that henceforth the proportion should be not 68·6 : 31·4 but 58 : 42. On this there was a deadlock; all through 1897 and 1898 the Quota-Deputations failed to come to an agreement. This, however, was not the worst. Parliamentary government in Austria had broken down; the opposition had recourse to obstruction, and no business could be done. Their object was to drive out the Badeni government, and for that reason the obstruction was chiefly directed against the renewal of the Ausgleich; for, as this was the first necessity of state, no government could remain in office which failed to carry it through. The extreme parties of the Germans and the anti-Semites were also, for racial reasons, opposed to the whole system. When, therefore, the government at the end of 1897 introduced the necessary measures for prolonging the existing arrangements provisionally till the differences with Hungary had been settled, scenes of great disorder ensued, and at the end of the year the financial arrangements had not been prolonged, and neither the bank charter nor the Customs Union had been renewed. The government, therefore (Badeni having resigned), had to proclaim the necessary measures by imperial warrant. Next year it was even worse, for there was obstruction in Hungary as well as in Austria; the Quota-Deputations again came to no agreement, and the proposals for the renewal of the Bank charter, the reform of the currency, the renewal of the Customs Union, and the new taxes on beer and brandy, which were laid before parliament both at Vienna and Pest, were not carried in either country; this time, therefore, the existing arrangements had to be prolonged provisionally by imperial and royal warrant both in Austria and Hungary. During 1899 parliamentary peace was restored in Hungary by the resignation of Bánffy; in Austria, however, though there was again a change of ministry the only result was that the Czechs imitated the example of the Germans and resorted to obstruction so that still no business could be done. The Austrian ministry, therefore, came to an agreement with the Hungarians that the terms of the new Ausgleich should be finally proclaimed in Austria by imperial warrant; the Hungarians only giving their assent to this in return for considerable financial concessions.

The main points of the agreement were: (1) the Bank charter was to be renewed till 1910, the Hungarians receiving a larger share in the direction than they had hitherto enjoyed; (2) the Customs Union so far as it was based on a reciprocal and binding treaty lapsed, both sides, however, continuing it in practice, and promising to do so until the 31st of December 1907. Not later than 1901 negotiations were to be begun for a renewal of the alliance, and if possible it was to be renewed from the year 1903, in which year the commercial treaties would expire. If this were done, then the tariff would be revised before any fresh commercial treaties were made. If it were not done, then no fresh treaties would be made extending beyond the year 1907, so that if the Commercial Union of Austria and Hungary were not renewed before 1907, each party would be able to determine its own policy unshackled by any previous treaties. These arrangements in Hungary received the sanction of the parliament; but this could not be procured in Austria, and they were, therefore, proclaimed by imperial warrant; first of all, on 20th July, the new duties on beer, brandy and sugar; then on 23rd September the Bank charter, &c. In November the Quota-Deputations at last agreed that Hungary should henceforward pay 33 $\frac{1}{2}$ %, a very small increase, and this was also in Austria proclaimed in the same way. The result was that a working agreement was made, by which the Union was preserved.

¹ The only change was that as the military frontier had been given over to Hungary, Hungary in consequence of this addition of territory had to pay 2%, the remaining 98% being divided as before, so that the real proportion was 31·4 and 68·6.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CRISIS OF 1903

SINCE the years 1866-1871 no period of Austro-Hungarian development has been so important as the years 1903-1907. The defeat of the old Austria by Prussia at Sadowa in 1866, the establishment of the Dual Monarchy in 1867 and the foundation of the new German empire in 1871, formed the starting-point of Austro-Hungarian history properly so called; but the Austro-Hungarian crisis in 1903-1906—a crisis temporarily settled but not definitively solved,—and the introduction of universal suffrage in Austria, discredited the original interpretation of the dual system and raised the question whether it represented the permanent form of the Austro-Hungarian polity.

At the close of the 19th century both states of the Dual Monarchy were visited by political crises of some severity. Parliamentary life in Austria was paralysed by the feud between Germans and Czechs that resulted directly from the Badeni language ordinances of 1897 and indirectly from the development of Slav influence, particularly that of Czechs and Poles during the Taaffe era (1879-1893). Government in Austria was carried on by cabinets of officials with the help of the emergency clause (paragraph 14) of the constitution. Ministers, nominally responsible to parliament, were in practice responsible only to the emperor. Thus during the closing years of last and the opening years of the present century, political life in Austria was at a low ebb and the constitution was observed in the letter rather than in the spirit.

Hungary was apparently better situated. Despite the campaign of obstruction that overthrew the Bánffy and led to the formation of the Széll cabinet in 1899, the hegemony of the Liberal party which, under various names, had been the mainstay of dualism since 1867, appeared to be unshaken. But clear signs of the decay of the dualist and of the growth of an extreme nationalist Magyar spirit were already visible. The Army bills of 1889, which involved an increase of the peace footing of the joint Austro-Hungarian army, had been carried with difficulty, despite the efforts of Kolo-man Tisza and of Count Julius Andrásy the Elder. Demands tending towards the Magyarization of the joint army had been advanced and had found such an echo in Magyar public opinion that Count Andrásy was obliged solemnly to warn the country of the dangers of nationalist Chauvinism and to remind it of its obligations under the Compact of 1867. The struggle over the civil marriage and divorce laws that filled the greater part of the 'nineties served and was perhaps intended by the Liberal leaders to serve as a diversion in favour of the Liberal-dualist standpoint; nevertheless, Nationalist feeling found strong expression during the negotiations of Bánffy and Széll with various Austrian premiers for the renewal of the economic *Ausgleich*, or "Customs and Trade Alliance." At the end of 1902 the Hungarian premier, Széll, concluded with the Austrian premier, Körber, a new customs and trade alliance comprising a joint Austro-Hungarian tariff as a basis for the negotiation of new commercial treaties with Germany, Italy and other states. This arrangement, which for the sake of brevity will henceforth be referred to as the Széll-Körber Compact, was destined to play an important part in the history of the next few years, though it was never fully ratified by either parliament and was ultimately discarded. Its conclusion was prematurely greeted as the end of a period of economic strife between the two halves of the monarchy and as a pledge of a decade of peaceful development. Events were soon to demonstrate the baselessness of these hopes.

In the autumn of 1902 the Austrian and the Hungarian governments, at the instance of the crown and in agreement with the joint minister for war and the Austrian and Hungarian ministers for national defence, laid before their respective parliaments bills providing for an increase of 21,000 men in the annual contingents of recruits. 16,700 men were needed for the joint army, and the remainder for the Austrian and Hungarian national defence troops (Landwehr and honvéd). The total contribution of Hungary would have been some 6500 and of Austria some 14,500 men. The military authorities made, however, the mistake of detaining in barracks several thousand supernumerary recruits (*i.e.* recruits liable to military service but in excess of the annual 103,000 enrollable by law) pending the adoption of the Army bills by the two parliaments. The object of this apparently high-handed step was to avoid the expense and delay of summoning the supernumeraries again to the colours when the bills should have received parliamentary sanction; but it was not unnaturally resented by the Hungarian Chamber, which has ever possessed a lively sense of its prerogatives. The Opposition, consisting chiefly of the independence party led by Francis Kossuth (eldest son of Louis Kossuth), made capital out of the grievance and decided to obstruct ministerial measures until the supernumeraries should be discharged. The estimates could not be sanctioned, and though Kossuth granted the Széll cabinet a vote on account for the first four months of 1903, the Government found itself at the mercy of the Opposition. At the end of 1902 the supernumeraries were discharged—too late to calm the ardour of the Opposition, which proceeded to demand that the Army bills should be entirely withdrawn or that, if adopted, they should be counterbalanced by concessions to Magyar nationalist feeling calculated to promote the use of the Magyar language in the Hungarian part of the army and to render the Hungarian regiments, few of which are purely Magyar, more and more Magyar in character. Széll, who vainly advised the crown and the military authorities to make timely concessions, was obliged to reject these demands which enjoyed the secret support of Count Albert Apponyi, the Liberal president of the Chamber and of his adherents. The obstruction of the estimates continued. On the 1st of May the Széll cabinet found itself without supply and governed for a time "*ex-lex*"; Széll, who had lost the confidence of the crown, resigned and was succeeded (June 26) by Count Khuen-Hederváry, previously ban, or governor, of Croatia. Before taking office Khuen-Hederváry negotiated with Kossuth and other Opposition leaders, who undertook that obstruction should cease if the Army bills were withdrawn. Despite the fact that the Austrian Army bill had been voted by the Reichsrath (February 19), the crown consented to withdraw the bills and thus compelled the Austrian parliament to repeal, at the dictation of the Hungarian obstructionists, what it regarded as a patriotic measure. Austrian feeling became embittered towards Hungary and the action of the crown was openly criticized.

Meanwhile the Hungarian Opposition broke its engagement. Obstruction was continued by a section of the independence party; and Kossuth, seeing his authority ignored, resigned the leadership. The obstructionists now raised the cry that the German words of command in the joint army must be replaced by Magyar words in the regiments recruited from Hungary—a demand which, apart from its disintegrating influence on the army, the crown considered to be an encroachment upon the royal military prerogatives as defined by the Hungarian Fundamental Law XII. of 1867. Clause 11 of the law runs: "In pursuance of the constitutional military prerogatives of His Majesty, everything relating to the unitary direction, leadership and inner organization of the whole army, and thus also of the Hungarian army as a complementary part of the whole army, is recognized as subject to His Majesty's disposal." The cry for the Magyar words of command on which the subsequent constitutional crisis turned, was tantamount to a demand that the monarch should differentiate the Hungarian from the Austrian part of the joint army, and should render it impossible for any but Magyar officers to command Hungarian regiments, less than half of which have a majority of Magyar recruits. The partisans of the Magyar words of command based their claim upon clause 12 of the Fundamental Law XII. of 1867—which runs: "Nevertheless the country reserves its right periodically to complete the Hungarian army and the right of granting recruits, *the fixing of the conditions on which the recruits are granted*, the fixing of the term of service and all the dispositions concerning the stationing and the supplies of the troops according to existing law both as regards legislation and administration." Since Hungary reserved her right to fix the conditions on which recruits should be granted, the partisans of the Magyar words of command argued that the abolition of the German words of command in the Hungarian regiments might be made such a condition, despite the enumeration in the preceding clause 11, of everything appertaining to the unitary leadership and inner organization of the joint Austro-Hungarian army as belonging to the constitutional military prerogatives of the crown. Practically, the dispute was a trial of strength between Magyar nationalist feeling and the crown. Austrian feeling strongly supported the monarch in his determination to defend the unity of the army, and the conflict gradually acquired an intensity that appeared to threaten the very existence of the dual system.

When Count Khuen-Hederváry took office and Kossuth relinquished the leadership of the independence party, the extension of the crisis could not be foreseen. A few extreme

nationalists continued to obstruct the estimates, and it appeared as though their energy would soon flag. An attempt to quicken this process by bribery provoked, however, an outburst of feeling against Khuen-Hederváry who, though personally innocent, found his position shaken. Shortly afterwards Magyar resentment of an army order issued from the cavalry manoeuvres at Chlopy in Galicia—in which the monarch declared that he would "hold fast to the existing and well-tried organization of the army" and would never "relinquish the rights and privileges guaranteed to its highest war-lord"—and of a provocative utterance of the Austrian premier Körber in the Reichsrath led to the overthrow of the Khuen-Hederváry cabinet (September 30) by an immense majority. The cabinet fell on a motion of censure brought forward by Kossuth, who had profited by the bribery incident to resume the leadership of his party.

An interval of negotiation between the crown and many leading Magyar Liberals followed, until at the end of October 1903 Count Stephen Tisza, son of Koloman Tisza, accepted a mission to form a cabinet after all others had declined. As programme Tisza brought with him a number of concessions from the crown to Magyar nationalist feeling in regard to military matters, particularly in regard to military badges, penal procedure, the transfer of officers of Hungarian origin from Austrian to Hungarian regiments, the establishment of military scholarships for Magyar youths and the introduction of the two years' service system. In regard to the military language, the Tisza programme—which, having been drafted by a committee of nine members, is known as the "programme of the nine"—declared that the responsibility of the cabinet extends to the military prerogatives of the crown, and that "the legal influence of parliament exists in this respect as in respect of every constitutional right." The programme, however, expressly excluded for "weighty political reasons affecting great interests of the nation" the question of the military language; and on Tisza's motion the Liberal party adopted an addendum, sanctioned by the crown: "the party maintains the standpoint that the king has a right to fix the language of service and command in the Hungarian army on the basis of his constitutional prerogatives as recognized in clause 11 of law XII. of 1867."

Notwithstanding the concessions, obstruction was continued by the Clericals and the extreme Independents, partly in the hope of compelling the crown to grant the Magyar words of command and partly out of antipathy towards the person of the young Calvinist premier. In March 1904, Tisza, therefore, introduced a drastic "guillotine" motion to amend the standing orders of the House, but withdrew it in return for an undertaking from the Opposition that obstruction would cease. This time the Opposition kept its word. The Recruits bill and the estimates were adopted, the Delegations were enabled to meet at Budapest—where they voted £22,000,000 as extraordinary estimates for the army and navy and especially for the renewal of the field artillery—and the negotiations for new commercial treaties with Germany and Italy were sanctioned, although parliament had never been able to ratify the Széll-Körber Compact with the tariff on the basis of which the negotiations would have to be conducted. But, as the autumn session approached, Tisza foresaw a new campaign of obstruction, and resolved to revert to his drastic reform of the standing orders. The announcement of his determination caused the Opposition to rally against him, and when on the 18th of November the Liberal party adopted a "guillotine" motion by a show of hands in defiance of orthodox procedure, a section of the party seceded. On the 13th of December the Opposition, infuriated by the formation of a special corps of parliamentary constables, invaded and wrecked the Chamber. Tisza appealed to the country and suffered, on the 26th of January 1905, an overwhelming defeat at the hands of a coalition composed of dissident Liberals, Clericals, Independents and a few Bánffyites. The Coalition gained an absolute majority and the Independence party became the strongest political group. Nevertheless the various adherents of the dual system retained an actual majority in the Chamber and prevented the Independence party from attempting to realize its programme of reducing the ties between Hungary and Austria to the person of the joint ruler. On the 25th of January, the day before his defeat, Count Tisza had signed on behalf of Hungary the new commercial treaties concluded by the Austro-Hungarian foreign office with Germany and Italy on the basis of the Széll-Körber tariff. He acted *ultra vires*, but by his act saved Hungary from a severe economic crisis and retained for her the right to benefit by economic partnership with Austria until the expiry of the new treaties in 1917.

A deadlock, lasting from January 1905 until April 1906, ensued between the crown and Hungary and, to a great extent, between Hungary and Austria. The Coalition, though possessing the majority in the Chamber, resolved not to take office unless the crown should grant its demands, including the Magyar words of command and customs separation from Austria. The crown declined to concede these points, either of which would have wrecked the dual system as interpreted since 1867. The Tisza cabinet could not be relieved of its functions till June 1905, when it was succeeded by a non-parliamentary administration under the premiership of General Baron Fejerváry, formerly minister for national defence. Seeing that the Coalition would not take office on acceptable terms, Fejerváry obtained the consent of the crown to a scheme, drafted by Kristóffy, minister of the interior, that the dispute between the crown and the Coalition should be subjected to the test of universal

suffrage and that to this end the franchise in Hungary be radically reformed. The schemes alarmed the Coalition, which saw that universal suffrage might destroy not only the hegemony of the Magyar nobility and gentry in whose hands political power was concentrated, but might, by admitting the non-Magyars to political equality with the Magyars, undermine the supremacy of the Magyar race itself. Yet the Coalition did not yield at once. Not until the Chamber had been dissolved by military force (February 19, 1906) and an open breach of the constitution seemed within sight did they come to terms with the crown and form an administration. The miserable state of public finances and the depression of trade doubtless helped to induce them to perform a duty which they ought to have performed from the first; but their chief motive was the desire to escape the menace of universal suffrage or, at least, to make sure that it would be introduced in such a form as to safeguard Magyar supremacy over the other Hungarian races.

The pact concluded (April 8, 1906) between the Coalition and the crown is known to have contained the following conditions: All military questions to be suspended until after the introduction of universal suffrage; the estimates and the normal contingent of recruits to be voted for 1905 and 1906; the extraordinary military credits, sanctioned by the delegations in 1904, to be voted by the Hungarian Chamber; ratification of the commercial treaties concluded by Tisza; election of the Hungarian Delegation and of the Quota-Deputation; introduction of a suffrage reform at least as far-reaching as the Kristóffy scheme. These "capitulations" obliged the Coalition government to carry on a dualist policy, although the majority of its adherents became, by the general election of May 1906, members of the Kossuth or Independence party, and, as such, pledged to the economic and political separation of Hungary from Austria save as regards the person of the ruler. Attempts were, however, made to emphasize the independence of Hungary. During the deadlock (June 2, 1905) Kossuth had obtained the adoption of a motion to authorize the compilation of an autonomous Hungarian tariff, and on the 28th of May 1906, the Coalition cabinet was authorized by the crown to present the Széll-Körber tariff to the Chamber in the form of a Hungarian autonomous tariff distinct from but identical with the Austrian tariff. This concession of form having been made to the Magyars without the knowledge of the Austrian government, Prince Konrad Hohenlohe, the Austrian premier, resigned office; and his successor, Baron Beck, eventually (July 6) withdrew from the table of the Reichsrath the whole Széll-Körber Compact, declaring that the only remaining economic ties between the two countries were freedom of trade, the commercial treaties with foreign countries, the joint state bank and the management of excise. If the Hungarian government wished to regulate its relationship to Austria in a more definite form, added the Austrian premier, it must conclude a new agreement before the end of the year 1907, when the reciprocity arrangement of 1899 would lapse. The Hungarian government replied that any new arrangement with Austria must be concluded in the form of a commercial treaty as between two foreign states and not in the form of a "customs and trade alliance."

Austria ultimately consented to negotiate on this basis. In October 1907 an agreement was attained, thanks chiefly to the sobering of Hungarian opinion by a severe economic crisis, which brought out with unusual clearness the fact that separation from Austria would involve a period of distress if not of commercial ruin for Hungary. Austria also came to see that separation from Hungary would seriously enhance the cost of living in Cisleithania and would deprive Austrian manufacturers of their best market. The main features of the new "customs and commercial treaty" were: (1) Each state to possess a separate but identical customs tariff. (2) Hungary to facilitate the establishment of direct railway communication between Vienna and Dalmatia, the communication to be established by the end of 1911, each state building the sections of line that passed through its own territory. (3) Austria to facilitate railway communication between Hungary and Prussia. (4) Hungary to reform her produce and Stock Exchange laws so as to prevent speculation in agrarian produce. (5) A court of arbitration to be established for the settlement of differences between the two states, Hungary selecting four Austrian and Austria four Hungarian judges, the presidency of the court being decided by lot, and each government being represented before the court by its own delegates. (6) Impediments to free trade in sugar to be practically abolished. (7) Hungary to be entitled to redeem her share of the old Austrian debt (originally bearing interest at 5 and now at 4.2 %) at the rate of 4.325 % within the next ten years; if not redeemed within ten years the rate of capitalization to decrease annually by $\frac{1}{15}$ % until it reaches 4.2 %. This arrangement represents a potential economy of some £2,000,000 capital for Hungary as compared with the original Austrian demand that the Hungarian contribution to the service of the old Austrian debt be capitalized at 4.2 %. (8) The securities of the two governments to rank as investments for savings banks, insurance companies and similar institutions in both countries, but not as trust fund investments. (9) Commercial treaties with foreign countries to be negotiated, not, as hitherto, by the joint minister for foreign affairs alone, but also by a nominee of each government. (10) The quota of Austrian and Hungarian contribution to joint expenditure to be 63.6 and 36.4 respectively—an increase of 2 % in the Hungarian quota, equal to some £200,000 a year.

The economic dispute between Hungary and Austria was thus settled for ten years after negotiations lasting more than twelve years. One important question, however, that of the future of the joint State Bank, was left over for subsequent decision. During the negotiations for the customs and commercial treaty, the Austrian government attempted to conclude for a longer period than ten years, but was unable to overcome Hungarian resistance. Therefore, at the end of 1917, the commercial treaties with Germany, Italy and other countries, and the Austro-Hungarian customs and commercial treaty, would all lapse. Ten years of economic unity remained during which the Dual Monarchy might grow together or grow asunder, increasing accordingly in strength or in weakness.

During this period of internal crisis the international position of the Dual Monarchy was threatened by two external dangers. The unrest in Macedonia threatened to reopen the Eastern Question in an acute form; with Italy the irredentist attitude of the Zanardelli cabinet led in 1902-1903 to such strained relations that war seemed imminent. The southern Tirol, the chief passes into Italy, strategic points on the Istrian and Dalmatian coasts, were strongly fortified, while in the interior the Tauern, Karawanken and Wochein railways were constructed, partly in order to facilitate the movement of troops towards the Italian border. The tension was relaxed with the fall of the Zanardelli government, and comparatively cordial relations were gradually re-established.

In the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula a temporary agreement with Russia was reached in 1903 by the so-called "February Programme," supplemented in the following October by the "Mürzsteg Programme." The terms of the Mürzsteg programme were observed by Count Goluchowski, in spite of the ruin of Russian prestige in the war with Japan, so long as he remained in office. In October 1906, however, he retired, and it was soon clear that his successor, Baron von Aerenthal,¹ was determined to take advantage of the changed European situation to take up once more the traditional policy of the Habsburg monarchy in the Balkan Peninsula. He gradually departed from the Mürzsteg basis, and in January 1908 deliberately undermined the Austro-Russian agreement by obtaining from the sultan a concession for a railway from the Bosnian frontier through the sanjak of Novibazar to the Turkish terminus at Mitrovitza. This was done in the teeth of the expressed wish of Russia; it roused the helpless resentment of Serbia, whose economic dependence upon the Dual Monarchy was emphasized by the outcome of the war of tariffs into which she had plunged in 1906, and who saw in this scheme another link in the chain forged for her by the Habsburg empire; it offended several of the great powers, who seemed to see in this railway concession the price of the abandonment by Austria-Hungary of her interest in Macedonian reforms. That Baron von Aerenthal was able to pursue a policy apparently so rash, was due to the fact that he could reckon on the support of Germany. The intimate relations between the two powers had been revealed during the dispute between France and Germany about Morocco; in the critical division of the 3rd of March 1906 at the Algeiras Conference Austria-Hungary, alone of all the powers, had sided with Germany, and it was a proposal of the Austro-Hungarian plenipotentiary that formed the basis of the ultimate settlement between Germany and France. The cordial relations thus emphasized encouraged Baron Aerenthal, in the autumn of 1908, to pursue a still bolder policy. The revolution in Turkey had entirely changed the face of the Eastern Question; the problem of Macedonian reform was swallowed up in that of the reform of the Ottoman empire generally; there was even a danger that a rejuvenated Turkey might in time lay claim to the provinces occupied by Austria-Hungary under the treaty of Berlin; in any case, the position of these provinces, governed autocratically from Vienna, between a constitutional Turkey and a constitutional Austria-Hungary, would have been highly anomalous. In the circumstances Baron Aerenthal determined on a bold policy. Without consulting the co-signatory powers of the treaty of Berlin, and in deliberate violation of its provisions, the king-emperor issued, on the 13th of October, a decree annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Habsburg Monarchy, and at the same time announcing the withdrawal of the Austro-Hungarian troops from the sanjak of Novibazar.

Meanwhile the relations between the two halves of the Dual Monarchy had again become critical. The agreement of 1907 had been but a truce in the battle between two irreconcilable principles; between Magyar nationalism, determined to maintain its ascendancy in an independent Hungary, and Habsburg imperialism, equally determined to preserve the economic and military unity of the Dual Monarchy. In this conflict the tactical advantage lay with the monarchy; for the Magyars were in a minority in Hungary, their ascendancy was based on a narrow and artificial franchise, and it was open to the king-emperor to hold *in terrorem* over them an appeal to the disfranchised majority. It was the introduction of a Universal Suffrage Bill by Mr Joseph Kristóffy, minister of the interior in the "unconstitutional" cabinet of Baron Fejérváry, which brought the Opposition leaders in the Hungarian parliament to terms and made possible the agreement of 1907. But the Wekerle ministry which succeeded that of Fejérváry on the 9th of April 1906 contained

¹ Alois, Count Lexa von Aerenthal, was born on the 27th of September 1854 at Gross-Skal in Bohemia, studied at Bonn and Prague, was attaché at Paris (1877) and afterwards at Petrograd, envoy extraordinary at Bucharest (1895) and ambassador at Petrograd (1896). He was created a count on the emperor's 79th birthday in 1909.

elements which made any lasting compromise impossible. The burning question of the "Magyar word of command" remained unsettled, save in so far as the fixed determination of the king-emperor had settled it; the equally important question of the renewal of the charter of the Austro-Hungarian State Bank had also formed no part of the agreement of 1907. On the other hand, the Wekerle ministry was pledged to a measure of franchise reform, a pledge which they showed no eagerness to redeem, though the granting of universal suffrage in the Austrian half of the Monarchy had made such a change inevitable. In March 1908 Mr Hallo laid before the Hungarian parliament a formal proposal that the charter of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, which was to expire at the end of 1910, should not be renewed; and that, in the event of failure to negotiate a convention between the banks of Austria and Hungary, a separate Hungarian Bank should be established. This question, obscured during the winter by the Balkan crisis, once more became acute in the spring of 1909. In the Coalition cabinet itself opinion was sharply divided, but in the end the views of the Independence party prevailed, and Dr Wekerle laid the proposal for a separate Hungarian Bank before the king-emperor and the Austrian government. Its reception was significant. The emperor Francis Joseph pointed out that the question of a separate Bank for Hungary did not figure in the act of 1867, and could not be introduced into it, *especially since the capital article of the ministerial programme, i.e. electoral reform, was not realized, nor near being realized.* This was tantamount to an appeal from the Magyar *populus* to the Hungarian *plebs*, the disfranchised non-Magyar majority; an appeal all the more significant from the fact that it ignored the suffrage bill brought in on behalf of the Hungarian government by Count Julius Andrassy in November 1908, a bill which, under the guise of granting the principle of universal suffrage, was ingeniously framed so as to safeguard and even to extend Magyar ascendancy. In consequence of this rebuff Dr Wekerle tendered his resignation on the 27th of April. Months passed without it being possible to form a new cabinet, and a fresh period of crisis and agitation was begun.

CHAPTER IX

THE ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA

THE energetic and aggressive policy of Baron Aerenthal in annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina (Oct. 13, 1908) was certainly expensive, but it was successful, and its very success won public opinion both in the Dual Monarchy itself and without. To soothe Turkey's susceptibilities a sum of over two millions sterling was paid to her (Feb. 26, 1909), but when Serbia and Montenegro also put forward claims for compensation, it seemed for a time that war was inevitable, seeing that Baron Aerenthal would recognize no good ground for the claims. It only demonstrated the strength of the Triple Alliance that Russia, on the recommendation of Germany, withdrew her support from Serbia, and when Serbia abated her claim (March 30, 1909) it was no difficult task to settle matters with Montenegro (April 6, 1909). The step, pregnant with so much for Austria-Hungary, which Baron Aerenthal took in October of 1908 was an accomplished fact by the beginning of April of 1909, and the conferment upon him of the title of Count by the Emperor on the 18th of August 1909 was a fitting reward for his work.

To maintain the *status quo* in the Balkans was the aim of Austria-Hungary throughout the years 1910 and 1911; to maintain the *status quo* was the policy bequeathed by Count Aerenthal on his death in 1912 to his successor, Count Berchtold.¹ The new Foreign Minister addressed the Delegations for the first time in April 1912, but not until the 24th of September 1912 did he make a striking pronouncement. It was to the effect that as affairs in Macedonia and Albania were becoming "troubled," Austria-Hungary had "proposed to the Powers an exchange of ideas on the Balkan situation." The object in view was to encourage Turkey in the reforms it was then inaugurating to restore order in its European possessions. It was all to be done "by means of the unanimous cohesion of the Powers on the basis of maintaining peace and of the *status quo* in the Balkans." In short, it was intended to promote an agreement between all the Powers in order to find a *via media* between the sovereign rights of Turkey and the legitimate interests of the Balkan peoples. All the Governments signified their approval of the suggestion. But it came too late. By the middle of October hostilities between the allied Balkan States and Turkey had already commenced. The results on Austro-Hungarian foreign policy are dealt with elsewhere. It remains to trace the course of domestic politics in Austria and Hungary from 1909.

Austria.—Whereas in 1909 the prestige of Austria-Hungary as a Power in Europe was enhanced by the policy of Count Aerenthal, its internal condition was greatly troubled by reason of the continued racial strife and opposition. In Austria the main point at issue continued to be, as it had long been, the language question. On 3rd February 1909, two laws were introduced into the Reichsrath, regulating the language question in Bohemia and intending to improve the administration. It was proposed to divide Bohemia into numerous districts according to language; there were to be 139 Czech, 95 German and 5 mixed areas of this kind. The Bills were debated on 5th February, and the Czech deputies condemned the scheme in unmeasured terms and raised a storm in the House by their wild and unruly conduct. "You are a disgrace to Austria," flew across the floor from the German benches, and the sentiment

¹ Count Leopold Berchtold, born on the 18th of March 1863; secretary of Embassy in Paris, 1895; councillor of embassy in London, 1899; at Petrograd, 1903; ambassador at Petrograd, 1906; foreign minister of the Dual Monarchy, 19th of February 1912.

only added fuel to the flame. So impossible did the position become that the House was closed.

Baron von Bienenrath (b. 1863), the Premier, sought to win some measure of support from all parties by reconstructing his cabinet so as to include representatives from every party. Baron von Härdt became minister of the interior; Baron von Bilinski went to the treasury; Dr von Hochenburger obtained the portfolio for justice; Count Stürgkh became minister of education; Herr Wreba, of railways; Dr Weiskirchner, of commerce; Marshal von Georgi, of defence; Herr Ritt, of public works, and Herr Braf of agriculture. But the Czechs were obdurate and asked as the price of their support the reopening of the Bohemian diet which had been closed because of German obstruction. To this demand the Germans were deaf, and hence the Czechs in the Reichsrath had recourse to the same policy to which the Germans in the Bohemian diet had resorted. Nevertheless the government maintained itself against a vote of censure on its Bonian land policy, which was moved by Dr Shushtershtich, one of the Slav deputies, and defeated.

The ministry continued in office for a little over eight months (Feb. 11 to Oct. 31, 1909). It broke up over the language question, on which the pure German crown lands—Upper and Lower Austria, Salzburg and Vorarlberg—took up a firm stand. A law passed the diets of these provinces making German the only language of the schools and of the administration. The imperial cabinet recommended the bill for the sanction of the crown, despite the opposition of the two Czech ministers, who, being defeated in the cabinet, forthwith resigned (Nov. 2). The victory of the German element in Austria stirred up anew the hate of the Czechs, whose national feelings had been strengthened by the congress at Warsaw, held earlier in the year (Aug. 1909). They accordingly decided on a policy of thoroughgoing obstruction in the imperial diet, and members of the party made speeches of twelve and thirteen hours' duration (Dec. 15-19, 1909). In consequence of this policy the House sat for eighty-six consecutive hours, virtually doing nothing. To make such a course impossible in the future, new rules of procedure were adopted (Dec. 19, 1909).

The language question had occupied so much parliamentary time that little was left for the consideration of the budget. But the budget this year demanded more attention than usual. For the first time since 1888 there was a deficit, the amount being over six millions sterling. The acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina was responsible for this to some extent; also the cost of the administration, which was steadily increasing, owing largely to national jealousies. In many cases one school would suffice where there were actually two and sometimes even more; but since it became necessary to give each nationality its own schools, the difficulty could not well be avoided. New revenues were therefore necessary, and on the 23rd of December 1909 a provisional budget for six months was agreed to, which included higher spirit duties, a progressive income tax and death duties.

As in the House itself, so in the country, racial antagonism was particularly marked during 1909, and it must be admitted that the Bienenrath ministry showed more energy in repressing outbursts than many of its predecessors. Especially troublesome were the student riots at Prague during the first three months of the year. Not till the police charged the crowd with bayonets (March 28) was there a cessation of hostilities. The student differences were only one aspect of the racial feuds, which expressed themselves in other ways as well. For instance, in January, there was an attack on Czech postal officials at Eger; at Cracow the Czech population resolved on a boycott of German commercial houses; on the 29th of January Baron Sternberg, a prominent Czech leader, roused German feeling by declaring that Bohemia was inhabited by Czechs and robbers. Though for a time there was a cessation of hostilities, race opposition smouldered. That it had not abated is proved by the fact that the conference of Austrian Catholics fixed for the first week in September in Vienna had to be postponed because it was feared that national ill-feeling would break it up.

The Czechs were not the only discontented element in Austria. There were also difficulties with the Italian subjects of the Empire, who had long been clamouring for an Italian university at Trieste. But the Slav nationalities had also put forward a similar request; and while the government were willing to meet the Italian demand, they were by no means disposed to listen to the Slavs. Hence they were in somewhat of a difficulty. However, a bill was introduced in the Reichsrath (Jan. 20, 1909) for the establishment of an independent Italian Faculty of Law, to be attached to the Vienna University. But this did not content the Italians, chiefly because they considered the capital unsuitable, and more than that, because in the proposed scheme lectures in German were optional. So the scheme was shelved for the moment, and the Italian agitation continued. Several alternative proposals were put forward by the government, but none of them found acceptance, and on the 14th of May 1910, two hundred Italian students demonstrated in front of the parliament buildings in favour of a full university at Trieste. No sooner did the Italians recommence their campaign than the other nationalities again put forward similar demands. The Czechs, who already had a university of their own at Prague, clamoured for a second one at Brünn; the Ruthenians also demanded a seat of learning, though they were not agreed as to the locality; the Slavonians pressed for a university at Laibach, and he Rumanians asked that the University of Czernowitz should become a Rumanian

academic centre. The government could not possibly satisfy all the demands, partly for lack of funds and partly because it was not politic to accentuate national differences still more. As it was, student riots were numerous enough; on the 1st of July 1910 a serious conflict between Poles and Ruthenians occurred at Lemberg.

The Agram trial was another illustration of the determined policy of the government to maintain order with a firm hand. The dissatisfaction of the Slav elements in the empire expressed itself in sympathy with the Servians, and it was alleged that an extensive Slav movement was on foot to wrest Croatia, Slavonia and Bosnia from Austria-Hungary in order to join them to Servia, with the view of forming a "Greater Servia." Fifty-three persons, mostly traders and teachers, were accused of high treason; the trial lasted from the 3rd of March to the 5th of October 1909, and thirty-one of the accused were found guilty and sentenced to penal servitude. The evidence was somewhat flimsy, and an appeal was lodged against the decision, which ended (Nov. 22, 1910) in the quashing of the sentences.

An echo of this case was the Friedjung trial. The Servian conspiracy had naturally been commented upon in the press, and among others, Dr Henry Friedjung, a publicist of some note, had written an article on the subject in the *Neue Freie Presse* of the 25th of March 1909, in which he accused the leaders of the Serbo-Croatian party (Dr Tuskan and Messrs Vinkowitsch and Supilo) of having received subsidies from the Servian government. The three persons named brought an action for libel against Dr Friedjung (September 9-22, 1909), in the course of which it was proved that the documents on which Friedjung had based his accusations had been forged. He thereupon withdrew his charge and the case was dropped.

The racial conflicts were as bitter as ever in the year 1910. Nevertheless the smooth drift of foreign affairs left the government free to become master in its own house. Moreover, the personality of the emperor did much to give it support indirectly; the celebration of his eightieth birthday (Aug. 18, 1910) only heightened the patriotic feelings of large masses of people. Hence the work of the government was facilitated somewhat, and it made fair progress. It strengthened the army and navy, it made commercial treaties with the Balkan states, and it promulgated a constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina. For defence no less a sum than twelve millions was voted, besides about £900,000 annually in addition, and for social insurance some three to four millions sterling. The Reichsrat therefore passed bills for extensive loans, and on the 24th of June the budget for 1910 was agreed to.

In both Austria and Hungary the ministries appeared to be stronger than the Opposition parties, even though their majorities were very small. The smallness of the majorities, however, rendered their position so uncertain that when a question arose on which the parties were not united the situation might become impossible. As a matter of fact it did in Austria; the stone of stumbling was the Canal policy of the government. As early as 1901 the Körber ministry had overcome obstruction by holding out the promise of an extensive programme of public works, more especially the construction of numerous canals, in which Czechs and Germans were alike interested. But the cost of the scheme had proved too high, and though the necessary bills had actually passed, the work was never carried out. Part of the plan had been the canalisation of Galician waterways, and the Poles now pressed for their realisation (Nov. 24, 1910). The resolution of Moraszewski was carried by 257 votes to 128, and for thirteen days longer the cabinet held out, hoping that the matter would not be insisted on. The Poles, however, were determined to make the most of their victory, and on the 12th of December the Bienerth ministry resigned. The emperor requested it to carry on the work of government until a successor should be appointed. In the meantime the House agreed to a provisional budget for three months (Dec. 16) and also extended the charter of the Austro-Hungarian bank until February 1911.

The reason for the government's defeat on the Canal issue was the impossibility of uniting the Germans and Czechs, both of whom would, in normal circumstances, have voted for the government on this question. But they were as far as ever from any agreement on the language question. An attempt on the part of the premier to unite them by a personal appeal to the leaders of the opposing "clubs" proved fruitless. Keen as the opposition was in Vienna, it was keener still in Prague, where, as a result of the obstructionist policy of the Germans, the Bohemian diet had to be adjourned after sitting four days (Feb. 8, 1910), because it could do no business. From the 8th of February to the 30th of September the diet was not in session, and as a result, since the local budget could not be got through the House, the Executive had to decide on a policy of economy, which included deleting items of expenditure for humanitarian and educational purposes. No less a sum than three-quarters of a million sterling was thus eliminated, and one consequence was that 280 lunatics had to be released from the State asylums. Nevertheless, the language struggle continued. On the 20th of September 1910 a conference took place at Cracow between Germans and Czechs with a view to some settlement, the Germans intimating their readiness to meet the other side half way. Thereupon the diet was summoned for the 30th of September. On the 20th of October the conference was renewed, and a temporary agreement was arrived at. According to this all self-governing communities should choose their official language as they wished. In Prague, however, all notices should be issued in both

languages, but the seal of the city and the names of the streets were to remain Czech. It seemed as though some settlement was in view. But on the 17th of November 1910 the Germans declared their inability to accept the compromise, and once more the diet had to be closed (Dec. 14) without any provision having been made for the financial needs of the year. The result was that Bohemia had to face a deficit of over two millions sterling.

The struggle in Bohemia was embittered by an agitation to throw off the authority of the Catholic Church (*Los von Rom Bewegung*). On the 20th of April a mass meeting was held in Johannesberg, which resolved on a policy of leaving the church, and fixed the 15th of May as the day appointed for the purpose. On the 6th of May there was a demonstration in front of the Parliament Buildings by several hundred divorced men and women, who demanded that the Civil Code should be so amended as to allow of divorced persons remarrying, and threatened to leave the church otherwise. From the 9th to the 13th of September the Congress of Austrian Catholics met at Innsbruck, and on the 11th a counter demonstration of over a thousand persons was held, demanding the separation of the state from the church, and freedom of the schools from clerical influence.

The racial conflict in Bohemia found its counterpart in Galicia and Moravia, where hatred of the German element increased in strength, more especially after the 500th celebration (July 15) of the Battle of Tannenberg,¹ which recalled ancient hatred and showed itself in persecution. In one community, Thermenau, in Lower Austria, the elected corporation was removed (July 28) because of its anti-German excesses, and was replaced by a government commissary.

The promulgation of a constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina was in striking contrast to this last fact. The two provinces had been annexed in 1908, and the constitution was proclaimed on the 22nd of February 1910. The diet, chosen by universal suffrage, is competent to deal with provincial finances, taxes, railways, police public works, civil and criminal laws, always subject to Austrian or Hungarian veto. There are three divisions of the electorate, and in all three the number of representatives in the diet is fixed according to the number of inhabitants professing each religion, the Jews have one seat, the Roman Catholics sixteen, the Mussulmans twenty-four, and the Orthodox thirty-one. The government appoints also twenty members, including the spiritual heads of the four religious communities. The president and vice-presidents of the assembly are appointed by the emperor every session, each religion being represented, and holding the presidency in turn. On the 14th of June the new diet was opened by the emperor in person, the occasion being marked by an attempt on the life of the governor, General Vareschanin; and one of the first acts of the diet was to pass a unanimous resolution declaring the constitution too narrow and not in accordance with the wishes of the people.

But the Austrian cabinet crisis of December 1910 required immediate attention, and little regard was likely to be had to the demands of the new diet, though it did receive a good deal of sympathy. On the 9th of January 1911 the cabinet was reconstructed. Baron Bienerth remained, and portfolios were given to members of the German, Czech and Polish parties. But the Slav element was strong in the cabinet; the Germans, therefore, disliked it, and already on its first appearance opposition was threatened. Its immediate work was to renew the charter of the Austro-Hungarian bank. This passed smoothly enough, but further effective work was impossible owing to the opposition of the Czechs and the Social Democrats. The ministry accordingly appealed to the country, and in June the general election brought about a somewhat different rearrangement of parties in the House. The German Nationalists obtained 100 seats; the Christian Socialists (Germans) 73; the Social Democrats (German Club) 49; the United Bohemian Club 84; the Social Democrats (Bohemian Club) 25; the Poles 70; the Social Democrats (Polish Club) 9; the Ukraine Union 28; the Croatia-Slavonian Coalition 27; the Dalmatian Club 7; the *Unio latina* 21; and Independents 23. The result was that the Social Democrats became the most influential party. Moreover, Baron Bienerth, having been defeated at the polls, was succeeded by Baron Gautsch² as premier. He did not hold office long; the task of attempting to unite Germans and Czechs was utterly hopeless, and on the 31st of October 1911 Baron Gautsch was succeeded by Dr Stürgkh.³ The change of *personnel* did not denote any change in policy. Parliamentary business showed the same characteristics this year as it did in previous years—obstruction and no progress—and when the end of the year approached no budget had been passed.

It was not very different in 1912, when the great bone of contention was the Army Bill, which nearly upset the Stürgkh administration. The catastrophe was averted only by the personal appeal of the emperor. The difficulties of the situation were accentuated by the serious misfortune that befell Count Stürgkh, who was threatened with blindness

¹ Battle of Tannenberg on 15th of July 1510, where a Polish-Lithuanian army defeated 80,000 German knights under the leadership of Ulrich von Jungingen.

² Paul Gautsch von Frankenthurn, born on the 26th of February 1851; in the ministry of education 1885-1893 and 1895-1897; made a peer 1890; premier and minister of the interior 1897-1898; premier 1904-1906.

³ Kalf Stürgkh, born on the 30th of October 1859; entered ministry of education 1880; minister of education 1909.

(May 15, 1912), and it was therefore necessary to appoint an acting premier in Baron von Reinhold, the minister of the interior. After much negotiation the Army Bill was passed, and the crisis averted. The outbreak of the war in the Balkans in October 1912 turned attention to matters of foreign policy, and the internal strife of factions flagged in consequence.

Economically the year 1911 was one of fair prosperity, chiefly because of the two successive good harvests (1910-11). The total volume of trade was large, though manufacturers and traders complained that the margin of profits was inadequate, owing to the continued high prices of food, and the remarkable rise in rents in most of the large towns. In consequence of these burdens on the working classes the Socialists organised a demonstration in the summer. The crowd became so threatening that it was necessary to order a cavalry charge. When the House met the incident was discussed, and during the sitting a man in the gallery fired at Dr Hoehenburger, the minister of justice.

Commerce was favourably affected by the various commercial treaties passed in 1909 and 1910. The treaty with Servia came into force on the 24th of January 1911, and put an end to the long tariff war. Austria stood to gain chiefly by the importation of slaughtered cattle from Servia. These would be supplemented by the exportation of cattle from Bulgaria, by the treaty which came into force on the 22nd of April 1912. With Montenegro likewise a commercial treaty was ratified on the 4th of March 1912.

As regards social legislation, the only enactment of importance was the law (June 3, 1910) forbidding night work for women, according to the terms of the international agreement of Berne. It came into force on the 1st of August 1911 (in the case of the raw sugar industry it will take effect in 1914).

Hungary.—In Hungary the prolonged political crisis of 1909 came to an end on the 17th-18th of January 1910, with the succession by Count Khuen-Hedervary¹ to the premiership. His cabinet was one of moderate views, yet when the House met (January 24, 1910) it passed a vote of lack of confidence in the new ministry by an overwhelming majority. The premier replied by adjourning the House for eight weeks. The time was utilized by the establishment of the "National Party of Work," under the leadership of Count Tisza. It appealed to the nation for support, pointing out that it was impossible to realize the demands of the Independent and Kossuth parties, seeing that the crown would never agree to the Hungarian word of command, and that an independent Hungarian bank had not sufficient credit. It was necessary to form a party which should bring about harmony between the crown and the people, and make possible a constructive policy. On the 21st of March the House was recalled to be dissolved, and the violent conduct of the members of the Kossuth and Justh parties, followed by street rioting by the Social Democrats, disgusted moderate men still more.

On the 22nd of March the House was dissolved, and when in June the new elections were held, the government received a large majority—246 seats out of a total of 413, whereas the Independent party in its two sections received only 85. Consequently the Hungarian parliament was able after a long interval to get legislative work done. The House was opened on the 25th of June 1910, and the speech from the throne referred to "the most urgent and immediate task of regulating the suffrage question anew." The government promised to introduce a bill "on the basis of universal suffrage, which while being in full consonance with the unity of the national character of the Hungarian State will yet be in accord with the demands of the development of democracy." Other measures that were passed included a bill sanctioning foreign loans and the Census Bill.

The Independent party, however, still maintained their old programme and resorted to obstructionist methods in order to make themselves heard. In November 1911 things came to such a pass that it was resolved to adopt new rules of procedure to make obstruction impossible. The Opposition was unyielding, and the House witnessed disgraceful scenes, the upshot of which was that the Cabinet came to an arrangement with the Kossuthists with regard to the Army Bill. But the basis of this agreement the crown was unable to recognize; whereupon Count Khuen-Hedervary tendered his resignation (March 6, 1912). At the request of the crown, however, the premier agreed to go on acting as first minister, especially as the emperor threatened to abdicate if he would not (March 31, 1912). It was intended that he should try to smooth over the difficulties of the situation. But difficult as the state of affairs was, it was intensified by the policy of the government in Croatia. In December 1911 the general elections for the diet had been held, and the government were defeated, obtaining only 21 seats, whereas the Serbo-Croatian coalition obtained 24 and the Allied Croatian Right 27. Hence the diet was dissolved at the end of January 1912, without meeting. Preparations for a new election were at once commenced, but the government, fearing a recurrence of the results, stopped the electioneering and suspended Croatian autonomy. A new Ban, M. Cuvaj, was appointed as royal commissioner (April 3, 1912), and virtually a despotism was established. A movement of protest at once grew up. By the middle of April 1912 it was beginning to take practical measures, such as the proclamation of a boycott of all goods coming from Hungary.

¹ Count Caroly Khuen-Belasi-Hedervary, born on the 23rd of June 1849; entered parliament 1875; ban of Croatia 1883-1903; premier 1903 and again in 1910.

The Khuen-Hedervary cabinet was unable to maintain itself, and on the 17th of April 1912, it resigned. Three days later the emperor-king entrusted Dr de Lukacs, minister of finance, with the formation of a new cabinet. The ministers of the late cabinet joined the new ministry, and Dr Lukacs attempted to find means of coming to some understanding with the Kossuth party with a view to introducing the army reform measure (April 21, 1912). The negotiations failed, and the only method of overcoming obstruction in the House seemed to be by an abusive interpretation of the standing orders. Count Tisza, who favoured such a course, was elected president of the chamber (May 22, 1912), and before long he carried through his policy with great success. On the 4th of June 1912, he secured the adoption of the Army Bill, and—after 36 Opposition deputies had been removed by the police and the rest had left the chamber—of a bill to increase the annual contingent of Honvéd recruits. His action was approved by the monarch (June 12, 1912), but the Opposition were by no means cowed. When parliament met after the recess (Sept. 17, 1912) the same tactics were resorted to by the dissatisfied party and similarly met by the president. For two days the chamber presented a scene of disorder, and on the 18th of September the majority of the deputies adjourned *sine die*.

Despite these proceedings the Hungarian minister of finance was able to declare (September 23, 1912) that the fiscal year ended with a surplus of over 2½ millions sterling. That was accountable by the fact that the year was on the whole a prosperous one for Hungary. One way in which the improved conditions showed themselves was an enormous development in the building trade. In Budapest alone no less than 600 new houses were completed, many of them very large ones. But prices of the necessaries of life, particularly of meat, continued to rule very high in the towns, and in all probability the high price of food contributed to the prosperity of farmers. That agriculture was a profitable business was evidenced by the immense increase in the value of land and the rise in rents.

CHAPTER X

PARTY GOVERNMENT IN AUSTRIA

As already explained, the name Austria is used for convenience to designate those portions of the possessions of the house of Habsburg, which were not included by the settlement of 1867 among the lands of the Hungarian crown. The separation of Hungary made it necessary to determine the method by which these territories¹ were henceforth to be governed. It was the misfortune of the country that there was no clear legal basis on which new institutions could be erected. Each of the territories was a separate political unit with a separate history, and some of them had a historic claim to a large amount of self-government; in many the old feudal estates had survived till 1848. Since that year the empire had been the subject of numerous experiments in government; by the last, which began in 1860, *Landtage* or diets have been instituted in each of the territories on a nearly uniform system and with nearly identical powers, and by the constitution published in February 1861 (the February Constitution, as it is called), which is still the ultimate basis for the government, there was instituted a *Reichsrath* or parliament for the whole empire; it consisted of a House of Lords (*Herrenhaus*), in which sat the archbishops and prince bishops, members of the imperial family, and other members appointed for life, besides some hereditary members, and a Chamber of Deputies. The members of the latter for each territory were not chosen by direct election, but by the diets. The diets themselves were elected for six years; they were chosen generally (there were slight local differences) in the following way: (a) a certain number of bishops and rectors of universities sat in virtue of their office; (b) the rest of the members were chosen by four electoral bodies or *curiae*,—(1) the owners of estates which before 1848 had enjoyed certain feudal privileges, the so-called great proprietors; (2) the chambers of commerce; (3) the towns; (4) the rural districts. In the two latter classes all had the suffrage who paid at least ten gulden in direct taxes. The districts were so arranged as to give the towns a very large representation in proportion to their populations. In Bohemia, e.g., the diet consisted of 241 members: of these five were *ex officio* members; the feudal proprietors had seventy; the towns and chambers of commerce together had eighty-seven; the rural districts seventy-nine. The electors in the rural districts were 236,000, in the towns 93,000. This arrangement seems to have been deliberately made by Schmerling, so as to give greater power to the German inhabitants of the towns; the votes of the proprietors would, moreover, nearly always give the final decision to the court and the government, for the influence exercised by the government over the nobility would generally be strong enough to secure a majority in favour of the government policy.

This constitution had failed; territories so different in size, history and

¹ It is impossible to avoid using the word "Austria" to designate these territories, though it is probably incorrect. Officially the word "Austria" is not found, and though the sovereign is emperor of Austria, an Austrian empire appears not to exist; the territories are spoken of in official documents as "the kingdoms and lands represented in the Reichsrath." The Hungarians and the German party in Austria have expressed their desire that the word Austria should be used, but it has not been gratified. On the other hand, expressions such as "Austrian citizens," "Austrian law" are found. The reason of this peculiar use is probably twofold. On the one hand, a reluctance to confess that Hungary is no longer in any sense a part of Austria; on the other hand, the refusal of the Czechs to recognize that their country is part of Austria. Sometimes the word *Erbländer*, which properly is applied only to the older ancestral dominions of the house of Habsburg, is used for want of a better word.

circumstances were not contented with similar institutions, and a form of self-government which satisfied Lower Austria and Salzburg did not satisfy Galicia and Bohemia. The Czechs of Bohemia, like the Magyars, had refused to recognize the common parliament on the ground that it violated the historic rights of the Bohemian as of the Hungarian crown, and in 1865 the constitution of 1861 had been superseded, while the territorial diets remained. In 1867 it was necessary once more to summon, in some form or another, a common parliament for the whole of Austria, by which the settlement with Hungary could be ratified.

This necessity brought to a decisive issue the struggle between the parties of the Centralists and Federalists. The latter claimed that the new constitution must be made by agreement with the territories; the former maintained that the constitution of 1861 was still valid, and demanded that in accordance with it the Reichsrath should be summoned and a "constitutional" government restored. The difference between the two parties was to a great extent, though not entirely, one of race. The kernel of the empire was the purely German district, including Upper and Lower Austria, Salzburg, Tirol (except the south) and Vorarlberg, all Styria except the southern districts, and a large part of Carinthia. There was strong local feeling, especially in Tirol, but it was local feeling similar to that which formerly existed in the provinces of France; among all classes and parties there was great loyalty both to the ruling house and to the idea of the Austrian state; but while the Liberal party, which was dominant in Lower Austria and Styria, desired to develop the central institutions, there was a strong Conservative and Clerical party which supported local institutions as a protection against the Liberal influence of a centralized parliament and bureaucracy, and the bishops and clergy were willing to gain support in the struggle by alliance with the Federalists.

Very different was it in the other territories where the majority of the population was not German—and where there was a lively recollection of the time when they were not Austrian. With Palacky, they said, "We existed before Austria; we shall continue to exist after it is gone." Especially was this the case in Bohemia. In this great country, the richest part of the Austrian dominions, where over three-fifths of the population were Czech, racial feeling was supported by the appeal to historic law. A great party, led by Palacky and Rieger, demanded the restoration of the Bohemian monarchy in its fullest extent, including Moravia and Silesia, and insisted that the emperor should be crowned as king of Bohemia at Prague as his predecessors had been, and that Bohemia should have a position in the monarchy similar to that obtained by Hungary. Not only did the party include all the Czechs, but they were supported by many of the great nobles who were of German descent, including Count Leo Thun, his brother-in-law Count Heinrich Clam-Martiniz, and Prince Friedrich von Schwarzenberg, cardinal archbishop of Prague, who hoped in a self-governing kingdom of Bohemia to preserve that power which was threatened by the German Liberals. The feudal nobles had great power arising from their wealth, the great traditions of their families, and the connexion with the court, and by the electoral law they had a large number of representatives in the diet. On the other hand the Germans of Bohemia, fearful of falling under the control of the Czechs, were the most ardent advocates of centralization. The Czechs were supported also by their fellow-countrymen in Moravia, and some of the nobles, headed by Count Belcredi, brother of the minister; but in Brünn there was a strong German party. In Silesia the Germans had a considerable majority, and as there was a large Polish element which did not support the Czechs, the diet refused to recognize the claims of the Bohemians.

The Poles of Galicia stood apart from the other Slav races. The German-speaking population was very small, consisting chiefly of government officials, railway servants and Jews; but there was a large minority (some 43 %) of Ruthenes. The Poles wished to gain as much autonomy as they could for their own province, but they had no interest in opposing the centralization of other parts; they were satisfied if Austria would surrender the Ruthenes to them. They were little influenced by the pan-Slav agitation; it was desirable for them that Austria, which gave them freedom and power, should continue strong and united. Their real interests were outside the monarchy, and they did not cease to look forward to a restoration of the Polish kingdom. The great danger was that they might entangle Austria in a war with Russia.

The southern Slavs had neither the unity, nor the organization, nor the historical traditions of the Czechs and Poles; but the Slovenes, who formed a large majority of the population in Carniola, and a considerable minority in the adjoining territory of Carinthia and the south of Styria, demanded that their language should be used for purposes of government and education. Their political ideal was an "Illyrian" kingdom, including Croatia and all the southern Slavs in the coast district, and a not very successful movement had been started to establish a so-called Illyrian language, which should be accepted by both Croats and Slovenes. There was, however, another element in the southern districts, viz. the Serbs, who, though of the same race and language as the Croats, were separated from them by religion. Belonging to the Orthodox Church they were attracted by Russia. They were in constant communication with Servia and Montenegro; and their ultimate hope, the creation of a great Servian kingdom, was less easy to reconcile with loyalty to

Austria. Of late years attempts have been made to turn the Slovenian national movement into this direction, and to attract the Slovenes also towards the Orthodox non-Austrian Slavs.

In the extreme south of Dalmatia is a small district which had not formed part of the older duchy of Dalmatia, and had not been joined to the Austrian empire till 1814; in former years part of it formed the republic of Ragusa, and the rest belonged to Albania. The inhabitants of this part, who chiefly belonged to the Greek Church, still kept up a close connexion with Albania and with Montenegro, and Austrian authority was maintained with difficulty. Disturbances had already broken out once before; and in 1869 another outbreak took place. This district had hitherto been exempted from military service; by the law of 1869, which introduced universal military service, those who had hitherto been exempted were required to serve, not in the regular army but in the militia. The inhabitants of the district round the Bocche di Cattaro (the Bocchesi, as they are commonly called) refused to obey this order, and when a military force was sent it failed to overcome their resistance; and by an agreement made at Knezlac in December 1869, Rodics, who had taken command, granted the insurgents all they asked and a complete amnesty. After the conquest of Bosnia another attempt was made to enforce military service; once more a rebellion broke out, and spread to the contiguous districts of Herzegovina. This time, however, the government, whose position in the Balkans had been much strengthened by the occupation of the new provinces, did not fear to act with decision. A considerable force was sent under General Baron Stephan von Jovanovich (1828-1885); they were supported from sea by the navy, and eventually the rebellion was crushed. An amnesty was proclaimed, but the greater number of the insurgents sought refuge in Montenegro rather than submit to military service.

The Italians of Trieste and Istria were the only people of the empire who really desired separation from Austria; annexation to Italy was the aim of the *Italianissimi*, as they were called. The feeling was less strong in Tirol, where, except in the city of Trent, they seem chiefly to have wished for separate local institutions, so that they should no longer be governed from Innsbruck. The Italian-speaking population on the coast of Dalmatia only asked that the government should uphold them against the pressure of the Slav races in the interior, and for this reason were ready to support the German constitutionalists.

The party of centralization was then the Liberal German party, supported by a few Italians and the Ruthenes, and as years went by it was to become the National German party. They hoped by a common parliament to create the feeling of a common Austrian nationality, by German schools to spread the use of the German language. Every grant of self-government to the territories must diminish the influence of the Germans, and bring about a restriction in the use of the German language; moreover, in countries such as Bohemia, full self-government would almost certainly mean that the Germans would become the subject race. This was a result which they could not accept. It was intolerable to them that just at the time when the national power of the non-Austrian Germans was so greatly increased, and the Germans were becoming the first race in Europe, they themselves should resign the position as rulers which they had won during the last three hundred years. They maintained, moreover, that the ascendancy of the Germans was the only means of preserving the unity of the monarchy; German was the only language in which the different races could communicate with one another; it must be the language of the army, the civil service and the parliament. They laid much stress on the historic task of Austria in bringing German culture to the half-civilized races of the east. They demanded, therefore, that all higher schools and universities should remain German, and that so far as possible the elementary schools should be Germanized. They looked on the German schoolmaster as the apostle of German culture, and they looked forward to the time when the feeling of a common Austrian nationality should obscure the national feeling of the Slavs, and the Slavonic idioms should survive merely as the local dialects of the peasantry, the territories becoming merely the provinces of a united and centralized state. The total German population was not quite a third of the whole. The maintenance of their rule was, therefore, only possible by the exercise of great political ability, the more so, since, as we have seen, they were not united among themselves, the clergy and Feudal party being opposed to the Liberals. Their watchword was the constitution of 1861, which had been drawn up by their leaders; they demanded that it should be restored, and with it parliamentary government. They called themselves, therefore, the Constitutional party. But the introduction of parliamentary government really added greatly to the difficulty of the task before them. In the old days German ascendancy had been secured by the common army, the civil service and the court. As soon, however, as power was transferred to a parliament, the Germans must inevitably be in a minority, unless the method of election was deliberately arranged so as to give them a majority. Parliamentary discussion, moreover, was sure to bring out those racial differences which it was desirable should be forgotten, and the elections carried into every part of the empire a political agitation which was very harmful when each party represented a different race.

The very first events showed one of those extraordinary changes of policy so characteristic of modern Austrian history. The decision of the government on the constitutional

question was really determined by immediate practical necessity. The Hungarians required that the settlement should be ratified by a parliament, therefore a parliament must be procured which would do this. It must be a parliament in which the Germans had a majority, for the system of dualism was directly opposed to the ambitions of the Slavs and the Federalists. Belcredi, who had come into power in 1865 as a Federalist, and had suspended the constitution of 1861 on the 2nd of January 1867, ordered new elections for the diets, which were then to elect deputies to an extraordinary Reichsrath which should consider the *Ausgleich*, or compact with Hungary. The wording of the decree implied that the February constitution did not exist as of law; the Germans and Liberals, strenuously objecting to a "feudal-federal" constitution which would give the Slavs a preponderance in the empire, maintained that the February constitution was still in force, and that changes could only be introduced by a regular Reichsrath summoned in accordance with it, protested against the decree, and, in some cases, threatened not to take part in the elections. As the Federalists were all opposed to the *Ausgleich*, it was clear that a Reichsrath chosen in these circumstances would refuse to ratify it, and this was probably Belcredi's intention. As the existence of the empire would thereby be endangered, Beust interfered; Belcredi was dismissed, Beust himself became minister-president on the 7th of February 1867, and a new edict was issued from Vienna ordering the diets to elect a Reichsrath, according to the constitution, which was now said to be completely valid. Of course, however, those diets in which there was a Federalist majority, viz. those of Bohemia, Moravia, Carinthia and Tirol, which were already pledged to support the January policy of the government, did not acquiesce in the February policy; and they refused to elect except on terms which the government could not accept. The first three were immediately dissolved. In the elections which followed in Bohemia the influence of the government was sufficient to secure a German majority among the landed proprietors; the Czechs, who were therefore in a minority, declared the elections invalid, refused to take any part in electing deputies for the Reichsrath, and seceded altogether from the diet. The result was that Bohemia now sent a large German majority to Vienna, and the few Czechs who were chosen refused to take their seat in the parliament. Had the example of the Czechs been followed by the other Slav races it would still have been difficult to get together a Reichsrath to pass the *Ausgleich*. It was, however, easier to deal with the Poles of Galicia, for they had no historical rights to defend; and by sending delegates to Vienna they would not sacrifice any principle or prejudice any legal claim; they had only to consider how they could make the best bargain. Their position was a strong one; their votes were essential to the government, and the government could be useful to them; it could give them the complete control over the Ruthenes. A compact then was easily arranged.

Beust promised them that there should be a special minister for Galicia, a separate board for Galician education, that Polish should be the language of instruction in all secondary schools, that Polish instead of German should be the official language in the law courts and public offices, Ruthenian being only used in the elementary schools under strict limitations. On these terms the Polish deputies, led by Ziemiakowski, agreed to go to Vienna and vote for the *Ausgleich*.

When the Reichsrath met, the government had a large majority; and in the House, in which all the races except the Czechs were represented, the *Ausgleich* was ratified almost unanimously. This having been done, it was possible to proceed to special legislation for the territories, which were henceforward officially known as "the kingdoms and lands represented in the Reichsrath." A series of fundamental laws were carried, which formally established parliamentary government, with responsibility of ministers, and complete control over the budget, and there were included a number of clauses guaranteeing personal rights and liberties in the way common to all modern constitutions. The influence of the Poles was still sufficient to secure considerable concessions to the wishes of the Federalists, since if they did not get what they wished they would leave the House, and the Slovenes, Dalmatians and Tirolese would certainly follow them. Hence the German Liberals were prevented from introducing direct elections to the Reichsrath, and the functions of the Reichsrath were slightly less extensive than they had hitherto been. Moreover, the Delegation was to be chosen not by the House as a whole, but by the representatives of the separate territories. This is one reason for the comparative weakness of Austria as compared with Hungary, where the Delegation is elected by each House as a whole; the Bohemian representatives, e.g., meet and choose 10 delegates, the Galicians 7, those from Trieste 1; the Delegation is, therefore, not representative of the majority of the chamber of deputies, but includes representatives of all the groups which may be opposing the government there, and they can carry on their opposition even in the Delegation. So it came about in 1869 that on the first occasion when there was a joint sitting of the Delegations to settle a point in the budget, which Hungary had accepted and Austria rejected, the Poles and Tirolese voted in favour of the Hungarian proposal.

As soon as these laws had been carried (December 1867), Beust retired from the post of minister-president; and in accordance with constitutional practice a parliamentary ministry was appointed entirely from the ranks of the Liberal majority; a ministry generally known as the "Bürger Ministerium" in which Giskra and Herbst—the leaders of the

German party in Moravia and Bohemia—were the most important members. Austria now began its new life as a modern constitutional state. From this time the maintenance of the revised constitution of 1867 has been the watchword of what is called the Constitutional party. The first use which the new government made of their power was to settle the finances, and in this their best work was done. Among them were nearly all the representatives of trade and industry, of commercial enterprise and financial speculation; they were the men who hoped to make Austria a great industrial state, and at this time they were much occupied with railway enterprise. Convinced free-traders, they hoped by private energy to build up the fortunes of the country, parliamentary government—which meant for them the rule of the educated and well-to-do middle class—being one of the means to this end. They accepted the great burden of debt which the action of Hungary imposed upon the country, and rejected the proposals for repudiation, but notwithstanding the protest of foreign bondholders they imposed a tax of 16 % on all interest on the debt. They carried out an extension of the commercial treaty with Great Britain by which a further advance was made in the direction of free trade.

Of equal importance was their work in freeing Austria from the control of the Church, which checked the intellectual life of the people. The concordat of 1855 had given the Church complete freedom in the management of all ecclesiastical affairs; there was full liberty of intercourse with Rome, the state gave up all control over the appointment of the clergy, and in matters of church discipline the civil courts had no voice—the clergy being absolutely subject to the power of the bishops, who could impose temporal as well as spiritual penalties. The state had even resigned to the Church all authority over some departments of civil life, and restored the authority of the canon law. This was the case as regards marriage; all disputes were to be tried before ecclesiastical courts, and the marriage registers were kept by the priests. All the schools were under the control of the Church; the bishops could forbid the use of books prejudicial to religion; in elementary schools all teachers were subject to the inspection of the Church, and in higher schools only Roman Catholics could be appointed. It had been agreed that the whole education of the Roman Catholic youth, in all schools, private as well as public, should be in accordance with the teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. The authority of the Church extended even to the universities. Some change in this system was essential; the Liberal party demanded that the government should simply state that the concordat had ceased to exist. To this, however, the emperor would not assent, and there was a difficulty in overthrowing an act which took the form of a treaty. The government wished to come to some agreement by friendly discussion with Rome, but Pius IX. was not willing to abate anything of his full claims. The ministry, therefore, proceeded by internal legislation, and in 1868 introduced three laws: (1) a marriage law transferred the decisions on all questions of marriage from the ecclesiastical to the civil courts, abolished the authority of the canon law, and introduced civil marriage in those cases where the clergy refused to perform the ceremony; (2) the control of secular education was taken from the Church, and the management of schools transferred to local authorities which were to be created by the diets; (3) complete civil equality between Catholics and non-Catholics was established. These laws were carried through both Houses in May amid almost unparalleled excitement, and at once received the imperial sanction, notwithstanding the protest of all the bishops, led by Joseph Othmar von Rauscher (1797-1875), cardinal archbishop of Vienna, who had earned his red hat by the share he had taken in arranging the concordat of 1855, and now attempted to use his great personal influence with the emperor (his former pupil) to defeat the bill.

The ministry had the enthusiastic support of the German population in the towns. They were also supported by the teaching profession, which desired emancipation from ecclesiastical control, and hoped that German schools and German railways were to complete the work which Joseph II. had begun. But the hostility of the Church was dangerous. The pope, in an allocution of 22nd June 1868, declared that these "damnable and abominable laws" which were "contrary to the concordat, to the laws of the Church and to the principles of Christianity," were "absolutely and for ever null and void." The natural result was that when they were carried into effect the bishops in many cases refused to obey. They claimed that the laws were inconsistent with the concordat, that the concordat still was in force, and that the laws were consequently invalid. The argument was forcible, but the courts decided against them. Rudigier, bishop of Linz, was summoned to a criminal court for disturbing the public peace; he refused to appear, for by the concordat bishops were not subject to temporal jurisdiction; and when he was condemned to imprisonment the emperor at once telegraphed his full pardon. In the rural districts the clergy had much influence; they were supported by the peasants, and the diets of Tirol and Vorarlberg, where there was a clerical majority, refused to carry out the school law.

On the proclamation of papal infallibility in 1870, the government took the opportunity of declaring that the concordat had lapsed, on the ground that there was a fundamental change in the character of the papacy. Nearly all the Austrian prelates had been opposed to the new doctrine; many of them remained to the end of the council and voted against it, and they only declared their submission with great reluctance. The Old Catholic move-

ment, however, never made much progress in Austria. Laws regulating the position of the Church were carried in 1874.

During 1868 the constitution then was open to attack on two sides, for the nationalist movement was gaining ground in Bohemia and Galicia. In Galicia the extreme party, headed by Smolka, had always desired to imitate the Czechs and not attend at Vienna; they were outvoted, but all parties agreed on a declaration in which the final demands of the Poles were drawn up; they asked that the powers of the Galician diet should be much increased, and that the members from Galicia should cease to attend the Reichsrath on the discussion of those matters with which the Galician diet should be qualified to deal. If these demands were not granted they would leave the Reichsrath. In Bohemia the Czechs were very active; while the Poles were parading their hostility to Russia in such a manner as to cause the emperor to avoid visiting Galicia, some of the Czech leaders attended a Slav demonstration at Moscow, and in 1868 they drew up and presented to the diet at Prague a "declaration" which has since been regarded as the official statement of their claims. They asked for the full restoration of the Bohemian kingdom; they contended that no foreign assembly was qualified to impose taxes in Bohemia; that the diet was not qualified to elect representatives to go to Vienna, and that a separate settlement must be made with Bohemia similar to that with Hungary. This declaration was signed by eighty-one members, including many of the feudal nobles and bishops. The German majority declared that they had forfeited their seats, and ordered new elections. The agitation spread over the country, serious riots took place, and with a view to keeping order the government decreed exceptional laws. Similar events happened in Moravia, and in Dalmatia the revolt broke out among the Bocchesi.

Before the combination of Clericals and Federalists the ministry broke down; they were divided among themselves; Counts Taaffe and Alfred Potocki, the minister of agriculture, wished to conciliate the Slav races—a policy recommended by Beust, probably with the sympathy of the emperor; the others determined to cripple the opposition by taking away the elections for the Reichsrath from the diets. Taaffe and his friends resigned in January 1870, but the majority did not long survive. In March, after long delay, the new Galician demands were definitely rejected; the whole of the Polish club, followed by the Tirolese and Slovenes, left the House, which consequently consisted of 110 members—the Germans and German representatives from Bohemia and Moravia. It was clearly impossible to govern with such a parliament. Not four years had gone by, and the new constitution seemed to have failed like the old one. The only thing to do was to attempt a reconciliation with the Slavs. The ministry resigned, and Potocki and Taaffe formed a government with this object. Potocki, now minister-president, then entered on negotiations hoping to persuade the Czechs to accept the constitution. Rieger and Thun were summoned to Vienna; he himself went to Prague, but after two days he had to give up the attempt in despair. Feudals and Czechs all supported the declaration of 1868, and would accept no compromise, and he returned to Vienna after what was the greatest disappointment of his life. Government, however, had to be carried on; the war between Germany and France broke out in July, and Austria might be drawn into it; the emperor could not at such a crisis alienate either the Germans or the Slavs. The Reichsrath and all the diets were dissolved. This time in Bohemia the Czechs, supported by the Feudals and the Clericals, gained a large majority; they took their seats in the diet only to declare that they did not regard it as the legal representative of the Bohemian kingdom, but merely an informal assembly, and refused to elect delegates for the Reichsrath. The Germans in their turn now left the diet, and the Czechs voted an address to the crown, drawn up by Count Thun, demanding the restoration of the Bohemian kingdom. When the Reichsrath met there were present only 130 out of 203 members, for the whole Bohemian contingent was absent; the government then, under a law of 1868, ordered that as the Bohemian diet had sent no delegates, they were to be chosen directly from the people. Twenty-four Constitutionalists and thirty *Declaranten* were chosen; the latter, of course, did not go to Vienna, but the additional twenty-four made a working majority by which the government was carried on for the rest of the year.

But Potocki's influence was gone, and as soon as the European crisis was over, in February 1871, the emperor appointed a ministry chosen not from the Liberals but from the Federalists and Clericals, led by Count Hohenwart and A. E. F. Schäffe, a professor at the university of Vienna, chiefly known for his writings on political economy. They attempted to solve the problem by granting to the Federalists all their demands. So long as parliament was sitting they were kept in check; as soon as it had voted supplies and the Delegations had separated, they ordered new elections in all those diets where there was a Liberal majority. By the help of the Clericals they won enough seats to put the Liberals in a minority in the Reichsrath, and it would be possible to revise the constitution if the Czechs consented to come. They would only attend, however, on their own terms, which were a complete recognition by the government of the claims made in the Declaration. This was agreed to; and on the 12th of September at the opening of the diet, the governor read a royal message recognizing the separate existence of the Bohemian kingdom, and promising that the emperor should be crowned as king at Prague. It was received with

delight throughout Bohemia; and the Czechs drew a draft constitution of fundamental rights. On this the Germans, now that they were in a minority, left the diet, and began preparations for resistance. In Upper Austria, Moravia and Carinthia, where they were outvoted by the Clericals, they seceded, and the whole work of 1867 was on the point of being overthrown. Were the movement not stopped the constitution would be superseded, and the union with Hungary endangered. Beust and Andrassy warned the emperor of the danger, and the crown prince of Saxony was summoned by Beust to remonstrate with him. A great council was called at Vienna (October 20), at which the emperor gave his decision that the Bohemian demands could not be accepted. The Czechs must come to Vienna, and consider a revision of the constitution in a constitutional manner. Hohenwart resigned, but at the same time Beust was dismissed, and a new cabinet was chosen once more from among the German Liberals, under the leadership of Prince Adolf Auersperg, whose brother Carlos had been one of the chief members in the Bürger Ministerium. For the second time in four years the policy of the government had completely changed within a few months. On 12th September the decree had been published accepting the Bohemian claims; before the end of the year copies of it were seized by the police, and men were thrown into prison for circulating it.

Auersperg's ministry held office for eight years. They began as had the Bürger Ministerium, with a vigorous Liberal centralizing policy. In Bohemia they succeeded at first in almost crushing the opposition. In 1872 the diet was dissolved; and the whole influence of the government was used to procure a German majority. Koller, the governor, acted with great vigour. Opposition newspapers were suppressed; cases in which Czech journalists were concerned were transferred to the German districts, so that they were tried by a hostile German jury. Czech manifestoes were confiscated, and meetings stopped at the slightest appearance of disorder; and the riots were punished by quartering soldiers upon the inhabitants. The decision between the two races turned on the vote of the feudal proprietors, and in order to win this a society was formed among the German capitalists of Vienna (to which the name of *Chabrus* was popularly given) to acquire by real or fictitious purchase portions of those estates to which a vote was attached. These measures were successful; a large German majority was secured; Jews from Vienna sat in the place of the Thuns and the Schwarzenbergs; and as for many years the Czechs refused to sit in the diet, the government could be carried on without difficulty. A still greater blow to the Federalists was the passing of a new electoral law in 1873. The measure transferred the right of electing members of the Reichsrath from the diets to the direct vote of the people, the result being to deprive the Federalists of their chief weapon; it was no longer possible to take a formal vote of the legal representatives in any territory refusing to appoint deputies, and if a Czech or Slovene member did not take his seat the only result was that a single constituency was unrepresented, and the opposition weakened. The measure was strongly opposed. A petition with 250,000 names was presented from Bohemia; and the Poles withdrew from the Reichsrath when the law was introduced. But enough members remained to give the legal quorum, and it was carried by 120 to 2 votes. At the same time the number of members was increased to 353, but the proportion of representatives from the different territories was maintained and the system of election was not altered. The proportion of members assigned to the towns was increased, the special representatives of the chambers of commerce and of the landed proprietors were retained, and the suffrage was not extended. The artificial system which gave to the Germans a parliamentary majority continued.

At this time the Czechs were much weakened by quarrels among themselves. A new party had arisen, calling themselves Radicals, but generally known as the Young Czechs. They disliked the alliance with the aristocracy and the clergy; they wished for universal suffrage, and recalled the Hussite traditions. They desired to take their seats in the diet, and to join with the Germans in political reform. They violently attacked Rieger, the leader of the Old Czechs, who maintained the alliance with the Feudalists and the policy of passive opposition. Twenty-seven members of the diet led by Gregr and Stadkowsky, being outvoted in the Czech Club, resigned their seats. They were completely defeated in the elections which followed, but for the next four years the two parties among the Czechs were as much occupied in opposing one another as in opposing the Germans. These events might have secured the predominance of the Liberals for many years. The election after the reform bill gave them an increased majority in the Reichsrath. Forty-two Czechs who had won seats did not attend; forty-three Poles stood aloof from all party combination, giving their votes on each occasion as the interest of their country seemed to require; the real opposition was limited to forty Clericals and representatives of the other Slav races, who were collected on the Right under the leadership of Hohenwart. Against them were 227 Constitutionalists, and it seemed to matter little that they were divided into three groups; there were 105 in the Liberal Club under the leadership of Herbst, 57 Constitutionalists; elected by the landed proprietors, and a third body of Radicals, some of whom were more democratic than the old Constitutional party, while others laid more stress on nationality. They used their majority to carry a number of important laws regarding ecclesiastical affairs. Yet within four years the government was obliged to turn for support

to the Federalists and Clericals, and the rule of the German Liberals was overthrown. Their influence was indirectly affected by the great commercial crisis of 1873. For some years there had been active speculations on the Stock Exchange; a great number of companies, chiefly banks and building societies, had been founded on a very insecure basis. The inevitable crisis began in 1872; it was postponed for a short time, and there was some hope that the Exhibition, fixed for 1873, would bring fresh prosperity; the hope was not, however, fulfilled, and the final crash, which occurred in May, brought with it the collapse of hundreds of undertakings. The loss fell almost entirely on those who had attempted to increase their wealth by speculative investment. Sound industrial concerns were little touched by it, but speculation had become so general that every class of society was affected, and in the investigation which followed it became apparent that some of the most distinguished members of the governing Liberal party, including at least two members of the government, were among those who had profited by the unsound finance. It appeared also that many of the leading newspapers of Vienna, by which the Liberal party was supported, had received money from financiers. For the next two years political interest was transferred from parliament to the law courts, in which financial scandals were exposed, and the reputations of some of the leading politicians were destroyed.

This was to bring about a reaction against the economic doctrines which had held the field for nearly twenty years; but the full effect of the change was not seen for some time. What ruined the government was the want of unity in the party, and their neglect to support a ministry which had been taken from their own ranks. In a country like Austria, in which a mistaken foreign policy or a serious quarrel with Hungary might bring about the disruption of the monarchy, parliamentary government was impossible unless the party which the government helped in internal matters were prepared to support it in foreign affairs and in the commercial policy bound up with the settlement with Hungary. This the constitutional parties did not do. During discussions on the economic arrangement with Hungary in 1877 a large number voted against the duties on coffee and petroleum, which were an essential part of the agreement; they demanded, moreover, that the treaty of Berlin should be laid before the House, and 112 members, led by Herbst, gave a vote hostile to some of its provisions, and in the Delegation refused the supplies necessary for the occupation of Bosnia. They doubtless were acting in accordance with their principles, but the situation was such that it would have been impossible to carry out their wishes; the only result was that the Austrian ministers and Andrassy had to turn for help to the Poles, who began to acquire the position of a government party, which they have kept since then. At the beginning of 1879 Auersperg's resignation, which had long been offered, was accepted. The constitutionalists remained in power; but in the reconstructed cabinet, though Stremayr was president, Count Taaffe, as minister of the interior, was the most important member.

Parliament was dissolved in the summer, and Taaffe, by private negotiations, first of all persuaded the Bohemian feudal proprietors to give the Feudalists, who had long been excluded, a certain number of seats; secondly, he succeeded where Potocki had failed, and came to an agreement with the Czechs; they had already, in 1878, taken their seats in the diet at Prague, and now gave up the policy of "passive resistance," and consented to take their seats also in the parliament at Vienna.

On entering the House they took the oath without reservation, but in the speech from the throne the emperor himself stated that they had entered without prejudice to their convictions, and on the first day of the session Rieger read a formal reservation of right. The Liberals had also lost many seats, so that the House now had a completely different aspect; the constitutionalists were reduced to 91 Liberals and 54 Radicals; but the Right, under Hohenwart, had increased to 57, and there were 57 Poles and 54 Czechs. A combination of these three parties might govern against the constitutionalists. Taaffe, who now became first minister, tried first of all to govern by the help of the moderates of all parties, and he included representatives of nearly every party in his cabinet. But the Liberals again voted against the government on an important military bill, an offence almost as unpardonable in Austria as in Germany, and a great meeting of the party decided that they would not support the government. Taaffe, therefore, was obliged to turn for support to the Right. The German members of the government resigned, their place was taken by Clericals, Poles and Czechs, Smolka was elected president of the Lower House of the Reichsrath, and the German Liberals found themselves in a minority opposed by the "iron ring" of these three parties, and helpless in the parliament of their own creation. For fourteen years Taaffe succeeded in maintaining the position he had thus secured. He was not himself a party man; he had sat in a Liberal government; he had never assented to the principles of the Federalists, nor was he an adherent of the Clerical party. He continued to rule according to the constitution; his watchword was "unpolitical politics," and he brought in little contentious legislation. The great source of his strength was that he stood between the Right and a Liberal government. There was a large minority of constitutionalists; they might easily become a majority, and the Right were therefore obliged to support Taaffe in order to avert this. They continued to support him, even if they did not get from him all that they could have wished, and the Czechs acquiesced in a

foreign policy with which they had little sympathy. Something, however, had to be done for them, and from time to time concessions had to be made to the Clericals and the Federalists.

The real desire of the Clericals was an alteration of the school law, by which the control of the schools should be restored to the Church and the period of compulsory education reduced. In this, however, the government did not meet them, and in 1882 the Clericals, under Prince Alfred v. Liechtenstein, separated from Hohenwart's party and founded their own club, so that they could act more freely. Both the new Clerical Club and the remainder of the Conservatives were much affected by the reaction against the doctrines of economic Liberalism. They began to adopt the principles of Christian Socialism expounded by Rudolf Mayer and Baron von Vogelfang, and the economic revolt against the influence of capital was with them joined to a half-religious attack upon the Jews. They represented that Austria was being governed by a close ring of political financiers, many of whom were Jews or in the pay of the Jews, who used the forms of the constitution, under which there was no representation of the working classes, to exploit the labour of the poor at the same time that they ruined the people by alienating them from Christianity in "godless schools." It was during these years that the foundation for the democratic clericalism of the future was laid. The chief political leader in this new tendency was Prince Aloys v. Liechtenstein, who complained of the political influence exercised by the chambers of commerce, and demanded the organization of working men in guilds. It was by their influence that a law was introduced limiting the rate of interest, and they co-operated with the government in legislation for improving the material condition of the people, which had been neglected during the period of Liberal government, and which was partly similar to the laws introduced at the same time in Germany.

There seems no doubt that the condition of the workmen in the factories of Moravia and the oil-mines of Galicia was peculiarly unfortunate; the hours of work were very long, the conditions were very injurious to health, and there were no precautions against accidents. The report of a parliamentary inquiry, called for by the Christian Socialists, showed the necessity for interference. In 1883 a law was carried, introducing factory inspection, extending to mines and all industrial undertakings. The measure seems to have been successful, and there is a general agreement that the inspectors have done their work with skill and courage. In 1884 and 1885 important laws were passed regulating the work in mines and factories, and introducing a maximum working day of eleven hours in factories, and ten hours in mines. Sunday labour was forbidden, and the hours during which women and children could be employed were limited. Great power was given to the administrative authorities to relax the application of these laws in special cases and special trades. This power was at first freely used, but it was closely restricted by a further law of 1893. In 1887-1888 laws, modelled on the new German laws, introduced compulsory insurance against accidents and sickness. These measures, though severely criticized by the Opposition, were introduced to remedy obvious, and in some cases terrible social evils. Other laws to restore guilds among working men had a more direct political object. Another form of state socialism was the acquisition of railways by the state. Originally railways had been built by private enterprise, supported in some cases by a state guarantee; a law of 1877 permitted the acquisition of private lines; when Taaffe retired the state possessed nearly 5000 m. of railway, not including those which belonged to Austria and Hungary conjointly. In 1899 a minister of railways was appointed. In this policy military considerations as well as economic were of influence. In every department we find the same reaction against the doctrines of *laissez-faire*. In 1889 for the first time the Austrian budget showed a surplus, partly the result of the new import duties, partly due to a reform of taxation.)

CHAPTER XI

THE LANGUAGE QUESTION

MEANWHILE it was necessary for the government to do something for the Czechs and the other Slavs, on whose support they depended for their majority. The influence of the government became more favourable to them in the matter of language, and this caused the struggle of nationalities to assume the first place in Austrian public life—a place which it has ever since maintained. The question of language becomes a political one, so far as it concerns the use of different languages in the public offices and law courts, and in the schools. There never was any general law laying down clear and universal rules, but since the time of Joseph II. German had been the ordinary language of the government. All laws were published in German; German was the sole language used in the central public offices in Vienna, and the language of the court and of the army; moreover, in almost every part of the monarchy it had become the language of what is called the *internal service* in the public offices and law courts; all books and correspondence were kept in German, not only in the German districts, but also in countries such as Bohemia and Galicia. The bureaucracy and the law courts had therefore become a network of German-speaking officialism extending over the whole country; no one had any share in the government unless he could speak and write German. The only exception was in the Italian districts; not only in Italy itself (in Lombardy, and afterwards in Venetia), but in South Tirol, Trieste, Istria and Dalmatia, Italian has always been used, even for the internal service of the government offices, and though the actual words of command are now given in German and the officers are obliged to know Serbo-Croatian it remains to this day the language of the Austrian navy. Any interference with the use of German would be a serious blow to the cause of those who hoped to Germanize the whole empire. Since 1867 the old rules have been maintained absolutely as regards the army, and German has also, as required by the military authorities, become the language of the railway administration. It remains the language of the central offices in Vienna, and is the usual, though not the only, language used in the Reichsrath. In 1869 a great innovation was made, when Polish was introduced throughout the whole of Galicia as the normal language of government; and since that time the use of German has almost entirely disappeared in that territory. Similar innovations have also begun, as we shall see, in other parts.

Different from this is what is called the *external service*. Even in the old days it was customary to use the language of the district in communication between the government offices and private individuals, and evidence could be given in the law courts in the language generally spoken. This was not the result of any law, but depended on administrative regulations of the government service; it was practically necessary in remote districts, such as Galicia and Bukovina, where few of the population understood German. In some places a Slav-speaking individual would himself have to provide the interpreter, and approach the government in German. Local authorities, e.g. town councils and the diets, were free to use what language they wished, and in this matter the Austrian government has shown great liberality. The constitution of 1867 laid down a principle of much importance, by which previous custom became established as a right. Article 19 runs: "All races of the empire have equal rights, and every race has an inviolable right to the preservation and use of its own nationality and language. The equality of all customary (*landesüblich*) languages in school,

office and public life, is recognized by the state. In those territories in which several races dwell, the public and educational institutions are to be so arranged that, without applying compulsion to learn a second *Landessprache*, each of the races receives the necessary means of education in its own language." The application of this law gives great power to the government, for everything depends on what is meant by *landesüblich*, and it rests with them to determine when a language is customary. The Germans demand the recognition of German as a customary language in every part of the empire, so that a German may claim to have his business attended to in his own language, even in Dalmatia and Galicia. In Bohemia the Czechs claim that their language shall be recognized as customary, even in those districts such as Reichenberg, which are almost completely German; the Germans, on the other hand, claim that the Czech language shall only be recognized in those towns and districts where there is a considerable Czech population. What Taaffe's Administration did was to interpret this law in a sense more favourable to the Slavs than had hitherto been the case.

Peculiar importance is attached to the question of education. The law of 1867 required that the education in the elementary schools in the Slav districts should be given in Czech or Slovenian, as the case might be. The Slavs, however, required that, even when a small minority of Slav race settled in any town, they should not be compelled to go to the German schools, but should have their own school provided for them; and this demand was granted by Prazak, minister of education under Count Taaffe. The Germans had always hoped that the people as they became educated would cease to use their own particular language. Owing to economic causes the Slavs, who increase more rapidly than the Germans, tend to move westwards, and large numbers settle in the towns and manufacturing districts. It might have been expected that they would then cease to use their own language and become Germanized; but, on the contrary, the movement of population is spreading their language and they claim that special schools should be provided for them, and that men of their own nationality should be appointed to government offices to deal with their business. This has happened not only in many places in Bohemia, but in Styria, and even in Vienna, where there has been a great increase in the Czech population and a Czech school has been founded. The introduction of Slavonic into the middle and higher schools has affected the Germans in their most sensitive point. They have always insisted that German is the *Kultur-sprache*. On one occasion Count A. Auersperg (Anastasius Grün) entered the diet of Carniola carrying the whole of the Slovenian literature under his arm, as evidence that the Slovenian language could not well be substituted for German as a medium of higher education.

The first important regulations which were issued under the law of 1867 applied to Dalmatia, and for that country between 1872 and 1876 a series of laws and edicts were issued determining to what extent the Slavonic idioms were to be recognized. Hitherto all business had been done in Italian, the language of a small minority living in the seaport towns. The effect of these laws has been to raise Croatian to equality with Italian. It has been introduced in all schools, so that nearly all education is given in Croatian, even though a knowledge of Italian is quite essential for the maritime population; and it is only in one or two towns, such as Zara, the ancient capital of the country, that Italian is able to maintain itself. Since 1882 there has been a Slav majority in the diet, and Italian has been disused in the proceedings of that body. In this case the concessions to the Servo-Croatians had been made by the Liberal ministry; they required the parliamentary support of the Dalmatian representatives, who were more numerous than the Italian, and it was also necessary to cultivate the loyalty of the Slav races in this part so as to gain a support for Austria against the Russian party, which was very active in the Balkan Peninsula. It was better to sacrifice the Italians of Dalmatia than the Germans of Carinthia.

It was not till 1879 that the Slovenes received the support of the government. In Carniola they succeeded, in 1882, in winning a majority in the diet, and from this time, while the diet of Styria is the centre of the German, that of Carniola is the chief support of the Slovene agitation. In the same year they won the majority in the town council of Laibach, which had hitherto been German. They were able, therefore, to introduce Illyrian as the official language, and cause the names of the streets to be written up in Illyrian. This question of street names is, as it were, a sign of victory. Serious riots broke out in some of the towns of Istria when, for the first time, Illyrian was used for this purpose as well as Italian. In Prague the victory of the Czechs has been marked by the removal of all German street names, and the Czech town council even passed a by-law forbidding private individuals to have tablets put up with the name of the street in German. In consequence of a motion by the Slovene members of the Reichsrath and a resolution of the diet of Carniola, the government also declared Slovenian to be a recognized language for the whole of Carniola, for the district of Cilli in Styria, and for the Slovene and mixed districts in the south of Carinthia, and determined that in Laibach a Slovene gymnasium should be maintained as well as the German one.

The Germans complain that in many cases the government acted very unfairly to them. They constantly refer to the case of Klagenfurt. This town in Carinthia had a population of 16,491 German-speaking Austrians; the Slovenian-speaking population numbered

568, of whom 180 were inhabitants of the gaol or the hospital. The government, however, in 1880 declared Slovenian a customary language, so that provision had to be made in public offices and law courts for dealing with business in Slovenian. It must be remembered, however, that even though the town was German, the rural population of the surrounding villages was chiefly Slovene.

It was in Bohemia and Moravia that the contest was fought out with the greatest vehemence. The two races were nearly equal, and the victory of Czech would mean that nearly two million Germans would be placed in a position of subordination; but for the last twenty years there had been a constant encroachment by Czech on German. This was partly due to the direct action of the government. An ordinance of 1880 determined that henceforward all business which had been brought before any government office or law court should be dealt with, within the office, in the language in which it was introduced; this applied to the whole of Bohemia and Moravia, and meant that Czech would henceforward have a position within the government service. It was another step in the same direction when, in 1886, it was ordered that "to avoid frequent translations" business introduced in Czech should be dealt with in the same language in the high courts of Prague and Brünn. Then not only were a large number of Czech elementary schools founded, but also many middle schools were given to the Czechs, and Czech classes introduced in German schools; and, what affected the Germans most, in 1882 classes in Czech were started in the university of Prague—a desecration, as it seemed, of the oldest German university.

The growth of the Slav races was, however, not merely the result of government assistance; it had begun long before Taaffe assumed office; it was to be seen in the census returns and in the results of elections. Prague was no longer the German city it had been fifty years before; the census of 1880 showed 36,000 Germans to 120,000 Czechs. It was the same in Pilsen. In 1861 the Germans had a majority in this town; in 1880 they were not a quarter of the population. This same phenomenon, which occurs elsewhere, cannot be attributed to any laxity of the Germans. The generation which was so vigorously demanding national rights had themselves all been brought up under the old system in German schools, but this had not implanted in them a desire to become German. It was partly due to economic causes—the greater increase among the Czechs, and the greater migration from the country to the towns; partly the result of the romantic and nationalist movement which had arisen about 1830, and partly the result of establishing popular education and parliamentary government at the same time. As soon as these races which had so long been ruled by the Germans received political liberty and the means of education, they naturally used both to reassert their national individuality.

It may be suggested that the resistance to the German language is to some extent a result of the increased national feeling among the Germans themselves. They have made it a matter of principle. In the old days it was common for the children of German parents in Bohemia to learn Czech; since 1867 this has ceased to be the case. It may almost be said that they make it a point of honour not to do so. A result of this is that, as educated Czechs are generally bilingual, it is easier for them to obtain appointments in districts where a knowledge of Czech is required, and the Germans, therefore, regard every order requiring the use of Czech as an order which excludes Germans from a certain number of posts. This attitude of hostility and contempt is strongest among the educated middle class; it is not shown to the same extent by the clergy and the nobles.

The influence of the Church is also favourable to the Slav races, not so much from principle as owing to the fact that they supply more candidates for ordination than the Germans. There is no doubt, however, that the tendency among Germans has been to exalt the principle of nationality above religion, and to give it an absolute authority in which the Roman Catholic Church cannot acquiesce. In this, as in other ways, the Germans in Austria have been much influenced by the course of events in the German empire. This hostility of the Church to the German nationalist movement led in 1898 to an agitation against the Roman Catholic Church, and among the Germans of Styria and other territories large numbers left the Church, going over either to Protestantism or to Old Catholicism. This "Los von Rom" movement, which was caused by the continued alliance of the Clerical party with the Slav parties, is more of the nature of a political demonstration than of a religious movement.

The Germans, so long accustomed to rule, now saw their old ascendancy threatened, and they defended it with an energy that increased with each defeat. In 1880 they founded a great society, the *Deutscher Schulverein*, to establish and assist German schools. It spread over the whole of the empire; in a few years it numbered 100,000 members, and had an income of nearly 300,000 gulden; no private society in Austria had ever attained so great a success. In the Reichsrath a motion was introduced, supported by all the German Liberal parties, demanding that German should be declared the language of state and regulating the conditions under which the other idioms could be recognized; it was referred to a committee from which it never emerged, and a bill to the same effect, introduced in 1886, met a similar fate. In Bohemia they demanded, as a means of protecting themselves against the effect of the language ordinances, that the country should be divided

into two parts; in one German was to be the sole language, in the other Czech was to be recognized. A proposal to this effect was introduced by them in the diet at the end of 1886, but since 1882 the Germans had been in a minority. The Czechs, of course, refused even to consider it; it would have cut away the ground on which their whole policy was built up, namely, the indissoluble unity of the Bohemian kingdom, in which German and Czech should throughout be recognized as equal and parallel languages. It was rejected on a motion of Prince Karl Schwarzenberg without discussion, and on this all the Germans rose and left the diet, thereby imitating the action of the Czechs in old days when they had the majority.

These events produced a great change in the character of the German opposition. It became more and more avowedly racial; the defence of German nationality was put in the front of their programme. The growing national animosity added bitterness to political life, and destroyed the possibility of a strong homogeneous party on which a government might depend. The beginning of this movement can be traced back to the year 1870. About that time a party of young Germans had arisen who professed to care little for constitutionalism and other "legal mummies," but made the preservation and extension of their own nationality their sole object. As is so often the case in Austria, the movement began in the university of Vienna, where a *Leseverein* (reading club) of German students was formed as a point of cohesion for Germans, which had eventually to be suppressed. The first representative of the movement in parliament was Herr von Schönerer, who did not scruple to declare that the Germans looked forward to union with the German empire. They were strongly influenced by men outside Austria. Bismarck was their national hero, the anniversary of Sedan their political festival, and approximation to Germany was dearer to them than the maintenance of Austria. After 1878 a heightening of racial feeling began among the Radicals, and in 1881 all the German parties in opposition joined together in a club called the United Left, and in their programme put in a prominent place the defence of the position of the Germans as the condition for the existence of the state, and demanded that German should be expressly recognized as the official language. The younger and more ardent spirits, however, found it difficult to work in harmony with the older constitutional leaders. They complained that the party leaders were not sufficiently decisive in the measures for self-defence. In 1885 great festivities in honour of Bismarck's eightieth birthday, which had been arranged in Graz, were forbidden by the government, and the Germans of Styria were very indignant that the party did not take up the matter with sufficient energy. After the elections of 1885 the Left, therefore, broke up again into two clubs, the "German Austrian," which included the more moderate, and the "German," which wished to use sharper language. The German Club, *e.g.*, congratulated Bismarck on his measures against the Poles; the German Austrians refused to take cognizance of events outside Austria with which they had nothing to do. Even the German Club was not sufficiently decided for Herr von Schönerer and his friends, who broke off from it and founded a "National German Union." They spoke much of *Germanentum* and *Unverfälschtes Deutschthum*, and they advocated a political union with the German empire, and were strongly anti-Hungarian, and wished to resign all control over Galicia, if by a closer union with Germany they could secure German supremacy in Bohemia and the south Slav countries. They play the same part in Austria as does the "pan-Germanic Union" in Germany. When in 1888 the two clubs, the German Austrians and the Germans, joined once more under the name of the "United German Left" into a new club with eighty-seven members, so as the better to guard against the common danger and to defeat the educational demands of the Clericals, the National Germans remained apart with seventeen members. They were also infected by the growing spirit of anti-Semitism. The German parties had originally been the party of the capitalists, and comprised a large number of Jews; this new German party committed itself to violent attacks upon the Jews, and for this reason alone any real harmony between the different branches would have been impossible.

Notwithstanding the concessions about language the Czechs had, however, made no advance towards their real object—the recognition of the Bohemian kingdom. Perhaps the leaders of the party, who were now growing old, would have been content with the influence they had already attained, but they were hard pressed at home by the Young Czechs, who were more impatient. When Count Thun was appointed governor of Bohemia their hopes ran high, for he was supposed to favour the coronation of the emperor at Prague. In 1890, however, instead of proceeding to the coronation as was expected, Taaffe attempted to bring about a reconciliation between the opposing parties. The influence by which his policy was directed is not quite clear, but the Czechs had been of recent years less easy to deal with, and Taaffe had never really shown any wish to alter the constitution; his policy always was to destroy the influence of parliament by playing off one party against the other, and so to win a clear field for the government. During the month of January conferences were held at Vienna, with Taaffe in the chair, to which were invited representatives of the three groups into which the Bohemian representatives were divided, the German party, the Czechs, and the Feudal party. After a fortnight's discussion an agreement was made on the basis of a separation between the German and the Czech districts, and a revision of

the electoral law. A protocol enumerating the points agreed on was signed by all who had taken part in the conference, and in May bills were laid before the diet incorporating the chief points in the agreement. But they were not carried; the chief reason being that the Young Czechs had not been asked to take part in the conference, and did not consider themselves bound by its decisions; they opposed the measures and had recourse to obstruction, and a certain number of the Old Czechs gradually came over to them. Their chief ground of criticizing the proposed measures was that they would threaten the unity of the Bohemian country. At the elections in 1891 a great struggle took place between the Old and the Young Czechs. The latter were completely victorious; Rieger, who had led the party for thirty years, disappeared from the Reichsrath. The first result was that the proposed agreement with Bohemia came to an end. But the disappearance of the Old Czechs made the parliamentary situation very insecure. The Young Czechs could not take their place; their Radical and anti-clerical tendencies alarmed the Feudalists and Clericalists who formed so large a part of the Right; they attacked the alliance with Germany; they made public demonstration of their French sympathies; they entered into communication with other Slav races, especially the Serbs of Hungary and Bosnia; they demanded universal suffrage, and occasionally supported the German Radicals in their opposition to the Clerical parties, especially in educational matters; under their influence disorder increased in Bohemia, a secret society called the *Umladina* (an imitation of the Servian society of that name) was discovered, and stringent measures had to be taken to preserve order. The government therefore veered round towards the German Liberals; some of the ministers most obnoxious to the Germans resigned, and their places were taken by Germans. For two years the government seemed to waver, looking now to the Left, now to Hohenwart and his friends; for a time Taaffe really had the support of all parties except the Young Czechs.

After two years he gave up his cautious policy and took a bold move. In October 1893 he introduced a reform bill. Universal suffrage had long been demanded by the working men and the Socialists; the Young Czechs also had put it on their programme, and many of the Christian Socialists and anti-Semites desired an alteration of the franchise. Taaffe's bill, while keeping the *curiae* of the feudal proprietors and the chambers of commerce as they were, and making no change in the number of members, proposed to give the franchise in both towns and rural districts to every one who could read and write, and had resided six months in one place. This was opposed by the Liberals, for, with the growth of socialism and anti-Semitism, they knew that the extension of the franchise would destroy their influence. On this Taaffe had probably calculated, but he had omitted to inquire what the other parties would do. He had not even consulted Hohenwart, to whose assistance he owed his long tenure of power. Not even the pleasure of ruining the Liberals was sufficient to persuade the Conservatives to vote for a measure which would transfer the power from the well-to-do to the indigent, and Hohenwart justly complained that they ought to have been secure against surprises of this kind. The Poles also were against a measure which would give more influence to the Ruthenes. The position of the government was hopeless, and without waiting for a division Taaffe resigned.

CHAPTER XII

THE COALITION MINISTRY OF 1893

THE event to which for fourteen years the Left had looked forward had now happened. Once more they could have a share in the government, which they always believed belonged to them by nature. Taught by experience and adversity, they did not scruple to enter into an alliance with their old enemies, and a coalition ministry was formed from the Left, the Clericals and the Poles. The president was Prince Alfred Windisch-Gratz, grandson of the celebrated general, one of Hohenwart's ablest lieutenants; Hohenwart himself did not take office. Of course an administration of this kind could not take a definite line on any controversial question, but during 1894 they carried through the commercial treaty with Russia and the laws for the continuance of the currency reform. The differences of the clubs appeared, however, in the discussions on franchise reform; the government, not strong enough to have a policy of its own, had referred the matter to a committee; for the question having once been raised, it was impossible not to go on with it. This would probably have been fatal to the coalition, but the final blow was given by a matter of very small importance arising from the disputes on nationality. The Slovenes had asked that in the gymnasium at Cilli classes in which instruction was given in Slovenian should be formed parallel to the German classes. This request caused great excitement in Styria and the neighbouring districts; the Styrian diet (from which the Slovene minority had seceded) protested. The Slovenes were, however, members of the Hohenwart Club, so Hohenwart and his followers supported the request, which was adopted by the ministry. The German Left opposed it; they were compelled to do so by the popular indignation in the German districts; and when the vote was carried against them (12th June 1895) they made it a question of confidence, and formally withdrew their support from the government, which therefore at once resigned.

After a short interval the emperor appointed as minister-president Count Badeni, who had earned a great reputation as governor of Galicia. He formed an administration the merit of which, as of so many others, was that it was to belong to no party and to have no programme. He hoped to be able to work in harmony with the moderate elements of the Left; his mission was to carry through the composition (*Ausgleich*) with Hungary; to this everything else must be subordinated. During 1896 he succeeded in carrying a franchise reform bill, which satisfied nearly all parties. All the old categories of members were maintained, but a fifth *curia* was added, in which almost any one might vote who had resided six months in one place and was not in domestic service; in this way seventy-two would be added to the existing members. This matter having been settled, parliament was dissolved. The result of the elections of 1897 was the return of a House so constituted as to make any strong government impossible. On both sides the anti-Semitic parties representing the extreme demagogic elements were present in considerable numbers. The United German Left had almost disappeared; it was represented only by a few members chosen by the great proprietors; in its place there were the three parties—the German Popular party, the German Nationalists, and the German Radicals—who all put questions of nationality first and had deserted the old standpoint of the constitution. Then there were the fourteen Social Democrats who had won their seats under the new franchise. The old party of the Right was, however, also broken up; side by side with forty-one Clericals there were twenty-eight Christian Socialists led by Dr Lueger, a man of

great oratorical power, who had won a predominant influence in Vienna, so long the centre of Liberalism, and had quite eclipsed the more modest efforts of Prince Liechtenstein. As among the German National party, there were strong nationalist elements in his programme, but they were chiefly directed against Jews and Hungarians; Lueger had already distinguished himself by his violent attacks on Hungary, which had caused some embarrassment to the government at a time when the negotiations for the *Ausgleich* were in progress. Like anti-Semites elsewhere, the Christian Socialists were reckless and irresponsible, appealing directly to the passions and prejudices of the most ignorant. There were altogether 200 German members of the Reichsrath, but they were divided into eight parties, and nowhere did there seem to be the elements on which a government could be built up.

The parliamentary situation is best explained by the following table showing the parties:—

	1897.	1901.
<i>German Liberals—</i>		
Constitutional Landed Proprietors	28	28
German Radicals	49	41
German Popular Party	42	51
Schönerer Group	5	21
Kronawetter	1	..
Democrat	1	..
	—	—
	126	141
<i>Social Democrats</i>	14	10
<i>German Conservatives—</i>		
German Clericals	30	37
Catholic Popular Party	15	
Christian Socialists	28	
	—	23
	73	60
<i>Federalist Great Proprietors</i>	16	16
<i>Czechs—</i>		
Young Czechs	60	53
Radical Young Czechs	1	4
Clerical Czechs	1	2
Agrarian Czechs	1	6
	—	63
	63	65
<i>Poles—</i>		
Polish Club	59	60
Stoyalovski Group	6	..
Popular Polish Party	3	11
	—	68
	68	71
<i>Slovenes—</i>		
Clerical Slovenes	11	..
Radical „	5	..
	—	16
	16	16
<i>Italians—</i>		
Liberal Italians	14	..
Clerical „	5	..
	—	19
	19	19
<i>Croatians</i>	11	9
<i>Serbs</i>	2	2
<i>Ruthenes—</i>		
Ruthenes	6	..
Young Ruthenes	5	..
	—	11
	11	11
<i>Rumanians—</i>		
Rumanians	5	..
Young Rumanians	1	..
	—	6
	6	5
Total	425	425

The most remarkable result of the elections was the disappearance of the Liberals in Vienna. In 1879, out of 37 members returned in Lower Austria, 33 were Liberals, but now they were replaced to a large extent by the Socialists. It was impossible to maintain a strong party of moderate constitutionalists, on whom the government could depend, unless there was a large nucleus from Lower Austria. The influence of Lueger was very embarrassing; he had now a majority of two-thirds in the town council, and had been elected burgomaster. The emperor had refused to confirm the election; he had been re-elected, and then the emperor, in a personal interview, appealed to him to withdraw. He consented to do so; but, after the election of 1897 had given him so many followers in the

Reichsrath, Badeni advised that his election as burgomaster should be confirmed. There was violent antipathy between the Christian Socialists and the German Nationalists, and the transference of their quarrels from the Viennese Council Chamber to the Reichsrath was very detrimental to the orderly conduct of debate.

The limited suffrage had hitherto prevented socialism from becoming a political force in Austria as it had in Germany, and the national divisions have always impeded the creation of a centralized socialist party. The first object of the working classes necessarily was the attainment of political power; in 1867 there had been mass demonstrations and petitions to the government for universal suffrage. During the next years there was the beginning of a real socialist movement in Vienna and in Styria, where there is a considerable industrial population; after 1879, however, the growth of the party was interrupted by the introduction of anarchical doctrines. Most's paper, the *Freiheit*, was introduced through Switzerland, and had a large circulation. The anarchists, under the leadership of Peukert, seem to have attained considerable numbers. In 1883-1884 there were a number of serious strikes, collisions between the police and the workmen, followed by assassinations; it was a peculiarity of Austrian anarchists that in some cases they united robbery to murder. The government, which was seriously alarmed, introduced severe repressive measures; the leading anarchists were expelled or fled the country. In 1887, under the leadership of Dr Adler, the socialist party began to revive (the party of violence having died away), and since then it has steadily gained in numbers; in the forefront of the political programme is put the demand for universal suffrage. In no country is the 1st of May, as the festival of Labour, celebrated so generally.

Badeni after the election sent in his resignation, but the emperor refused to accept it, and he had, therefore, to do the best he could and turn for support to the other nationalities. The strongest of them were the fifty-nine Poles and sixty Young Czechs; he therefore attempted, as Taaffe had done, to come to some agreement with them. The Poles were always ready to support the government; among the Young Czechs the more moderate had already attempted to restrain the wilder spirits of the party, and they were quite prepared to enter into negotiations. They did not wish to lose the opportunity which now was open to them of winning influence over the administration. What they required was further concession as to the language in Bohemia. In May 1897 Badeni, therefore, published his celebrated *ordinances*. They determined (1) that all correspondence and documents regarding every matter brought before the government officials should be conducted in the language in which it was first introduced. This applied to the whole of Bohemia, and meant the introduction of Czech into the government offices throughout the whole of the kingdom; (2) after 1903 no one was to be appointed to a post under the government in Bohemia until he had passed an examination in Czech. These ordinances fulfilled the worst fears of the Germans. The German Nationalists and Radicals declared that no business should be done till they were repealed and Badeni dismissed. They resorted to obstruction. They brought in repeated motions to impeach the ministers, and parliament had to be prorogued in June, although no business of any kind had been transacted. Badeni had not anticipated the effect his ordinances would have; as a Pole he had little experience in the western part of the empire. During the recess he tried to open negotiations, but the Germans refused even to enter into a discussion until the ordinances had been withdrawn. The agitation spread throughout the country; great meetings were held at Eger and Aussig, which were attended by Germans from across the frontier, and led to serious disturbances; the cornflower, which had become the symbol of German nationality and union with Germany, was freely worn, and the language used was in many cases treasonable. The emperor insisted that the Reichsrath should again be summoned to pass the necessary measures for the agreement with Hungary; scenes then took place which have no parallel in parliamentary history. To meet the obstruction it was determined to sit at night, but this was unsuccessful. On one occasion Dr Lecher, one of the representatives of Moravia, spoke for twelve hours, from 9 P.M. till 9 A.M., against the *Ausgleich*. The opposition was not always limited to feats of endurance of this kind. On the 3rd of November there was a free fight in the House; it arose from a quarrel between Dr Lueger and the Christian Socialists on the one side (for the Christian Socialists had supported the government since the confirmation of Lueger as burgomaster) and the German Nationalists under Herr Wolf, a German from Bohemia, the violence of whose language had already caused Badeni to challenge him to a duel. The Nationalists refused to allow Lueger to speak, clapping their desks, hissing and making other noises, till at last the Young Czechs attempted to prevent the disorder by violence. On the 24th of November the scenes of disturbance were renewed. The president, Herr v. Abrahamovitch, an Armenian from Galicia, refused to call on Schönerer to speak. The Nationalists therefore stormed the platform, and the president and ministers had to fly into their private rooms to escape personal violence, until the Czechs came to their rescue, and by superiority in numbers and physical strength severely punished Herr Wolf and his friends. The rules of the House giving the president no authority for maintaining order, he determined, with the assent of the ministers, to propose alterations in procedure. The next day, when the sitting began, one of the ministers, Count Falkenhayn, a Clerical who was very unpopular, moved "That

any member who continued to disturb a sitting after being twice called to order could be suspended—for three days by the president, and for thirty days by the House." The din and uproar was such that not a word could be heard, but at a pre-arranged signal from the president all the Right rose, and he then declared that the new order had been carried, although the procedure of the House required that it should be submitted to a committee. The next day, at the beginning of the sitting, the Socialists rushed on the platform, tore up and destroyed all the papers lying there, seized the president, and held him against the wall. After he had escaped, eighty police were introduced into the House and carried out the fourteen Socialists. The next day Herr Wolf was treated in the same manner. The excitement spread to the street. Serious disorders took place in Vienna and in Graz; the German opposition had the support of the people, and Lueger warned the ministers that as burgomaster he would be unable to maintain order in Vienna; even the Clerical Germans showed signs of deserting the government. The emperor, hastily summoned to Vienna, accepted Badeni's resignation, the Germans having thus by obstruction attained part of their wishes. The new minister, Gautsch, a man popular with all parties, held office for three months; he proclaimed the budget and the Ausgleich, and in February replaced the language ordinances by others, under which Bohemia was to be divided into three districts—one Czech, one German and one mixed. The Germans, however, were not satisfied with this; they demanded absolute repeal. The Czechs also were offended; they arranged riots at Prague; the professors in the university refused to lecture unless the German students were defended from violence; Gautsch resigned, and Thun, who had been governor of Bohemia, was appointed minister. Martial law was proclaimed in Bohemia, and strictly enforced. Thun then arranged with the Hungarian ministers a compromise about the Ausgleich.

The Reichsrath was again summoned, and the meetings were less disturbed than in the former year, but the Germans still prevented any business from being done. The Germans now had a new cause of complaint. Paragraph 14 of the Constitutional law of 1867 provided that, in cases of pressing necessity, orders for which the assent of the Reichsrath was required might, if the Reichsrath were not in session, be proclaimed by the emperor; they had to be signed by the whole ministry, and if they were not laid before the Reichsrath within four months of its meeting, or if they did not receive the approval of both Houses, they ceased to be valid. The Germans contended that the application of this clause to the Ausgleich was invalid, and demanded that it should be repealed. Thun had in consequence to retire, in September 1899. His successor, Count Clary, began by withdrawing the ordinances which had been the cause of so much trouble, but it was now too late to restore peace. The Germans were not sufficiently strong and united to keep in power a minister who had brought them the relief for which they had been clamouring for two years. The Czechs, of course, went into opposition, and used obstruction. The extreme German party, however, took the occasion to demand that paragraph 14 should be repealed. Clary explained that this was impossible, but he gave a formal pledge that he would not use it. The Czechs, however, prevented him passing a law on excise which was a necessary part of the agreements with Hungary; it was, therefore, impossible for him to carry on the government without breaking his word; there was nothing left for him to do but to resign, after holding office for less than three months. The emperor then appointed a ministry of officials, who were not bound by his pledge, and used paragraph 14 for the necessary purposes of state. They then made way for a ministry under Herr v. Körber. During the early months of 1900 matters were more peaceful, and Körber hoped to be able to arrange a compromise; but the Czechs now demanded the restoration of their language in the internal service of Bohemia, and on 8th June, by noise and disturbance, obliged the president to suspend the sitting. The Reichsrath was immediately dissolved, the emperor having determined to make a final attempt to get together a parliament with which it would be possible to govern. The new elections on which so much was to depend did not take place till January 1901. They resulted in a great increase of the extreme German Nationalist parties. Schönerer and the German Radicals—the fanatical German party who in their new programme advocated union of German Austria with the German empire—now numbered twenty-one, who chiefly came from Bohemia. They were able for the first time to procure the election of one of their party in the Austrian Delegation, and threatened to introduce into the Assembly scenes of disorder similar to those which they had made common in the Reichsrath. All those parties which did not primarily appeal to national feeling suffered loss; especially was this the case with the two sections of the Clericals, the Christian Socialists and the Ultramontanes; and the increasing enmity between the German Nationalists (who refused even the name German to a Roman Catholic) and the Church became one of the most conspicuous features in the political situation. The loss of seats by the Socialists showed that even among the working men the national agitation was gaining ground; the diminished influence of the anti-Semites was the most encouraging sign.

CHAPTER XIII

FRANCHISE REFORM

THE history of Austria since the general election of 1901 is the history of franchise reform as a crowning attempt to restore parliament to normal working conditions. The premier, Dr von Körber, who had undertaken to overcome obstruction and who hoped to effect a compromise between Germans and Czechs, induced the Chamber to sanction the estimates, the contingent of recruits and other "necessities of state" for 1901 and 1902, by promising to undertake large public works in which Czechs and Germans were alike interested. These public works were chiefly a canal from the Danube to the Oder; a ship canal from the Danube to the Moldau near Budweis, and the canalization of the Moldau from Budweis to Prague; a ship canal running from the projected Danube-Oder canal near Prerau to the Elbe near Pardubitz, and the canalization of the Elbe from Pardubitz to Melnik; a navigable connexion between the Danube-Oder Canal and the Vistula and the Dniester. It was estimated that the construction of these four canals would require twenty years, the funds being furnished by a 4% loan amortizable in ninety years. In addition to the canals, the cabinet proposed and the Chamber sanctioned the construction of a "second railway route to Trieste" designed to shorten the distance between South Germany, Salzburg and the Adriatic, by means of a line passing under the Alpine ranges of central and southern Austria. The principal sections of this line were named after the ranges they pierced, the chief tunnels being bored through the Tauern, Karawanken and Wochein hills. Sections were to be thrown open to traffic as soon as completed and the whole work to be ended during 1909. The line forms one of the most interesting railway routes in Europe. The cost, however, greatly exceeded the estimate sanctioned by parliament; and the contention that the parliamentary adoption of the Budget in 1901-1902 cost the state £100,000,000 for public works is not entirely unfounded. True, these works were in most cases desirable and in some cases necessary, but they were hastily promised and often hastily begun under pressure of political expediency. The Körber administration was for this reason subsequently exposed to severe censure.

Despite these public works Dr von Körber found himself unable to induce parliament to vote the Budgets for 1903, 1904 or 1905, and was obliged to revert to the expedient employed by his predecessors of sanctioning the estimates by imperial ordinance under paragraph 14 of the constitution. His attempts in December 1902 and January 1903 to promote a compromise between Czechs and Germans proved equally futile. Körber proposed that Bohemia be divided into 10 districts, of which 5 would be Czech, 3 German and 2 mixed. Of the 234 district tribunals, 133 were to be Czech, 94 German and 7 mixed. The Czechs demanded on the contrary that both their language and German should be placed on an equal footing throughout Bohemia, and be used for all official purposes in the same way. As this demand involved the recognition of Czech as a language of internal service in Bohemia it was refused by the Germans. Thenceforward, until his fall on the 31st of December 1904, Körber governed practically without parliament. The Chamber was summoned at intervals rather as a pretext for the subsequent employment of paragraph 14 than in the hope of securing its assent to legislative measures. The Czechs blocked business by a pile of "urgency motions" and occasionally indulged in noisy obstruction. On one occasion a sitting lasted 57 hours without interruption. In consequence of Czech aggressiveness, the German parties (the German Progressists, the German Populists,

the Constitutional Landed Proprietors and the Christian Socialists) created a joint executive committee and a supreme committee of four members to watch over German racial interests.

By the end of 1904 it had become clear that the system of government by paragraph 14, which Dr von Körber had perfected, was not effective in the long run. Loans were needed for military and other purposes, and paragraph 14 itself declares that it cannot be employed for the contraction of any lasting burden upon the exchequer, nor for any sale of state patrimony. As the person of the premier had become so obnoxious to the Czechs that his removal would be regarded by them as a concession, his resignation was suddenly accepted by the emperor, and, on the 1st of January 1905, a former premier, Baron von Gautsch, was appointed in his stead. Parliamentary activity was at once resumed; the Austro-Hungarian tariff contained in the Széll-Körber compact was adopted, the estimates were discussed and the commercial treaty with Germany ratified. In the early autumn, however, a radical change came over the spirit of Austrian politics. For nearly three years Austria had been watching with bitterness and depression the course of the crisis in Hungary. Parliament had repeatedly expressed its disapproval of the Magyar demands upon the crown, but had succeeded only in demonstrating its own impotence. The feeling that Austria could be compelled by imperial ordinance under paragraph 14 to acquiesce in whatever concessions the crown might make to Hungary galled Austrian public opinion and prepared it for coming changes. In August 1905 the crown took into consideration and in September sanctioned the proposal that universal suffrage be introduced into the official programme of the Fejerváry cabinet then engaged in combating the Coalition in Hungary. It is not to be supposed that the king of Hungary assented to this programme without reflecting that what he sought to further in Hungary, it would be impossible for him, as emperor of Austria, to oppose in Cisleithania. His subsequent action justifies, indeed, the belief that, when sanctioning the Fejerváry programme, the monarch had already decided that universal suffrage should be introduced in Austria; but even he can scarcely have been prepared for the rapidity with which the movement in Austria gained ground and accomplished its object.

On the 15th of September 1905 a huge socialist and working-class demonstration in favour of universal suffrage took place before the parliament at Budapest. The Austrian Socialist party, encouraged by this manifestation and influenced by the revolutionary movement in Russia, resolved to press for franchise reform in Austria also. An initial demonstration, resulting in some bloodshed, was organized in Vienna at the beginning of November. At Prague, Graz and other towns, demonstrations and collisions with the police were frequent. The premier, Baron Gautsch, who had previously discountenanced universal suffrage while admitting the desirability of a restricted reform, then changed attitude and permitted an enormous Socialist demonstration, in support of universal suffrage, to take place (November 28) in the Vienna Ringstrasse. Traffic was suspended for five hours while an orderly procession of workmen, ten abreast, marched silently along the Ringstrasse past the houses of parliament. The demonstration made a deep impression upon public opinion. On the same day the premier promised to introduce by February a large measure of franchise reform so framed as to protect racial minorities from being overwhelmed at the polls by majorities of other races. On the 23rd of February 1906 he indeed brought in a series of franchise reform measures. Their main principles were the abolition of the *curia* or electoral class system and the establishment of the franchise on the basis of universal suffrage; and the division of Austria electorally into racial compartments within which each race would be assured against molestation from other races. The Gautsch redistribution bill proposed to increase the number of constituencies from 425 to 455, to allot a fixed number of constituencies to each province and, within each province, to each race according to its numbers and tax-paying capacity. The reform bill proper proposed to enfranchise every male citizen above 24 years of age with one year's residential qualification.

At first the chances of the adoption of such a measure seemed small. It was warmly supported from outside by the Social Democrats, who held only 11 seats in the House; inside, the Christian Socialists or Lueger party were favourable on the whole as they hoped to gain seats at the expense of the German Progressives and German Populists and to extend their own organization throughout the empire. The young Czechs, too, were favourable, while the Poles reserved their attitude. Hostile in principle and by instinct, they waited to ascertain the mind of the emperor, before actively opposing the reform. With the exception of the German Populists, who felt that a German "Liberal" party could not well oppose an extension of popular rights, all the German Liberals were antagonistic, some bitterly, to the measure. The Constitutional Landed Proprietors who had played so large a part in Austrian politics since the 'sixties, and had for a generation held the leadership of the German element in parliament and in the country, saw themselves doomed and the leadership of the Germans given to the Christian Socialists. None of the representatives of the *curia* system fought so tenaciously for their privileges as did the German nominees of the *curia* of large landed proprietors. Their opposition proved unavailing. The emperor frowned repeatedly upon their efforts.

Baron Gautsch fell in April over a difference with the Poles, and his successor, Prince

Konrad zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, who had taken over the reform bills, resigned also, six weeks later, as a protest against the action of the crown in consenting to the enactment of a customs tariff in Hungary distinct from, though identical with, the joint Austro-Hungarian tariff comprised in the Széll-Körber compact and enacted as a joint tariff by the Reichsrath. A new cabinet was formed (June 2) by Baron von Beck, permanent under secretary of state in the ministry for agriculture, an official of considerable ability who had first acquired prominence as an instructor of the heir-apparent, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, in constitutional and administrative law. By dint of skilful negotiation with the various parties and races, and steadily supported by the emperor who, on one occasion, summoned the recalcitrant party leaders to the Hofburg *ad audiendum verbum* and told them the reform "must be accomplished," Baron Beck succeeded, in October 1906, in attaining a final agreement, and on the 1st of December in securing the adoption of the reform. During the negotiations the number of constituencies was raised to 516, divided, according to provinces, as follows:

Bohemia	130	previously	110
Galicia	106	"	78
Lower Austria	64	"	46
Moravia	49	"	43
Styria	30	"	27
Tirol	25	"	21
Upper Austria	22	"	20
Austrian Silesia	15	"	12
Bukovina	14	"	11
Carniola	12	"	11
Dalmatia	11	"	11
Carinthia	10	"	10
Salzburg	7	"	7
Istria	6	"	5
Görz and Gradisca	6	"	5
Trieste and territory	5	"	5
Vorarlberg	4	"	4

In the allotment of the constituencies to the various races their tax-paying capacity was taken into consideration. In mixed districts separate constituencies and registers were established for the electors of each race, who could only vote on their own register for a candidate of their own race. Thus Germans were obliged to vote for Germans and Czechs for Czechs; and, though there might be victories of Clerical over Liberal Germans or of Czech Radicals over Young Czechs, there could be no victories of Czechs over Germans, Poles over Ruthenes, or Slovenes over Italians. The constituencies were divided according to race as follows:

Germans of all parties	233	previously	205
Czechs of all parties	108	"	81
Poles	80	"	71
Southern Slavs (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs)	37	"	27
Ruthenes	34	"	11
Italians	19	"	18
Rumanians	5	"	5

These allotments were slightly modified at the polls by the victory of some Social Democratic candidates not susceptible of strict racial classification. The chief feature of the allotment was, however, the formal overthrow of the fiction that Austria is preponderatingly a German country and not a country preponderatingly Slav with a German dynasty and a German façade. The German constituencies, though allotted in a proportion unduly favourable, left the Germans, with 233 seats, in a permanent minority as compared with the 259 Slav seats. Even with the addition of the "Latin" (Rumanian and Italian) seats the "German-Latin block" amounted only to 257. This "block" no longer exists in practice, as the Italians now tend to co-operate rather with the Slavs than with the Germans. The greatest gainers by the redistribution were the Ruthenes, whose representation was trebled, though it is still far from being proportioned to their numbers. This and other anomalies will doubtless be corrected in future revisions of the allotment, although the German parties, foreseeing that any revision must work out to their disadvantage, stipulated that a two-thirds majority should be necessary for any alteration of the law.

After unsuccessful attempts by the Upper House to introduce plural voting, the bill became law in January 1907, the peers insisting only upon the establishment of a fixed *maximum* number or *numerus clausus*, of non-hereditary peers, so as to prevent the resistance of the Upper Chamber from being overwhelmed at any critical moment by an influx of crown nominees appointed *ad hoc*. The general election which took place amid considerable enthusiasm on the 14th of May resulted in a sweeping victory for the Social Democrats

whose number rose from 11 to 87; in a less complete triumph for the Christian Socialists who increased from 27 to 67; and in the success of the extremer over the conservative elements in all races. A classification of the groups in the new Chamber presents many difficulties, but the following statement is approximately accurate. It must be premised that, in order to render the Christian Socialist or Lueger party the strongest group in parliament, an amalgamation was effected between them and the conservative Catholic party:

<i>German Conservatives—</i>	Total.	
Christian Socialists	96	
German Agrarians	19	
<i>German Liberals—</i>		
Progressives	15	
Populists	29	
Pan-German radicals (Wolf group)	13	
Unattached Pan-Germans	3	
„ Progressives	2	
	—	
	177	
<i>Czechs—</i>		
Czech Agrarians	28	
Young Czechs	18	
Czech Clericals	17	
Old Czechs	7	
Czech National Socialists	9	
Realists	2	
Unattached Czech	1	
	—	
	82	
<i>Social Democrats—</i>		
Of all races	87	
	87	
<i>Poles—</i>		
Democrats	26	
Conservatives	15	
Populists	18	
Centre	12	
Independent Socialist	1	
	—	
	72	
<i>Ruthenes—</i>		
National Democrats	25	
Old or Russophil Ruthenes	5	
	—	
	30	
<i>Slovenes—</i>		
Clericals	17	
<i>Southern Slav Club—</i>		
Croats	} 20	37
Serbs		
Slovene Liberal		
<i>Italians—</i>		
Clerical Populists	11	
Liberals	4	
	—	
	15	
<i>Rumanians—</i>		
Rumanian Club	5	
	5	
<i>Jews—</i>		
Zionists	4	
Democrats	1	
	—	
	5	
Unclassified, vacancies, &c.	6	
	—	
	6	
	516	

The legislature elected by universal suffrage worked fairly smoothly during the first year of its existence. The estimates were voted with regularity, racial animosity was somewhat less prominent, and some large issues were debated. The desire not to disturb the emperor's Diamond Jubilee year by untoward scenes doubtless contributed to calm political passion, and it was celebrated in 1908 with complete success. But it was no sooner over than the crisis over the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has been dealt with above, eclipsed all purely domestic affairs in the larger European question.

CHAPTER XIV

MAGYAR CONQUEST OF HUNGARY

WHEN Árpád, the semi-mythical founder of the Magyar monarchy, at the end of A.D. 895 led his savage hordes through the Vereczka pass into the regions of the Upper Theiss, the land, now called Hungary, was, for the most part, in the possession of Slavs, or semi-Slavs. From the Riesengebirge to the Vistula, and from the Moldau to the Drave, extended the shadowy empire of Meravia, founded by Moimir and Svatopluk (c. 850-890), which collapsed so completely at the first impact of the Magyars that, ten years after their arrival, not a trace of it remained. The Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats and Avars in the southern provinces were subdued with equal ease. Details are wanting, but the traditional decisive battle was fought at Alpar on the Theiss: whereupon the victors pressed on to Orsova, and the conquest was completed by Árpád about the year 906. This forcible intrusion of a non-Aryan race altered the whole history of Europe; but its peculiar significance lay in the fact that it permanently divided the northern from the southern and the eastern from the western Slavs. The inevitable consequence of this rupture was the Teutonizing of the western branch of the great Slav family, which, no longer able to stand alone, and cut off from both Rome and Constantinople, was forced, in self-defence, to take Christianity, and civilization along with it, from Germany.

During the following seventy years we know next to nothing of the internal history of the Magyars. Árpád died in 907, and his immediate successors, Zsolt (907-947) and Taksony (947-972), are little more than chronological landmarks. This was the period of those devastating raids which made the savage Magyar horsemen the scourge and the terror of Europe. We have an interesting description of their tactics from the pen of the emperor Leo VI., whose account of them is confirmed by the contemporary Russian annals. Trained riders, archers and javelin-throwers from infancy, they advanced to the attack in numerous companies following hard upon each other, avoiding close quarters, but wearing out their antagonists by the persistency of their onslaughts. Scarce a corner of Europe was safe from them. First (908-910) they ravaged Thuringia, Swabia and Bavaria, and defeated the Germans on the Lechfeld, whereupon the German king Henry I. bought them off for nine years, employing the respite in reorganizing his army and training cavalry, which henceforth became the principal military arm of the Empire. In 933 the war was resumed, and Henry, at the head of what was really the first national German army, defeated the Magyars at Gotha and at Reid (933). The only effect of these reverses was to divert them elsewhere. Already, in 926, they had crossed the Rhine and ravaged Lotharingia, in 934 and 942 they raided the Eastern Empire, and were bought off under the very walls of Constantinople. In 943 Taksony led them into Italy, when they penetrated as far as Otranto. In 955 they ravaged Burgundy. The same year the emperor Otto I. proclaimed them the enemies of God and humanity, refused to receive their ambassadors, and finally, at the famous battle of the Lechfeld, overwhelmed them on the very scene of their first victory, near Augsburg, which they were besieging (August 10, 955). Only seven of the Magyars escaped, and these were sold as slaves on their return home.

The catastrophe of the Lechfeld convinced the leading Magyars of the necessity of accommodating themselves as far as possible to the Empire, especially in the matter of religion. Christianity had already begun to percolate Hungary. A large proportion of the captives of the Magyars had been settled all over the country to teach their

conquerors the arts of peace, and close contact with this civilizing element was of itself an enlightenment. The moral superiority of Christianity to paganism was speedily obvious. The only question was which form of Christianity were the Magyars to adopt, the Eastern or the Western? Constantinople was the first in the field. The splendour of the imperial city profoundly impressed all the northern barbarians, and the Magyars, during the 10th century, saw a great deal of the Greeks. One Transylvanian raider, Gyula, brought back with him from Constantinople a Greek monk, Hierothus (c. 950), who was consecrated "first bishop of Turkia." Simultaneously a brisk border trade was springing up between the Greeks and the Magyars, and the Greek chapmen brought with them their religion as well as their wares. Everything at first tended to favour the propaganda of the Greek Church. But ultimately political prevailed over religious considerations. Alarmed at the sudden revival of the Eastern Empire, which under the Macedonian dynasty extended once more to the Danube, and thus became the immediate neighbour of Hungary, Duke Geza, who succeeded Taksony in 972, shrewdly resolved to accept Christianity from the more distant and therefore less dangerous emperor of the West. Accordingly an embassy was sent to Otto II. at Quedlinburg in 973, and in 975 Geza and his whole family were baptized. During his reign, however, Hungarian Christianity did not extend much beyond the limits of his court. The nation at large was resolutely pagan, and Geza, for his own sake, was obliged to act warily. Moreover, by accepting Christianity from Germany, he ran the risk of imperilling the independence of Hungary. Hence his cautious, dilatory tactics: the encouragement of Italian propagandists, who were few, the discouragement of German propagandists, who were many. Geza, in short, regarded the whole matter from a statesman's point of view, and was content to leave the solution to time and his successor.

That successor, Stephen I., was one of the great constructive statesmen of history. His long and strenuous reign (997-1038) resulted in the firm establishment of the Hungarian church and the Hungarian state. The great work may be said to have begun in 1001, when Pope Silvester II. recognized Magyar nationality by endowing the young Magyar prince with a kingly crown. Less fortunate than his great exemplar, Charlemagne, Stephen had to depend entirely upon foreigners—men like the Saxon Asztrik¹ (c. 976-1010), the first Hungarian primate; the Lombard St Gellert (c. 977-1046); the Bosomans, a German family, better known under the Magyarized form of their name Pázmány, and many others who came to Hungary in the suite of his enlightened consort Gisela of Bavaria. By these men Hungary was divided into dioceses, with a metropolitan see at Esztergom (Gran), a city originally founded by Geza, but richly embellished by Stephen, whose Italian architects built for him there the first Hungarian cathedral dedicated to St Adalbert. Towns, most of them also the seats of bishops, now sprang up everywhere, including Székesfehérvár (Stuhlweissenburg), Veszprém, Pécs (Fünfkirchen) and Győr (Raab). Esztergom, Stephen's favourite residence, was the capital, and continued to be so for the next two centuries. But the Benedictines, whose settlement in Hungary dates from the establishment of their monastery at Pannonhalma (c. 1001), were the chief pioneers. Every monastery erected in the Magyar wildernesses was not only a centre of religion, but a focus of civilization. The monks cleared the forests, cultivated the recovered land, and built villages for the colonists who flocked to them, teaching the people western methods of agriculture and western arts and handicrafts. But conversion, after all, was the chief aim of these devoted missionaries, and when some Venetian priests had invented a Latin alphabet for the Magyar language a great step had been taken towards its accomplishment.

The monks were soon followed by foreign husbandmen, artificers and handicraftsmen, who were encouraged to come to Hungary by reports of the abundance of good land there and the promise of privileges. This immigration was also stimulated by the terrible condition of western Europe between 987 and 1060, when it was visited by an endless succession of bad harvests and epidemics.² Hungary, now better known to Europe, came to be regarded as a Promised Land, and, by the end of Stephen's reign, Catholics of all nationalities, Greeks, Pagans, Jews and Mahomedans were living securely together within her borders. For, inexorable as Stephen ever was towards fanatical pagans, renegades and rebels, he was too good a statesman to inquire too closely into the private religious opinions of useful and quiet citizens.

In endeavouring, with the aid of the church, to establish his kingship on the Western model Stephen had the immense advantage of building on unencumbered ground, the greater part of the soil of the country being at his absolute disposal. His authority, too, was absolute, being tempered by the shadowy right of the Magyar nation to meet in general assembly; and this authority he was careful not to compromise by any slavish imitation of that feudal polity by which in the West the royal power was becoming obscured. Although he broke off the Magyar tribal system, encouraged the private ownership of land, and even made grants of land on condition of military service—in order to secure an armed force independent of the national levy—he based his new principle of government, not on feudalism, but on the organization of the Frankish empire, which he adapted to suit the peculiar

¹ Ger. Ottrik, in religion Anastasius.

² At its worst, c. 1030-1033, cannibalism was common.

exigencies of his realm. Of the institutions thus borrowed and adapted the most notable was the famous county system which still plays so conspicuous a part in Hungarian national life. Central and western Hungary (the south and north-east still being desolate) were divided into forty-six counties (*vármegyék*, Lat. *comitatus*). At the head of each county was placed a count, or lord-lieutenant¹ (*Főispán*, Lat. *comes*), who nominated his subordinate officials: the castellan (*várnagy*), chief captain (*hadnagy*) and "hundredor" (*százados*, Lat. *centurio*). The lord-lieutenant was nominated by the king, whom he was bound to follow to battle at the first summons. Two-thirds of the revenue of the county went into the royal treasury, the remaining third the lord-lieutenant retained for administrative purposes. In the county system were included all the inhabitants of the country save two classes: the still numerous pagan clans, and those nobles who were attached to the king's person, from whom he selected his chief officers of state and the members of his council, of which we now hear for the first time.

It is significant for the whole future of Hungary that no effort was or could be made by Stephen to weld the heterogeneous races under his crown into a united nation. The body politic consisted, after as before, of the king and the whole mass of Magyar freemen or nobles, descendants of Arpád's warriors, theoretically all equal in spite of growing inequalities of wealth and power, who constituted the *populus*; privileges were granted by the king to foreign immigrants in the cities, and the rights of nobility were granted to non-Magyars for special services; but, in general, the non-Magyars were ruled by the royal governors as subject races, forming—in contradistinction to the "nobles"—the mass of the peasants, the *misera contribuens plebs* upon whom until 1848 nearly the whole burden of taxation fell. The right, not often exercised, of the Magyar nobles to meet in general assembly and the elective character of the crown Stephen also did not venture to touch. On the other hand, his example in manumitting most of his slaves, together with the precepts of the church, practically put an end to slavery in the course of the 13th century, the slaves becoming for the most part serfs, who differed from the free peasants only in the fact that they were attached to the soil (*adscripti glebae*).

At this time all the conditions of life in Hungary were simple and primitive. The court itself was perambulatory. In summer the king dispensed justice in the open air, under a large tree. Only in the short winter months did he dwell in the house built for him at Esztergom by his Italian architects. The most valuable part of his property still consisted of flocks and herds, or the products of the labours of his serfs, a large proportion of whom were bee-keepers, hunters and fishers employed in and around the interminable virgin-forests of the rough-hewn young monarchy.

A troubled forty years (1038–1077) divides the age of St Stephen from the age of St Ladislaus. Of the six kings who reigned in Hungary during that period three died violent deaths, and the other three were fighting incessantly against foreign and domestic foes. In 1046, and again in 1061, two dangerous pagan risings shook the very foundations of the infant church and state; the western provinces were in constant danger from the attacks of the acquisitive emperors, and from the south and south-east two separate hordes of fierce barbarians (the Petchenegs in 1067–1068, and the Kumanians in 1071–1072) burst over the land. It was the general opinion abroad that the Magyars would either relapse into heathendom or become the vassals of the Holy Roman Empire, and this opinion was reflected in the increasingly hostile attitude of the popes towards the Arpád kings. The political independence of Hungary was ultimately secured by the outbreak of the quarrel about investiture (1076), when Geza I. (1074–1077) shrewdly applied to Pope Gregory VII. for assistance, and submitted to accept his kingdom from him as a fief of the Holy See. The immediate result of the papal alliance was to enable Hungary, under both Ladislaus and his capable successor Coloman [Kálmán] (1095–1116), to hold her own against all her enemies, and extend her dominion abroad by conquering Croatia and a portion of the Dalmatian coast. As an incipient great power, she was beginning to feel the need of a seaboard.

In the internal administration both Ladislaus I. and Coloman approved themselves worthy followers of St Stephen. Ladislaus planted large Petcheneg colonies in Transylvania and the trans-Dravian provinces, and established military cordons along the constantly threatened south-eastern boundary, the germs of the future banates² (*bánságok*) which were to play such an important part in the national defence in the following century. Law and order were enforced with the utmost rigour. In that rough age crimes of violence predominated, and the king's justiciars regularly perambulated the land in search of offenders, and decimated every village which refused to surrender fugitive criminals. On the other hand, both the Jews and the "Ishmaelites" (Mahomedans) enjoyed complete civil and religious liberty in Hungary, where, indeed, they were too valuable to be persecuted. The Ishmaelites, the financial experts of the day, were the official mint-masters,

¹ The English title of lord-lieutenant is generally used as the best translation of *Főispán* or *comes* (in this connexion). The title of count (*gróf*) was assumed later (15th century) by those nobles who had succeeded, in spite of the Golden Bull, in making their authority over whole counties independent and hereditary.

² The *bán* is equivalent to the margrave, or count of the marches.

treasurers and bankers. The clergy, the only other educated class, supplied the king with his lawyers, secretaries and ambassadors. The Magyar clergy was still a married clergy, and their connubial privileges were solemnly confirmed by the synod of Szabolcs, presided over by the king, in 1092. So firmly rooted in the land was this practice, that Coloman, much as he needed the assistance of the Holy See in his foreign policy, was only with the utmost difficulty induced, in 1106, to bring the Hungarian church into line with the rest of the Catholic world by enforcing clerical celibacy. Coloman was especially remarkable as an administrative reformer, and Hungary, during his reign, is said to have been the best-governed state in Europe. He regulated and simplified the whole system of taxation, encouraged agriculture by differential duties in favour of the farmers, and promoted trade by a systematic improvement of the ways of communication. The *Magna via Colomanni Regis* was in use for centuries after his death. Another important reform was the law permitting the free disposal of landed estate, which gave the holders an increased interest in their property, and an inducement to improve it. During the reign of Coloman, moreover, the number of freemen was increased by the frequent manumission of serfs. The lot of the slaves was also somewhat ameliorated by the law forbidding their exportation.

Throughout the greater part of the 12th century the chief impediment in the way of the external development of the Hungarian monarchy was the Eastern Empire, which, under the first three princes of the Comnenian dynasty, dominated south-eastern Europe. During the earlier part of that period the Magyars competed on fairly equal terms with their imperial rivals for the possession of Dalmatia, Rascia (the original home of the Serbians, situated between Bosnia, Dalmatia and Albania) and Rama or northern Bosnia (acquired by Hungary in 1135); but on the accession of Manuel Comnenus in 1143 the struggle became acute. As the grandson of St Ladislaus, Manuel had Hungarian blood in his veins; his court was the ready and constant refuge of the numerous Magyar malcontents, and he aimed not so much at the conquest as at the suzerainty of Hungary, by placing one of his Magyar kinsmen on the throne of St Stephen. He successfully supported the claims of no fewer than three pretenders to the Magyar throne, and finally made Béla III. (1173-1196) king of Hungary, on condition that he left him, Manuel, a free hand in Dalmatia. The intervention of the Greek emperors had important consequences for Hungary. Politically it increased the power of the nobility at the expense of the crown, every competing pretender naturally endeavouring to win adherents by distributing largess in the shape of crownlands. Ecclesiastically it weakened the influence of the Catholic Church in Hungary, the Greek Orthodox Church, which permitted a married clergy and did not impose the detested tithe (the principal cause of nearly every pagan revolt) attracting thousands of adherents even among the higher clergy. At one time, indeed, a Magyar archbishop and four or five bishops openly joined the Orthodox communion and willingly crowned Manuel's nominees despite the anathemas of their Catholic brethren.

The Eastern Empire ceased to be formidable on the death of Manuel (1080), and Hungary was free once more to pursue a policy of aggrandizement. In Dalmatia the Venetians were too strong for her; but she helped materially to break up the Byzantine rule in the Balkan peninsula by assisting Stephen Nemanya to establish an independent Servian kingdom, originally under nominal Hungarian suzerainty. Béla endeavoured to strengthen his own monarchy by introducing the hereditary principle, crowning his infant son Emerich as his successor during his own lifetime, a practice followed by most of the later Árpáds; he also held a brilliant court on the Byzantine model, and replenished the treasury by his wise economies.

Unfortunately the fruits of his diligence and foresight were dissipated by the follies of his two immediate successors, Emerich (1196-1204) and Andrew II., who weakened the royal power in attempting to win support by lavish grants of the crown domains on the already over-influential magnates, a policy from which dates the supremacy of the semi-savage Magyar oligarchs, that insolent and self-seeking class which would obey no superior and trampled ruthlessly on every inferior. The most conspicuous event of Andrew's reign was the promulgation in 1222 of the so-called Golden Bull, which has aptly been called the Magna Carta of Hungary, and is in some of its provisions strikingly reminiscent of that signed seven years previously by the English king John.

The Golden Bull has been described as consecrating the humiliation of the crown by the great barons, whose usurpations it legalized; the more usually accepted view, however, is that it was directed not so much to weakening as to strengthening the crown by uniting its interests with those of the mass of the Magyar nobility, equally threatened by the encroachments of the great barons. The preamble, indeed, speaks of the curtailment of the liberties of the nobles by the power of certain of the kings, and at the end the right of armed resistance to any attempt to infringe the charter is conceded to "the bishops and the higher and lower nobles" of the realm; but, for the rest, its contents clearly show that it was intended to strengthen the monarchy by ensuring "that the momentary folly or weakness of the king should not endanger the institution itself." This is especially clear from clause xvi., which decrees that the title and estates of the lords-tenant of counties should not be hereditary, thus attacking feudalism at its very roots, while clause xiv. provides for the degradation of any lord-tenant who should abuse his office. On the

other hand, the principle of the exemption of all the nobles from taxation is confirmed, as well as their right to refuse military service abroad, the defence of the realm being their sole obligation. All nobles were also to have the right to appear at the court which was to be held once a year at Székesfehérvár, by the king, or in his absence by the palatine, for the purpose of hearing causes. A clause also guarantees all nobles against arbitrary arrest and punishment at the instance of any powerful person.

This famous charter, which was amplified, under the influence of the clergy, in 1231, when its articles were placed under the guardianship of the archbishop of Esztergom (who was authorized to punish their violation by the king with excommunication), is generally regarded as the foundation of Hungarian constitutional liberty, though like Magna Carta it purported only to confirm immemorial rights; and as such it was expressly ratified as a whole in the coronation oaths of all the Habsburg kings from Ferdinand to Leopold I. Its actual effect in the period succeeding its issue was, however, practically nugatory; if indeed it did not actually give a new handle to the subversive claims of the powerful barons.

Béla IV. (1235-1270), the last man of genius whom the Arpáds produced, did something to curb the aristocratic misuse which was to be one of the determining causes of the collapse of his dynasty. But he is best known as the regenerator of the realm after the cataclysm of 1241-1242. On his return from exile, after the subsidence of the Tatar deluge, he found his kingdom in ashes; and his two great remedies, wholesale immigration and castle-building, only sowed the seeds of fresh disasters. Thus the Kumanian colonists, mostly pagans, whom he settled in vast numbers on the waste lands, threatened to overwhelm the Christian population; while the numerous strongholds, which he encouraged his nobles to build as a protection against future Tatar invasions, subsequently became so many centres of disloyalty. To bind the Kumanian still more closely to his dynasty, Béla married his son Stephen V. (1270-1272) to a Kumanian girl, and during the reign of her son Ladislaus IV. (1272-1290) the court was certainly more pagan than Christian. Valiant and enterprising as both these princes were (Stephen successfully resisted the aggressions of the brilliant "golden King," Ottakar II. of Bohemia, and Ladislaus materially contributed to his utter overthrow at Durnkrüt in 1278), neither of them was strong enough to make head against the disintegrating influences all around them. Stephen contrived to hold his own by adroitly contracting an alliance with the powerful Neapolitan Angevins who had the ear of the pope; but Ladislaus was so completely caught in the toils of the Kumanians, that the Holy See, the suzerain of Hungary, was forced to intervene to prevent the relapse of the kingdom into barbarism, and the unfortunate Ladislaus perished in the crusade that was preached against him. An attempt of a patriotic party to keep the last Arpád, Andrew III. (1290-1301), on the throne was only temporarily successful, and after a horrible eight years' civil war (1301-1308) the crown of St Stephen finally passed into the capable hands of Charles Robert of Naples.

During the four hundred years of the Arpád dominion the nomadic Magyar race had established itself permanently in central Europe, adopted western Christianity and founded a national monarchy on the western model. Hastily and violently converted, driven like a wedge between the Eastern and the Western Empires, the young kingdom was exposed from the first to extraordinary perils. But, under the guidance of a series of eminent rulers, it successfully asserted itself alike against pagan reaction from within, and aggressive pressure from without, and, as it grew in strength and skill, expanded territorially at the expense of all its neighbours. These triumphs were achieved while the monarchy was absolute and thus able to concentrate in its hands all the resources of the state, but towards the end of the period a political revolution began. The weakness and prodigality of the later Arpáds, the depopulation of the realm during the Tatar invasion, the infiltration of western feudalism and, finally, the endless civil discords of the 13th century, brought to the front a powerful and predacious class of barons who ultimately overshadowed the throne. The ancient county system was gradually absorbed by this new governing element. The ancient royal tenants became the feudatories of the great nobles, and fell naturally into two classes, the *nobiles bene possessionati*, and the *nobiles unius sessionis*, in other words the richer and the poorer gentry. We cannot trace the gradations of this political revolution, but we know that it met with determined opposition from the crown, which resulted in the utter destruction of the Arpáds, who, while retaining to the last their splendid physical qualities, now exhibited unmistakable signs of moral deterioration, partly due perhaps to their too frequent marriages with semi-Oriental Greeks and semi-savage Kumanians. On the other hand, the great nobles were the only class who won for themselves a recognized political position. The tendency towards a representative system of government had begun, but the almost uninterrupted anarchy which marked the last thirty years of the Arpád rule was no favourable time for constitutional development. The kings were fighting for their lives, the great nobles were indistinguishable from brigands and the whole nation seemed to be relapsing into savagery.

CHAPTER XV

THE HOUSE OF ANJOU

It was reserved for the two great princes of the house of Anjou, Charles I. (1310-1342) and Louis I. (1342-1382), to rebuild the Hungarian state, and lead the Magyars back to civilization. Both by character and education they were eminently fitted for the task, and all the circumstances were in their favour. They brought from their native Italy a thorough knowledge of the science of government as the middle ages understood it, and the decimation of the Hungarian magnates during the civil wars enabled them to re-create the noble hierarchy on a feudal basis, in which full allowance was made for Magyar idiosyncrasies. Both these monarchs were absolute. The national assembly (*Országgyűlés*) was still summoned occasionally, but at very irregular intervals, the real business of the state being transacted in the royal council, where able men of the middle class, principally Italians, held confidential positions. The lesser gentry were protected against the tyranny of the magnates, encouraged to appear at court and taxed for military service by the royal treasury direct—so as to draw them closer to the crown. Scores of towns, too, owe their origin and enlargement to the care of the Angevin princes, who were lavish of privileges and charters, and saw to it that the high-roads were clear of robbers. Charles, moreover, was a born financier, and his reform of the currency and of the whole fiscal system greatly contributed to enrich both the merchant class and the treasury. Louis encouraged the cities to surround themselves with strong walls. He himself erected a whole cordon of forts round the flourishing mining towns of northern Hungary. He also appointed Hungarian consuls in foreign trade centres, and established a system of protective tariffs. More important in its ulterior consequences to Hungary was the law of 1351 which, while confirming the Golden Bull in general, abrogated the clause (iv.) by which the nobles had the right to alienate their lands. Henceforward their possessions were to descend directly and as of right to their brothers and their issue, whose claim was to be absolute. This "principle of aviticity" (*ösiség, aviticum*), which survived till 1848, was intended to preserve the large feudal estates as part of the new military system, but its ultimate effect was to hamper the development of the country by preventing the alienation, and therefore the mortgaging of lands, so long as any, however distant, scion of the original owning family survived. Louis's efforts to increase the national wealth were also largely frustrated by the Black Death, which ravaged Hungary from 1347 to 1360, and again during 1380-1381, carrying off at least one-fourth of the population.

Externally Hungary, under the Angevin kings, occupied a commanding position. Both Charles and Louis were diplomatists as well as soldiers, and their foreign policy, largely based on family alliances, was almost invariably successful. Charles married Elizabeth, the sister of Casimir the Great of Poland, with whom he was connected by ties of close friendship, and Louis, by virtue of a compact made by his father thirty-one years previously, added the Polish crown to that of Hungary in 1370. Thus, during the last twelve years of his reign, the dominions of Louis the Great included the greater part of central Europe, from Pomerania to the Danube, and from the Adriatic to the steppes of the Dnieper.

The Angevins were less successful towards the south, where the first signs were appearing of that storm which ultimately swept away the Hungarian monarchy. In 1353 the Ottoman Turks crossed the Hellespont from Asia Minor and began that career of conquest which made them the terror of Europe for the next three centuries. In 1360

they conquered southern Bulgaria. In 1365 they transferred their capital from Brusa to Adrianople. In 1371 they overwhelmed the Servian tsar Vukashin at the battle of Taenarus and penetrated to the heart of old Servia. In 1380 they threatened Croatia and Dalmatia. Hungary herself was now directly menaced, and the very circumstances which had facilitated the advance of the Turks, enfeebled the potential resistance of the Magyars. The Árpád kings had succeeded in encircling their whole southern frontier with half a dozen military colonies or banates, comprising, roughly speaking, Little Walachia,¹ and the northern parts of Bulgaria, Servia and Bosnia. But during this period a redistribution of territory had occurred in these parts, which converted most of the old banates into semi-independent and violently anti-Magyar principalities. This was due partly to the excessive proselytizing energy of the Angevins, which provoked rebellion on the part of their Greek-Orthodox subjects, partly to the natural dynastic competition of the Servian and Bulgarian tsars, and partly to the emergence of a new nationality, the Walachian. Previously to 1320, what is now called Walachia was regarded by the Magyars as part of the banate of Szörény. The base of the very mixed and ever-shifting population in these parts were the Vlachs (Rumanians), perhaps the descendants of Trajan's colonists, who, under their voivode, Bazarad, led King Charles into an ambushade from which he barely escaped with his life (Nov. 9-12, 1330). From this disaster are to be dated the beginnings of Walachia as an independent state. Moldavia, again, ever since the 11th century, had been claimed by the Magyars as forming, along with Bessarabia and the Bukowina, a portion of the semi-mythical *Etelköz*, the original seat of the Magyars before they occupied modern Hungary. This desolate region was subsequently peopled by Vlachs, whom the religious persecutions of Louis the Great had driven thither from other parts of his domains, and, between 1350 and 1360, their voivode Bogdan threw off the Hungarian yoke altogether. In Bosnia the persistent attempts of the Magyar princes to root out the stubborn, crazy and poisonous sect of the Bogomils had alienated the originally amicable Bosnians, and in 1353 Louis was compelled to buy the friendship of their Bar Tvrtko by acknowledging him as king of Bosnia. Both Servia and Bulgaria were by this time split up into half a dozen principalities which, as much for religious as for political reasons, preferred paying tribute to the Turks to acknowledging the hegemony of Hungary. Thus, towards the end of his reign, Louis found himself cut off from the Greek emperor, his sole ally in the Balkans, by a chain of bitterly hostile Greek-Orthodox states, extending from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. The commercial greed of the Venetians, who refused to aid him with a fleet to cut off the Turks in Europe from the Turks in Asia Minor, nullified Louis' last practical endeavour to cope with a danger which from the first he had estimated at its true value.

Louis the Great left two infant daughters: Maria, who was to share the throne of Poland with her betrothed, Sigismund of Pomerania, and Hedwig, better known by her Polish name of Jadwiga, who was to reign over Hungary with her young bridegroom, William of Austria. This plan was upset by the queen-dowager Elizabeth, who determined to rule both kingdoms during the minority of her children. Maria, her favourite, with whom she refused to part, was crowned queen of Hungary a week after her father's death (Sept. 17, 1382). Two years later Jadwiga, reluctantly transferred to the Poles instead of her sister, was crowned queen of Poland at Cracow (Oct. 15, 1384) and subsequently compelled to marry Jagiello, grand-duke of Lithuania. In Hungary, meanwhile, impatience at the rule of women induced the great family of the Horváthys to offer the crown of St Stephen to Charles III. of Naples, who, despite the oath of loyalty he had sworn to his benefactor, Louis the Great, accepted the offer, landed in Dalmatia with a small Italian army, and, after occupying Buda, was crowned king of Hungary on the 31st of December, 1385, as Charles II. His reign lasted thirty-eight days. On the 7th of February, 1386, he was treacherously attacked in the queen-dowager's own apartments, at her instigation, and died of his injuries a few days later. But Elizabeth did not profit long by this atrocity. In July the same year, while on a pleasure trip with her daughter, she was captured by the Horváthys, and tortured to death in her daughter's presence. Maria herself would doubtless have shared the same fate, but for the speedy intervention of her *fiancé*, whom a diet, by the advice of the Venetians, had elected to rule the headless realm on the 31st of March 1387. He married Maria in June the same year, and she shared the sceptre with him till her sudden death by accident on the 17th of May 1395.

During the long reign of Sigismund (1387-1437) Hungary was brought face to face with the Turkish peril in its most threatening shape, and all the efforts of the king were directed towards combating or averting it. However sorry a figure Sigismund may have cut as emperor in Germany, as king of Hungary he claims our respect, and as king of Hungary he should be judged, for he ruled her, not unsuccessfully, for fifty years during one of the most difficult crises of her history, whereas his connexion with Germany was at best but casual and transient.² From the first he recognized that his chief duty was to drive the

¹ That is to say the western portion of Walachia, which lies between the Aluta and the Danube.

² Though elected king of the Romans in 1411, he cannot be regarded as the legal emperor till his coronation at Rome in 1423, and if he was titular king of Bohemia as early as 1419, he was not acknowledged as king by the Czechs themselves till 1436.

Turks from Europe, or, at least, keep them out of Hungary, and this noble ambition was the pivot of his whole policy. A domestic rebellion (1387-1395) prevented him at the outset from executing his design till 1396, and if the hopes of Christendom were shattered at Nicopolis, the failure was due to no fault of his, but to the haughty insubordination of the feudal levies. Again, his inaction during those memorable twelve years (1401-1413) when the Turkish empire, after the collapse at Angora (1402), seemed about to be swallowed up by "the great wolf" Tamerlane, was due entirely to the malice of the Holy See, which, enraged at his endeavours to maintain the independence of the Magyar church against papal aggression (the diet of 1404, on Sigismund's initiative, had declared bulls bestowing Magyar benefices on foreigners, without the royal consent, pernicious and illegal), saddled him with a fresh rebellion and two wars with Venice, resulting ultimately in the total loss of Dalmatia (c. 1430). Not till 1409 could Sigismund be said to be king in his own realm, yet in 1413 we find him traversing Europe in his endeavour to terminate the Great Schism, as the first step towards uniting Christendom once more against the Turk. Hence the council of Constance to depose three rival popes; hence the council of Basel to pacify the Hussites, and promote another anti-Moslem league. But by this time the Turkish empire had been raised again from its ruins by Mahommed I. (1402-1421), and resumed its triumphal progress under Murad II. (1421-1451). Yet even now Sigismund, at the head of his Magyars, thrice (1422-1424, 1426-1427, and 1430-1431) encountered the Turks, not ingloriously, in the open field, till, recognizing that Hungary must thenceforth rely entirely on her own resources in any future struggle with Islam, he elaborately fortified the whole southern frontier, and converted the little fort of Nándorfehérvár, later Belgrade, at the junction of the Danube and Save, into an enormous first-class fortress, which proved strong enough to repel all the attacks of the Turks for more than a century. It argued no ordinary foresight thus to recognize that Hungary's strategy in her contest with the Turks must be strictly defensive, and the wisdom of Sigismund was justified by the disasters which almost invariably overcame the later Magyar kings whenever they ventured upon aggressive warfare with the sultans.

A monarch so overburdened with cares was naturally always in need of money,¹ and thus obliged to lean heavily upon the support of the estates of the realm. The importance and influence of the diet increased proportionately. It met every year, sometimes twice a year, during Sigismund's reign, and was no longer, as in the days of Louis the Great, merely a consultative council, but a legislative body in partnership with the king. It was still, however, essentially an assembly of notables, lay and clerical, at which the gentry, though technically eligible, do not seem to have been directly represented. At Sigismund's first diet (1397) it was declared that the king might choose his counsellors where he listed, and at the diet of 1397 he invited the free and royal towns to send their deputies to the parliament. Subsequently this privilege was apparently erected into a statute, but how far it was acted upon we know not. Sigismund, more fortunate than the Polish kings, seems to have had little trouble with his diets. This was largely due to his friendly intimacy with the majority of the Magyar notables, from among whom he chose his chief counsellors. The estates loyally supported him against the attempted exactions of the popes, and do not seem to have objected to any of his reforms, chief among which was the army-reform project of 1435, to provide for the better defence of the land against the Turks. This measure obliged all the great dignitaries, and the principal towns also, according to their means, to maintain a *banderium* of five hundred horsemen, or a proportional part thereof, and hold it ready, at the first summons, thus supplying the crown with a standing army 76,875 strong. In addition to this, a reserve force called the *telekhatonaság* was recruited from among the lesser gentry according to their *teleks* or holdings, every thirty-three *teleks* being held responsible for a mounted and fully equipped archer. Moreover, river fleets, built by Genoese masters and manned by Servians, were constructed to patrol and defend the great rivers of Hungary, especially on the Turkish frontier. Much as he owed to them, however, Sigismund was no mere nobles' king. His care for the common people was sincere and constant, but his beneficial efforts in this direction were thwarted by the curious interaction of two totally dissimilar social factors, feudalism and Hussitism. In Sigismund's reign the feudal system, for the first time, became deeply rooted in Magyar soil, and it is a lamentable fact that in 15th-century Hungary it is to be seen at its very worst, especially in those wild tracts, and they were many, in which the king's writ could hardly be said to run. Simultaneously from the west came the Hussite propagandists teaching that all men were equal, and that all property should be held in common. The suffering Magyar multitudes eagerly responded to these seductive teachings, and the result was a series of dangerous popular risings (the worst in 1433 and 1436) in which heresy and communism were inextricably intermingled. With the aid of inquisitors from Rome, the evil was literally burnt out, but not before provinces, especially in the south and south-east, had been utterly depopulated. They were re-peopled by Vlachs.

Yet despite the interminable wars and rebellions which darken the history of Hungary in the reign of Sigismund, the country, on the whole, was progressing. Its ready response

¹ In 1412 he pawned the twenty-four Zips towns to Poland, and in 1411 he pledged his margraviate of Brandenburg to the Hohenzollerns.

to the king's heavy demands for the purpose of the national defence points to the existence of a healthy and self-sacrificing public spirit, and the eagerness with which the youth of all classes now began to flock to the foreign universities is another satisfactory feature of the age. Between 1362 and 1450 no fewer than 4151 Magyar students frequented the university of Vienna, nearly as many went by preference to Prague, and this, too, despite the fact that there were now two universities in Hungary itself, the old foundation of Louis the Great at Pécs, and a new one established at Buda by Sigismund.

Like Louis the Great before him, Sigismund had failed to found a dynasty, but, fifteen years before his death, he had succeeded in providing his only daughter Elizabeth with a consort apparently well able to protect both her and her inheritance in the person of Albert V., duke of Austria. Albert, a sturdy soldier, who had given brilliant proofs of valour and generalship in the Hussite wars, was crowned king of Hungary at Székesfehérvár (Stuhlweissenburg) on the 1st of January 1438, elected king of the Romans at Frankfort on the 18th of March 1438, and crowned king of Bohemia at Prague on the 29th of June 1438. On returning to Buda in 1439, he at once plunged into a war with the Turks, who had, in the meantime, captured the important Servian fortress of Semendria and subjugated the greater part of Bosnia. But the king got no farther than Servia, and was carried off by dysentery (Oct. 27, 1439), in the forty-second year of his age, in the course of the campaign.

Albert left behind him two infant daughters only, but his consort was big with child, and, in the event of that child proving to be an heir male, his father's will bequeathed to him the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, under the regency of his mother. Thus, with the succession uncertain, with the Turk at the very door, with the prospect, dismal at the best, of a long minority, the political outlook was both embarrassing and perilous. Obviously a warrior-king was preferable to a regimen of women and children, and the eyes of the wiser Magyars turned involuntarily towards Wladislaus III. of Poland, who, though only in his nineteenth year, was already renowned for his martial disposition. Wladislaus accepted the proffered throne from the Magyar delegates at Cracow on the 8th of March 1440; but in the meantime (Feb. 22) the queen-widow gave birth to a son who, six weeks later, as Ladislaus V. was crowned king of Hungary (May 15) at Székesfehérvár. On the 22nd of May the Polish monarch appeared at Buda, was unanimously elected king of Hungary under the title of Wladislaus I. (June 24) and crowned on the 17th of July. This duoregnum proved even more injurious to Hungary than the dreaded interregnum. Queen Elizabeth, aided by her kinsmen, the emperor Frederick III. and the counts of Cilli, flooded northern and western Hungary with Hussite mercenaries, one of whom, Jan Giskra, she made her captain-general, while Wladislaus held the central and south-eastern parts of the realm. The resulting civil war was terminated only by the death of Elizabeth on the 13th of December 1443.

CHAPTER XVI

THE RULE OF THE HUNYADI

ALL this time the pressure of the Turks upon the southern provinces of Hungary had been continuous, but fortunately all their efforts had so far been frustrated by the valour and generalship of the ban of Szörény, John Hunyadi, the fame of whose victories, notably in 1442 and 1443, encouraged the Holy See to place Hungary for the third time at the head of a general crusade against the infidel. The experienced diplomatist Cardinal Cesarini was accordingly sent to Hungary to reconcile Wladislaus with the emperor. The king, who had just returned from the famous "long campaign" of 1443, willingly accepted the leadership of the Christian League. At the diet of Buda, early in 1444, supplies were voted for the enterprise, and Wladislaus was on the point of quitting his camp at Szeged for the seat of war, when envoys from Sultan Murad arrived with the offer of a ten years' truce on such favourable conditions (they included the relinquishment of Servia, Walachia and Moldavia, and the payment of an indemnity) that Hunyadi persuaded the king to conclude (in July) a peace which gave him more than could reasonably be anticipated from the most successful campaign. Unfortunately, two days later, Cardinal Cesarini absolved the king from the oath whereby he had sworn to observe the peace of Szeged, and was thus mainly responsible for the catastrophe of Varna, when four months later (Nov. 10) the young monarch and the flower of the Magyar chivalry were overwhelmed by fourfold odds on Turkish soil.

The next fourteen years form one of the most interesting and pregnant periods of Hungarian history. It marks the dawn of a public spirit as represented by the gentry, who, alarmed at the national peril and justly suspicious of the ruling magnates unhesitatingly placed their destinies in the hands of Hunyadi, the one honest man who by sheer merit had risen within the last ten years from the humble position of a country squire to a leading position in the state. This feeling of confidence found due expression at the diet of 1446, which deliberately passing over the palatine László Garai elected Hunyadi governor of Hungary, and passed a whole series of popular measures intended to be remedial, e.g. the decree ordering the demolition of the new castles, most of them little better than robber-strongholds; the decree compelling the great officers of state to suspend their functions during the session of the diet; the decree declaring illegal the new fashion of forming confederations on the Polish model, all of which measures were obviously directed against the tyranny and the lawlessness of the oligarchy. Unfortunately this salutary legislation remained a dead letter. It was as much as the governor could do to save the state from destruction, let alone reform it. At this very time northern Hungary, including the wealthy mining towns, was in the possession of the Hussite mercenary Jan Giszkra, who held them nominally for the infant king Ladislaus V., still detained at Vienna by his kinsman the emperor. The western provinces were held by Frederick himself. Invaluable time was wasted in negotiating with these intruders before the governor could safely devote himself to the task of expelling the Turk from the southern provinces. He had to be content with armistices, reconciliations and matrimonial contracts, because the great dignitaries of the state, men like the palatine László Garai, Count Ulrich of Cilli, and the voivode of Transylvania, Mihály Ujlaky, thwarted in every way the *novus homo* whom they hated and envied. From them, the official guardians of Hungary's safety, he received no help, either during his governorship (1446-1453), or when, in 1454, on the

eve of his departure for his last and most glorious campaign, the diet commanded a *levée en masse* of the whole population in his support. At that critical hour it was at his own expense that Hunyadi fortified Belgrade, now the sole obstacle between Hungary and destruction, with the sole assistance of the Franciscan friar Giovanni da Capistrano, equipped the fleet and the army, which relieved the beleaguered fortress and overthrew Mahommed II. But the nation at least was grateful, and after his death (Aug. 11, 1456) it freely transferred its allegiance to his family as represented by his two sons, László, now in his 23rd, and Matthias, now in his 16th year. The judicial murder of László Hunyadi by the enemies of his house (March 16, 1457) was therefore a stupid blunder as well as the foulest of crimes, and on the death of his chief assassin, Ladislaus V., six months later (Nov. 23, 1457), the diet which assembled on the banks of the Rákos, in defiance of the magnates and all foreign competitors, unanimously and enthusiastically elected Matthias Hunyadi king of Hungary (Jan. 24, 1458).

In less than three years the young king had justified their confidence, and delivered his country from its worst embarrassments. This prodigy was accomplished in the face of every conceivable obstacle. His first diet grudgingly granted him supplies and soldiers for the Turkish war, on condition that under no circumstances whatever should they henceforth be called upon to contribute towards the national defence, and he was practically deprived of the control of the *banderia* or mounted militia. It was with a small force of mercenaries, raised at his own expense, that the young king won his first Turkish victories, and expelled the Czechs from his northern and the Habsburgs from his western provinces. But his limited resources, and, above all, the proved incapacity of the militia in the field, compelled him instantly to take in hand the vital question of army reform. In the second year of his reign he undertook personally the gigantic task of providing Hungary with an army adequate to her various needs on the model of the best military science of the day. The landless younger sons of the gentry and the Servian and Vlach immigrants provided him with excellent and practically inexhaustible military material. The old feudal levies he put aside. Brave enough personally, as soldiers they were distinctly inferior both to the Janissaries and the Hussites, with both of whom Matthias had constantly to contend. It was a trained regular army in his pay and consequently at his disposal that he wanted. The nucleus of the new army he found in the Czech mercenaries, seasoned veterans who readily transferred their services to the best payer. This force, formed in 1459, was generally known as the *Fehete Szereg*, or "Black Brigade," from the colour of its armour. From 1465 the pick of the Magyars and Croatians were enlisted in the same way every year, till, towards the end of his reign, Matthias could count upon 20,000 horse and 8000 foot, besides 6000 black brigaders. The cavalry consisted of the famous Hussars, or light horse, of which he may be said to have been the creator, and the heavily armed mounted musketeers on the Czech-German model. The infantry, in like manner, was divided into light and heavy. This army was provided with a regular commissariat, cannon¹ and ballistic machines, and, being constantly on active service, was always in a high state of efficiency. The land forces were supported by a river fleet consisting (in 1479) of 360 vessels, mostly sloops and corvettes, manned by 2600 sailors, generally Croats, and carrying 10,000 soldiers. Eight large military stations were also built at the chief strategic points on the Danube, Save and Theiss. These armaments, which cost Matthias 1,000,000 florins per annum, equivalent to £200,000, did not include the auxiliary troops of the hospodars of Walachia and Moldavia, or the feudal levies of the barons and prelates.

The army of Matthias was not only a military machine of first-rate efficiency, but an indispensable civilizing medium. It enabled the king to curb the lawlessness of the Magyar nobility, and explains why none of the numerous rebellions against him ever succeeded. Again and again, during his absence on the public service, the barons and prelates would assemble to compass his ruin or dispose of his crown, when, suddenly, "like a tempest," from the depths of Silesia or of Bosnia, he would himself appear among them, confounding and scattering them, often without resistance, always without bloodshed. He also frequently employed his soldiers in collecting the taxes from the estates of those magnates who refused to contribute to the public burdens, in protecting the towns from the depredations of the robber barons, or in convoying the caravans of the merchants. In fact, they were a police force as well as an army.

Despite the enormous expense of maintaining the army, Matthias, after the first ten years of his reign, was never in want of money. This miracle was achieved by tact and management. No Hungarian king had so little trouble with the turbulent diet as Matthias. By this time the gentry, as well as the barons and prelates, took part in the legislature. But attendance at the diet was regarded by the bulk of the poorer deputies as an intolerable burden, and they frequently agreed to grant the taxes for two or three years in advance, so as to be saved the expense of attending every year. Moreover, to promote their own convenience, they readily allowed the king to assess as well as to collect the taxes, which consequently tended to become regular and permanent, while Matthias' reform of the

¹ Some of these were of gigantic size, e.g. the Varga Mozsar, or great mortar, which sixty horses could scarce move from its place, and a ballistic machine invented by Matthias which could hurl stones of 3 cwt.

treasury, which was now administered by specialists with separate functions, was economically of great benefit to the state. Yet Matthias never dispensed with the diet. During the thirty-two years of his reign he held at least fifteen diets,¹ at which no fewer than 450 statutes were passed. He re-codified the Hungarian common law; strictly defined the jurisdiction of the whole official hierarchy from the palatine to the humblest village judge; cheapened and accelerated legal procedure, and in an age when might was right did his utmost to protect the weak from the strong. There is not a single branch of the law which he did not simplify and amend, and the iron firmness with which he caused justice to be administered, irrespective of persons, if it exposed him to the charge of tyranny from the nobles, also won for him from the common people the epithet of "the Just." To Matthias is also due the credit of creating an efficient official class. Merit was with him the sole qualification for advancement. One of his best generals, Pál Kinizsy, was a miller's son, and his capable chancellor, Péter Várady, whom he made archbishop of Kálócsa, came of a family of small squires. For education so scholarly a monarch as Matthias naturally did what he could. He founded the university of Pressburg (*Academia Istropolitana*, 1467), revived the declining university of Pecs, and, at the time of his death, was meditating the establishment of a third university at Buda.

Unfortunately the civilizing efforts of Matthias made but little impression on society at large. The bulk of the Magyar nobility was still semi-barbaric. Immensely wealthy (it is estimated that most of the land, at this time, was in the hands of 25 great families, the *Zapolyas* alone holding an eighth of it), it was a point of honour with them to appear in public in costly raiment ablaze with silver, gold and precious stones, followed at every step by armies of retainers scarcely less gorgeous. At the same time their ignorance was profound. Many of the highest dignitaries of state did not know their alphabet. Signatures to documents of the period are rare; seals served instead of signatures, because most of the nobles were unable to sign their names. Learning, indeed, was often ridiculed as pedantry in a gentleman of good family.

The clergy, the chief official class, were naturally less ignorant than the gentry. Some of the prelates—notably János Csezmecezy, better known as Janus Pannonius (1433-1472)—had a European reputation for learning. The primate Cardinal, János Vitez (1408-1472), at the beginning, and the primate, Cardinal Tamas Bakócz, at the end of the reign were men of eminent ability and the highest culture. But the moral tone of the Magyar church at this period was very low. The bishops prided themselves on being great statesmen, great scholars, great financiers, great diplomatists—anything, in fact, but good Christians. Most of them, except when actually celebrating mass, were indistinguishable alike in costume and conduct from the temporal magnates. Of twelve of them it is said that foreigners took them at first for independent temporal princes, so vast were their estates, so splendid their courts, so numerous their armed retainers. Under such guides as these the lower clergy erred deplorably, and drunkenness, gross immorality, brawling and manslaughter were common occurrences in the lives of the parish priests. The regular clergy were if possible worse than the secular, with the exception of the Paulicians, the sole religious order which steadily resisted the general corruption, and whose abbot, the saintly Gregory, was the personal friend of Matthias.

What little culture there was outside the court, the capital and the palaces of a few prelates, was to be found in the towns, most of them of German origin. Matthias laboured strenuously to develop and protect the towns, multiplied municipal charters, and materially improved the means of communication, especially in Transylvania. His Silesian and Austrian acquisitions were also very beneficial to trade, throwing open as they did the western markets to Hungarian produce. Wine and meat were the chief exports. The wines of Hungary were already renowned throughout Europe, and cattle-breeding was conducted on a great scale. Of agricultural produce there was barely sufficient for home consumption, but the mining industries had reached a very high level of excellence, and iron, tin and copper were very largely exported from the northern counties to Danzig and other Baltic ports. So highly developed indeed were the Magyar methods of smelting, that Louis XI. of France took the Hungarian mining system as the model for his metallurgical reforms, and Hungarian master-miners were also in great demand at the court of Ivan the Terrible. Moreover, the keen artistic instincts of Matthias led him to embellish his cities as well as fortify them. Debreczen was practically rebuilt by him, and dates its prosperity from his reign. Breslau, his favourite town, he endowed with many fine public buildings. Buda he endeavoured to make the worthy capital of a great realm, and the palace which he built there was pronounced by the papal legates to be superior to any in Italy.

Politically Matthias raised Hungary to the rank of the greatest power in central Europe, her influence extending into Asia and Africa. Poland was restrained by his alliances with the Teutonic Knights and the tsardom of Muscovy, and his envoys appeared in Persia and in Egypt to combat the diplomacy of the Porte. He never, indeed, jeopardized the position of the Moslems in Europe as his father had done, and thus the peace of Szeged (1444), which regained the line of the Danube and drove the Turk behind the Balkans, must always be reckoned as the high-water mark of Hungary's Turkish triumphs. But Matthias at

¹ We know actually of fifteen, but there may have been many more.

least taught the sultan to respect the territorial integrity of Hungary, and throughout his reign the Eastern Question, though often vexatious, was never acute. Only after his death did the Ottoman empire become a menace to Christendom. Besides, his hands were tied by the unappeasable enmity of the emperor and the emperor's allies, and he could never count upon any material help from the West against the East. The age of the crusades had gone. Throughout his reign the Czechs and the Germans were every whit as dangerous to Hungary as the Turks, and the political necessity which finally compelled Matthias to partition Austria and Bohemia, in order to secure Hungary, committed him to a policy of extreme circumspection. He has sometimes been blamed for not crushing his incurably disloyal and rebellious nobles, instead of cajoling them, after the example of his contemporary, Louis XI., who laid the foundations of the greatness of France on the ruin of the vassals. But Louis XI. had a relatively civilized and politically developed middle class behind him, whereas Matthias had not. It was as much as Matthias could do to keep the civic life of Hungary from expiring altogether, and nine-tenths of his burgesses were foreigners with no political interest in the country of their adoption. Never was any dominion so purely personal, and therefore so artificial as his. His astounding energy and resource curbed all his enemies during his lifetime, but they were content to wait patiently for his death, well aware that the collapse of his empire would immediately follow.

All that human foresight could devise for the consolidation and perpetuation of the newly established Hungarian empire had been done by Matthias in the last years of his reign. He had designated as his successor his natural son, the highly gifted János (John) Corvinus, a youth of seventeen. He had raised him to princely rank, endowed him with property which made him the greatest territorial magnate in the kingdom, placed in his hands the sacred crown and half-a-dozen of the strongest fortresses, and won over to his cause the majority of the royal council. How János was cajoled out of an almost impregnable position, and gradually reduced to insignificance, is told elsewhere. The nobles and prelates, who detested the severe and strenuous Matthian system, desired, as they expressed it, "a king whose beard they could hold in their fists," and they found a monarch after their own heart in Wladislaus Jagiello, since 1471 king of Bohemia, who as Wladislaus II. was elected unanimously king of Hungary on the 15th of July 1490. Wladislaus was the personification of helpless inertia. His Bohemian subjects had long since dubbed him "King All Right" because he said yes to everything. As king of Hungary he was, from first to last, the puppet of the Magyar oligarchs, who proceeded to abolish all the royal prerogatives and safeguards which had galled them under Matthias. By the compact of Farkashida (1490) Wladislaus not only confirmed all the Matthian privileges, but also repealed all the Matthian novelties, including the system of taxation which had enabled his predecessor to keep on foot an adequate national army. The virtual suppression of Wladislaus was completed at the diet of 1492, when "King All Right" consented to live on the receipts of the treasury, which were barely sufficient to maintain his court, and engaged never to impose any new taxes on his Magyar subjects. The dissolution of the standing army, including the Black Brigade, was the immediate result of these decrees. Thus, at the very time when the modernization of the means of national defence had become the first principle, in every other part of Europe, of the strongly centralized monarchies which were rising on the ruins of feudalism, the Hungarian magnates deliberately plunged their country back into the chaos of medievalism. The same diet which destroyed the national armaments and depleted the exchequer confirmed the disgraceful peace of Pressburg, concluded between Wladislaus and the emperor Maximilian on the 7th of November 1491, whereby Hungary retroceded all the Austrian conquests of Matthias, together with a long strip of Magyar territory, and paid a war indemnity equivalent to £200,000.

The thirty-six years which elapsed between the accession of Wladislaus II. and the battle of Mohács is the most melancholy and discreditable period of Hungarian history. Like Poland two centuries later, Hungary had ceased to be a civilized autonomous state because her prelates and her magnates, uncontrolled by any higher authority, and too ignorant or corrupt to look beyond their own immediate interests, abandoned themselves to the exclusive enjoyment of their inordinate privileges, while openly repudiating their primal obligation of defending the state against extraneous enemies. During these miserable years everything like patriotism or public spirit seems to have died out of the hearts of the Hungarian aristocracy. The great officers of state acted habitually on the principle that might is right. Stephen Bathóry, voivode of Transylvania and count of the Szeklers, for instance, ruled Transylvania like a Turkish pasha, and threatened to behead all who dared to complain of his exactions; "Stinking carrion," he said, was better than living Szeklers. Thousands of Transylvanian gentlemen emigrated to Turkey to get out of his reach. Other great nobles were at perpetual feud with the towns whose wealth they coveted. Thus the Zapolyas, in 1500 and again in 1507, burnt a large part of Breznóbánya and Besztercebánya, two of the chief industrial towns of north Hungary. Kronstadt, now the sole flourishing trade centre in the kingdom, defended itself with hired mercenaries against the robber barons. Everywhere the civic communities were declining; even Buda and Pressburg were half in ruins. In their misery the cities frequently appealed for protection to the emperor and other foreign potentates, as no redress was attainable at home.

Compared even with the contemporary Polish diet the Hungarian national assembly was a tumultuous mob. The diet of 1497 passed most of its time in constructing, and then battering to pieces with axes and hammers, a huge wooden image representing the ministers of the crown, who were corrupt enough, but immovable, since they regularly appeared at the diet with thousands of retainers armed to the teeth, and openly derided the reforming endeavours of the lower gentry, who perceived that something was seriously wrong, yet were powerless to remedy it. All that the gentry could do was to depress the lower orders, and this they did at every opportunity. Thus, many of the towns, notably Visegrád, were deprived of the charters granted to them by Matthias, and a whole series of anti-civic ordinances were passed. Noblemen dwelling within the walls of the towns were especially exempted from all civic burdens, while every Burgess who bought an extra-mural estate was made to pay double for the privilege.¹ Every nobleman had the right to engage in trade toll-free, to the great detriment of their competitors the burgesses. The peasant class suffered most of all. In 1496 Varady, archbishop of Kalocsa, one of the few good prelates, declared that their lot was worse than that of brute beasts. The whole burden of taxation rested on their shoulders, and so ground down were they by ingeniously multiplied exactions that thousands of them were reduced to literal beggary.

Yet, despite this inward rottenness, Hungary, for nearly twenty years after the death of Matthias, enjoyed an undeserved prestige abroad, due entirely to the reputation which that great monarch had won for her. Circumstances, indeed, were especially favourable. The emperor Maximilian was so absorbed by German affairs that he could do her little harm, and under Bayezid II. and Selim I. the Turkish menace gave little anxiety to the court of Buda, Bayezid being no warrior, while Selim's energies were claimed exclusively by the East, so that he was glad to renew the triennial truce with Hungary as often as it expired. Hungary, therefore, for almost the first time in her history, was free to choose a foreign policy of her own, and had she been guided by a patriot, she might now have easily regained Dalmatia, and acquired besides a considerable sea-board. Unfortunately Tamás Bakócz, her leading diplomatist from 1499 to 1521, was as much an egotist as the other magnates, and he sacrificed the political interests of Hungary entirely to personal considerations. Primate of Hungary since 1497, he coveted the popedom—and the red hat as the first step thereto above all things—and looked mainly to Venetian influence for both. He therefore supported Venice against her enemies, refused to enter the League of Cambray in 1508, and concluded a ten years' alliance with the Signoria, which obliged Hungary to defend Venetian territory without any equivalent gain. Less reprehensible, though equally self-seeking, were his dealings with the emperor, which aimed at a family alliance between the Jagiellons and the Habsburgs on the basis of a double marriage between the son and daughter of Wladislaus, Louis and Anne, and an Austrian archduke and archduchess; this was concluded by the family congress at Vienna, July 22, 1515, to which Sigismund I. of Poland, the brother of Wladislaus, acceded. The Hungarian diet frantically opposed every Austrian alliance as endangering the national independence, but to any unprejudiced observer a union with the house of Habsburg, even with the contingent probability of a Habsburg king, was infinitely preferable to the condition into which Hungary, under native aristocratic misrule, was swiftly drifting. The diet itself had become as much a nullity as the king, and its decrees were systematically disregarded. Still more pitiable was the condition of the court. The penury of Wladislaus II. was by this time so extreme, that he owed his very meals to the charity of his servants. The diet, indeed, voted him aids and subsidies, but the great nobles either forbade their collection within their estates, or confiscated the amount collected. Under the circumstances, we cannot wonder if the frontier fortresses fell to pieces, and the border troops, unpaid for years, took to brigandage.

¹ It should be remembered that at this time one-third of the land belonged to the church and the remainder was in the hands of less than a dozen great families who had also appropriated the royal domains.

CHAPTER XVII

THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

THE last reserves of the national wealth and strength were dissipated by the terrible peasant rising of György Dozsa in 1514, of which the enslavement of the Hungarian peasantry was the immediate consequence. The "Savage Diet" which assembled on the 18th of October the same year, to punish the rebels and restore order, well deserved its name. Sixty-two of its seventy-one enactments were directed against the peasants, who were henceforth bound to the soil and committed absolutely into the hands of "their natural lords." To this vindictive legislation, which converted the labouring population into a sullenly hostile force within the state, it is mainly due that a healthy political life in Hungary became henceforth impossible. The same spirit of hostility to the peasantry breathed through the famous codification of the Hungarian customary law known as the *Tripartitum*, which, though never actually formally passed into law, continued until 1845 to be the only document defining the relations of king and people, of nobles and their peasants, and of Hungary and her dependent states.¹

Wladislaus II. died on the 13th of March 1516, two years after the "Savage Diet," the ferocity of whose decrees he had feebly endeavoured to mitigate, leaving his two kingdoms to his son Louis, a child of ten, who was pronounced of age in order that his foreign guardians, the emperor Maximilian and Sigismund of Poland, might be dispensed with. The government remained in the hands of Cardinal Bakócz till his death in 1521, when the supreme authority at court was disputed between the lame palatine István Báthory, and his rival, the eminent jurist and orator István Verböczy, —both of them incompetent, unprincipled place-hunters,—while, in the background lurked János Zapolya, voivode of Transylvania, patiently waiting till the death of the feeble and childless king (who, in 1522, married Maria of Austria) should open for him a way to the throne. Every one felt that a catastrophe was approaching. "Things cannot go on like this much longer," wrote the Venetian ambassador to his government. The war of each against all continued; no taxes could be collected; the holders of the royal domains refused to surrender them at the command of the diet; and the boy king had very often neither clothes to wear nor food to eat. The whole atmosphere of society was one of rapine and corruption, and only on the frontier a few self-sacrificing patriots like the ban-bishop, Peter Biriszlo, the last of Matthias's veterans, and his successor the saintly Pál Tomori, archbishop of Kalocsa, showed, in their ceaseless war against the predatory Turkish bands, that the ancient Magyar valour was not yet wholly extinct. But the number of the righteous men was too few to save the state. The first blow fell in 1521, when Sultan Suleiman appeared before the southern fortresses of Sabác and Belgrade, both of which fell into his hands during the course of the year. After this Venice openly declared that Hungary was no longer worth the saving. Yet the *coup de grâce* was postponed for another five years, during which time Suleiman was occupied with the conquest of Egypt and the

¹ The *Opus tripartitum juris consuetudinarii regni Hungariae* was drawn up by Verböczy at the instance of the diet in 1507. It was approved by a committee of the diet and received the royal *imprimatur* in 1514, but was never published. In the constitutional history of Hungary the *Tripartitum* is of great importance as reasserting the fundamental equality of all the members of the *populus* (i.e. the whole body of the nobles) and, more especially, as defining the co-ordinate power of the king and "people" in legislation: i.e. the king may propose laws, but they had no force without the consent of the people, and vice versa.

siege of Rhodes. The Magyars fancied they were safe from attack, because the final assault was suspended; and everything went on in the old haphazard way. Every obstacle was opposed to the collection of the taxes which had been voted to put the kingdom in a state of defence. "If this realm could be saved at the expense of three florins," exclaimed the papal envoy, Antonio Burgio, "there is not a man here willing to make the sacrifice." Only on the southern frontier did Archbishop Tomori painfully assemble a fresh army and fleet, and succeed, by incredible efforts, in constructing at Péterwardein, on the right bank of the Danube, a new fortress which served him as a refuge and sally post in his interminable guerilla war with the Turks.

In the spring of 1526 came the tidings that Sultan Suleiman had quitted Constantinople at the head of a countless host, to conquer Hungary. On the 28th of July Péterwardein, after a valiant resistance, was blown into the air. The diet, which met at Buda in hot haste, proclaimed the young king¹ dictator, granted him unlimited subsidies which there was no time to collect, and ordered a *levée en masse* of the entire male population, which could not possibly assemble within the given time. Louis at once formed a camp at Tolna, whence he issued despairing summonses to the lieges, and, by the middle of August, some 25,000 ill-equipped gentlemen had gathered around him. With these he marched southwards to the plain of Mohács, where, on the 29th of August, the Hungarians, after a two-hours' fight, were annihilated, the king, both the archbishops, five bishops and 24,000 men perishing on the field. The sultan refused to believe that the pitiful array he had so easily overcome could be the national army of Hungary. Advancing with extreme caution, he occupied Buda on the 12th of September, but speedily returned to his own dominions, carrying off with him 105,000 captives, and an amount of spoil which filled the bazaars of the East for months to come. By the end of October the last Turkish regular had quitted Magyar soil, and, to use the words of a contemporary observer, one quarter of Hungary was as utterly destroyed as if a flood had passed over it.

The Turks had no sooner quitted the land than John Zapolya, voivode of Transylvania, assembled a diet at Tokaj (Oct. 14, 1526) at which the towns were represented as well as the counties. The tone of the assembly being violently anti-German, and John being the only conceivable national candidate, his election was a matter of course; but his misgivings were so great that it was not till the beginning of November that he very reluctantly allowed himself to be crowned at a second diet, held at Székesfehérvár. By this time a competitor had entered the field. This was the archduke Ferdinand, who claimed the Hungarian crown by right of inheritance in the name of his wife, Anne, sister of the late king. Ferdinand was elected (Dec. 16) by a scratch assembly consisting of deputies from Croatia and the towns of Pressburg and Sopron; but he speedily improved his position in the course of 1527, by driving King John first from Buda and then from Hungary. In November the same year he was elected and crowned by a properly constituted diet at Székesfehérvár (Stuhlweissenburg). In 1529 Zapolya was reinstated in Buda by Suleiman the Magnificent in person, who, at this period, preferred setting up a rival to "the king of Vienna" to conquering Hungary outright. Thus the Magyars were saddled with two rival kings with equally valid titles, which proved an even worse disaster than the Mohács catastrophe; for in most of the counties of the unhappy kingdom desperadoes of every description plundered the estates of the gentry, and oppressed the common people, under the pretext that they were fighting the battles of the contending monarchs. The determination of Ferdinand to partition Hungary rather than drive the Turks out, which he might easily have done after Suleiman's unsuccessful attempts on Vienna in 1529-1530, led to a prolongation of the struggle till the 24th of February 1538, when, by the secret peace of Nagyvarad,² Hungary was divided between the two competitors. By this treaty Ferdinand retained Croatia-Slavonia and the five western counties with Pressburg and Esztergom (Gran), while Zapolya kept the remaining two-thirds with the royal title. He was indeed the last national king of Hungary till modern times. His court at Buda was maintained according to the ancient traditions, and his *gyűlés*, at which 67 of the 73 counties were generally represented, was the true national diet, the phantom assembly occasionally convened at Pressburg by Ferdinand scarcely deserving the title. Indeed, Ferdinand regarded his narrow strip of Hungarian territory as simply a barrier behind which he could better defend the hereditary states. During the last six years (1534-1540) of John's reign his kingdom, beneath the guidance of the Paulician monk, Frater György, or George Martinuzzi the last great statesman of old Hungary, enjoyed a stability and prosperity marvellous in the difficult circumstances of the period, Martinuzzi holding the balance exactly between the emperor and the Porte with astounding diplomatic dexterity, and at the same time introducing several important domestic reforms. Zapolya died on the 18th of July 1540, whereupon the estates of Hungary elected his baby son John Sigismund king, in direct violation of the peace of Grosswardein which had formally acknowledged Ferdinand as John's successor, whether he left male issue or not. Ferdinand at once asserted his rights by force of arms, and attacked Buda in May 1541, despite the urgent remonstrances of Martinuzzi, who knew that the Turk would never suffer the emperor to reign

¹ He was just twenty.

² It was kept secret for some years for fear of Turkish intervention.

at Buda. His fears were instantly justified. In August 1541, Suleiman, at the head of a vast army, invaded Hungary, and on the 30th of August, Buda was in his hands. During the six following years the sultan still further improved his position, capturing, amongst many other places, Pécs, and the primal city of Esztergom; but, in 1547, the exigencies of the Persian war induced him to sell a truce of five years to Ferdinand for £100,000, on a *uti possidetis* basis, Ferdinand holding thirty-five counties (including Croatia and Slavonia) for which he was to pay an annual tribute of £60,000; John Sigismund retaining Transylvania and sixteen adjacent counties with the title of prince, while the rest of the land, comprising most of the central counties, was annexed to the Turkish empire. Thus the ancient kingdom was divided into three separate states with divergent aims and interests, a condition of things which, with frequent rearrangements, continued for more than 150 years.

A period of infinite confusion and extreme misery now ensued, of which only the salient points can here be noted. The attempts of the Habsburgs to conquer Transylvania drew down upon them two fresh Turkish invasions, the first in 1552, when the sultan's generals captured Temesvár and fifty-four lesser forts or fortresses, and the second in 1566, memorable as Suleiman's last descent upon Hungary, and also for the heroic defence of Szigetvár by Miklós Zrínyi, one of the classical sieges of history. The truce of Adrianople in 1568, nominally for eight years, but prolonged from time to time till 1593, finally suspended regular hostilities, and introduced the epoch known as "The Long Peace," though, throughout these twenty-five years, the guerilla warfare on the frontier never ceased for more than a few months at a time, and the relations between the Habsburgs and Transylvania were persistently hostile.

Probably no other country ever suffered so much from its rulers as Hungary suffered during the second half of the 16th century. This was due partly to political and partly to religious causes. To begin with, there can be no doubt that from 1558, when the German imperial crown was transferred from the Spanish to the Austrian branch of the Habsburg family, royal Hungary¹ was regarded by the emperors as an insignificant barrier province yielding far more trouble than profit. The visible signs of this contemptuous point of view were (1) the suspension of the august dignity of palatine, which, after the death of Tamás Nádasdy, "the great palatine," in 1562, was left vacant for many years; (2) the abolition or attenuation of all the ancient Hungarian court dignitaries; (3) the degradation of the capital, Pressburg, into a mere provincial town; and (4) the more and more openly expressed determination to govern Hungary from Vienna by means of foreigners, principally German or Czech. During the reign of Ferdinand, whose consort, Anne, was a Hungarian princess, things were at least tolerable; but under Maximilian (1564-1576) and Rudolph (1576-1612) the antagonism of the Habsburgs towards their Magyar subjects was only too apparent. The diet, which had the power of the purse, could not be absolutely dispensed with; but it was summoned as seldom as possible, the king often preferring to forego his subsidies rather than listen to the unanswerable remonstrances of the estates against the illegalities of his government. In the days of the semi-insane recluse Rudolph things went from bad to worse. The Magyar nobles were now systematically spoliated on trumped up charges of treason; hundreds of them were ruined. At last they either durst not attend the diet, or "sat like dumb dogs" during its session, allowing the king to alter and interpret the statutes at his good pleasure. Presently religious was superadded to political persecution.

The Reformation had at first produced little effect on Hungary. Except in the towns, mostly of German origin, it was generally detested, just because it came from Germany. The battle of Mohács, however, severely shook the faith of the Hungarians. "Where are the old Magyar saints? Why do they not defend the realm against the Turks?" was the general cry. Moreover, the corrupt church had lost its hold on the affections of the people. Zapolya, a devout Catholic, is lauded by Archbishop Frangipan in 1533 for arresting the spread of the new doctrines, though he would not allow Martinuzzi to take the extreme step of burning perverts at the stake. These perverts were mostly to be found among nobles desirous of amassing church property, or among those of the clergy who clamoured for communion in both kinds. So long, however, as the old national kingdom survived, the majority of the people still clung to the old faith. Under Ferdinand the parochial clergy were tempted to become Lutherans by the prospect of matrimony, and, in reply to the remonstrances of their bishops, declared that they would rather give up their cures than their wives. In Transylvania matters were at first ordered more peaceably. In 1552 the new doctrines obtained complete recognition there, the diet of Torda (1557) going so far as to permit every one to worship in his own way so long as he did not molest his neighbour. Yet, in the following year, the whole of the property of the Catholic Church there was diverted to secular uses, and the Calvinists were simultaneously banished, though they regained complete tolerance in 1564, a privilege at the same time extended to the Unitarians, who were now very influential at court and converted Prince John Sigismund to their views. In Turkish Hungary all the confessions enjoyed liberty of worship, though the Catholics, as possible partisans of the "king of Vienna," were liked the least. It was only when the

¹ In contradistinction to Turkish Hungary and Transylvanian Hungary.

Jesuits obtained a footing both at Prague¹ and Klausenburg that persecution began, but then it was very violent. In Transylvania the princes of the Báthory family (1571-1604) were ardent disciples of the Jesuit fathers, and Sigismund Báthory in particular persecuted fiercely, his fury being especially directed against the queer judaizing sect known as the Sabbatarians, whose tenets were adopted by the Szeklers, the most savage of "the three nations" of Transylvania, many thousands of whom were, after a bloody struggle, forced to emigrate. In royal Hungary also the Jesuits were the chief persecutors. The extirpation of Protestantism was a deliberate prearranged programme, and as Protestantism was by this time identical with Magyarism² the extirpation of the one was tantamount to the extirpation of the other. The method generally adopted was to deprive the preachers in the towns of their churches by force, Italian mercenaries being preferably employed for the purpose. It was assumed that the Protestant nobles' jealousy of the burgesses would prevent them from interfering; but religious sympathy proved stronger than caste prejudice, and the diets protested against the persecution of their fellow-citizens so vehemently that religious matters were withdrawn from their jurisdiction.

¹ At first the Habsburgs held their court at Prague instead of at Vienna.

² According to contemporary records the number of prelates and priests in the three parts of Hungary at the beginning of the 17th century was but 103, all told, and of the great families not above half a dozen still clung to Catholicism.

CHAPTER XVIII

RISE OF TRANSYLVANIA

THIS persecution raged most fiercely towards the end of what is generally called "The Long War," which began in 1593, and lasted till 1606. It was a confused four-cornered struggle between the emperor and the Turks, the Turks and Transylvania, Michael of Moldavia and Transylvania, and Transylvania and the emperor, desultory and languishing as regards the Turks (the one notable battle being Sigismund Báthory's brilliant victory over the grand vizier in Walachia in 1595, when the Magyar army penetrated as far as Giurgevo), but very bitter as between the emperor and Transylvania, the principality being finally subdued by the imperial general, George Basta, in August 1604. A reign of terror ensued, during which the unfortunate principality was well-nigh ruined. Basta was authorized to Germanize and Catholicize without delay, and he began by dividing the property of most of the nobles among his officers, appropriating the lion's share himself. In royal Hungary the same object was aimed at by innumerable indictments against the richer landowners, indictments supported by false title-deeds and carried through by forged or purchased judgments of the courts. At last the estates of even the most devoted adherents of the Habsburgs were not safe, and some of them, like the wealthy István Illesházy (1540-1609), had to fly abroad to save their heads. Fortunately a peculiarly shameless attempt to blackmail Stephen Bocskay, a rich and powerful Transylvanian nobleman, converted a long-suffering friend of the emperor into a national deliverer. Bocskay, a quiet but resolute man, having once made up his mind to rebel, never paused till he had established satisfactory relations between the Austrian court and the Hungarians. The two great achievements of his brief reign (he was elected prince of Transylvania on the 5th of April 1605, and died on the 29th of December 1606) were the peace of Vienna, (June 23, 1606) and the truce of Zsitvatorök (November 1606). By the peace of Vienna Bocskay obtained religious liberty and political autonomy, the restoration of all confiscated estates, the repeal of all unrighteous judgments and a complete retrospective amnesty for all the Magyars in royal Hungary, besides his own recognition as independent sovereign prince of an enlarged¹ Transylvania. This treaty is remarkable as being the first constitutional compact between the ruling dynasty and the Hungarian nation. Almost equally important was the twenty years' truce of Zsitvatorök, negotiated by Bocskay between the emperor and the sultan, which established for the first time a working equilibrium between the three parts of Hungary, with a distinct political preponderance in favour of Transylvania. Of the 5163 sq. m. of Hungarian territory, Transylvania now possessed 2082, Turkish Hungary 1859, and royal Hungary only 1222. The emperor, on the other hand, was freed from the humiliating annual tribute to the Porte on payment of a war indemnity of £400,000. The position of royal Hungary was still further improved when the popular and patriotic Archduke Matthias was elected king of Hungary on the 16th of November 1608. He had previously confirmed the treaty of Vienna, and the day after his election he appointed Illesházy, now reinstated in all his possessions and dignities, palatine of Hungary.² In Transylvania, meantime, Gabriel Bathóry had been elected (Nov. 11, 1608) in place of the decrepit Sigismund Rákoczy, Bocskay's immediate successor.

¹ The counties of Szatmar, Ugocsa and Bereg and the fortress of Tokaj were formally ceded to him.

² He was the first Protestant palatine.

For more than fifty years after the peace of Vienna the principality of Transylvania continued to be the bulwark of the liberties of the Magyars. It owed its ascendancy in the first place to the abilities of the two princes who ruled it from 1613 to 1648. The first and most famous of these rulers was Gabriel Bethlen, who reigned from 1613 to 1629, perpetually thwarted all the efforts of the emperor to oppress or circumvent his Hungarian subjects, and won some reputation abroad by adroitly pretending to champion the Protestant cause. Three times he waged war on the emperor, twice he was proclaimed king of Hungary, and by the peace of Nikolsburg (Dec. 31, 1621) he obtained for the Protestants a confirmation of the treaty of Vienna, and for himself seven additional counties in northern Hungary besides other substantial advantages. Bethlen's successor, George I. Rákoczy, was equally successful. His principal achievement was the peace of Linz (Sept. 16, 1645), the last political triumph of Hungarian Protestantism, whereby the emperor was forced to confirm once more the oft-broken articles of the peace of Vienna, to restore nearly a hundred churches to the sects and to acknowledge the sway of Rákoczy over the north Hungarian counties. Gabriel Bethlen and George I. Rákoczy also did much for education and civilization generally, and their era has justly been called the golden era of Transylvania. They lavished money on the embellishment of their capital, Gyulafehérvár, which became a sort of Protestant Mecca, whither scholars and divines of every anti-Roman denomination flocked to bask in the favour of princes who were as liberal as they were pious. Yet both Bethlen and Rákoczy owed far more to favourable circumstances than to their own cunning. Their reigns synchronized with the Thirty Years' War, during which the emperors were never in a position seriously to withstand the attacks of the malcontent Magyars, the vast majority of whom were still Protestants, who naturally looked upon the Transylvanian princes as their protectors and joined them in thousands whenever they raided Moravia or Lower Austria, or threatened to advance upon Vienna. In all these risings no battle of importance was fought. Generally speaking, the Transylvanians had only to appear, to have their demands promptly complied with; for these marauders had to be bought off because the emperor had more pressing business elsewhere. Yet their military efficiency must have been small, for their allies the Swedes invariably allude to them as wild and ragged semi-barbarians.

Another fortunate accident which favoured the hegemony of Transylvania was the temporary collapse of Hungary's most formidable adversary, the Turk. From the peace of Zsitvatörök (1606) to the ninth year of the reign of George Rákoczy II., who succeeded his father in 1648, the Turkish empire, misruled by a series of incompetent sultans and distracted by internal dissensions, was unable to intervene in Hungarian politics. But in the autumn of 1656 a great statesman, Mahommed Kuprili, obtained the supreme control of affairs at Constantinople, and all Europe instantly felt the pressure of the Turk once more. It was George Rákoczy II. who gave the new grand vizier a pretext for interference. Against the advice of all his counsellors, and without the knowledge of the estates, Rákoczy, in 1657, plunged into the troubled sea of Polish politics, in the hope of winning the Polish throne, and not only failed miserably but overwhelmed Transylvania in his own ruin. Kuprili, who had forbidden the Polish enterprise, at once occupied Transylvania, and, in the course of the next five years, no fewer than four princes, three of whom died violent deaths, were forced to accept the kaftan and kalpag of investiture in the camp of the grand vizier. When, at the end of 1661, a more stable administration was set up with Michael Apaffy (1661-1690) as prince, Transylvania had descended to the rank of a feudatory of the Turkish empire. On the death of Mahommed Kuprili (Oct. 11, 1661) his son Fazil Ahmed succeeded him as grand vizier, and pursued his father's policy with equal genius and determination. In 1663 he invaded royal Hungary, with the intention of uniting all the Magyars against the emperor, but, the Magyars steadily refusing to attend any diet summoned under Turkish influence, his plan fell through, and his only notable military success was the capture of the fortress of Érsekujvár (Neuhäusel). In the following year, thanks to the generalship and heroism of Miklós Zrinyi the younger, Kuprili was still less successful. Zrinyi captured fortress after fortress, and interrupted the Turkish communications by destroying the famous bridge of Esseg, while Montecuculi defeated the grand vizier at the battle of St Gothard (Aug. 1, 1664). Yet, despite these reverses, Kuprili's superior diplomacy enabled him, at the peace of Vasvár (Aug. 10, 1664) to obtain terms which should only have been conceded to a conqueror. The fortress of Érsekujvár and surrounding territory were now ceded to the Turks, with the result that royal Hungary was not only still further diminished, but its northern practically separated from its southern portion. On the other hand the treaty of Vasvár gave Hungary a respite from regular Turkish invasions for twenty years, though the border raiding continued uninterruptedly.

CHAPTER XIX

HABSBURG REPRESSION

OF far more political importance than these fluctuating wars of invasion and conquest was the simultaneous Catholic reaction in Hungary. The movement may be said to have begun about 1601, when the great Jesuit preacher and controversialist, Péter Pázmány, first devoted himself to the task of reconverting his countrymen. Progress was necessarily retarded by the influence of the independent Protestant princes of Transylvania in the northern counties of Hungary. Even as late as 1622 the Protestants at the diet of Pressburg were strong enough to elect their candidate, Szaniszló Thurzó, palatine. But Thurzó was the last Protestant palatine, and, on his death, the Catholics, at the diet of Sopron (1625), where they dominated the Upper Chamber, and had a large minority in the Lower, were able to elect Count Miklós Esterházy in Thurzó's stead. The Jesuit programme in Hungary was the same as it had been in Poland a generation earlier, and may be summed up thus : convert the great families and all the rest will follow.¹ Their success, due partly to their whole-hearted zeal, and partly to their superior educational system, was extraordinary ; and they possessed the additional advantage of having in Pázmány a leader of commanding genius. During his primacy (1616-1637), when he had the whole influence of the court, and the sympathy and the assistance of the Catholic world behind him, he put the finishing touches to his life's labour by founding a great Catholic university at Nagyszombat (1635), and publishing a Hungarian translation of the Bible to counteract the influence of Gaspar Károli's widely spread Protestant version. Pázmány was certainly the great civilizing factor of Hungary in the 17th century, and indirectly he did as much for the native language as for the native church. His successors had only to build on his foundations. One most striking instance of how completely he changed the current of the national mind may here be given. From 1526 to 1625 the usual jubilee pilgrimages from Hungary to Rome had entirely ceased. During his primacy they were revived, and in 1650, only seventeen years after his death, they were as numerous as ever they had been. Five years later there remained but four noble Protestant families in royal Hungary. The Catholicization of the land was complete.

Unfortunately the court of Vienna was not content with winning back the Magyars to the Church. The Habsburg kings were as jealous of the political as of the religious liberties of their Hungarian subjects. This was partly owing to the fact that national aspirations of any sort were contrary to the imperial system, which claimed to rule by right divine, and partly to an inveterate distrust of the Magyars, who were regarded at court as rebels by nature, and therefore as enemies far more troublesome than the Turks. The conduct of the Hungarian nobles in the past, indeed, somewhat justified this estimate, for the fall of the ancient monarchy was entirely due to their persistent disregard of authority, to their refusal to bear their share of the public burdens. They were now to suffer severely for their past misdoings, but unfortunately the innocent nation was forced to suffer with them. Throughout the latter part of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th century, the Hungarian gentry underwent a cruel discipline at the hands of their Habsburg kings. Their privileges were overridden, their petitions were disregarded, their diets were degraded into mere registries of the royal decrees. They were never fairly represented in the royal council, they were excluded as far as

¹ The *jobbagyok*, or under-tenants, had to follow the example of their lords ; they were, by this time, mere serfs with no privileges either political or religious.

possible from commands in Hungarian regiments, and were treated generally as the members of an inferior and guilty race. This era of repression corresponds roughly with the reign of Leopold I. (1657-1705), who left the government of the country to two bigoted Magyar prelates, György Szelepesényi (1595-1685) and Lipót (Leopold) Kollonich (1631-1707), whose domination represents the high-water mark of the anti-national regimen. The stupid and abortive conspiracy of Peter Zrinyi and three other magnates, who were publicly executed (April 30, 1671), was followed by wholesale arrests and confiscations, and for a time the legal government of Hungary was superseded (Patent of March 3, 1673) by a committee of eight persons, four Magyars and four Germans, presided over by a German governor; but the most influential person in this committee was Bishop Kollonich, of whom it was said that, while Pázmány hated the heretic in the Magyar, Kollonich hated the Magyar in the heretic. A gigantic process against leading Protestant ministers for alleged conspiracy was the first act of this committee. It began at Pressburg in March 1674, when 236 of the ministers were "converted" or confessed to acts of rebellion. But the remaining 93 stood firm and were condemned to death, a punishment commuted to slavery in the Neapolitan galleys. Sweden, as one of the guarantors of the peace of Westphalia, and several north German states, protested against the injury thus done to their coreligionists. It was replied that Hungary was outside the operation of the treaty of Westphalia, and that the Protestants had been condemned not *ex odio religionis* but *crimine rebellionis*.

But a high-spirited nation cannot be extinguished by any number of patents and persecutions. So long as the Magyar people had any life left, it was bound to fight in self-defence, it was bound to produce "malcontents" who looked abroad for help to the enemies of the house of Habsburg. The first and most famous of the malcontent leaders was Count Imre Tököli. Between 1678 and 1682 Tököli waged three wars with Leopold, and, in September 1682, was acknowledged both by the emperor and the sultan as prince of North Hungary as far as the river Garam, to the great relief of the Magyar Protestants. The success of Tököli rekindled the martial ardour of the Turks, and a war party, under the grand vizier Kara Mustafa, determined to wrest from Leopold his twelve remaining Hungarian counties, gained the ascendancy at Constantinople in the course of 1682. Leopold, intent on the doings of his perennial rival Louis XIV., was loth to engage in an eastern war even for the liberation of Hungary, which he regarded as of far less importance than a strip or two of German territory on the Rhine. But, stimulated by the representations of Pope Innocent XI., who, well aware of the internal weakness of the Turk, was bent upon forming a Holy League to drive them out of Europe, and alarmed, besides, by the danger of Vienna and the hereditary states, Leopold reluctantly contracted an alliance with John III. of Poland, and gave the command of the army which, mainly through the efforts of the pope he had been able to assemble, to Prince Charles of Lorraine. The war, which lasted for 16 years and put an end to the Turkish dominion in Hungary, began with the world-renowned siege of Vienna (July 14-Sept. 12, 1683). There is no need to recount the oft-told victories of Sobieski. What is not quite so generally known is the fact that Leopold slackened at once and would have been quite content with the results of these earlier victories had not the pope stiffened his resistance by forming a Holy League between the Emperor, Poland, Venice, Muscovy and the papacy, with the avowed object of dealing the Turk the *coup de grâce* (March 5, 1684). This statesmanlike persistence was rewarded by an uninterrupted series of triumphs, culminating in the recapture of Buda (1686) and Belgrade (1688), and the recovery of Bosnia (1689). But, in 1690, the third of the famous Kuprili, Mustafa, brother of Fazil Ahmed, became grand vizier, and the Turk, still further encouraged by the death of Innocent XI., rallied once more. In the course of that year Kuprili regained Servia and Bulgaria, placed Tököli on the throne of Transylvania, and on the 6th of October took Belgrade by assault. Once more the road to Vienna lay open, but the grand vizier wasted the remainder of the year in fortifying Belgrade, and on August 18th, 1691, he was defeated and slain at Slankamen by the margrave of Baden. For the next six years the war languished owing to the timidity of the emperor, the incompetence of his generals and the exhaustion of the Porte; but on the 11th of September 1697 Prince Eugene of Savoy routed the Turks at Zenta and on the 13th of November 1698 a peace-congress was opened at Karlowitz which resulted in the peace of that name (Jan. 26, 1699). Nominally a truce for 25 years on the *uti possidetis* basis, the peace of Karlowitz left in the emperors' hands the whole of Hungary except Syrmia and the territory lying between the rivers Maros, Theiss, Danube and the mountains of Transylvania, the so-called Temesköz, or about one-eleventh of the modern kingdom. The peace of Karlowitz marks the term of the Magyar's secular struggle with Mahomedanism and finally reunited her long-separated provinces beneath a common sceptre.

But the liberation of Hungary from the Turks brought no relief to the Hungarians. The ruthless suppression of the Magyar malcontents, in which there was little discrimination between the innocent and the guilty, had so crushed the spirit of the country that Leopold considered the time ripe for realizing a long-cherished ideal of the Habsburgs and changing Hungary from an elective into an hereditary monarchy. For this purpose a diet was assembled at Pressburg in the autumn of 1687. It was a mere rump, for wholesale

executions had thinned its numbers and the reconquered countries were not represented in it. To this weakened and terrorized assembly the emperor-king explained that he had the right to treat Hungary as a conquered country, but that he was prepared to confirm its constitutional liberties under three conditions: the inaugural diploma was to be in the form signed by Ferdinand I., the crown was to be declared hereditary in the house of Habsburg, and the 31st clause of the Golden Bull, authorizing armed resistance to unconstitutional acts of the sovereign, was to be abrogated. These conditions the diet had no choice but to accept, and, in October 1687, the elective monarchy of Hungary, which had been in existence for nearly seven hundred years, ceased to exist. The immediate effect of the peace of Karlowitz was thus only to strengthen despotism in Hungary. Kollonich, who had been created a cardinal in 1685, archbishop of Kalocsa in 1691 and archbishop of Esztergom (Gran) and primate of Hungary in 1695, was now at the head of affairs, and his plan was to germanize Hungary as speedily as possible by promoting a wholesale immigration into the recovered provinces, all of which were in a terrible state of delapidation.¹

The border counties, now formed into a military zone, were planted exclusively with Croatian colonists as being more trustworthy defenders of the Hungarian frontier than the Hungarians themselves. Moreover, a *neo-acquisita commissio* was constituted to inquire into the title-deeds of the Magyar landowners in the old Turkish provinces, and hundreds of estates were transferred, on the flimsiest of pretexts, to naturalized foreigners. Transylvania since 1690 had been administered from Vienna, and though the farce of assembling a diet there was still kept up, even the promise of religious liberty, conceded to it on its surrender in 1687, was not kept. No wonder then if the whole country was now seething with discontent and only awaiting an opportunity to burst forth in open rebellion. This opportunity came when the emperor, involved in the War of the Spanish Succession, withdrew all his troops from Hungary except some 1600 men. In 1703 the malcontents found a leader in Francis Rakóczy II., who was elected prince by the Hungarian estates on the 6th of July 1704, and during the next six years gave the emperor Joseph I., who had succeeded Leopold in May 1705, considerable anxiety. Rakóczy had often as many as 100,000 men under him, and his bands penetrated as far as Moravia and even approached within a few miles of Vienna. But they were guerillas, not regulars; they had no good officers, no serviceable artillery, and very little money; and all the foreign powers to whom Rakóczy turned for assistance (excepting France, who fed them occasionally with paltry subsidies) would not commit themselves to a formal alliance with rebels who were defeated in every pitched battle they fought. On the other hand, if the Rakóczians were easily dispersed, they as quickly reassembled, and at one time they held all Transylvania and the greater part of Hungary. In the course of 1707 two Rakóczian diets even went so far as formally to depose the Habsburgs and form an interim government with Rakóczy at its head, till a national king could be legally elected. The Maritime Powers, too, fearful lest Louis XIV. should materially assist the Rakóczians and thus divert part of the emperor's forces at the very crisis of the War of the Spanish Succession, intervened, repeatedly and energetically, to bring about a compromise between the court and the insurgents, whose claims they considered to be just and fair. But the obstinate refusal of Joseph to admit that the Rakóczians were anything but rebels was always the insurmountable object in all such negotiations. But when, on the 7th of April 1711, Joseph died without issue, leaving the crown to his brother the Archduke Charles, then fighting the battles of the Allies in Spain, a peace-congress met at Szátmár on the 27th of April, and, two days later, an understanding was arrived at on the basis of a general amnesty, full religious liberty and the recognition of the inviolability of the ancient rights and privileges of the Magyars.

Thus the peace of Szátmár assured to the Hungarian nation all that it had won by former compacts with the Habsburgs; but whereas hitherto the Transylvanian principality had been the permanent guardian of all such compacts, and the authority of the reigning house had been counterpoised by the Turk, the effect and validity of the peace of Szátmár depended entirely upon the support it might derive from the nation itself. It was a fortunate thing for Hungary that the conclusion of the War of the Spanish Succession introduced a new period, in which, at last, the interests of the dynasty and the nation were identical, thus rendering a reconciliation between them desirable. Moreover, the next century and a half was a period of domestic tranquillity, during which Hungary was able to repair the ruin of the long Turkish wars, nurse her material resources, and take the first steps in the direction of social and political reform. The first reforms, however, were dynastic rather than national. Thus, in 1715, King Charles III.² persuaded the diet to consent to the establishment of a standing army, which—though the diet reserved the right to fix the number of recruits and vote the necessary subsidies from time to time—was placed under the control of the Austrian council of war. The same centralizing tendency was shown in the administrative and judicial reforms taken in hand by the diet of 1722. A Hungarian court chancery was now established at Vienna, while the government of Hungary proper was committed to a royal stadholdership at Pressburg. Both the chancery and the stadholdership were independent of the diet and responsible to the king alone, being, in fact,

¹ E.g. in Esztergom, the primatial city, there were only two buildings still standing.

² Charles VI. as emperor.

his executive instruments. It was this diet also which accepted the Pragmatic Sanction, first issued in 1713, by which the emperor Charles VI., in default of his leaving male heirs, settled the succession to his hereditary dominions on his daughter Maria Theresa and her heirs. By the laws of 1723, which gave effect to the resolution of the diet in favour of accepting the principle of female succession, the Habsburg king entered into a fresh contract with his Hungarian subjects, a contract which remained the basis of the relations of the crown and nation until 1848. On the one hand it was declared that the kingdom of Hungary was an integral part of the Habsburg dominions and inseparable from these so long as a male or female heir of the kings Charles, Joseph and Leopold should be found to succeed to them. On the other hand, Charles swore, on behalf of himself and his heirs, to preserve the Hungarian constitution intact, with all the rights, privileges, customs, laws, &c., of the kingdom and its dependencies. Moreover, in the event of the failure of a Habsburg heir, the diet reserved the right to revive the "ancient, approved and accepted custom and prerogative of the estates and orders in the matter of the election and coronation of their king."

The reign of Charles III. is also memorable for two Turkish wars, the first of which, beginning in 1716, and made glorious by the victories of Prince Eugene and János Pálffy, was terminated by the peace of Passarowitz (July 21, 1718), by which the Temesköz was also freed from the Turks, and Servia, Northern Bosnia and Little Walachia, all of them ancient conquests of Hungary, were once more incorporated with the territories of the crown of St Stephen. The second war, though undertaken in league with Russia, proved unlucky, and, at the peace of Belgrade (Sept. 1, 1739), all the conquests of the peace of Passarowitz, including Belgrade itself, were lost, except the banat of Temesvár.

With Maria Theresa (1740-1780) began the age of enlightened despotism. Deeply grateful to the Magyars for their sacrifices and services during the War of the Austrian Succession, she dedicated her whole authority to the good of the nation, but she was very unwilling to share that authority *with* the people. Only in the first stormy years of her reign did she summon the diet; after 1764 she dispensed with it altogether. She did not fill up the dignity of palatine, vacant since the 26th of October 1765, and governed Hungary through her son-in-law, Albert of Saxe-Teschen. She did not attack the Hungarian constitution; she simply put it on one side. Her reforms were made not by statue, but by royal decree. Yet the nation patiently endured the mild yoke of the great queen, because it felt and knew that its welfare was safe in her motherly hands. Her greatest achievement lay in the direction of educational reform. She employed the proceeds of the vast sums coming to her from the confiscation of the property of the suppressed Jesuit order in founding schools and colleges all over Hungary. The kingdom was divided into ten educational districts for the purpose, with a university at Buda. Towards all her Magyars, especially the Catholics, she was ever most gracious; but the magnates, the Bâtthyanis, the Nadásdys, the Pálffys, the Andrásseys, who had chased her enemies from Bohemia and routed them in Bavaria, enjoyed the lion's share of her benefactions. In fact, most of them became professional courtiers, and lived habitually at Vienna. She also attracted the gentry to her capital by forming a Magyar body-guard from the cadets of noble families. But she was good to all, not even forgetting the serfs. The *úrbéri szabálysát* (feudal prescription) of 1767 restored to the peasants the right of transmigration and, in some respects, protected them against the exactions of their landlords.

Joseph II. (1780-1790) was as true to the principles of enlightened despotism and family politics as his mother; but he had none of the common sense which had led her to realize the limits of her power. Joseph was an idealist and a doctrinaire, whose dream was to build up his ideal body politic; the first step toward which was to be the amalgamation of all his dominions into a common state under an absolute sovereign. Unfortunately, the Hungarian constitution stood in the way of this political paradise, so Joseph resolved that the Hungarian constitution must be sacrificed. Refusing to be crowned, or even to take the usual oaths of observance, he simply announced his accession to the Hungarian counties, and then deliberately proceeded to break down all the ancient Magyar institutions. In 1784 the Language Edict made German the official language of the common state. The same year he ordered a census and a land-survey to be taken, to enable him to tax every one irrespective of birth or wealth. Protests came in from every quarter and a dangerous rebellion broke out in Transylvania; but opposition only made Joseph more obstinate, and he endeavoured to anticipate any further resistance by abolishing the ancient county assemblies and dividing the kingdom into two districts administered by German officials.

In taking this course Joseph made the capital mistake of neglecting the Machiavellian maxim that in changing the substance of cherished institutions the prince should be careful to preserve the semblance. In substance the county assemblies were worse than ineffective: mere turbulent gatherings of country squires and peasants, corrupt and prejudiced, representing nothing but their own pride of race and class; and to try and govern without them, or to administer in spite of them, may have been the only expedient possible to statesmen. But to the Magyars they were the immemorial strongholds of their liberties, the last defences of their constitution; and the attempt to suppress them, which made every county a centre of disaffection and resistance, was the action not of a statesman, but of a visionary. The failure of Joseph's "enlightened" policy in Hungary was inevitable in any case; it was

hastened by the disastrous Turkish war of 1787-92, which withdrew Joseph altogether from domestic affairs; and on his death-bed (Feb. 22, 1790) he felt it to be his duty to annul all his principal reforms, so as to lighten the difficulties of his successor.

Leopold II. found the country on the verge of revolution; but the wisdom of the new monarch saved the situation and won back the Magyars. At the diet of 1790-1791 laws were passed not only confirming the royal prerogatives and the national liberties, but leaving the way open for future developments. Hungary was declared to be a free, independent and unsubjected kingdom governed by its own laws and customs. The legislative functions were to be exercised by the king and the diet conjointly and by them alone. The diets were henceforth to be triennial, and every new king was to pledge himself to be crowned and issue his credentials¹ within six months of the death of his predecessor. Latin was still to be the official language, but Magyar was now introduced into the university and all the schools. Leopold's successor Francis I. (1792-1835) received a declaration of war from the French Legislative Assembly immediately on ascending the throne. For the next quarter of a century he, as the champion of legitimacy, was fighting the Revolution on countless battle-fields, and the fearful struggle only bound the Magyar nation closer to the Habsburg dynasty. Ignaz Jozsef Martinovics (1755-1795) and his associates, the Hungarian Jacobins, vainly attempted a revolutionary propaganda (1795), and Napoleon's mutilations of the ancient kingdom of St Stephen did not predispose the Hungarian gentry in his favour. Politically, indeed, the whole period was one of retrogression and stagnation. The frequent diets held in the earlier part of the reign occupied themselves with little else but war subsidies; after 1811 they ceased to be summoned. In the latter years of Francis I. the dark shadow of Metternich's policy of "stability" fell across the kingdom, and the forces of reactionary absolutism were everywhere supreme. But beneath the surface a strong popular current was beginning to run in a contrary direction. Hungarian society, not unaffected by western Liberalism, but without any direct help from abroad, was preparing for the future emancipation. Writers, savants, poets, artists, noble and plebeian, layman and cleric, without any previous concert, or obvious connexion, were working towards that ideal of political liberty which was to unite all the Magyars. Mihály Vörösmartyo, Ferencz Kölcsey, Ferencz Kazinczy and his associates, to mention but a few of many great names, were, consciously or unconsciously, as the representatives of the renascent national literature, accomplishing a political mission, and their pens proved no less efficacious than the swords of their ancestors.

¹ *Litterae credentiales*, nearly equivalent to a coronation oath.

CHAPTER XX

HUNGARIAN REVIVAL

It was a direct attack upon the constitution which, to use the words of István Széchenyi, first "startled the nation out of its sickly drowsiness." In 1823, when the reactionary powers were meditating joint action to suppress the revolution in Spain, the government, without consulting the diet, imposed a war-tax and called out the recruits. The county assemblies instantly protested against this illegal act, and Francis I. was obliged, at the diet of 1823, to repudiate the action of his ministers. But the estates felt that the maintenance of their liberties demanded more substantial guarantees than the dead letter of ancient laws. Széchenyi, who had resided abroad and studied Western institutions, was the recognized leader of all those who wished to create a new Hungary out of the old. For years he and his friends educated public opinion by issuing innumerable pamphlets in which the new Liberalism was eloquently expounded. In particular Széchenyi insisted that the people must not look exclusively to the government, or even to the diet, for the necessary reforms. Society itself must take the initiative by breaking down the barriers of class exclusiveness and reviving a healthy public spirit. The effect of this teaching was manifest at the diet of 1832, when the Liberals in the Lower Chamber had a large majority, prominent among whom were Francis Deák and Ödön Beöthy. In the Upper House, however, the magnates united with the government to form a Conservative party obstinately opposed to any project of reform, which frustrated all the efforts of the Liberals.

The alarm of the government at the power and popularity of the Liberal party induced it, soon after the accession of the new king, the emperor Ferdinand I. (1835-1848), to attempt to crush the reform movement by arresting and imprisoning the most active agitators among them, Louis Kossuth and Miklós Wesselényi. But the nation was no longer to be cowed. The diet of 1839 refused to proceed to business till the political prisoners had been released, and, while in the Lower Chamber the reforming majority was larger than ever, a Liberal party was now also formed in the Upper House under the brilliant leadership of Count Louis Batthyány and Baron Joseph Eötvös. Two progressive measures of the highest importance were passed by this diet, one making Magyar the official language of Hungary, the other freeing the peasants' holdings from all feudal obligations.

The results of the diet of 1839 did not satisfy the advanced Liberals, while the opposition of the government and of the Upper House still further embittered the general discontent. The chief exponent of this temper was the *Pesti Hírlap*, Hungary's first political newspaper, founded in 1841 by Kossuth, whose articles, advocating armed reprisals if necessary, inflamed the extremists but alienated Széchenyi, who openly attacked Kossuth's opinions. The polemic on both sides was violent; but, as usual, the extreme views prevailed, and on the assembling of the diet of 1843, Kossuth was more popular than ever, while the influence of Széchenyi had sensibly declined. The tone of this diet was passionate, and the government was fiercely attacked for interfering with the elections. Fresh triumphs were won by the Liberals. Magyar was now declared to be the language of the schools and the law-courts as well as of the legislature; mixed marriages were legalized; and official positions were thrown open to non-nobles.

The interval between the diet of 1843 and that of 1847 saw a complete disintegration and transformation of the various political parties. Széchenyi openly joined the

Louis Kossuth, born 1802, died 1894, Hungarian patriot and revolutionist. To his efforts, in spite of their apparent failure at the moment, is due the



steady assertion of Hungarian independence which finally won recognition from the Emperor Francis Joseph.

LOUIS KOSSUTH.



GOLDEN JUBILEE OF FRANCIS JOSEPH I., 1848-1898.

The medal struck on this occasion gives on the one side the portrait of Francis Joseph, Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia and King of Hungary. On the other side the Muse of History has recorded on her tablet the fifty years of his reign; the cornucopia at her feet indicates the prosperity of the empire, and the words "Viribus Unitis" the union of its many peoples.



ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, OCT. 5, 1908.

The event commemorated by this medal roused indignation among the Slav races, and must count as one of the landmarks by which may be traced the course of the Austro-Serbian conflict resulting in the European war of 1914. The medal shows the arms of Bosnia and the date of the annexation.

NO. 1000
ABSTRACT

government, while the moderate Liberals separated from the extremists and formed a new party, the Centralists. Immediately before the elections, however, Deák succeeded in reuniting all the Liberals on the common platform of "The Ten Points": (1) Responsible ministries, (2) Popular representation, (3) The incorporation of Transylvania, (4) Right of public meeting, (6) Absolute religious liberty, (7) Universal equality before the law, (8) Universal taxation, (9) The abolition of the *Aviticum*, an obsolete and anomalous land-tenure, (10) The abolition of serfdom, with compensation to the landlords. The ensuing elections resulted in a complete victory of the Progressives. All efforts to bring about an understanding between the government and the opposition were fruitless. Kossuth demanded not merely the redress of actual grievances, but a reform which would make grievances impossible in the future. In the highest circles a dissolution of the diet now seemed to be the sole remedy; but, before it could be carried out, tidings of the February revolution in Paris reached Pressburg¹ (March 1), and on the 3rd of March Kossuth's motion for the appointment of an independent, responsible ministry was accepted by the Lower House. The moderates, alarmed not so much by the motion itself as by its tone, again tried to intervene; but on the 13th of March the Vienna revolution broke out, and the king, yielding to pressure or panic, appointed Count Louis Batthyány premier of the first Hungarian responsible ministry, which included Kossuth, Széchenyi and Deák. The Ten Points, or the March Laws as they were now called, were then adopted by the legislature and received the royal assent (April 10). Hungary had, to all intents and purposes, become an independent state bound to Austria only by the fact that the palatine chanced to be an Austrian archduke.

In the assertion of their national aspirations, confused as these were with the new democratic ideals, the Magyars had had the support of the German democrats who temporarily held the reins of power in Vienna. On the other hand, they were threatened by an ominous stirring of the subject races in Hungary itself. Croats, Vlachs, Serbs and Slovaks resented Magyar domination—a domination which had been carefully secured under the revolutionary constitution by a very narrow franchise, and out of the general chaos each race hoped to create for itself a separate national existence. The separatist movement was strongest in the south, where the Rumans were in touch with their kinsmen in Walachia and Moldavia, the Serbs with their brethren in Servia, and the Croats intent on reasserting the independence of the "Tri-une Kingdom."

The attitude of the distracted imperial government towards these movements was at first openly suspicious and hostile. The emperor and his ministers hoped that, having conceded the demands of the Magyars, they would receive the help of the Hungarian government in crushing the revolution elsewhere, a hope that seemed to be justified by the readiness with which Batthyány consented to send a contingent to the assistance of the imperialists in Italy. That the encouragement of the Slav aspirations was soon deliberately adopted as a weapon against the Hungarian government was due, partly to the speedy predominance at Pest of Kossuth and the extreme party of which he was the mouthpiece, but mainly to the calculated policy of Baron Jellachich, who on the 14th of April was appointed ban of Croatia. Jellachich, who as a soldier was devoted to the interests of the imperial house, realized that the best way to break the revolutionary power of the Magyars and Germans would be to encourage the Slav national ideas, which were equally hostile to both; to set up against the Dualism in favour at Pest and Vienna the federal system advocated by the Slavs, and so to restore the traditional Habsburg principle of *Divide et impera*. This policy he pursued with masterly skill. His first acts on taking up his office were to repudiate the authority of the Hungarian diet, to replace the Magyar officials with ardent "Illyrians," and to proclaim martial law. Under pressure from the palatine of Batthyány an imperial edict was issued, on the 7th of May, ordering the ban to desist from his separatist plans and take his orders from Pest. He not only refused to obey, but on the 5th of June convoked to Agram the Croatian national diet, of which the first act was to declare the independence of the Tri-une Kingdom. Once more, at the instance of Batthyány, the emperor intervened; and on the 10th an imperial edict stripped Jellachich of all his offices.

Meanwhile, however, Jellachich had himself started for Innsbruck, where he succeeded in persuading the emperor of the loyalty of his intentions, and whence, though not as yet formally reinstated, he was allowed to return to Croatia with practically unfettered discretion. The Hungarian government, in fact, had played into his hands. At a time when everything depended on the army, they had destroyed the main tie which bound the Austrian court to their interests by tampering with the relation of the Hungarian army to the crown. In May a national guard had been created, the disaffected troops being bribed by increased pay to desert their colours and join this; and on the 1st of June the garrison of Pest had taken an oath to the constitution. All hope of crushing revolutionary Vienna with Magyar aid was thus at an end, and Jellachich, who on the 20th issued a proclamation to the Croat regiments in Italy to remain with their colours and fight for the common fatherland, was free to carry out his policy of identifying the cause of the southern Slavs with that of the imperial army. The alliance was cemented in July by a military demonstration, of which Jellachich was the hero, at Vienna; as the result of which the government

¹ Up to 1848 the Hungarian diet was usually held at Pressburg.

mustered up courage to declare publicly that the basis of the Austrian state was "the recognition of the equal rights of all nationalities." This was the challenge which the Magyars were not slow to accept.

In the Hungarian diet, which met on the 2nd of July, the influence of the conservative cabinet was wholly overshadowed by that of Kossuth, whose inflammatory orations—directed against the disruptive designs of the Slavs and the treachery of the Austrian government—precipitated the crisis. At his instance the diet not only refused to vote supplies for the troops of the ban of Croatia, but only consented to pass a motion for sending reinforcements to the army in Italy on condition that the anti-Magyar races in Hungary should be first disarmed. On the 11th, on his motion, a decree was passed by acclamation for a levy of 200,000 men and the raising of £4,500,000 for the defence of the independence of the country. Desultory fighting, in which Austrian officers with the tacit consent of the minister of war took part against the Magyars, had already broken out in the south. It was not, however, until the victory of Custoza (July 25) set free the army in Italy, that the Austrian government ventured on bolder measures. On the 4th of September, after weeks of fruitless negotiation, the king-emperor threw down the gauntlet by reinstating Jellachich in all his honours. Seven days later the ban declared open war on Hungary by crossing the Drave at the head of 36,000 Croatian troops. The immediate result was to place the extreme revolutionaries in power at Pest. Széchenyi had lost his reason some days before; Eötvös and Deák retired into private life; of the conservative ministers only Batthyány, to his undoing, consented to remain in office, though hardly in power. Kossuth alone was supreme.

The advance of Jellachich as far as Lake Balaton had not been checked, the Magyar troops, though—contrary to his expectation—none joined him, offering no opposition. The palatine, the Austrian Archduke Stephen, after fruitless attempts at negotiation, laid down his office on the 24th September and left for Vienna. One more attempt at compromise was made, General Count Lamberg¹ being sent to take command of all the troops, Slav or Magyar, in Hungary, with a view to arranging an armistice. His mission, which was a slight to Jellachich, was conceived as a concession to the Magyars, and had the general approval of Batthyány. Unhappily, however, when Lamberg arrived in Pest, Batthyány had not yet returned; the diet, on Kossuth's motion, called on the army not to obey the new commander-in-chief, on the ground that his commission had not been countersigned by a minister at Pest. Next day, as he was crossing the bridge of Buda, Lamberg was dragged from his carriage by a frantic mob and torn to pieces. This made war inevitable; though Batthyány hurried to Vienna to try and arrange a settlement. Failing in this, he retired, and on the 2nd of October a royal proclamation, countersigned by his successor, Reccsény, placed Hungary under martial law and appointed Jellachich viceroy and commander of all forces. This proclamation, together with the order given to certain Viennese regiments to march to the assistance of Jellachich, who had been defeated at Pákozd on the 29th of September, led to the *émeute* (Oct. 3) which ended in the murder of the minister of war, Latour, and the second flight of the emperor to Innsbruck. The fortunes of the German revolutionaries in Vienna and the Magyar revolutionists in Pest were now closely bound up together; and when, on the 11th, Prince Windischgrätz laid siege to Vienna, it was to Hungary that the democrats of the capital looked for relief. The despatch of a large force of militia to the assistance of the Viennese was, in fact, the first act of open rebellion of the Hungarians. They suffered a defeat at Schwechat on the 30th of October, which sealed the fate of the revolutionists in Vienna and thus precipitated a conflict *à outrance* in Hungary itself.

In Austria the army was now supreme, and the appointment of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg as head of the government was a guarantee that its power would be used in a reactionary sense without weakness or scruple. The Austrian diet was transferred on the 15th of November to Kremsier, remote from revolutionary influences; and, though the government still thought it prudent to proclaim its constitutional principles, it also proclaimed its intention to preserve the unity of the monarchy. A still further step was taken when, on the 2nd of December, the emperor Ferdinand abdicated in favour of his nephew Francis Joseph. The new sovereign was a lad of eighteen, who for the present was likely to be the mere mouthpiece of Schwarzenberg's policy. Moreover, he was not bound by the constitutional obligations unwillingly accepted by his uncle. The Magyars at once took up the challenge. On the 7th the Hungarian diet formally refused to acknowledge the title of the new king, "as without the knowledge and consent of the diet no one could sit on the Hungarian throne," and called the nation to arms. Constitutionally, in the Magyar opinion, Ferdinand was still king of Hungary, and this gave to the revolt an excuse of legality. Actually, from this time until the collapse of the rising, Louis Kossuth was the ruler of Hungary.

The struggle opened with a series of Austrian successes. Prince Windischgrätz, who

¹ Franz Phillip, Count von Lamberg (1791-1848), a field-marshal in the Austrian army, who had seen service in the campaigns of 1814-1815 in France, belonged to the Stockerau branch of the ancient countly family of Orteneck-Ottenstein. He was chosen for this particular mission as being himself a Hungarian magnate conversant with Hungarian affairs, but at the same time of the party devoted to the court.

had received orders to reduce Hungary by fire and sword, began his advance on the 15th of December; opened up the way to the capital by the victory of Mór (Oct. 30), and on the 5th of January 1849 occupied Pest, while the Hungarian government and diet retired behind the Theiss and established themselves at Debreczen. A last attempt at reconciliation, made by the more moderate members of the diet in Windischgrätz's camp at Bieské (Jan. 3), had foundered on the uncompromising attitude of the Austrian commander, who demanded unconditional submission; whereupon the moderates, including Deák and Batthyány, retired into private life, leaving Kossuth to carry on the struggle with the support of the enthusiastic extremists who constituted the rump of the diet at Debreczen. The question now was: how far the military would subordinate itself to the civil element of the national government. The first symptom of dissonance was a proclamation by the commander of the Upper Danube division, Arthur Görgei, from his camp at Vác (Jan. 5) emphasizing the fact that the national defence was purely constitutional, and menacing all who might be led astray from this standpoint by republican aspirations. Immediately after this proclamation Görgei disappeared with his army among the hills of Upper Hungary, and, despite the difficulties of a phenomenally severe winter and the constant pursuit of vastly superior forces, fought his way down to the valley of Hernád—and safety. This masterly winter-campaign first revealed Görgei's military genius, and the discipline of that terrible month of marching and counter-marching had hardened his recruits into veterans whom his country regarded with pride and his country's enemies with respect. Unfortunately his success caused some jealousy in official quarters, and when, in the middle of February 1849, a commander-in-chief was appointed to carry out Kossuth's plan of campaign, that vital appointment was given, not to the man who had made the army what it was, but to a foreigner, a Polish refugee, Count Henrik Dembinski, who, after fighting the bloody and indecisive battle of Kápolna (Feb. 26–27), was forced to retreat. Görgei was immediately appointed his successor, and the new generalissimo led the *Houvéds* from victory to victory. Aably supported by Klapka and Damjanich he pressed forward irresistibly. Szőlök (March 5), Isaszeg (April 6), Vác (April 10), and Nagysarló (April 19) were so many milestones in his triumphal progress. On the 25th of May the Hungarian capital was once more in the hands of the Hungarians.

Meanwhile, the earlier events of the war had so altered the political situation that any idea which the diet at Debreczen had cherished of a compromise with Austria was destroyed. The capture of Pest had confirmed the Austrian court in its policy of unification, which after the victory of Kápolna they thought it safe to proclaim. On the 7th of March the diet of Kremsier was dissolved, and immediately afterwards a proclamation was issued in the name of the emperor Francis Joseph establishing a united constitution for the whole empire, of which Hungary, cut up into half a dozen administrative districts, was henceforth to be little more than the largest of several subject provinces. The news of this manifesto, arriving as it did simultaneously with that of Görgei's successes, destroyed the last vestiges of a desire of the Hungarian revolutionists to compromise, and on the 14th of April, on the motion of Kossuth, the diet proclaimed the independence of Hungary, declared the house of Habsburg as false and perjured, for ever excluded from the throne, and elected Kossuth president of the Hungarian Republic. This was an execrable blunder in the circumstances, and the results were fatal to the national cause. Neither the government nor the army could accommodate itself to the new situation. From henceforth the military and civil authorities, as represented by Kossuth and Görgei, were hopelessly out of sympathy with each other, and the breach widened till all effective co-operation became impossible.

Meanwhile the humiliating defeats of the imperial army and the course of events in Hungary had compelled the court of Vienna to accept the assistance which the emperor Nicholas I. of Russia had proffered in the loftiest spirit of the Holy Alliance. The Austro-Russian alliance was announced at the beginning of May, and before the end of the month the common plan of campaign had been arranged. The Austrian commander-in-chief, Count Haynau, was to attack Hungary from the west, the Russian, Prince Paskevich, from the north, gradually environing the kingdom, and then advancing to end the business by one decisive blow in the mid-Theissian counties. They had at their disposal 375,000 men, to which the Magyars could only oppose 160,000. The Magyars, too, were now more than ever divided among themselves, no plan of campaign had yet been drawn up, no commander-in-chief appointed to replace Görgei, whom Kossuth had deposed. Haynau's first victories (June 20–28) put an end to their indecisions. On the 2nd of July the Hungarian government abandoned Pest and transferred its capital first to Szeged and finally to Arad. The Russians were by this time well on their way to the Theiss, and the terrible girdle which was to throttle the liberties of Hungary was all but completed. Kossuth again appointed as commander-in-chief the brave but inefficient Dembinski, who was utterly routed at Temesva (Aug. 9) by Haynau. This was the last great battle of the War of Independence. The final catastrophe was now unavoidable. On the 13th of August Görgei, who had been appointed dictator by the panic-stricken government two days before, surrendered the remnant of his hardly pressed army to the Russian General Rüdiger at Világos. The other army corps and all the fortresses followed his example, Komárom, heroically defended by

Klapka, being the last to capitulate (Sept. 27). Kossuth and his associates, who had quitted Arad on the 10th of August, took refuge in Turkish territory. By the end of the month Paskevich could write to the Emperor Nicholas: "Hungary lies at the feet of your Imperial Majesty."

From October 1849 to July 1850 Hungary was governed by martial law administered by "the butcher" Haynau. This was a period of military tribunals, dragooning, wholesale confiscation and all manner of brutalities.¹ From 1851 to 1860 pure terrorism was succeeded by the "Bach System," which derives its name from the imperial minister of the interior, Baron Alexander von Bach. The Bach System did not recognize historical Hungary. It postulated the existence of one common indivisible state of which mutilated Hungary formed an important section. The supreme government was entrusted to an imperial council responsible to the emperor alone. The counties were administered by imperial officials, Germans, Czechs and Galicians, who did not understand the Magyar tongue. German was the official language. But though reaction was the motive power of this new machinery of government, it could not do away with many of the practical and obvious improvements of 1848, and it was not blind to some of the indispensable requirements of a modern state. The material welfare of the nation was certainly promoted by it. Modern roads were made, the first railways were laid down, the regulation of the river Theiss was taken in hand, a new and better scheme of finance was inaugurated. But the whole system, so to speak, hung in the air. It took no root in the soil. The Magyar nation stood aloof from it. It was plain that at the first revolutionary blast from without, or the first insurrectionary outburst from within, the "Bach System" would vanish like a mirage.

Meanwhile the new Austrian empire had failed to stand the test of international complications. The Crimean War had isolated it in Europe. The Italian war of 1859 had revealed its essential instability. It was felt at court that some concessions were now due to the subject nationalities. Hence the October Diploma (Oct. 20, 1860) which proposed to prop up the crazy common state with the shadow of a constitution and to grant some measure of local autonomy to Hungary, subject always to the supervision of the imperial council (Reichsrath). This project was favoured by the Magyar conservative magnates who had never broken with the court, but was steadily opposed by the Liberal leader Ferencz Deák whose upright and tenacious character made him at this crisis the oracle and the buttress of the national cause. Deák's standpoint was as simple as it was unchangeable. He demanded the re-establishment of the constitution of 1848 in its entirety, the whole constitution and nothing but the constitution.

The October Diploma was followed by the February Patent (Feb. 26, 1861), which proposed to convert the Reichsrath into a constitutional representative assembly, with two chambers, to which all the provinces of the empire were to send deputies. The project, elaborated by Anton von Schmerling, was submitted to a Hungarian diet which assembled at Pest on the 2nd of April 1861. After long and violent debates, the diet, on the 8th of August, unanimously adopted an address to the crown, drawn up by Deák, praying for the restoration of the political and territorial integrity of Hungary, for the public coronation of the king with all its accompaniments, and the full restitution of the fundamental laws. The executive retorted by dissolving the diet on the 21st of August and levying the taxes by military execution. The so-called *Provisorium* had begun.

But the politicians of Vienna had neither the power nor the time to realize their intentions. The question of Italian unity had no sooner been settled than the question of German unity arose, and fresh international difficulties once more inclined the Austrian government towards moderation and concession. In the beginning of June 1865 Francis Joseph came to Buda; on the 26th a provisional Hungarian government was formed, on the 20th of September the February constitution was suspended, and on the 14th of December a diet was summoned to Buda-Pest. The great majority of the nation naturally desired a composition with its ruler and with Austria, and this general desire was unerringly interpreted and directed by Deák, who carried two-thirds of the deputies along with him. The session was interrupted by the outbreak of the Austro-Prussian War, but not before a committee had been formed to draft the new constitution. The peace of Prague (Aug. 20, 1866), excluding Austria from Italy and Germany, made the fate of the Habsburg monarchy absolutely dependent upon a compromise with the Magyars. On the 7th of November 1866 the diet reassembled. On the 17th of February 1867 a responsible independent ministry was formed under Count Gyula Andrassy. On the 29th of May the new constitution was adopted by 209 votes to 89. Practically it was an amplification of the March Laws of 1848. The coronation took place on the 8th of June, on which occasion the king solemnly declared that he wished "a veil to be drawn over the past." The usual coronation gifts he devoted to the benefit of the Honvéd invalids who had fought in the War of Independence. The reconciliation between monarch and people was assured.

¹ The crowning atrocities, which the Magyars have never wholly forgiven, were the shooting and hanging of the "Arad Martyrs" and the execution of Batthyány. On October 6, 1849, thirteen generals who had taken part in the war, including Damjanics and Counts Vécsey and Leiningen, were hanged or shot at Arad. On the same day Count Louis Batthyány was shot at Pest.

CHAPTER XXI

THE INDEPENDENT KINGDOM

HUNGARY was now a free and independent modern state ; but the very completeness and suddenness of her constitutional victory made it impossible for the strongly flowing current of political life to keep within due bounds. The circumstance that the formation of political parties had not come about naturally was an additional difficulty. Broadly speaking, there have been in Hungary since 1867 two parties : those who accept the compromise with Austria, and affirm that under it Hungary, so far from having surrendered any of her rights, has acquired an influence which she previously did not actually possess ; and secondly, those who see in the compromise an abandonment of the essentials of independence and aim at the restoration of the conditions established in 1848. Within this broad division, however, have appeared from time to time political groups in bewildering variety, each adopting a party designation according to the exigencies of the moment, but each basing its programme on one or other of the theoretical foundations above mentioned. Thus, at the outset, the most heterogeneous elements were to be found both on the Left and Right. The Extreme Left was infected by the fanaticism of Kossuth, who condemned the compromise and refused to take the benefit of the amnesty, while the prelates and magnates who had originally opposed the compromise were now to be found by the side of Deák and Andrassy. The Deák party preserved its majority at the elections of 1869, but the Left Centre and Extreme Left returned to the diet considerably reinforced. The outbreak of the Franco-German War of 1870 turned the attention of the Magyars to foreign affairs. Andrassy never rendered a greater service to his country than when he prevented the imperial chancellor and joint foreign minister, Count Beust,¹ from intervening in favour of France. On the retirement of Beust in 1871, Andrassy was appointed his successor, the first instance, since Hungary came beneath the dominion of the Habsburgs, of an Hungarian statesman being entrusted with the conduct of foreign affairs. But, however gratifying such an elevation might be, it was distinctly prejudicial, at first, to Hungary's domestic affairs, for no one else at this time, in Hungary, possessed either the prestige or the popularity of Andrassy. Within the next five years ministry followed ministry in rapid succession. A hopeless political confusion ensued. Few measures could be passed. The finances fell into disorder. The national credit was so seriously impaired abroad that foreign loans could only be obtained at ruinous rates of interest. During this period Deák had almost entirely withdrawn from public life. His last great speech was delivered on the 28th of June 1873, and he died on the 29th of January 1876. Fortunately, in Kálmán Tisza, the leader of the Liberal (*Szabadelmű*, i.e. "Free Principle") party, he left behind him a statesman of the first rank, who for the next eighteen years was to rule Hungary uninterruptedly. From the first, Tisza was exposed to the violent attacks of the opposition, which embraced, not only the party of Independence, champions of the principles of 1848, but the so-called National party, led by the brilliant orator Count Albert Apponyi, which aimed at much the same ends but looked upon the Compromise of 1867 as a convenient substructure on which to build up the Magyar state. Neither could forgive Tisza for repudiating his earlier Radical policy, the so-called Bihar Programme (March 6, 1868), which went far beyond the Compromise in the direction

¹ Beust was the only "imperial chancellor" in Austro-Hungarian history ; even Metternich bore only the title of "chancellor" ; and Andrassy, who succeeded Beust styled himself "minister of the imperial and royal household and for foreign affairs."

of independence, and both attacked him with a violence which his unyielding temper, and the ruthless methods by which he always knew how to secure victory, tended ever to fan into fury. Yet Tisza's aim also was to convert the old polyglot Hungarian kingdom into a homogeneous Magyar state, and the methods which he employed—notably the enforced magyarization of the subject races, which formed part of the reformed educational system introduced by him—certainly did not err on the side of moderation. Whatever view may be held of Tisza's policy in this respect, or of the corrupt methods by which he maintained his party in power, there can be no doubt that during his long tenure of office—which practically amounted to a dictatorship—he did much to promote the astonishing progress of his country, which ran a risk of being stifled in the strife of factions. Himself a Calvinist, he succeeded in putting an end to the old quarrel of Catholic and Protestant and uniting them in a common enthusiasm for a race ideal; nominally a Liberal, he trampled on every Liberal principle in order to secure the means for governing with a firm hand; and if the political corruption of modern Hungary is largely his work,¹ to him also belongs the credit for the measures which have placed the country on a sound economic basis and the statesmanlike temper which made Hungary a power in the affairs of Europe. In this latter respect Tisza rendered substantial aid to the joint minister for foreign affairs by repressing the anti-Russian ardour of the Magyars on the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, and by supporting Andrassy's execution of the mandate from the Berlin Congress to Austria-Hungary for the occupation of Bosnia, against which the Hungarian opposition agitated for reasons ostensibly financial. Tisza's policy on both these occasions increased his unpopularity in Hungary, but in the highest circles at Vienna he was now regarded as indispensable.

The following nine years mark the financial and commercial rehabilitation of Hungary, the establishment of a vast and original railway system which won the admiration of Europe, the liberation and expansion of her over-sea trade, the conversion of her national debt under the most favourable conditions and the consequent equilibrium of her finances. These benefits the nation owed for the most part to Gábor Baross, Hungary's greatest finance minister, who entered the cabinet in 1886 and greatly strengthened it. But the opposition, while unable to deny the recuperation of Hungary, shut their eyes to everything but Tisza's "tyranny," and their attacks were never so savage and unscrupulous as during the session of 1889, when threats of a revolution were uttered by the opposition leaders and the premier could only enter or leave the House under police protection. The tragic death of the crown prince Rudolph hushed for a time the strife of tongues, and in the meantime Tisza brought into the ministry Dezső Szilágyi, the most powerful debater in the House, and Sándor Wekerle, whose solid talents had hitherto been hidden beneath the bushel of an under-secretaryship. But in 1890, during the debates on the Kossuth Repatriation Bill, the attacks on the premier were renewed, and on the 13th of March he placed his resignation in the king's hands.

The withdrawal of Tisza scarcely changed the situation, but the period of brief ministries now began. Tisza's successor, Count Gyula Szápáry, formerly minister of agriculture, held office for eighteen months, and was succeeded (Nov. 21, 1892) by Wekerle. Wekerle, essentially a business man, had taken office for the express purpose of equilibrating the finances, but the religious question aroused by the encroachments of the Catholic clergy, and notably their insistence on the baptism of the children of mixed marriages, had by this time (1893-1894) excluded all others, and the government were forced to postpone their financial programme to its consideration. The Obligatory Civil Marriage Bill, the State Registries Bill and the Religion of Children of Mixed Marriages Bill, were finally adopted on the 21st of June 1894, after fierce debates and a ministerial interregnum of ten days (June 10-20); but on the 25th of December, Wekerle, who no longer possessed the king's confidence,² resigned a second time, and was succeeded by Baron Dezső (Desiderius) Bánffy. The various parties meanwhile had split up into some half a dozen sub-sections; but the expected fusion of the party of independence and the government fell through, and the barren struggle continued till the celebration of the millennium of the foundation of the monarchy produced for some months a lull in politics. Subsequently, Bánffy still further exasperated the opposition by exercising undue influence during the elections of 1896. The majority he obtained on this occasion enabled him, however, to carry through the Army Education Bill, which tended to magyarize the Hungarian portion of the joint army; and another period of comparative calm ensued, during which Bánffy attempted to adjust various outstanding financial and economical differences with Austria. But in November 1898, on the occasion of the renewal of the commercial convention with Austria, the attack on the ministry was renewed with unprecedented virulence, obstruction being systematically practised with the object of goading the government into committing

¹ Especially the Electoral Law of 1874, which established a very unequal distribution of electoral areas, a highly complicated franchise, and voting by public declaration, thus making it easy for the government to intimidate the electors and generally to gerrymander the elections.

² The Austrian court resented especially the decree proclaiming national mourning for Louis Kossuth, though no minister was present at the funeral.

illegalities, till Bánffy, finding the situation impossible, resigned on the 17th of February 1899. His successor, Kálmán Széll, obtained an immense but artificial majority by a fresh fusion of parties, and the minority pledged itself to grant an indemnity for the extra-parliamentary financial decrees rendered necessary by Hungary's understanding with Austria, as well as to cease from obstruction. As a result of this compromise the budget of 1899 was passed in little more than a month, and the commercial and tariff treaty with Austria were renewed till 1903.¹ But the government had to pay for this complacency with a so-called "pactum," which bound its hands in several directions, much to the profit of the opposition during the "pure" elections of 1901. On the reassembling of the diet, Count Albert Apponyi was elected speaker, and the minority seemed disposed to let the government try to govern. But the proposed raising of the contingent of recruits by 15,000 men (Oct. 1902) once more brought up the question of the common army, the parliament refusing to pass the bill, except in return for the introduction of the Hungarian national flag into the Hungarian regiments and the substitution of Magyar for German in the words of command. The king refusing to yield an inch of his rights under clause ii. of Law XII. of the Compromise of 1867, the opposition once more took to obstruction, and on the 1st of May 1903 Széll was forced to resign.

Every one now looked to the crown to extract the nation from an *ex-lex*, or extra-constitutional situation, but when the king, passing over the ordinary party-leaders, appointed as premier Count Károly Khuen-Hederváry, who had made himself impossible as ban of Croatia, there was general amazement and indignation. The fact was that the king, weary of the tactics of a minority which for years had terrorized every majority and prevented the government from exercising its proper constitutional functions, had resolved to show the Magyars that he was prepared to rule unconstitutionally rather than imperil the stability of the Dual Monarchy by allowing any tampering with the joint army. In an ordinance on the army word of command, promulgated on the 16th of September, he reaffirmed the inalienable character of the powers of the crown over the joint army and the necessity for maintaining German as the common military language. This was followed by the fall of Khuen-Hederváry (September 29), and a quarrel *à outrance* between crown and parliament seemed unavoidable. The Liberal party, however, realized the abyss towards which they were hurrying the country, and united their efforts to come to a constitutional understanding with the king. The problem was to keep the army an Hungarian army without infringing on the prerogative of the king as commander-in-chief, for, unconstitutional as the new ordinance might be, it could not constitutionally be set aside without the royal assent. The king met them half way by inviting the majority to appoint a committee to settle the army question provisionally, and a committee was formed, which included Széll, Apponyi, Count István Tisza and other experienced statesmen.

A programme approved of by all the members of the committee was drawn up, and on the 3rd of November 1903, Count István Tisza was appointed minister president to carry it out. Thus, out of respect for the wishes of the nation, the king had voluntarily thrown open to public discussion the hitherto strictly closed and jealously guarded domain of the army. Tisza, a statesman of singular probity and tenacity, seemed to be the one person capable of carrying out the programme of the king and the majority. The irreconcilable minority, recognizing this, exhausted all the resources of "technical obstruction" in order to reduce the government to impotence, a task made easy by the absurd standing-rules of the House which enabled any single member to block a measure. These tactics soon rendered legislation impossible, and a modification of the rule of procedure became absolutely necessary if any business at all was to be done. The Modification of the Standing-orders Bill was accordingly introduced by the deputy Gábor Daniel (Nov. 18, 1904); but the opposition, to which the National party had attached itself, denounced it as "a gagging order" inspired at Vienna, and shouted it down so vehemently that no debate could be held; whereupon the president declared the bill carried and adjourned the House till the 13th of December 1904. This was at once followed by an anti-ministerial fusion of the extremists of all parties, including seceders from the government (known as the Constitutional party); and when the diet reassembled, the opposition broke into the House by force and wrecked all the furniture, so that a session was physically impossible (Jan. 5, 1905). Tisza now appealed to the country, but was utterly defeated. The opposition thereupon proceeded to annul the Lex Daniel (April 7) and stubbornly to clamour for the adoption of the Magyar word of command in the Hungarian part of the common army. To this demand the king as stubbornly refused to accede; and as the result of the consequent dead-lock, Tisza, who had courageously continued in office at the king's request, after every other leading politician had refused to form a ministry, was finally dismissed on the 17th of June.

¹ Subsequently extended till 1907.

CHAPTER XXII

EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT

LONG negotiations between the crown and the leaders of the Coalition having failed to give any promise of a *modus vivendi*, the king-emperor at last determined to appoint an extra-parliamentary ministry, and on the 21st of June Baron Fejérváry, an officer in the royal bodyguard, was nominated minister president with a cabinet consisting of little-known permanent officials. Instead of presenting the usual programme, the new premier read to the parliament a royal autograph letter stating the reasons which had actuated the king in taking this course, and giving as the task of the new ministry the continuance of negotiations with the Coalition on the basis of the exclusion of the language question. The parliament was at the same time prorogued. A period followed of arbitrary government on the one hand and of stubborn passive resistance on the other. Three times the parliament was again prorogued—from the 15th of September to the 10th of October, from this date to the 19th of December, and from this yet again to the 1st of March 1906—in spite of the protests of both Houses. To the repressive measures of the government—press censorship, curtailment of the right of public meeting, dismissal of recalcitrant officials, and dragooning of disaffected county assemblies and municipalities—the Magyar nation opposed a sturdy refusal to pay taxes, to supply recruits or to carry on the machinery of administration.

Had this attitude represented the temper of the whole Hungarian people, it would have been impossible for the crown to have coped with it. But the Coalition represented, in fact, not the mass of the people, but only a small dominant minority,¹ and for years past this minority had neglected the social and economic needs of the mass of the people in the eager pursuit of party advantage and the effort to impose, by coercion and corruption failing other means, the Magyar language and Magyar culture on the non-Magyar races. In this supreme crisis, then, it is not surprising that the masses listened with sullen indifference to the fiery eloquence of the Coalition leaders. Moreover, by refusing the royal terms, the Coalition had forced the crown into an alliance with the extreme democratic elements in the state. Universal suffrage had already been adopted in the Cis-leithan half of the monarchy; it was an obvious policy to propose it for Hungary also, and thus, by an appeal to the non-Magyar majority, to reduce the irreconcilable Magyar minority to reason. Universal suffrage, then, was the first and most important of the proposals put forward by Mr Jozsef Kristóffy, the minister of the interior, in the programme issued by him on the 26th of November 1905. Other proposals were: the maintenance of the system of the joint army as established in 1867, but with the concession that all Hungarian recruits were to receive their education in Magyar; the maintenance till 1917 of the actual customs convention with Austria; a reform of the land laws, with a view to assisting the poorer proprietors; complete religious equality; universal and compulsory primary education.

The issue of a programme so liberal, and notably the inclusion in it of the idea of universal suffrage, entirely checkmated the opposition parties. Their official organs, indeed, continued to fulminate against the "unconstitutional" government, but the enthusiasm with which the programme had been received in the country showed the Coalition leaders the danger of their position, and henceforth, though they continued

¹ Of the 16,000,000 inhabitants of Hungary barely a half were Magyar; and the franchise was possessed by only 800,000, of whom the Magyars formed the overwhelming majority.

their denunciations of Austria, they entered into secret negotiations with the king-emperor, in order, by coming to terms with him, to ward off the fatal consequences of Kristóffy's proposals.

On the 19th of February 1906 the parliament was dissolved, without writs being issued for a new election, a fact accepted by the country with an equanimity highly disconcerting to patriots. Meanwhile the negotiations continued, so secretly that when, on the 9th of April, the appointment of a Coalition cabinet¹ under Dr Sandór Wekerle was announced, the world was taken completely by surprise. The agreement with the crown which had made this course possible included the postponement of the military questions that had evoked the crisis, and the acceptance of the principle of Universal Suffrage by the Coalition leaders, who announced that their main tasks would be to repair the mischief wrought by the "unconstitutional" Fejérváry cabinet, and then to introduce a measure of franchise reform so wide that it would be possible to ascertain the will of the whole people on the questions at issue between themselves and the crown. In the general elections that followed the Liberal party was practically wiped out, its leader, Count István Tisza, retiring into private life.

For two years and a half the Coalition ministry continued in office without showing any signs that they intended to carry out the most important item of their programme. The old abuses continued: the muzzling of the press in the interests of Magyar nationalism, the imprisonment of non-Magyar deputies for "incitement against Magyar nationality," the persecution of Socialists and of the subordinate races. That this condition of things could not be allowed to continue was, indeed, recognized by all parties; the fundamental difference of opinion was as to the method by which it was to be ended. The dominant Magyar parties were committed to the principle of franchise reform; but they were determined that this reform should be of such a nature as not to imperil their own hegemony. What this would mean was pointed out by Mr Kristóffy in an address delivered at Budapest on the 14th of March 1907. "If the work of social reform," he said, "is scamped by a measure calculated to falsify the essence of reform, the struggle will be continued in the Chamber until full electoral liberty is attained. Till then there can be no social peace in Hungary." The postponement of the question was, indeed, already producing ugly symptoms of popular indignation. On the 10th of October 1907 there was a great and orderly demonstration at Budapest, organized by the socialists, in favour of reform. About 100,000 people assembled, and a deputation handed to Mr Justh, the president of the Chamber, a monster petition in favour of universal suffrage. The reception it met with was not calculated to encourage constitutional methods. The Socialist deputy, Mr Mezöffy, who wished to move an interpellation on the question, was howled down by the Independents with shouts of "Away with him! Down with him!" Four days later, in answer to a question by the same deputy, Count Andrassy said that the Franchise Bill would be introduced shortly, but that it would be of such a nature that "the Magyar State idea would remain intact and suffer no diminution." Yet more than a year was to pass before the promised bill was introduced, and meanwhile the feeling in the country had grown more intense, culminating in serious riots at Budapest on the 13th of March 1908.

At last (November 11, 1908) Count Andrassy introduced the long-promised bill. How far it was from satisfying the demands of the Hungarian peoples was at once apparent. It granted manhood suffrage, it is true, but hedged with so many qualifying conditions and complicated with so elaborate a system of plural voting as to make its effect nugatory. Every male Hungarian citizen, able to read and write, was to receive the vote at the beginning of his twenty-fifth year, subject to a residential qualification of twelve months. Illiterate citizens were to choose one elector for every ten of their number. All electors not having the qualifications for the plural franchise were to have one vote. Electors who, e.g., had passed four standards of a secondary school, or paid 16s. 8d. in direct taxation, were to have two votes. Electors who had passed five standards, or who paid £4, 3s. 4d. in direct taxes, were to have three votes. Voting was to be public, as before, on the ground, according to the Preamble, that "the secret ballot protects electors in dependent positions only in so far as they break their promises under the veil of secrecy."

It was at once seen that this elaborate scheme was intended to preserve "the Magyar State idea intact." Its result, had it passed, would have been to strengthen the representation of the Magyar and German elements, to reduce that of the Slovaks, and almost to destroy that of the Rumanians and other non-Magyar races whose educational status was low. On the other hand, according to the *Neue Freie Presse*, it would have increased the number of electors from some million odd to 2,600,000, and the number of votes to 4,000,000; incidentally it would have largely increased the working-class representation.

This proposal was at once recognized by public opinion—to use the language of the *Journal des Debats* (May 21, 1909)—as "an instrument of domination" rather than as an attempt to carry out the spirit of the compact under which the Coalition government had been summoned to power. It was not, indeed, simply a reactionary or undemocratic

¹ The cabinet consisted of Dr Wekerle (premier and finance), Ferencz Kossuth (commerce), Count Gyula Andrassy (interior), Count Albert Apponyi (education), Daványi (agriculture), Polónyi (justice) and Count Aladár Zichy (court).

measure ; it was, as *The Times* correspondent pointed out, " a measure *sui generis*, designed to defeat the objects of the universal suffrage movement that compelled the Coalition to take office in April 1906, and framed in accordance with Magyar needs as understood by one of the foremost Magyar noblemen." Under this bill culture was to be the gate to a share in political power, and in Hungary culture must necessarily be Magyar.

Plainly, this bill was not destined to settle the Hungarian problem, and other questions soon arose which showed that the crisis, so far from being near a settlement, was destined to become more acute than ever. In December 1908 it was clear that the Coalition Ministry was falling to pieces. Those ministers who belonged to the constitutional and popular parties, *i.e.* the Liberals and Clericals, desired to maintain the compact with the crown ; their colleagues of the Independence party were eager to advance the cause they have at heart by pressing on the question of a separate Hungarian bank. So early as March 1908 Mr Halo had laid a formal proposal before the House that the charter of the Austro-Hungarian bank, which was to expire on the 31st of December 1910, should not be renewed ; that negotiations should be opened with the Austrian government with a view to a convention between the banks of Austria and Hungary ; and that, in the event of these negotiations failing, an entirely separate Hungarian bank should be established. The Balkan crisis threw this question into the background during the winter ; but, with the settlement of the international questions raised by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it once more came to the front. The ministry was divided on the issue, Count Andrassy opposing and Mr Ferencz Kossuth supporting the proposal for a separate bank. Finally, the prime minister, Dr Wekerle, mainly owing to the pressure put upon him by Mr Justh, the president of the Chamber, yielded to the importunity of the Independence party, and, in the name of the Hungarian government, laid the proposals for a separate bank before the king-emperor and the Austrian government.

The result was a foregone conclusion. The conference at Vienna revealed the irreconcilable difference within the ministry ; but they revealed also something more—the determination of the emperor Francis Joseph, if pressed beyond the limits of his patience, to appeal again to the non-Magyar Hungarians against the Magyar chauvinists. He admitted that under the Compromise of 1867 Hungary might have a separate bank, while urging the expediency of such an arrangement from the point of view of the international position of the Dual Monarchy. But he pointed out also that the question of a separate bank did not actually figure in the act of 1867, and that it could not be introduced into it, *more especially since the capital article of the ministerial programme, i.e. electoral reform, was not realized, nor near being realized.* On the 27th of April, in consequence of this rebuff, Dr Wekerle tendered his resignation, but consented to hold office pending the completion of the difficult task of forming another government.

This task was destined to prove one of almost insuperable difficulty. Had the issues involved been purely Hungarian and constitutional, the natural course would have been for the king to have sent for Mr Kossuth, who commanded the strongest party in the parliament, and to have entrusted him with the formation of a government. But the issues involved affected the stability of the Dual Monarchy and its position in Europe ; and neither the king-emperor nor his Austrian advisers, their position strengthened by the success of Baron Aehrenthal's diplomatic victory in the Balkans, were prepared to make any substantial concessions to the party of Independence. In these circumstances the king sent for Dr László Lukacs, once finance minister in the Fejérváry cabinet, whose task was, acting as a *homo regius* apart from parties, to construct a government out of any elements that might be persuaded to co-operate with him. But Lukacs had no choice but to apply in the first instance to Mr Kossuth and his friends, and these, suspecting an intention of crushing their party by entrapping them into unpopular engagements, rejected his overtures. Nothing now remained but for the king to request Dr Wekerle to remain " for the present " in office with his colleagues, thus postponing the settlement of the crisis (July 4).

This procrastinating policy played into the hands of the extremists ; for supplies had not been voted, and the question of the credits for the expenditure incurred in connection with the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, increasingly urgent, placed a powerful weapon in the hands of the Magyars, and made it certain that in the autumn the crisis would assume an even more acute form. By the middle of September affairs had again reached an *impasse*. On the 14th Dr Wekerle, at the ministerial conference assembled at Vienna for the purpose of discussing the estimates to be laid before the delegations, announced that the dissensions among his colleagues made the continuance of the Coalition government impossible. The burning points of controversy were the magyarization of the Hungarian regiments and the question of the separate state bank. On the first of these Wekerle, Andrassy and Apponyi were prepared to accept moderate concessions ; as to the second, they were opposed to the question being raised at all. Kossuth and Justh, on the other hand, competitors for the leadership of the Independence party, declared themselves not prepared to accept anything short of the full rights of the Magyars in those matters. The matter was urgent ; for parliament was to meet on the 28th, and it was important that a new cabinet, acceptable to it, should be appointed before that date, or

that the Houses should be prorogued pending such appointment ; otherwise the delegations would be postponed and no credits would be voted for the cost of the new Austro-Hungarian " Dreadnoughts " and of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the event, neither of these courses proved possible, and on the 28th Dr Wekerle once more announced his resignation to the parliament.

The prime minister was not, however, as yet to be relieved of an impossible responsibility. After a period of wavering Mr Kossuth had consented to shelve for the time the question of the separate bank, and on the strength of this Dr Wekerle advised the crown to entrust to him the formation of a government. The position thus created raised a twofold question : Would the crown accept ? In that event, would he be able to carry his party with him in support of his modified programme ? The answer to the first question, in effect, depended on that given by events to the second ; and this was not long in declaring itself. The plan, concerted by Kossuth and Apponyi, with the approval of Baron Aehrenthal, was to carry on a modified Coalition government with the aid of the Andrassy Liberals, the National party, the Clerical People's party¹ and the Independence party, on a basis of suffrage reform with plural franchise, the prolongation of the charter of the joint bank, and certain concessions to Magyar demands in the matter of the army. It was soon clear, however, that in this Kossuth would not carry his party with him. A trial of strength took place between him and Mr de Justh, the champion of the extreme demands in the matter of Hungarian financial and economic autonomy ; on the 7th of November rival banquets were held, one at Mako, Justh's constituency, over which he presided, one at Budapest with Kossuth in the chair ; the attendance at each foreshadowed the outcome of the general meeting of the party held at Budapest on the 11th, when Kossuth found himself in a minority of 46. The Independence party was now split into two groups : the " Independence and 1848 party," and the " Independence, 1848 and Kossuth party."

On the 12th Mr de Justh resigned the presidency of the Lower House and sought re-election, so as to test the relative strength of parties. He was defeated by a combination of the Kossuthists, Andrassy Liberals and Clerical People's party, the 30 Croatian deputies, whose vote might have turned the election, abstaining on Dr Wekerle promising them to deliver Croatia from the oppressive rule of the ban, Baron Rauch. A majority was thus secured for the Kossuthist programme of compromise, but a majority so obviously precarious that the king-emperor, influenced also—it was rumoured—by the views of the heir-apparent, in an interview with Count Andrassy and Mr Kossuth on the 15th, refused to make any concessions to the Magyar national demands. Hereupon Kossuth publicly declared (Nov. 22) to a deputation of his constituents from Czegled that he himself was in favour of an independent bank, but that the king opposed it, and that in the event of no concessions being made he would join the opposition.

How desperate the situation had now become was shown by the fact that on the 27th the king sent for Count Tisza, on the recommendation of the very Coalition ministry which had been formed to overthrow him. This also proved abortive, and affairs rapidly tended to revert to the *ex-lex* situation. On the 23rd of December Dr Lukacs was again sent for. On the previous day the Hungarian parliament had adopted a proposal in favour of an address to the crown asking for a separate state bank. Against this Dr Wekerle had protested, as opposed to general Hungarian opinion and ruinous to the national credit, pointing out that whenever it was a question of raising a loan, the maintenance of the financial community between Hungary and Austria was always postulated as a preliminary condition. Point was given to this argument by the fact that the premier had just concluded the preliminaries for the negotiation of a loan of £20,000,000 in France, and that the money—which could not be raised in the Austrian market, already glutted with Hungarian securities—was urgently needed to pay for the Hungarian share in the expenses of the annexation policy, for public works (notably the new railway scheme), and for the redemption in 1910 of treasury bonds. It was hoped that, in the circumstances, Dr Lukacs, a financier of experience, might be able to come to terms with Mr de Justh, on the basis of dropping the bank question for the time, or, failing that, to patch together out of the rival parties some sort of a working majority.

On the 28th the Hungarian parliament adjourned *sine die*, pending the settlement of the crisis, without having voted the estimates for 1910, and without there being any prospect of a meeting of the delegations. On the two following days Dr Lukacs and Mr de Justh had audiences of the king, but without result ; and on the 31st Hungary once more entered on a period of extra-constitutional government.

After much negotiation a new cabinet was finally constituted on the 17th of January 1910. At its head was Count Khuen Hedervary, who, in addition to the premiership, was minister of the interior, minister for Croatia, and minister in waiting on the crown. Other

¹ The People's party first emerged during the elections of 1896, when it contested 98 seats. Its object was to resist the anti-clerical tendencies of the Liberals, and for this purpose it appealed to the " nationalities " against the dominant Magyar parties, the due enforcement of the Law of Equal Rights of Nationalities (1868) forming a main item of its programme. Its leader, Count Ziely, in a speech of Jan. 1, 1897, declared it to be neither national, nor Liberal, nor Christian to oppress the nationalities. See Seton-Watson, p. 185.

ministers were Mr Károly de Hieronymi (commerce), Dr Lukacs (finance), Ferencz de Szekely (justice, education, public worship), Béla Serenyi (agriculture) and General Hazay (national defence). The two main items in the published programme of the new government were the introduction of universal suffrage and—even more revolutionary from the Magyar point of view—the substitution of state-appointed for elected officials in the counties. The real programme was to secure, by hook or by crook, a majority at the polls. Meanwhile, the immediate necessities of the government were provided for by the issue through Messrs Rothschild of £2,000,000 fresh treasury bills. These were to be redeemed in December 1910, together with the £9,000,000 worth issued in 1909, out of the £20,000,000 loan agreed on in principle with the French government; but in view of the opposition in Paris to the idea of advancing money to a member of the Triple Alliance, it was doubtful whether the loan would ever be floated.

The overwhelming victory of the government in June at the polls produced a lull in a crisis which at the beginning of the year had threatened the stability of the Dual Monarchy and the peace of Europe; but, in view of the methods by which the victory had been won, not the most sanguine could assert that the crisis was overpassed. Its deep underlying causes can only be understood in the light of the whole of Hungarian history. It is easy to denounce the dominant Magyar classes as a selfish oligarchy, and to criticize the methods by which they have sought to maintain their power. But a nation that for a thousand years had maintained its individuality in the midst of hostile and rival races could not be expected to allow itself without a struggle to be sacrificed to the force of mere numbers, and the less so if it were justified in its claim that it stood for a higher ideal of culture and civilization. The Magyars had certainly done much to justify their claim to a special measure of enlightenment. In their efforts to establish Hungarian independence on the firm basis of national efficiency they had succeeded in changing their country from one of very backward economic conditions into one which promised to be in a position to hold its own on equal terms with any in the world.

CHAPTER XXIII

EARLY HISTORY OF POLAND

POLAND (Polish *Polska*, Ger. *Polen*) till the end of the 18th century was a kingdom extending (with Lithuania) over the basins of the Warta, Vistula, Dwina, Dnieper and upper Dniester, and had under its dominions, besides the Poles proper and the Baltic Slavs, the Lithuanians, the White Russians and the Little Russians or Ruthenians.

We possess no certain historical data relating to Poland till the end of the 10th century. It would seem, from a somewhat obscure passage in the chronicle compiled from older sources by Nestor, a monk of Kiev (d. c. 1115), that the progenitors of the Poles, originally established on the Danube, were driven from thence by the Romans to the still wilder wilderness of central Europe, settling finally among the virgin forests and impenetrable morasses of the basin of the upper waters of the Oder and the Vistula. Here the Lechici, as they called themselves (a name derived from the mythical patriarch, Lech), seemed to have lived for centuries, in loosely connected communities, the simple lives of huntsmen, herdsmen and tillers of the soil, till the pressure of rapacious neighbours compelled them to combine for mutual defence. Of this infant state, the so-called kingdom of the Piasts (from Piast, its supposed founder), we know next to nothing. Its origin, its territory, its institutions are so many insoluble riddles. The earliest Polish chroniclers, from Gallus in the early 12th century to Janko of Czarnkow¹ in the 14th, are of little help to us. The only facts of importance to be gleaned from them are that Prince Ziemovit, the great-grandfather of Mieszko (Mieczyslaw) I. (962-992), wrested from the vast but tottering Moravian Empire the province of Chrobacyja (extending from the Carpathians to the Bug), and that Christianity was first preached on the Vistula by Greek Orthodox missionary monks. Mieszko himself was converted by Jordan, the chaplain of his Bohemian consort, Dobrawa or Bona, and when Jordan became the first bishop of Posen, the people seem to have followed the example of their prince. But the whole movement was apparently the outcome not of religious conviction, but of political necessity. The Slavonic peoples, whose territories then extended to the Elbe, and embraced the whole southern shore of the Baltic, were beginning to recoil before the vigorous impetus of the Germans in the West, who regarded their pagan neighbours in much the same way as the Spanish Conquistadores regarded the Aztecs and the Incas. To accept Christianity, at least formally, was therefore a prudential safeguard on the part of the Slavonians. This was thoroughly understood by Mieszko's son Boleslaus I. (992-1025), who went a considerable step farther than his father. Mieszko had been content to be received on almost any terms into the Christian community, Boleslaus aimed at securing the independence of the Polish Church as an additional guarantee of the independence of the Polish nation. It was Boleslaus who made the church at Gnesen in Great Poland a national shrine by translating thither the relics of the martyred missionary, St Adalbert of Prague. Subsequently he elevated Gnesen into the metropolitan see of Poland, with jurisdiction over the bishoprics of Cracow, Breslau and Kolberg, all three of these new sees, it is important to notice, being in territory conquered by Boleslaus; for hitherto both Cracow and Breslau had been Bohemian cities, while Kolberg was founded to curb the lately subjugated Pomeranians. Boleslaus was also the first Polish prince to bear the royal title, which seems to have been conferred upon him by Otto III. in 1000, though as Boleslaus crowned himself king a second time in 1025, it is evident that he regarded the validity of his first coronation as

¹ Archdeacon of Gnesen, 1367; vice-chancellor of Poland; d. c. 1387.

somewhat doubtful. He was primarily a warrior, whose reign, an almost uninterrupted warfare, resulted in the formation of a vast kingdom extending from the Baltic to the Carpathians, and from the Elbe to the Bug. But this imposing superstructure rested on the flimsiest of foundations. In less than twenty years after the death of its founder, it collapsed before a combined attack of all Poland's enemies, and simultaneously a terrible pagan reaction swept away the poor remnants of Christianity and civilization. For a time Poland proper became a smoking wilderness, and wild beasts made their lairs in the ruined and desecrated churches. Under Boleslaus II. (1058-1079) and Boleslaus III. (1102-1139) some of the lost provinces, notably Silesia and Pomerania, were recovered and Poland was at least able to maintain her independence against the Germans. Boleslaus III., moreover, with the aid of St Otto, bishop of Bamberg, succeeded in converting the heathen Pomeranians (1124-1128), and making head against paganism generally.

The last act of Boleslaus III. was to divide his territories among his sons, whereby Poland was partitioned into no fewer than four, and ultimately into as many as eight, principalities, many of which (Silesia and Great Poland for instance) in process of time split up into still smaller fractions all of them more or less bitterly hostile to each other. This partitional period, as Polish historians generally call it, lasted from 1138 to 1305, during which Poland lost all political significance, and became an easy prey to her neighbours. The duke of Little Poland, who generally styled himself duke of Poland, or *dux totius Poloniæ*, claimed a sort of supremacy among these little states, a claim materially strengthened by the wealth and growing importance of his capital, Cracow, especially after Little Poland had annexed the central principality of Sieradia (Sieradz). But Masovia to the north, and Great Poland to the north-west, refused to recognize the supremacy of Little Poland, while Silesia soon became completely germanized. It was at the beginning of this period too, between 1216 and 1224, that Pomerania, under an energetic native dynasty, freed herself from the Polish suzerainty. Nearly a generation later (1241) the Tatar hordes, under Batu, appeared for the first time on the confines of Poland. The Polish princes opposed a valiant but ineffectual resistance; the towns of Sandomir and Cracow were reduced to ashes, and all who were able fled to the mountains of Hungary or the forests of Moravia. Pursuing his way to Silesia, Batu overthrew the confederated Silesian princes at Liegnitz (April 9), and, after burning all the Silesian towns, invaded Hungary, where he routed King Bela IV. on the banks of the Sajó. But this marked the limit of his triumph. Exhausted and diminished by the stout and successful opposition of the Moravians at Olmütz, the Tatars vanished as suddenly as they had appeared, leaving a smoking wilderness behind them.

Batu's invasion had an important influence upon the social and political development of Poland. The only way of filling up the gaps in the population of the ravaged land was to invite foreign immigrants of a superior class, chapmen and handicraftsmen, not only given to peaceful pursuits and accustomed to law and order, but capable of building and defending strong cities. Such immigrants could naturally be obtained only from the civilized west, and on their own terms. Thus it came about that the middle-class element was introduced into Polish society for the first time. Immediately dependent upon the prince, from whom they obtained their privileges, the most important of which were self-government and freedom from taxation, these traders soon became an important factor in the state, counterpoising, to some extent, the influence of the gentry, enriching the land by developing its resources, and promoting civilization by raising the standard of comfort.

Most of these German citizens in process of time were absorbed by the Polish population, and became devoted, heart and soul, to their adopted country; but these were not the only Germans with whom the young Polish state had now to deal. In the first year of the 13th century, the Knights of the Sword, one of the numerous orders of crusading military monks, had been founded in Livonia to "convert" the pagan Letts, and, in 1208, the still more powerful Teutonic Order was invited by Duke Conrad of Masovia to settle in the district of Kulm (roughly corresponding to modern East Prussia) to protect his territories against the incursions of the savage Prussians, a race closely akin to the Lithuanians. Conrad has been loudly blamed by Polish historians for introducing this foreign, and as it ultimately proved, dangerous element into Poland. But the unfortunate prince had to choose between dependence and extermination, for his unaided resources were powerless against the persistent attacks of the unconquerable Prussians. The Teutonic Order, which had just been expelled from Hungary by Andrew II., joyfully accepted this new domicile, and its position in the north was definitely established by the compact of Kruschwitz in 1230, whereby it obtained absolute possession of the maritime district between Pomerania and Courland, and southwards as far as Thorn. So far were the Poles from anticipating any danger from the Teutonic Order, that, from 1243 to 1255, they actually assisted it to overthrow the independent Pomeranian princes, the most formidable opponents of the Knights in the earlier years of their existence. A second Tatar raid in 1259, less dangerous, perhaps, but certainly more ruinous, than the first invasion—for the principalities of Little Poland and Sandomir were systematically ravaged for three months—still further depressed the land, and, at this very time, another enemy appeared in the east—the Lithuanians.

This interesting people, whose origin is to this day the most baffling of ethnographical puzzles, originally dwelt amidst the forests and marshes of the Upper Niemen. Thanks to the impenetrability of their fastnesses, they preserved their original savagery longer than any of their neighbours, and this savagery was coupled with a valour so tenacious and enterprising as to make them formidable to all who dwelt near them. The Russians fled at the sight of them, "like hares before hunters." The Livs and Letts were as much the prey of the Lithuanians "as sheep are the prey of wolves." The German chroniclers describe them as the most terrible of all the barbarians. The Lithuanians first emerge into the light of history at the time of the settlement of the Teutonic Order in the North. Rumours of the war of extermination conducted against their kinsmen, the wild Prussians, by the Knights, first woke the Lithuanians to a sense of their own danger, and induced them to abandon their loose communal system in favour of a monarchical form of government, which concentrated the whole power of the state in a single hand. Fortunately, too, at this crisis of their history, the Lithuanians were blessed with an altogether exceptional series of great rulers, who showed themselves fully capable of taking care of themselves. There was, for instance, Mendovg (1240-1263), who submitted to baptism for purely political reasons, checkmated the Teutonic Knights by adroitly seeking the protection of the Holy See, and annexed the principality of Plock to his ever-widening grand duchy, which already included Black Russia, and formed a huge wedge extending southwards from Courland, thus separating Poland from Russia. A still greater prince was Gedymin (1315-1342), who did his utmost to civilize Lithuania by building towns, introducing foreigners and tolerating all religions, though he himself remained a pagan for political reasons. Gedymin still further extended the limits of Lithuania by annexing Kiev, Chernigov and other old Russian principalities.

At the very time when Lithuania was thus becoming a compact, united, powerful state, Poland seemed literally to be dropping to pieces. Not even the exhortations of the popes could make her score of princes unite for mutual defence against the barbarians who envired them. For a time it seemed highly probable that Poland would be completely germanized, like Silesia, or become a part of the new Bohemian Empire which Wenceslaus II. (crowned king of Poland in 1300) had inherited from his father, Ottakar II. From this fate she was saved by the valour of Wladislaus Lokietek, duke of Great Poland (1306-1333), who reunited Great and Little Poland, revived the royal dignity in 1320, and saved the kingdom from annihilation by his great victory over the Teutonic Knights at Płowce in 1332. The whole reign of Wladislaus I. was indeed an unceasing struggle against all the forces of anarchy and disintegration; but the fruits of his labours were richly reaped by his son Casimir III. the Great (1333-1370), Poland's first great statesman in the modern sense of the word, who, by a most skilful system of matrimonial alliances, reintroduced isolated Poland into the European system, and gave the exhausted country an inestimably beneficial breathing space of thirty-seven years. A born ruler, Casimir introduced a whole series of administrative and economical reforms. He was the especial protector of the cities and the peasants, and, though averse from violent measures, punished aristocratic tyranny with an iron hand. Casimir's few wars were waged entirely for profit, not glory. It is to him that Poland owed the important acquisition of the greater part of Red Russia or Galicia, which enabled her to secure her fair share of the northern and eastern trade. In default of male issue, Casimir left the Polish throne to his nephew, Louis of Hungary, who ruled the country (1370-1382) through his mother, Queen Elizabeth, Wladislaus Lokietek's daughter. Louis well deserved the epithet of "great" bestowed upon him by his contemporaries; but Poland formed but a small portion of his vast domains, and Poland's interests were subordinated to the larger demands of an imperial policy which embraced half Europe within its orbit.

On the death of Louis there ensued an interregnum of two years marked by fierce civil wars, instigated by Duke Ziemovit of Masovia, the northernmost province of Poland, which continued to exist as an independent principality alongside of the kingdom of Poland. Ziemovit aimed at the Polish crown, proposing to marry the infant princess Jadwiga of Hungary, who, as the daughter of Louis the Great and the grand-daughter of Wladislaus Lokietek, had an equal right, by inheritance, to the thrones of Hungary and Poland. By an agreement with the queen-mother of Hungary at Kassa in 1383, the Poles finally accepted Jadwiga as their queen, and, on the 18th of February 1386, greatly against her will, the young princess, already betrothed to William of Austria, was wedded to Jagiello, grand duke of Lithuania, who had been crowned king of Poland at Cracow three days previously, under the title of Wladislaus II.

The union of Poland and Lithuania as separate states under one king had been brought about by their common fear of the Teutonic Order. Five years after the death of Gedymin, Olgiard, the most capable of his seven sons, had been placed upon the throne of Lithuania by his devoted brother Kiejstut, and for the next two-and-thirty years (1345-1377) the two princes still further extended the sway of Lithuania, principally at the expense of Muscovy and the Tatars. Kiejstut ruled the western portion of the land where the Teutonic Knights were a constant menace, while Olgiard drove the Tatar hordes out of the south-eastern steppes, and compelled them to seek a refuge in the Crimea. During Olgiard's

reign the southern boundaries of Lithuania touched the Black Sea, including the whole tract of land between the mouth of the Bug and the mouth of the Dnieper. Olgiert was succeeded by his son Jagiello as grand duke in 1377, while Kiejstut was left in possession of Samogitia, Troki and Grodno; but the Teutonic Order, alarmed at the growth of Lithuania, succeeded in estranging uncle and nephew, and Kiejstut was treacherously assassinated by Jagiello's orders, at Krewo, on the 15th of August 1382. Three weeks later Jagiello was compelled to cede Samogitia, as far as the Dubissa, to the Knights, and in the following year they set up against him Kiejstut's son Witowt. The eyes of Jagiello were now opened to the fact that the machiavellian policy of the Knights aimed at subjugating Lithuania by dividing it. He at once made peace with his cousin; restored him his patrimony; and, to secure Lithuania against the future vengeance of the Knights, Jagiello made overtures to Poland for the hand of Jadwiga, and received the Polish crown along with it, as already mentioned.

Before proceeding to describe the Jagiellonic period of Polish history, it is necessary to cast a rapid glance at the social and political condition of the country in the preceding Piast period.

The paucity and taciturnity of our sources make it impossible to give anything like an adequate picture of Old Poland during the first four centuries of its existence. A glimpse here and there of the political development of the country is the utmost that the most diligent scrutiny can glean from the scanty record of the early chronicles. External pressure, here as elsewhere, created a patriotic military caste, and the subsequent partitional period, when every little prince had his own separate court, still further established the growing influence of the *szlachta*, or gentry, who were not backward in claiming and obtaining special privileges in return for their services. The first authentic *pacta conventa* made between the Polish nobility and the Crown dates from the compact of Kassa (September 17, 1374), when Louis of Hungary agreed to exempt the *szlachta* from all taxation, except two Polish groschen per hide of land, and to compensate them for the expenses of all military service rendered beyond the confines of the realm. The clergy received their chief privileges much earlier. It was at the synod of Leczyca, nearly a century before the compact of Kassa, that the property of the Church was first safeguarded against the encroachments of the state. The beneficial influence of the Church of Poland in these early times was incalculable. To say nothing of the labours of the Cistercians as colonists, pioneers and church-builders, or of the missions of the Dominicans and Franciscans (the former of whom were introduced into Poland by Ivo, bishop of Cracow,¹ the personal friend of Dominic), the Church was the one stable and unifying element in an age of centrifugal particularism. The frequent synods represented the whole of Poland, and kept alive, as nothing else could, the idea of national solidarity. The Holy See had also a considerable share in promoting the political development of the land. In the 13th century alone no fewer than forty-nine papal legates visited Poland, and thirty provincial synods were held by them to regulate church affairs and promote good government. Moreover the clergy, to their eternal honour, consistently protected the lower from the tyranny of the upper classes.

The growth of the towns was slower. During the heroic Boleslawic period there had been a premature outcrop of civil life. As early as the 11th century Kruschwitz, the old Polish capital, and Gnesen, the metropolitan see, were of considerable importance, and played a leading part in public life. But in the ensuing anarchic period both cities were utterly ruined, and the centre of political gravity was transferred from Great Poland to Little Poland, where Cracow, singularly favoured by her position, soon became the capital of the monarchy, and one of the wealthiest cities in Europe. At the end of the 14th century we find all the great trade guilds established there, and the cloth manufactured at Cracow was eagerly sought after, from Prague to Great Novgorod. So wealthy did Cracow become at last that Casimir the Great felt it necessary to restrain the luxury of her citizens by sumptuary ordinances. Towards the end of the 14th century the Polish towns even attained some degree of political influence, and their delegates sat with the nobles and clergy in the king's councils, a right formally conceded to them at Radom in March 1384. Even the peasants, who had suffered severely from the wholesale establishment of prisoners of war as serfs on the estates of the nobles, still preserved the rights of personal liberty and free transit from place to place, whence their name of *laszigi*. The only portion of the community which had no privileges were the Jews, first introduced into Poland by Boleslaus the Pious, duke of Great Poland, in 1264, when bitter persecutions had driven them northwards from the shores of the Adriatic. Casimir the Great extended their liberty of domicile over the whole kingdom (1334). From the first they were better treated in Poland than elsewhere, though frequently exposed to outbreaks of popular fanaticism.

The transformation of the pagan Lithuanian chieftain Jagiello into the catholic king of Poland, Wladislaus II., was an event of capital importance in the history of eastern Europe. Its immediate and inevitable consequence was the formal reception of the Lithuanian nations into the fold of the Church. What the Teutonic Order had vainly endeavoured to bring about by fire and sword, for two centuries, was peacefully accomplished by Jagiello within a single generation, the Lithuanians, for the most part, willingly yielding

¹ Archbishop of Gnesen 1219-1220; died at Modena 1229.

to the arguments of a prince of their own blood, who promptly rewarded his converts with peculiar and exclusive privileges. The conversion of Lithuania menaced the very existence of the Teutonic Knights. Originally planted on the Baltic shore for the express purpose of christianizing their savage neighbours, these crusading monks had freely exploited the wealth and the valour of the West, ostensibly in the cause of religion, really for the purpose of founding a dominion of their own which, as time went on, lost more and more of its religious character, and was now little more than a German military forepost, extending from Pomerania to the Niemen, which deliberately excluded the Slavs from the sea and thrived at their expense. The mere instinct of self-preservation had, at last, drawn the Poles and Lithuanians together against these ruthless and masterful intruders, and the coronation of Jagiello at Cracow on the 15th of February 1386 was both a warning and a challenge to the Knights. But if the Order had now become a superfluous anachronism, it had still to be disposed of, and this was no easy task. For if it had failed utterly as a mission *in partibus*, it had succeeded in establishing on the Baltic one of the strongest military organizations in Europe. In the art of war the Knights were immeasurably superior to all their neighbours. The pick of the feudal chivalry composed their ranks; with all Europe to draw upon, their resources seemed inexhaustible, and centuries of political experience made them as formidable in diplomacy as they were valiant in warfare. And indeed, for the next twenty years, the Teutonic Order more than held its own. Skilfully taking advantage of the jealousies of Poland and Lithuania, as they were accentuated by the personal antagonism of Jagiello and Witowt, with the latter of whom the Knights more than once contracted profitable alliances, they even contrived (Treaty of Salin, 1378) to extend their territory by getting possession of the province of Samogitia, the original seat of the Lithuanians, where paganism still persisted, and where their inhuman cruelties finally excited the horror and indignation of Christian Europe. By this time, however, the prudent Jagiello had become convinced that Lithuania was too strong to be ruled by or from Poland, and yet not strong enough to stand alone, and by the compact of Vilna (January 18, 1401, confirmed by the compact of Radowo, March 10) he surrendered the whole grand duchy to Witowt, on the understanding that the two states should have a common policy, and that neither of them should elect a new prince without the consent of the other. The wisdom of this arrangement was made manifest in 1410, when Jagiello and Witowt combined their forces for the purpose of delivering Samogitia from the intolerable tyranny of the Knights. The issue was fought out on the field of Tannenberg, or Grūnewald (July 15, 1410), when the Knights sustained a crushing defeat, which shook their political organization to its very foundations. A few weeks after the victory the towns of Thorn, Elbing, Braunsberg and Danzig submitted to the Polish king, and all the Prussian bishops voluntarily offered to render him homage. But the excessive caution of Jagiello gave the Knights time to recover from the blow; the Polish levies proved unruly and incompetent; Witowt was suddenly recalled to Lithuania by a Tatar invasion, and thus it came about that, when peace was concluded at Thorn, on the 1st of February 1411, Samogitia (which was to revert to the Order on the death of Jagiello and Witowt), Dobryzn, and a war indemnity of 100,000 marks payable in four instalments, were the best terms Poland could obtain from the Knights, whose territory practically remained intact. Jagiello's signal for the attack at the battle of Grūnewald, "Cracow and Vilna" (the respective capitals of Poland and Lithuania) had eloquently demonstrated the solidarity of the two states. This solidarity was still further strengthened by the Union of Horodlo (October 2, 1413), which enacted that henceforth Lithuania was to have the same order of dignitaries¹ as Poland, as well as a council of state, or senate, similar to the Polish senate. The power of the grand duke was also greatly increased. He was now declared to be the equal of the Polish king, and his successor could be elected only by the senates of Poland and Lithuania in conjunction. The Union of Horodlo also established absolute parity between the nobility of Poland and Lithuania, but the privileges of the latter were made conditional upon their profession of the Roman Catholic faith, experience having shown that difference of religion in Lithuania meant difference of politics, and a tendency Moscow-wards, the majority of the Lithuanian boyars being of the Greek Orthodox Confession.

During the remainder of the reign of Wladislaus II. the Teutonic Order gave Poland much trouble, but no serious anxiety. The trouble was due mainly to the repeated efforts of the Knights to evade the fulfilment of the obligations of the Treaty of Thorn. In these endeavours they were materially assisted by the emperor Sigismund, who was also king of Hungary. Sigismund, in 1422, even went so far as to propose a partition of Poland between Hungary, the empire and the Silesian princes, a scheme which foundered upon Sigismund's impetuosity and the reluctance of the Magyars to injure the Poles. More than once Wladislaus II. was even obliged to renew the war against the Knights, and, in 1422, he compelled them to renounce all claims upon Samogitia; but the long struggle, still undecided at his death, was fought mainly with diplomatic weapons at Rome, where the popes, gener-

¹ All the chief offices of state were consequently duplicated, e.g. the *hetman wielki koronny*, i.e. "grand hetman of the crown," as the Polish commander-in-chief was called, had his counterpart in Lithuania, who bore the title of *wielki hetman litewski*, i.e. "grand hetman of Lithuania," and so on.

ally speaking, listened rather to the victorious monarch who had added an ecclesiastical province to the church than to the discomfited and turbulent Knights.

Had Wladislaus II. been as great a warrior as Witowt he might, perhaps, have subdued the Knights altogether. But by nature he was pre-eminently a diplomatist, and it must in fairness be admitted that his diplomacy in every direction was distinctly beneficial to Poland. He successfully thwarted all the schemes of the emperor Sigismund, by adroitly supporting the revolutionary party in Bohemia. In return Hussite mercenaries fought on the Polish side at Tannenburg, and Czech patriots repeatedly offered the crown of Bohemia to Wladislaus. The Polish king was always ready enough to support the Czechs against Sigismund; but the necessity of justifying his own orthodoxy (which the Knights were for ever impugning) at Rome and in the face of Europe prevented him from accepting the crown of St Wenceslaus from the hands of heretics.

Wladislaus II. died at Lemberg in 1434, at the age of eighty-three. During his long reign of forty-nine years Poland had gradually risen to the rank of a great power, a result due in no small measure to the insight and sagacity of the first Jagiello, who sacrificed every other consideration to the vital necessity of welding the central Slavs into a compact and homogeneous state. The next ten years severely tested the stability of his great work, but it stood the test triumphantly. Neither a turbulent minority, nor the neglect of an absentee king; neither the revival of separatist tendencies in Lithuania, nor the outbreaks of aristocratic lawlessness in Poland, could do more than shake the superstructure of the imposing edifice. After the death at Varna, in 1444, of Jagiello's eldest son and successor, Wladislaus III. (whose history belongs rather to Hungary than to Poland), another great statesman, in no wise inferior to Wladislaus II., completed and consolidated his work. This was Wladislaus's second son, already grand-duke of Lithuania, who ascended the Polish throne as Casimir IV. in 1447, thus reuniting Poland and Lithuania under one monarch.

Enormous were the difficulties of Casimir IV. He instinctively recognized not only the vital necessity of the maintenance of the union between the two states, but also the fact that the chief source of danger to the union lay in Lithuania, in those days a maelstrom of conflicting political currents. To begin with, Lithuania was a far less composite state than Poland. Two-thirds of the grand-duchy consisted of old Russian lands inhabited by men who spoke the Ruthenian language and professed the Orthodox Greek religion, while in the north were the Lithuanians proper, semi-savage and semi-catholic, justly proud of their heroic forefathers of the house of Gedymin, and very sensitive of the pretensions of Poland to the provinces of Volhynia and Podolia, the fruits of Lithuanian valour. A Lithuanian himself, Casimir strenuously resisted the attempts of Poland to wrest these provinces from the grand-duchy. Moreover, during the earlier years of his reign, he was obliged to reside for the most part in Lithuania, where his tranquillizing influence was needed. His supposed preference for Lithuania was the real cause of his unpopularity in Poland, where, to the very end of his reign, he was regarded with suspicion, and where every effort was made to thwart his far-seeing and patriotic political combinations, which were beyond the comprehension of his self-seeking and narrow-minded contemporaries. This was notably the case as regards his dealings with the old enemy of his race, the Teutonic Order, whose destruction was the chief aim of his ambition.

The Teutonic Order had long since failed as a religious institution; it was now to show its inadequacy as a political organization. In the domain of the Knights the gentry, parochial clergy and townsmen, who, beneath its protection, had attained to a high degree of wealth and civilization, for long remained without the slightest political influence, though they bore nearly the whole burden of taxation. In 1414, however, intimidated by the growing discontent, which frequently took the form of armed rebellion, the Knights consented to the establishment of a diet, which was re-formed on a more aristocratic basis in 1430. But the old abuses continuing to multiply, the Prussian towns and gentry at last took their affairs into their own hands, and formed a so-called Prussian League, which demanded an equal share in the government of the country. This league was excommunicated by the pope, and placed under the ban of the empire almost simultaneously in 1453, whereupon it placed itself beneath the protection of its nearest powerful neighbour, the king of Poland, who (March 6, 1454) issued a manifesto incorporating all the Prussian provinces with Poland, but, at the same time, granting them local autonomy and free trade.

But provinces are not conquered by manifestos, and Casimir's acceptance of the homage of the Prussian League at once involved him in a war with the desperate Teutonic Knights, which lasted twelve years, but might easily have been concluded in a twelvemonth had he only been loyally supported by his own subjects, for whose benefit he had embarked upon this great enterprise. But instead of support, Casimir encountered obstinate obstruction at every point. No patriotic Pole, we imagine, can read the history of this miserable war without feeling heartily ashamed of his countrymen. The acquisition of the Prussian lands was vital to the existence of Poland. It meant the excision of an alien element which fed like a cancer on the body politic; it meant the recovery, at comparatively little cost, of the command of the principal rivers of Poland, the Vistula and the Niemen; it meant the obtaining of a seaboard with the corollaries of sea-power and world-wide commerce. Yet,

except in the border province of Great Poland, which was interested commercially, the whole enterprise was regarded with such indifference, that the king, in the very crisis of the struggle, could only with the utmost difficulty obtain contributions for war expenses from the half-dozen local diets of Poland, which extorted from the helplessness of their distracted and impecunious sovereign fresh privileges for every subsidy they grudgingly granted. Moreover Casimir's difficulties were materially increased by the necessity of paying for Czech mercenaries, the *pospolite ruszenie*, or Polish militia, proving utterly useless at the very beginning of the war. Indeed, from first to last, the Polish gentry as a body took good care to pay and fight as little as possible, and Casimir depended for the most part upon the liberality of the Church and the Prussian towns, and the valour of the Hussite infantry, 170,000 of whom, fighting on both sides, are said to have perished. Not till the victory of Puck (September 17, 1462), one of the very few pitched battles in a war of raids, skirmishes and sieges, did fortune incline decisively to the side of the Poles, who maintained and improved their advantage till absolute exhaustion compelled the Knights to accept the mediation of a papal legate, and the second peace of Thorn (October 14, 1466) concluded a struggle which had reduced the Prussian provinces to a wilderness.¹ By the second peace of Thorn, Poland recovered the provinces of Pomerelia, Kulm and Michalow, with the bishopric of Ermeland, numerous cities and fortresses, including Marienburg, Elbing, Danzig and Thorn. The territory of the Knights was now reduced to Prussia proper, embracing, roughly speaking, the district between the Baltic, the lower Vistula and the lower Niemen, with Königsberg as its capital. For this territory the grand-masters, within nine months of their election, were in future to render homage to the Polish king; but, on the other hand, the king undertook not to make war or engage in any important enterprise without the consent of the Prussian province, and *vice versa*. Thus Prussia was now confederated with Poland, but she occupied a subordinate position as compared with Lithuania, inasmuch as the grand-master, though filling the first place in the royal council, was still a subject of the Polish crown. Thus the high hopes entertained by Casimir at the beginning of the war had not been realized. The final settlement with the Poles was of the nature of a compromise. Still the Knights had been driven beyond the Vistula, and Poland had secured a seaboard; and it was due entirely to the infinite patience and tenacity of the king that even as much as this was won at last.

The whole foreign policy of Casimir IV. was more or less conditioned by the Prussian question, and here also his superior diplomacy triumphantly asserted itself. At the beginning of the war both the empire and the pope were against him, but he neutralized their hostility by allying himself with George of Podvebrad, whom the Hussites had placed on the throne of Bohemia. On the death of George, Casimir's eldest son, Wladislaus, was elected king of Bohemia by the Utraquist party, despite the determined opposition of Matthias Corvinus, king of Hungary, whose ability and audacity henceforth made him Casimir's most dangerous rival. Sure of the support of the pope, Matthias deliberately set about traversing all the plans of Casimir. He encouraged the Teutonic Order to rebel against Poland; he entertained at his court anti-Polish embassies from Moscow; he encouraged the Tatars to ravage Lithuania; he thwarted Casimir's policy in Moldavia. The death of the brilliant adventurer at Vienna in 1490 came therefore as a distinct relief to Poland, and all danger from the side of Hungary was removed in 1490 when Casimir's son Wladislaus, already king of Bohemia, was elected king of Hungary also.

It was in the reign of Casimir IV. that Poland first came into direct collision with the Turks. The Republic was never, indeed, the "Buckler of Christendom." That glorious epithet belonged of right to Hungary, which had already borne the brunt of the struggle with the Ottoman power for more than a century. It is true that Wladislaus II. of Poland had fallen on the field of Varna, but it was as a Magyar king at the head of a Magyar army that the young monarch met his fate. Poland, indeed, was far less able to cope with the Turks than compact, wealthy Hungary, which throughout the 15th century was one of the most efficient military monarchies in Europe. The Jagiellos, as a rule, prudently avoided committing themselves to any political system which might irritate the still distant but much-dreaded Turk, but when their dominions extended so far southwards as to embrace Moldavia, the observance of a strict neutrality became exceedingly difficult. Poland had established a sort of suzerainty over Moldavia as early as the end of the 14th century; but at best it was a loose and vague overlordship which the Hospodars repudiated whenever they were strong enough to do so. The Turks themselves were too much occupied elsewhere to pay much attention to the Danubian principalities till the middle of the 15th century. In 1478 Mahomet II. had indeed attempted their subjugation, with but indifferent success; but it was not till 1484 that the Ottomans became inconvenient neighbours to Poland. In that year a Turkish fleet captured the strongholds of Kilia and Akkerman, commanding respectively the mouths of the Danube and Dneister. This aggression seriously threatened the trade of Poland, and induced Casimir IV. to accede to a general league against the Porte. In 1485, after driving the Turks out of Moldavia, the Polish king, at the head of

¹ 18,000 of their 21,000 villages were destroyed, 1000 churches were razed to the ground, and the population was diminished by more than a quarter of a million.

20,000 men, proceeded to Kolomea on the Pruth, where Bayezid II., then embarrassed by the Egyptian war, offered peace, but as no agreement concerning the captured fortresses could be arrived at, hostilities were suspended by a truce. During the remainder of his reign the Turks gave no trouble.

It was a fortunate thing for Poland that, during the first century of her ascension to the rank of a great power, political exigencies compelled her to appropriate almost more territory than her primitive and centrifugal government could properly assimilate; it was fortunate that throughout this period of expansion her destinies should, with one brief interval, have been controlled by a couple of superior statesmen, each of whom ruled for nearly fifty years. During the fourteen years (1492-1506) which separate the reigns of Casimir IV. and Sigismund I. she was not so lucky. The controlling hand of Casimir IV. was no sooner withdrawn than the unruly elements, ever present in the Republic, and ultimately the cause of its ruin, at once burst forth. The first symptom of this lawlessness was the separation of Poland and Lithuania, the Lithuanians proceeding to elect Alexander, Casimir's fourth son, as their grand duke, without even consulting the Polish senate, in flagrant violation of the union of Horodlo. The breach, happily, was of no very long duration. A disastrous war with Ivan III., the first Muscovite tsar, speedily convinced the Lithuanians that they were not strong enough to stand alone, and in 1499 they voluntarily renewed the union. Much more dangerous was the political revolution proceeding simultaneously in Poland, where John Albert, the third son of Casimir, had been elected king on the death of his father. The nature of this revolution will be considered in detail when we come to speak of the growth of the Polish constitution. Suffice it here to say that it was both anti-monarchical and anti-democratic, tending, as it did, to place all political authority in the hands of the *szlachta*, or gentry. The impecunious monarch submitted to the dictation of the diet in the hope of obtaining sufficient money to prosecute his ambitious designs. With his elder brother Wladislaus reigning over Bohemia and Hungary the credit of the Jagiellos in Europe had never been so great as it was now, and John Albert, bent upon military glory, eagerly placed himself at the head of what was to have been a great anti-Turkish league, but ultimately dwindled down to a raid upon Moldavia which ended in disaster. The sole advantage which John Albert reaped from his championship of the Christian cause was the favour of the Curia, and the ascendancy which that favour gave him over the Teutonic Knights, whose new grand-master, Albert of Saxony, was reluctantly compelled to render due homage to the Polish king. Under Alexander, who succeeded his brother in 1501, matters went from bad to worse. Alexander's election cemented, indeed, once for all, the union between Poland and Lithuania, inasmuch as, on the eve of it (Oct. 3, 1501), the senates of both countries agreed that, in future, the king of Poland should always be grand duke of Lithuania; but this was the sole benefit which the Republic derived from the reign of Alexander, under whom the Polish government has been well described as a rudderless ship in a stormy sea, with nothing but the grace of God between it and destruction. In Lithuania the increasing pressure of the Muscovite was the chief danger. Till the accession of Ivan III. in 1462 Muscovy had been a negligible factor in Polish politics. During the earlier part of the 15th century the Lithuanian princes had successfully contested Muscovite influence even in Pskov and Great Novgorod. Many Russian historians even maintain that, but for the fact that Witowt had simultaneously to cope with the Teutonic Order and the Tatars, that energetic prince would certainly have extinguished struggling Muscovy altogether. But since the death of Witowt (1430) the military efficiency of Lithuania had sensibly declined; single-handed she was no longer a match for her ancient rival. This was owing partly to the evils of an oligarchic government; partly to the weakness resulting from the natural attraction of the Orthodox-Greek element in Lithuania towards Muscovy, especially after the fall of Constantinople, but chiefly to the administrative superiority of the highly centralized Muscovite government. During the reign of Alexander, who was too poor to maintain any adequate standing army in Lithuania, the Muscovites and Tatars ravaged the whole country at will, and were prevented from conquering it altogether only by their inability to capture the chief fortresses. In Poland, meanwhile, something very like anarchy prevailed. Alexander had practically surrendered his authority to an incapable aristocracy, whose sole idea of ruling was systematically to oppress and humiliate the lower classes. In foreign affairs a policy of drift prevailed which encouraged all the enemies of the Republic to raise their heads, while the dependent states of Prussia in the north and Moldavia in the south made strenuous efforts to break away from Poland. Fortunately for the integrity of the Polish state the premature death of Alexander in 1506 brought upon the throne his capable brother Sigismund, the fifth son of Casimir IV., whose long reign of forty-two years was salutary, and would have been altogether recuperative, had his statesmanship only been loyally supported by his subjects. Eminently practical, Sigismund recognized that the first need of Poland was a standing army. The miserable collapse of the Polish chivalry during the Bukovinian campaign of 1497 had convinced every one that the *ruszenie pospolite* was useless for serious military purposes, and that Poland, in order to hold her own, must in future follow the example of the West, and wage her warfare with trained mercenaries. But professional soldiers could not be hired without money, and the difficulty was to persuade the diet to loose its purse-

strings. All that the gentry contributed at present was two pence (groschen) per hide of land, and this only for defensive service at home. If the king led the *ruszenie polskie* abroad, he was obliged to pay so much per pike out of his own pocket, notwithstanding the fact that the heavily mortgaged crown lands were practically valueless. At the diet of 1510 the chancellor and primate, Adam Laski, proposed an income-tax of 50 % at once, and 5 % for subsequent years, payable by both the lay and clerical estates. In view of the fact that Poland was the most defenceless country in Europe, with no natural boundaries, and constantly exposed to attacks from every quarter, it was not unreasonable to expect even this patriotic sacrifice from the privileged classes, who held at least two-thirds of the land by military tenure. Nevertheless, the diet refused to consider the scheme. In the following year a more modest proposal was made by the Crown in the shape of a capitation of six gulden, to be levied on every nobleman at the beginning of a campaign, for the hiring of mercenaries. This also was rejected. In 1512 the king came forward with a third scheme. He proposed to divide the country into five circles, corresponding to the five provinces, each of which was to undertake to defend the realm in turn should occasion arise. Moreover, every one who so desired it might pay a commutation in lieu of personal service, and the amount so realized was to be re-used to levy troops. To this the dietines, or local diets, of Great Poland, and Little Poland, agreed, but at the last moment the whole project foundered on the question who was the proper custodian of the new assessment rolls, and the king had to be content with the renewal of former subsidies, varying from twelve to fifteen groats per hide of land for three years. Well might the disappointed monarch exclaim: "It is vain to labour for the welfare of those who do not care a jot about it themselves." Matters improved somewhat in 1527, when the *szlachta*, by a special act, placed the mightiest magnates on the same level as the humblest squire as regards military service, and proposed at the same time a more general assessment for the purpose, the control of the money so realized to be placed in the hands of the king. In consequence of this law the great lords were compelled to put forces in the field proportioned to their enormous fortunes, and Sigismund was able in 1529 to raise 300 foot and 3200 horse from the province of Podolia alone. But though the treasury was thus temporarily replenished and the army increased, the gentry who had been so generous at the expense of their richer neighbours would hear of no additional burdens being laid on themselves, and the king only obtained what he wanted by sacrificing his principles to his necessities, and helping the *szlachta* to pull down the magnates. This fatal parsimony had the most serious political consequences, for it crippled the king at every step. Strive and scheme as he might, his needs were so urgent, his enemies so numerous, that, though generally successful in the end, he had always to be content with compromises, adjustments and semi-victories. Thus he was obliged, in 1525, to grant local autonomy to the province of Prussia instead of annexing it; he was unable to succour his unfortunate nephew, Louis of Hungary, against the Turkish peril; he was compelled to submit to the occupation of one Lithuanian province after the other by the Muscovites, and look on helplessly while myriads of Tatars penetrated to the very heart of his domains, wasting with fire and sword everything they could not carry away with them.

Again, it should have been the first duty of the Republic adequately to fortify the *dzikie pola*, or "savage steppe," as the vast plain was called which extended from Kiev to the Black Sea, and some feeble attempts to do so were at last made. Thus, in the reign of Alexander, the fugitive serfs whom tyranny or idleness had driven into this wilderness (they were subsequently known as Kazaki, or Cossacks, a Tatar word meaning freebooters) were formed into companies (c. 1504) and placed at the disposal of the frontier *starostas*, or lord marchers, of Kaniev, Kamenets, Czerkask on the Don and other places. But these measures proved inadequate, and in 1533 the lord marcher, Ostafi Daszkiewicz, the hero of Kaniev, which he had successfully defended against a countless host of Turks and Tatars, was consulted by the diet as to the best way of defending the Ukraine permanently against such inroads. The veteran expert advised the populating and fortifying of the islands of the Dnieper. Two thousand men would suffice, he said, and the Cossacks supplied excellent military material ready to hand. The diet unaniously approved of this simple and inexpensive plan; a special commission examined and approved of its details, and it was submitted to the next diet, which rejected it. So nothing at all was done officially, and the defence of the eastern Ukraine was left to providence. Oddly enough the selfish prudence of Sigismund's rapacious consort, Queen Bona, did more for the national defence than the Polish state could do. Thus, to defend her immense possessions in Volhynia and Podolia, she converted the castles of Bar and Krzemieniec into first-class fortresses, and placed the former in the hands of her Silesian steward, who acquitted himself so manfully of his charge¹ that "the Tatars fell away from the frontier all the days of Pan Preticz," and a large population settled securely beneath the walls of Bar, henceforth known as "the bastion of Podolia." Nothing, perhaps, illustrates so forcibly the casual character of the Polish government in the most vital matters as this single incident.

The most important political event during the reign of Sigismund was the collapse of the ancient Hungarian monarchy at Mohacs in 1526. Poland, as the next neighbour of

¹ Preticz won no fewer than 70 engagements over the Tatars.

Hungary, was more seriously affected than any other European power by this catastrophe, but her politicians differed as to the best way of facing it. Immediately after the death of King Louis, who fell on the field of battle, the emperor Ferdinand and John Zapolya, voivode of Transylvania, competed for the vacant crown, and both were elected almost simultaneously. In Poland Zapolya's was the popular cause, and he also found powerful support in the influential and highly gifted Laski family, as represented by the Polish chancellor and his nephews John and Hieronymus. Sigismund, on the other hand, favoured Ferdinand of Austria. Though bound by family ties with both competitors, he regarded the situation from a purely political point of view. He argued that the best way to keep the Turk from Poland was for Austria to incorporate Hungary, in which case the Austrian dominion would be a strong and permanent barrier against a Mussulman invasion of Europe. History has more than justified him, and the long duel which ensued between Ferdinand and Zapolya enabled the Polish monarch to maintain to the end a cautious but observant neutrality. More than once, indeed, Sigismund was seriously compromised by the diplomatic vagaries of Hieronymus Laski, who entered the service of Zapolya (since 1529 the protégé of the sultan), and greatly alarmed both the emperor and the pope by his disturbing philo-Turk proclivities. It was owing to Laski's intrigues that the new hospodar of Moldavia, Petrylo, after doing homage to the Porte, intervened in the struggle as the foe of both Ferdinand and Sigismund, and besieged the Grand Hetman of the Crown, Jan Tarnowski, in Obertyn, where, however, the Moldavians (August 22, 1531) sustained a crushing defeat, and Petrylo was slain. Nevertheless, so anxious was Sigismund to avoid a collision with the Turks, that he forbade the victorious Tarnowski to cross the Moldavian frontier, and sent a letter of explanation to Constantinople. On the death of John Zapolya, the Austro-Polish alliance was still further cemented by the marriage of Sigismund's son and heir, Sigismund Augustus, with the archduchess Elizabeth. In the reign of Sigismund was effected the incorporation of the duchy of Masovia with the Polish crown, after an independent existence of five hundred years. In 1526 the male line of the ancient dynasty became extinct, and on the 26th of August Sigismund received the homage of the Masovians at Warsaw, the capital of the duchy and ere long of the whole kingdom. Almost every acre of densely populated Masovia was in the hands of her sturdy, ultra-conservative squires, in point of culture far below their brethren in Great and Little Poland. The additional revenue gained by the Crown from Masovia was at first but 14,000 gulden per annum.

The four-and-twenty years of Sigismund II.'s reign was a critical period of Polish history. Complications with the Turk were avoided by the adroit diplomacy of the king, while the superior discipline and efficiency of the Polish armies under the great Tarnowski and his pupils overawed the Tatars and extruded the Muscovites, neither of whom were so troublesome as they had been during the last reign. All the more disquieting was the internal condition of the country, due mainly to the invasion of Poland by the Reformation, and the coincidence of this invasion with an internal revolution of a quasi-democratic character, which aimed at substituting the rule of the *szlachta* for the rule of the senate.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE REFORMATION PERIOD

HITHERTO the Republic had given the Holy See but little anxiety. Hussite influences, in the beginning of the 15th century, had been superficial and transitory. The Polish government had employed Hussite mercenaries, but rejected Hussite propagandists. The edict of Wielun (1424), remarkable as the first anti-heretical decree issued in Poland, crushed the new sect in its infancy. Lutheranism, moreover, was at first regarded with grave suspicion by the intensely patriotic Polish gentry, because of its German origin. Nevertheless, the extremely severe penal edicts issued during the reign of Sigismund I., though seldom applied, seem to point to the fact that heresy was spreading widely throughout the country. For a time, therefore, the Protestants had to be cautious in Poland proper, but they found a sure refuge in Prussia, where Lutheranism was already the established religion, and where the newly erected university of Königsberg became a seminary for Polish ministers and preachers.

While Lutheranism was thus threatening the Polish Church from the north, Calvinism had already invaded her from the west. Calvinism, indeed, rather recommended itself to the Poles as being of non-German origin, and Calvin actually dedicated his *Commentary on the Mass* to the young *krolewicz* (or crown prince) Sigismund Augustus, from whom protestantism, erroneously enough, expected much in the future. Meanwhile conversion to Calvinism, among the higher classes in Poland, became more and more frequent. We hear of crowded Calvinist conventicles in Little Poland from 1545 onwards, and Calvinism continued to spread throughout the kingdom during the latter years of Sigismund I. Another sect, which ultimately found even more favour in Poland than the Calvinists, was that of the Bohemian Brethren. We first hear of them in Great Poland in 1548. A royal decree promptly banished them to Prussia, where they soon increased so rapidly as to be able to hold their own against the Lutherans. The death of the uncompromising Sigismund I. came as a great relief to the Protestants, who entertained high hopes of his son and successor. He was known to be familiar with the works of the leading reformers; he was surrounded by Protestant counsellors, and he was actually married to Barbara, daughter of Prince Nicholas Radziwill, "Black Radziwill," the all-powerful chief of the Lithuanian Calvinists. It was not so generally known that Sigismund II. was by conviction a sincere though not a bigoted Catholic; and nobody suspected that beneath his diplomatic urbanity lay a patriotic firmness and statesmanlike qualities of the first order. Moreover, they ignored the fact that the success of the Protestant propaganda was due rather to political than to religious causes. The Polish gentry's jealousy of the clerical estate, whose privileges even exceeded their own, was at the bottom of the whole matter. Any opponent of the established clergy was the natural ally of the *szlachta*, and the scandalous state of the Church herself provided them with a most formidable weapon against her. It is not too much to say that the condition of the Catholic Church in Poland was almost as bad as it was in Scotland during the same period. The bishops were, for the most part, elegant triflers, as pliant as reeds, with no fixed principles and saturated with a false humanism. Some of them were notorious evil-livers. "Pint-pot" at Luski, bishop of Posen, had purchased his office for 12,000 ducats from Queen Bona; while another of her creatures, Peter, popularly known as the "wencher," was appointed bishop of Przemysl with the promise of the reversion of the still richer see of Cracow. Moreover, despite her immense wealth

(in the province of Little Poland alone she owned at this time 26 towns, 83 landed estates and 772 villages), the Church claimed exemption from all public burdens, from all political responsibilities, although her prelates continued to exercise an altogether disproportionate political influence. Education was shamefully neglected, the masses being left in almost heathen ignorance—and this, too, at a time when the upper classes were greedily appropriating the ripe fruits of the Renaissance and when, to use the words of a contemporary, there were "more Latinists in Poland than there used to be in Latium." The university of Cracow, the sole source of knowledge in the vast Polish realm, still moved in the vicious circle of scholastic formularies. The provincial schools, dependent upon so decrepit an Alma Mater, were suffered to decay. This criminal neglect of national education brought along with it its own punishment. The sons of the gentry, denied proper instruction at home, betook themselves to the nearest universities across the border, to Goldberg in Silesia, to Wittemberg, to Leipzig. Here they fell in with the adherents of the new faith, grave, earnest men who professed to reform the abuses which had grown up in the Church; and a sense of equity as much as a love of novelty moved them, on their return home, to propagate wholesome doctrines and clamour for the reformation of their own degenerate prelates. Finally the poorer clergy, neglected by their bishops, and excluded from all preferment, took part with the *szlachta* against their own spiritual rulers and eagerly devoured and imparted to their flocks, in their own language, the contents of the religious tracts which reached them by divers ways from Goldberg and Königsberg. Nothing indeed did so much to popularize the new doctrines in Poland as this beneficial revival of the long-neglected vernacular by the reformers.

Such was the situation when Sigismund II. began his reign. The bishops at once made a high bid for the favour of the new king by consenting to the coronation of his Calvinist consort (Dec. 7, 1550) and the king five days afterwards issued the celebrated edict in which he pledged his royal word to preserve intact the unity of the Church and to enforce the law of the land against heresy. Encouraged by this pleasing symptom of orthodoxy the bishops, instead of first attempting to put their own dilapidated house in order, at once proceeded to institute prosecutions for heresy against all and sundry. This at once led to an explosion, and at the diet of Piotrkow, 1552, the *szlachta* accepted a proposition of the king, by way of compromise, that the jurisdiction of the clerical courts should be suspended for twelve months, on condition that the gentry continued to pay tithes as heretofore. Then began a religious *interim*, which was gradually prolonged for ten years, during which time Protestantism in Poland flourished exceedingly. Presently reformers of every shade of opinion, even those who were tolerated nowhere else, poured into Poland, which speedily became the battle-ground of all the sects of Europe. Soon the Protestants became numerous enough to form ecclesiastical districts of their own. The first Calvinist synod in Poland was held at Pinczow in 1550. The Bohemian Brethren evangelized Little Poland, but ultimately coalesced with the Calvinists at the synod of Kozminek (August 1555). In the diet itself the Protestants were absolutely supreme, and invariably elected a Calvinist to be their marshal. At the diet of 1555 they boldly demanded a national synod, absolute toleration, and the equalization of all the sects except the Anti-trinitarians. But the king intervened and the existing *interim* was indefinitely prolonged. At the diet of Piotrkow, 1558–1559, the onslaught of the *szlachta* on the clergy was fiercer than ever, and they even demanded the exclusion of the bishops from the senate. The king, however, perceiving a danger to the constitution in the violence of the *szlachta*, not only supported the bishops, but quashed a subsequent reiterated demand for a national synod. The diet of 1558–1559 indicates the high-water mark of Polish Protestantism. From this time forward it began to subside, very gradually but unmistakably. The chief cause of this subsidence was the division among the reformers themselves. From the chaos of creeds resulted a chaos of ideas on all imaginable subjects, politics included. The Anti-trinitarian proved to be the chief dissolvent, and from 1560 onwards the relations between the two principal Protestant sects, the Lutherans and the Calvinists, were fratricidal rather than fraternal. An auxiliary cause of the decline of Protestantism was the beginning of a Catholic reaction. The bulk of the population still held persistently, if languidly, to the faith of its fathers; the new bishops were holy and learned men, very unlike the creations of Queen Bona, and the Holy See gave to the slowly-reviving zeal of both clergy and laity the very necessary impetus from without. For Poland, unlike Scotland, was fortunately, in those days of difficult inter-communication, not too far off, and it is indisputable that in the first instance it was the papal nuncios, men like Berard of Camerino and Giovanni Commendone, who reorganized the scattered and faint-hearted battalions of the Church militant in Poland and led them back to victory. At the diet of Piotrkow in 1562, indeed, the king's sore need of subsidies induced him, at the demand of the *szlachta*, to abolish altogether the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts in cases of heresy; but, on the other hand, at the diet of 1564 he accepted from Commendone the Tridentine decrees and issued an edict banishing all foreign, and especially Anti-trinitarian, heretics from the land. At the diet of 1565 Sigismund went still farther. He rejected a petition for a national pacificatory synod as unnecessary, inasmuch as the Council of Trent had already settled all religious questions, and at the same time consented to the introduction into Poland of the most formidable

adversaries of the Reformation, the Jesuits. These had already been installed at Poltusk, and were permitted, after the diet rose, to found establishments in the dioceses of Posen, Ermeland and Vilna, which henceforth became centres of a vigorous and victorious propaganda. Thus the Republic recovered her catholicity and her internal harmony at the same time.

With rare sagacity Sigismund II. had thus piloted the Republic through the most difficult internal crisis it had yet encountered. In purely political matters also both initiative and fulfilment came entirely from the Crown, and to the last of the Jagiellos Poland owed the important acquisition of Livonia and the welding together of her loosely connected component parts into a single state by the Union of Lublin.

In the middle of the 16th century the ancient order of the Knights of the Sword, whose territory embraced Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, Semgallen and the islands of Dagö and Oesel, was tottering to its fall. All the Baltic powers were more or less interested in the apportionment of this vast tract of land, whose geographical position made it not only the chief commercial link between east and west, but also the emporium whence the English, Dutch, Swedes, Danes and Germans obtained their corn, timber and most of the raw products of Lithuania and Muscovy. Matters were complicated by the curious political intricacies of this long-coveted domain, where the grand-master, the archbishop of Riga, and the estates of Livonia possessed concurrent and generally conflicting jurisdictions. Poland and Muscovy as the nearest neighbours of this moribund state, which had so long excluded them from the sea, were vitally concerned in its fate. After an anarchic period of suspense, lasting from 1546 to 1561, during which Sweden secured Esthonia, while Ivan the Terrible fearlessly ravaged Livonia, in the hope of making it valueless to any other potentate, Sigismund II., to whom both the grand-master and the archbishop had appealed more than once for protection, at length intervened decisively. Both he and his chancellor, Piotr Myszkowski (d. 1591), were well aware of the importance of securing a coast-land which would enable Poland to become a naval power. But the diet, with almost incredible shortsightedness, refused to waste a penny on an undertaking which, they argued, concerned only Lithuania, and it was not as king of Poland, but as grand duke of Lithuania, and with purely Lithuanian troops, that Sigismund, in 1561, occupied Livonia. At his camp before Riga the last grand-master, Gotthard von Ketteler, who had long been at the head of the Polish party in Livonia, and William of Brandenburg, archbishop of Riga, gladly placed themselves beneath his protection, and by a subsequent convention signed at Vilna (Nov. 28, 1561) Livonia was incorporated with Lithuania in much the same way as Prussia had been incorporated with Poland thirty-six years previously. Ketteler, who had adopted Lutheranism during a visit to Germany in 1553, now professed the Augsburg Confession, and became the first duke of a new Protestant duchy, which he was to hold as a fief of the Polish crown, with local autonomy and absolute freedom of worship. The southern provinces of the ancient territory of the Order, Courland and Semgallen, had first been ceded on the 24th of June 1559 to Lithuania on similar conditions, the matter being finally adjusted by the compact of March 1562.

The apathy of Poland in such a vital matter as the Livonian question must have convinced so statesmanlike a prince as Sigismund II. of the necessity of preventing any possibility of cleavage in the future between the two halves of his dominions whose absolute solidarity was essential to their existence as a great power. To this patriotic design he devoted the remainder of his life. A personal union, under one monarch, however close, had proved inadequate. A further step must be taken—the two independent countries must be transformed into a single state. The great obstacle in the way of this, the only true solution of the difficulty, was the opposition of the Lithuanian magnates, who feared to lose the absolute dominancy they possessed in the grand duchy if they were merged in the *szlachta* of the kingdom. But, at the last moment, the dread of another Muscovite invasion made them more pliable and, at a Polish diet held at Warsaw from November 1563 to June 1564, which the Lithuanians attended, the question of an absolute union was hotly debated. When things came to a deadlock the king tactfully intervened and voluntarily relinquished his hereditary title to Lithuania, thus placing the two countries on a constitutional equality and preparing the way for fresh negotiations in the future. The death, in 1565, of Black Radziwill, the chief opponent of the union, still further weakened the Lithuanians, and the negotiations were reopened with more prospect of success at the diet which met at Lublin on the 10th of January 1569. But even now the Lithuanians were indisposed towards a complete union, and finally they quitted the diet, leaving two commissioners behind to watch their interests. Then Sigismund executed his master-stroke. Knowing the sensitiveness of the Lithuanians as regards Volhynia and Podolia, he suddenly, of his own authority, formally incorporated both these provinces with the kingdom of Poland, whereupon, amidst great enthusiasm, the Volhynian and Podolian deputies took their places on the same benches as their Polish brethren. The hands of the Lithuanians were forced. Even a complete union on equal terms was better than mutilated independence. Accordingly they returned to the diet, and the union was unanimously adopted on the 1st of July 1569. Henceforth the kingdom of Poland and the grand duchy of Lithuania were to constitute one inseparable and indivisible body politic, under one

sovereign, elected in common, with one diet and one currency. All dependencies and colonies, including Prussia and Livonia, were to belong to Poland and Lithuania in common. The retention of the old duality of dignities was the one reminiscence of the original separation. No decision, however, could be come to as to the successor of the childless king, partly because of the multiplicity of candidates, partly because of Austrian intrigue, and this, the most momentous question of all, was still unsettled when Sigismund II. expired on the 6th of July 1572.

The Jagiellonic period (1386-1572) is the history of the consolidation and fusion into one homogeneous, political whole of numerous national elements, more or less akin ethnologically, but differing immensely in language, religion and, above all, in degrees of civilization. Out of the ancient Piast kingdom, mutilated by the loss of Silesia and the Baltic shore, arose a republic consisting at first of various loosely connected entities, naturally centrifugal, but temporarily drawn together by the urgent need of combination against a superior foe, who threatened them separately with extinction. Beneath the guidance of a dynasty of princes which, curiously enough, was supplied by the least civilized portion of this congeries of nationalities, the nascent republic gradually grew into a power which subjugated its former oppressors and, viewed externally, seemed to bear upon it the promise of empire. It is dangerous to prophesy, but all the facts and circumstances before us point irresistibly to the conclusion that had the Jagiellonic dynasty but endured this promise of empire might well have been realized. The extraordinary thing about the Jagiellos was the equable persistency of their genius. Not only were five of the seven great statesmen, but they were statesmen of the same stamp. We are disturbed by no such sharp contrasts as are to be found among the Plantagenets, the Vasas and the Bourbons. The Jagiellos were all of the same mould and pattern, but the mould was a strong one and the pattern was good. Their predominant and constant characteristic is a sober sagacity which instinctively judges aright and imperturbably realized its inspirations. The Jagiellos were rarely brilliant, but they were always perspicacious. Above all, they alone seem to have had the gift of guiding the most difficult of nations properly. Two centuries of Jagiellonic rule made Poland great despite her grave external difficulties. Had that dynasty been prolonged for another century, there is every reason to suppose that it would also have dealt satisfactorily with Poland's still more dangerous internal difficulties, and arrested the development of that anarchical constitution which was the ruling factor in the ruin of the Republic.

Simultaneously with the transformation into a great power of the petty principalities which composed ancient Poland, another and equally momentous political transformation was proceeding within the country itself.

The origin of the Polish constitution is to be sought in the *wiece* or councils of the Polish princes, during the partitional period (c. 1279-1370). The privileges conferred upon the magnates of which these councils were composed, especially upon the magnates of Little Poland, who brought the Jagiellos to the throne, directed their policy, and grew rich upon their liberality, revolted the less favoured *szlachta*, or gentry, who, towards the end of the 14th century, combined for mutual defence in their *sejmiki*, or local diets, of which originally there were five, three in Great Poland, one in Little Poland and one in Posen-Kalisz.¹ In these *sejmiki* the deputies of the few great towns were also represented. The Polish towns, notably Cracow, had obtained their privileges, including freedom from tolls and municipal government, from the Crown in return for important services, such as warding off the Tatars, while the cities of German origin were protected by the Magdeburg law. Casimir the Great even tried to make municipal government as democratic as possible by enacting that one half of the town council of Cracow should be elected from the civic patriciate, but the other half from the commonalty. Louis the Great placed the burgesses on a level with the gentry by granting to the town council of Cracow jurisdiction over all the serfs in the extra-rural estates of the citizens. From this time forth deputies from the cities were summoned to the *sejmiki* on all important occasions, such, for instance, as the ratification of treaties, a right formally conceded to them by the *sejmik* of Radom in 1384. Thus at this period Poland was a confederation of half a dozen semi-independent states. The first general assembly of which we have certain notice is the *xjazd walny* which was summoned to Koszyce in November 1404, to relieve the financial embarrassments of Wladislaus, and granted him an extraordinary subsidy of twenty groats per hide of land to enable him to purchase Dobrzyn from the Teutonic Knights. Such subsidies were generally the price for the confirmation of ancient or the concession of new privileges. Thus at the diet of Brzesc Kujawski, in 1425, the *szlachta* obtained its first habeas corpus act in return for acknowledging the right of the infant *krolewicz* Wladislaus to his father's throne. The great opportunity of the *szlachta* was, of course, the election of a new king, especially the election of a minor, an event always accompanied and succeeded by disorders. Thus at the election of the infant Wladislaus III., his guardians promised in his name to confirm all the privileges granted by his father. If, on attaining his majority, the king refused to ratify these promises, his subjects were *ipso facto* absolved from their obedience. This is the first existence of the mischievous principle of *prestanda obedientia*, subsequently elevated into a statute. It is in this reign, too, that we meet with the first *rokosz*, or insurrection of

¹ The Red Russian *sejmik* was of later origin, c. 1433.

the nobility against the executive. The extraordinary difficulties of Casimir IV. were freely exploited by the *szlachta*, who granted that ever impecunious monarch as little as possible, but got full value for every penny they grudgingly gave. Thus by the Articles of Cerekwica presented to him by the *sejmik* or dietine of Great Poland in 1454 on the outbreak of the Teutonic War, he conceded the principle that no war should in future be begun without the consent of the local diets. A few months later he was obliged to grant the Privileges of Nieszawa, which confirmed and extended the operation of the Articles of Cerekwica. The *sejmiki* had thus added to their original privilege of self-taxation the right to declare war and control the national militia.¹ This was a serious political retrogression. A strongly centralized government had ever been Poland's greatest need, and Casimir the Great had striven successfully against all centrifugal tendencies. And now, eighty-four years after his death, Poland was once more split up into half a dozen loosely federated states in the hands of country gentlemen too ignorant and prejudiced to look beyond the boundaries of their own provinces. The only way of saving the Republic from disintegration was to concentrate all its political factors into a *sejm-walny* or general diet. But to this the magnates and the *szlachta* were equally opposed, the former because they feared the rivalry of a national assembly, the latter because they were of more importance in their local diets than they could possibly hope to be in a general diet. The first *sejm* to legislate for the whole of Poland was the diet of Piotrkow (1493), summoned by John Albert to grant him subsidies; but the mandates of its deputies were limited to twelve months, and its decrees were to have force for only three years. John Albert's second diet (1496), after granting subsidies the burden of which fell entirely on the towns and peasantry, passed a series of statutes benefiting the nobility at the expense of the other classes. Thus one statute permitted the *szlachta* henceforth to export and import goods duty free, to the great detriment of the towns and the treasury. Another statute prohibited the burgesses from holding landed property and enjoying the privileges attaching thereto. A third statute disqualified plebeians from being elected to canonries or bishoprics. A fourth endeavoured to bind the peasantry more closely to the soil by forbidding emigration. The condition of the serfs was subsequently (1520) still further deteriorated by the introduction of socage. In a word, this diet disturbed the equilibrium of the state by enfeebling and degrading the middle classes. Nevertheless, so long as the Jagiello dynasty lasted, the political rights of the cities were jealously protected by the Crown against the usurpations of the nobility. Deputies from the towns took part in the election of John Albert (1492), and the burgesses of Cracow, the most enlightened economists in the kingdom, supplied Sigismund I. with his most capable counsellors during the first twenty years of his reign (1506-1526). Again and again the nobility attempted to exclude the deputies of Cracow from the diet, in spite of a severe edict issued by Sigismund I. in 1509, threatening to prosecute for treason all persons who dared to infringe the liberties of the citizens. During Sigismund's reign, moreover, the Crown recovered many of the prerogatives of which it had been deprived during the reign of his feeble predecessor, Alexander, who, to say nothing of the curtailments of the prerogative, had been forced to accept the statute *nihil novi* (1505) which gave the *sejm* and the senate an equal voice with the Crown in all executive matters. In the latter years of Sigismund I. (1530-1548) the political influence of the *szlachta* grew rapidly at the expense of the executive, and the gentry in diet assembled succeeded in curtailing the functions of all the great officers of state. During the reign of Sigismund II. (1548-1572) they diverted their attention to the abuses of the Church and considerably reduced both her wealth and her privileges. In this respect both the Crown and the country were with them, so that their interference, if violent, was on the whole distinctly beneficial.

The childless Sigismund II. died suddenly without leaving any regulations as to the election of his successor. Fortunately for Poland the political horizon was absolutely unclouded. The Turks, still reeling from the shock of Lepanto, could with difficulty hold their own against the united forces of the pope, Spain and Venice; while Ivan the Terrible had just concluded a truce with Poland. Domestic affairs, on the other hand, were in an almost anarchical condition. The Union of Lublin, barely three years old, was anything but consolidated, and in Lithuania it continued to be extremely unpopular. In Poland proper the *szlachta* were fiercely opposed to the magnates; and the Protestants seemed bent upon still further castigating the clergy. Worst of all, there existed no recognized authority in the land to curb and control its jarring centrifugal political elements. It was nearly two hundred years since the Republic had suffered from an interregnum, and the precedents of 1382 were obsolete. The primate, on hearing of the demise of the Crown, at once invited all the senators of Great Poland to a conference at Lowicz, but passed over the *szlachta* altogether. In an instant the whole Republic was seething like a caldron, and a rival assembly was simultaneously summoned to Cracow by Jan Ferlej, the head of the Protestant party. Civil war was happily averted at the last moment, and a national convention, composed of senators and deputies from all parts of the country, assembled at Warsaw, in April 1573, for the purpose of electing a new king. Five candidates for the

¹ In view of the frequency of the Tatar inroads, the control of the militia was transferred to the Crown in 1501.

throne were already in the field. Lithuania favoured Ivan IV. In Poland the bishops and most of the Catholic magnates were for an Austrian archduke, while the strongly anti-German *szlachta* were inclined to accept almost any candidate but a German, so long as he came with a gift in his hand and was not a Muscovite. In these circumstances it was an easy task for the adroit and energetic French ambassador, Jean de Montluc (d. 1579), brother of the famous marshal, and bishop of Valence, to procure the election of the French candidate, Henry, duke of Anjou. Well provided with funds, he speedily bought over many of the leading magnates, and his popularity reached its height when he strenuously advocated the adoption of the mode of election by the gentry *en masse* (which the *szlachta* proposed to revive), as opposed to the usual and more orderly "secret election" by a congress of senators and deputies, sitting with closed doors. The religious difficulty, meanwhile, had been adjusted to the satisfaction of all parties by the compact of Warsaw (Jan. 28, 1573), which granted absolute religious liberty to all non-Catholic denominations (*dissidentes de religione*, as they now began to be called) without exception, thus exhibiting a far more liberal intention than the Germans had manifested in the religious peace of Augsburg eighteen years before. Finally, early in April 1573, the election diet assembled at Warsaw, and on the 11th of May, in the midst of intrigue, corruption, violence and confusion, Henry of Valois was elected king of Poland.

The election had, however, been preceded by a *correctura jurum*, or reform of the constitution, which resulted in the famous "Henrican Articles" which converted Poland from a limited monarchy into a republic with an elective chief magistrate. Henceforward the king was to have no voice in the choice of his successor. He was not to use the word *haeres*, not being an hereditary sovereign. He was to marry a wife selected for him by the senate. He was neither to seek for a divorce nor give occasion for one. He was to be neutral in all religious matters. He was not to lead the militia across the border except with the consent of the *szlachta*, and then only for three months at a time. Every year the senate was to appoint sixteen of its number to be in constant attendance upon the king in rotas of four, which *sedecimvirs* were to supervise all his actions. Should the king fail to observe any one of these articles, the nation was *ipso facto* absolved from its allegiance. This constitutional reform was severely criticized by contemporary political experts. Some strongly condemned the clause justifying renunciation of allegiance, as tending to treason and anarchy. Others protested against the anomalous and helpless position of the so-called king, who, if he could do no harm, was certainly powerless for good. But such Cassandras prophesied to heedless ears. The Republic had deliberately cast itself upon the downward grade which was to lead to ruin.

The reign of Henry of Valois lasted thirteen months. The tidings of the death of his brother Charles IX., which reached him on the 14th of June 1574, determined him to exchange a thorny for what he hoped would be a flowery throne, and at midnight on the 18th of June 1574 he literally fled from Poland, pursued to the frontier by his indignant and bewildered subjects. Eighteen months later (Dec. 14, 1575), mainly through the influence of Jan Zamoyski, Stephen Báthory, prince of Transylvania, was elected king of Poland by the *szlachta* in opposition to the emperor Maximilian, who had been elected two days previously by the senate, after disturbances which would have rent any other state but Poland to pieces.

The glorious career of Stephen Báthory (1575-1586) demonstrates the superiority of genius and valour over the most difficult circumstances. But his reign was too brief to be permanently beneficial.

The Vasa period of Polish history which began with the election of Sigismund, son of John III., king of Sweden, was the epoch of last and lost chances. The collapse of the Muscovite tsardom in the east, and the submersion of the German Empire in the west by the Thirty Years' War, presented Poland with an unprecedented opportunity of consolidating, once for all, her hard-won position as the dominating power of central Europe. Everywhere circumstances were favourable to her, and in Zolkiewski, Chodkiewicz and Koniecpolski she possessed three of the greatest captains of that or any other age. With all the means at her disposal cheerfully placed in the hands of such valiant and capable ministers, it would have been no difficult task for the Republic to have wrested the best part of the Baltic littoral from the Scandinavian powers, and driven the distracted Muscovites beyond the Volga. Permanent greatness and secular security were within her reach at the commencement of the Vasa period; how was it, then, that at the end of that period, only fifty years later, Poland had already sunk irredeemably into much the same position as Turkey occupies now, the position of a moribund state, existing on sufferance simply because none was yet quite prepared to administer the *coup de grâce*? There is only one answer; the principal cause of this complete and irremediable collapse is to be sought for in the folly, egotism and selfishness of the Polish gentry, whose insane dislike of all discipline, including even the salutary discipline of regular government, converted Poland into something very like a primitive tribal community at the very time when every European statesman, including the more enlightened of the Poles themselves, clearly recognized that the political future belonged to the strongly centralized monarchies, which were everywhere rising on the ruins of feudalism. Of course there were other contributory causes. The tenacity

with which Sigismund III. clung to his hereditary rights to the Swedish Crown involved Poland in a quite unnecessary series of wars with Charles IX. and Gustavus Adolphus, when her forces were sorely needed elsewhere. The adhesion of the same monarch to the League of the Catholic Reaction certainly added to the difficulties of Polish diplomacy, and still further divided the already distracted diet, besides alienating from the court the powerful and popular chancellor Zamoyski. Yet Sigismund III. was a far more clear-sighted statesman than any of his counsellors or contraditors. For instance, he was never misled by the successes of the false Demetrius in Muscovy, and wisely insisted on recovering the great eastern fortress of Smolensk rather than attempting the conquest of Moscow. His much-decried alliance with the emperor at the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War was eminently sagacious. He perceived at once that it was the only way of counteracting the restlessness of the sultan's protégés, the Protestant princes of Transylvania, whose undisciplined hordes, scarcely less savage than their allies the Turks and Tatars, were a perpetual menace both to Austria and to Poland. Finally he was bent upon reforming the Polish constitution by substituting the decision of all matters by a plurality of votes for a unanimity impossible to count upon.

When we turn to the *szlachta* who absolutely controlled the diet, we find not the slightest trace, I will not say of political foresight—that they never possessed—but of common patriotism, or ordinary public spirit. The most urgent national necessities were powerless to stir their hearts or open their purses. The diets during the reign of Sigismund III. were even more niggardly than they had been under the Jagiellos, and on the single occasion when the terrors of an imminent Tatar invasion constrained them to grant extraordinary subsidies, they saw to it that such subsidies should rest entirely on the shoulders of the burgesses (who had in the meantime been deprived of the franchise) and the already overburdened peasantry. In the very crisis of the Swedish War, the diminutive army of the victorious Chodkiewicz was left unpaid, with the result that the soldiers mutinied, and marched off *en masse*. Both Chodkiewicz and Zolkiewski frequently had to pay the expenses of their campaigns out of their own pockets, and were expected to conquer empires and defend hundreds of miles of frontier with armies of 3000 or 4000 men at most. When they retreated before overwhelming odds they were publicly accused of cowardice and incompetence. The determination to limit still further the power of the executive was at the bottom of this fatal parsimony, with the inevitable consequence that, while the king and the senate were powerless, every great noble or lord-marcher was free to do what he chose in his own domains, so long as he flattered his "little brothers," the *szlachta*. Incredible as it may seem, the expedition to place the false Demetrius on the Muscovite throne was a private speculation of a few Lithuanian magnates, and similar enterprises on the part of other irresponsible noblemen on the Danube or Dniester brought upon unhappy Poland retaliatory Tatar raids, which reduced whole provinces to ashes. Every attempt to improve matters, by reforming the impossible constitution, stranded on the opposition of the gentry. Take, for instance, the typical and highly instructive case of Zebrzydowski's rebellion. Nicholas Zebrzydowski, a follower of the chancellor Zamoyski, was one of the wealthiest and most respectable magnates in Poland. As palatine of Cracow he held one of the highest and most lucrative dignities in the state, and was equally famous for his valour, piety and liberality. Disappointed in his hope of obtaining the great seal on the death of Zamoyski, he at once conceived that the whole of the nobility had been insulted in his person, and proceeded to make all government impossible for the next three years. On the 7th of March 1606 Sigismund summoned a diet for the express purpose of introducing the principle of decision by majority in the diet, whereupon Zebrzydowski summoned a counter-confederation to Stenczyn in Little Poland, whose first act was to open negotiations with the prince of Transylvania, Stephen Bocskay, with the view of hiring mercenaries from him for further operations. At a subsequent confederation, held at Lublin in June, Zebrzydowski was reinforced by another great nobleman, Stanislaus Stadnicki, called the Devil, who "had more crimes on his conscience than hairs on his head," and was in the habit of cropping the ears and noses of small squires and chaining his serfs to the walls of his underground dungeons for months at a time. This champion of freedom was very eloquent as to the wrongs of the *szlachta*, and proposed that the assembly should proceed in a body to Warsaw and there formally renounce their allegiance. The upshot of his oratory was the summoning of a *rokosz*, or national insurrection, to Sandomir, which was speedily joined by the majority of the *szlachta* all over the country, who openly proclaimed their intention of dethroning the king and chastising the senate, and sent Stadnicki to Transylvania to obtain the armed assistance of Stephen Bocskay. Only the clergy, naturally conservative, still clung to the king, and Sigismund III., who was no coward, at once proceeded to Cracow to overawe the *rokoszanie*, or insurrectionists, by his proximity, and take the necessary measures for his own protection. By the advice of his senators he summoned a *zjazd*, or armed convention, to Wiślica openly to oppose the insurrection of Sandomir, which *zjazd* was to be the first step towards the formation of a general confederation for the defence of the throne. Civil war seemed inevitable, when the *szlachta* of Red Russia and Sieradz suddenly rallied to the king, who at once ordered his army to advance, and after defeating the insurrectionists at Janowiec (in October), granted them a full pardon, on the sole condition that they should

refrain from all such acts of rebellion in future. Despite their promises, Zebzydowski and his colleagues a few months later were again in arms. In the beginning of 1607 they summoned another *rokosz* to Jendrzejew, at the very time when the diet was assembling at Warsaw. The diet authorized the king to issue a proclamation dissolving the *rokosz*, and the *rokosz* retorted with a manifesto in which an insurrection was declared to be as much superior to a parliament as a general council was to a pope. In a second manifesto published at Jezierna, on the 24th of June, the insurrectionists again renounced their allegiance to the king. Oddly enough, the diet before dissolving had, apparently in order to meet the *rokosz* half-way, issued the famous edict *De non praestanda obedientia*, whereby, in case of future malpractices by the king and his subsequent neglect of at least two solemn warnings thereabout by the primate and the senate, he was to be formally deposed by the next succeeding diet. But even this was not enough for the insurrectionists. It was not the contingent but the actual deposition of the king that they demanded, and they had their candidate for the throne ready in the person of Gabriel Bethlen, the new prince of Transylvania. But the limits of even Polish complacency had at last been reached, and Zolkiewski and Chodkiewicz were sent against the rebels, whom they routed at Oransk near Guzow, after a desperate encounter, on the 6th of July 1607. But, though driven from the field, the agitation simmered all over the country for nearly two years longer, and was only terminated, in 1609, by a general amnesty which excluded every prospect of constitutional reform.

Wladislaus IV., who succeeded his father in 1632, was the most popular monarch who ever sat on the Polish throne. The *szlachta*, who had had a "King Log" in Sigismund, were determined that Wladislaus should be "a King Bee who will give us nothing but honey"—in other words, they hoped to wheedle him out of even more than they had wrested from his predecessor. Wladislaus submitted to everything. He promised never to declare war or levy troops without the consent of the *sejm*, undertook to fill all vacancies within a certain time, and released the *szlachta* from the payment of income-tax, their one remaining fiscal obligation. This boundless complacency was due to policy, not weakness. The second Polish Vasa was a man of genius, fully conscious of his powers, and determined to use them for the benefit of his country. The events of the last reign had demonstrated the incompetence of the Poles to govern themselves. Any amelioration of the existing anarchy must be extra-parliamentary and proceed from the throne. But a reforming monarch was inconceivable unless he possessed the confidence of the nation, and such confidence, Wladislaus naturally argued, could only be won by striking and undeniable public services. On these principles he acted with brilliant results. Within three years of his accession he compelled the Muscovites (Treaty of Polyankova, May 28, 1634) to retrocede Smolensk and the eastern provinces lost by Sigismund II., overawed the Porte by a military demonstration in October of the same year, and, by the Truce of Stumdorf (Sept. 12, 1635), recovered the Prussian provinces and the Baltic seaboard from Sweden. But these achievements excited not the gratitude but the suspicion of the *szlachta*. They were shrewd enough to guess that the royal triumph might prejudice their influence, and for the next five years they deliberately thwarted the enlightened and far-reaching projects of the king for creating a navy and increasing the revenue without burdening the estates, by a system of tolls levied on the trade of the Baltic ports, even going so far as to refuse for nine years to refund the expenses of the Muscovite War, which he had defrayed out of his privy purse. From sheer weariness and disgust the king refrained from any intervention in public affairs for nearly ten years, looking on indifferently while the ever shorter and stormier diets wrangled perpetually over questions of preferment and the best way of dealing with the extreme dissenters, to the utter neglect of public business. But towards the end of his reign the energy of Wladislaus revived, and he began to occupy himself with another scheme for regenerating his country, in its own despite, by means of the Cossacks. First, however, it is necessary to describe briefly the origin and previous history of these romantic freebooters who during the second half of the 17th century were the determining factor of Polish and Muscovite politics.

CHAPTER XXV

THE COSSACKS

At the beginning of the 16th century the illimitable steppe of south-eastern Europe, extending from the Dnieper to the Urals, had no settled population. Hunters and fishermen frequented its innumerable rivers, returning home laden with rich store of fish and pelts, while runaway serfs occasionally settled in small communities beneath the shelter of the fortresses built, from time to time, to guard the southern frontiers of Poland and Muscovy. Obligated, for fear of the Tatars, to go about with arms in their hands, these settlers gradually grew strong enough to raid their raiders, selling the booty thus acquired to the merchants of Muscovy and Poland. Moreover, the Turks and Tatars being the natural enemies of Christendom, a war of extermination against them was regarded by the Cossacks as a sacred duty. Curiously enough, these champions of orthodoxy borrowed the name, which has stuck to them ever since, from their "dog-headed" adversaries. The rank and file of the Tatar soldiery were known as *Kazaki*, or Cossacks, a word meaning "freebooters," and this term came to be applied indiscriminately to all the free dwellers in the *Ukraine*, or border-lands. As time went on the Cossacks multiplied exceedingly. Their daring grew with their numbers, and at last they came to be a constant annoyance to all their neighbours, both Christian and Mussulman, frequently involving Poland in dangerous and unprofitable wars with the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, it is not too much to say that, until the days of Sobieski, the Cossacks were invariably the chief cause of the breaches between the Porte and the Republic. We have seen how carefully the Jagiellos avoided participating in any of the crusades directed by the Holy See against the arch-enemies of the Cross. So successful was their prudential abstention that no regular war occurred between Turkey and Poland during the two centuries of their sway. The first actual collisions, the Cecora campaign of 1620 and the Khotin War of 1621 (for John Albert's Moldavian raid does not count), were due to the depredations of the Cossacks upon the dominions of the sultan by land and sea, and in all subsequent treaties between the two powers the most essential clause was always that which bound the Republic to keep its freebooters in order.

But in the meantime the Cossacks themselves had become a semi-independent community. The origin of the Cossack state is still somewhat obscure, but the germs of it are visible as early as the beginning of the 16th century. The union of Lublin, which led to the polonization of Lithuania, was the immediate occasion of a considerable exodus to the lowlands of the Dnieper of those serfs who desired to escape from the taxes of the Polish government and the tyranny of the Polish landlords. Stephen Báthory presently converted the pick of them into six registered regiments of 1000 each for the defence of the border. Ultimately the island of Hortica, just below the falls of the Dnieper, was fixed upon as their headquarters; and on the numerous islands of that broad river there gradually arose the famous Cossack community known as the *Zaporozhskaya Syech*, or Settlement behind the Falls, whence the Dnieperian Cossacks were known, generally, as *Zaporozhians*, or Backfallsmen.¹ The Cossack *kosh*, or commonwealth, had the privilege of electing its *hetman*, or chief, and his chief officers, the *starshins*. The *hetman*, after election, received from the king of Poland direct the insignia of his office, viz. the *bulawa*, or bâton, the *bunchuk*, or horse-tail standard, and his official seal; but he was responsible for his actions to the *kosh* alone,

¹ Cf. American, Backwoodsmen.

and an inquiry into his conduct was held at the expiration of his term of office in the *obschaya shkola*, or general assembly. In time of peace his power was little more than that of the responsible minister of a constitutional republic; but in time of warfare he was a dictator, and disobedience to his orders in the field was punishable by death.

The Cossacks were supposed to be left alone as much as possible by the Polish government so long as they faithfully fulfilled their chief obligation of guarding the frontiers of the Republic from Tatar raids. But the relations between a community of freebooters, mostly composed of fugitive serfs and refugees, and a government of small squires who regarded the Cossacks as a mere rabble were bound to be difficult at the best of times, and political and religious differences presently supervened. The Cossacks, mostly of Lithuanian origin, belonged to the Orthodox religion, so far as they belonged to any religion at all, and the Jagiellos had been very careful to safeguard the religious liberties of their Lithuanian subjects, especially as the Poles themselves were indifferent on the subject. But, at the beginning of the 17th century, when the current of the Catholic reaction was running very strongly and the Jesuits, after subduing the Protestants, began to undermine the position of the Orthodox Church in Lithuania, a more intolerant spirit began to prevail. The old Calvinist nobility of Lithuania were speedily reconverted; a Uniatic Church in connexion with Rome was established; Greek Orthodox congregations, if not generally persecuted, were at least depressed and straitened; and the Cossacks began to hate the *Pans*, or Polish lords, not merely as tyrants, but as heretics. Yet all these obstacles to a good understanding might perhaps have been surmounted if only the Polish diet had treated the Cossacks with common fairness and common sense. In 1619 the Polish government was obliged to prohibit absolutely the piratical raids of the Cossacks in the Black Sea, where they habitually destroyed Turkish property to the value of millions. At the same time, by the compact of Rastawica, the *sejm* undertook to allow the Cossacks, partly as wages, partly as compensation, 40,000 (raised by the compact of Kurukow to 60,000) *gulden* and 170 wagons of cloth per annum. These terms were never kept, despite the earnest remonstrances of the king and the complaints of the aggrieved borderers. Parsimony prevailed, as usual, over prudence, and when the Cossacks showed unmistakable signs of restiveness, the Poles irritated them still further by ordering the construction of the strong fortress of Kudak at the confluence of the Dnieper and the Samara, to overawe the Zaporozhian community. This further act of repression led to two terrible Cossack risings, in 1635 and 1636, put down only with the utmost difficulty, whereupon the diet of 1638 deprived the Cossacks of all their ancient privileges, abolished the elective hetmanship, and substituted for it a commission of Polish noblemen with absolute power, so that the Cossacks might well declare that those who hated them were lords over them.

Such was the condition of affairs in the Ukraine when Wladislaus IV. proposed to make the Cossacks the pivot of his foreign policy and his domestic reforms. His far-reaching plans were based upon two facts, the absolute devotion of the Zaporozhians to himself personally, and the knowledge, secretly conveyed to him by Stanislaus Koniecpolski, that the whole of the Ukraine was in a ferment. He proposed to provoke the Tatars to a rupture by repudiating the humiliating tribute with which the Republic had so long and so vainly endeavoured to buy off their incessant raids. In case of such rupture he meant, at the head of 100,000 Cossacks, to fall upon the Crimea itself, the seat of their power, and exterminate the Khanate. This he calculated would bring about a retaliatory invasion of Poland by the Turks, which would justify him in taking the field against them also with all the forces of the Republic. In case of success he would be able to impose the will of a victorious king upon a discredited diet, and reform the constitution on an English or Swedish model. Events seemed at first to favour this audacious speculation. Almost simultaneously a civil war broke out in the Crimea and the Porte declared war against the Venetian republic, with which Wladislaus at once concluded an offensive and defensive alliance (1645). He then bade the Cossacks prepare their boats for a raid upon the Turkish galleys, and secured the co-operation of the tsar in the Crimean expedition by a special treaty. Unfortunately, Venice, for her own safety's sake, insisted on the publication of Wladislaus's anti-Turkish alliance; the Porte, well informed of the course of Polish affairs, remained strictly neutral despite the most outrageous provocations; and Wladislaus, bound by his coronation oath not to undertake an offensive war, found himself at the mercy of the diet which, full of consternation and rage, assembled at Warsaw on the 2nd of May 1647. It is needless to say that the Venetian alliance was repudiated and the royal power still further reduced. A year later Wladislaus died at his hunting-box at Merez, at the very moment when the long-impending tempest which he himself had conjured up burst with overwhelming fury over the territories of the Republic.

The prime mover of the great rebellion of 1648, which shook the Polish state to its very foundations, was the Cossack Bohdan Chmielnicki, who had been initiated in all the plans of Wladislaus IV. and, with good reason, feared to be the first victim of the Polish magnates when the king's designs were unmasked and frustrated. To save himself he hit upon the novel and terrible expedient of uniting the Tatars and the Cossacks in a determined onslaught upon the Republic, whose inward weakness, despite its brave outward show, he had been quick to discern. On the 18th of April 1648, at the general assembly of the Zaporozhians,

he openly expressed his intention of proceeding against the Poles and was elected hetman by acclamation; on the 10th of May he annihilated a small detached Polish corps on the banks of the river Zhelndya Vodui, and seven days later overwhelmed the army of the Polish grand-hetman, massacring 8500 of his 10,000 men and sending the grand-hetman himself and all his officers in chains to the Crimea. The immediate consequence of these victories was the outburst of a *khlop'skaya szloba*, or "serfs' fury." Throughout the Ukraine the gentry were hunted down, flayed, burnt, blinded and sawn asunder. Every manor-house and castle was reduced to ashes. Every Uniate or Catholic priest who could be caught was hung up before his own high altar, along with a Jew and a hog. The panic-stricken inhabitants fled to the nearest strongholds, and soon the rebels were swarming over the palatinates of Volhynia and Podolia. Meanwhile the Polish army, 40,000 strong, with 100 guns, was assembling on the frontier. It consisted almost entirely of the noble militia, and was tricked out with a splendour more befitting a bridal pageant than a battle array. For Chmielnicki and his host these splendid cavaliers expressed the utmost contempt. "This rabble must be chased with whips, not smitten with swords," they cried. On the 23rd of September the two armies encountered near Pildawa, and after a stubborn three days' contest the gallant Polish pageant was scattered to the winds. The steppe for miles around was strewn with corpses, and the Cossacks are said to have reaped 10,000,000 guildens worth of booty when the fight was over. All Poland now lay at Chmielnicki's feet, and the road to the defenceless capital was open before him; but he wasted two precious months in vain before the fortress of Zamość, and then the newly elected king of Poland, John Casimir, Wladislaus IV.'s brother, privately opened negotiations with the rebel, officially recognized him by sending him the *bulawa* and the other insignia of the *hetman's* dignity, and promised his "faithful Zaporozhians" the restoration of all their ancient liberties if they would break off their alliance with the Tatars and await the arrival of peace commissioners at Pereyaslavl. But the negotiations at Pereyaslavl came to nothing. Chmielnicki's conditions of peace were so extravagant that the Polish commissioners durst not accept them, and in 1649 he again invaded Poland with a countless host of Cossacks and Tatars. Again, however, he made the mistake of attacking a fortress, which delayed his advance for a month, and gave John Casimir time to collect an army for the relief of the besieged. By the compact of Zborów (Aug. 21, 1649) Chmielnicki was recognized as *hetman* of the Zaporozhians, whose registered number was now raised from 6000 to 40,000; a general amnesty was also granted, and it was agreed that all official dignities in the Orthodox palatinates of Lithuania should henceforth be held solely by the Orthodox gentry. For the next eighteen months Chmielnicki ruled the Ukraine like a sovereign prince. He made Chigirin, his native place, the Cossack capital, subdivided the country into sixteen provinces, and entered into direct relations with foreign powers. His attempt to carve a principality for his son out of Moldavia led to the outbreak of a third war between suzerain and subject in February 1651. But fortune, so long Bohdan's friend, now deserted him, and at Beresteczko (July 1, 1651) the Cossack chieftain was utterly routed by Stephen Czarniecki. All hope of an independent Cossackdom was now at an end; yet it was not Poland but Muscovy which reaped the fruits of Czarniecki's victory.

Chmielnicki, by suddenly laying bare the nakedness of the Polish republic, had opened the eyes of Muscovy to the fact that her secular enemy was no longer formidable. Three years after his defeat at Beresteczko, Chmielnicki, finding himself unable to cope with the Poles, single-handed, very reluctantly transferred his allegiance to the tsar, and the same year the tsar's armies invaded Poland, still bleeding from the all but mortal wounds inflicted on her by the Cossacks. The war thus begun, and known in Russian history as the Thirteen Years' War, far exceeded even the Thirty Years' War in grossness and brutality. It resembled nothing so much as a hideous scramble of ravening beasts and obscene fowls for the dismembered limbs of a headless carcass, for such did Poland seem to all the world before the war was half over. In the summer of 1655, moreover, while the Republic was still reeling beneath the shock of the Muscovite invasion, Charles X. of Sweden, on the flimsiest of pretexts, forced a war upon reluctant and inoffensive Poland, simply to gratify his greed of martial glory, and before the year was out his forces had occupied the capital, the coronation city and the best half of the land. King John Casimir, betrayed and abandoned by his own subjects, fled to Silesia, and profiting by the cataclysm which, for the moment, had swept the Polish state out of existence, the Muscovites, unopposed, quickly appropriated nearly everything which was not already occupied by the Swedes. At this crisis Poland owed her salvation to two events—the formation of a general league against Sweden, brought about by the apprehensive court of Vienna, and an almost simultaneous popular outburst of religious enthusiasm on the part of the Polish people. The first of these events, to be dated from the alliance between the emperor Leopold and John Casimir, on the 27th of May 1657, led to a truce with the tsar and the welcome diversion of all the Muscovite forces against Swedish Livonia. The second event, which began with the heroic and successful defence of the monastery of Czenstochowa by Prior Kordecki against the Swedes, resulted in the return of the Polish king from exile, the formation of a national army under Stephen Czarniecki and the recovery of almost all the lost provinces from the Swedes, who were driven back headlong to the sea, where with difficulty they held their

own. On the sudden death of Charles X. (Feb. 13, 1660), Poland gladly seized the opportunity of adjusting all her outstanding differences with Sweden. By the peace of Oliva (May 3, 1660), made under French mediation, John Casimir ceded Livonia, and renounced all claim to the Swedish crown. The war with Muscovy was then prosecuted with renewed energy and extraordinary success. In the autumn of 1661 the Russian commanders were routed at Zeromsk, and nearly all the eastern provinces were recovered. In 1664 a peace congress was opened at Durovicha and the prospects of Poland seemed most brilliant; but at the very moment when she needed all her armed strength to sustain her diplomacy, the rebellion of one of her leading magnates, Prince Lubomirsky, involved her in a dangerous civil war, compelled her to reopen negotiations with the Muscovites, at Andrussowo, under far more unfavourable conditions, and after protracted negotiations practically to accept the Muscovite terms. By the truce of Andrussowo (Feb. 11, 1667) Poland received back from Muscovy Vitebsk, Polotsk and Polish Livonia, but ceded in perpetuity Smolensk, Syeversk, Chernigov and the whole of the eastern bank of the Dnieper, including the towns of Konolop, Gadyach, Pereyaslav, Mirgorod, Poltava and Izyum. The Cossacks of the Dnieper were henceforth to be under the joint dominion of the tsar and the king of Poland. Kiev, the religious metropolis of western Russia, was to remain in the hands of Muscovy for two years.

CHAPTER XXVI

RUSSIAN ASCENDANCY

THE "truce" of Andrussowo proved to be one of the most permanent peaces in history, and Kiev, though only pledged for two years, was never again to be separated from the Orthodox Slavonic state to which it rightly belonged. But for the terrible and persistent ill-luck of Poland it is doubtful whether the "truce" of Andrussowo would ever have been signed. The war which it concluded was to be the last open struggle between the two powers. Henceforth the influence of Russia over Poland was steadily to increase, without any struggle at all, the Republic being already stricken with that creeping paralysis which ultimately left her a prey to her neighbours. Muscovy had done with Poland as an adversary, and had no longer any reason to fear her ancient enemy.

Poland had, in fact, emerged from the cataclysm of 1648-1667 a moribund state, though her not unskilful diplomacy had enabled her for a time to save appearances. Her territorial losses, though considerable, were, in the circumstances, not excessive, and she was still a considerable power in the opinion of Europe. But a fatal change had come over the country during the age of the Vasas. We have already seen how the ambition of the oligarchs and the lawlessness of the *szlachta* had reduced the executive to impotence, and rendered anything like rational government impossible. But these demoralizing and disintegrating influences had been suspended by the religious revival due to the Catholic reaction and the Jesuit propaganda, a revival which reached its height towards the end of the 16th century. This, on the whole, salutary and edifying movement permeated public life, and produced a series of great captains who cheerfully sacrificed themselves for their country, and would have been saints if they had not been heroes. But this extraordinary religious revival had wellnigh spent itself by the middle of the 17th century. Its last manifestation was the successful defence of the monastery of Czenstochowa by Prior Kordecki against the finest troops in Europe, its last representative was Stephen Czarniecki, who brought the fugitive John Casimir back from exile and reinstalled him on his tottering throne. The succeeding age was an age of unmitigated egoism, in which the old ideals were abandoned and the old examples were forgotten. It synchronized with, and was partly determined by, the new political system which was spreading all over Europe, the system of dynastic diplomatic competition and the unscrupulous employment of unlimited secret service funds. This system, which dates from Richelieu and culminated in the reign of Louis XIV., was based on the secular rivalry of the houses of Bourbon and Habsburg, and presently divided all Europe into two hostile camps. Louis XI. is said to have expended 50,000,000 livres a year for bribing purposes, the court of Vienna was scarcely less liberal, and very soon nearly all the monarchs of the Continent and their ministers were in the pay of one or other of the antagonists. Poland was no exception to the general rule. Her magnates, having already got all they could out of their own country, looked eagerly abroad for fresh El Dorados. Before long most of them had become the hirelings of France or Austria, and the value demanded for their wages was, not infrequently, the betrayal of their own country. To do them justice, the *szlachta* at first were not only free from the taint of official corruption, but endeavoured to fight against it. Thus, at the election diet of 1669, one of the deputies, Pieniaszek, moved that a new and hitherto unheard-of clause should be inserted in the agenda of the general confederation, to the effect that every senator

and deputy should solemnly swear not to take bribes, while another *szlachcic* proposed that the ambassadors of foreign Powers should be excluded permanently from the Polish elective assemblies. But the flighty and ignorant *szlachta* not only were incapable of any sustained political action, but they themselves unconsciously played into the hands of the enemies of their country by making the so-called *liberum veto* an integral part of the Polish constitution. The *liberum veto* was based on the assumption of the absolute political equality of every Polish gentleman, with the inevitable corollary that every measure introduced into the Polish diet must be adopted unanimously. Consequently, if any single deputy believed that a measure already approved of by the rest of the house might be injurious to his constituency, he had the right to rise and exclaim *nie pozwalam*, "I disapprove," when the measure in question fell at once to the ground. Subsequently this vicious principle was extended still further. A deputy, by interposing his individual veto, could at any time dissolve the diet, when all measures previously passed had to be re-submitted to the consideration of the following diet. The *liberum veto* seems to have been originally devised to cut short interminable debates in times of acute crisis, but it was generally used either by highly placed criminals, anxious to avoid an inquiry into their misdeeds,¹ or by malcontents, desirous of embarrassing the executive. The origin of the *liberum veto* is obscure, but it was first employed by the deputy Wladislaus Sicinski, who dissolved the diet of 1652 by means of it, and before the end of the 17th century it was used so frequently and recklessly that all business was frequently brought to a standstill. In later days it became the chief instrument of foreign ambassadors for dissolving inconvenient diets, as a deputy could always be bribed to exercise his veto for a handsome consideration.

The Polish crown first became an object of universal competition in 1573, when Henry of Valois was elected. In 1575, and again in 1587, it was put up for public auction, when the Hungarian Báthory and the Swede Sigismund respectively gained the prize. But at all three elections, though money and intrigue were freely employed, they were not the determining factors of the contest. The Polish gentry were still the umpires as well as the stakeholders; the best candidates generally won the day; and the defeated competitors were driven out of the country by force of arms if they did not take their discomfiture, after a fair fight, like sportsmen. But with the election of Michael Wisniowiecki in 1669 a new era began. In this case a native Pole was freely elected by the unanimous vote of his countrymen. Yet a few weeks later the Polish commander-in-chief formed a whole series of conspiracies for the purpose of dethroning his lawful sovereign, and openly placed himself beneath the protection of Louis XIV. of France, just as the rebels of the 18th century placed themselves under the protection of Catherine II. of Russia. And this rebel was none other than John Sobieski, at a later day the heroic deliverer of Vienna! If heroes could so debase themselves, can we wonder if men who were not heroes lent themselves to every sort of villainy? We have come, in fact, to the age of utter shamelessness, when disappointed place-hunters openly invoked foreign aid against their own country. Sobieski himself, as John III. (he succeeded Michael in 1674), was to pay the penalty of his past lawlessness, to the uttermost farthing. Despite his brilliant military achievements, his reign of twenty-two years was a failure. His victories over the Turks were fruitless so far as Poland was concerned. His belated attempts to reform the constitution only led to conspiracies against his life and crown, in which the French faction, which he had been the first to encourage, took an active part. In his later years Lithuania was in a state of chronic revolt, while Poland was bankrupt both morally and materially. He died a broken-hearted man, prophesying the inevitable ruin of a nation which he himself had done so much to demoralize.

It scarcely seemed possible for Poland to sink lower than she had sunk already. Yet an era was now to follow, compared with which even the age of Sobieski seemed to be an age of gold. This was the Saxon period which, with occasional violent interruptions, was to drag on for nearly seventy years. By the time it was over Poland was irretrievably doomed. It only remained to be seen how that doom would be accomplished.

On the death of John III. no fewer than eighteen candidates for the vacant Polish throne presented themselves. Austria supported James Sobieski, the eldest son of the late king, France Francis Louis Prince of Conti (1664-1709), but the successful competitor was Frederick Augustus, elector of Saxony, who cheerfully renounced Lutheranism for the coveted crown, and won the day because he happened to arrive last of all, with fresh funds, when the agents of his rivals had spent all their money. He was crowned, as Augustus II., on the 15th of September 1697, and his first act was to expel from the country the prince of Conti, the elect of a respectable minority, directed by the cardinal primate Michal Radziejowski (1645-1705), whom Augustus II. subsequently bought over for 75,000 thalers. Good luck attended the opening years of the new reign. In 1699 the long Turkish War, which had been going on ever since 1683, was concluded by the peace of Karlowitz, whereby Podolia, the Ukraine and the fortress of Kamenets Podolskiy were retroceded to the Republic by the Ottoman Porte. Immediately afterwards Augustus was persuaded by the plausible Livonian exile, Johan Reinhold Patkul, to form a nefarious league with Frederick of Denmark and Peter of Russia, for the purpose of de-

¹ Thus the Sapiehas, who had been living on rapine for years, dissolved the diet of 1688 by means of the veto of one of their hirelings, for fear of an investigation into their conduct.



STANISLAUS II.



JOHN SOBIESKI.



KOSCIUSZKO.

John III. (Sobieski) and Stanislaus II. (Poniatowski), two great rulers of Poland, belong to the 17th and 18th centuries respectively. The first delivered Hungary from the Turks, the second, aided by Kosciuszko, wrested, though only for a time, a constitution from the Empress Catherine of Russia. Tadeusz Andrzej Bonaventura Kosciuszko, the Polish patriot and general, who won his military training under Washington in the American War of Independence and turned it to brilliant account in five years of struggle against the Russians, 1791-6, until he fell wounded and insensible into their hands on the bloody field of Maciejowice.

70 1981
ANATOMY

spoiling the youthful king of Sweden, Charles XII. This he did as elector of Saxony, but it was the unfortunate Polish republic which paid for the hazardous speculation of its newly elected king. Throughout the Great Northern War, which wasted northern and central Europe for twenty years (1700-1720), all the belligerents treated Poland as if she had no political existence. Swedes, Saxons and Russians not only lived upon the country, but plundered it systematically. The diet was the humble servant of the conqueror of the moment, and the leading magnates chose their own sides without the slightest regard for the interests of their country, the Lithuanians for the most part supporting Charles XII., while the Poles divided their allegiance between Augustus and Stanislaus Leszczyński, whom Charles placed upon the throne in 1704 and kept there till 1709. At the end of the war Poland was ruined materially as well as politically. Augustus attempted to indemnify himself for his failure to obtain Livonia, his covenanted share of the Swedish plunder, by offering Frederick William of Prussia Courland, Polish Prussia and even part of Great Poland, provided that he were allowed a free hand in the disposal of the rest of the country. When Prussia declined this tempting offer for fear of Russia, Augustus went a step farther and actually suggested that "the four¹ eagles" should divide the banquet between them. He died, however (Feb. 1, 1733), before he could give effect to this shameless design.

On the death of Augustus II., Stanislaus Leszczyński, who had, in the meantime, become the father-in-law of Louis XV., attempted to regain his throne with the aid of a small French army corps and 4,000,000 livres from Versailles. Some of the best men in Poland, including the Czartoryscy, were also in his favour, and on the 26th of August 1733 he was elected king for the second time. But there were many malcontents, principally among the Lithuanians, who solicited the intervention of Russia in favour of the elector of Saxony, son of the late king, and in October 1733 a Russian army appeared before Warsaw and compelled a phantom diet (it consisted of but 15 senators and 500 of the *szlachta*) to proclaim Augustus III. From the end of 1733 till the 30th of June 1734 Stanislaus and his partisans were besieged by the Russians in Danzig, their last refuge, and with the surrender of that fortress the cause of Stanislaus was lost. He retired once more to his little court in Lorraine, with the title of king, leaving Augustus III. in possession of the kingdom.

Augustus III. was disqualified by constitutional indolence from taking any active part in affairs. He left everything to his omnipotent minister, Count Heinrich Brühl, and Brühl entrusted the government of Poland to the Czartoryscy, who had intimate relations of long standing with the court of Dresden.

The Czartoryscy, who were to dominate Polish politics for the next half-century, came of an ancient Ruthenian stock which had intermarried with the Jagiellos at an early date, and had always been remarkable for their civic virtues and political sagacity. They had powerfully contributed to the adoption of the Union of Lublin; were subsequently received into the Roman Catholic Church; and dated the beginning of their influence in Poland proper from the time (1674) when Florian Czartoryski became primate there. Florian's nephews, Fryderyk Michal and Augustus, were now the principal representatives of "the Family," as their opponents sarcastically called them. The former, through the influence of Augustus's minister and favourite Brühl, had become, in his twenty-eighth year, vice-chancellor and subsequently grand chancellor of Lithuania, and was always the political head of the family. His brother Augustus, after fighting with great distinction against the Turks both by land and sea (Prince Eugene decorated him with a sword of honour for his valour at the siege of Belgrade), had returned home to marry Sophia Sieniewska, whose fabulous dowry won for her husband the sobriquet of "the Family Croesus." Their sister Constantia had already married Stanislaus Poniatowski, the father of the future king. Thus wealth, position, court influence and ability combined gave the Czartoryscy a commanding position in Poland, and, to their honour be it said, they had determined from the first to save the Republic, whose impending ruin in existing circumstances they clearly foresaw, by a radical constitutional reconstruction which was to include the abolition of the *liberum veto* and the formation of a standing army.

Unfortunately the other great families of Poland were obstinately opposed to any reform or, as they called it, any "violation" of the existing constitution. The Potoccy, whose possessions in south Poland and the Ukraine covered thousands of square miles, the Radziwillowie, who were omnipotent in Lithuania and included half a dozen millionaires² amongst them, the Lubomirscy and their fellows, hated the Czartoryscy because they were too eminent, and successfully obstructed all their well-meant efforts. The castles of these great lords were the foci of the social and political life of their respective provinces. Here they lived like little princes, surrounded by thousands of retainers, whom they kept for show alone, making no attempt to organize and discipline this excellent military material for the defence of their defenceless country. Here congregated hundreds of the younger *szlachta*, fresh from their school benches, whence they brought nothing but a smattering of Latin and a determination to make their way by absolute subservience to their "elder brethren," the *pans*. These were the men who, a little later, at the bidding of their "bene-

¹ The fourth eagle was the White Eagle, *i.e.* Poland.

² Michal Kazimierz Radziwill alone was worth thirty millions.

factors," dissolved one inconvenient diet after another; for it is a significant fact that during the reigns of the two Augustuses every diet was dissolved in this way by the hirelings of some great lord or, still worse, of some foreign potentate. In a word constitutional government had practically ceased, and Poland had become an arena in which contesting clans strove together for the mastery.

It was against this primitive state of things that the Czartoryscy struggled, and struggled in vain. First they attempted to abolish the *liberum veto* with the assistance of the Saxon court where they were supreme, but fear of foreign complications and the opposition of the Potoccy prevented anything being done. Then they broke with their old friend Brühl and turned to Russia. Their chief intermediary was their nephew Stanislaus Poniatowski, whom they sent, as Saxon minister, to the Russian court in the suite of the English minister Hanbury Williams, in 1755. The handsome and insinuating Poniatowski speedily won the susceptible heart of the grand duchess Catherine, but he won nothing else and returned to Poland in 1759 somewhat discredited. Disappointed in their hopes of Russia, the Czartoryscy next attempted to form a confederation for the deposition of Augustus III., but while the strife of factions was still at its height the absentee monarch put an end to the struggle by expiring, conveniently, on the 5th of October 1763.

The interregnum occurring on the death of Augustus III. befell at a time when all the European powers, exhausted by the Seven Years' War, earnestly desired peace. The position of Poland was, consequently, much more advantageous than it had been on every other similar occasion, and if only the contending factions had been able to agree and unite, the final catastrophe might, perhaps, even now, have been averted. The Czartoryscy, of all men, were bound by their principles and professions to set their fellow-citizens an example of fraternal concord. Yet they rejected with scorn and derision the pacific overtures of their political opponents, the Potoccy, the Radziwillowie, and the Braniscy, Prince Michal openly declaring that of two tyrannies he preferred the tyranny of the Muscovite to the tyranny of his equals. He had in fact already summoned a Russian army corps to assist him to reform his country, which sufficiently explains his own haughtiness and the unwonted complacency of the rival magnates.

The simplicity of the Czartoryscy was even more mischievous than their haughtiness. When the most enlightened statesmen of the Republic could seriously believe in the benevolent intentions of Russia the end was not far off. Their naïve expectations were very speedily disappointed. Catherine II. and Frederick II. had already determined (Treaty of Petrograd, April 22, 1764) that the existing state of things in Poland must be maintained, and as early as the 18th of October 1763 Catherine had recommended the election of Stanislaus Poniatowski as "the individual most convenient for our common interests." The personal question did not interest Frederick: so long as Poland was kept in an anarchical condition he cared not who was called king. Moreover, the opponents of the Czartoryscy made no serious attempt to oppose the entry of the Russian troops. At least 40,000 men were necessary for the purpose, and these could have been obtained for 200,000 ducats; but a congress of magnates, whose collective fortunes amounted to hundreds of millions, having decided that it was impossible to raise this sum, there was nothing for it but to fight a few skirmishes and then take refuge abroad. The Czartoryscy now fancied themselves the masters of the situation. They at once proceeded to pass through the convocation diet a whole series of salutary measures. Four special commissions were appointed to superintend the administration of justice, the police and the finances. The extravagant powers of the grand *hetmans* and the grand marshals were reduced. All financial and economical questions before the diet were henceforth to be decided by a majority of votes. Shortly afterwards Stanislaus Poniatowski was elected king (Sept. 7, 1764) and crowned (Nov. 25). But at the beginning of 1766 Prince Nicholas Repnin was sent as Russian minister to Warsaw with instructions which can only be described as a carefully elaborated plan for destroying the Republic. The first weapon employed was the dissident question. At that time the population of Poland was, in round numbers, 11,500,000, of whom about 1,000,000 were dissidents or dissenters. Half of these were the Protestants of the towns of Polish Prussia and Great Poland, the other half was composed of the Orthodox population of Lithuania. The dissidents had no political rights, and their religious liberties had also been unjustly restricted; but two-thirds of them being agricultural labourers, and most of the rest artisans or petty tradesmen, they had no desire to enter public life, and were so ignorant and illiterate that their new protectors, on a closer acquaintance, became heartily ashamed of them. Yet it was for these persons that Repnin, in the name of the empress, now demanded absolute equality, political and religious, with the gentlemen of Poland. He was well aware that an aristocratic and Catholic assembly like the *sejm* would never concede so preposterous a demand. He also calculated that the demand itself would make the *szlachta* suspicious of all reform, including the Czartoryscian reforms, especially as both the king and his uncles were generally unpopular, as being innovators under foreign influence. His calculations were correct. The *sejm* of 1766 not only rejected the dissident bill, but repealed all the Czartoryscian reforms and insisted on the retention of the *liberum veto* as the foundation of the national liberties. The discredit into which Stanislaus had now fallen encouraged the Saxon party, led by Gabriel Podoski (1719-1777), to form a com-

bination for the purpose of dethroning the king. Repnin knew that the allied courts would never consent to such a measure; but he secretly encouraged the plot for his own purposes, with signal success. Early in 1767 the malcontents, fortified by the adhesion of the leading political refugees, formed a confederation at Radom, whose first act was to send a deputation to Petrograd, petitioning Catherine to guarantee the liberties of the Republic and allow the form of the Polish constitution to be settled by the Russian ambassador at Warsaw. With this *carte blanche* in his pocket, Repnin proceeded to treat the diet as if it were already the slave of the Russian empress. But despite threats, wholesale corruption and the presence of Russian troops outside and even inside the *izba*, or chamber of deputies, the patriots, headed by four bishops, Woclaw Hieronim Sierakowski (1699-1784) of Lemberg, Feliks Pawel Turski of Chelm (1729-1800), Kajetan Ignaty Soltyk of Cracow (1715-1788), and Józef Jendrzzej Zaluski of Kiev (1702-1774), offered a determined resistance to Repnin's demands. Only when brute force in its extremest form had been ruthlessly employed, only when three senators and some deputies had been arrested in full session by Russian grenadiers and sent as prisoners to Kaluga, did the opposition collapse. The *liberum veto* and all the other ancient abuses were now declared unalterable parts of the Polish constitution, which was placed under the guarantee of Russia. All the edicts against the dissidents were, at the same time, repealed.

This shameful surrender led to a Catholic patriotic uprising, known as the Confederation of Bar, which was formed on the 29th of February 1768, at Bar in the Ukraine, by a handful of small squires. It never had a chance of permanent success, though, feebly fed by French subsidies and French volunteers, it lingered on for four years, till finally suppressed in 1772. But, insignificant itself, it was the cause of great events. Some of the Bar confederates, scattered by the Russian regulars, fled over the Turkish border, pursued by their victors. The Turks, already alarmed by the progress of the Russians in Poland, and stimulated by Vergennes, at that time French ambassador at Constantinople, at once declared war against Russia. Seriously disturbed at the prospect of Russian aggrandizement, the idea occurred, almost simultaneously, to the courts of Berlin and Vienna that the best mode of preserving the equilibrium of Europe was for all three powers to readjust their territories at the expense of Poland. The idea of a partition of Poland was nothing new, but the vastness of the country, and the absence of sufficiently powerful and united enemies, had hitherto saved the Republic from spoliation. But now that Poland lay utterly helpless and surrounded by the three great military monarchies of Europe, nothing could save her. In February 1769 Frederick sent Count Rochus Friedrich Lynar (1708-1783) to Petrograd to sound the empress as to the expediency of a partition, in August Joseph II. solicited an interview with Frederick, and in the course of the summer the two monarchs met, first at Neisse in Silesia and again at Neustadt in Moravia. Nothing definite as to Poland seems to have been arranged, but Prince Kaunitz, the Austrian chancellor, was now encouraged to take the first step by occupying, in 1770, the county of Zips, which had been hypotheated by Hungary to Poland in 1442 and never redeemed. This act decided the other confederates. In June 1770 Frederick surrounded those of the Polish provinces he coveted with a military cordon, ostensibly to keep out the cattle plague. Catherine's consent had been previously obtained by a special mission of Prince Henry of Prussia to the Russian capital. The first treaty of partition was signed at Petrograd between Prussia and Russia on the 6-17th of February 1772; the second treaty, which admitted Austria also to a share of the spoil, on the 5-16th of August the same year. It is unnecessary to recapitulate the unheard-of atrocities by which the consent of the *sejm* to this act of brigandage was at last extorted (Aug. 18, 1773). Russia obtained the palatinates of Vitebsk, Polotsk Mscislaw: 1586 sq. m. of territory, with a population of 550,000 and an annual revenue of 920,000 Polish gulden. Austria got the greater part of Galicia, minus Cracow: 1710 sq. m., with a population of 806,000 and an annual revenue of 1,408,000 gulden. Prussia received the maritime palatinate minus Danzig, the palatinate of Kulm minus Thorn, Great Poland as far as the Nitz, and the palatinates of Marienburg and Ermeland: 629 sq. m., with a population of 378,000, and an annual revenue of 534,000 thalers. In fine, Poland lost about one-fifth of her population and one-fourth of her territory.

In return for these enormous concessions the partitioning powers presented the Poles with a constitution superior to anything they had ever been able to devise for themselves. The most mischievous of the ancient abuses, the elective monarchy and the *liberum veto*, were of course retained. Poland was to be dependent on her despoilers, but they evidently meant to make her a serviceable dependant. The government was henceforth to be in the hands of a *rada niestajaca*, or permanent council of thirty-six members, eighteen senators and eighteen deputies, elected biennially by the *sejm* in secret ballot, subdivided into the five departments of foreign affairs, police, war, justice and the exchequer, whose principal members and assistants, as well as all other public functionaries, were to have fixed salaries. The royal prerogative was still further reduced. The king was indeed the president of the permanent council, but he could not summon the Diet without its consent, and in all cases of preferment was bound to select one out of three of the council's nominees. The annual budget was fixed at 30,000,000 Polish gulden,¹ out of which a regular army of

¹ Pol. gulden = 5 silber groschen.

30,000¹ men was to be maintained. Sentiment apart, the constitution of 1775 was of distinct benefit to Poland. It made for internal stability, order and economy, and enabled her to develop and husband her resources, and devote herself uninterruptedly to the now burning question of national education. For the shock of the first partition was so far salutary that it awoke the public conscience to a sense of the national inferiority; stimulated the younger generation to extraordinary patriotic efforts; and thus went far to produce the native reformers who were to do such wonders during the great quadrennial Diet.

It was the second Turkish War of Catherine II. which gave patriotic Poland her last opportunity of re-establishing her independence. The death of Frederick the Great (Aug. 17, 1786) completely deranged the balance of power in Europe. The long-standing accord between Prussia and Russia came to an end, and while the latter drew nearer to Austria, the former began to look to the Western powers. In August 1787 Russia and Austria provoked the Porte to declare war against them both, and two months later a defensive alliance was concluded between Prussia, England and Holland, as a counterpoise to the alarming preponderance of Russia. In June 1788 Gustavus III. of Sweden also attacked Russia, with 50,000 men, while in the south the Turks held the Muscovites at bay beneath the walls of Ochakov, and drove back the Austrian invaders into Transylvania. Prussia, emboldened by Russia's difficulties, now went so far as to invite Poland also to forsake the Russian alliance, and placed an army corps of 40,000 men at her disposal.

¹ At the very next Diet, 1776, the Poles themselves reduced the army to 18,000 men.

CHAPTER XXVII

PRUSSIAN INTERVENTION

It was under these exceptional circumstances that the "four years' Diet" assembled (Oct. 6, 1788). Its leaders, Stanislaw Malachowski, Hugo Kollontaj and Ignaty Potocki, were men of character and capacity, and its measures were correspondingly vigorous. Within a few months of its assembling it had abolished the permanent council; enlarged the royal prerogative; raised the army to 65,000 men; established direct communications with the Western powers; rejected an alliance which Russia, alarmed at the rapid progress of events, had hastened to offer; declared its own session permanent; and finally settled down to the crucial task of reforming the constitution on modern lines. But the difficulties of the patriots were commensurate with their energies, and though the new constitution was drafted so early as December 1789, it was not till May 1791 that it could safely be presented to the Diet. Meanwhile Poland endeavoured to strengthen her position by an advantageous alliance with Prussia. Frederick William II. stipulated, at first, that Poland should surrender Danzig and Thorn, and Pitt himself endeavoured to persuade the Polish minister Michal Kleophas Oginski (1765-1833) that the protection of Prussia was worth the sacrifice. But the Poles proving obstinate, and Austria simultaneously displaying a disquieting interest in the welfare of the Republic, Prussia, on the 20th of March 1791, concluded an alliance with Poland which engaged the two powers to guarantee each other's possessions and render mutual assistance in case either were attacked.

But external aid was useless so long as Poland was hampered by her anarchical constitution. Hitherto the proceedings of the Diet had not been encouraging. The most indispensable reforms had been frantically opposed, the debate on the reorganization of the army had alone lasted six months. It was only by an audacious surprise that Kollontaj and his associates contrived to carry through the new constitution. Taking advantage of the Easter recess, when most of the malcontents were out of town, they suddenly, on the 3rd of May, brought the whole question before the Diet and demanded urgency for it. Before the opposition could remonstrate, the marshal of the Diet produced the latest foreign despatches, which unanimously predicted another partition, whereupon, at the solemn adjuration of Ignaty Potocki, King Stanislaus exhorted the deputies to accept the new constitution as the last means of saving their country, and himself set the example by swearing to defend it.

The revolution of the 3rd of May 1791 converted Poland into an hereditary¹ limited monarchy, with ministerial responsibility and duennial parliaments. The *liberum veto* and all the intricate and obstructive machinery of the anomalous old system were for ever abolished. All invidious class distinctions were done away with. The franchise was extended to the towns. Serfdom was mitigated, preparatorily to its entire abolition; absolute religious toleration was established, and every citizen declared equal before the law. Frederick William II. officially congratulated Stanislaus on the success of "the happy revolution which has at last given Poland a wise and regular government," and declared it should henceforth be his "chief care to maintain and confirm the ties which unite us." Cobenzl, the Austrian minister at Petrograd, writing to his court immediately after the reception of the tidings at the Russian capital, describes the empress as full of consternation at the idea that

¹ On the death of Stanislaus, the Crown was to pass to the family of the elector of Saxony.

Poland under an hereditary dynasty might once more become a considerable power. But Catherine, still in difficulties, was obliged to watch in silence the collapse of her party in Poland, and submit to the double humiliation of recalling her ambassador and withdrawing her army from the country. Even when the Peace of Jassy (Jan. 9, 1792) finally freed her from the Turk, she waited patiently for the Polish malcontents to afford her a pretext and an opportunity for direct and decisive interference. She had not long to wait. The constitution of the 3rd of May had scarce been signed when Felix Potocki, Severin Rzewuski and Xavier Branicki, three of the chief dignitaries of Poland, hastened to Petrograd, and there entered into a secret convention with the empress, whereby she undertook to restore the old constitution by force of arms, but at the same time promised to respect the territorial integrity of the Republic. On the 14th of May 1792 the conspirators formed a confederation, consisting, in the first instance, of only ten other persons, at the little town of Targowica in the Ukraine, protesting against the constitution of the 3rd of May as tyrannous and revolutionary, and at the same time the new Russian minister at Warsaw presented a formal declaration of war to the king and the Diet. The Diet met the crisis with dignity and firmness. The army was at once despatched to the frontier; the male population was called to arms, and Ignaty Potocki was sent to Berlin to claim the assistance stipulated by the treaty of the 10th of March 1791. The king of Prussia, in direct violation of all his oaths and promises, declined to defend a constitution which had never had his "concurrence." Thus Poland was left entirely to her own resources. The little Polish army of 46,000 men, under Prince Joseph Poniatowski and Tadeusz Kościuszko, did all that was possible under the circumstances. For more than three months they kept back the invader, and, after winning three pitched battles, retired in perfect order on the capital. But the king, and even Kollontaj, despairing of success, now acceded to the confederation; hostilities were suspended; the indignant officers threw up their commissions; the rank and file were distributed all over the country; the reformers fled abroad; and the constitution of the 3rd of May was abolished by the Targowicians as "a dangerous novelty." The Russians then poured into eastern Poland; the Prussians, at the beginning of 1793, alarmed lest Catherine should appropriate the whole Republic, occupied Great Poland; and a diminutive, debased and helpless assembly met at Grodno in order, in the midst of a Russian army corps, "to come to an amicable understanding" with the partitioning powers. After every conceivable means of intimidation had been unscrupulously applied for twelve weeks, the second treaty of partition was signed at three o'clock on the morning of the 23rd of September 1793. By this *pactum subjectionis*, as the Polish patriots called it, Russia got all the eastern provinces of Poland, extending from Livonia to Moldavia, comprising a quarter of a million of square miles; while Prussia got Dobrzyn, Kujavia and the greater part of Great Poland, with Thorn and Danzig. Poland was now reduced to one-third of her original dimensions, with a population of about three and a half millions.

The focus of Polish nationality was now transferred from Warsaw, where the Targowicians and their Russian patrons reigned supreme, to Leipzig, whither the Polish patriots, Kościuszko, Kollontaj and Ignaty Potocki among the number, assembled from all quarters. From the first they meditated a national rising, but their ignorance, enthusiasm and simplicity led them to commit blunder after blunder. The first of such blunders was Kościuszko's mission to Paris, in January 1794. He was full of the idea of a league of republics against the league of sovereigns; but he was unaware that the Jacobins themselves were already considering the best mode of detaching Prussia, Poland's worst enemy, from the anti-French coalition. With a hypocrisy worthy of the diplomacy of "the tyrants," the committee of public safety declared that it could not support an insurrection engineered by aristocrats, and Kościuszko returned to Leipzig empty-handed. The next blunder of the Polish refugees was to allow themselves to be drawn into a premature rising by certain Polish officers in Poland who, to prevent the incorporation of their regiments in the Russian army, openly revolted and led their troops from Warsaw to Cracow. Kościuszko himself condemned their hastiness; but, when the Russian troops began to concentrate, his feelings grew too strong for him, and early in April he himself appeared at Cracow. In an instant the mutiny became a revolution. Throughout April the Polish arms were almost universally successful. The Russians were defeated in more than one pitched battle; three-quarters of the ancient territory was recovered, and Warsaw and Vilna, the capitals of Poland and Lithuania respectively, were liberated. Kościuszko was appointed dictator, and a supreme council was established to assist him. The first serious reverse, at Szczekociny (June 5), was more than made up for by the successful defence of Warsaw against the Russians and Prussians (July 9 to Sept. 6); but in the meantime the inveterate lawlessness of the Poles had asserted itself, as usual, and violent and ceaseless dissensions, both in the supreme council and in the army, neutralized the superhuman efforts of the unfortunate but still undaunted dictator. The death-blow to the movement was the disaster of Maciejowice (Oct. 10), and it expired amidst the carnage of Praga (Oct. 29), though the last Polish army corps did not capitulate till the 18th of November. Yet all the glory of the bitter struggle was with the vanquished, and if the Poles, to the last, had shown themselves children in the science of government, they had at least died on the field of battle like men. The greed of the three partitioning powers very nearly led

to a rupture between Austria and Prussia ; but the tact and statesmanship of the empress of Russia finally adjusted all difficulties. On the 24th of October 1795 Prussia acceded to the Austro-Russian partition compact of the 3rd of January, and the distribution of the conquered provinces was finally regulated on the 10th of October 1796. By the third treaty of partition Austria had to be content with Western Galicia and Southern Masovia ; Prussia took Podlachia, and the rest of Masovia, with Warsaw ; and Russia all the rest.

The immediate result of the third partition was an immense emigration of the more high-spirited Poles who, during the next ten years, fought the battles of the French Republic and of Napoleon all over Europe, but principally against their own enemies, the partitioning powers. They were known as the Polish legions, and were commanded by the best Polish generals, *e.g.* Joseph Poniatowski and Dombrowski. Only Kościuszko stood aloof. Even when, after the Peace of Tilsit, the independent grand duchy of Warsaw was constructed out of the central provinces of Prussian Poland, his distrust of Napoleon proved to be invincible. He was amply justified by the course of events. Napoleon's anxiety to conciliate Russia effectually prevented him from making Poland large and strong enough to be self-supporting. The grand duchy of Warsaw originally consisted of about 1850 sq. m., to which Western Galicia and Cracow, about 900 sq. m. more, were added in 1809. The grand duchy was, from first to last, a mere recruiting-ground for the French emperor. Its army was limited, on paper, to 30,000 men ; but in January 1812 65,000, and in November the same year 97,000 recruits were drawn from it. The constitution of the little state was dictated by Napoleon, and, subject to the exigencies of war, was on the French model. Equality before the law, absolute religious toleration and local autonomy were its salient features. The king of Saxony, as grand-duke, took the initiative in all legislative matters ; but the administration was practically controlled by the French.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE CONGRESS KINGDOM

THE Grand Duchy of Warsaw perished with the Grand Army in the retreat from Moscow in 1812. The Polish troops had taken a prominent part in the invasion of Russia, and their share in the plundering of Smolensk and of Moscow had intensified the racial hatred felt for them by the Russians. Those of them who survived or escaped the disasters of the retreat fled before the tsar's army and followed the fortunes of Napoleon in 1813 and 1814. The Russians occupied Warsaw on the 18th of February 1813 and overran the grand duchy, which thus came into their possession by conquest. Some of the Poles continued to hope that Alexander would remember his old favour for them, and would restore their kingdom under his own rule. Nor was the tsar unwilling to encourage their delusion. He himself cherished the desire to re-establish the kingdom for his own advantage. As early as the 13th of January 1813 he wrote to assure his former favourite and confidant, Prince Adam Czartoryski, that, "Whatever the Poles do now to aid in my success, will at the same time serve to forward the realization of their hopes." But the schemes of Alexander could be carried out only with the co-operation of other powers. They refused to consent to the annexation of Saxony by Prussia, and other territorial arrangements which would have enabled him to unite all Poland in his own hand. By the final act of the Congress of Vienna, signed on the 9th of June 1815, Poland was divided between Prussia, Austria and Russia, with one trifling exception; Cracow with its population of 61,000 was erected into a republic embedded in Galicia. Posen and Gnesen, with a population of 810,000, were left to Prussia. Austria remained in possession of Galicia with its 1,500,000 inhabitants. Lithuania and the Ruthenian Palatinates, the spoil of former partitions, continued to be incorporated with Russia. The remnant was constituted as the so-called Congress Kingdom under the emperor of Russia as king (tsar) of Poland. It had been stipulated by the Final Act that the Poles under foreign rule should be endowed with institutions to preserve their national existence according to such forms of political existence as the governments to which they belong shall think fit to allow them.

Alexander, who had a sentimental regard for freedom, so long as it was obedient to himself, had promised the Poles a constitution in April 1815 in a letter to Ostrowski, the president of the senate at Warsaw. His promise was publicly proclaimed on the 25th of May, and was reaffirmed in the Zamok or palace at Warsaw and the cathedral of St John on the 20th of June. The constitution thus promised was duly drafted, and was signed on the 30th of November. It contained 165 articles divided under seven heads. The kingdom of Poland was declared to be united to Russia, in the person of the tsar, as a separate political entity. The kingdom was the Congress Kingdom, for the vague promises of an extension to the east which Alexander had made to the Poles were never fulfilled. Lithuania and the Ruthenian Palatinates continued to be incorporated with Russia as the Western Provinces and were divided from the Congress Kingdom by a customs barrier till the reign of Nicholas I. The kingdom of Poland thus defined was to have at its head a lieutenant of the emperor (*namiestnik*), who must be a member of the imperial house or a Pole. The first holder of the office, General Zajoncsek (1752-1826), was a veteran who had served Napoleon. Roman Catholicism was recognized as the religion of the state, but other religions were tolerated. Liberty of the press was promised subject to the passing of a law to

restrain its abuses. Individual liberty, the use of the Polish language in the law courts, and the exclusive employment of Poles in the civil government were secured by the constitution. The machinery of government was framed of a council of state, at which the imperial government was represented by a commissioner plenipotentiary, and a Diet divided into a senate composed of the princes of the blood, the palatines and councillors named for life, and a house of *nuntii* elected for seven years, 77 chosen by the "dietines" of the nobles, and 51 by the commons. The Diet was to meet every other year for a session of thirty days, and was to be renewed by thirds every two years. Poland retained its flag, and a national army based on that which had been raised by and had fought for Napoleon. The command of the army was given to the emperor's brother Constantine, a man of somewhat erratic character, who did much to offend the Poles by violence, but also a good deal to please them by his marriage with Johanna Grudzinska, a Polish lady afterwards created Princess Lowicz, for whose sake he renounced his right to the throne of Russia.

The Diet met three times during the reign of Alexander, in 1818, in 1820 and in 1825, and was on all three occasions opened by the tsar, who was compelled to address his subjects in French, since he did not speak, and would not learn, their language. It is highly doubtful whether, with the best efforts on both sides, a constitutional government could have been worked by a Russian autocrat, and an assembly of men who inherited the memories and characters of the Poles. In fact the tsar and the Diet soon quarrelled. The Poles would not abolish the jury to please the tsar, nor conform as he wished them to do to the Russian law of divorce. Opposition soon arose, and as Alexander could not understand a freedom which differed from himself, and would not condescend to the use of corruption, by which the ancient Polish Diets had been managed, he was driven to use force. The third session of the Diet—13th of May to 13th of June 1825—was a mere formality. All publicity was suppressed, and one whole district was disfranchised because it persisted in electing candidates who were disapproved of at court. On the other hand, the Poles were also to blame for the failure of constitutional government. They would agitate by means of the so-called National Masonry, or National Patriotic Society as it was afterwards called, for the restoration of the full kingdom of Poland. The nobles who dominated the Diet did nothing to remove the most crying evil of the country—the miserable state of the peasants, who had been freed from personal serfdom by Napoleon in 1807, but were being steadily driven from their holdings by the landlords. In spite of the general prosperity of the country due to peace, and the execution of public works mostly at the expense of Russia, the state of the agricultural class grew, if anything, worse.

Yet no open breach occurred during the reign of Alexander, nor for five years after his death in 1825. The Decembrist movement in Russia had little or no echo in Poland. On the death of Zajonczek in 1826, the grand duke Constantine became imperial lieutenant, and his administration, though erratic, was not unfavourable to displays of Polish nationality. The Polish army had no share in the Turkish War of 1829, largely, it is said, at the request of Constantine, who loved parades and thought that war was the ruin of soldiers. No attempt was made to profit by the embarrassments of the Russians in their war with Turkey. A plot to murder Nicholas at his coronation on the 24th of May 1829 was not carried out, and when he held the fourth Diet on the 30th of May 1830, the Poles made an ostentatious show of their nationality which Nicholas was provoked to describe as possibly patriotic but certainly not civil. Nevertheless, he respected the settlement of 1815. In the meantime the Patriotic Society had divided into a White or Moderate party and a Red or Extreme party, which was subdivided into the Academics or Republicans and the Military or Terrorists. The latter were very busy and were supported by the Roman Catholic Church, which did little for the Prussian Poles and nothing for the Austrian Poles, but was active in harassing the schismatical government of Russia.

The outbreak of the French Revolution in 1830 and the revolt of Belgium produced a great effect in Poland. The spread of a belief, partly justified by the language of Nicholas, that the Polish army would be used to coerce the Belgians, caused great irritation. At last, on the 29th of November 1830, a military revolt took place in Warsaw accompanied by the murder of the minister of war, Hauke, himself a Pole, and other loyal officers. The extraordinary weakness of the grand duke allowed the rising to gather strength. He evacuated Warsaw and finally left the country, dying at Vitebsk on the 27th of June 1831. The war lasted from January till September 1831. The fact that the Poles possessed a well-drilled army of 23,800 foot, 6800 horse and 108 guns, which they were able to recruit to a total strength of 80,821 men with 158 guns, gave solidity to the rising. The Russians, who had endeavoured to overawe Europe by the report of their immense military power, had the utmost difficulty in putting 114,000 men into the field, yet in less than a year, under the leadership of Diebitsch, and then of Paskevich, they mastered the Poles. On the political and administrative side the struggle of the Poles was weakened by the faults which had been the ruin of their kingdom—faction pushed to the point of anarchy, want of discipline, intrigue and violence, as shown by the abominable massacre which took place in Warsaw when the defeat of the army was known. The Poles had begun by protesting that they only wished to defend their rights against the tsar, but they soon proceeded to

proclaim his deposition. Their appeal to the powers of Europe for protection was inevitably disregarded.

When the Congress Kingdom had been reconquered it was immediately reduced to the position of a Russian province. No remnant of Poland's separate political existence remained save the minute republic of Cracow. Unable to acquiesce sincerely in its insignificance, and even unable to enforce its neutrality, Cracow was a centre of disturbance, and, after Russia, Prussia, and Austria had in 1846 agreed to its suppression, was finally occupied by Austria on the 6th of November 1848, as a consequence of the troubles, more agrarian than political, which convulsed Galicia. The administration established by Nicholas I. in Russian Poland was harsh and aimed avowedly at destroying the nationality, and even the language of Poland. The Polish universities of Warsaw and Vilna were suppressed, and the students compelled to go to Petrograd and Kiev. Polish recruits were distributed in Russian regiments, and the use of the Russian language was enforced as far as possible in the civil administration and in the law courts. The customs barrier between Lithuania and the former Congress Kingdom was removed, in the hope that the influence of Russia would spread more easily over Poland. A very hostile policy was adopted against the Roman Catholic Church. But though these measures cowed the Poles, they failed to achieve their main purpose. Polish national sentiment was not destroyed, but intensified. It even spread to Lithuania. The failure of Nicholas was in good part due to mistaken measures of what he hoped would be conciliation. He supported Polish students at Russian universities on condition that they then spent a number of years in the public service. It was the hope of the emperor that they would thus become united in interest with the Russians. But these Polish officials made use of their positions to aid their countrymen, and were grasping and corrupt with patriotic intentions. The Poles in Russia, whether at the universities or in the public service, formed an element which refused to assimilate with the Russians. In Poland itself the tsar left much of the current civil administration in the hands of the nobles, whose power over their peasants was hardly diminished and was misused as of old. The Polish exiles who filled Europe after 1830 intrigued from abroad, and maintained a constant agitation. The stern government of Nicholas was, however, so far effective that Poland remained quiescent during the Crimean War, in which many Polish soldiers fought in the Russian army. The Russian government felt safe enough to reduce the garrison of Poland largely. It was not till 1863, eight years after the death of the tsar in 1855, that the last attempt of the Poles to achieve independence by arms was made.

The rising of 1863 may without injustice be said to be due to the more humane policy of the tsar Alexander II. Exiles were allowed to return to Poland, the Church was propitiated, the weight of the Russian administration was lightened, police rules as to passports were relaxed, and the Poles were allowed to form an agricultural society and to meet for a common purpose for the first time after many years. Poland in short shared in the new era of milder rule which began in Russia. In April 1856 Alexander II. was crowned king in the Roman Catholic cathedral of Warsaw, and addressed a flattering speech to his Polish subjects in French, for he too could not speak their language. His warning, "No nonsense, gentlemen" (*Point de rêveries, Messieurs*), was taken in very ill part, and it was perhaps naturally, but beyond question most unhappily, the truth that the tsar's concessions only served to encourage the Poles to revolt, and to produce a strong Russian reaction against his liberal policy. As the Poles could no longer dispose of an army, they were unable to assail Russia as openly as in 1830. They had recourse to the so-called "unarmed agitation," which was in effect a policy of constant provocation designed to bring on measures of repression to be represented to Europe as examples of Russian brutality. They began in 1860 at the funeral of the widow of General Sobinski, killed in 1830, and on the 27th of February 1861 they led to the so-called Warsaw massacres, when the troops fired on a crowd which refused to disperse. The history of the agitation which culminated in the disorderly rising of 1863 is one of intrigue, secret agitation, and in the end of sheer terrorism by a secret society, which organized political assassination. The weakness of the Russian governor, General Gorchakov, in 1861 was a repetition of the feebleness of the Grand Duke Constantine in 1830. He allowed the Poles who organized the demonstration of the 27th of February to form a kind of provisional government. Alongside of such want of firmness as this were, however, to be found such measures of ill-timed repression as the order given in 1860 to the agricultural society not to discuss the question of the settlement of the peasants on the land. Concession and repression were employed alternately. The Poles, encouraged by the one and exasperated by the other, finally broke into the partial revolt of 1863-1864. It was a struggle of ill-armed partisans, who were never even numerous, against regular troops, and was marked by no real battle. The suppression of the rising was followed by a return to the hard methods of Nicholas. The Polish nobles, gentry and Church—the educated classes generally—were crushed. It must, however, be noted that one class of the measures taken to punish the old governing part of the population of Poland has been very favourable to the majority. The peasants were freed in Lithuania, and in Poland proper much was done to improve their position.

CHAPTER XXIX

PHYSICAL FEATURES

A. AUSTRIA

AUSTRIA (Ger. *Österreich*) is bounded E. by Russia and Rumania, S. by Hungary, the Adriatic Sea and Italy, W. by Switzerland, Liechtenstein and the German empire (Bavaria), and N. by the German empire (Saxony and Prussia) and Russia. It has an area of 115,533 sq. m., or about twice the size of England and Wales together. Austria does not form a geographical unity, and the constituent parts of this empire belong to different geographical regions. Thus, Tirol, Styria and Carinthia belong, like Switzerland, to the system of the Alps, but these provinces together with those lying in the basin of the Danube form, nevertheless, a compact stretch of country. On the other hand Galicia, extending on the eastern side of the Carpathians, belongs to the great plain of Russia; Bohemia stretches far into the body of Germany; while Dalmatia, which is quite separated from the other provinces, belongs to the Balkan Peninsula.

Coasts.—Austria has amongst all the great European countries the most continental character, in so far as its frontiers are mostly land-frontiers, only about one-tenth of them being coast-land. The Adriatic coast, which stretches for a distance of about 1000 m., is greatly indented. The Gulf of Trieste on the west, and the Gulf of Fiume or Quarnero on the east, include between them the peninsula of Istria, which has many sheltered bays. In the Gulf of Quarnero are the Quarnero islands, of which the most important are Cherso, Veglia and Lussin. The coast west of the mouth of the Isonzo is fringed by lagoons, and has the same character as the Venetian coast, while the Gulf of Trieste and the Istrian peninsula have a steep coast with many bays and safe harbours. The principal ports are Trieste, Capodistria, Pirano, Parenzo, Rovigno and Pola, the great naval harbour and arsenal of Austria. The coast of Dalmatia also possesses many safe bays, the principal being those of Zara, Cattaro and Ragusa, but in some places it is very steep and inaccessible. On the other hand a string of islands extends along this coast, which offer many safe and easily accessible places of anchorage to ships during the fierce winter gales which rage in the Adriatic. The principal are Pago, Pasman, Isola Lunga and Isola Incoronata, Brazza, Lesina, Curzola and Meleda.

Mountains.—Austria is the most mountainous country of Europe after Switzerland, and about four-fifths of its entire area is more than 600 ft. above the level of the sea. The mountains of Austria belong to three different mountain systems, namely, the Alps, the Carpathians and the Bohemian-Moravian Mountains. The Danube, which is the principal river of Austria, divides the Alpine region, which occupies the whole country lying at its south, from the Bohemian-Moravian Mountains and their offshoots lying at its north; while the valleys of the March and the Oder separate the last-named mountains from the Carpathians. Of the three principal divisions of the Alps—the western, the central and the eastern Alps—Austria is traversed by several groups of the central Alps, while the eastern Alps lie entirely within its territory. The eastern Alps are continued by the Karst mountains, which in their turn are continued by the Dinaric Alps, which stretch through Croatia and Dalmatia. The second great mountain-system of Austria, the Carpathians, occupy its eastern and north-eastern portions, and stretch in the form of an arch through Moravia, Silesia, Galicia and Bukovina, forming the frontier towards Hungary, within which territory

they principally extend. Finally, the Bohemian-Moravian Mountains, which enclose Bohemia and Moravia, and form the so-called quadrilateral of Bohemia, constitute the link of the Austrian mountain-system with the hilly region (the *Mittelgebirge*) of central Europe. Only a little over 25 % of the area of Austria is occupied by plains. The largest is the plain of Galicia, which is part of the extensive Sarmatic plain; while in the south, along the Isonzo, Austria comprises a small part of the Lombardo-Venetian plain. Several smaller plains are found along the Danube, as the Tulner Becken in Lower Austria, and the Wiener Becken, the plain on which the capital is situated; to the north of the Danube this plain is called the Marchfeld, and is continued under the name of the Marchebene into Moravia as far north as Olmütz. Along the other principal rivers there are also plains of more or less magnitude, some of them possessing tracts of very fertile soil.

Rivers.—Austria possesses a fairly great number of rivers, pretty equally distributed amongst its crown lands, with the exception of Istria and the Karst region, where there is a great scarcity of even the smallest rivers. The principal rivers are: the Danube, the Dniester, the Vistula, the Oder, the Elbe, the Rhine and the Adige or Etsch. As the highlands of Austria form part of the great watershed of Europe, which divides the waters flowing northward into the North Sea or the Baltic from those flowing southward or eastward into the Mediterranean or the Black Sea, its rivers flow in three different directions—northward, southward and eastward. With the exception of the small streams belonging to it which fall into the Adriatic, all its rivers have their mouths in other countries, and its principal river, the Danube, has also its source in another country. When it enters Austria at the gorge of Passau, where it receives the Inn, a river which has as large a body of water as itself, the Danube is already navigable. Till it leaves the country at Hainburg, just before Pressburg, its banks are pretty closely hemmed by the Alps, and the river passes through a succession of narrow defiles. But the finest part of its whole course, as regards the picturesqueness of the scenery on its banks, is between Linz and Vienna. Where it enters Austria the Danube is 898 ft. above the level of the sea, and where it leaves it is only 400 ft.; it has thus a fall within the country of 498 ft., and is at first a very rapid stream, becoming latterly much slower. The Danube has in Austria a course of 234 m., and it drains an area of 50,377 sq. m. Its principal affluents in Austria, besides the Inn, are the Traun, the Enns and the March. The Dniester, which, like the Danube, flows into the Black Sea, has its source in the Carpathians in Eastern Galicia, and pursues a very winding course towards the south-east, passing into Russia. It has in Austria a course of 370 m., of which 300 are navigable, and drains an area of 12,000 sq. m. The Vistula and the Oder both fall into the Baltic. The former rises in Moravia, flows first north through Austrian Silesia, then takes an easterly direction along the borders of Prussian Silesia, and afterwards a north-easterly, separating Galicia from Russian Poland, and leaving Austria not far from Sandomir. Its course in Austria is 240 m., draining an area of 15,500 sq. m. It is navigable for nearly 200 m., and its principal affluents are the Dunajec, the San and the Bug. The Oder has also its source in Moravia, flows first east and then north-east through Austrian Silesia into Prussia. Its length within the Austrian territory is only about 55 m., no part of which is navigable. The only river of this country which flows into the North Sea is the Elbe. It has its source in the Riesengebirge, not far from the Schneekoppe, flows first south, then west, and afterwards north-west through Bohemia, and then enters Saxony. Its principal affluents are the Adler, Iser and Eger, and, most important of all, the Moldau. The Elbe has a course within the Austrian dominions of 185 m., for about 65 of which it is navigable. It drains an area of upwards of 21,000 sq. m. The Rhine, though scarcely to be reckoned a river of the country, flows for about 25 m. of its course between it and Switzerland. The principal river of Austria which falls into the Adriatic is the Adige or Etsch. It rises in the mountains of Tirol, flows south, then east, and afterwards south, into the plains of Lombardy. It has in Austria a course of 138 m., and drains an area of 4266 sq. m. Its principal affluent is

the Eisak. Of the streams which have their course entirely within the country, and fall into the Adriatic, the principal is the Isonzo, 75 m. in length, but navigable only for a short distance from its mouth.

Lakes.—Austria does not possess any great lakes; but has numerous small mountain lakes situated in the Alpine region, the most renowned for the beauty of their situation being found in Salzburg, Salzkammergut, Tirol and Carinthia. There should also be mentioned the periodical lakes situated in the Karst region, the largest of them being the Lake of Zirknitz. The numerous and large marshes, found now mostly in Galicia and Dalmatia, have been greatly reduced in the other provinces through the canalization of the rivers, and other works of sanitation.

Mineral Springs.—No other European country equals Austria in the number and value of its mineral springs. They are mostly to be found in Bohemia, and are amongst the most frequented watering-places in the world. The most important are, the alkaline springs of Carlsbad, Marienbad, Franzensbad and Bilin; the alkaline acidulated waters of Giesshübel, largely used as table waters; the iron springs of Marienbad, Franzensbad and of Pyrawarth in Lower Austria; the bitter waters of Püllna, Saidschitz and Sedlitz; the saline waters of Ischl and of Aussee in Styria; the iodine waters of Hall in Upper Austria; the different waters of Gastein; and lastly the thermal waters of Teplitz-Schönau, Johannisbad, and of Römerbad in Styria. Altogether there are reckoned to exist over 1500 mineral springs, of which many are not used.

Climate.—The climate of Austria, in consequence of its great extent, and the great differences in the elevation of its surface, is very various. It is usual to divide it into three distinct zones. The most southern extends to 46° N. lat., and includes Dalmatia and the country along the coast, together with the southern portions of Tirol and Carinthia. Here the seasons are mild and equable, the winters are short (snow seldom falling), and the summers last for five months. The vine and maize are everywhere cultivated, as well as olives and other southern products. In the south of Dalmatia tropical plants flourish in the open air. The central zone lies between 46° and 49° N. lat., and includes Lower and Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Central and Northern Tirol, Southern Moravia and a part of Bohemia. The seasons are more marked here than in the preceding. The winters are longer and more severe, and the summers are hotter. The vine and maize are cultivated in favourable situations, and wheat and other kinds of grain are generally grown. The northern zone embraces the territory lying north of 49° N. lat., comprising Bohemia, Northern Moravia, Silesia and Galicia. The winters are here long and cold; the vine and maize are no longer cultivated, the principal crops being wheat, barley, oats, rye, hemp and flax. The mean annual temperature ranges from about 59° in the south to 48° in the north. In some parts of the country, however, it is as low as 46° 40' and even 36°. In Vienna the average annual temperature is 50°, the highest temperature being 94°, the lowest 2° Fahr. In general the eastern part of the country receives less rain than the western. In the south the rains prevail chiefly in spring and autumn, and in the north and central parts during summer. Storms are frequent in the region of the south Alps and along the coast. In some parts in the vicinity of the Alps the rainfall is excessive, sometimes exceeding 60 in. It is less among the Carpathians, where it usually varies from 30 to 40 in. In other parts the rainfall usually averages from 20 to 24 in.

Flora.—From the varied character of its climate and soil the vegetable productions of Austria are very diverse. It has floras of the plains, the hills and the mountains; an alpine flora, and an arctic flora; a flora of marshes, and a flora of steppes; floras peculiar to the clay, the chalk, the sandstone and the slate formations. The number of different species is estimated at 12,000, of which one-third are phanerogamous, or flowering plants, and two-thirds cryptogamous, or flowerless. The crown land of Lower Austria far surpasses in this respect the other divisions of the country, having about four-ninths of the whole, and not less than 1700 species of flowering plants. As stated above, Austria is a very mountainous country and the mountains are frequently covered with vegetation to a great elevation. At the base are found vines and maize; on the lower slopes are green pastures, or wheat, barley and other kinds of corn; above are often forests of oak, ash, elm, &c.; and still higher the yew and the fir may be seen braving the climatic conditions. Corn grows to between 3400 and 4500 ft. above the level of the sea, the forests extend to 5600 or 6400 ft., and the line of perpetual snow is from 7800 to 8200 ft.

Fauna.—The animal kingdom embraces, besides the usual domestic animals (as horses, cattle, sheep, swine, goats, asses, &c.), wild boars, deer, wild goats, hares, &c.; also bears, wolves, lynxes, foxes, wild cats, jackals, otters, beavers, polecats, martens, weasels and the like. Eagles and hawks are common, and many kinds of singing birds. The rivers and lakes abound in different kinds of fish, which are also plentiful on the sea-coast. Among the insects the bee and the silkworm are the most useful. The leech forms an article of trade. In all there are 90 different species of mammals, 248 species of birds, 377 of fishes and more than 13,000 of insects.

Divisions.—Austria is composed of seventeen "lands," called also "crown lands." Of these, three—namely, Bohemia, Galicia and Lodomeria, and Dalmatia—are kingdoms; two—Lower and Upper Austria—archduchies; six—Jalzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola,

Silesia and Bukovina—duchies; two—Görz-Gradisca and Tirol—countships of princely rank (*gefürstete Grafshafren*); two—Moravia and Istria—margraviates (march counties). Vorarlberg bears the title simply of "land." Trieste, with its district, is a town treated as a special crown land. For administrative purposes Trieste, with Görz-Gradisca and Istria, constituting the Küstenland (the Coast land) and Tirol and Vorarlberg, are each comprehended as one administrative territory. The remaining lands constitute each an administrative territory by itself.

B. HUNGARY

Hungary (Hungarian *Magyarország*) is bounded E. by Austria (Bukovina) and Rumania; S. by Rumania, Servia, Bosnia and Austria (Dalmatia); W. by Austria (Istria, Carniola, Styria and Lower Austria); and N. by Austria (Moravia, Silesia and Galicia). It has an area of 125,402 sq. m., being thus about 4000 sq. m. larger than Great Britain and Ireland. Hungary, unlike Austria, presents a remarkable geographical unity. It is almost exclusively continental, having only a short extent of seaboard on the Adriatic (a little less than 100 m.). Its land-frontiers are for the most part well defined by natural boundaries: on the N.W., N., E. and S.E. the Carpathian mountains; on the S. the Danube, Save and Unna. On the W. they are not so clearly marked, being formed partly by low ranges of mountains and partly by the rivers March and Leitha. From the last-mentioned river are derived the terms Cisleithania and Transleithania, applied to Austria and Hungary respectively.

General Division.—The kingdom of Hungary in its widest extent, or the "Realm of the Crown of St Stephen," comprises Hungary proper (*Magyarország*), with which is included the former grand principality of Transylvania, and the province of Croatia-Slavonia. This province enjoys to a large extent autonomy, granted by the so-called compromise of 1868. The town and district of Fiume, though united with Hungary proper in respect of administration, possess a larger measure of autonomy than the other cities endowed with municipal rights. Of the total area of the kingdom Hungary proper has 108,982 sq. m. and Croatia-Slavonia 16,420 sq. m.

Mountains.—Orographically Hungary is composed of an extensive central plain surrounded by high mountains. These mountains belong to the Carpathians and the Alps, which are separated by the valley of the Danube. But by far the greater portion of the Hungarian highlands belongs to the Carpathian mountains, which begin, to the north, on the left bank of the Danube at Dévény near Pressburg (Pozsony), run in a north-easterly and easterly direction, sways round south-eastward and then westward in a vast irregular semicircle, and end near Orsova at the Iron Gates of the Danube, where they meet the Balkan mountains. The greatest elevations are in the Tatra mountains of the north of Hungary proper, in the east and south of Transylvania (the Transylvanian Alps) and in the eastern portion of the Banat. The highest peak, the Gerlsdorf or Spitze or Gerlachfalva, situated in the Tatra group, has an altitude of 8700 ft. The portion of Hungary situated on the right bank of the Danube is filled by the Alpine system, namely, the eastern outlying groups of the Alps. These groups are the Leitha mountains, the Styrian highlands, the Lower Hungarian highlands, which are a continuation of the former, and the Bakony Forest. The Bakony Forest, which lies entirely within Hungarian territory, extend to the Danube in the neighbourhood of Budapest, the highest peak being Köröshegy (2320 ft.). The south-western portion of this range is specially called Bakony Forest, while the ramifications to the north-east are known as the Vértes group (1575 ft.), and the Pilis group (2476 ft.). The Lower Hungarian highlands extend between the Danube, the Mur, and Lake Balaton, and attain in the Mesek hills near Mohács and Pécs an altitude of 2200 ft. The province of Croatia-Slavonia belongs mostly to the Karst region, and is traversed by the Dinaric Alps.

Plains.—The mountain systems enclose two extensive plains, the smaller of which, called the "Little Hungarian Alföld" or "Pressburg Basin," covers an area of about 6000 sq. m., and lies to the west of the Bakony and Mátra ranges, which separate it from the "Pest Basin" or "Great Hungarian Alföld." This is the largest plain in Europe, and covers about 37,000 sq. m., with an average elevation above sea-level of from 300 to 350 ft. The Pest Basin extends over the greater portion of central and southern Hungary, and is traversed by the Theiss (Tisza) and its numerous tributaries. This immense tract of low land, though in some parts covered with barren wastes of sand, alternating with marshes, presents in general a very rich and productive soil. The monotonous aspect of the Alföld is in summer time varied by the *déli-báb*, or *Fata Morgana*.

Caverns.—The numerous caverns deserve a passing notice. The Aggtelek or Baradla cave, in the county of Gömör, is one of the largest in the world. In it various fossil mammalian remains have been found. The Fonácsa cave, in the county of Bihar, has also yielded fossils. No less remarkable are the Okno, Vodi and Deményfalva caverns in the county of Liptó, the Veterani in the Banat and the ice cave at Dobsina in Gömör county. Of the many interesting caverns in Transylvania the most remarkable are the sulphurous Búdós in the county of Háromszék, the Almás to the south of Udvarhely and the brook-traversed rocky caverns of Csetate-Boli, Pestere and Ponor in the southern mountains of Hunyad county.

Rivers.—The greater part of Hungary is well provided with both rivers and springs, but some trachytic and limestone mountainous districts show a marked deficiency in this respect. The Mátra group, e.g., is poorly supplied, while the outliers of the Vértes mountains towards the Danube are almost entirely wanting in streams, and have but few water sources. A relative scarcity in running waters prevails in the whole region between the Danube and the Drave. The greatest proportionate deficiency, however, is observable in the arenaceous region between the Danube and Theiss, where for the most part only periodical floods occur. But in the north and east of the kingdom rivers are numerous. Owing to its orographical configuration the river system of Hungary presents several characteristic features. The first consists in the parallelism in the course of its rivers, as the Danube and the Theiss, the Drave and the Save, the Waag with the Neutra and the Gran, &c. The second is the direction of the rivers, which converge towards the middle of the country, and are collected either mediately or immediately by the Danube. Only the Zsil, the Aluta and the Bodza or Buzeu pierce the Transylvanian Alps, and flow into the Danube outside Hungary. Another characteristic feature is the uneven distribution of the navigable rivers, of which Upper Hungary and Transylvania are almost completely devoid. But even the navigable rivers, owing to the direction of their course, are not available as a means of external communication. The only river communication with foreign countries is furnished by the Danube, on the one hand towards Austria and Germany, and on the other towards the Black Sea. All the rivers belong to the watershed of the Danube, with the exception of the Poprád in the north, which as an affluent of the Dunajec flows into the Vistula, and of a few small streams near the Adriatic. The Danube enters Hungary through the narrow defile called the *Porta Hungarica* at Dévény near Pressburg, and after a course of 585 m. leaves it at Orsova by another narrow defile, the Iron Gate. Where it enters Hungary the Danube is 400 ft. above sea-level, and where it leaves it is 127 ft. ; it has thus a fall within the country of 273 ft. It forms several large islands, as the Great Schütt, called in Hungarian *Czallóköz* or the deceiving island, with an area of nearly 1000 sq. m. ; the St Andrew's or *Szent-Endre* island ; the *Csepel* island ; and the *Margitta* island. The principal tributaries of the Danube in Hungary, of which some are amongst the largest rivers in Europe, are, on the right, the Raab, Drave and Save, and, on the left, the Waag, Neutra, Gran, Eipel, Theiss (the principal affluent, which receives numerous tributaries), Temes and Cserna. The total length of the river system of Hungary is about 8800 m., of which only about one-third is navigable, while of the navigable part only one-half is available for steamers. The Danube is navigable for steamers throughout the whole of its course in Hungary. Regulating works have been undertaken to ward off the dangers of periodical inundations, which occur in the valley of the Danube and of the other great rivers, as the Theiss, the Drave and the Save. The beds of these rivers, as well as that of the Danube, are continually changing, forming morasses and pools, and rendering the country near their banks marshy. Notwithstanding the work already done, such as canalizing and regulating the rivers, the erection of dams, &c., the problems of preventing inundations, and of reclaiming the marshes, have not yet been satisfactorily solved.

Canals.—Hungary is poorly supplied with canals. They are constructed not only as navigable waterways, but also to relieve the rivers from periodical overflow, and to drain the marshy districts. The most important canal is the *Franz Josef* canal between Béce and Bezdán, above Zombor. It is about 70 m. in length, and considerably shortens the passage between the Theiss and the Danube. A branch of this canal called *Új Csatorna* or *New Channel*, extends from Kis-Sztrapár, a few miles below Zombor, to Ujvidék, opposite *Petervárad*. The *Béga* canal runs from *Temesvár* to *Nagy-Becskerek*, and thence to *Titel*, where it flows into the Theiss. The *Versecz* and the *Berzava* canal, which are connected with one another, drain the numerous marshes of the Banat, including the *Alibunar* marsh. The *Berzava* canal ends in the river *Temes*. The *Sió* and the *Kapos* or *Zichy* canal between *Lake Balaton* and the Danube is joined by the *Sárvíz* canal, which drains the marshes south of *Sopron*. The *Berettyó* canal between the *Körös* and the *Berettyó* rivers, and the *Körös* canal along the *White Körös* were constructed in conjunction with the regulation of the Theiss, and for the drainage of the marshy region.

Lakes and Marshes.—Hungary has two large lakes, *Balaton* or *Platten-See*, the largest lake of southern Europe, and *Fertő* or *Neusiedler See*. The *Fertő* lake lies in the counties of *Moson* and *Sopron*, not far from the town of *Sopron*, and is about 23 m. in length by 6 to 8 m. in breadth. It is so shallow that it completely evaporated in 1865, but has filled again since 1870, at the same time changing its configuration. It lies in the marshy district known as the *Hanság*, through which it is in communication with the Danube. In the neighbourhood of this lake are very good vineyards. Several other small lakes are found in the *Hanság*. The other lowland lakes, as, for instance, the *Palics* near *Szabadka*, and the *Velencez* in the county of *Fehér*, are much smaller. In the deep hollows between the peaks of the Carpathians are many small lakes, popularly called "eyes of the sea." In the *puszta* are numerous small lakes, named generally *Fehér Tó* or *White Lakes*, because they evaporate in the summer leaving a white crust of soda on their bed. The vegetation around them contains plants characteristic of the sea shores. The largest of these lakes is the *Fehér Tó* situated to the north of *Szeged*.

As already mentioned large tracts of land on the banks of the principal rivers are occupied by marshes. Besides the Hanság, the other principal marshes are the Sárrét, which covers a considerable portion of the counties of Jász-Kun-Szolnok, Békés and Bihar; the Escedi Láp in the county of Szatmár; the Szernye near Munkács, and the Alibunár in the county of Torontál. Since the last half of the 19th century many thousands of acres have been reclaimed for agricultural purposes.

Climate.—Hungary has a continental climate—cold in winter, hot in summer—but owing to the physical configuration of the country it varies considerably. If Transylvania be excepted, three separate zones are roughly distinguishable: the "highland," comprising the counties in the vicinity of the Northern and Eastern Carpathians, where the winters are very severe and continue for half the year; the "intermediate" zone, embracing the country stretching northwards from the Drave and Mur, with the Little Hungarian Plain, and the region of the Upper Alföld, extending from Budapest to Nyiregyháza and Sárospatak; and the "great lowland" zone, including the main portion of the Great Hungarian Plain, and the region of the lower Danube, where the heat during the summer months is almost tropical. In Transylvania the climate bears the extreme characteristics peculiar to mountainous countries interspersed with valleys; whilst the climate of the districts bordering on the Adriatic is modified by the neighbourhood of the sea. The minimum of the temperature is attained in January and the maximum in July. The rainfall in Hungary, except in the mountainous regions, is small in comparison with that of Austria. The vast sandy wastes mainly contribute to the dryness of the winds on the Great Hungarian Alföld. Occasionally, the whole country suffers much from drought; but disastrous floods not unfrequently occur, particularly in the spring, when the beds of the rivers are inadequate to contain the increased volume of water caused by the rapid melting of the snows on the Carpathians. On the whole Hungary is a healthy country, excepting in the marshy tracts, where intermittent fever and diphtheria sometimes occur with great virulence.

The following table gives the mean temperature, relative humidity, and rainfall (including snow) at a series of meteorological stations during the years 1896–1900:

Stations.	Feet above Sea.	Mean Temperature (Fahrenheit).			Relative Humidity.	Rainfall in Inches.
		Annual.	Jan.	July.		
Selmeczbánya . . .	2037	46·2	27·9	64·8	79	35·29
Budapest	502	50·9	30·9	68·8	76	24·02
Keszthely	436	52·5	30·0	71·4	78	26·67
Zágráb	534	52·3	34·3	70·5	72	34·32
Fiume	16	56·9	43·6	72·7	75	70·39
Debreczen	423	50·2	28·6	70	79	22·26
Szeged	312	51·6	31·1	71·1	80	25·58
Nagyszeben	1357	48·9	25·9	69·1	79	28·66

Fauna.—The horned cattle of Hungary are amongst the finest in Europe, and large herds of swine are reared in the oak forests. The wild animals are bears, wolves, foxes, lynxes, wild cats, badgers, otters, martens, stoats and weasels. Among the rodents there are hares, marmots, beavers, squirrels, rats and mice, the last in enormous swarms. Of the larger game the chamois and deer are specially noticeable. Among the birds are the vulture, eagle, falcon, buzzard, kite, lark, nightingale, heron, stork and bustard. Domestic and wild fowl are generally abundant. The rivers and lakes yield enormous quantities of fish, and leeches also are plentiful. The Theiss, once better supplied with fish than any other river in Europe, has for many years fallen off in its productiveness. The culture of the silkworm is chiefly carried on in the south, and in Croatia-Slavonia.

Flora.—Almost every description of grain is found, especially wheat and maize, besides Turkish pepper or paprika, rape-seed, hemp and flax, beans, potatoes and root crops. Fruits of various descriptions, and more particularly melons and stone fruits, are abundant. In the southern districts almonds, figs, rice and olives are grown. Amongst the forest and other trees are the oak, which yields large quantities of galls, the beech, fir, pine, ash and alder, also the chestnut, walnut and filbert. The vine is cultivated over the greater part of Hungary, the chief grape-growing districts being those of the Hegyalja (Tokaj), Sopron, and Ruszt, Ménés, Somlyó (Schomlau), Bélye and Villány, Balaton, Neszmély, Visonta, Eger (Erlau) and Buda. Hungary is one of the greatest wine-producing countries in Europe, and the quality of some of the vintages, especially that of Tokaj, is unsurpassed. A great quantity of tobacco is also grown; it is wholly monopolized by the crown. In Hungary proper and in Croatia and Slavonia there are many species of indigenous plants, which are unrepresented in Transylvania. Besides 12 species peculiar to the former grand-principality, 14 occur only there and in Siberia.

CHAPTER XXX

POPULATION

A. AUSTRIA

ACCORDING to the preliminary results of the census taken on 31st of December 1910 Austria had a population of 28,567,898 inhabitants, showing an increase of 2,417,190 or 9·2 % over that of 1900. Every province shared in the increase, the populations in 1910 being respectively as follows: Lower Austria, 3,530,698; Upper Austria, 852,667; Salzburg, 214,997; Styria, 1,441,604; Carinthia, 394,735; Carniola, 525,083; Coastland, 894,457; Tirol and Vorarlberg, 1,092,292; Bohemia, 6,774,309; Moravia, 2,620,914; Silesia, 756,590; Galicia, 8,022,126; Bukowina, 801,364; and Dalmatia, 646,062. The principal feature revealed by the new census is again the steady decrease of the rural population and the massing of the inhabitants in great towns. Thus, 14,130,291 or 49·5 % of the total population were living in places with less than 2000 inhabitants, while in 1900 the proportion of the rural population was 53·6 %.

The number of emigrants between 1901-10 was 1,114,547; during the decade there was a net loss of 660,575 persons.

The census figures gave the population of the principal towns as follows: Vienna, 2,031,498; Trieste, 229,475; Prague, 224,721; Lemberg, 206,574; Graz, 151,668; Cracow, 150,318; Brünn, 125,008; Czernowitz, 86,870; Pilsen, 81,165; Zizkow, 72,195; Pola, 70,145; Linz, 67,859; Przemyśl, 54,069; Innsbruck, 53,194; Smichow, 51,815; Salzburg, 36,210; Wiener-Neustadt, 32,869; Reichenberg, 36,372.

Birth rate (1910) 33·4 per thousand; death-rate 21·2; marriage rate 7·6.

On 31st of December 1910, Bosnia-Herzegovina had a census population of 1,898,044, an increase of 329,952 or 21·04 % over 1895. In 1910 there were 77,176 births, and 51,834 deaths. The population of the principal towns was: Serajevo, 51,872; Mostar, 16,385; Banjaluka, 14,793; Tuzla, 11,333 and Bjelina, 10,069.

Races.—From an ethnographical point of view Austria contains a diversity of races; in fact no other European state contains within its borders so many nationalities as the Austrian empire. The three principal races of Europe—the Latin, the Teutonic and the Slavonic—are all represented in Austria. The Slavonic race, numbering 15,690,000, is numerically the principal race in Austria, but as it is divided into a number of peoples, differing from one another in language, religion, culture, customs and historical traditions, it does not possess a national unity. Besides, these various nationalities are geographically separated from one another by other races, and are divided into two groups. The northern group includes the Czechs, the Moravians, the Slovaks, the Ruthenians and the Poles; while the southern group contains the Slovenes, the Servians and the Croats. Just as their historical traditions are different, so are also the aspirations of these various peoples of the Slavonic race different, and the rivalries between them, as for instance between the Poles and the Ruthenians, have prevented them from enjoying the full political advantage due to their number. The Germans, numbering 9,171,614, constitute the most numerous nationality in Austria, and have played and still play the principal rôle in the political life of the country. The Germans are in a relative majority over the other peoples in the empire, their language is the vehicle of communication between all the other peoples both in official life and in the press; they are in a relatively more advanced state of culture, and they are

spread over every part of the empire. Historically they have contributed most to the foundation and to the development of the Austrian monarchy, and think that for all the above-mentioned reasons they are entitled to the principal position amongst the various nationalities of Austria. The Latin race is represented by the Italians, Ladini and Rumanians.

The following table gives the numbers of different nationalities, as determined by the languages spoken by them in 1900 :—

Germans	9,171,614
Czechs and Slovaks	5,955,397
Poles	4,252,483
Ruthenians	3,381,570
Slovenes	1,192,780
Italians and Ladini	727,102
Servians and Croats	711,380
Rumanians	230,963
Magyars	9,516

The Germans occupy exclusively Upper Austria, Salzburg, Vorarlberg, and, to a large extent, Lower Austria; then the north and central part of Styria, the north and western part of Carinthia, and the north and central part of Tirol. In Bohemia they are concentrated round the borders, in the vicinity of the mountains, and they form nearly half the population of Silesia; besides, they are found in every part of the monarchy. The Czechs occupy the central and eastern parts of Bohemia, the greatest part of Moravia and a part of Silesia. The Poles are concentrated in western Galicia, and in a part of Silesia; the Ruthenians in eastern Galicia and a part of Bukovina; the Slovenes in Carniola, Görz and Gradišca, Istria, the south of Styria, and the Trieste territory. The Servians and Croats are found in Istria and Dalmatia; the Italians and Ladini in southern Tirol, Görz and Gradišca, Trieste, the coast of Istria, and in the towns of Dalmatia; while the Rumanians live mostly in Bukovina.

B. HUNGARY

Population.—According to the census taken on December 31, 1910, Hungary had a population of 20,886,487, an increase of 1,631,928 or 8·5 per cent over 1900. In 1910 there were 742,899 births, 490,689 deaths and 179,537 marriages. Emigration is decreasing: (1909) 113,315, (1910) 96,324, (1911) 54,173. Allowing for the number who returned the net loss was (1909) 96,330, (1910) 71,602, (1911) 23,809.

The census figures for the principal towns were: Budapest, 880,371; Szeged, 118,328; Szabadka, 94,610; Debreczen, 92,729; Pressburg, 78,223; Zágráb, 79,038; Temesvár, 72,555; Kecskemét, 66,834; Arad, 63,166; Hodmezö-Vásárhely, 62,445; Nagyvárad, 64,169; Kolozsvár, 60,808; Pécs, 49,822; Ujpest, 55,197; Miskolcz, 51,459; Fiume, 49,806; Kassa, 44,211; Békéscsaba, 42,599; Győr, 44,300; and Brassó, 41,056.

From 1870 to 1880 there was little increase of population, owing to the great cholera epidemic of 1872–1873, and to many epidemic diseases among children towards the end of the period. More normal conditions having prevailed from 1880 to 1890, the yearly increase rose from 0·13 % to 1·09 %, declining in the decade 1890–1900 to 1·03.

If compared with the first general census of the country, decreed by Joseph II. in 1785, the population of the kingdom shows an increase of nearly 108 % during these 116 years. Recent historical research has ascertained that the country was densely peopled in the 15th century. Estimates, based on a census of the tax-paying peasantry in the years 1494 and 1495, give five millions of inhabitants, a very respectable number, which explains fully the predominant position of Hungary in the east of Europe at that epoch. The disastrous invasion of the Turks, incessant civil wars and devastation by foreign armies and pestilence, caused a very heavy loss both of population and of prosperity. In 1715 and 1720, when the land was again free from Turkish hordes and peace was restored, the population did not exceed three millions. Then immigration began to fill the deserted plains once more, and by 1785 the population had trebled itself. But as the immigrants were of very different foreign nationalities, the country became a collection of heterogeneous ethnical elements, amid which the ruling Magyar race formed only a minority.

The most serious drain on the population is caused by emigration, due partly to the grinding poverty of the mass of the peasants, partly to the resentment of the subject races against the process of "Magyarization" to which they have long been subjected by the government. This movement reached its height in 1900, when 178,170 people left the country; in 1906 the number had sunk to 169,202, of whom 47,920 were women.¹ Altogether, since 1896 Hungary has lost about a million of its inhabitants through this cause, a serious source of weakness in a sparsely populated country; in 1907 an attempt was made by the Hungarian parliament to restrict emigration by law. The flow of emigration is mainly to the United States, and a certain number of the emigrants return (27,612 in

¹ In 1911 the emigration figures had sunk to 54,173.

1906) bringing with them much wealth, and Americanized views which have a considerable effect on the political situation. Of political importance also is the steady immigration of Magyar peasants and workmen into Croatia-Slavonia, where they become rapidly absorbed into the Croat population. From the Transylvanian counties there is an emigration to Rumania and the Balkan territories of 4000 or 5000 persons yearly.

This great emigration movement is the more serious in view of the very slow increase of the population through excess of births over deaths. The birth-rate is indeed high (40·2 in 1897), but with the spread of culture it is tending to decline (38·4 in 1902), and its effect is counteracted largely by the appalling death-rate, which exceeds that of any other European country except Russia.

In this respect, however, matters are improving, the death-rate sinking from 33·1 per thousand in 1881-1885 to 28·1 per thousand in 1896-1900. The improvement, which is mainly due to better sanitation and the draining of the pestilential marshes, is most conspicuous in the case of Hungary proper, which shows the following figures: 33·3 per thousand in 1881-1885, and 27·8 per thousand in 1896-1900.

Races.—One of the prominent features of Hungary being the great complexity of the races residing in it, the census returns of 1880, 1890 and 1900, exhibiting the numerical strength of the different nationalities, are of great interest. Classifying the population according to the mother-tongue of each individual, there were, in the civil population of Hungary proper, including Fiume:

Census.	Hungarians. (<i>Magyars</i>).	Germans (<i>Német</i>).	Slovaks (<i>Tót</i>).	Rumanians (<i>Oláh</i>).	Ruthenians (<i>Ruthén</i>).	Croatians (<i>Horvát</i>).	Serivians (<i>Szerb</i>).	Others.
1880	6,404,070	1,870,772	1,855,451	2,403,041	353,229	639,986		223,054
1890	7,357,936	1,990,084	1,896,605	2,580,079	379,786	194,412	495,133	259,803
1900	8,588,834	1,980,423	1,991,402	2,784,726	423,159	188,552	434,641	329,837

i.e. in percentages of the total population:

1880	46·58	13·61	13·49	17·48	2·57	4·65		1·62
1890	48·53	13·12	12·51	17·08	2·50	1·28	3·27	1·71
1900	51·38	11·88	11·88	16·62	2·52	1·17	2·60	1·95

The censuses show a decided tendency of change in favour of the dominating nationality, the Magyar, which reached an absolute majority in the decade 1890-1900. This is also shown by the data relating to the percentage of members of other Hungarian races speaking this language. Thus in 1900 out of a total civil population of 8,132,740, whose mother-tongue is not Magyar, 1,365,764 could speak Magyar. This represents a percentage of 16·8, while in 1890 the percentage was only 13·8. In Croatia-Slavonia the language of instruction and administration being exclusively Croat, the other races tend to be absorbed in this nationality. The Magyars formed but 3·8 %, the Germans 5·6 % of the population according to the census of 1900.

The various races of Hungary are distributed either in compact ethnographical groups, in larger or smaller colonies surrounded by other nationalities, or—e.g. in the Banat—so intermingled as to defy exact definition. The Magyars occupy almost exclusively the great central plain intersected by the Danube and the Theiss, being in an overwhelming majority in 19 counties (99·7 % in Hajdu, east of the Theiss). With these may be grouped the kindred population of the three Szekel counties of Transylvania. In 14 other counties, on the linguistic frontier, they are either in a small majority or a considerable minority (61·6 % in Szatmár, 18·9 % in Torontál). The Germans differ from the other Hungarian races in that, save in the counties on the borders of Lower Austria and Styria, where they form a compact population in touch with their kin across the frontier, they are scattered in racial islets throughout the country. Excluding the above counties these settlements form three groups: (1) central and northern Hungary, where they form considerable minorities in seven counties (25 % in Szepes, 7 % in Komárom); (2) the Swabians of southern Hungary, also fairly numerous in seven counties (35·5 % in Baranya, 32·9 % in Temes, 10·5 % in Arad); (3) the Saxons of Transylvania, in a considerable minority in five counties (42·7 % in Nagy Küküllő, 17·6 % in Kis Küküllő). The Germans are most numerous in the towns, and tend to become absorbed in the Magyar population. The Slavs, the most numerous race after the Magyars, are divided into several groups: the Slovaks, mainly massed in the mountainous districts of northern Hungary; the Ruthenians, established mainly on the slopes of the Carpathians between Poprád and Máramaros Sziget; the Serbs, settled in the south of Hungary from the bend of the Danube eastwards across the Theiss into the Banat; the Croats, overwhelmingly preponderant in Croatia-Slavonia, with outlying settlements in the counties of Zala, Vas and Sopron along the Croatian and Styrian frontier. Of these the Slovaks are the most important, having an overwhelming majority in seven counties (94·7 % in Arva, 66·1 % in Sáros), a bare majority in three (Szepes, Bars and Pozsody) and a considerable minority in five (40·6 % in Gömör, 22·9 % in Abauj-Torna). The Ruthenians are not in a majority in any county, but in four they form a minority of from 36 to 46 %

(Máramaros, Bereg, Ugocsa, Ung) and in three others (Sáros, Zemplén, Szepes) a minority of from 8.2 to 19.7 %. The Serbs form considerable minorities in the counties of Torontál (31.2 %), Bács-Bodrog (19.0 %) and Temes (21.4 %). Next to the Slav races in importance are the Rumanians (Vlachs), who are in an immense majority in ten of the eastern and south-eastern counties (90.2 % in Fogaras), in eight others form from 30 to 60 % of the population, and in two (Máramaros and Torontál) a respectable minority.

The Jews in 1900 numbered 851,378, not counting the very great number who have become Christians, who are reckoned as Magyars. Their importance is out of all proportion to their number, since they monopolize a large portion of the trade, are with the Germans the chief employers of labour, and control not only the finances but to a great extent the government and press of the country. Owing to the improvidence of the Hungarian landowners and the poverty of the peasants the soil of the country is also gradually passing into their hands.

The Gipsies, according to the special census of 1893, numbered 274,940. Of these, however, only 82,000 gave Romany as their language, while 104,000 described themselves as Magyars and 67,000 as Rumanians. They are scattered in small colonies, especially in Gömör county and in Transylvania. Only some 9000 are still nomads, while some 20,000 more are semi-nomads. Other races, which are not numerous, are Armenians, Greeks, Bulgars, Albanians and Italians.

The ethnographical map of Hungary does much to explain the political problems of the country. The central plains, which have the most fertile soil, and from the geographical conditions of the country form its centre of gravity, are occupied almost exclusively by the Magyars, the most numerous and the dominant race. But all round these, as far as the frontiers, the country is inhabited by the other races, which, as a rule, occupy it in large, compact and uniform ethnographical groups. The only exception is formed by the Banat, where Magyars, Rumanians, Serbs, Bulgarians, Croats and Germans live mixed together. Another important fact is that these races are all in direct contact with kindred peoples living outside Hungary: the Rumanians in Transylvania and Banat with those in Rumania and Bukovina; the Serbs and Croats with those on the other bank of the Danube, the Save and the Unna; the Germans in western Hungary with those in Upper Austria and Styria; the Slovaks in northern Hungary with those in Moravia; and lastly the Ruthenians with the Ruthenians of Galicia, who occupy the opposite slopes of the Carpathians. The centrifugal forces within the Hungarian kingdom are thus increased by the attraction of kindred nationalities established beyond its borders, a fact which is of special importance in considering the vexed and difficult racial problem in Hungary.

CHAPTER XXXI

AGRICULTURE AND MINERALS

A. AUSTRIA

Agriculture.—Notwithstanding the great industrial progress made by Austria during the last quarter of the 19th century, agriculture still forms the most important source of revenue of its inhabitants. In 1900 over 50 % of the total population of Austria derived their income from agricultural pursuits. The soil is generally fertile, although there is a great difference in the productivity of the various crown-lands owing to their geographical situation. The productive land of Austria covers 69,519,953 acres, or 93·8 % of the total area, which is 74,102,001 acres; to this must be added 0·4 of lakes and fish-ponds, making a total of 94·2 % of productive area. The remainder is unproductive, or used for other, not agricultural purposes. The area of the productive land has been steadily increasing—it was estimated to cover about 89 % in 1875,—and great improvements in the agricultural methods have also been introduced. Of the whole productive area of Austria, 37·6 % is laid out in arable land; 34·6 % in woods; 25·2 % in pastures and meadows; 1·3 % in gardens, 0·9 % in vineyards; and 0·4 % in lakes, marshes and ponds. The provinces having the largest proportion of arable land are Bohemia, Galicia, Moravia and Lower Austria. The principal products are wheat, rye, barley, oats, maize, potatoes, sugar beet and cattle turnip. The produce of the ploughed land does not, on the whole, suffice for the home requirements. Large quantities in particular of wheat and maize are imported from Hungary for home consumption. Only barley and oats are usually reaped in quantity for export. The provinces which have the lowest proportion of arable land are Tirol and Salzburg. Besides these principal crops, other crops of considerable magnitude are: buckwheat in Styria, Galicia, Carniola and Carinthia; rape and rape-seed in Bohemia and Galicia, poppy in Moravia and Silesia; flax in Bohemia, Moravia, Styria and Galicia; hemp in Galicia, chicory in Bohemia; tobacco, which is a state monopoly, in Galicia, Bukovina, Dalmatia and Tirol; fuller's thistle in Upper Austria and Styria; hops in Bohemia, including the celebrated hops round Saaz, in Galicia and Moravia; rice in the Küstenland; and cabbage in Bohemia, Galicia, Lower Austria and Styria. The principal garden products are kitchen vegetables and fruit, of which large quantities are exported. The best fruit districts are in Bohemia, Moravia, Upper Austria and Styria. Certain districts are distinguished for particular kinds of fruit, as Tirol for apples, Bohemia for plums, Dalmatia for figs, pomegranates and olives. The chestnut, olive and mulberry trees are common in the south—chiefly in Dalmatia, the Küstenland and Tirol; while in the south of Dalmatia the palm grows in the open air, but bears no fruit.

The vineyards of Austria covered in 1901 an area of 626,044 acres, the provinces with the largest proportion of vineyards being Dalmatia, the Küstenland, Lower Austria, Styria and Moravia. The wines of Dalmatia are mostly sweet wines, and not suitable to be kept for long periods, while those of the other provinces are not so sweet, but improve with age.

Forests.—The forests occupy just a little over one-third of the whole productive area of Austria, and cover 24,157,709 acres. In the forests tall timber predominates to the extent of 85 %, and consists of conifers much more than of green or leaved trees, in the proportion of seventy against fifteen out of the 85 % of the total forests laid out

in tall timber. Exceptions are the forest lands of the Karst region, where medium-sized trees and underwood occupy 80 %, and of Dalmatia, where underwood occupies 92.6 % of the whole forest land. The Alpine region is well wooded, and amongst the other provinces Bukovina is the most densely wooded, having 43.2 % of its area under forests, while Galicia with 25.9 % is the most thinly wooded crown-land of Austria. The forests are chiefly composed of oak, pine, beech, ash, elm and the like, and constitute one of the great sources of wealth of the country. Forestry is carried on in a thoroughly scientific manner. Large works of afforestation have been undertaken in Carinthia, Carniola and Tirol with a view of checking the periodical inundations, while similar works have been successfully carried out in the Karst region.

Landed Property.—Of the whole territory of the state, 74,102,001 acres, about 29 % is appropriated to large landed estates; 71 % is disposed of in medium and smaller properties. Large landed property is most strongly represented in Bukovina, where it absorbs 46 % of the whole territory, and in Salzburg, Galicia, Silesia and Bohemia. To the state belongs 4½ % of the total territory. The Church, the communities, and the corporations are also in possession of large areas of land; 4 % (speaking roundly) of the territory of Austria is held on the tenure of *fidei-commissum*. Of the entire property in large landed estates, 59 % is laid out in woods; of the property in *fidei-commissum*, 66 % is woodland; of the entire forest land, about 10 % is the property of the state, 14.5 % is communal property, and 3.8 % is the property of the Church. The whole of the territory in large landed estates includes 52 % of the entire forest land. The forest land held under *fidei-commissum* amounts to over 9 % of the entire forest land.

Live Stock.—Although richly endowed by nature, Austria cannot be said to be remarkable as a cattle-rearing country. Indeed, except in certain districts of the Alpine region, where this branch of human activity is carried on under excellent conditions, there is much room for improvement. The amount of live stock is registered every ten years along with the census of the population.

Census of the Population.

	1880.	1890.	1900.
Horses	1,463,282	1,548,197	1,711,077
Mules and asses	49,618	57,952	66,638
Cattle	8,584,077	8,643,936	9,506,626
Goats	1,006,675	1,035,832	1,015,682
Sheep	3,841,340	3,186,787	2,621,026
Pigs	2,721,541	3,549,700	4,682,734
Beehives	926,312	920,640	996,139

Austria is distinguished for the number and superiority of its horses, for the improvement of which numerous studs exist all over the country. All kinds of horses are represented, from the heaviest to the lightest, from the largest to the smallest. The most beautiful horses are found in Bukovina, the largest and strongest in Salzburg; those of Styria, Carinthia, Northern Tirol and Upper Austria are also famous. In Dalmatia, the Küstenland and Southern Tirol, horses are less numerous, and mules and asses in a great measure take their place. The finest cattle are to be found in the Alpine regions; of the Austrian provinces, Salzburg and Upper Austria contain the largest proportion of cattle. The number of sheep has greatly diminished, but much has been done in the way of improving the breeds, more particularly in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Upper and Lower Austria. The main object has been the improvement of the wool, and with this object the merino and other fine-wooled breeds have been introduced. Goats abound mostly in Dalmatia, Bohemia and Tirol. The rearing of pigs is carried on most largely in Styria, Bohemia, Galicia and Upper and Lower Austria. Bees are extensively kept in Carinthia, Carniola, Lower Austria and Galicia. The silk-worm is reared more particularly in Southern Tirol and in the Küstenland, and the average annual yield is 5,000,000 lb of cocoons. In the Alpine region dairy-farming has attained a great degree of development, and large quantities of butter and cheese are annually produced. Altogether, the rearing of cattle, with all its actual shortcomings, constitutes a great source of revenue, and yields a certain amount for export.

Fisheries.—The fisheries of Austria are very extensive, and are divided into river, lake and sea fisheries. The numerous rivers of Austria swarm with a great variety of fishes. The lake fisheries are mostly pursued in Bohemia, where pisciculture is an art of old standing, and largely developed. The sea-fisheries on the coast of Dalmatia and of the Küstenland constitute an important source of wealth to the inhabitants of these provinces. About 4000 vessels, with a number of over 16,000 fishermen, are employed, and the average annual catch realizes £240,000.

In the mountainous regions of Austria game is plentiful, and constitutes a large source of income.

Minerals.—In the extent and variety of its mineral resources Austria ranks among the

first countries of Europe. With the exception of platinum, it possesses every useful metal; thus, besides the noble metals, gold and silver, it abounds in ores of more or less richness in iron, copper, lead and tin. Rich deposits of coal, both pit coal and brown coal, are to be found, as well as extensive basins of petroleum, and large deposits of salt. In smaller quantities are found zinc, antimony, arsenic, cobalt, nickel, manganese, bismuth, chromium, uranium, tellurium, sulphur, graphite and asphalt. There are also marble, roofing-slate, gypsum, porcelain-earth, potter's clay and precious stones. It is therefore natural that mining operations should have been carried out in Austria from the earliest times, as, for instance, the salt mines of Hallstatt in Upper Austria, which had already been worked during the Celtic and Romanic period. Famous through the middle ages were also the works, especially for the extraction of gold and silver, carried out in Bohemia and Moravia, whose early mining regulations, for instance those of Iglau, were adopted in other countries. But the great industrial development of the 19th century, with its growing necessity for fuel, has brought about the exploitation of the rich coal-fields of the country, and to-day the coal mines yield the heaviest output of any mineral products. To instance the rapid growth in the extraction of coal, it is worth mentioning that in 1825 its output was about 150,000 tons; in 1875, or only after half a century, the output has become 100 times greater, namely, over 15,000,000 tons; while in 1900 it was 32,500,000 tons. Coal is found in nearly every province of Austria, with the exception of Salzburg and Bukovina, but the richest coal-fields are in Bohemia, Silesia, Styria, Moravia and Carniola in the order named. Iron ores are found more or less in all the crown-lands except Upper Austria, the Küstenland and Dalmatia, but it is most plentiful in Styria, Carinthia, Bohemia and Moravia. Gold and silver ores are found in Bohemia, Salzburg and Tirol. Quicksilver is found at Idría in Carniola, which after Almadén in Spain is the richest mine in Europe. Lead is extracted in Carinthia and Bohemia, while the only mines for tin in the whole of Austria are in Bohemia. Zinc is mostly found in Galicia, Tirol and Bohemia, and copper is extracted in Tirol, Moravia and Salzburg. Petroleum is found in Galicia, where ozocerite is also raised. Rock-salt is extracted in Galicia, while brine-salt is produced in Salzburg, Salzkammergut and Tirol. Graphite is extracted in Bohemia, Moravia, Styria and Lower Austria. Uranium, bismuth and antimony are dug out in Bohemia, while porcelain-earth is found in Bohemia and Moravia. White, red, black and variously-coloured marbles exist in the Alps, particularly in Tirol and Salzburg; quartz, felspar, heavy spar, rock-crystal and asbestos are found in various parts; and among precious stones may be specially mentioned the Bohemian garnets. The total value of the mines and foundry products throughout Austria in 1875 was £5,000,000. The number of persons employed in the mines and in the smelting and casting works in the same year was 94,019. The total value of the mining products throughout Austria in 1902 was £10,500,000, and the value of the product of the foundries was £3,795,000. Of this amount £3,150,000 represents the value of the iron, raw steel and pig-iron. The increase in the value of the mining products during the period 1892-1902 was 40%; and the increase in the product of the furnaces in the same period was 35%. The number of persons employed in 1902 in mining was 140,890; in smelting works, 7148; and in the extraction of salt, 7963. The value of the chief mining products of Austria in 1903 was: brown coal (21,808,583 tons), £4,182,516; coal (12,145,000 tons), £4,059,807; iron ores (1,688,960 tons), £615,273; lead ores, £135,965; silver ores, £119,637; quicksilver ores, £92,049; graphite, £78,437; tin ores, £78,275; copper ores, £22,119; manganese ores £5368; gold ores, £4407; asphalt, £2250; alum and vitriol slate, £992. The production of petroleum was 660,000 tons, and of salt 340,000 tons. The value of the principal products of the smelting furnaces in 1903 was: iron (955,543 tons), £2,970,866; coke, £862,137; zinc (metallic), £174,344; silver, £141,594; copper, £57,542; sulphuric acid, £8488; copper vitriol, £5710; mineral colours, £5565; lead, £5067; tin, £4566; gold, £878; iron vitriol, £603; litharge, £384; quicksilver, £218; coal briquettes, £92,000. In 1910 the total value of the mining products, exclusive of salt and petroleum, was £13,145,000, and that of the furnace products was £5,956,000. The amounts of the principal minerals and metals produced were: coal, 13,573,000 tons (14,631,000 tons in 1911); lignite, 24,722,000 tons (24,863,000 tons in 1911); iron ore, 2,586,000 tons; pig iron, 1,482,000 tons; graphite, 32,600 tons; lead, 15,200 tons; zinc, 12,200 tons; copper, 1440 tons; mercury, 592 tons; gold, 391 lbs. (401 lbs. in 1911); silver, 109,322 lbs.; salt, 341,000 tons. In Galicia, 1,737,000 tons of petroleum were extracted, valued at £1,850,000.

The Austrian government has bought the radium-producing pitchblende mines at Joachimsthal at a cost of about £94,000, and has thereby obtained what is practically a world's monopoly of radium. The annual production of ore from these mines is estimated at 22,000 lbs., which should contain about 46 grains of radium.

B. HUNGARY

Agriculture.—Hungary is pre-eminently an agricultural country and one of the principal wheat-growing regions of Europe. At the census of 1900 nearly 69% of the total population of the country derived their income from agriculture, forestry, horticulture and other

agricultural pursuits. The agricultural census taken in 1895 shows the great progress made in agriculture by Hungary, manifested by the increase in arable lands and the growth of the average production. The increase of the arable land has been effected partly by the reclamation of the marshes, but mostly by the transformation of large tracts of *puszta* (waste prairie land) into arable land. This latter process is growing every year, and is coupled with great improvements in agricultural methods, such as more intensive cultivation, the use of the most modern implements and the application of scientific discoveries. According to the agricultural census of 1895, the main varieties of land are distributed as follows :

	Hungary Proper.	Croatia-Slavonia.
By area in acres—		
Arable land	29,714,382	13,370,540
Gardens	928,053	136,354
Meadows	7,075,888	1,099,451
Vineyards	482,801	65,475
Pastures	9,042,267	1,465,930
Forests	18,464,396	3,734,094
Marshes	199,685	7,921
By percentage of the total area—		
Arable land	42·81	32·26
Gardens	1·34	1·31
Meadows	10·19	10·52
Vineyards	0·69	0·63
Pastures	13·03	14·03
Forests	26·60	35·74
Marshes	0·28	0·08

The remainder, such as barren territory, devastated vineyards, water and area of buildings, amounts to 5·1 % of the total.

The chief agricultural products of Hungary are wheat, rye, barley, oats and maize, the acreage and produce of which are shown in the following tables :

Area in Acres in Hungary Proper.

Cereal.	Average per Annum.			1900.	1907.
	1881-85.	1886-90.	1891-95.		
Wheat	6,483,876	7,014,891	7,551,584	8,142,303	8,773,440
Rye	2,475,301	2,727,078	2,510,093	2,546,738	2,529,350
Barley	2,420,393	2,491,422	2,407,469	2,485,117	2,885,160
Oats	2,460,080	2,546,582	2,339,297	2,324,992	2,898,780
Maize	4,567,186	4,681,376	5,222,538	5,469,050	7,017,270

Produce in Millions of Bushels.

Cereal.	Average per Annum.			1900.	1907.
	1881-85.	1886-90.	1891-95.		
Wheat	99·8	121·3	144·9	137·3	128·5
Rye	41·8	42·1	46·5	39·2	38·0
Barley	46·2	43·7	53·6	49·7	51·0
Oats	53·9	52·3	64·9	63·6	43·7
Maize	92·4	86·4	118·0	121·7	158·7

In Croatia-Slavonia no crop statistics were compiled before 1885. Subsequent returns for maize and wheat show an increase both in the area cultivated and quantity yielded. The former is the principal product of this province. Certain districts are distinguished for particular kinds of fruit, which form an important article of commerce both for inland consumption and for export. The principal of these fruits are : apricots round Kecskemét, cherries round Körös, melons in the Alföld and plums in Croatia-Slavonia. The vineyards of Hungary, which have suffered greatly by the phylloxera since 1881, show since 1900 a tendency to recover ground, and their area is again slowly increasing.

Forests.—Of the productive area of Hungary 26·60 % is occupied by forests, which for most part cover the slopes of the Carpathians. Nearly half of them belong to the state.

Live Stock.—The number of live stock in Hungary proper in two different years is shown in the following table :

Animal.	1884.	1895.
Horses	1,749,302	1,972,930
Cattle	4,879,334	5,829,483
Sheep	10,594,867	7,526,783
Pigs	4,803,777	6,447,134

In Croatia-Slavonia the live stock was numbered in 1895 at : horses, 309,098 ; cattle, 908,774 ; sheep, 595,898 ; pigs, 882,957. But the improved quality of the live stock is more worthy of notice than the growth in numbers.

The small Magyar horse, once famous for its swiftness and endurance, was improved during the Turkish wars, so far as height and beauty were concerned, by being crossed with Arabs ; but it degenerated after the 17th century as the result of injudicious cross-breeding. The breed has, however, been since improved by government action, the establishment of state studs supported since 1867 by annual parliamentary grants, and the importation especially of English stock. Large numbers of horses are exported annually.

Owing to its wide stretches of pasture-land Hungary is admirably suited for cattle-raising. The principal breeds are either native or Swiss (especially that of Simmenthal). The export trade in cattle is considerable, amounting in 1905 to 238,296 head of oxen, 56,540 cows, 23,765 bulls and 19,643 breeding cattle, as well as a large number of carcasses. Sheep are not stocked so extensively as cattle, and are tending rapidly to decrease, a result due to the spread of intensive cultivation and the rise in value of the soil. They are not exported, but there is a considerable export trade in wool.

Pigs are reared in large quantities all over the country, but the principal centres for distribution are Debreczen, Gyula, Barcs, Szeged and Budapest. They are exported in large numbers (408,000 in 1905), almost exclusively to Austria. There is also a considerable export trade in geese and eggs.

Minerals.—Hungary is one of the richest countries in Europe as regards both the variety and the extent of its mineral wealth. Its chief mineral products are coal, nitre, sulphur, alum, soda, saltpetre, gypsum, porcelain-earth, pipe-clay, asphalt, petroleum, marble and ores of gold, silver, mercury, copper, iron, lead, zinc, antimony, cobalt and arsenic. The principal mining regions are Zsepes-Gömör in Upper Hungary, the Kremnitz-Schemnitz district, the Nagybánya district, the Transylvanian deposits and the Banat. Gold and silver are chiefly found in Transylvania, where their exploitation dates back to the Roman period, and are mined at Zalatna and Abrudbánya ; rich deposits are also found in the Kremnitz-Schemnitz, and the Nagybánya districts. The average yearly yield of gold is about £100,000, and that of silver about the same amount. The sand of some of the rivers, as for instance the Maros, Szamos, Körös and Aranyos, is auriferous. Coal is extensively mined in the region of Budapest-Oravicza, Nagybánya, Zalatna, at Brennberg near Sopron, at Salgó-Tarján, Pécs, in the counties of Krassó-Szörény, and of Esztergom, and in the valley of the river Zsil. Iron is extracted in the counties of Zsepes, Gömör and Abauj-Torna. The production of coal and iron trebled during the period 1880–1900, amounting in 1900 to 6,600,000 tons, and 463,000 tons respectively. The principal salt-mines are in Transylvania at Torda, Parajd, Deésakna and Marós-Ujvár ; and in Hungary at Sztatina, Rónaszék and Sugatag. The salt-mines are a state monopoly. Hungary is the only country in Europe where the opal is found, namely at the famous mines of Vörösvágás in the county of Sáros, and at Nagy-Mihály in that of Zemplin. Other precious stones found are chalcidony, garnet, jacinth, amethyst, carnelian, agate, rock-crystals, &c. Amber is found at Magura in Zsepes, while fine marble quarries are found in the counties of Esztergom, Komárom, Veszprém and Szepes. The value of the mining (except salt) and smelting production in Hungary amounted in 1900 to £4,500,000, while in 1877 the value was only £1,500,000. The number of persons employed in mining and smelting works was (1900 census) 70,476.

Mining.—The total value of all mining and furnace products in 1910 was £6,364,000. The quantity of the leading minerals and metals produced was : lignite, 7,617,000 tons ; coal, 1,282,000 tons ; iron ore, 1,876,000 tons ; pig iron, 494,000 tons ; gold, 6,690lb. ; silver, 27,603 lb., and salt, 232,000 tons.

Mineral Springs.—Hungary possesses a great number of cold, and several hot mineral springs, some of them being greatly frequented. Among the principal in Hungary proper except Transylvania are those of Budapest, Mehádia, Eger, Sztubnya (Turóc county), Szliács (Zólyom county), Harkány (Baránya county), Pistyán (Nyitra county) and Trencsén-Teplitz, where there are hot springs. Cold mineral springs are at Bártfa, with alkaline ferruginous waters ; Czigelka, with iodate waters ; Parád, with ferruginous and sulphate springs ; Koritnicza or Korytnica, with strong iron springs ; and the mineral springs of Budapest. Among the principal health resorts of Hungary are Táttrafüred in the Táttra mountains, and Balatonfüred on the shores of Lake Balaton.

CHAPTER XXXII

INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

A. AUSTRIA

Industry.—The manufactures of Austria were much developed during the last quarter of the 19th century, although Austria as a whole cannot be said to be an industrial country. Austria possesses many favourable conditions for a great industrial activity. It possesses an abundance of raw materials, of fuel—both mineral and wood—of metals and minerals, in fact all the necessaries for a great and flourishing industry; and the rivers can easily be utilized as producers of motive power. It is besides densely populated, and has an adequate supply of cheap labour; while the undeveloped industries of the Balkan states also offer a ready market for its products. The glass manufacture in Bohemia is very old, and has kept up its leading position in the markets of the world up to the present day. Industrial activity is greatly developed in Bohemia, Lower Austria, Silesia, Moravia and Vorarlberg, while in Dalmatia and Bukovina it is almost non-existent. The principal branches of manufactures are the textile industry; the metallurgic industries; brewing and distilling; leather, paper and sugar; glass, porcelain and earthenware; chemicals; and scientific and musical instruments.

The textile industry in all its branches—cotton, woollen, linen, silk, flax and hemp—is mostly concentrated in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Lower Austria. It is an old industry, and one which has made great progress since 1875. Thus the number of mechanical looms increased more than threefold during this period, and numbered in 1902 about 120,000. In the same year the number of spindles at work was about 3,100,000. Austria had in 1902, 21,837 textile factories with 337,514 workmen. The principal seat of the manufacture of cotton goods is in northern Bohemia, from the Eger to Reichenberg, which can be considered as the Lancashire of Austria, Lower Austria between the Wiener Wald and the Leitha, and in Vorarlberg. Woollen goods are manufactured in the above places, and besides in Moravia, at Brünn and at Iglau; in Silesia; and at Biala in Galicia. Vienna is also distinguished for its manufacture of shawls. The coarser kind of woollen goods are manufactured all over the country, principally in the people's houses as a home industry. The most important places for the linen industry are in Bohemia at Trautenau; in Moravia and Silesia, while the commoner kinds of linen are mostly produced as a home industry by the peasants in the above-mentioned crown-lands. The manufacture of ribbons, embroidery and lace, the two latter being carried on principally as a house industry in Vorarlberg and in the Bohemian Erzgebirge, also thrives. The industry in stitched stuffs is especially developed in northern Bohemia. Ready-made men's clothes and oriental caps (fezes) are produced on a large scale in Bohemia and Moravia. The manufacture of silk goods is mainly carried on in Vienna, while the spinning of silk has its principal seat in southern Tirol, and to a smaller extent in the Küstenland.

The metallurgic industry forms one of the most important branches of industry, because iron ore of excellent quality is extracted annually in great quantities. The principal seats of the iron and steel manufactures are in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Upper and Lower Austria, Styria and Carinthia, which contain extensive iron-works. The most important manufactured products are cutlery, fire-arms, files, wire, nails,

tin-plates scythes, sickles, steel pens, needles, rails, iron furniture, drains, and kitchen utensils. A famous place for its iron manufacture is Steyr in Upper Austria. The manufacture of machinery, for industrial and agricultural purposes, and of railway engines is mainly concentrated in Vienna, Wiener-Neustadt, Prague, Brünn and Trieste; while the production of rolling stock for railways is carried on in Vienna, Prague and Graz. Shipbuilding yards for sea-vessels are at Trieste and Pola; while for river-vessels the largest yards are at Linz. Among other metal manufactures, the principal are copper works at Brixlegg and other places in Tirol, and in Galicia, tin and lead in Bohemia, and metallic alloys, especially *Pachfong* or German silver, an alloy of nickel and copper, at Berndorf in Lower Austria. The precious metals, gold and silver, are principally worked in the larger towns, particularly at Vienna and Prague. Vienna is also the principal seat for scientific and surgical instruments. In the manufacture of musical instruments Austria takes a leading part amongst European states, the principal places of production being Vienna, Prague, Königgrätz, Gralsitz and Schönbach.

The glass manufacture is one of the oldest industries in Austria, and is mainly concentrated in Bohemia. Its products are of the best quality, and rule the markets of the world. In the manufacture of earthenwares Austria plays also a leading part, and the porcelain industry round Carlsbad and in the Eger district in Bohemia has a world-wide reputation. The leather industry is widely extended, and is principally carried on in Lower Austria, Bohemia and Moravia. Vienna and Prague are great centres for the boot and shoe trade, and the gloves manufactured in these towns enjoy a great reputation. The manufacture of wooden articles is widespread over the country, and is very varied. In Vienna and other large towns the production of ornamental furniture has attained a great development. The industry in paper has also assumed great proportions, its principal seats being in Bohemia, Moravia, Upper and Lower Austria. Of food-stuffs, besides milling, and other flour products, the principal industry is the manufacture of sugar from beet-root. The sugar industry is almost exclusively carried on in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Galicia. It has attained such large proportions that large districts in those provinces have been converted from wheat-growing districts into fields for the cultivation of beet-root. Brewing is extensively carried on, and the beer produced is of a good quality. The largest brewing establishment is at Schwechat near Vienna, and large breweries are also found at Pilsen and Budweiss in Bohemia, whose products enjoy a great reputation abroad. There were in Austria 1341 breweries, which produced 422,993,120 gallons of beer, in 1902-1903. Distilling is carried on on a large scale in Galicia, Bukovina, Bohemia, Moravia and Lower Austria; the number of distilleries being 1257, which produced 30,435,812 gallons of spirit. Rosoglio, maraschino, and other liqueurs are made in Dalmatia and Moravia. The manufacture as well as the growth of tobacco is a government monopoly, which has 30 tobacco factories with over 40,000 workpeople, the largest establishment being at Hainburg in Lower Austria. Other important branches of industry are the manufacture of chemicals, in Vienna and in Bohemia; petroleum refineries in Galicia, and the extraction of various petroleum products; the manufacture of buttons; printing, lithographing, engraving and map-making, especially in Vienna, &c.

In 1900 the various manufacturing industries employed in Austria 3,138,800 persons, of whom 2,264,871 were workmen and 103,854 were labourers. Including families and domestic servants, a little over 7,000,000 were dependent on industry for their livelihood.

Trade.—On the basis of the customs and commercial agreement between Austria and Hungary, concluded in 1867 and renewable every ten years, the following affairs, in addition to the common affairs of the monarchy, are in both states treated according to the same principles:—Commercial affairs, including customs legislation; legislation on the duties closely connected with industrial production—on beer, brandy, sugar and mineral oils; determination of legal tender and coinage, as also of the principles regulating the Austro-Hungarian Bank; ordinances in respect of such railways as affect the interests of both states. In conformity with the customs and commercial compact between the two states, renewed in 1899, the monarchy constitutes one identical customs and commercial territory, inclusive of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the principality of Liechtenstein.

The foreign trade of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy is shown in the following table:—

Year.	Imports.	Exports.
1900	£70,666,000	£80,916,000
1901	68,833,000	78,541,000
1902	71,666,000	79,708,000
1903	78,200,000	88,600,000
1904	85,200,000	86,200,000
1905	89,430,000	93,500,000

The following tables give the foreign trade¹ of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as regards raw material and manufactured goods :—

Imports.

Articles.	Value in Millions Sterling.				
	1900.	1901.	1902.	1903.	1904.
Raw material (including articles of food ; raw material for agriculture and industry ; and mining and smelting products)	41·5	40·5	41·8	45·9	51·9
Semi-manufactured goods	9·6	9·6	10·3	10·6	10·8
Manufactured goods	19·5	18·7	19·5	21·6	22·5

Exports.

Articles.	Value in Millions Sterling.				
	1900.	1901.	1902.	1903.	1904.
Raw material (as above)	34·1	34·1	35·8	39	35·3
Semi-manufactured goods	12·6	11·1	11·1	12·4	12·6
Manufactured goods	34·2	33·3	32·8	37·2	38·3

The most important place of derivation and of destination for the Austro-Hungarian trade is the German empire with about 40 % of the imports, and about 60 % of the exports. Next in importance comes Great Britain, afterwards India, Italy, the United States of America, Russia, France, Switzerland, Rumania, the Balkan states and South America in about the order named. The principal articles of import are cotton and cotton goods, wool and woollen goods, silk and silk goods, coffee, tobacco and metals. The principal articles of export are wood, sugar, cattle, glass and glassware, iron and ironware, eggs, cereals, millinery fancy goods, earthenware and pottery, and leather goods.

Communications.—As regards internal communications, Austria is provided with an extensive network of railways, the industrial provinces being specially favoured. This has been accomplished in spite of the engineering difficulties owing to the mountainous nature of the country and of the great financial expenses resulting therefrom. The construction of the Semmering railway, opened in 1854, for instance, was the first mountain railway built in the European continent, and marked an epoch in railway engineering. The first railway laid down in Austria was in 1824 between Budweis and Kerschbaum, over a distance of 40 m., and was at first used for horse tramway. The first steam railway was opened in 1837 over a distance of about 10 m. between Floridsdorf (near Vienna) and Wagram. From the first, the policy of the Austrian government was to construct and to work the railways itself ; and in granting concessions to private companies it stipulated among its conditions the reversionary right of the state, whereby the line becomes the property of the state without compensation after the lapse of the period of concession. With various modifications, according to its financial means, it vigorously pursued its policy, by both building railways itself, and encouraging private companies to build. In 1905 the total length of railways in Austria was 13,590 m., of which 5017 m. belonged to and were worked by the state, and 3359 m. belonged to private companies, but were worked by the state.

At the end of 1910 Austria had 20,486 m. of railways, of which 7939 m. were state railways, 544 m. companies' lines worked by the state, and 3287 m. companies' lines worked by the companies. The revenue from the state railways was £26,000,000.

The length of the navigable rivers and canals was 4055 m., of which 825 m. were navigable for steamers. A bill was passed by the Austrian Parliament in 1912 for extending and improving the waterways and canals, on which £15,000,000 would be spent during the next 15 years. The principal works to be executed are in Galicia, Bohemia and Lower Austria. In Galicia the completion of the Vistula canal by building a canal from Cracow to Oswiecim was undertaken, and also the building of portions of navigable connection between the Oder and the Dniester. Work on the Cracow-Oswiecim canal began during 1912. The works

¹ The outstanding feature of the foreign trade has been the growing excess of imports over exports. This so-called "unfavourable balance of trade" which began in 1907 had grown steadily until in 1911 it amounted to over £32,000,000. Austro-Hungarian economists have come to consider this state of affairs as a normal condition of the existing economic development of the country, which is going through the transition from a mainly agricultural to an industrial state. Elsewhere the excess of imports is mainly due to the large importation of foodstuffs and raw materials, while the export of manufactured goods grows faster than the imports of similar character from abroad.

in Bohemia comprise the canalisation and regulation of the middle Elbe from Melnik to Jaromer, the completion of the Moldau canal in the district and town of Prague, and the continuation of the Moldau canal from Prague to Stechowitz. In Lower Austria, the Vienna-Danube canal is to be enlarged and a winter harbour to be built at Vienna.

Commercial Navy.—The commercial sea navy of Austria, excluding small coasting vessels and fishing-boats, consisted in 1900 of 154 vessels, with a tonnage of 198,322 tons, of which 123 vessels with a tonnage of 183,949 were steamers. The greatest navigation company is the Austrian Lloyd in Trieste, which in 1900 employed 70 steamers of 165,430 tons. During 1900 the total tonnage of vessels engaged in the foreign trade, which entered all the Austrian ports, was 1,448,764 tons under the Austro-Hungarian flag, and 888,707 under foreign flags; the total tonnage of vessels cleared during the same period was 1,503,532 tons under the Austro-Hungarian flag, and 866,591 under foreign flags. At Trieste in 1911 12,998 vessels of 4,271,073 tons entered; of these, 86 vessels of 283,176 tons were British.

B, HUNGARY.

Industrial Development.—Efforts to create a native industry date only from 1867, and, considering the shortness of the time and other adverse factors, such as scarcity of capital, lack of means of communication, the development of industry in the neighbouring state of Austria, &c., the industry of Hungary has made great strides. (Much of this progress is due to the state, one of the principal aims of the Hungarian government being the creation of a large and independent native industry. For this purpose legislation was promoted in 1867, 1881, 1890 and 1907. The principal facilities granted by the state are, exemption of taxation for a determined period of years, reduced railway fares for the goods manufactured, placing of government contracts, the grant of subsidies and loans and the foundation of industrial schools for the training of engineers and of skilled workmen.) The branches of industry which have received special encouragement are those whose products are in universal request, such as cotton and woollen goods, and those which are in the service of natural production. In this category are the manufacture of agricultural machines, of tools and implements for agriculture, forestry and mining; such industries as depend for their raw material on the exploitation of the natural resources of the country, viz. those related to agriculture, forestry, mining, &c. Lastly, encouragement is given to all branches of industry concerned with the manufacture of articles used in the more important Hungarian industries, *i.e.* machinery, or semi-manufactured goods which serve as raw material for those industries. For the period 1890–1905, an average of 40 to 50 industrial establishments with an invested capital of £1,250,000 to £1,750,000 were founded yearly.

The principal industry of Hungary is flour-milling. The number of steam-mills, which in 1867 was about 150, rose to 1723 in 1895 and to 1845 in 1905. Between 3,000,000 and 3,200,000 tons of wheat-flour are produced annually. The principal steam-mills are at Budapest; large steam-mills are also established in many towns, while there are a great number of water-mills and some wind-mills. The products of these mills form the principal article of export of Hungary. Brewing and distilling, as other branches of industry connected with agriculture, are also greatly developed. The sugar industry has made great strides, the amount of beetroot used having increased tenfold between 1880 and 1905. Other principal branches of industry are: tobacco manufactories, belonging to the state, tobacco being a government monopoly; iron foundries, mostly in the mining region; agricultural machinery and implements, notably at Budapest; leather manufactures; paper-mills, the largest at Fiume; glass (only the more common sort) and earthenwares; chemicals; wooden products; petroleum-refineries; woollen yarns and cloth manufactories, as well as several establishments of knitting and weaving. The various industrial establishments are located in the larger towns, but principally at Budapest, the only real industrial town of Hungary.

In 1900 the various industries of Hungary (including Croatia-Slavonia) employed 1,127,730 persons, or 12·8% of the earning population. In 1890 the number of persons employed was 913,010. Including families and domestic servants, 2,605,000 persons or 13·5% of the total population were dependent on industries for their livelihood in Hungary in 1900.

Commerce.—The following table gives the foreign trade of Hungary only for a period of years in millions sterling:—

Year.	Imports.	Exports.
1886–1890	37·3	37·5
1891–1895	43·7	44·1
1900	46·3	55·3
1907	66·0	64·7

Of the merchandise¹ entering the country, 75-80 % comes from Austria, and exports go to the same country to the extent of 75 %. Next comes Germany with about 10 % of the value of the total exports and 5 % of that of imports. The neighbouring Balkan states—Rumania and Servia—follow, and the United Kingdom receives somewhat more than 2 % of the exports, while supplying about 1.5 % of the imports. The principal imports are: cotton goods, woollen manufactures; apparel, haberdashery and linen; silk manufactures; leather and leather goods. The exports, which show plainly the prevailing agricultural character of the country, are flour, wheat, cattle, beef, barley, pigs, wine in barrels, horses and maize.

With but a short stretch of sea-coast, and possessing only one important seaport, Fiume, the mercantile marine of Hungary is not very developed. It consisted in 1905 of 434 vessels with a tonnage of 91,784 tons and with crews of 2359 persons. Of these 95 vessels with a tonnage of 89,161 tons were steamers. Fifty-four vessels with 84,844 tons and crews numbering 1168 persons were sea-going; 134 with 6587 tons were coasting-vessels, and 246 with 353 tons were fishing vessels.

At all the Hungarian ports in 1900 there entered 19,223 vessels of 2,223,302 tons; cleared 19,218 vessels of 2,226,733 tons. The tonnage of British steamers amounted to somewhat more than 11 % of the total tonnage of steamers entered and cleared.

Railways.—Hungary is covered by a fairly extensive network of railways, although in the sparsely populated parts of the kingdom the high road is still the only means of communication. The first railway in Hungary was the line between Budapest and Vác (Waitzen), 20 m. long, opened in 1846 (15th of July). After the Compromise of 1867, the policy of the Hungarian government was to construct its own railways, and to take over the lines constructed and worked by private companies.² In 1907 the total length of the Hungarian railways, in which over £145,000,000 had been invested, was 12,100 m., of which 5000 m. belonged to and were worked by the state, 5100 m. belonged to private companies but were worked by the state, and 2000 m. belonged to and were worked by private companies. The passengers carried in 1907 numbered 107,171,000, the goods traffic was 61,483,000 tons; the traffic receipts for the year were £16,420,000. The corresponding figures for 1880 were as follows: passengers carried, 9,346,000; goods carried, 11,225,000 tons; traffic receipts, £4,300,000. The so-called zone tariff, adopted for the first time in Europe by the Hungarian state railways, was inaugurated in 1889 for passengers and in 1891 for goods. The principle of this system is to offer cheap fares and relatively low tariffs for greater distances, and to promote, therefore, long-distance travelling. The zone tariff has given a great impetus both to passenger and goods traffic in Hungary, and has been adopted on some of the Austrian railways.

In 1907 the length of the navigable waterways of Hungary was 3200 m., of which 2450 m. were navigable by steamers.

Seaports.—On the Adriatic lies the port of Fiume, the only direct outlet by sea for the produce of Hungary. Its commanding position at the head of the Gulf of Quarnero, and spacious new harbour works, as also its immediate connexions with both the Austrian and Hungarian railway systems, render it specially advantageous as a commercial port. As shipping stations, Buccari, Portoré, Selče, Novi, Zengg, San Giorgio, Jablanac and Carlopago are of comparative insignificance. The whole of the short Hungarian seaboard is mountainous and subject to violent winds.

¹ Merchandise passing the boundaries is subject to declaration; the respective values are stated by a special commission of experts residing in Budapest.

² The acquisition of the Austrian Staatsbahn in 1891 practically gave to the state the control of the whole railway net of Hungary. By 1900 all the main lines, except the Südbahn and the Kaschan-Oberbergar Bahn, were in its hands.

CHAPTER XXXIII

RELIGION AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

A. AUSTRIA

Religion.—Religious toleration was secured throughout the Habsburg dominions by the patent of the 13th of October 1781, but Protestants were not given full civil rights until the issue of the *Protestantenpatent* of the 8th of April 1861, after the promulgation of the imperial constitution of the 26th of February. The principle underlying this and all subsequent acts is the guarantee to all religious bodies *recognized by law* of freedom of worship, the management of their own affairs, and the undisturbed possession and disposal of their property. Though all the churches are, in a sense, "established," the Roman Catholic Church, to which the sovereign must belong, is the state religion. The reigning house, however, though strongly attached to the Roman faith, has always resisted the extreme claims of the papacy, an attitude which in Joseph II.'s time resulted, under the influence of Febronianism, in what was practically a national schism. Thus the emperor retains the right to tax church property, to nominate bishops, and to prohibit the circulation of papal bulls without his permission. By the concordat of August 18, 1855, this traditional attitude was to some extent reversed; but this agreement soon became a dead letter and was formally denounced by the Austrian government after the promulgation of the dogma of papal infallibility.

Of the population of Austria in 1900, 23,796,814 (91 %) were Roman Catholics, including 3,134,439 uniate Greeks and 2096 uniate Armenians. There were 12,937 Old Catholics, in scattered communities, 606,764 members of the Eastern Orthodox Church, mainly in Bukovina and Dalmatia, and 698 Armenians, also mainly in Bukovina. The Protestants, who in the 16th century comprised 90 % of the population, are now only 1.9 %. In 1900, 365,505 of them were returned as belonging to the Augsburg Confession (Lutheran), 128,557 to the Helvetic (Reformed). Other Christian Confessions in Austria are Herrnhuters (Moravian Brethren) in Bohemia, Mennonites in Galicia, Lippovians (akin to the Russian Skoptsy) in Bukovina, and Anglicans. The Jews compose 4.7 % of the population, and are strongest in Galicia, Lower Austria, Bohemia, Moravia and Bukovina. The Roman Catholic Church is divided into eight provinces, seven of the Latin rite—Vienna, Prague, Lemberg, Salzburg, Olmütz, Görz and Zara—with 23 bishoprics, and one of the Greek rite (Lemberg), with two bishoprics. The Armenian bishoprics of Lemberg and the Austrian part of the archdiocese of Breslau are under the immediate jurisdiction of the Holy See. The Greek Orthodox Church has one archbishopric (at Czernowitz) and two bishoprics. There are 559 communities of the Jewish religion (253 in Galicia, and 255 in Bohemia). In 1900 there were, belonging to the Roman Catholic Church, 541 monasteries with 7775 monks, and 877 convents with 19,194 nuns; while the Greek Orthodox Church had 14 monasteries with 85 members. The Evangelical Church, according to the constitution granted by imperial decree on the 9th of April 1861 (modified by those of January 6, 1866 and December 9, 1891), is organized on a territorial basis, being administered by 10 superintendents, who are, in their turn, subject to the Supreme Church Council (*K.K. Oberkirchenrat*) at Vienna, the emperor as sovereign being technically head of the Church. The small Anglican community at Trieste is under the jurisdiction of the Evangelical superintendent of Vienna.

Education.—The system of elementary schools dates from the time of Maria Theresa; the present organization was introduced by the education law of May 14, 1869 (amended in 1883). By this law the control of the schools, hitherto in the hands of the Church, was assumed by the state, every local community being bound to erect and maintain public elementary schools. These are divided into *Volksschulen* (national or primary schools) and *Bürgerschulen* (higher elementary schools). Attendance is obligatory on all from the age of six to fourteen (in some provinces six to twelve). Religious instruction is given by the parish priest, but in large schools a special grant is made or a teacher *ad hoc* appointed in the higher classes (law of June 17, 1888). Private schools are also allowed which, if fulfilling the legal requirements, may be accorded the validity of public primary schools. The language of instruction is that of the nationality prevalent in the district. In about 40 % of the schools the instruction is given in German; in 26 % in Czech; in 28 % in other Slavonic languages, and in the remainder in Italian, Rumanian or Magyar. In 1903 there were in Austria 20,268 elementary schools with 78,025 teachers, frequented by 3,618,837 pupils, which compares favourably with the figures of the year 1875, when there were 14,257 elementary schools with 27,677 teachers, frequented by 2,050,808 pupils. About 88 % of the children who are of school age actually attend school, but in some provinces like Upper Austria and Salzburg nearly the full 100 attend, while in the eastern parts of the monarchy the percentage is much lower. In 1900 62 % of the total population of Austria could read and write, and 2.9 % could only read. In the number of illiterates are included children under seven years of age. For the training of teachers of elementary schools there were in 1900 54 institutions for masters and 38 for mistresses. In these training colleges, as also in the secondary or "middle" schools (*Mittelschulen*), religious instruction is also in the hands of the Roman Catholic Church; but, by the law of June 20, 1870, the state must provide for such teaching in the event of the Protestant pupils numbering 20 or upwards (the school authorities usually refuse to take more than 19 Protestants in consequence).

Besides the elementary schools three other groups of educational establishments exist in Austria: "middle" schools (*Mittelschulen*); "high" schools (*Hochschulen*); professional and technical schools (*Fachlehranstalten* and *Gewerbeschulen*). The "middle" schools include the classical schools (*Gymnasien*), "modern" schools with some Latin teaching (*Realgymnasien*), and modern schools simply (*Realschulen*). In 1903 there were 202 *Gymnasien*, 19 *Realgymnasien* and 117 *Realschulen*, with 7,121 teachers and 111,012 scholars. The "high" schools include the universities and the technical high schools (*Technische Hochschulen*). Of state universities there are eight:—Vienna, Gratz, Innsbruck, Prague (German), and Czernowitz, in which German is the language of instruction; Prague (Bohemian) with Czech; and Cracow and Lemberg with Polish as the language of instruction. Each university has four faculties— theology, law and political science, medicine and philosophy. In Czernowitz, however, the faculty of medicine is wanting. Since 1905 an Italian faculty of law has been added to the university of Innsbruck. The theological faculties are all Roman Catholic, except Czernowitz, where the theological faculty is Orthodox Eastern. All the universities are maintained by the state. The number of professors and lecturers was about 1596 in 1903; while the number of students was 17,498.)

Justice.—The judicial authorities in Austria are:—(1) the county courts, 963 in number; (2) the provincial and district courts, 74 in number, to which are attached the jury courts,—both these courts are courts of first instance; (3) the higher provincial courts, 9 in number, namely, at Vienna, Graz, Trieste, Innsbruck, Zara, Prague, Brünn, Cracow and Lemberg; these are courts of appeal from the lower courts, and have the supervision of the criminal courts in their jurisdiction; (4) the supreme court of justice and court of cassation in Vienna. The judicial organization is independent of the executive power. There are also special courts for commercial, industrial, shipping, military and other matters. There is also the court of the Empire at Vienna, which has the power to decide in case of conflict between different authorities.

B. HUNGARY

Religion.—There is in Hungary just as great a variety of religious confessions as there is of nationalities and of languages. None of them possesses an overwhelming majority, but perfect equality is granted to all religious creeds legally recognized. According to the census returns of 1900 in Hungary proper there were:

	Per Cent. of Population.
Roman Catholics	8,198,497 or 48.69
Uniat Greeks ¹	1,841,272 or 10.93
Greek Orthodox	2,199,195 or 13.06
Evangelicals—	
Augsburg confession, or Lutherans	1,258,860 or 7.48
Helvetian confession, or Calvinists	2,427,232 or 14.41
Unitarians	68,551 or 0.41
Jews	831,162 or 4.94
Others	13,486 or 0.08

¹ i.e. Catholics of the Oriental rite in communion with Rome.

In many instances nationality and religious faith are conterminous. Thus the Servians are mostly Greek Orthodox; the Ruthenians are Uniat Greeks; the Rumanians are either Greek Orthodox or Greek Uniats; the Slovaks are Lutherans; the only other Lutherans are the Germans in Transylvania and in the Zsepes county. The Calvinists are composed mostly of Magyars, so that in the country the Lutherans are designated as the "German Church," and the Calvinists as the "Hungarian Church." The Unitarians are all Magyars. Only to the Roman Catholic Church belong several nationalities. The Roman Catholic Church has 4 archbishops; Esztergom (Gran), Kalocsa, Eger (Erlau) and Zágráb (Agram), and 17 diocesan bishops; to the latter must be added the chief abbot of Pannonháma, who likewise enjoys episcopal rights. The primate is the archbishop of Esztergom, who also bears the title of prince, and whose special privilege it is to crown the sovereigns of Hungary. The Greek Uniat Church owns besides the archbishop of Esztergom the archbishop of Gyulafedérvár (Carlsburg), or rather Balásfalva (*i.e.* "the city of Blasius") and 6 bishops. The Armenian Uniat Church is partly under the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic bishop of Transylvania, and partly under that of the Roman Catholic archbishop of Kalocsa. The Orthodox Eastern Church in Hungary is subject to the authority of the metropolitan of Carlowitz and the archbishop of Nagyszeben (Hermannstadt); under the former are the bishops of Bács, Buda, Temesvár, Versecz and Pakrácz, and under the latter the bishops of Arad and Karánsebes. The two great Protestant communities are divided into ecclesiastical districts, five for each; the heads of these districts bear the title of superintendents. The Unitarians, chiefly resident in Transylvania, are under the authority of a bishop, whose see is Kolozsvár (Klausenburg). The Jewish communities are comprised in ecclesiastical districts, the head direction being at Budapest.

Education.—Although great improvements have been effected in the educational system of the country since 1867, Hungary is still backward in the matter of general education, as in 1900 only a little over 50 % of the population could read and write. By a law passed in 1868 attendance at school is obligatory on all children between the ages of 6 and 12 years. The communes or parishes are bound to maintain elementary schools, and they are entitled to levy an additional tax of 5 % on the state taxes for their maintenance. In 1902 there were in Hungary 18,729 elementary schools with 32,020 teachers, attended by 2,573,377 pupils, figures which compare favourably with those of 1877, when there were 15,486 schools with 20,717 teachers, attended by 1,559,636 pupils. In about 61 % of these schools the language used was exclusively Magyar, in about 20 % it was mixed, and in the remainder some non-Magyar language was used. In 1902, 80.56 % of the children of school age actually attended school. Since 1891 infant schools, for children between the ages of 3 and 6 years, have been maintained either by the communes or by the state.

The public instruction of Hungary contains three other groups of educational institutions: middle or secondary schools, "high schools" and technical schools. The high schools include the universities, of which Hungary possesses three, all maintained by the state: at Budapest (founded in 1635), at Kolozsvár (founded in 1872), and at Zágráb (founded in 1874). They have four faculties: of theology, law, philosophy and medicine. (The university at Zágráb is without a faculty of medicine.) There are besides ten high schools of law, called academies, which in 1900 were attended by 1569 pupils. The Polytechnicum in Budapest, founded in 1844, which contains four faculties and was attended in 1900 by 1772 pupils, is also considered a high school. There were in Hungary in 1900 forty-nine high theological colleges, twenty-nine Roman Catholic; five Greek Uniat, four Greek Orthodox, ten Protestant and one Jewish. Among special schools the principal mining schools are at Selmeczbánya, Nagyág and Felsőbánya; the principal agricultural colleges at Debreczen and Kolozsvár; and there are a school of forestry at Selmeczbánya, military colleges at Budapest, Kassa, Déva and Zágráb, and a naval school at Fiume. There are besides an adequate number of training institutes for teachers, a great number of schools of commerce, several art schools—for design, painting, sculpture, music, &c. Most of these special schools are of recent origin, and are almost entirely maintained by the state or the communes.

The richest libraries in Hungary are the National Library at Budapest; the University Library, also at Budapest, and the library of the abbey of Pannonháma. Besides the museums mentioned in the article Budapest, several provincial towns contain interesting museums, namely, Pressburg, Temesvár, Déva, Kolozsvár, Nagyszeben; further, the national museum at Zágráb, the national (Székler) museum at Marós-Vásarhely, and the Carpathian museum at Poprád should be mentioned.

At the head of the learned and scientific societies stands the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, founded in 1830; the Kisfaludy Society, the Petöfi society, and numerous societies of specialists, as the historical, geographical, &c., with their centre at Budapest. There are besides a number of learned societies in the various provinces for the fostering of special provincial or national aims. There are also a number of societies for the propagation of culture, both amongst the Hungarian and the non-Hungarian nationalities. Worth mentioning are also the two Carpathian societies: the Hungarian and the Transylvanian.

CHAPTER XXXIV

GOVERNMENT

A. THE DUAL MONARCHY

THE present constitution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy is based on the Pragmatic Sanction of the emperor Charles VI., first promulgated on the 19th of April 1713, whereby the succession to the throne is settled in the dynasty of Habsburg-Lorraine, descending by right of primogeniture and lineal succession to male heirs, and, in case of their extinction, to the female line, and whereby the indissolubility and indivisibility of the monarchy are determined; is based, further, on the diploma of the emperor Francis Joseph I. of the 20th of October 1860, whereby the constitutional form of government is introduced; and, lastly, on the so-called *Ausgleich* or "Compromise," concluded on the 8th of February 1867, whereby the relations between Austria and Hungary were regulated.

The two separate states—Austria and Hungary—are completely independent of each other, and each has its own parliament and its own government. The unity of the monarchy is expressed in the common head of the state, who bears the title Emperor of Austria and Apostolic King of Hungary, and in the common administration of a series of affairs, which affect both halves of the Dual Monarchy. These are: (1) foreign affairs, including diplomatic and consular representation abroad; (2) the army, including the navy, but excluding the annual voting of recruits, and the special army of each state; (3) finance in so far as it concerns joint expenditure.

For the administration of these common affairs there are three joint ministries: the ministry of foreign affairs and of the imperial and royal house, the ministry of war, and the ministry of finance. It must be noted that the authority of the joint ministers is restricted to common affairs, and that they are not allowed to direct or exercise any influence on affairs of government affecting separately one of the halves of the monarchy. The minister of foreign affairs conducts the international relations of the Dual Monarchy, and can conclude international treaties. But commercial treaties, and such state treaties as impose burdens on the state, or parts of the state, or involve a change of territory, require the parliamentary assent of both states. The minister of war is the head for the administration of all military affairs, except those of the Austrian *Landwehr* and of the Hungarian *Honveds*, which are committed to the ministries for national defence of the two respective states. But the supreme command of the army is vested in the monarch, who has the power to take all measures regarding the whole army. It follows, therefore, that the total armed power of the Dual Monarchy forms a whole under the supreme command of the sovereign. The minister of finance has charge of the finances of common affairs, prepares the joint budget, and administers the joint state debt. (Till 1909 the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were also administered by the joint minister of finance, excepting matters exclusively dependent on the minister of war.) For the control of the common finances, there is appointed a joint suprême court of accounts, which audits the accounts of the joint ministries.

Budget.—Side by side with the budget of each state of the Dual Monarchy, there is a common budget, which comprises the expenditure necessary for the common affairs, namely for the conduct of foreign affairs, for the army, and for the ministry of finance. The revenues of the joint budget consist of the revenues of the joint ministries, the net proceeds of the customs, and the quota, or the proportional contributions of

the two states. This quota is fixed for a period of years, and generally coincides with the duration of the customs and commercial treaty. Until 1897 Austria contributed 70 %, and Hungary 30 % of the joint expenditure, remaining after deduction of the common revenue. It was then decided that from 1897 to July 1907 the quota should be 66 $\frac{2}{3}$ % for Austria, and 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ % for Hungary. In 1907 Hungary's contribution was raised to 36.4 %. Of the total charges 2 % is first of all debited to Hungary on account of the incorporation with this state of the former military frontier.

The Budget estimates for the common administration were as follows in 1905 :

<i>Revenue—</i>		
Ministry of Foreign Affairs		£21,167
Ministry of War		305,907
Ministry of Finance		4,870
Board of Control		18
The Customs		4,780,000
Proportional contributions		15,650,448
	Total	£20,762,410
<i>Expenditure—</i>		
Ministry of Foreign Affairs		£485,480
Ministry of War—		
Army		12,679,160
Navy		2,306,100
Ministry of Finance		177,000
Board of Control		13,250
Extraordinary Military Expenditure		4,785,500
Extraordinary Military Expenditure in Bosnia		315,920
		£20,762,410 ¹

The following table gives in thousands sterling the joint budget for the years 1875–1905 :

Expenditure.

	1875.	1885.	1895.	1900.	1905.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	396	368.7	333	433.4	493.8
Ministry of War (Army and Navy)	9005.4	10,085	12,539	13,887.5	18,087.7
Ministry of Finance	154.2	167.2	170.4	175	177.1
Supreme Court of Accounts	10.5	10.6	10.7	12.5	13.3
Total	9566.1	10,631.5	13,053.1	14,508.4	20,430.3

Revenue.

	1875.	1885.	1895.	1900.	1905.
For the above Departments	432	258.2	260.7	260.3	331.9
Customs	997.4	402.2	4,476.6	5,202.3	4,799.7
Proportional Contributions	8136.7	9,971.1	8,316.4	9,045.8	15,650.4
Total	9566.1	10,631.5	13,053.1	14,508.4	20,430.3

Debt.—Besides the debts of each state of the Dual Monarchy, there is a general debt, which is borne jointly by Austria and Hungary. The following table gives in millions sterling the amount of the general debt for the years 1875–1905 :

1875.	1885.	1895.	1900.	1905.
232.41	231.02	229.67	226.81	224.31

Delegations.—The constitutional right of voting money applicable to the common affairs and of its political control is exercised by the Delegations, which consist each of sixty members, chosen for one year, one-third of them by the Austrian Herrenhaus (Upper House) and the Hungarian Table of Magnates (Upper House), and two-thirds of them by the Austrian and the Hungarian Houses of Representatives. The delegations are annually summoned by the monarch alternately to Vienna and to Budapest. Each delegation has its separate sittings, both alike public. Their decisions are reciprocally communicated in writing, and, in case of non-agreement, their deliberations are renewed. Should three such interchanges be made without agreement, a common plenary sitting is held of an equal number of both delegations ; and these collectively, without discussion, decide the question

¹ In 1912 the Budget estimates were £24,000,000.

by common vote. The common decisions of both houses require for their validity the sanction of the monarch. Each delegation has the right to formulate resolutions independently, and to call to account and arraign the common ministers. In the exercise of their office the members of both delegations are irresponsible, enjoying constitutional immunity.

The Austro-Hungarian Bank.—Common to the two states of the monarchy is the "Austro-Hungarian Bank," which possesses a legal exclusive right to the issue of bank-notes. It was founded in 1816, and had the title of the Austrian National Bank until 1878, when it received its actual name. In virtue of the new bank statute of the year 1899 the bank is a joint-stock company, with a stock of £8,780,000. The bank's notes of issue must be covered to the extent of two-fifths by legal specie (gold and current silver) in reserve; the rest of the paper circulation, according to bank usage. The state, under certain conditions, takes a portion of the clear profits of the bank. The management of the bank and the supervision exercised over it by the state are established on a footing of equality, both states having each the same influence. The accounts of the bank at the end of 1900 were as follows: capital, £8,750,000; reserve fund, £428,250; note circulation, £62,251,000 cash, £50,754,000. In 1907 the reserve fund was £548,041; note circulation, £84,501,000; cash, £60,036,625. The charter of the bank, which expired in 1897, was renewed until the end of 1910. In the Hungarian ministerial crisis of 1909 the question of the renewal of the charter played a conspicuous part, the more extreme members of the Independence party demanding the establishment of separate banks for Austria and Hungary with, at most, common superintendence. After a long delay and strenuous opposition in the Hungarian parliament the charter of the bank, which expired on December 1, 1910, was renewed until December 31, 1917. The new charter differs from the old notably in regard to the obligatory redemption of bank-notes in gold. It does not compel the bank to redeem its notes in gold but throws on the governors the responsibility of deciding the moment when specie payment may be made obligatory without danger to the financial and commercial stability of the Monarchy, and defines the procedure by which the legislative sanction for the enforcement of specie payments is eventually to be obtained. It increases from £16,666,000 to £25,000,000 the non-funded bank-note circulation which the bank is entitled to issue without incurring the punitive 5 per cent tax, and like the old charter it authorizes the bank to reckon among its metallic reserve £2,500,000 of foreign gold bills, and other gold credits. The funded bank-note circulation remains fixed at two-and-a-half times the amount of the total metallic reserve. The most important proviso of the new charter is the obligation imposed upon the bank to maintain the gold bill policy, by which it has hitherto succeeded in regulating the rates of foreign exchanges in such a manner that, despite the existence of an optional gold standard, the Austro-Hungarian currency has been kept on a par with that of gold standard countries. Failure would entail immediate loss of the charter.

B. AUSTRIA

Austria proper is a parliamentary or constitutional (limited) monarchy, its monarch bearing the title of emperor. The succession to the throne is hereditary, in the order of primogeniture, in the male line of the house of Habsburg-Lothringen; and failing this, in the female line. The monarch must be a member of the Roman Catholic Church. The emperor of Austria is also king of Hungary, but except for having the same monarch and a few common affairs the two states are quite independent of one another. The emperor has the supreme command over the armed forces of the country, has the right to confer degrees of nobility, and has the prerogatives of pardon for criminals. He is the head of the executive power, and shares the legislative power with the Reichsrat; and justice is administered in his name. The constitution of Austria is based upon the following statutes: (1) the Pragmatic Sanction of the emperor Charles VI., first promulgated on the 19th of April 1713, which regulated the succession to the throne; (2) the Pragmatic Patent of the emperor Francis II. of the 1st of August 1804, by which he took the title of Emperor of Austria; (3) the Diploma of the emperor Francis Joseph I. of the 20th of October 1860, by which the constitutional form of government was introduced; (4) the Diploma of the emperor Francis Joseph I. of the 26th of February 1861, by which the provincial diets were created; (5) the six fundamental laws of the 21st of December 1867, which contain the exposition and guarantee of the civil and political rights of the citizen, the organization of justice, the organization and method of election for the Reichsrat, &c.

The executive power is vested in the council of ministers, at whose head is the minister-president. There are eight ministries, namely, the ministry of the interior, of national defence, of worship and instruction, of finance, of commerce, of agriculture, of justice, and of railways. There are, further, two ministries, without portfolio, for Galicia and Bohemia. The civil administration in the different provinces is carried out by governors or *stattholders* (*Statthalter*), to whom are subordinate the heads of the 347 districts in which Austria was divided in 1900, and of the 33 towns with special statute, *i.e.* of the towns which have also the management of the civil administration. Local self-government of the provinces, districts and communities is also granted, and is exercised by various elective bodies. Thus

the autonomous provincial administration is discharged by the provincial committees elected by the local diets ; and the affairs of the communities are discharged by an elected communal council.)

The legislative power for all the kingdoms and lands which constitute Austria is vested in the Reichsrat. It consists of two Houses : an Upper House (*the Herrenhaus*), and a Lower House (*the Abgeordnetenhaus*). The Upper House is composed of (1) princes of the imperial house, who are of age (14 in 1907) ; (2) of the members of the large landed nobility, to which the emperor had conferred this right, and which is hereditary in their family (78 in 1907) ; (3) of 9 archbishops and 8 prince-bishops ; (4) of life members nominated by the emperor for distinguished services (170 in 1907). The Lower House has undergone considerable changes since its creation in 1861, by the various modifications of the electoral laws passed in 1867, 1873, 1892, 1896 and 1907. The general spirit of those modifications was to broaden the electoral basis, and to extend the franchise to a larger number of citizens. The law of the 26th of January 1907 granted universal franchise to Austrian male citizens over twenty-four years of age, who have resided for a year in the place of election. The Lower House consists of 516 members, elected for a period of six years. The members receive payment for their services, as well as an indemnity for travelling expenses. A bill to become law must pass through both Houses, and must receive the sanction of the emperor. The emperor is bound to summon the Reichsrat annually.

According to the imperial Diploma of the 26th February 1861, local diets have been created for the legislation of matters of local interest. These provincial parliaments are 17 in number, and their membership varies from 22 members, which compose the diet of Görz and Gradisca, to the 242 members which constitute that of Bohemia. They assemble annually and are composed of members elected for a period of six years, and of members *ex-officio*, namely, the archbishops and bishops of the respective provinces, and the rector of the local university.

Finance.—The growth of the Austrian budget is shown by the following figures :

	1885.	1895.	1900.	1905.
Expenditure	£44,121,600	£55,396,916	£66,003,494	£74,013,000
Revenue	43,714,666	57,446,091	66,020,475	74,079,000

The chief sources of revenue are direct taxes, indirect taxes, customs duties, post and telegraph and post-office savings banks receipts, railway receipts, and profits or royalties on forests, domains and mining. The direct taxes are divided into two groups, real and personal ; the former include the land tax and house-rent tax, and the latter the personal income tax, tax on salaries, tax on commercial and industrial establishments, tax on all business with properly audited accounts (like the limited liability companies), and tax on investments. The principal indirect taxes are the tobacco monopoly, stamps and fees, excise duties on sugar, alcohol and beer, the salt monopoly, excise duty on mineral oil, and excise duty on meat and cattle for slaughtering.

The national debt of Austria is divided into two groups, a general national debt, incurred jointly by the two halves of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy for common affairs, and is therefore jointly borne by both parts, and a separate debt owed only by Austria alone. The following table shows the growth of the Austrian debt in millions sterling :

1885.	1890.	1895.	1900.	1905.
45	88.23	119.60	140.68	167.91

At the close of 1903 the debt of Austria was £156,724,000, an increase since 1900 of £16,044,000. This large increase is due to the great expenditure on public works, as railways, navigable canals, harbour works, &c., started by the Austrian government since 1900.

C. HUNGARY

Hungary is a constitutional monarchy, its monarch bearing the title of king. The succession to the throne is hereditary in the order of primogeniture in the male line of the house of Habsburg-Lorraine ; and failing this, in the female line. The king must be a member of the Roman Catholic Church. The king of Hungary is also emperor of Austria, but beyond this personal union, and certain matters regulated by both governments jointly, the two states are independent of each other, having each its own constitution, legislature and administration. The king is the head of the executive, the supreme commander of the armed forces of the nation, and shares the legislative power with the parliament.

The constitution of Hungary is in many respects strikingly analogous to that of Great Britain, more especially in the fact that it is based on no written document but on immemorial prescription, confirmed or modified by a series of enactments, of which the earliest and most famous was the Golden Bull of Andrew III. (1222), the *Magna Carta* of Hungary.

The ancient constitution, often suspended and modified, based upon this charter, was reformed under the influence of Western Liberalism in 1848, the supremacy of the Magyar race, however, being secured by a somewhat narrow franchise. Suspended after the collapse of the Hungarian revolt in 1849 for some eighteen years, the constitution was restored in 1867 under the terms of the Compromise (*Ausgleich*) with Austria, which established the actual organization of the country (see *History*, below).

The legislative power is vested in the parliament (*Országgyűlés*), which consists of two houses: an upper house or the House of Magnates (*Főrendiház*), and a lower house or House of Representatives (*Képviselőház*). The House of Magnates is composed as follows: princes of the royal house who have attained their majority (16 in 1904); hereditary peers who pay at least £250 a year land tax (237 in 1904); high dignitaries of the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox churches (42 in 1904); representatives of the Protestant confessions (13 in 1904); life peers appointed by the crown, not exceeding 50 in number, and life peers elected by the house itself (73 altogether in 1904); members *ex officio* consisting of state dignitaries and high judges (19 in 1904); and three delegates of Croatia-Slavonia. The House of Representatives consists of members elected, under the Electoral Law of 1874, by a complicated franchise based upon property, taxation, profession or official position, and ancestral privileges.¹ The house consists of 453 members, of which 413 are deputies elected in Hungary and 43 delegates of Croatia-Slavonia sent by the parliament of that province. The members are elected for five years and receive payment for their services. The parliament is summoned annually by the king at Budapest. The official language is Magyar, but the delegates of Croatia-Slavonia may use their own language. The Hungarian parliament has power to legislate on all matters concerning Hungary, but for Croatia-Slavonia only on matters which concern these provinces in common with Hungary. The executive power is vested in a responsible cabinet, consisting of ten ministers, namely, the president of the council, the minister of the interior, of national defence, of education and public worship, of finance, of agriculture, of industry and commerce, of justice, the minister for Croatia-Slavonia, and the minister *ad latus* or near the king's person. As regards local government, the country is divided into municipalities or counties, which possess a certain amount of self-government. Hungary proper is divided into sixty-three rural, and—including Fiume—twenty-six urban municipalities (see section on *Administrative Divisions*). These urban municipalities are towns which for their local government are independent of the counties in which they are situated, and have, therefore, a larger amount of municipal autonomy than the communes or the other towns. The administration of the municipalities is carried on by an official appointed by the king, aided by a representative body. The representative body is composed half of elected members, and half of citizens who pay the highest taxes. Since 1876 each municipality has a council of twenty members to exercise control over its administration.

Administrative Divisions.—Since 1867 the administrative and political divisions of the lands belonging to the Hungarian crown have been in great measure remodelled. In 1868 Transylvania was definitely reunited to Hungary proper, and the town and district of Fiume declared autonomous. In 1873 part of the "Military Frontier" was united with Hungary proper and part with Croatia-Slavonia. Hungary proper, according to ancient usage, was generally divided into four great divisions or circles, and Transylvania up to 1876 was regarded as the fifth. In 1876 a general system of counties was introduced. According to this division Hungary proper is divided into seven circles, of which Transylvania forms one. The whole country is divided into the following counties:

- (a) The circle on the left bank of the Danube contains eleven counties: (1) Árva, (2) Bars, (3) Esztergom, (4) Hont, (5) Liptó, (6) Nógrád, (7) Nyitra, (8) Pozsony (Pressburg), (9) Trencsén, (10) Turóc and (11) Zólyom.
- (b) The circle on the right bank of the Danube contains eleven counties: Baranya, Fejér, Győr, Komárom, Moson, Somogy, Sopron, Tolna, Vas, Veszprém and Zala.
- (c) The circle between the Danube and Theiss contains five counties: Bács-Bodrog, Csongrád, Heves, Jász-Nagykún-Szolnok and Pest-Pilis-Solt-Kiskun.
- (d) The circle on the right bank of the Theiss contains eight counties: Abauj-Torna, Bereg, Borsod, Gömör-és Kis-Hont, Sáros, Szepes, Ung, Zemplén.
- (e) The circle on the left bank of the Theiss contains eight counties: Békés, Bihar, Hajdu, Máramaros, Szabolcs, Szatmár, Szilágy and Ugocsa.
- (f) The circle between the Theiss and the Maros contains five counties: Arad, Csanád, Krassó-Szörény, Temes and Torontál.
- (g) Transylvania contains fifteen counties: Alsó-Fehér, Besztercze-Naszód, Brassó, Csík, Fogaras, Háromszék, Hunyad, Kis-Küküllő, Kolozs, Maros-Torda, Nagy-Küküllő, Szeben, Szolnok-Doboka, Torda-Aranyos and Udvarhely.

¹ The franchise is "probably the most illiberal in Europe." Servants, in the widest sense of the word, apprenticed workmen and agricultural labourers are carefully excluded. The result is that the working classes are wholly unrepresented in the parliament, only 6% of them, and 13% of the small trading class, possessing the franchise, which is only enjoyed by 6% of the entire population.

Fiume town and district forms a separate division.

Croatia-Slavonia is divided into eight counties : Belovar-Körös, Lika-Krbava, Modrus-Fiume, Pozsega, Szerém, Varasd, Verőcze and Zágráb.

Besides these sixty-three rural counties for Hungary, and eight for Croatia-Slavonia, Hungary has twenty-six urban counties or towns with municipal rights. These are : Arad, Baja, Debreczen, Győr, Hódmező-Vásárhely, Kassa, Kecskemét, Kolozsvár, Komaróm, Maros-Vásárhely, Nagyvárad, Pancsova, Pécs, Pozsony, Selmecz-és Béalábánya, Sopron, Szabadka, Szatmár-Németi, Szeged, Székesfehérvár, Temesvár, Ujvidék, Versecz, Zombor, the town of Fiume, and Budapest, the capital of the county.

In Croatia-Slavonia there are four urban counties or towns with municipal rights, namely : Eszék, Varasd, Zágráb and Zimony.

Justice.—The judicial power is independent of the administrative power. The judicial authorities in Hungary are : (1) the district courts with single judges (458 in 1905) ; (2) the county courts with collegiate judgeships (76 in number) ; to these are attached 15 jury courts for press offences. These are courts of first instance. (3) Royal Tables (12 in number), which are courts of second instance, established at Budapest, Debreczen, Győr, Kassa, Kolozsvár, Maros-Vásárhely, Nagyvárad, Pécs, Pressburg, Szeged, Temesvár and Zágráb. (4) The Royal Supreme Court at Budapest, and the Supreme Court of Justice or Table of Septemvirs, at Zágráb, which are the highest judicial authorities. There are also a special commercial court at Budapest, a naval court at Fiume, and special army courts.

Finance.—After the revolution of 1848-1849 the Hungarian budget was amalgamated with the Austrian, and it was only after the Compromise of 1867 that Hungary received a separate budget. The development of the Hungarian kingdom can be better appreciated by a comparison of the estimates for the year 1849 prepared by the Hungarian minister of finance, which shows a revenue of £1,335,000 and an expenditure of £5,166,000 (including £3,500,000 for warlike purposes), with the budget of 1905, which shows a revenue of £51,583,000, and an expenditure of about the same sum. Owing to the amount spent on railways, the Fiume harbour works and other causes, the Hungarian budgets after 1867 showed big annual deficits, until in 1888 great reforms were introduced and the finances of the country were established on a more solid basis. During the years 1891-1895 the annual revenue was £42,100,000 and the expenditure £39,000,000 ; in 1900 the revenue and expenditure balanced themselves at £45,400,000. The following figures in later years are typical :

	<i>Revenue.</i>	<i>Expenditure.</i>
1904	£49,611,200	£49,592,400
1908	57,896,845	57,894,923

The ordinary revenue of the state is derived from direct and indirect taxation, monopolies, stamp dues, &c. In 1904 direct taxes amounted to £9,048,000, and the chief heads of direct taxes yielded as follows : ground tax, £2,317,000 ; trade tax, £1,879,000 ; income tax, £1,400,000 ; house tax, £1,000,000. Indirect taxes amounted in 1904 to £7,363,000, and the chief heads of indirect taxation yielded as follows : taxes on alcoholic drinks, £4,375,000 ; sugar tax, £1,292,000 ; petroleum tax, £418,000 ; meat tax, £375,000. The principal monopolies yielded as follows : salt monopoly, £1,210,000 ; tobacco monopoly, £2,850,000 ; lottery monopoly, £105,000. Other revenues yielded as follows : stamp taxes and dues, £3,632,000 ; state railways, £3,545,000 ; post and telegraphs, £710,000 ; state landed property and forests, £250,000.

The national debt of Hungary alone, excluding the debt incurred jointly by both members of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, was £192,175,000 at the end of 1903. The following table shows the growth of the total debt, due chiefly to expenditure on public works, in millions sterling :

1880.	1890.	1900.	1905.
£83·6	£171·9	£192·8	£198·2

CHAPTER XXXV

ARMY AND NAVY

Army.—The military system of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy is similar in both states, and rests since 1868 upon the principle of the universal and personal obligation of the citizen to bear arms. Its military force is composed of the common army (*K. und K.*); the special armies, namely the Austrian (*K.K.*) *Landwehr*, and the Hungarian *Honveds*, which are separate national institutions, and the *Landsturm* or levy-in-mass. As stated above, the common army stands under the administration of the joint minister of war, while the special armies are under the administration of the respective ministries of national defence. The yearly contingent of recruits for the army is fixed by the military bills voted by the Austrian and Hungarian parliaments, and is generally determined on the basis of the population, according to the last census returns. It amounted in 1905 to 103,100 men, of which Austria furnished 59,211 men, and Hungary 43,889. Besides 10,000 men are annually allotted to the Austrian *Landwehr*, and 12,500 to the Hungarian *Honveds*. The term of service is 2 years (3 years in the cavalry) with the colours, 7 or 8 in the reserve and 2 in the *Landwehr*; in the case of men not drafted to the active army the same total period of service is spent in various special reserves.)

For the military and administrative service of the army the Dual Monarchy is divided into 16 military territorial districts (15 of which correspond to the 15 army corps) and 108 supplementary districts (105 for the army, and 3 for the navy). In 1902, since which year no material change was made in the formal organization of the army, there were 5 cavalry divisions and 31 infantry divisions, formed in 15 army corps, which are located as follows :—I. Cracow, II. Vienna, III. Graz, IV. Budapest, V. Pressburg, VI. Kaschau, VII. Temesvár, VIII. Prague, IX. Josefstadt, X. Przemysl, XI. Lemberg, XII. Herrmannstadt, XIII. Agram, XIV. Innsbruck, XV. Serajewo. In addition there is the military district of Zara. The usual strength of the corps is, 2 infantry divisions (4 brigades, 8 or 9 regiments, 32 or 36 battalions), 1 cavalry brigade (18 squadrons), and 1 artillery brigade (16-18 batteries or 128-144 field-guns), besides technical and departmental units and in some cases fortress artillery regiments. The infantry is organized into line regiments, *Jäger* and *Tirolese* regiments, the cavalry into dragoons, lancers, *Uhlans* and hussars, the artillery into regiments. The Austrian *Landwehr* (which retains the old designation *K.K.*, formerly applied to the Austrian regular army) is organized in 8 divisions of varying strength, the "Royal Hungarian" *Landwehr* or *Honveds* in 7 divisions, both Austrian and Hungarian *Landwehr* having in addition cavalry (*Uhlans* and hussars) and artillery. It is probable that a *Landwehr* or *Honveds* division will, in war, form part of each army corps except in the case of the Vienna corps, which has 3 divisions in peace. The remaining men of military age (up to 42) as usual form the *Landsturm*. It is to be noted that this *Landsturm* comprises many men who would elsewhere be classed as *Landwehr*.

The strength of the Austro-Hungarian army on a peace footing was as follows in 1905 :

	Officers.	Men.	Horses.	Guns.
Infantry—				
Common Army	10,801	187,604	1,152	..
Austrian Landwehr	1,883	23,905	174	..
Hungarian Honveds	2,258	21,149	262	..
Cavalry—				
Common Army	1,890	45,486	40,740	..
Austrian Landwehr	170	1,861	1,282	..
Hungarian Honveds	390	4,170	3,510	..
Field Artillery	1,630	27,612	14,520	1048
Fortress Artillery	408	7,722	131	..
Technical troops	588	9,935	19	..
(Pioneers, and Railway and Telegraph Regiment)				
Transport Service	461	4,312	3,097	..
Sanitary Service	85	3,062
Total	20,564	336,818	64,887	1048
Belonging to the				
Common Army	15,863	285,733	59,659	1048
Austrian Landwehr	2,053	25,766	1,456	..
Hungarian Honveds	2,648	25,319	3,772	..

The troops stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1905 (376 officers and 6372 men) are included in the total for the common army.

The peace strength of the active army in combatants is thus about 350,000 officers and men, inclusive of the two Landwehrs and of the Austrian "K.K." guards, the Hungarian crown guards, the gendarmerie, &c. The numbers of the Landsturm and the war strength of the whole armed forces are not published. It is estimated that the first line army in war would consist of 460,000 infantry, 49,000 cavalry, 78,000 artillery, 21,000 engineers, &c., beside train and non-combatant soldiers. The Landwehr and Honved would yield 219,000 infantry and 18,000 cavalry, and other reserves 223,000 men. These figures give an approximate total strength of 1,147,000, not inclusive of Landsturm.

The new army bill, which met with strenuous opposition both in the Austrian and the Hungarian parliament, became law in July 1912. By its provisions the annual contingent for the common army was increased from 103,100 to 159,500 men, of which Austria would provide 91,313 and Hungary 68,187 men. The term of active service was reduced from 3 to 2 years except for cavalry and horse artillery, so that of the yearly recruits 134,500 would be enrolled for two years, 19,000 for three years, and 6000, who would serve in the navy, for four years. The peace strength of the common army therefore was raised from 295,000 men (in 1911) to 350,000, and the war strength from 900,000 to 1,500,000 men. The yearly contingents for the Austrian Landwehr and for the Hungarian Honved were also increased, and the latter thoroughly reorganized. In 1911 the Austrian Landwehr numbered 43,178 men and 4877 officers and staff, and the Hungarian Honved 28,443 men and 4327 officers and staff. These changes were calculated to raise the number of recruits for the whole army from 135,750 to 212,500 men, or an annual increase of 76,930. The duration of this act is for 12 years, and the additional cost of the army during that period was calculated at £35,625,000. The non-recurring expenditure to introduce these changes amounted to £3,125,000, of which Austria would contribute £2,000,000 and Hungary £1,125,000, and the permanent expenditure was raised by £3,100,000 yearly. Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia, was to be strongly fortified. In October 1912 the Minister of War asked for an extraordinary credit of £10,000,000 for war material and the rearmament of the artillery.

Fortifications.—The principal fortifications in Austria-Hungary are: Cracow and Przemyśl in Galicia; Komárom, the centre of the inland fortifications, Pétervárad, O-Arad and Temesvár in Hungary; Serajevo, Mostar and Bilek in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Alpine frontiers, especially those in Tirol, have numerous fortifications, whose centre is formed by Trent and Franzensfeste; while all the military roads leading into Carinthia have been provided with strong defensive works, as at Malborgeth, Predil Pass, &c. The two capitals, Vienna and Budapest, are not fortified. On the Adriatic coast, the naval harbour of Pola is strongly fortified with sea and land defences; then come Trieste, and several places in Dalmatia, notably Zara and Cattaro.

Navy.—The Austro-Hungarian navy is mainly a coast defence force, and includes also a flotilla of monitors for the Danube. It is administered by the naval department of the ministry of war. It consisted in 1905 of 9 modern battleships, 3 armoured cruisers, 5 cruisers, 4 torpedo gunboats, 20 destroyers and 26 torpedo boats. There was in hand at the same time a naval programme to build 12 armourclads, 5 second-class cruisers, 6 third-

class cruisers, and a number of torpedo boats. The headquarters of the fleet are at Pola, which is the principal naval arsenal and harbour of Austria; while another great naval station is Trieste.

In 1911 a new shipbuilding programme was adopted, which included the building of 4 "Dreadnoughts" of about 20,000 tons displacement each (to be ready at the end of 1914); 3 cruisers of about 3500 tons; 6 torpedo destroyers of about 800 tons, 12 torpedo boats, and 6 submarines. The cost was estimated at £13,016,666, to be spread in instalments over the six years 1911-16. The instalment spent in 1911 was £2,291,667, and that in 1912 was £2,800,000.

At the end of 1912 the effective navy consisted of 1 "Dreadnought"; 12 battleships, of which the three newest have a displacement of 14,268 tons each; 3 armoured cruisers; 6 cruisers; 7 torpedo gunboats; 12 destroyers; 69 torpedo boats; and 7 submarines. In the autumn of 1912 the Admiralty obtained an additional credit in order to replace the three oldest battleships, laid down in 1893, by three "Dreadnoughts" (to be ready for use in 1915), and for the immediate building of three fast destroyers. This was an addition to the programme adopted in 1911, and the naval estimates for 1913 showed a further increase. The active *personnel* amounted to 17,500 men, and it was intended to bring up the non-commissioned rank to a total of 20,000 within a year.) A new fortified naval base is being prepared at Selenico, on the Dalmatian coast.

THE END

(5)