

VITAL PEACE

A Study of Risks

by

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P R E F A C E

THIS book is meant as a challenge. It is addressed to pacifists and non-pacifists alike. Its purpose is to bid them reflect upon the "peace" of which they often speak.

For twenty years I have thought upon peace. Of "peace literature" I have read my fill; and I might have been loth to add this volume to the huge pile of what has already been written and printed had not contact with audiences in this country as well as in France, Belgium, Switzerland, the United States and—formerly—Germany led me to believe that the views of peace and war which I have come to hold are not only sound in themselves but are felt to be sound by "ordinary" or "common" folk whenever and wherever they are clearly stated.

This is my warrant for setting them forth. If I am not a "pacifist," I have faith in peace as a goal which, though distant, need not be so far off as to lie quite beyond the reach of this or a succeeding generation provided that it be sought with courage and vision and without delay.

Peace, as I conceive it, must be a more vital form of human existence than any which mankind has known in the past. It will not be attained without changes revolutionary. But I would rather see the peace revolution begun in a boldly constructive spirit than have it come as a rebound from the catastrophe which retrograde revolutions are now preparing.

What I have written is, in some degree, autobiographical, inasmuch as it records the growth in my own mind of ideas upon war, non-war and peace during the past two decades. But I have also drawn freely upon the thoughts and works of others, to whom I make dutiful and grateful acknowledgment.

If, at times, I have seen a little farther ahead than some of my fellows, I lay no claim to any sort of prophetic insight. Nor have I thought it right or needful to dwell upon the horrors of future war as a spur to the adventure of vital peace. War may come again or it may not. If it come, none will be entitled to be horror-stricken at the result of what has been left undone and of what is even now being done in many countries. Our generation will deserve, and may get, scant sympathy from its successors if it go forward on the path trodden since 1918.

It is because I would have this generation, especially its younger members, tread another path in open-eyed fearlessness that I have written what I think wholesome and true. For repetitions and redundancies I offer no excuse. In examining various aspects of one and the same problem some overlapping may be unavoidable and even helpful. I have not striven after literary effect. The only reproach I wish not to merit is that of having failed to make my meaning clear.

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VITAL PEACE

CHAPTER I

WAR AND LIFE

To the Thebans of old the Sphinx put a riddle. Whomsoever answered wrongly she slew. Œdipus gave the right answer, and the Sphinx slew herself. The riddle ran : " A being with four feet has two feet and three feet, and when it has most it is weakest." This being, said Œdipus, is man. In infancy he crawls upon all fours, in manhood he stands upright on two feet, and in old age leans tottering on a staff.

War, like the Sphinx, puts to men a riddle. It runs : " What is the meaning of life ?" They have not yet found the right answer. Till it is found and given, the solution for them is like to be, as it was for the puzzled Thebans, what Carlyle called " a thing of tooth and claw."

From time immemorial men have been slain by war. Is there reason to think that what has ever been will never again be ? However strange it may seem that human beings, holding their own lives precious, should plan and plot and get ready to cut short other lives that may be just as precious, they do in truth thus plot and plan. They act as though other things were more precious than life, and their impulse so to act is often stronger than their love of life itself.

Yet life is dear to them, the dearest thing they possess. Without it they would not be. Is it so

dear that it ought never to be risked or thrown away? By the highest standards of human conduct, "No!" Though we mourn over brave men who perish while striving to save comrades entombed in a mine, we do not think their sacrifice useless or wish it had not been made. Nor are the lives of a lifeboat crew held to have been needlessly thrown away when they are lost in going to help the shipwrecked. Hundreds, nay, thousands of seamen and fishermen drown year by year. Should men therefore cease to sail the seas? A noble seafaring motto replies: "*Vivere non necesse, navigare necesse est*"—and we do not quarrel with its dictum that to sail the seas is more needful than to live.

So the point is not that life should never be risked, but that it should be risked for something worth while. And this, at bottom, is the very question which war raises. Is war worthy, is it needful as a means of holding or gaining something more precious than life?

It is easy to say that warfare is so cruel, so destructive, so uncertain in its outcome that it ought to be swept away by the common consent of good citizens in every civilised land. We have been told this, time and again, till we are weary. If war is as bad as its opponents make out, why did not mankind get rid of it long ago? Why are there some nations, or their accepted guides and leaders, who even now call war a good in itself, and extol it as the highest expression of a people's life and will? Herr Hitler, the ruler of sixty-five million Germans, says this outright, as does Signor Mussolini, the leader of forty million Italians. On October 2, 1934, Signor Mussolini wrote, in a

widely-published newspaper article, "Why I Prepare for War":

"The American character has been forged by the difficulties of Nature, and it has always shown its strength whenever it has been tested in the fervour of fight. Riches and softening ease will not spare America. The fighting spirit of its pioneers is its best talisman.

"The most sublime act of faith a man can achieve is that of sacrificing his own life for the sake of the national collectivity.

"In the present clash of ideals, shall we subject those ideals we nurse in our souls to those we consider wrong or inferior, and only because this impels us to resort to arms?

"A people without a fighting spirit is doomed. In relations between States, it is war that ultimately decides. I have defined war as the 'supreme court of peoples.' It is that, indeed, because victory and defeat are the factors which determine the hierarchies of States. Its judgment is final. Appeal can be but another war."

Words like these cannot be put aside as idle talk on the part of leaders of nations which have never suffered from war. The Germans and the Italians have suffered from war, in some ways more severely than other nations whose sayings suggest that their ideal is peace or, rather, non-war at any price. Why, then, do Germans and Italians preach war and get ready for it?

Clearly, they must be looking for some gain which, they think, will be worth the risks and the sacrifices of war. Their neighbours, who fear them, prepare for conflict in their turn, and justify war in self-defence. Other nations, more distant from the scene of prospective strife, deplore the wickedness and con-

demn the folly of preparing to kill and be killed ; but, perhaps because they are distant, these nations are unwilling to risk the lives of their own citizens so that the wickedness may not be done or the folly committed. They prepare to "keep out of it," and think it the highest wisdom not to be entangled in the quarrels of others.

* * * * *

Are these other nations right or are they wrong ? This, again, is a riddle hard to read. If, like the American mother in the anti-war song, their citizens say or sing, "I didn't raise my boy to be a soldier," they invite the retort, "What did you raise your boy for ?"

One answer might run : "To be a good citizen, a loving son, a decent, manly fellow, kindly and helpful, fit to earn his own bread and to lend a hand to others." But here's the rub. What is a "good citizen" ? Plainly, he is an honest member of some community or nation, governed by certain laws and rules of which the purpose is to maintain the life of the community itself. A good citizen will obey those laws and rules, so that he and his fellows may live safe and orderly lives and, thus doing, help to sustain each other.

Yet it happens that the weal of communities and the safety of their members is sometimes threatened by rebels against their laws and rules, and that good citizens can no longer go about their business in peace and quiet. When this happens, what is a good citizen to do ? Is he to say that he was not born or raised to fight, and let the rebels prevail until they set

up quite other laws and rules and change the very notion of what good citizens should be? Or is he to band himself together with other good citizens and do his best to put down the rebels and preserve his community, even at the risk of killing or being killed? If so, the good citizen must be a fighter.

Or suppose his community is threatened or attacked from without by some other community or nation whose members may be poorer, hungrier or more full of fight than his own. Is the good citizen to stand by while all that he holds dear is taken away or smashed? If not, he must help to beat off the disturbers of his country's peace without reckoning too nicely the chances that his own life or the lives of others may be lost in the process. So, once again, the good citizen may find himself fighting.

But these, it may be said, are cases in which fighting or war touches a good citizen directly. They have nothing to do with the quarrels of other and more distant peoples in whose strife a man's own community has neither part nor lot. Are men everywhere their brothers' keepers? Is there no such thing as meddling in matters that are no concern of theirs? Surely the busybodies who want everybody to jump in and try to stop everybody else's fights are general nuisances who do more harm than good.

The factors of distance and detachment, both in geographical space and in terms of time, do enter largely into men's ideas about war. A brilliant English writer, Mr. A. A. Milne, in his well-known work, *Peace with Honour*, draws up a "Table of Comparative Deaths" to show the varying degrees of horror which the deaths of others inspire in English-

men according to distance and to the likelihood that their own lives may be affected. He writes : " 10,000,000 deaths from famine in China equal in horror 100,000 deaths from earthquake in Sicily, which equal 1,000 deaths from influenza in Brighton or 10 deaths from typhoid in one's own village or one sudden death of a friend." With a touch of irony he adds that the sudden death of 1,000 friends equals in horror the death of oneself; and, assuming such a table to be somewhere near the truth, he concludes that the chance of doing away with war would be far greater if war were realised rather in terms of one's own death than of the death of strangers.

On this showing, the so-called "Cause of Peace" may not be quite so hopeless as it sometimes appears. Modern war—that is to say, future war, not the wars of the past which many people unconsciously take as their standards of comparison—bids fair to bring the prospect of their own deaths more nearly home to common men, whether they be fighters or non-fighters, than war has ever done before. Still, the factor of distance in space and in time needs to be taken into account. If physical distance does not lend enchantment to a bloody scene, it mitigates the disenchantment of it; and chronological distance may actually lend it glamour. The loss of life in the American War of Independence has long ceased to strike citizens of the United States or, for that matter, Britons, as especially horrible. I am not sure that it is not sometimes extolled as heroism in school books and manuals of history. Certainly the horrors of Waterloo are not present to the minds of English schoolboys; and the Crimean War is most often

remembered by Tennyson's poem about the "Gallant Six Hundred," who, not reasoning "why," rode into the "Valley of Death" to "do or die." The American frontier wars have been celebrated, time without number, in stories and films, without forgetting the late Colonel Cody's "Wild West Show." English youths today pay little heed to the bloodshed of the World War. Some of them are rather sorry to have been born too late for that great adventure. Those of their elders who dislike war and denounce it as inhuman are apt to forget that the time-factor is working steadily against them.

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How, then, do common men think of war? I have never met a fighter in the World War, either in the ranks or as an officer, who wanted to go through it again; but I have met many who loathe and resent variations on the theme that "War is Hell," for they felt that war is, or was, half hell, half picnic and, at moments, whole ecstasy. Over-insistence on its horrors moves those of them who came safely through it to remember that for months or years they lived an open-air life, in good physical condition, well fed and well cared for, well paid and with ample leisure when off duty—in short, a care-free life once they had got used to the chance of being suddenly despatched to the other world by bullet or shell. As compared with their humdrum lives today, in stuffy office or noisy factory, with the fear of unemployment before their eyes, and burdened by the care of keeping wife and children on a meagre wage, the war days seem to them the one time in their lives when they really lived.

And there is, or was, another aspect to war. I saw and felt it myself at the front in France during the summer of 1916. Those who have never seen or felt it may not know what I mean; but those who have will understand. As I put it long ago in my book *Through Thirty Years* :

“ Out towards the front, our car halted while some companies of a famous regiment moved up to take over the positions allotted to them in the impending offensive. The sight of these strong, lean men with their heavy packs and helmets, marching grimly on what many of them doubtless knew would be their last march, was at once tragic and sublime. I think all of us who saw it felt ashamed that we were not also marching in that column. Later on, I read an account of a visit to the front by E. W. Hornung, in which he put his own feelings, on seeing a regiment go up to the front, into lines that expressed exactly what had then been in my mind :

‘ And I felt like a man in a prison van,
While the rest of the world goes free.’ ”

* * * * *

“ Free ? ” “ Free ” to do what ? To stake their lives for a cause they held worthier than life itself ? So we come back to the riddle : “ What is the meaning or purpose of life ? ” If a man in his senses could feel sorry or ashamed that he was not courting death in war, why seek to abolish war or complain of its horrors ? Men live by emotions. They run after emotions when their daily tasks offer them none, and seek ecstasy in daring exploits, in dangerous games or in gambling and betting. Some forget themselves in drink ; others enjoy moral or religious exaltation and “ uplift.” Logical proof that “ the game is not

worth the candle" moves them little, though disappointment may presently make them believe that they were fooled, that the things they thought worth while were not worth while at all. Disillusionment of this sort has overcome thousands who were told that, in the Great War, they were fighting to end war; for now they hear talk of "the next war," and think that what they went through was a tragic farce.

Were they deceived? Was it a tragic farce? A true answer might take the form of the further question whether the men who managed the Great War, and the peoples in whose names they "made the peace" when the fighting was over, were fit for peace or knew what peace meant. It may be true that the Great War, with all its destructiveness of life, all the ruin it wrought, all the heroism it inspired, all the ideals it failed to realise, was but a stage in the education of mankind. "Learn, or perish!" wrote the late Lord Grey of Fallodon (better known as Sir Edward Grey) at the end of his candid book *Twenty-Five Years*. Yet learning is apt to be a slow process. In it there may be ups and downs, flashes of insight, moments of blank bewilderment, fresh insight, relapses into dullness and, as the sum of all knowledge, a sense that there is still so much to know and so little time to learn it that the search for wisdom is a hopeless quest.

Still, through effort and failure, the bounds of knowledge are widened. Shafts of light pierce the outer darkness. So swiftly does science advance in some directions that it loses alignment and gets out of touch with what men know in other fields. Then the new learning, unco-ordinated with the old, may

recoil upon those who forget the relativity or the interdependence of all things. There ensue periods of lopsidedness during which progress in technical or physical knowledge is unaccompanied by equivalent moral or social advance. At such times common men are prone to wonder whither "progress" may be leading them.

* * * * *

This is such a time. Today the very meaning of old words has changed and no new words have yet been coined to fit new truths. What is "war"? What is "peace"? We may know what these words used to mean. Now we know only that their old meanings are out of date. Mr. Beverley Nichols, the young British author of a much-read book—*Cry Havoc!*—drives this point home in an Introductory Letter to Mr. H. G. Wells. Mr. Nichols writes: "This is a book about WAR. It is a passionate endeavour to clear up a few of the problems which are agitating the mind of a very average man—agitating him so much that he has to set aside the writing of plays and novels in order to get this thing settled. And therefore it seems vital that the word WAR should be clearly defined unless we are going to argue at cross purposes."

He goes on to say that until August, 1914, the word "war" meant to the nations of the world what it always meant since the days of Napoleon, indeed, since the days of Hannibal. Morally, the old chivalry was still alive. There were individual sacrifice and heroism, magnificent and incredible, on both sides. But chivalry, as a unifying, purifying spirit, fled affrighted

from all the armies at last, whether of the Allies or of the Central Powers. The obsolescence of the word "war" was not immediately apparent. Not until its end did we realise how completely new was this vile and hideous thing which had us in its grip. "And even then, only a few minds realised it. The majority of the English people, even in the middle of an air-raid, still carried a subconscious mental image of 'war' as a fight of one group of men against another group of men, whereas the image they should have carried was the universal struggle of all mankind against a common enemy, an enemy whose arms were steel and whose breath was a sickly, yellow death."

Mr. Beverley Nichols is by way of being a pacifist. Nobody has yet hurled this epithet at Mr. Winston Spencer Churchill, who is looked upon in Great Britain as a militant "Diehard" and has fought or seen fighting in more parts of the world than any English public man. Yet his book *My Early Life* contains a passage upon his training as a cavalry officer with which Mr. Beverley Nichols would hardly disagree. It runs :

"War, which used to be cruel and magnificent, has now become cruel and squalid. In fact it has been completely spoilt. It is all the fault of Democracy and Science. From the moment that either of these meddlers and muddlers was allowed to take part in actual fighting, the doom of War was sealed. Instead of a small number of well-trained professionals championing their country's cause with ancient weapons and a beautiful intricacy of archaic manœuvre, sustained at every moment by the applause of their nation, we now have entire popula-

tions, including even women and children, pitted against one another in brutish mutual extermination, and only a set of blear-eyed clerks left to add up the butcher's bill. From the moment Democracy was admitted to, or rather forced itself upon, the battlefield War ceased to be a gentleman's game. To Hell with it! Hence the League of Nations."

So we need a new word for "war." It will be coined when we are ready to use it and, what is more, to understand it. War still stands for one of the oldest things in human history, recorded and unrecorded—though not for the oldest, which, despite Darwin's doctrine of the "struggle for existence," I think is "love." War is so old that it has been a chief subject of thought in countless minds for countless ages, a thing so weighty that the lives of men and peoples, the power of States and rulers, their glory and their well-being were held to depend upon knowledge of the "art of war" and skill in its practice. Over against it the word "peace" has been put, a word little understood even today, seeing that most people use it as a synonym for "non-war" when it should mean "creative helpfulness." Men have not yet given to peace a tithe of the thought they have given to war.

My purpose is to look at war more closely, to see it not as it was but as it is and must be, to ask and to answer the question how it bears upon the lives of common men, and to enquire what they could and should do about it. I seek to understand, and to make plain to others what I think I have understood. It is for them to appraise what I may write, to accept or reject it in the light of their own judgment.

My effort to understand war is little more than twenty years old. It began consciously on March 4, 1916, when, six days after the first German onslaught upon the fortress of Verdun, I stood on a spur above the battlefield and watched an artillery duel. My impression was less one of horror (though I saw a French battery, men and guns, blown to pieces by indirect fire from invisible German howitzers) than of exasperation that the resources of modern science should thus be put to murderous uses; and I found myself wondering why this should be and how it could be stopped. At the same time I was aware of something I had not before experienced—a sense of being magnetised, almost exhilarated by influences that caused me to forget cold, fatigue and hunger, and induced a feeling of unusual physical and moral strength. The whole region seemed to vibrate with magnetism; and I began to realise that, dreadful and horrible though war might be, the atmosphere of it could and did give men power to endure and to do things of which they would have felt incapable in the surroundings of their ordinary lives.

Still later, when on further visits to the British and French lines in France, and to the Italian front before and after the disaster of Caporetto, I thought I divined the deeper meaning of this “atmosphere of war.” How far it prevailed among all armies I cannot say, but many of the officers and men with whom I spoke were under the spell of a “something in the air” that seemed to transfigure them. They themselves rarely mentioned it, even if they were aware of it, for they were not given to self-analysis. Yet their words and, more eloquently, their bearing and

behaviour, bore witness to it. Briefly, the "war atmosphere"—at the front and in the sense I have in mind—was that of a no-man's-land between life and death, between this world and the next, an intermediate region in which men scarcely paused to think whether they were dead or alive. If they were alive one day they might be dead on the morrow. Thus, to them, the chief realities were discipline and duty and obedience to higher commands. It was more than a mood, it was a way of being. It was not exaltation. Rather was it sober fact. In it danger appeared to be so much a matter of course that to face it was as natural as to eat or sleep.

While breathing this atmosphere I perceived that there may be, or may have been, something in war that is often overlooked. To this "something" Major Yeats-Brown alludes in his *Dogs of War!* which he wrote in reply to Mr. Beverley Nichols's *Cry Havoc!* "We need to breathe a transcendent atmosphere at times," he writes. "Not always, but sometimes. We must pledge ourselves to an ideal, and know that there is at least a possibility that we may have to die for it. There is an instinct in the average man which tells him (let the pacifist search his heart, and not too glibly deny it) that in offering his life to his country he has touched the source from which the saints drew their inward and irresistible strength."

Readers of Major Yeats-Brown's famous book *Bengal Lancer* will know that he is not a blatant fire-eater. They will recognise his sincerity in quoting de Quincey's affirmation that "war has a deeper and more ineffable relation to hidden grandeurs in man than has yet been deciphered." Nor will those of

us who have breathed the "atmosphere of war" quarrel with his statement: "Millions of my generation have seen and touched this grandeur, but the circumstances of the revelation have left us inarticulate. It is so with the great moments of life. . . . We want peace, if possible. But peace for what? To toil in factories and offices? No! We want life, and by a sublime paradox the War gave more life, not less. Yes, life, in spite of all the lives we lost."

If this "something" in war, these "hidden grandeurs" in man, was more tangible in the field than among common folk at home, these common folk were likewise under the spell. They volunteered for distasteful and dangerous tasks and were ready to risk their lives in performing them. It was knowledge of their spirit that led me, on a September evening in 1916, to give advice which some may think that a civilian whose own life was in no special danger ought not to have given. I have often thought over it, and have as often concluded that, in like circumstances and in a "war atmosphere," I should give it again.

At British Headquarters in France, shortly before the second battle of the Somme for which "artillery preparation" was going on, the General in command of the artillery told me he was uncertain whether or not to order a fresh supply of 100,000 particularly deadly shells which, according to an incautious paragraph in a German newspaper, were working havoc among the enemy. He asked if I could get confirmation of the paragraph and said that, if I could, he would order the shells forthwith, though the filling of them might cost the lives of not a few women

munition-workers. I failed to get confirmation, and the General was perplexed. Without hesitation I advised him to place the order, saying that if the question were put before the women munition-workers they would all volunteer to fill the shells in the hope that they might thus "do their bit" to help the men at the front. I think he took my advice.

If he did, and if devoted women lost their lives as a result, ought I to feel remorse? My conscience may be blunted, but it has never pricked me on this score, and it is untroubled still. We were all "in the War"; just as, if war is ever to give place to worthier means of settling disputes between nations, we shall all need to be "in the Peace." The question is whether war itself will or need recur, and, in a minor degree, whether the impact of future war upon the lives of whole peoples would not be so devastating as to change the very meaning of war itself. The present mobilisation laws of France and some other countries ordain that every man, woman and child, with all their real and personal belongings, shall be under conscription for national defence; and the issue of gas masks and the organisation of gas drill in Germany and elsewhere suggest that "the next war," should it come, would be literally a matter of life and death not alone for soldiers but for entire populations.

It might be supposed that this prospect would lead peoples and Governments to have done with war altogether and to rule it out effectually as an infamous and pestilential thing. In theory this has happened. In practice it has not yet been done. Notwithstanding the League of Nations Covenant and the renunciation

of war by the signatories of the Kellogg Pact, eagerness to avoid responsibilities and "entanglements" have been more noticeable—not only among English-speaking peoples and Governments—than willingness to run risks in discouraging warmakers. How to "keep out of it" has seemed to be their main anxiety. Surely this is one of the most curious examples of human psychology—and of the uselessness of ordinary logic in forecasting the conduct of men and nations—that modern history can offer. Gregarious animals may get together instinctively in the presence of a common danger. Even beasts of prey have been known to observe a truce when a great peril has threatened them all. But, at the very thought that they might have to take common action against war, the most highly civilised peoples have tended to draw away from each other and to turn their backs upon arrangements for their common safety. Why?

* * * * *

The explanation may lie, to some extent, in a feeling of doubt whether the general danger is as real as it is made out to be. And this doubt may, in part, be due to reflection that, though the weapons of war have changed since the time when men fought with swords and bows and arrows, means of defence have usually kept pace with means of offence, and that one deadly device has been offset by another deadlier still. Was "Greek fire" more humane than a modern "flame-thrower"? Is the invention of poison gas, which threatens to bring "the front" into peaceful streets and houses, really worse than the invention

of gunpowder? Carlyle called gunpowder "your true leveller," in that it put the man-at-arms on the same footing as the armoured knight, and brought an element of equality into warfare. The Italian poet Ariosto, writing in the early sixteenth century his version of the adventures of Count Roland and Charlemagne's paladins, tells—a little anachronistically—how Roland, the invulnerable, was fired at by a sort of gun and, after overcoming the malefactor who had thus degraded chivalry, took the "abominable engine" and sank it fathoms deep in the blue sea. In much the same spirit men revolt today against attack by aircraft upon large cities with gas and bomb. Is it because no sure means of warding off such attack has yet been found? Were it found tomorrow, long odds might be laid on the chance that preparations for war would go merrily on without a tithe of the indignation and terror which they now inspire.

"The next war," say the wiseacres, "will be the end of civilisation. No civilised people can be so mad, so criminal, as to let it loose." They forget that madness does not reason or, if it reasons, has a logic of its own. Up to the summer of 1914 many wise men said and thought that war was impossible. They argued that the links of trade and of finance between nations were too strong to be snapped. Moreover, war "would not pay." Then the Great War made fools of the soothsayers. A like fate may be in store for their successors, unless men learn ere they perish.

But fear of perdition will not always move men to safeguard themselves or others. They are apt to behave as though it were better to go on and take the chances. Fear of death in railway accidents did not

prevent the development of railroads, nor does loss of life in motor traffic, or the daily crashing of aeroplanes, check the use of motor-cars and aircraft. The thought that every triumph of speed over distance must levy a toll on human lives helps to account for the complacency with which these casualty lists are regarded. They are looked upon as the price of progress. The urge to extend man's mastery over natural obstacles, and to conquer space and time in ways of which our fathers never dreamed, seems irresistible; and the warning of a nineteenth-century poet that men should have a care lest they "outstrip the stars in speed, and lose the boon of sleep," has come to sound like an old wives' tale.

Should the nations one day resolve to ban war effectually, it will not be solely because of the risks to life which it entails. War will be banned when its drawbacks are thought greater than its possible benefits or, in other words, because the war-method will be accounted over-costly, haphazard and inadequate. Risk for risk, the risks of what General Smuts has termed "creative peace" will then be accepted as better worth while than the risks of war, even though the risks of peace involve sacrifice of many an individual and national sovereignty which men have long held to be more precious than their material possessions or their lives.

Meanwhile there remains in the concept of war enough of the old glamour, a sufficiency of appeal to patriotism and self-sacrifice, nay, to the ecstasy that men feel when their blood is up or their deeper emotions are stirred, to render its sway over virile minds hard to break. To work against war is really

to seek new outlets not merely for the fighting or competitive spirit but for many a nobler impulse ; and to me it seems that the whole issue resolves itself into a question—not lightly to be answered in the affirmative—whether these new outlets can be found and opened to common men in such fashion as to offer them fuller lives, and emotions deeper and more intense, even than those which they have hitherto sought in war.

CHAPTER II

THE CASE AGAINST WAR

"I THINK war silly. I think that war is the ultimate expression of man's wickedness and man's silliness. There are times when I think that its childish silliness is even more heart-breaking than its wickedness."

In these words Mr. A. A. Milne puts one of the arguments against war that fill his thought-provoking book *Peace with Honour*. He seems to invoke men's goodness against their wickedness, their wisdom against their silliness. Yet, on this very point of silliness, I am reminded of a story told me long ago by the late Sir Hall Caine. In his early days, before he became a popular novelist, he was employed as a "reader" by the publishing firm Richard Bentley and Son. They sent him the manuscript of a novel by an unknown lady whose name was afterwards familiar to readers of fiction throughout the English-speaking world. Hall Caine read the manuscript and reported thus: "This book is ineffably silly; but it is silly in the way so many people are silly that its publication might be a great success."

The novel was published. It was Miss Marie Corelli's first essay in fiction. To celebrate its success, Mr. Richard Bentley senior gave in honour of the authoress a party to which Hall Caine was invited. There he foolishly told her that he might "perhaps claim the honour of having been her literary sponsor."

She, eager to know what he had written, went next day to the publisher's office and persuaded Mr. Bentley's guileless son to show her Hall Caine's report. Hence lifelong war between the rival novelists.

So much in life is "silly," so many hoary conventions are absurd—and, by their sturdy survival, mock those who mock at them—that the argument against the silliness of war might not avail to discredit it. But Mr. Milne likewise condemns war as "the ultimate expression of man's wickedness." Can he have forgotten that many forms of wickedness hold their own against the assaults of militant virtue and the injunctions of religion? Unless a more cogent case can be made out against war its folly and unrighteousness may not destroy it.

I have before me a pile of books and pamphlets which, from one standpoint and another, essay to state the case against war. Religious, pacifist, humanitarian, economic and social counts are put forward. Taken together, they make up a formidable indictment which, if it were as conclusive as its authors imagine it to be, ought to banish the very thought of war from the minds of men. Nevertheless men do think and talk insistently of war. Surely there is something wrong somewhere?

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One of the strongest religious protests against war is to be found in an article, "The Unknown Soldier," by Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, which has been reprinted as a pamphlet and widely circulated. Dr. Fosdick says that, as a Christian minister, he has an account to settle between his soul and the Unknown

Soldier. He knew the Unknown Soldier well and lived with him and his fellows, British, Australian, New Zealander, French, American, in the trenches from Ypres through the Somme battlefield down to the southern front, and, short of actual battle, saw the war from training camp to hospital. He, a Christian minister, took part in it. He, too, was persuaded that it was a war to end war. He, too, "was a gullible fool and thought that modern war could make somehow the world safe for democracy." He helped to nerve the fighters for the fight from which many of them knew they could not come back. He wonders if the Unknown Soldier was among the men he thus encouraged, for, he says: "I deceived him. I deceived myself first, unwittingly, and then I deceived him, assuring him that good consequences could come out of that. As a matter of hard-headed biological fact, what good could come out of that? Mad civilisation! You cannot sacrifice on bloody altars the best of your breed and expect anything to compensate for that."

Dr. Fosdick does not blame the men who fought or the nations who conscripted them. The War could never have been won without conscription. Last time boys and men were conscripted. Next time girls and women and all property will be conscripted likewise. Repeated once or twice, this conscription will end everything that remotely approaches liberty. If Dr. Fosdick blames anybody it is men like himself who, he thinks, ought to have known better. He does not deny that war may give men moments of high ecstasy; and he quotes the words of a wounded American after a battle: "We went

over the parapet at five o'clock and I was not hit till nine. They were the greatest four hours of my life." This young man may have been hit only once, and Dr. Fosdick does not think such evidence conclusive. He dares any man to tell the young fellows who went over the top many times, were wounded, nursed and hardened up again, about the lyric glory of war. Still he confesses that, far from appealing to the worst in men, "the war brought out his best—his loyalty, his courage, his venturesomeness, his care for the downtrodden, his capacity for self-sacrifice. The noblest qualities of his young manhood were aroused."

But he watched war lay its hands on these strongest, loveliest things in men and use the noblest attributes of the human spirit for ungodly deeds. For the ultimate condemnation of war is that it prostitutes the noblest powers of the human soul to the most dastardly deeds, the most abysmal cruelties of which our human nature is capable. And Dr. Fosdick's quarrel with himself is that men like him were sent into the camps to awaken the idealism of the soldier, "to touch those secret, holy springs within him so that, with devotion, fidelity, loyalty and self-sacrifice, he might go out to war." And he adds :

"O war, I hate you most of all for this, that you do lay your hands on the noblest elements in human character, with which we might make a heaven on earth, and you use them to make a hell on earth instead. You take even our science, the fruit of our dedicated intelligence, by means of which we might build here the City of God, and, using it, you fill the earth instead with new ways of slaughtering men. You take our loyalty, our unselfishness, with which we might make the earth beautiful, and, using these our finest qualities, you make

death fall from the sky and burst up from the sea and hurtle from unseen ambuscades sixty miles away ; you blast fathers in the trenches with gas while you are starving their children at home with blockades ; and you so bedevil the world that fifteen years after the Armistice we cannot be sure who won the war, so sunk in the same disaster are victors and vanquished alike. If war were fought simply with evil things, like hate, it would be bad enough, but, when one sees the deeds of war done with the loveliest faculties of the human spirit, one looks into the very pit of hell."

In conclusion Dr. Fosdick claims that he is not trying to make people sentimental but rather hard-headed about war. We can have the monstrous thing that is war "or we can have Christ, but we cannot have both. O my country, stay out of war ! Co-operate with the nations in every movement that has any hope for peace ; but set your face steadfastly and for ever against being drawn into another war. O Church of Christ, stay out of war. Withdraw from every alliance that maintains or encourages it." And for his own part Dr. Fosdick exclaims :

"I renounce war for its consequences, for the lies it lives and propagates, for the undying hatreds it arouses, for the dictatorships it puts in the place of democracy, for the starvation that stalks after it. I renounce war and never again, directly or indirectly, will I sanction or support another."

Dr. Fosdick and the 13,000 ministers of religion in the United States who are alleged to have followed his lead have their counterparts in Great Britain, where the popular preacher, and former military padre, the Very Rev. Dr. H. R. L. Sheppard (better known as

"Dick Sheppard") has issued a declaration in Dr. Fosdick's words: "I renounce war and never again, directly or indirectly, will I support or sanction another." In a letter to the editor of the *Manchester Guardian* of January 3, 1935, Dr. Sheppard stated that tens of thousands had sent in their signatures to this declaration, but he added that there were many who were unable to reconcile it "with the demands which their patriotism would make upon them if their country were invaded or some distant part of the Empire attacked."

In a reply to them Dr. Sheppard argued that "it is impossible to make any real distinction between wars of aggression and wars of defence," and said, "in all sincerity," that "my original appeal was made quite simply on the Christian premise that if an evil is to be renounced it must be renounced regardless of consequences."

Religious convictions like these command respect when they are held by men so upright and fearless as Dr. Fosdick and Dr. Sheppard. The danger is that if the case against war is deduced from religious postulates alone the question of ultimate religious authority may arise, and that the disputants may end by hurling Scriptural quotations at each other's heads. One little incident of this kind happened in the summer of 1934 after I had addressed a large "peace meeting," held under religious auspices, in an English Midland city. No sooner had I set forth what I conceived to be the matter-of-fact case against war than a well-known Methodist minister arose and made a passionate profession of ultra-pacifist faith, and of belief in the duty of non-resistance to evil. Dr.

Fosdick and Dr. Sheppard would probably have approved of what he said. Yet as I left the hall a pious old lady approached me and whispered : " I am sure he is wrong. Did not Christ say : ' They who take the sword shall perish by the sword ? ' But how are they to perish by the sword if nobody takes the sword against them ? "

The bandying of texts leads but a little way, especially in a world that is far from being Christian. And there are pungent rejoinders to religious advocates of peace without responsibility in the late Mr. Frank H. Simonds's two volumes, *Can Europe Keep the Peace?* and *Can America Stay at Home?* In the former he wrote : " In fact, although the great mass of the American people have long ago abandoned incantation as a method of curing disease, a majority are still convinced of its efficacy in preventing war." For " American " write " British " and for " majority " write " ultra-pacifist minority," and this stricture is as applicable in Great Britain as in the United States. The same is true of Mr. Simonds's warning to his fellow-countrymen in *Can America Stay at Home?* that, so long as refusal of responsibility for the maintenance of peace endures, " American concern for peace must continue to appear in all European eyes a transparent endeavour to combine the mission of John the Baptist with the method of Pontius Pilate."

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Mr. Frank H. Simonds was, as I am, a mere scribe without pretension to religious authority of any kind. This disability does not affect an eminent Scottish

divine, the Right Rev. Dr. Norman Maclean, sometime Moderator of the General Assembly of the (Presbyterian) Church of Scotland. It is entitled: *How Shall We Escape?* and it deals respectfully, albeit vigorously, with Dr. Fosdick's arguments. Dr. Maclean writes :

"The eloquence and absolute sincerity of Dr. Fosdick appeal straight to the heart. The Unknown Soldier certainly looked for good to come out of his sacrifice. It was for him a war to end war. But who was it who blasted his hopes? Who turned Dr. Fosdick's promise of a possible good into a lie? It was those who refused to ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations. Who was it who refused any share of the burden and rehabilitation of the world? His own countrymen . . . those who made the institution of International Law and the establishment of security impossible by making the League of Nations impotent from the beginning because the greatest nation of all—its own begetter—deserted it. That would be a fitting theme for Dr. Fosdick's prophetic utterances. But he is silent regarding the real reason why the hope of the Unknown Soldier has been belied.

" . . . I wonder whether Dr. Fosdick's pacifism includes the John Dillingers and all the enemies Nos. I., II. and III. who rob and murder and carry away the innocent, holding them to ransom. Does he disapprove of the odds against the 'killer,' only one revolver against many? It does look rather unsportsmanlike and I felt something like disapproval myself when I read it. But probably Dr. Fosdick approves war on gangsters. If Dr. Fosdick approves war on gangsters, how can he disapprove of war waged on gangster nations who fall on their neighbours to devour them? Can force be right as the instrument of justice in the United States and wrong as the instrument of justice in Europe?"

Dr. Norman Maclean works out in some detail the argument that Christ was by no means a pacifist. He lays stress on Christ's saying : " Think not that I am come to send peace on earth : I am come not to send peace, but a sword." He contends that the peace which Christianity proclaimed was peace to the men of goodwill ; and he adds : " The supreme gift attributed by Jesus to the evolution of the soul of man was that He, and all they who named His name with loyal words, ever refused to make peace with iniquity. If iniquity were allowed to enjoy peace the world would become a sty." With the late Lord Bryce and the present Archbishop of York, Dr. Maclean urges that the only way to subdue lawless force is to endow law with superior force. And he concludes his reply to Dr. Fosdick in the words :

" Dr. Fosdick may be right. If, however, he be right, then historic Christianity was all wrong. For neither Christ nor His followers in all the ages exalted the mere physical life above honour, loyalty, truth and righteousness. Jesus expressly said that the greatest thing any man can do with his life is to lay it down for his friends. And in what nobler way could any man lay down his life for his friends than in defence of their freedom, their honour, their wives and children and their homes ? To die that the heritage of the freedom of man's soul may be preserved for unborn generations is truly to share in the spirit of Jesus Christ. ' I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken,' wrote Cromwell to the Scottish Covenanters. It is possible that even Dr. Fosdick may be mistaken."

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Not far from Dr. Maclean's standpoint is that of an Anglican clergyman, Canon W. L. Grane, whose

book, *War, Its Curse and Cure*, reflects wide learning and the thought of a lifetime. He views the struggle between war and peace as mental and moral rather than material. The world, he believes, is walking as near to the edge of the abyss as it walked in the decade before 1914 when, in the conflict of thought that preceded the Great War "the wrong side won." He means that Nietzsche and Treitschke, with General von Bernhardi and war prophets in other countries, prevailed over Tolstoi, Romain Rolland, Norman Angell and H. G. Wells. Today the acute psychological contest has been renewed between strident nationalism, on the one hand, and various sorts of internationalism and pacifism, on the other. With pacifism pure and simple Canon Grane has little sympathy. He would have nations take the risk of standing together and pledging all their resources in support of a new international law that shall make war a crime against humanity and reduce, or raise, the lawful functions of national armaments to that of putting, in Theodore Roosevelt's words, the combined power of civilisation behind its collective purpose of justice between nations. And upon what "civilisation" may be, he agrees with the Swiss philosopher Amiel that "civilisation rests not on science but on conscience."

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Here Canon Grane touches an issue of fundamental importance. It is whether civilised ethics, and their reflection in conscience, have kept pace with the advance of scientific knowledge and achievement. Inasmuch as it consists in the pursuit of knowledge,

science may be conscienceless or, at least, non-ethical, save in so far as it is governed by the respect for truth which has an ethical value of its own. If, by itself, science may be unable to redeem mankind from war or to supply the ethical impulse that is needed to vanquish war, it is natural and fitting that Christians should look to the Christian ethic for the source of this impulse and should seek to draw from it their indictment of war. In this respect another Canon of the Anglican Church, Dr. Charles E. Raven, Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge, has made so noteworthy a contribution to Christian thought in a book entitled *Is War Obsolete?* that its main thesis must be set forth. Like Dr. Fosdick he writes from direct experience of war; and though his hatred of war is not less deep than that of the eminent American preacher, his treatment of the subject is firmer. To no fact does he close his eyes, nor is he blind to practical necessity.

"Despite the long tale of disappointments during the past few years," Canon Raven writes, "the conviction remains with me that the implementing of our pledges against war must be the first step to world order." War, he says, obviously has its deepest roots in the will to live, in that struggle for existence which, in one form or another, plays and has played so large a part in evolution. But it is not true that military training in itself fosters the combative instinct and "blood lust." Blood lust, or the condition vividly described as "seeing red," is not common among normal men. Military training makes almost no appeal to it; forming fours and shooting at a target are far more remote from it than a boxing match.

Pugnacity played almost no part in the desire to enlist in 1914; nor did it loom large when the recruit found himself in the firing line. One could find far more blood lust in professors and maiden ladies at home than in the soldiery at the front. Far more important as a motive was the desire to test to the uttermost the quality of one's manhood—the same impulse that sends men to Everest or to the South Pole, the zest for adventure and achievement, the basic joy in exercising the faculties at their highest pitch.

In the fighting line, Canon Raven notes, men become indifferent to the minor discomforts of existence, to fatigue and worry, they are cleansed as in great tragedy by the influence of pity and fear, they become intuitively sensitive to the claims and supports of comradeship. The effect of this is equivalent to a speeding up of the evolutionary process, and to the development of character under its influence. Latent possibilities for good or evil spring into full growth in a few hours. Men grew up in a week and were exhausted in a year:

“I do not think that anyone who had a consecutive year of actual front-line service has ever recovered from the effects of it—certainly not if he was in the infantry and in an active sector. This is, of course, why the United States never experienced the real stress of war at all. Its army was only in the field long enough to see the best of it; it was spared the grim and inevitable tragedies of good men undermined, nerves slowly exhausted, character distorted and brutalised.”

On the whole, men turned out vastly better than could be expected. There is no more ignorant libel than to denounce war as an orgy of lust and savagery.

There was a total disappearance of any personal hatred for the enemy. Having censored thousands of letters from a fighting battalion, Canon Raven is emphatic on this point. Speech, he says, might consist of a monotonous repetition of two adjectives and two nouns, three of them originally obscene. But the atmosphere was cleaner and more humane than in most gatherings of men; and the delicacy of feeling, the respect for others, the generosity of outlook constantly filled him with wonder.

Whatever may have been the character of earlier fighting, he declares, modern warfare makes a larger demand upon the psychological than the physical resources. Most of the cases labelled "shell-shock" were caused not by some sudden explosion but by the failure of the organism to meet the demands upon it. There comes a point at which sensibilities can respond no longer—a point of collapse. For war, like evolution, fosters sensitiveness, and it is the naturally sensitive who survive. For centuries it was assumed that military virtue was synonymous with muscular prowess, with solid, unimaginative and rather animal temperaments. But in battle it was the bovine, not the highly strung, who succumbed to shell-shock. It was usually the sensitive, intelligent folk who displayed fantastic heroism and gained control of the situation and of their own fate. The folly of war, even for those who got the best from it, lies in the fact that such tension is unnatural in itself and unworthy in its objective—unnatural because it is a reversion to an environment that we have long outgrown, unworthy because the purpose of our agony is ultimately the crude intent to kill.

Mankind is no longer organised for conflict at this level.

The endurance of the men who fought, Canon Raven goes on, might be justified if the end were divine. The man who will not fling away his life for a cause is not fit for earth or for heaven. But it is folly and wastage, idolatry and sacrilege, to demand such an offering for any but the highest service. The best should only be given to the highest. Warfare was a relapse into the childhood of the race. This is the evolutionary case against war—that it subjects a highly organised creature to conditions which have now become not creative but disintegrating. It is nonsense to say that civilisation has enervated the race, or that war is necessary to prevent men from becoming soft and degenerate. No one who compares the Great War with its predecessors will regard human valour as diminishing, or human endurance as undermined by increasing culture. But to devote the finest susceptibilities of mankind to the business of escaping and inflicting physical torture is to use the surgeon's scalpel to do the work of a frontiersman's axe.

At the same time Canon Raven admits that if, in the training of the young, there is still a stage at which physical force is the appropriate argument, the question of using force in dealing with backward races must remain open. For here we have to do with peoples whose whole training, tradition and religion glorify warfare, whose power to kill is at present restrained by the use of superior military force, and from whom we are pledged to defend men and women who would otherwise be their victims. Under the pledge of security which British

rule has offered on the North-West Frontier of India, for instance, great civilising activities are being carried on, and peaceful multitudes are living in reliance upon its protection. Any one of us is entitled and may be bound to accept martyrdom for ourselves : to expose to it innocent folk who have settled in countries kept secure by our garrisons is quite a different moral issue.

Nor does it seem morally right to vote for a policy of disarmament if one is not convinced that it is immediately practicable. Would those who so earnestly support full disarmament take the responsibility for acting upon their convictions ? If not, are they not in the position of crying for the moon in the hope that thereby they may at least stimulate their fellows to move up a storey nearer to the roof of the house ? Unless an immediately available alternative to the method of military constraint can be found, the extreme pacifist position is not, Canon Raven thinks, likely to commend itself to practical citizens.

What, then, is his solution ? He finds it in fuller understanding of the teachings and purpose of Christ. To take life boldly, counting it well spent if lost for loyalty ; to live from hour to hour, savouring to the full its joys and pains ; to be swift to catch the meaning of the moment, and to turn it to good account : above all to centre one's interest upon persons, not upon things—such was the way of living which, in Canon Raven's view, Christ revealed and strove to create. " Some of us," he says, " found our clearest expression of it when we had come to terms with death and found ourselves freed from fear and pride in the comradeship of shared suffering. We knew it

for the first time in the trenches, and realised that it was theoretically familiar. We had already found it, and failed to recognise it, in the Gospels."

The first requisite for the living of such a life, he believes, is the possession of a satisfying ideal, such as can call out a passionate devotion and draw all our energies to its attainment. Devotion must quicken into love. That is why the art of loving is the highest and hardest part of education. The second requisite is to have, along with the ideal, some great and concrete task to be performed for its sake. It is in the doing of the work which it inspires that the quality of the ideal is disclosed. And the third requisite is the support and inspiration of fellowship which renders available a flood of new vitality. It is a commonplace that the valour of comrades differs vastly from the sum of their individual courage.

The weakness of mankind today lies not in its resources, which are increasing at least in proportion to the scale and complexity of human problems, but, Canon Raven holds, in the moral and spiritual inadequacy of its fitness to deal with them. Christians are called to devote themselves to the task of moral and religious education, of evangelism in the true sense. It is in the service of the Prince of Peace that a moral equivalent and a satisfying alternative for war can best be found. A common faith that transcends the barriers of race and class and sex is essential as the foundation of a world-wide commonwealth. It is the magnitude of the effort which makes it worthy of support.

It has become increasingly plain, he concludes, that

only if the imagination of mankind be fired and its energies enlisted in a task of superhuman greatness is there any prospect of recovery from depression and inertia. The War showed that there is an almost limitless reserve of power latent in human beings. Given a sufficient cause, it might be released from wastage and made available for service. If the older and more traditionalist Churches are not ready to move, we should look to groups within them or to bodies which form the Peace Movement to take the initiative. To appeal to younger men and women to give their lives to the service of reconciliation, to provide funds to enable them to do so, and to send them out to the areas where the rule of military power is still unquestioned and at present irreplaceable, would be to take a first step towards putting into practice the Christian obligation.

Yet those Christians who believe in love, not in force, as the ultimate power will not advance their cause by refusal to sympathise with others who differ from them upon the steps by which its rule is to be advanced. On the immediate issue of using "sanctions" or penalties to prevent war it ought surely to be possible for Christians to acquiesce in the internationalising of armed force while advocating and developing another way of reconciliation. The Churches have denounced war as inconsistent with Christ's teaching. The nations have solemnly outlawed it. "Surely there are among us men and women sufficiently adventurous, sufficiently Christian, to take up the ministry of reconciliation, to exercise it wherever the outlook is most dangerous, to convince the world that the power of the spirit is stronger than the arms

of the flesh, and that in these days warfare is as obsolete and as intolerable as slavery."

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Canon Raven's statement of the Christian case against war appears to me more cogent than that of Dr. Fosdick or the Very Rev. "Dick" Sheppard. But many, possibly most, dwellers in Christian lands do not take their views on war and peace from the Churches. Pacifists, as a rule, draw their arguments from other sources. Even when they do not look upon peace (which they usually identify with non-war) as the highest good in human life, they think it inexcusable to use lawful force for the prevention of war, and distrust any form of compulsion or constraint as a means of securing justice and upholding freedom. They hold, despite the experience of men like Canon Raven, that war lets loose the worst passions in men, turning them into wild beasts, and that violence merely begets violence and leaves a legacy of hate and resentment. Unwilling to admit that fear of consequences plays any notable part in the prevention of lawlessness or crime, they think police methods only one degree less harmful than military methods. If, in most human beings, there be an element of lawlessness and brutality, there is also, they urge, something essentially divine that needs to be cultivated and developed. Surely it would be far better, they claim, to draw forth the good than merely to repress the bad. It is the inhumanity of war, its alleged suppression of pity and lovingkindness, which these pacifists feel to be worse even than its destructiveness of human life, since there may be a more sublime

heroism in suffering wrong without retaliation than in asserting right by force.

Other opponents of war add the plea that the habit of war-making is no better than the old convention which formerly compelled men to fight duels in vindication of their "honour." The conception of national "honour" and of "patriotism" needs to be changed. Closely examined, the sentiment of patriotism appears to them not much more praiseworthy than the sentiment of honour, since, at bottom, it is only self-love writ large. The only way to get rid of war is to renounce war. A nation's honour ought to be linked with its pride in having turned its back upon so horrible and stupid a thing as war as a means of defending its "honour," possessions or rights. Whatever risk may be involved, the opponents of war should wish their country to incur it. As Mr. A. A. Milne writes at the conclusion of his *Peace with Honour* :

"I should be proud to think of England risking something for a cause outside herself. Whether we are patriots, or just plain men and women who love our country, we want to be proud of England. How can pride-of-country be an admirable quality, an inspiring quality, if it is nothing more than a pride of material possession? It is difficult for a man to be proud of his name if, through the centuries, his family has shown no attribute more noble, more selfless, than a determination to keep trespassers off its property. . . . Were England now to seek a new virtue: were she to take the risk of sacrifice in the cause of Peace and for the saving of the world: then, for every vocal patriot who cried out, a thousand quiet English men and women would feel in their hearts a pride too deep for words.

. . . Granted the premise it is unthinkable that one faithless nation should break faith, and attack another nation. Even if this were not so, nations should take the risk of it for the cause higher than any national cause, the cause of humanity.

“The premise is that Europe wants peace.”

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Mr. Milne believes that the people of Europe want peace and that they have never wanted anything else, but is uncertain whether the dictators of Europe want peace. I am not sure that the peoples of Europe have always wanted peace, or that the only doubt is whether the dictators want it. Be this as it may, his supposition raises the important question whether and how far forms of government make for non-war or for war—whether, that is to say, government of the people by the people for the people is and will in all circumstances be a safeguard against the passions, appetites, ambitions and interests which have in the past prompted monarchs and dictators to lead or to drive their peoples into war.

To this question there is hardly a conclusive answer. The English historian Kinglake, whose *History of the Crimean War* is a classic, affirms that one of the determining causes of that war was an outburst of popular passion in England, and that this passion drove the Government into courses which it might not otherwise have followed. This statement opens up, in its turn, a wide field of enquiry into the causes of war—a complicated matter upon which men agree as little as they agree upon the means of preventing war. Many ardent pacifists affirm that a chief cause

of war is the capitalist system with its insistence upon the rights of private property, and claim that both an economic and a political revolution will have to be gone through before war can be abolished. In other words, these pacifists beg the question, even if they beg it less obviously than Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels begged it in their famous *Communist Manifesto*. If mankind has to wait for the abolition of war until the "capitalist system" is dead and Communism is everywhere triumphant, all enquiry into the causes of war and its cure had better be suspended. Argument for argument, it would be possible to make out a very plausible contention that not until war has been effectively banned as an instrument of national policy, and not until the thought of war as a means of settling international disputes has disappeared from the minds of men, will it be possible to carry through such changes in economic and social structure as would bring the less sordid aspects of the Communist ideal within sight of attainment.

The truth is that war will not be overcome by argument alone. If hard logic could prevail against it, the militarists and warmongers of all nations would long since have fled to the mountains, with the pacifists in hot pursuit. The trouble about hard logic is that it usually builds up its syllogisms by leaving out terms that are important yet impede the happy business of deduction from abstract premises. For instance, as Mr. J. A. Spender has observed, war, even successful war, may profit no nation. But, incontestably, defeat is apt to be a worse disaster even than victory. Or, again, armaments may not

give security. They may, on the contrary, defeat themselves in the long run by engendering counter-armaments. The point is that the effect does not follow immediately upon the cause and that, in the interval, the possession of armaments may give Governments and nations a feeling that, for the time being, they are safe against aggression or able to ensure respect for their interests. Theologians and ministers of religion may be able to think in terms of eternity, whereas statesmen and peoples think chiefly in terms of their own time and desire safety in that time; and until pacifists can put their ideas in such a way as to convince short-term as well as long-term minds, they will be likely to find their reasoning more satisfactory to themselves than to others.

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Many years ago I coined the word "brainglory" to describe sundry Jewish intellectual tendencies. The word fits the case of not a few pacifists who seem to fancy that, as soon as they have shown an argument to be logically faulty, they have disposed of it altogether. This supposition is itself fallacious for human conduct is rarely, if ever, determined by logic. Even among peoples which set store by rationality, as the French are alleged to do, action is more often prompted by feeling than by thought. Religious pleas against war do at least appeal to feeling. They may even engender a kind of fanaticism. Their weakness lies in the circumstance that, among the majority of civilised men and women, the religious mood is not stable enough to sustain an unvarying standard of behaviour. Patriotic emotion may be steadier, both because it

is more widespread and because it is linked with matters which ordinary human beings care about.

Hitherto the patriotic emotion has usually been enlisted on behalf of war or in justification of it. If it is ever to be turned against war, a new meaning will have to be given to "patriotism" and a higher ideal than that of promoting national interests or even of defending one's native soil will need to be attached to it. Edith Cavell showed sublime vision when she declared that "Patriotism is not enough"; but the task of ennobling the patriotic instinct, of raising it to a loftier level and of finding for it positive outlets has still to be grappled with in ways to which pacifists have, so far, paid too little heed.

It is here that Mr. A. A. Milne's *Peace with Honour* strikes a new note. He distinguishes between "patriotism" and "pride of country," and he would have patriots put their pride into the service of national and international honour and good faith. If we could establish good faith as the supreme moral law of nations, and identify a country's honour with the observance of this law, Mr. Milne believes that we might get peace. On the assumption that good faith will govern international affairs—a very large assumption—he thinks that two of the main obstacles to peace—that is to say, "security" and "sanctions"—would disappear. But he asks how can we establish good faith, and how can we disestablish "patriotism," or persuade the patriots of various nations to trust each other.

Meanwhile Mr. Milne finds his supreme argument in the thought of what modern war must be. He points out that it would mean "women and children

first," not in the sense that they must first be protected but that they must first be destroyed, since the next war will be waged by aerial attack from which women and children cannot be saved. Against such attack there can be no defence except through counter-attack which would strike at the enemy's women and children.

Therefore he asks statesmen and peoples to display all their humanity, and to decide that there shall be no next war; to exert all their intelligence, and to understand that the only way to avoid war is to renounce it; and to pledge all their honour in an oath of renunciation. Finally he asks statesmen to have the grace to remember, and to remember with shame, that through all the butchery of this "next war" the lives most carefully preserved would be their own and that, before the safety of any woman, any child, would be put the safety of the British and French Prime Ministers and that of Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini.

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Mr. Milne does well to get away, in the end, from his logical or semi-logical reasoning against war, and to round off his reasoning with a frank denunciation of the character of future warfare. While a number of experts, including some soldiers who went through gas attacks in the Great War and have since experimented with newer and more deadly gases, attempt to prove that, after all, the use of poison gases on a large scale might not be so very terrible, and that the efficacy of bacteriological warfare has been wildly exaggerated, I do not think that the destructive

potentiality of modern mechanical, chemical and bacteriological weapons has been or can be overstated. In this respect the Great War was an amateurish affair. Nor do I imagine that the military command of any nation which should mean to use war to advance its interests would shrink from employing any agency that it would expect to destroy its adversary swiftly.

War-thinkers are apt to work out their problems in a moral vacuum. Peace-thinkers need to be no less hard-headed. Otherwise they will always find themselves at a disadvantage. Moral precepts and lofty humanitarian emotions are no match for clear thought backed by resolute will. For instance, it is quite useless to argue that no civilised nation would ever do this or that in warfare; or that, if a number of nations had bound themselves by international treaty not to use deadly gases or bacteriological cultures or incendiary or explosive bombs against undefended cities, all of them could be trusted to keep their word. No nation can be trusted to keep its word if it believes its own existence to be endangered; and not every nation would, as things are today, allow its "honour" to stand in the way of gaining what it might feel sure would be a decisive military advantage over a rival nation.¹

In any event a "nation" might have very little say in the matter. It would be committed to certain forms of ruthless action by its military authorities or chemical experts long before it knew, or could know, the things that had been or were about to be done.

¹ This was written in the spring of 1935, six months before the Italian attack upon Abyssinia and a year before the use of "mustard" gas to break the spirit of the unprotected Abyssinian forces.

The strictest secrecy would be observed. Besides, it stands to (military) reason that any Government or High Command that should resolve to use forbidden agencies of slaughter would be careful to tell its own people that the foe was preparing to use or had used the same or deadlier agencies, and that to meet like with like was the only means of self-defence. For this procedure the annals of the Great War offer more than one precedent.

I do not believe that either Mr. H. G. Wells or any other qualified thinker who has foreshadowed the nature of future warfare goes beyond conclusions that can be legitimately induced from existing data. Such study as I have been able to make of this matter persuades me that, if a "next war" be waged between nations equipped with large industrial resources, chemical plants and bacteriological institutes, it will be begun by surprise, that is to say, without warning or declaration, at a moment when the selected victims of attack are least on their guard. Nor will the aggressor start with operations on a restricted scale or by comparatively "gentlemanly" means. He will use every engine of destruction at the outset on a scale and with an intensity that may be inconceivable to those who are unacquainted with the studies already carried out and the preparations already made by the General Staffs of more than one modern State.

Not only am I not incredulous on this score, but I am certain that present realities outrun popular imagination in a degree which plain citizens would hardly think possible were the truth suddenly placed before them. Yet I am not horror-stricken. If the peoples of the world are not ready for non-war, to

say nothing of peace, if they seek solace in doctrines of heroic non-resistance, if they faintly trust the larger hope that everything will come right provided their own intentions are pure, they will one day get what they deserve, and will richly deserve what they get. Should those of them who survive the first attack find that their cities are blazing from end to end with fires which tens of thousands of inextinguishable bombs have started, that the streets are choked with dead and dying, that highways are blocked by masses of vehicles jammed together and full of the writhing bodies of men, women and children who had vainly sought safety in flight, that their railways are out of action, their water supplies and the air they breathe laden with deadly bacteria—should they perceive that, even as they wring their hands in hopeless and helpless terror, an invisible gas is causing the skin on those hands to melt, or to peel off their faces in strips, they would at least have the consolation of expiring as the last representatives of a “civilisation” which they would not take the trouble to uphold by the acceptance of any individual or national responsibility for putting war beyond the thought of nations and of men.

In writing this I am not drawing upon mere fantasy. I am illustrating the declared principles of modern strategists in the light of technical and chemical agencies of destruction now at the disposal of every well-organised General Staff. Those principles were frankly laid down by an expert writer in the leading German military organ, the *Militärwochenblatt*, as long ago as September, 1932. He explained, with truth, that war as a recognised institution has reached a

crisis which may be fatal to it unless its strategy be radically renewed so as to render long-drawn-out hostilities impossible. The Great War, which lasted nearly four and a half years, wrought such economic and financial ruin that another war of the same kind would leave the world safe only for Bolshevism. Given approximate equality of modern weapons, the protraction of hostilities cannot be avoided if war is declared in the old way, and mobilisations proceed by stages. Therefore, if war is to be saved, it must be waged more reasonably; and its humaneness would be in direct proportion to its brevity, whatever the vigour and the destructiveness of the means employed. Thus attack must be a complete surprise. It must be made with forces so overwhelming that the country attacked would be utterly paralysed, and would have no choice save to surrender at discretion. For this purpose superiority of military force must first be attained. When it has been attained one thing only could deter its possessor from using it—the risk, the fear of failure.

This German writer had enough intellectual virtue to think out the problem of modern war in the moral vacuum that is proper to such exercises, and to state his conclusions lucidly. If it be said that efficient ruthlessness is no pledge of success since it would rouse the conscience of the civilised world against it—as happened when the Germans invaded neutral Belgium in 1914—the answer is that time is needed effectively to express moral indignation, and that the aim of war-making strategy will be precisely to leave no time for such expression. Once the German writer's premise—that international war is worth preserving—

is accepted, his reasoning seems to me unanswerable. Those who reject his premise, as I do, find themselves face to face with the real question which opponents of war have to answer. It is this : How can they, as individuals and as nations, help so to increase the fear and the risks of failure in war as to remove the very idea of war as an instrument of national policy from the minds of all save the criminal or the mad ?

Even then there will remain the problem of dealing with nations in which mad or criminal impulses may prevail. A civilisation powerless to protect itself against ruin by madmen or criminals would not be worth saving. It may well be that, under modern conditions, only the mad or the criminal can think of having recourse to war, despite Signor Mussolini's dictum that war is "the Supreme Court of peoples" from whose existence the only appeal is another war. Yet there exists a body of doctrine, ancient and modern, that upholds and extols the necessity of war ; and it is probable that, even among human beings who think themselves civilised, a majority still accept this doctrine in one form or another. In the next chapter it will be set forth and examined.

CHAPTER III

THE CASE FOR WAR

THERE must be something to say for an institution that has lasted so long as war, something more than mere assertions that war always has been and always will be, or that it is rooted in the nature of things. If it were merely "silly" or "wicked" it would scarcely have stood the test of ages, nor would the keenest thought of the ablest brains have been given to it. Great religions, like Islam, would not have made it a divinely ordained means of spreading the truth or suppressing error as, indeed, other religions, including the Jewish, had already done; and even the Christian Gospels contain some warrant for believing that wars and rumours of wars "must needs be."

On this latter ground I was once taxed with impiety in a public meeting for having argued that war should be got rid of; and though I "scored off" my critic to the satisfaction of the audience I felt that he might have put his case better. I suggested that if he took war to be part of the divine order of the universe, he should not, for instance, seek to put an end to the germs that might be warring against his teeth, or choking his children with diphtheria or spreading typhoid in his drinking water, since these agencies of destruction were also part of the divine order. He might have retorted, though he did not, that the fight against disease is a form of war and, as such,

commendable, whereas he was objecting to my unchristian plea that there should be no more war.

It is wholesome for critics of war as a human institution suddenly to be faced with arguments they have not thought of, and to be forced to realise that their opponents may have more to say than sentimental pacifists are ready to admit. I believe that the case for peace, as a dynamic ideal, cannot be convincingly stated save by those who have thought out and weighed the case for war; and though I am not sure I can make out a telling case for war, I shall try to do so. As a first step I shall give in outline the best analysis of war, its nature and its aims that I know of.

This is the classical work *On War* by the great Prussian soldier General von Clausewitz. He wrote it during the first quarter of the nineteenth century, and it was published by his wife in 1832, shortly after his death. Modern armaments may have rendered obsolete many of his teachings upon strategy and tactics, but his philosophy of war was, until very recently, unchallenged in Germany. Even now it is challenged only by General Ludendorff, whose latest work, *Total War*, rejects Clausewitz's conception of war as the handmaid of policy and claims that policy must be the handmaid of war. With Ludendorff's somewhat rhapsodical thesis I shall deal in a later chapter, since it assumes war to be an end in itself, not a case to be established.

As General Count von Schlieffen (a former Chief of the German General Staff, and author of the famous "Schlieffen Plan" for the invasion of France through Belgium) wrote in his Preface to the 1905 edition of Clausewitz's work, Clausewitz provided a doctrine

adaptable to the infinite variety of war, and established the truth that every form of warfare must be worked out according to its character. For this achievement, Schlieffen claimed, the Prussian and indeed the whole German army "owe the great thinker imperishable gratitude. The seed sown by Clausewitz bore rich fruit on the battlefields of 1866 and of 1870-71. The superiority of our leadership which revealed itself there had its roots essentially in the work *On War* that served to form a whole generation of distinguished soldiers. . . . The lasting value of this work lies—alongside of its high ethical and psychological content—in the insistent emphasis it lays upon the idea of annihilating the enemy. Clausewitz looked upon war as subject 'to a supreme law of decision by force of arms.' He placed 'the destruction of enemy forces ever foremost among all the other objects that may be pursued by war.' This doctrine guided us to Königgrätz and Sedan. But it was itself drawn from experience of the Great War era at the beginning of the nineteenth century."

Clausewitz entered the Prussian army as an ensign in 1792, served in the campaigns of 1793-94 on the Rhine, and, after being wounded and made prisoner by the French during the Prussian fight against Napoleon which ended at Jena in 1806, was chosen as military instructor to the Crown Prince of Prussia. General Scharnhorst, head of the Berlin Military School and one of the reorganisers of the Prussian army, recognised Clausewitz's ability and employed him on the staff until, like other Prussian officers, Clausewitz took service with Russia and worked as a Russian staff officer up to the close of Napoleon's

Russian campaign. Then Clausewitz was attached, still as a Russian staff officer, to Blücher's headquarters, though he rejoined the Prussian army in 1815 and served as Chief of Staff to the Prussian corps which was engaged with Grouchy at Wavre on June 18, 1815, the day of Waterloo. In 1818 he was appointed, in his turn, head of the Berlin Military School. In this capacity he was able to work out his ideas in detail, adapting them to the revolutionary lessons he had learned from Napoleon.

Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century and up to the Great War of 1914-18, the principles of Clausewitz governed the military thought of Germany and of many other countries. By degrees, and in ways which Clausewitz himself would have been the first to condemn, this thought became stereotyped; and had General von Schlieffen lived to see how the German General Staff worked out in 1914 his own plan for the invasion of France through Belgium he, too, might have let their inelastic minds feel the bite of his censure. At the same time, British commanders and staff officers showed similar incapacity to understand Clausewitz and were hardly less pedantic in what they mistook for fidelity to his principles than their German adversaries had been. In particular they persisted in applying his precepts upon wars of movement to what had in fact become siege warfare, and overlooked what he had written upon the conduct of sieges.

Rightly or wrongly interpreted, Clausewitz's philosophy still guides orthodox German military thought no less than that of Japan and of other countries which look upon war as a legitimate instrument of

national policy. Thus it is well for critics of war to ask whence that philosophy draws its strength. If enquiry should lead them to the conclusion that the philosophy of war cannot be overcome without a sounder philosophy of life and peace their quest may be fruitful. One truth will soon force itself upon their minds. It is that war-thinking necessarily makes light of individual human lives and weighs them in the mass against the mass of other human lives which it is the business of war to destroy. "Numbers determine victory," writes Clausewitz, in substantial agreement with Napoleon, who said: "Only numbers can annihilate." War-thinking requires that if, say, one million lives have to be extinguished in order to annihilate eight hundred thousand other lives, and to win a war, the million lives must be sacrificed. The same principle applies to armaments and engines of destruction generally. Given the right weapons, in sufficient number and quality, their use at a favourable moment becomes a question of nerve on the part of governments and commanders who, in the service of their nation, may think the existence of a part of it less important than the existence, or the prospective advantage, of the whole.

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Some of Clausewitz's phrases have become aphorisms. For example: "War is nothing but the continuation of policy by other means." But his next sentence is less often cited. It runs: "This standpoint, if everywhere held fast, will bring much more unity into consideration of the matter, and everything will fall more easily into its right place." He himself holds

fast to his standpoint from the outset, and develops it in detail with remarkable clearness. He asks: "What is war?" and answers that it is an enlarged duel, "an act of violence meant to force an opponent to do our will." In a passage that has a very modern ring he adds:

"Violence arms itself with the inventions of the arts and sciences so as to meet violence. It is accompanied by trifling limitations, hardly worth mentioning, which it places on itself under the name of international legal usages, without essentially weakening its power. Violence, that is to say physical violence—since there is no moral force apart from the notions of the State and of Law—is therefore the means; to force our will upon the enemy is the end. We must render the enemy defenceless so as to make sure of reaching this end, and this is, according to the very concept of war, the real aim of warlike action. This (immediate) aim takes the place of the (ultimate) end and thrusts it aside in a certain degree as something not appertaining to war itself."

Clausewitz plainly means that though the ultimate end of war is to compel an enemy to yield to the will of a victorious foe, the process of compulsion, or actual fighting, takes little account of how the enemy may be treated once he is beaten and disarmed, and is determined solely by the thought of beating and disarming him. Here we have, in germ, the source of many a conflict between "politicians" and "soldiers"—the kind of conflict in which Bismarck was involved in 1866 when he opposed the annexation of Austrian territory by the "soldiers." The friction between Mr. Lloyd George and the British Commander-in-Chief during the Great War arose, on the other hand

mainly from differences of view upon military methods and, in one instance at least, upon the most economical use of "man-power"—that is to say, human lives. "Soldiers," who are not always right, are apt to feel that any sacrifice of life is justified if its object is to shorten a war or win it.

Upon this matter Clausewitz is emphatic. Humane souls, he writes, might easily imagine that there are clever ways of disarming or overthrowing the enemy without hurting him too much, and that this is the proper purpose of the art of war. However nice this may seem, it is an error that must be stamped upon, "since in a matter so dangerous as war the mistakes that arise from kindness are the worst of all. . . . He who uses violence ruthlessly, without sparing bloodshed, gets the upper hand—unless the enemy does it. Thus he lays down the law to the other, and both carry things to extremes without other limitations than those inherent in the contending forces themselves." And Clausewitz declares roundly :

"This is how the thing must be seen ; and it is a futile, self-stultifying endeavour to overlook the nature of violence out of dislike of its roughness.

"If the wars of civilised peoples are much less cruel and destructive than those of savages, the difference lies in the social conditions prevailing in States themselves and between themselves. War proceeds from these conditions and the relations between them, and is determined, circumscribed and moderated by them. But these things do not belong to war itself. They are only given factors ; and never can a principle of moderation be brought into the philosophy of war without absurdity."

Clausewitz was doubtless thinking of operations against enemy forces in the field. In this respect his reasoning holds good; though when it is construed, as some German commanders have construed it, as a warrant for "a certain frightfulness" against civil populations, its ruthlessness may set up moral reactions disadvantageous alike to the military and the political aims of a war-maker. Still, dwelling upon the worth of violence in the strictly military sense, Clausewitz gives fair warning to those who would fain see war "humanised," a distinction drawn between weapons of offence and those of defence, and the most destructive modern agencies and weapons abolished. He speaks of war as it has been and must be if men and nations continue to put their trust in it. Its object, he insists, is the complete disarming of the enemy or his reduction to a state of defencelessness. By defencelessness Clausewitz means that, first, the enemy forces must be annihilated or rendered powerless to continue the fight. Second, the enemy country must be conquered so that it cannot raise fresh forces. Nor, when this has been done, can the war be looked upon as finished until the enemy's will has been broken, his government compelled to sign peace or his people driven to surrender.

How these ends are to be attained in practice Clausewitz explains in precise detail. But through all his detail runs a philosophical strain. To him the psychological side of war is not less important than its technical side; and he uses the example of Prussia in preparing for the "War of Liberation" before 1813 to show the part a people can play when its will is steeled for the fight and it is urged on by strong

ambition. A firm policy he holds to be essential to the successful waging of war, since war, as he repeats in the final section of his work, is only one form of political intercourse, not a detached or independent undertaking. It is a continuation of policy by other than political means. In the service of a splendid policy, he declares, war may rise to so high a level as to become almost an absolute end in itself. Therefore the need for an ideal policy must never be lost sight of, nor should the inseparability of policy and war ever be forgotten.

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Partisans of peace as a positive condition of mankind, not less than those who give the name of peace to a state of non-war, have much to learn from Clausewitz's doctrine. If policy and war are inseparable, if "a splendid policy" is able to raise war to so high a level that it becomes almost an absolute end in itself, does it not follow that policy and peace should also be inseparable and that a splendid peace policy might raise peace to an absolute end instead of allowing it to be conceived as a longer or shorter interval between "inevitable" wars? In some degree the objection may hold good that a war policy can be pursued by a single country, whereas a peace policy postulates agreement between several countries; and that this is precisely the difficulty which peace-loving nations have hitherto failed fully to overcome. Yet, in the last resort, it is a question of clearness of vision and of firmness of resolve. Should these be lacking, as they have often been lacking among supporters of peace during the past fifteen years, the advantage of the

initiative is left to those countries and governments which still look upon war as the supreme instrument of policy. It is chiefly for this reason that the war idea has been gaining ground while the peace idea has fallen into discredit.

In two European countries at least—Fascist Italy and Hitlerite Germany—the war idea is now strongly held and authoritatively taught. Quite as vigorously is it inculcated upon the people of Japan. Signor Mussolini has more than once declared that his aim is to make Italy both a military and a militaristic nation. He has, indeed, militarised his fellow-countrymen almost from the cradle up. The same process is going on in Germany, no longer secretly but openly. Herr Hitler's autobiography, *Mein Kampf*, breathes the spirit of war, as do the widely-read writings of Herr Rosenberg and other of his associates. Nowhere in Europe is the case for war so ardently advocated as in Germany; and it is assuredly no accident that, under Herr Hitler's leadership, Chairs of Military Science should have been created in German high schools and universities, or that one of the most outspoken of contemporary German war-prophets, Professor Ewald Banse, should have been appointed to the first of them.

Professor Banse's teachings are, despite expostulations and denials, representative of current German thought and policy. Though, in deference to foreign protests, his works were ostensibly banned for a time, no effort has been spared to instil the ideas he propounds into the minds of German youth. If these ideas were peculiar to Professor Banse, or were out of keeping with pre-war German tradition from Clause-

witz onward, less weight would need to be attached to them, and they might to some extent be ignored. But, in point of fact, they make up the substance of the case for war upon which the present German policy of military rearmament and territorial expansion is based. It was therefore fitting that, in the spring of 1935, shortly before Germany repudiated (on March 16) the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty, Professor Banse should have been given a fresh mark of approval by being appointed to a "Chair of Honour" at Hanover.

After all, he had but restated teachings that were commonplace in Germany before the Great War of 1914. For instance, General Friedrich von Bernhardi, author of the well-known work *Germany and the Next War* (published in 1911), declared that the object of abolishing war entirely and of denying its necessary place in historical development "is directly antagonistic to the great universal laws which rule all life. War," he added, "is a biological necessity of the first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind that cannot be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real civilisation." And he quotes with approval the saying of Heraclitus of Ephesus that "War is the father of all things."

Bernhardi's chapter, "The Right to Make War," is worth re-reading, even today, if only for the array of opinions which it cites in favour of war. One of them—that of the famous German historian Heinrich von Treitschke (at whose feet I sat as a student in Berlin)—runs: "It has always been the weary, spiritless

and exhausted ages which have played with the dream of perpetual peace." Another is culled from A. W. von Schlegel: "War is as necessary as the struggle of the elements in Nature." A third is taken from Schiller's *Bride of Messina* :

"Man is stunted by peaceful days,
In idle repose his courage decays.
Law is the weakling's game,
Law makes the world the same.
But in war man's strength is seen,
War ennobles all that is mean ;
Even the coward belies his name."

From Professor Kuno Fischer, the philosopher of Heidelberg whose work on *Hegel* was used as a textbook by generations of German students, General von Bernhardt quoted the passage : "Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the State from social petrification and stagnation. It is well that the transitoriness of the goods of this world be not only preached but learned from experience. War alone teaches this lesson." Wilhelm von Humboldt was equally affirmative. "I recognise in the effect of war upon national character," he wrote, "one of the most salutary elements in the moulding of the human race"—a view not hard to reconcile with Frederick the Great's panegyric : "War opens the most fruitful field to all virtues, for at every moment constancy, pity, magnanimity, heroism and mercy shine forth in it ; every moment offers an opportunity to exercise one of these virtues."

In the perfume of these flowers of German thought it is easy to understand von Bernhardt's own claim that every means ought to be employed to oppose the visionary schemes of peacemongers which must

be "publicly denounced as what they really are—an unhealthy and feeble Utopia, or a cloak for political machinations. Our people must learn to see that *the maintenance of peace never can or may be the goal of a policy.* [Italics in original.] The policy of a great State has positive aims. It will endeavour to attain these by pacific measures so long as that is possible and profitable. It must not only be conscious that, in momentous questions which influence definitely the entire development of a nation, the appeal to arms is a sacred right of the State, but it must keep this conviction fresh in the national consciousness. The inevitableness, the idealism and the blessing of war, as an indispensable and stimulating law of development, must be repeatedly emphasised."

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General von Bernhardi wrote before the Great War. Some may therefore imagine that the experience of disaster and misery which defeat brought upon Germany has rendered his views obsolete. Ten years ago this supposition might have seemed to hold good. Today there is strong reason to think that it, not the doctrine of von Bernhardi, is obsolete. One of the most convinced of British pacifists, Mr. Robert Dell, sometime Berlin correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, who was expelled from France for his pro-German sympathies and thereafter betook himself to Germany, has stated in his recent volume *Germany Unmasked*:

"It was the Germany I knew in 1922-25 that was deceptive and misled so many of us, especially those of us who, like myself, had known little of pre-war Germany.

The Germany of 1922-25 seemed as different from pre-war Germany as the Germany of 1934 is different from that of 1922-25, but the former difference was only superficial and the real Germany has come back."

Having known much of pre-war and something of post-war Germany, I agree with Mr. Robert Dell. For this reason also the writings of Professor Banse in praise of war, and quite apart from their intrinsic merits or demerits, strike me as statements of German thought that are as sincere as they are enlightening. They are a direct application of the principle which von Bernhardi laid down—that a German Government must do everything to foster a military spirit and "must continually point to the significance and the necessity of war as an indispensable agent in policy and civilisation, together with the duty of self-sacrifice and devotion to State and country."

This principle is being consistently observed in Germany today. The injunction which is ever kept before the eyes of German youths—to remember that they were born to die for Germany—is entirely in keeping with it. Professor Banse's pamphlet *Wehrwissenschaft* ("Military Science"), which was ostensibly banned in October, 1933, received fresh official approval as early as December, 1933, when it was included in the catalogue of the National Socialist publishing house, "Arminen," of Leipzig. The catalogue announced the pamphlet as giving "the fundamental ideas for military education as it is now to be introduced in all schools." A letter of commendation to the publishers from the Prussian Minister of the Interior was also printed.

Banse's "fundamental ideas for military education"

have, indeed, been introduced in all schools. Thus the representative character of his doctrine can scarcely be questioned. As a doctrine it is the more significant because its presentation of the case for war is grim and stern. Nor is it less forceful because no effort is made to render it superficially attractive. In the Preface to the first edition of *Wehrwissenschaft* Professor Banse writes : " Nowadays war is no longer a breezy, gladsome campaign with regimental music and flags of victory and a cornucopia of titles and orders, but is a bloody fight and, in particular, a battle of materials. It is gas and plague, terror of tanks and aircraft, hunger and penury, baseness and lies, renunciation and sacrifice. Through it can pass unshaken only that people in which each individual has known for years, and is persuaded in the depths of his soul, that his life belongs to the State, solely to the State and yet again and ever to the State as the warden of folk and mother tongue and culture."

And, again, in the opening pages of *Wehrwissenschaft* :

" War is the end of an old and the beginning of a new development. In it two different, often essentially different, eras meet. Hence war is always a renewer : it builds up even while it destroys. In the frenzy of war the old forces of an outworn evolution are used up, and the forerunners and founders of a new evolution proclaim themselves.

" Thus it is quite wrong to look upon war as solely a destroyer. To do so is to see in it only the extinction of human lives and human works ; but this is merely a passing phase, a necessary stage of transition, a purifying bath of steel for fresh upward striving. . . . War is the raising to the highest power both of material

means and of the total spirituality of a time, the soaring to the extremest height of the forces in a people's soul and in the will of the State that make for self-assertion and might. It embraces spirit and deed in a measure nowhere else conceivable. It is the ground whereon the human soul can most richly and most strongly reveal itself, bursting forth from deeper springs and more variously than in any single achievement of learning or art. If the will and the work of a folk, of a State, can anywhere find their fullest expression, it is in war."

Everybody must understand, Professor Banse concludes, that war is nothing abnormal or criminal, no sin against humanity. War is the biological form of the struggle for existence according to the will of God. He says textually: "The fate of peoples, the waxing and waning of States, lie with God. But God lives in the soul of a people and in the form given it by truthfulness to type. A people that lives according to its deepest spiritual behest fulfils God's will."

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Thus does *Wehrwissenschaft* sum up the ideas set forth in Professor Banse's earlier work *Raum und Volk im Weltkriege* ("Space and People in the World War") in which he outlined the policy of territorial expansion which Germany should pursue. In this work also he was at pains to portray war as an iron necessity of an iron age. "The day of comfort and make-believe is over," he said in its Preface, "and the day of discomfort and hard-thinking and grim resolve and cold steel" has dawned. "The sword will come into its own again, and the pen, after fourteen years of exaggerated prestige, will be put into its right place. . . . The pen is good and the

sword is good. But the sword is the older weapon, and it is the final, the ultimately decisive one—therefore it should have first place.” The mighty Empire which the Third German Reich must build up—from the coast of Flanders to the border of Hungary, from Memel on the Baltic to the Adige in Italy and the Rhône in France—can arise only out of the clash of swords. “The coming war, the great war that will decide the fate of the German people, will ultimately be fought out deep down in the souls of the belligerent nations. The soul is the starting-point of human thought, human action and human events. From it, and from it alone, radiate those forces which control brain and hand, achievement and failure, courage and cowardice.”

This philosophy needs earnest attention, intellectual no less than political. It is the frank expression of a tribal idea, not to say a tribal religion. As Professor Arnold Toynbee shrewdly said in the *Manchester Guardian* of April 10, 1935: “This tribe-worship is a low form of religion and a disastrous one: but it is a religion all the same, and that is its strength.” He added:

“The tribal warfare which is one of the scourges of our latter-day Western world is, I suggest, a kind of ritual human sacrifice—an immolation of oneself as well as one’s neighbour—to one’s particular tribal god; and, as far as we are tribe-worshippers, I think we seek to glorify our tribal divinities—our Englands and Frances and Lithuanias and Czechoslovakias—by loading them with both power and wealth and all the other material commodities in which a primitive divinity has always been supposed to delight.

"But I do not think that the majority of our tribe-worshippers, when they offer the human sacrifice of war upon their idols' altars, are seeking either power or wealth for themselves. Indeed, the terrific hold which the institution of war manifestly possesses over the hearts of men lies, surely, in the opportunity for self-sacrifice which is offered to the individual by this cult of Moloch. An uncompromising demand for submission and self-abnegation and self-sacrifice is manifestly the strength of those militant State cults—whether Fascist or Communist—which have been the most successful in gaining converts during these post-war years. People will sacrifice themselves for the 'Third Reich,' or whatever the *Ersatz-Götzen* (substitute idols) may be, till they learn again to sacrifice themselves for the Kingdom of God."

Here Professor Toynbee puts his finger upon what I hold to be the chief weakness of the peace ideal—its failure to offer men an adequate occasion for self-devotion and self-sacrifice. Today the war ideal and the peace ideal are at grips as never before in human history. Which is to prevail? True though it be to say that people will sacrifice themselves for a third Reich or other tribal idol "till they learn again to sacrifice themselves for the Kingdom of God," there remains the task of defining "the Kingdom of God" in such terms that, as an ideal, it will move the hearts and minds of men more powerfully than the ideal of tribal triumph and supremacy. Any such definition must solve deep problems of philosophy and belief, and change men's outlook on life. So I return to my contention that the case for war can only be met and answered by a case for peace that is stronger, wider and more exalted. And, before it can be convincingly

stated, economic as well as moral and political factors must be taken into account; for if "man doth not live by bread alone" no means have yet been found of enabling him to live without bread or some form of material sustenance.

In other words "the struggle for existence" plays a real part in the case for war, and plays it in other ways than are suggested by writers who invoke the "laws" of a "Nature red in tooth and claw" as a perennial sanction for war. Alongside of the instinct of self-sacrifice runs the instinct of self-preservation, though—of the two, and taken individually—the former may be the stronger. Taken collectively, the instinct of self-preservation holds the upper hand. Since it is obviously futile to ask men to sacrifice their lives for the sake of preserving them, they are bidden to immolate themselves and others in war for the preservation of their families, their race, tribe or country. War, and the discipline, the regimentation, incidental to it are recommended to them as a supreme form of patriotism, as an "absolute value." Thus presented, the war ideal may stir a deep impulse to which many religions have appealed, an impulse akin to that which has sought ecstatic outlets in an "ethic of renunciation" not unknown to Christian and Buddhist saintliness.

Sometimes, too, the war ideal borrows from the peace ideal, and claims that true peace can only flourish in the shadow of the sword. Such a peace, it is argued, was the *pax romana*; such is the *pax britannica* among the races and creeds of India. Herr Hitler uses this argument in his autobiography, *Mein Kampf*, on behalf of a *pax germanica* that might have been

and, perhaps, may yet be attained by complete herd-unity among disciplined Germanic tribes. He writes :

“ If, in its historical development, the German people had possessed the same herd-unity that stood other peoples in good stead, the German Reich would today be master of the globe. History would have taken another course ; and who can say if this course would not have led to what so many purblind pacifists hope to get by whining and whimpering—a peace not supported by the tearful pacifist lamentations of palm-waving females but founded on the victorious sword of a ruling race bending the world to the service of a higher *Kultur* ? ”

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Unwittingly, perhaps, Herr Hitler thus states the case for war in lofty terms. He goes beyond the idea of war for plunder, or even as an opening for the exercise of manly virtues, a school of virility and a form of pious obedience to the “ laws of nature.” He represents it as a means of “ bending the world to the service of a higher *Kultur*.” The German word *Kultur* cannot be rendered precisely into English. It means both “ culture ” and “ civilisation,” and much besides. It is an almost mystical concept. To Herr Hitler’s mind the thought of imposing it on the world may seem akin to the ideal which the *pax romana* realised, and not wholly unlike the *pax britannica* that many a devoted Briton, manfully bearing his share of “ the white man’s burden,” honestly feels to be a better sort of life than that which savage tribes and other “ lesser breeds ” in a far-flung Empire could have learned to live by themselves.

This British faith, sustained by works, is no mean thing. Nor would it be just to question the sincerity

of the Germanic belief that *Kultur*, imposed by the German sword, would raise non-Germanic mankind to more exalted levels. If war is to be retained as a method of adjusting matters between civilised peoples, it is surely better that its avowed aim should be the uplifting of humanity than that its advocates should extol it solely as fostering physical fitness, strength and courage. For in point of "fitness," strength and courage, warlike peoples in Africa, such as the Zulus or the Masai—to say nothing of the North American Indians—reached high degrees of excellence long ago; and it is by no means certain that European peoples would be treading the path of progress were they to set themselves to emulate these examples. The "fittest" might survive without advancing perceptibly the welfare of humanity or promoting anything nobler than thew and sinew.

Herr Hitler's ideal may be accepted as being, in the words of Clausewitz, at least "a splendid policy." War, conceived as a contest between superior and inferior "cultures" or "civilisations," would obviously be less odious than war for glory or loot. But I do not think that any such case for war really goes to the root of the matter. It leaves out of account what I take to be the deepest reason for strife among individuals and nations. At the risk of verging upon a thesis that underlies the materialist interpretation of history propounded by Marx and Engels, I should say that war springs, in the last resort, from two allied and interrelated impulses. One of these is the desire to get and to hold sovereignty, individual and national; and the other is the will to acquire and control property as an attribute and indispensable agency of sovereignty.

In saying this I must not be understood as accepting the Marxist view that the "capitalist system" is the chief source of warfare or that peace, even in the form of non-war, will be unattainable until capitalism has given place to the collective ownership of all the means of production and distribution. I am not persuaded that private property (subject to necessary social limitations) and personal and national sovereignties, under definite international restrictions, are not essential factors of human freedom. What I have in mind is the undeniable fact that men have always fought to defend or to increase their belongings, and have acted as though material possessions were more important than human life. When Canon Raven argues that "what is best"—by which he means the endurance and the courage of fine men, as well as their lives—should only be given "to the highest" or sacrificed for any save the highest cause, he expresses a feeling which many idealists share. Yet he would probably admit that men have fought and will fight, killing and being killed, and counting their lives well spent if they are given for hearth and home or in defence of their belongings and their native soil. Notwithstanding the supremacy of law in civilised lands, many a man holds it right to use weapons against robbers or burglars. Nay, in some countries which think themselves civilised, the preserving of game is not denounced as barbarous even though it entail deadly affrays between gamekeepers and poachers. In these instances the defence of property seems to be rated higher than the chance that it may lead to the loss of human lives.

More widely applied and, as it were, sublimated,

the same principle inspires the lower, though by no means the less dynamic, forms of patriotism. War in self-defence is accounted lawful and even righteous ; and not all authorities agree upon the point at which defence begins against actual or possible offence. According to a German proverb the best way to parry a thrust is to strike a blow ; and there is a doggerel gloss upon Shakespeare's "Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just," which runs : "and four times he who gets his blow in fu'st." Given the "sacred right" of property, personal, national or imperial ; given, too, real or supposed coveters of that property, the strongest case for war appears to lie in the belief that property, and the sovereignty which it connotes, must, and in the last resort should, be defended by force of arms.

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I have already suggested that those who work against war are bound to ask themselves what the meaning of life may be, and that, in seeking an answer, they will perhaps be driven to think of sacrificing many an individual and national sovereignty which men have long held to be more precious than life itself. Until some new philosophy of this kind has been thought through to the end, I doubt whether a satisfying case against war can be made out, no matter what expedients for safeguarding sovereignties and possessions from attack may be devised in the shape of this or that system of non-war. The true case for war is the determination of individuals and communities to hold on to what they have, and to defend it at all costs against others who would like to wrest it from them.

They may mask this determination by lofty precepts and sentiments, some of which will look plausible or even convincing. But as long as they are resolved to keep their belongings entirely in their own control, either as a means of livelihood, or as a condition indispensable to their type of civilisation, or as the wherewithal for the pursuit of a more or less Messianic mission to raise other peoples to a presumed nobler level of civilisation, or to bend them to the service of a higher *Kultur*, the case for war as an *ultima ratio* of persons, peoples and States will not and cannot be gainsaid.

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This does not necessarily mean that mankind will be condemned to recurrent bouts of bloody strife until it renounces all private and national properties and sovereignties. It does mean that those who seek peace cannot be content with an ideal of mere non-war in an unbalanced world, or refuse to consider the implications of even an organised suppression of international and racial feuds. Some of these implications are not hard to discern. Without forgetting the more ferocious "laws of nature," seekers after peace should remember that nature has other laws which many of the higher animals and human beings obey even amid their struggle for existence, and understand that love, helpfulness, fellowship and the instinct of self-sacrifice are scarcely less elemental than is the instinct of self-preservation. And they may conclude that the true means of raising, or bending, mankind to the service of a higher civilisation are to be found in the development of what, for want of a more

comprehensive term, may be called the Christian ethic.

This ethic has, indeed, given a distinctive character to Western civilisation, and has been the inspiration of some of its worthiest qualities. It is, in essence, an ethic of optimism, since it takes for granted the perfectibility of mankind. The case for war which invokes the sanguinary "laws of nature" as the governing rules of humanity, and even the claim that a—non-existent—"Aryan" race is entitled, by the superior virtue of its blood, to rule the world, is, in effect, an exercise in pessimism and a denial of human perfectibility. War may be justified if the possibility of general moral progress be denied; but, if that possibility be affirmed, the case for peace is stronger.

Indefensible, in the long run, is the case for mere non-war. It rests upon semi-pessimistic assumptions and often appears to flout both the instinct of self-sacrifice and the instinct of self-preservation. Its ideal is the attainment of a riskless existence—and risk is the salt of life. The organisation of non-war may be a halfway house on the road to peace, if it be recognised as such, if it be taken as a thing of expedients and limited liabilities, a system of mutual assurance, an amalgam of half-heartedness and half-mindedness. Men and nations may be fain to dwell in this halfway house for a space, while they gather courage and vigour to resume their upward march. They may never have the strength even to reach it if they mistake it for the final goal.

CHAPTER IV

THE CAUSES OF WAR

SOME years ago an international religious organisation made enquiry into the causes of war, and published a volume of studies upon them.¹ These studies or essays dealt with the economic, racial, religious and political influences which play a part in fostering war, and also with the relationship between science and war and the tendency of what may be thought superior forms of civilisation or "culture" to impose themselves by force upon more elementary forms.

To this volume I contributed an essay—which I now feel not to have been wholly adequate—on the political causes of war. Before writing it I was, however, constrained to clear my own mind as best I could; and after its publication I sought to continue, by self-criticism, the process of clarification. This process may still be far from complete. But, as far as it has gone, it has at least served to persuade me that the subject is more intricate and elusive than those who have not weighed it carefully are apt to imagine.

In that essay I placed fear foremost among the political causes of war and said that its removal is one of the major postulates of peace. Within limits I think this is still true, though many other emotions and states of feeling need to be added to that of fear if any comprehensive view is to be attained.

¹ *The Causes of War*, Macmillan, 1932.

Since I wrote, early in 1931, the predatory instinct of some peoples has come into play on a scale which then could hardly be foreseen. Not only has Japan conquered Manchuria and laid her hand on vast regions in the north of China, almost without let or hindrance, but Soviet Russia has extended her sway in Central Asia, and Italy has used "mustard" gas in her effort to subjugate Abyssinia. In Germany Hitlerism has brought forth a whole philosophy of territorial acquisition; and this philosophy, like that of Italian Fascism and, to some extent, of Russian Communism, has been inspired by a sort of ecstatic Messianism which must be reckoned as a potential cause of war.

In whatever degree covetousness or need, envy or jealousy, thirst for glory or lust of power may be counted among the motives for war it seems to me that an indispensable condition if not an actual cause of war is the kind of ecstasy into which men and peoples fall—or rise—when they think of war as a means either of winning "a place in the sun" or of affirming their equality with other nations or of extending their "culture" or civilisation. I use the word "ecstasy" in its true sense, that of a feeling which induces human beings to "stand outside" or even "beside" themselves. It is akin to religious exaltation. It offers an escape from perplexing relativities into an absolute state of mind, it is a casting of the trammels of cool reason, a species of rapture that tends to merge individual cares and interests in a crusade.

Wars may be planned and prepared for in cold blood. Those who plan them may seek to count the cost and coolly to estimate the chances of success.

No matter how subtle or cunning their scheming they wish nevertheless to be sure of commanding enough ecstatic support among their peoples to feel certain that the venture can be carried through, or at least begun, in an atmosphere of trans-rational enthusiasm. None of the psychological conditions for the waging of war is more important than the fostering, by education and propaganda, of feelings which may develop into ecstasy.

Education and propaganda to this end have been cunningly organised in Soviet Russia, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. In these countries the party which controls the State is careful to suppress the criticism and the discussion of public affairs without which public control of them cannot be ensured. Under "totalitarian" dictatorships there can be no control by public opinion—and most of the philosophers of non-war have relied upon the force of international public opinion as a powerful deterrent to war-makers. This reliance was the outstanding feature of Mr. Henry L. Stimson's memorable address to the New York Council of Foreign Relations on August 8, 1932; and that remarkable utterance has lost cogency precisely as free public opinion has ceased to exist or to exert decisive influence upon the conduct of Governments in Japan, Soviet Russia, Germany and Italy, and has been replaced by the propaganda of armed factions in control of the State. If, in Soviet Russia, Messianic zeal for spreading a Communist revolution throughout the world may seem of late to have abated, nationalist exaltation has become a settled mood among the leaders, at least, of Imperialist Japan, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The belief

that "in serving our German people and our Leader we are at the same time serving Almighty God" is being persistently instilled into the minds of German youth. These words were actually addressed by the Reich Youth Leader, Herr Baldur von Schirach, on June 2, 1935, to a gathering of the Hitler Youth Movement at Erfurt. Throughout his address he identified the German people and its Leader with God. His doctrine is merely a variation upon the theme of Herr Rosenberg, in his *Mythos of the Twentieth Century*, and of Professor Bergmann that "God is in our blood."

Behind the ecstatic belief in the God-given right of the German people to rule over other races, in virtue of the inborn superiority of the Nordic Germanic blood, there may lie political and economic aspirations in the service of which the most powerful fighting-machine Germany has ever possessed is now being built up. The tendencies of current German education show, however, that this formidable machine depends for its ultimate efficiency upon the old *furor teutonicus*, the berserker ecstasy into which Teutonic warriors fell either in the frenzy of combat or after drinking potions sapiently distilled from fungi. Knowledge that they have at their disposal an immense reserve of self-sacrificing ecstasy may weigh in the balance as heavily as the possession of superior weapons when the rulers of a country decide that the hour for war has struck. And it is with the psychological rather than with the political or military workings of this ecstasy that I am now concerned.

One of its immediate workings is to set up acute fear among neighbouring peoples. In the old days, when war was looked upon as the *ultima ratio* of

monarchs, the inculcation of fear was a constant aim of diplomacy and statecraft. Behind the ostensibly peaceful conduct of international relations the threat of war was ever present. To it referred the phrase "Wouldst thou have peace, prepare for war"; and armaments were held to be the sole safeguard against aggression. Upon this matter of armaments, so loudly and so heatedly debated as being the main cause of war, one reflection is necessary. It is claimed that armaments cannot give security, and that, by rousing fear and stimulating counter-armament among other nations, they tend to hasten the very strife which it is their object to prevent. It is also argued that the danger of war cannot be removed even by a preponderance of armed strength on the part of the upholders of a system of collective security against nations or Governments that may be bent on war, and that the only certain path to safety lies through the disarmament of all nations.

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These contentions are sometimes answered by the plea that just as the police force in a law-abiding community should be, indeed must be, more powerful than any lawless section of the community if the law is to be upheld, so the creation of armed international preponderance over any individual war-maker would avail to ensure the outlawry of war. But pending the organisation of irresistible force in the service of non-war it is necessary to recognise a fallacy which underlies the argument that armaments cannot give security.

All human actions take place and are thought of in the dimensions of space and time. Space and time are

the factors which govern and, as the phrase goes, "condition" them. To ignore the space-factor in dealing with war and armaments is as misleading as to overlook the time-factor. However true it may be that, "in the long run," armaments tend to produce counter-armaments and thus to bring about growing rivalry and strife between nations that fear each other, it is equally true that, "in the short run," the circumstance that a nation has armed itself in a degree which may make other nations think twice before attacking or coercing it, does give the strongly-armed nation a feeling of security against the immediate danger of being attacked. The Government, democratic or dictatorial, that should fail to give an anxious people such feeling of comparative safety as armaments can ensure would itself feel unsafe ; for Governments, like individuals, think in terms of limited periods, not in terms of what might be an ideal policy if time and space were of no account. Therefore philosophers who would suggest policies or principles of action need to bear in mind the ordinary ways of thought and feeling of the ordinary men with whom they have to deal.

One illustration of the way the time-factor works may not be out of place even though it be drawn from mechanics rather than from politics. Some thirty years ago an inventor, who was at once a mathematician and a musician, conceived the idea of turning to mechanical account the time-factor in musical vibrations. Starting from the well-known truth that some vibrations are so slow as to be below the range of audibility and some so rapid as to be above it, he pursued the study of vibrations and reached interesting theoretical conclusions. Presently he worked out a

four-dimensional equation in which he added the factor, or dimension, of time to the usual three dimensions of length, breadth and depth. Then he constructed an electric motor which could give him the requisite number of vibrations per second; and, applying the results to practical mechanics by synchronising the vibrations with mechanical impulses, he produced not only the pneumatic drill which breaks cement on the roads with terrific noise but also a machine-gun capable of firing a thousand bullets a minute between the propellers of an aeroplane. Still later, on the same principle, he invented a field gun that could propel a projectile many thousand yards without explosive or recoil. One, at least, of these inventions played an important part on the Allied fronts during the Great War, though few of the airmen who used them understood that they were a result of shrewd utilisation of the time-factor.

This inventor believes that mechanics are today in their infancy, hardly more advanced than electricity was when Galvani imagined that electric sparks could best be produced from the head of a frog. One day, he believes, mechanical science will work not merely with four-dimensional but with six- or eight-dimensional equations, and that then the rudimentary appliances which men now use will stand in the same relation to the machines of the future as the original "velocipede" or "bone-shaker" stands to the high-powered motor-car or aeroplane of today. He believes, too, that if a tithe of the vast sums now spent on armaments as a provision for national safety against attack could be used for scientific and mechanical research and experiment, the material welfare of

mankind might be immeasurably enhanced. Enough sunlight could be stored to warm the habitable globe without fuel, the tides could be harnessed to produce enough energy for all the motive power man would be likely to need for industry or transport, and progress which today lies beyond the range of practical imagination could be achieved in turning the forces of nature to human advantage.

But this great inventor also believes that men will be unlikely to bend their thoughts effectively in these directions until they have had another, and perhaps more than one other, taste of war. In times of non-war or comparative peace, he argues, invention is discouraged if it be on a revolutionary scale—that is, if it threaten to render obsolete industrial and other plants in which large amounts of capital have been invested. It is only in war time, when nations may be fighting for dear life, that economic or financial considerations are thrown to the winds and the revolutionary inventor gets his chance; though even then he may be obstructed at every turn by official dull-mindedness. In the Great War scientists and scientific invention played some part and showed, on a small scale in haphazard fashion, what they could do in the way of destructiveness. In the next war—which will surely come unless men change their ways of thought and deed betimes—science and mechanics will play a larger part, and the paralysing destruction they will work will be correspondingly greater. Mankind will not like the experience, though dislike of it may still not be strong enough to bring all war to an end. Further proof of the utter destructiveness of truly scientific warfare may be needed before the lesson

is learned. Then, my inventor believes, if anything remains of civilised humanity, war and its causes will be finally swept away.

This outlook is not wholly reassuring, at any rate for the present generation and its immediate successors. My inventor may be proved right or wrong. Men may still cling to their local sovereignties and patriotisms. They may continue flatly to deny by their behaviour, if not in principle, that they are their brothers' keepers until disaster, dire and almost irretrievable, convinces them at long last of the indivisibility of peace. On the other hand, they may learn ere they perish; and in their learning no stage will be harder than that of merging or co-ordinating their local or national loyalties so as to transform them into a higher loyalty.

Noblest among the emotions that make for war is the compound of love, pride and self-sacrifice that goes by the name of patriotism. No source of ecstasy is more generous than this; and, on the whole, none is purer. Patriotism may be "the last refuge of a scoundrel," as Dr. Johnson averred; but it can also inspire a Rupert Brooke, a Spring-Rice, and give true meaning to the Latin line "*Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.*" To say that this is merely self-love writ large, or that it is a sublimation of the proprietorial instinct or a feeling due to the accident of birth and upbringing in given surroundings, is to miss the significant fact that patriotism may be the last refuge of quasi-religious devotion in men and women who find in it an outlet for a passionate subordination of self to an object beyond themselves—that is to say, a chance to lose themselves in an uplifting ecstasy. In

the last resort the man who will not fight or die for his country, for its people, its traditions and all that it has stood for in the world is likely to be accounted a poor wight by his fellow-men, few of whom will be ready to look upon his "conscientious objection" as being really free from all taint of care for his own precious skin. In many cases, perhaps in most, such scepticism will be unjust, but the story of mankind is full of similar injustices. What is war itself but a violent injustice, an ordeal by battle in default or in contempt of trial and settlement by right and law? In truth the ultimate causes of war lie deep in the human heart and may not be removed until sad experience has taught the human brain to school the heart's impulses.

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In a broad, if not in the broadest, sense war may be said to arise from a conflict between incompatible moralities or "matters of conscience." Philosophically speaking, conscience is best defined as the reflection in the individual consciousness of the customs and ideals cherished by the community to which an individual belongs, coupled with a knowledge of what a community esteems to be the individual's duty towards it. The function of conscience is to compare a man's doings with his duty, and to upbraid him if he fall short of what he "owes to society." The sum of a community's individual consciences makes up its morality. Conversely, without a community or society, and without consciousness of its requirements, there can be no morality. A lone man, devoid of social experience, on a desert island might be religious

and muse upon his relationship to the Universe, but he could not be moral, for the simple reason that there would be nobody else on the island for him to treat morally or otherwise. For him the guiding law would be his own well-being or preservation. This law would bid him resist, destroy or escape from anything that might threaten his existence. Morality begins with association, and the laws of association reflected in the consciousness of two or more beings become the foundations of conscience. Hence the almost infinite variability of what men feel they can conscientiously do; for their sense of duty, or what they feel they owe to society, depends in the last resort upon what that society holds needful for its own welfare or protection. Hence also the non-morality of "totalitarian" dictatorships. The armed factions on which they are based recognise no obligations or duty towards other sections of the community over which they rule, and no source of international right save might. They are a law unto themselves and are restrained solely by adverse circumstances which they have not succeeded in overcoming.

Now, whether it be in the social or in the international sphere, the recognition of obligations towards others is the foundation of morality. In effect, a man who declines to admit that he has a duty to his fellow-men is at war with society. He is a law unto himself, an Ishmael, an unsocial and therefore non-moral person. Similarly, an absolute or totalitarian State is unable to be moral or to embody morality since it takes no account of what it owes to other States or peoples. Its relations with them are solely matters of temporary expediency. The notion of an omnipo-

tent, all-embracing, totalitarian and deified State is an affirmation of international non-morality and a potential cause of war. And lest it be thought that these conclusions are unwarranted deductions from the modern phenomena of Communism, Fascism and Nazism, it is important to trace them back to their philosophical fountain-head in the German philosopher Hegel, who was a progenitor of Marxism, Fascism and Nazism alike.

Hegel, as is well known, deified the State and, in his *Philosophy of History*, called it "the divine idea as it exists on earth." In his *Philosophie des Rechts* he repeated: "The State is the divine will as the present spirit unfolding itself in the actual shape and organisation of a world." "It is the absolute power on earth." "It is an end in itself. It is the ultimate end which has the highest right against the individual, whose highest duty is to be a member of the State."

This theory is identical with the doctrines proclaimed by Italian Fascism and German Nazism. It is not moral or ethical because it does not seek to find reasons for human conduct in any ultimate goal of human endeavour or in any rational principle of human duty. Nor is it scientific. It assumes certain conceptions and expounds them dogmatically in general terms, thrusting aside the appeal to experience. It was no accident that Hegel became the philosophical propagandist of a Prussian State-idea of which the essence was the righteousness and rightfulness of war. He went so far as to insist that beyond the State there is no higher human association, and that States have no duties to one another or to humanity. They are absolved from any obligation to act morally,

and they deny that international relations can be governed by moral obligations or by valid international law. Logically they point to a struggle for domination between individual States until the stronger or, as Hitler might put it, the racially worthier, prevails.

The Hegelian, and the Hitlerite, doctrine implies that individual States must struggle and fight until the strongest imposes its will upon others. From this implication to the downright justification of war is but a short step; and in Hegel's, as in Hitler's, writings we find war treated as an ethical factor. According to Hegel war is the means by which the State preserves its security; or, in Hitler's phrase, the means by which it founds peace "upon the victorious sword of a ruling race bending the world to the service of a higher *Kultur*." Mussolini, for his part, calls war "the Supreme Court of peoples," whose judgment is final. "Appeal," he adds, "can be but another war."

Hegel was certainly consistent in repudiating Kant's humanitarian proposal for a League of Peace. Though States may make stipulations with each other, Hegel argued, the State must at the same time stand above such stipulations because it must judge for itself what it will treat as a matter of honour, especially when, after a long period of peace, it has to seek an occasion for activity beyond its borders. It need not wait for any actual injury. The idea of a threatening danger is enough. Preventive or anticipatory wars are therefore justified. They need not be waged for any philanthropic purpose, since the State has to think of its own well-being, and its well-being is superior to that of any individual, within its own confines or without.

If Hegelian teachings be compared with Hitler's "Perpetual Political Testament for the German Nation" it will be seen how truly the Nazi leader has caught the spirit of Hegelian political philosophy. Hitler's Testament runs :

"Never allow two continental Powers in Europe to arise. Look upon every attempt to organise a second military Power on the frontiers of Germany, even though it be only in the form of a State susceptible of military development, as an attack upon Germany, and think it not alone a right but a duty to prevent such a State from arising, or to smash it if it has arisen, by every means, including armed force" (*Mein Kampf*, 5th edition, pp. 754-55).

In such a doctrine, inculcated upon the German people in Hitler's autobiography *Mein Kampf*, the Nazi Bible, of which millions of copies have been sold, lies a potent cause of future war. It affirms an absolutely non-moral idea of a nation's rights, repudiates all notion of an international conscience, or consciousness of what a community of nations is entitled to expect from individual members, and it challenges the view held by all opponents of war that the sovereign State is bound to subordinate the exercise of its sovereignty to the fulfilment of its obligations as member of a commonwealth or community of nations.

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That is what I mean by saying that war arises from a conflict between incompatible moralities. But political warfare, or the use of armed force in such a conflict, may be only one form of international strife. Other forms may be economic rivalry, cut-throat

competition, dumping or any attempt to gain advantage for one people at the expense of another without regard to the wrong that may be wrought. Many States admit that their political actions may be circumscribed by international laws or moral obligations. Few, if any, look upon their economic actions in the same light. Not often do their individual business men recognise, as a moral principle, the existence of any limitation to their efforts to get the better of or even to ruin rivals in other countries; and out of those efforts an atmosphere favourable to political war may easily arise. Limitations upon economic warfare there certainly are in the form of commercial treaties and of undertakings between trusts, rings or other combines to reserve certain fields of enterprise for exploitation by a particular branch or member of the combine. The establishment of "quotas" of imports and exports between sovereign States comes under a slightly different heading. They are in the nature of armistices concluded after economic warfare and are designed to protect the nationals of one State from further injury by the nationals of another.

If it be claimed that the main causes of war are economic, the claim may be justified up to the point of admitting that, in their desire for extended markets or sources of raw material, manufacturers or industrial interests of a given State may seek to drive their Governments into active hostility towards another State. There have been many instances of political warfare for the sake of "expansion," though these have usually been classed as "colonial enterprise." Sometimes, though by no means always, these under-

takings have ended by improving the lot of human beings inhabiting the territories which the colonising States have brought under their control. But the tendency has latterly been to circumscribe if not to curtail the privileges of economic monopolies obtained by earlier "expansion," and to favour suggestions like that made by the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, to the League of Nations Assembly on September 11, 1935, that equality of access to raw materials should be assured to all the nations that may need them. The aim of this tendency is to remove what might otherwise become a plausible economic pretext for war or, perhaps, one of its real economic causes.

A further hypothetical cause is the alleged need of densely populated countries to find room elsewhere for their surplus inhabitants, or alternatively to conquer alien populations so as to compel them to buy and to consume the manufactured products of densely populated and highly industrialised countries. This "cause of war" calls for careful examination. If it were true that the pressure of population justifies the territorial expansion of one State at the cost of other peoples, and that such expansion is an unavoidable necessity, militarist dictators like Mussolini and Hitler would hardly have done their utmost, by special legislation, to check the declining birth-rate in their respective countries and to increase their populations so that the pressure of them may burst the bounds of national territories. "Pressure of population" may be a pretext. Before the Great War emigration from Germany fell off steadily, despite the rapid increase of the German population, because Germany was

able to find increasing employment for large numbers of her people at home, thanks to her industrial efficiency and to the excellence of her manufactures. This healthy process was checked when, not without German responsibility, the Great War was let loose. Of that war the causes were political in the first place and economic only in the sense that extended political sway might be expected to bring economic advantage to a victor. If, indeed, the War was planned and waged for economic purposes, its results proved its authors to have been the veriest simpletons, just as its outbreak made fools of the soothsayers who argued that there could never be another great war because the nations were too closely bound together by the economic and financial ties which war would sever. These wiseacres forgot that war between highly developed peoples is a political undertaking, that the waging of it calls for a passionate ecstasy in which economic and financial considerations are thrown to the winds, and that when the passions of men are aroused or a sufficient ecstasy is engendered in them they will behave in the most uneconomic ways without pausing to count the cost.

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This does not mean that economic aims are not contributory to the fostering of a war spirit or that wars do not entail economic consequences of the first magnitude. Hope of economic gain may inspire the political action of statesmen and Governments no less than lust of profit has entered into the efforts of armament firms to influence public opinion and to foment national passions. The history of armament

firms, and the colossal profits made by "armament kings," tell a story upon which the twelve volumes of the Senate Enquiry in Washington throw much light—a story which President Roosevelt's efforts to "take the profits out of war" sufficiently illustrate. Still this story has a psychological background that needs to be kept in the foreground of attention. The makers of armaments have more constantly played upon the fears of Governments and peoples for their own safety than upon their desires for expansion; and, after selling the latest weapons to one Government they have tried to arouse the fears of other Governments in order to sell to them, in turn, an equal or larger supply of similar weapons. Had there been no grounds for fear these manœuvres could hardly have succeeded. There are ecstasies of fear no less than ecstasies of patriotism or self-devotion.

Then, up to the Great War, there was the unquestionable fact that war, as an enterprise, had been remarkably profitable to the country that had undertaken it thrice within a single decade of the nineteenth century. The Austro-Prussian War of 1864 against Denmark, which Bismarck prepared and carried through, brought Prussia an increase of territory and potential openings for future enrichment. The Prussian War against Austria in 1866 enabled Bismarck to extend Prussian sway over German States. It removed many a barrier between them while getting rid of a tiresome rival for economic and political supremacy over them, and it set the scene for the most profitable enterprise of all. This was the Franco-German War of 1870-71 which gained for Prussia not only the leadership of a united Germany but the

wealthy territory of Alsace-Lorraine, a considerable money indemnity and a commercial treaty that laid the foundations of German economic expansion.

In these instances, it may be said, the economic results of warfare were so favourable that they might fairly be classed among its causes. Though it is not easy clearly to distinguish between cause and effect, I am inclined to agree with the memorandum upon tariffs as a cause of war which M. André Siegfried prepared at the request of the League of Nations in 1929. In it he said that when economic rivalries are considered strictly in an economic sense they are a guarantee against political complications, and that "it is only when political or national passions are involved that the possibility of war really arises." He added :

"Here we touch upon one of the most dangerous causes of war—one which depends less upon the opposition of interests than upon what may be called the emotional conception of such interests held by the Government or by public opinion. Conflict at arms arises not so much from the dispute itself as from the passions that are enkindled around it. It may be that in some cases Governments deliberately deceive the public in their desire to provoke a conflict for other unadmitted reasons. But it may also be that Governments are themselves mistaken and, self-hypnotised, adopt extreme measures from a kind of auto-suggestion of danger. In such a case the true cause of an appeal to arms is chiefly psychological. We may find an economic germ, but it can only develop in virulent fashion in a political atmosphere."

Referring then to the quarrels that may arise in the form of tariff wars, M. Siegfried points out that the quarrel more often than not takes the form of a

business discussion. "There may be bitterness or even violence in the exchange of arguments, but usually the involving of national honour, with the dangerous passions that it unchains, is avoided; especially when the tariff conflict is waged between countries in a like state of civilisation—that is to say, when it is concerned solely with commercial interests." M. Siegfried continues, significantly :

"The contingency is more serious if, behind the exchange of merchandise which it is sought to regulate, two different civilisations, two different levels of life, affront and oppose one another. When American 'machinery' is in conflict with European 'quality,' when Western industrialism with its high standard of living opposes the Asiatic proletariat, let us not be deceived into thinking that there is nothing more at stake than a simple question of tariffs. It is two different conceptions of life that oppose one another, and through this door there is a risk that political pressure may be brought into play."

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"Two different conceptions of life" is another way of saying two different moralities. If the origins of the Great War be carefully and impartially sought—and they should be sought not merely in the complicated political and diplomatic contest of July and August, 1914—it will be found that the conception or idea of the future of Germany which was styled "pan-Germanism" loomed large in the background of the struggle. How far was this idea economic and how far was it chiefly political? When writing on this very subject in the *Daily Mail Year Book* of 1912—that is to say, more than two and a half years

before the actual outbreak of war—I said that “the goal of German policy is unchanged—to break, by menace or persuasion, the Anglo-French Entente that has for seven full years curtailed German power to reap, with unsheathed sword, the fruits of armed victory.” I meant that the political prestige of the victory gained over France in 1870-71 had long served Germany as an economic advertisement, and not less as a means of extracting from other countries concessions which they might not have made had they not feared to challenge German military might. For forty years Imperial Germany had thriven on the prestige of being the latest victor in Europe. Victory over France had brought her gold, and more than gold—the self-confidence that comes of victory. This self-confidence, as I then wrote :

“became the motive force of her military, maritime, industrial, commercial and financial development. It inspired her creation of a powerful navy, and has crystallised itself into a world policy of territorial aggrandisement. Her population doubled itself, emigration decreased, wealth succeeded to indigence, luxury to raw simplicity ; a new industrial and financial class sprang up, eager for power and influence in public life but debarred from both, at least in Prussia, by the Prussian gentry that has long enjoyed a monopoly of administrative functions and of military command. Against all pacific influences and tendencies in Germany must be set off the plight of the Prussian landed gentry which sees its influence circumscribed by the progressive transformation of Prussia from an agricultural into an industrial State but is determined not to yield without a struggle or to suffer its proud penury to be overshadowed by the mushroom wealth of merchant and Jew. The sword

of the gentry that guided the Prussian armies to victory in 1870 is likely to strike a blow in defence of its privileges before resigning itself to rust in the scabbard or to hang, gilded with plebeian gold, on ancient walls."

I see no reason to change today this pre-war analysis of a main cause of the Great War—all the less because it is an accepted fact that the pressure of the Prussian gentry, or Junkers, upon the late President von Hindenburg was a determining influence in persuading him to entrust power to Adolf Hitler on January 30, 1933. But it is a fair question whether, if Junker influence was and may again be, directly or indirectly, a cause of war, it should be classed as economic or political. Clearly the answer is: Both. I am well aware that many other subsidiary and contingent factors helped to bring on the Great War, and that the German people as a whole were by no means averse from it. As Herr Theodor Wolff, the distinguished editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, shows in his book *The Eve of 1914* the German people allowed its national business to be conducted, without any sort of external supervision, by the Kaiser and a few persons who, for one reason or another, enjoyed his favour. After forty-three years of peace the whole of Germany felt secure in the presence of extraordinary economic progress and of a seemingly invincible army. It has been said that between the common people and the Junkers, who dominated the official world and the army, a kind of tacit understanding had grown up, an understanding to the effect that if the army were strong the people would be rich. Herr Wolff does not accredit this assertion, though he says truthfully that even among those Germans who were full of

distaste for the arrogance of the official and Junker caste, "by far the greater number took it for granted that the quality of the leadership of the military forces was pre-eminent, that they were invincible and in sole possession of the secret of a special science. There were very few who did not surrender themselves to mystical assumptions of this sort."

Certain it is that the state of mind represented by books like *World Mastery or Downfall?* and by the writings of General von Bernhardi did prevail among wide sections of the German people. The extension of Germany's political sway as a source of future wealth was unquestionably looked upon as desirable and legitimate. Here again political and economic motives were inextricably interwoven.

A similar state of mind exists in Japan, and has been revealed by Japanese operations in Manchuria and Northern China since the autumn of 1931. Political and economic aims go hand in hand, just as they inspired the Italian Fascist war of aggression against Abyssinia. Italian Fascism and German Nazism are essentially militarist, though the origins of both were as much economic as political. From the outset, and despite their revolutionary character, these movements received financial support from the magnates of industry, and "big business" generally, which looked upon them as safeguards against the Socialist or Communist menace. For this reason also Fascism and Nazism were favoured by "conservatives" in many lands. These "conservatives" hardly paused to reflect that the outcome of Fascism and Nazism must be rearmament and would probably be war. Still less were they troubled by the thought that the

vindication, which war would be interpreted as furnishing, of the Communist doctrine that war and the capitalist system are inseparable might lead the industrial masses to accept that doctrine, or that eventual revolutionary violence on their part would find a strong precedent, if not justification, in the bloodstained brutality of Fascist and Nazi methods.

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I have said enough to show the need for caution in accepting the thesis that wars are due mainly if not solely to economic causes. With the economic aspects of any assured system of international peace I may deal at a later stage. They are likely to acquire greater prominence in proportion as the political influences that make for strife are progressively neutralised or eliminated. In this attempt briefly to diagnose the state of mind from which wars have sprung, and may again spring, I have left out of account the old dynastic ambitions that were answerable for so many wars in the past, and have likewise said nothing of the religious passions and ecstasies that found vent in bloodshed and destruction during bygone centuries. The ambitions of dictators may perhaps be taken as the nearest modern equivalent to the older dynastic appetites, and the quasi-religious ecstasy into which Italian Fascism, German Nazism and, to some extent, Russian Communism have sought to throw their adepts, as a substitute for religious fanaticism. In a sense, dictatorships may be more dangerous than were the former dynasties, for the simple reason that dictators cannot afford to wait and are more likely

than established monarchies to seek glory "in their time" as a sanction for their rule.

Yet if the majority of enlightened peoples in the modern world, imperfectly organised against war though it may still be, show plainly that they will withstand in concert any predatory or nationalistic enterprise on the part of dictatorships, such enterprises may be thwarted or kept within bounds. Checks upon dictatorial aggression will, however, need to be inspired by a firm international morality, not merely by care for the particular interests which the would-be aggressor might endanger. In the ultimate contest between the moral forces that make for non-war, and the non-moral or even immoral forces that make for war, the issue will depend upon the degree in which firm and unswerving devotion to principle, amounting if need be to moral ecstasy, can prevail over the ecstatic delirium of nationalist pride or vanity that still puts its trust in lawless might.

There is something specious, not to say intellectually dishonest, in the plea which was put forward on behalf of a British Government at Geneva in March, 1925, that it is futile and wrong to seek to overcome war by placing collective restraints upon aggression, since such restraints may become "war on the largest scale." The members of that Government would not have hesitated to use "police force on the largest scale" in upholding British law against rebels; and the knowledge that police force would be used, and legal penalties imposed to suppress rebellion against just laws, freely enacted, has tended to restrain the lawless in the British Isles. "War on the largest scale" should never befall mankind if the great

majority of its peoples and Governments are resolved effectively to ostracise and otherwise to restrain the lawless until the way of the transgressor becomes too hard to tread.

As things stand, the deepest cause of war is doubt whether civilised peoples are determined to act together against unlawful recourse to violence, and to make their resistance to it overwhelming. This cause of war is not likely to be removed, in the long run, by any preponderant strength of armaments on the part of individual countries. Collective preponderance would be enough if there were no doubt that it would promptly be brought into play. "Security" is a mental condition arising from belief in the unlikelihood of successful war, and therefore of war itself, this belief being sustained by the certainty that all nations of enlightened morality will join at once in opposing a war-maker and in bringing him to reason. Safety against war postulates self-sacrificing devotion to a higher international morality against what may be ecstatic devotion to lower national or racial moralities.

Approaches to this ideal of safety in the modern world date from The Hague Conference of 1899. That effort failed as, in the circumstances, it was bound to fail. The terms of the problem were too imperfectly understood. The effort was renewed during and after the Great War by the drafting of the League of Nations Covenant, the establishment of the League itself and, presently, by the Geneva Protocol, the Locarno Treaties and by the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris in August, 1928. The story of those efforts is worth retelling. To it, and to the moral it points, the succeeding chapters will be devoted.

CHAPTER V

APPROACHES TO NON-WAR

OF the making of books upon non-war there is no end. They go by the name of "peace" literature, which most of them are not. Their purpose is mainly negative—to discuss how war can best be prevented and a state of non-war ensured. This state of non-war the majority of writers identify with the reputed "blessings of peace." I think they are wrong. Even to organise non-war will, I believe, be a task beyond the power of Governments and nations unless it be conceived as a mere approach to the greater and more positive task of creating active, vigorous peace. Only with the larger aim in view will individuals and communities be persuaded to accept the sacrifices and to shoulder the burdens which the effective organisation of non-war must entail.

Nevertheless the history of efforts to bring about a state of non-war needs to be surveyed before the problem of peace can be rightly understood. As a history of those efforts no recent work surpasses the massive volume in which Lord Davies of Llandinam defines *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*. True, his chief purpose is to show how well-founded is his plea for the application of restraints, "sanctions" or penalties to aggressive war-makers by means of an International Police Force, and that only by the establishment of such a force can the warlike be held

in check. Yet his account of the antecedents of the League of Nations serves to bring out the weakness of past plans for the elimination of war. The aim of them all was to get rid of an acknowledged evil; and the weakness of all was to overlook the roots of the evil and to propose safeguards against it without seeking to put something better and more positive in its place.

It is one thing to abhor the bad and quite another to create a good, especially when the hold of the bad upon human instincts is so strong and, in many respects, so natural as the hold of war. Time has always worked against the reformers, as time is bound to work against those who hate war solely for its destructiveness, its unworthiness and, often, its criminality. Men's minds are not retentive enough to remember horrors for indefinite periods or to draw perennial wisdom from experience. As one generation follows another, the wisdom of the elder may seem foolishness to the younger. The noblest negative impulses are apt to fade and die unless more vital, creative impulses sustain them.

As Lord Davies shows, the desire to suppress the horrors of war is at least as old as the Amphictyonic League of Greek City-States and may well have been older. The members of this League made a sort of gentleman's agreement to abstain from ungentlemanly forms of strife and agreed to punish any member who should break this engagement. The later Confederacy of Delos, formed in 477 B.C., carried the idea of "sanctions" a step further by forming a kind of international navy and police force against the Persians and the Ægean pirates. But Athens, who possessed

docks and skilled craftsmen, soon became the mistress of this international navy by getting a monopoly of shipbuilding and transforming the League of Delos into a maritime empire. The Delian League was followed by the Achæan League, to which both Corinth and Sparta belonged. It had a standing army under the direct control of a League Assembly; and though it did not interfere with the internal affairs of its members, it did at times compel unwilling City-States outside its circle to accept the responsibilities of membership.

The Achæan League ceased to exist after the advent of the Roman power. Rome in her turn ended by imposing her *pax romana* and her laws upon a heterogeneous Empire, using her army as the ultimate instrument of authority. The *pax romana* was, broadly, a condition of non-war which bore the outward semblance of peace, much as the *pax britannica* does in India today. But it depended upon the Roman power, and with the decline of that power the world fell during the Dark Ages into a welter of lawlessness and disorder.

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In the Middle Ages dreams of justice and of a surcease of strife, under the ægis of an imperial or an ecclesiastical authority, were cherished by more than one great mind, especially by Dante. But it was reserved for the Duke of Sully, the great Minister of Henry IV. of France, to work out, early in the seventeenth century, a Grand Design for the federation of Europe, the elimination of war and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The misery and impoverish-

ment that had befallen the peoples of Europe as the result of war convinced him that "the happiness of mankind can never arise from war, of which we ought to have been persuaded long ago." But the Thirty Years' War, which began in 1620 while Sully was still putting the final touches to his Grand Design, made his wisdom seem Utopian. Thinkers of kindred mind nevertheless came under its influence. Among them may have been William Penn, whose "Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe by the Establishment of a European Diet, Parliament or Estates" was printed in 1693.

More widely known was the "Projet de Paix Perpétuelle" drawn up by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and printed in Holland in 1713. It took Sully's Grand Design as a model and presently won the approval of philosophers like Leibnitz, Rousseau and Kant. As a scheme it was thorough. Unlike the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was to be framed more than two centuries later, it left no loopholes in its arrangements for the prevention either of war between nations or of domestic rebellions against the rulers of anti-war States. It did not seek to stereotype the territorial situations then existing by requiring a unanimous decision before they could be changed, but provided that frontiers could be altered with the consent and under the warranty of the Peace Union by a three-fourths majority; and it stipulated that any sovereign should be declared an "enemy to the repose of Europe" if he should take up arms or commit any hostility save against him whom the Union might declare an "enemy to the European Society." Aggression was thus outlawed. The self-defence of

each State belonging to the Union was merged in the defence of the Union itself. The Senate of the Union would have power to mediate between disputants and to pronounce arbitral judgment, its decisions being taken provisionally by a majority vote and finally by a three-fourths majority.

Very significant was the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's plan for dealing with a sudden and unprovoked attack upon the Union or its members. Prompt action might be imperative. The Senators would have no time to consult their Governments. The responsibility for taking action therefore devolved upon the Senate, whose members were to decide first, by a majority vote, whether the matter was urgent, and then, by a three-fourths majority, what action should be taken. Saint-Pierre was persuaded that neither a balance of power nor bilateral treaties would be sufficient to prevent war; the only way would be a European union.

This clear-sighted project was far in advance of its time. Some of its provisions are still in advance of our time. Rousseau, in his *Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe*, of which the first part was published in 1761 and the second in 1782, clearly saw how valuable yet how Utopian Saint-Pierre's scheme would have proved. Whereas Saint-Pierre was an idealist who appealed to the nobler instincts of princes and statesmen, Rousseau thought himself a realist and trusted rather to the enlightened selfishness of men. His reckoning proved to be as far out as that of Saint-Pierre, and he took refuge in attributing to human craziness the disregard into which it fell, adding that he himself might be thought crazy

“because to be sane in a world of madmen is in itself a kind of madness.”

More notable than Rousseau's effort was Kant's famous treatise on “Perpetual Peace.” Like Rousseau and the English philosopher, Hobbes, Kant looked upon human nature as depraved, but thought that the realisation of perpetual peace need not necessarily depend upon the change of man's moral character. Though passions and prejudices are ranged against the process of evolution, Kant believed that man is powerless to avert his destiny, and that the guarantee of perpetual peace is given by Nature “in whose mechanical course is clearly exhibited a predetermined design to make harmony from human discord, even against the will of man.” Under the workings of a Higher Cause, or Providence, Kant believed that wars tended in the long run to unite the human race. He predicted that, after many buffetings and scorplings, the nations would be compelled to establish a federation of Free States based on the principles of voluntary assent to the reign of law. A uniting influence must come to prevail over the individual wills of nations so as to produce a common will, and to regulate conflicting interests until a state of peace, in which laws have valid force, were brought about. For the anarchy of Europe Kant could see no “possible remedy save a system of International Right founded upon public laws conjoined with power to which every State must submit.”

Kant saw as truly as the Abbé de Saint-Pierre that lasting non-war or, as he called it, “Perpetual Peace,” must involve the curtailment of the right of sovereign nations to make war; and, as happens to most seers,

his vision outstripped contemporary imagination. The Holy Alliance, formed at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, turned out to be a poor substitute for his idea, which was essentially progressive, whereas the Holy Alliance was essentially repressive and retrograde. It was an organised reaction against the effects of the French Revolution. If only for this reason it was foredoomed to failure even as an approach to non-war. When it broke down, and the principle of nationality made headway—often by means of war—in Europe, little more was heard of organising a system of non-war until the Tsar of Russia convoked the first “Peace Conference” at The Hague in 1899.

This first “Peace Conference,” originally designed to bring about a decrease of armaments, found itself sandwiched in between the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. In substance it yielded only an expression of pious desire for a draft covenant to ensure the intangibility of private property at sea, and in various limited proposals for international arbitration. The second “Peace Conference” of 1907 at The Hague was even less fruitful. It dealt especially with the codification of older international law, though the possibility of establishing an international police force was discussed, mainly at the instance of the United States.

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In view of the refusal of the United States Senate in 1920 to accept the League of Nations Covenant or to ratify the Peace Treaty which contained it, the following text of a resolution to which both the

Senate and the House of Representatives assented in 1910 is of interest. It runs :

“RESOLVED . . . that a Commission of five members be appointed by the President of the United States to consider the expediency of utilising existing international agencies for the purpose of limiting the armaments of the nations of the world by international agreement, and of constituting the combined navies of the world an international force for the preservation of universal peace, and to consider and report upon any other means to diminish the expenditures of Governments for military purposes and to lessen the probabilities of war.”

The President of the United States, Mr. Taft, sought to find out what European Governments thought of this resolution. On behalf of Great Britain Sir Edward Grey welcomed it and undertook to support any well-considered and practical scheme which the United States Government might bring forward. In the British House of Commons on March 13, 1911, he said : “Some armies and navies would remain, no doubt, but they would remain then (if the American proposals could go through) not in rivalry with each other but as the police of the world.”

Other European Governments damned the American proposal with faint praise, and nothing further was done to give it substance. But the proposal served to show how vigorously the ablest minds in the United States were and had been working in this direction. President Theodore Roosevelt’s message to Congress in 1904 dwelt upon the need for sufficient armaments, and insisted upon a truth which many ostensible peace-lovers have often overlooked—that, under any

organisation of the world for non-war, "a sufficient armament would have to be kept up to serve the purposes of international police." President Roosevelt spoke shrewdly. Serious and perhaps insuperable though the obstacles may be to the creation of an international police force to be stationed somewhere at the disposal of an international authority, it is plain that the lawful function of armaments in a world that renounces war as an instrument of national policy cannot be other than a police function, and that the exercise of this function is incompatible with the maintenance of neutrality. The question of neutrality, as will presently appear, lies behind the whole problem of organising the world against war; and it is not too much to say that, until individual nations renounce their right to remain neutral in a contest between the anti-war forces of the world and those that make for war, efficacious international police action will be impeded.

Though Theodore Roosevelt seems not fully to have perceived the essential connection between neutrality and non-war, he had advocated again and again the principle of a World League in which the nations would severally undertake to use their entire military forces, if necessary, against any nation which should defy the decrees of an arbitral tribunal or which violated the rights of member nations. He put his views, with his usual directness, in his book *Why America Should Join the Allies*, which appeared soon after the outbreak of the Great War in 1914.

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The shock of war in 1914 stimulated thought and action upon the postulates of peace in many countries

besides the United States. Groups and societies were formed in Great Britain, France, Holland and elsewhere. Colonel David Davies (now Lord Davies of Llandinam) formed a British group called "The League of Free Nations Society"; and in 1916 Mr. Herbert Stead, brother of the famous W. T. Stead, founded the "League to Abolish War" of which the main object was to work for the establishment of an International Police Force. Clearer even than the programmes of these groups were the principles of the American "League to Enforce Peace" which was organised in the United States by ex-President Taft and others. It urged that all disputes susceptible of legal treatment should be submitted to an international tribunal for hearing and judgment; that all other disputes, not settled by negotiation, should be submitted to a Council of Conciliation; and that the Powers joining the "League to Enforce Peace" should use their economic and military forces against any one of their number that might resort to war or commit acts of hostility against another before a dispute between them had been submitted to conciliation. The "signatory Powers," declared this American programme, "shall jointly use, forthwith, their economic forces against any of their number that refuses to submit any question which arises to an international judicial tribunal or Council of Conciliation before issuing an ultimatum or threatening war. They shall follow this up by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually proceeds to make war or invades another's territory."

This statement, be it remembered, was issued and endorsed by a large number of the most influential

men in the United States nearly two years before President Wilson associated his country with the European Allies in the Great War, and some three and a half years before the Covenant of the League of Nations was actually drafted in Paris. It is too often overlooked that this statement of principles indispensable to the organisation of the world for non-war was made in an atmosphere of war, and that the League Covenant itself was mainly the work of men whose countries had just come through a long and terrible ordeal and were resolved that, so far as in them might lie, the nations should be spared any like ordeal in future. No less than men's bodies, wealth and economic resources, their minds were mobilised under stress of war.

But when the fighting was over and military demobilisation was in sight or had actually begun, war-weary minds in many countries tended likewise to demobilise themselves and to forget the truth that only instruments forged under war conditions would be likely to withstand the strain or to possess the fineness of temper they would need should war or the prospect of war again inflame the hearts of men. Hence, especially after the withdrawal of the United States from the Peace Settlement and from the provisions of the League Covenant, statesmen and peace advocates alike began the process of whittling down the Covenant and of decrying its stipulations as too drastic. Ceasing to think with the clarity that had marked their "war minds," men and nations began to imagine that peace could be ensued by pious aspiration, prayerfulness and a pacifist "uplift" that tended to identify the use of lawful force with lawless

violence and to denounce all force as unchristian and ethically wrong.

The ultra-pacifist temperament thus displayed is an interesting subject of psychological study. Merely to dub pacifists "unpractical," as many of their critics have done, is to evade the question why so many earnest and upright souls take so obviously "unpractical" a view of a major human problem. The true answer to this question lies, I think, in the deep-seated yearning of not a few minds for some haven of absolute refuge from the harassing relativities of mundane affairs. Such a haven they find in accepting and obeying with uncompromising fidelity what they believe to be a higher than human injunction. This yearning for an escape into the absolute, for a kind of permanent exaltation above the strife of contending expedients, is not in itself deserving of censure. At worst it is a renunciation of earthly citizenship, with its unpleasant duties and perplexities, in favour of what may be thought a loftier citizenship of some ideal Kingdom of God. At best it is a mystical aspiration toward a state of human perfection which mankind may one day attain. But, as a contribution to any present solution of the tough problem of organising the nations on a basis of lasting non-war, it is hardly more helpful, and it may be much more paralysing, than the cynical resistance of those who argue that men have always fought, always will fight, and that efforts to restrain them from fighting are so many futile beatings of the air.

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It is no part of my purpose to examine once again the immediate origins of the League of Nations

Covenant or to tell how it was drafted at the Paris Peace Conference. Those who may care to study these matters will gain much knowledge from Mr. Ray Stannard Baker's *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, Mr. David Hunter Miller's *The Drafting of the Covenant*, Professor Charles Seymour's *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* and from many another volume. Rather do I wish briefly to relate the circumstances which seem to me to have been decisive in the actual formation of a League of Nations, in the decision of the United States to abstain from membership of it, in the consequent crippling of the League itself, and in the developments which led up to the Pact of Paris, or Briand-Kellogg Pact, for the renunciation of war of August 27, 1928. Running through all these matters I see one connecting thread of which the end is not in sight even today. Whether all the strands of this thread have ever been or can be counted and identified may be open to doubt ; but unless I am quite mistaken the existence of the thread itself is indisputable.

It may be taken as certain that there would have been no League of Nations Covenant nor, after the adoption of the Covenant by the Paris Peace Conference, any establishment of the League itself if the United States had not entered the Great War. Therefore the circumstances in which the United States did enter the War are of outstanding importance. Leaving aside contributory causes and taking account only of ascertained and recognised facts, it must be admitted that President Wilson declared war against Germany on April 6, 1917, with the substantial approval of his fellow-citizens, in order to uphold the American

doctrine of the "Freedom of the Seas." Into the controverted question whether he foresaw from the outset that the United States would not be able to avoid belligerency there is no need to go. Nor does it greatly matter that he was re-elected to the Presidency by a very narrow majority in November, 1916, on the plea that he had kept the United States out of the War. The facts are that in 1915 and 1916 relations between Great Britain and the United States were so strained by British interference with American seaborne trade—that is to say, by British infringements of the freedom of the seas—that American intervention against the Allies rather than in support of them was a disquieting possibility.

Early in 1917 this position changed. The irritant of British disrespect for the freedom of the seas was overcome by the counter-irritant of the German unrestricted submarine campaign against Allied and neutral seaborne commerce. It was this counter-irritant which ended by bringing the United States into the War against Germany. The first phase of the Russian revolution in March, 1917, may have eased President Wilson's mind by overthrowing the Tsarist autocracy and setting up in Russia a provisional constitutional government. Yet there is no gainsaying the truth that it was the German submarine campaign which decided the issue.

Upon this point President Wilson's statement to Congress on April 2, 1917, is convincing. He said: "The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations." Doubtless the desire to help in creating a new international order, based upon demo-

cratic freedom, and a permanent agency for consultation and action that would ensure peace and justice in the world, had long been growing in Mr. Wilson's mind, though as the responsible leader of the United States he had not been able to give full expression to it. The change from the Wilson of January 4, 1917, who told Colonel House, "There will be no war. This country does not intend to become involved in this war," to the Wilson of April 2 who asked Congress for a declaration of war, can only be explained by the development of German submarine warfare in the interval. For the freedom of the seas the President felt he could ask his people to fight. He could not have been sure of their whole-hearted assent had he asked them to fight for any vaguer cause.

The workings of President Wilson's mind, like those of many great popular leaders, appear not to have been altogether clear even to himself. On November 27, 1916, when he was drafting his appeal to the belligerents to inform him of their war aims, his first draft contained the sentence: "The causes and the objects of the War are obscure." His adviser, Colonel House, saw at once that the President had fallen again into the "error of saying something which would have made the Allies frantic with rage." Colonel House noted in his diary: "I have called his attention to this time after time, and yet in almost every instance when he speaks of the War he offends in the same way. . . . I told him the Allies thought if there was one thing clearer than another, it was this (that the causes and the objects of the War were perfectly plain); that their quarrel with him was that he did not seem to understand their

viewpoints. They held that Germany started the War for conquest; that she broke all international obligations and laws of humanity in pursuit of it. They claimed to be fighting to make such another war impossible, and so to break Prussian militarism that a permanent peace may be established."

Less than six months later the objects of the War, at least, no longer seemed obscure to the President. Then he told Congress and his people that "The right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free."

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It was language such as this, and the power of putting into words the aspirations and ideals of the great majority, if not of all, the Allied peoples that gradually won for President Wilson the moral leadership of the Allied cause and enabled him to come to Europe on December, 13, 1918, as the First Citizen of what, it was fondly hoped, would truly be a new world. Warnings, scarcely heard in Europe, had indeed been given by his critics and opponents in the United States that the President did not speak for the American people as a whole and should not be taken as commanding their unqualified support. Even had European nations or their Governments heeded these warnings they would have been faced with the political

inexpediency, not to say the impossibility, of questioning the credentials of the President of the United States. It was not their business to go behind the American Chief Executive. Had they attempted to do so they might properly have been told that it was no business of theirs, and that, for all practical purposes, the President was the only authorised exponent of American policy.

Yet the President had himself laid the axe to the root of his national authority by his ill-judged appeal to his fellow-citizens in October 1918 to vote for his Democratic Administration at the biennial November elections. Whoever was responsible for this appeal bears a heavy burden of historical responsibility. Colonel House, the President's wisest and most faithful adviser, was then on the Atlantic. On landing in France he heard with dismay what the President had done. He felt that to urge the electors to vote for Democratic candidates only, on the ground that the President should have a Democratic Congress to assist in carrying out his policies, was a grave political error. He agreed substantially with the view expressed six years later by the Attorney-General, Mr. Gregory, that the President's letter "immediately raised an electoral issue and gave an opportunity to the Republicans which up to then had been lacking. . . . They had some reason to complain of a document which injected a partisan issue at a moment when hosts of them could well claim that they had forgotten everything in order to win the War. Without this issue the Democrats would have carried the election easily, on the basis of Wilson's prestige and the fact that the War had been won."

Even if Mr. Gregory's memorandum be looked upon as wisdom after the event, Professor Charles Seymour records that Colonel House wrote in his diary on October 25, 1918 :

"I have been greatly disturbed by the President's appeal for a Democratic Congress. All he says is true, but it is a political error to appeal for a partisan Congress. If he had asked the voters to support members of Congress and the Senate who had supported the American war aims, regardless of party, he would be in a safe position. In this way he would avoid partisan feeling and would win, no matter which party controlled Congress, provided those selected had been loyal to our war aims. Here again, the President has taken a great gamble. If it turns out well, he will be acclaimed a bold and forceful leader; if it turns out badly, an opposite view will be taken.

"It seems to me a needless venture, and if I had been at home I should have counselled against it. He mentioned, the last time I was in Washington, that he thought of making an appeal. I made no reply, which always indicates to him my disapproval. As a matter of fact, we were so absorbed with the German notes (requesting an Armistice) that I brushed the question aside and gave it but little attention. I am sorry now that I did not discuss it with him to a finish."

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I have long thought that President Wilson's blunder—for it was nothing less—handicapped him fatally. The setback which, mainly in consequence of it, he received at the November elections of 1918, and the effects of his refusal to invite outstanding Republicans like Mr. Elihu Root and ex-President Taft to join the American Delegation to the Peace Conference, made

him in American eyes a party rather than a national leader. On October 5 Germany had appealed to him for peace on the basis of his Fourteen Points and subsequent definitions of war aims. He and the European Allies feared that this appeal might be a "peace trap," intended to save the German army from catastrophe and to keep it in being as a means of pressure during the peace negotiations. German military testimony has since shown this suspicion to have been well-founded. It moved President Wilson to insist that Germany and Austria-Hungary should furnish adequate guarantees; that they enter into a clear-cut agreement to accept his Fourteen Points and subsequent addresses as the basis of peace; that they give an assurance that the German Chancellor was appealing for peace in the name of the German people and not only of those who, so far, had been responsible for the conduct of the war; and, finally, that they evacuate the territories which their forces had invaded.

This insistence caused consternation at German army headquarters. While accepting three of the President's conditions Germany nevertheless proposed that there should be preliminary negotiations upon the evacuation of occupied territories and that this matter should be handled by a Mixed Commission. Herein lay the trap. While the Mixed Commission was discussing conditions of evacuation General Ludendorff would have had time to withdraw his armies and escape from the overwhelming pressure of the Allied forces. President Wilson therefore declined the Mixed Commission; declared that the terms of evacuation "must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the United States and he

Allied Governments"; that no armistice could be granted which did not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards for the maintenance of the military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field, or so long "as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhuman practices which they persist in." The reply concluded with the warning that the whole character of the peace would depend upon the character of the German Government.

On October 23, 1918, the President communicated to the Allies the text of his correspondence with Germany in order that they might determine whether there should be an armistice and, if so, whether they would agree to make the Fourteen Points the basis of the peace. It was at this moment that Colonel House reached Europe as the "Special Representative of the Government of the United States of America in Europe in matters relating to the War." One of his chief difficulties in securing acceptance of the Fourteen Points arose over the Second Point, relating to the freedom of the seas. And it is here that the authorised American interpretation of the Fourteen Points was especially significant. It pointed out that the Second Point—"Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants"—must be read in connection with the creation of a League of Nations. In time of peace, the interpretation added, there could be no interference with trade; in case of a general war the League would be empowered to

close the seas to the trade of the offending nation ; in case of a limited war, involving no breach of international covenants, the " rights of neutrals " would be maintained against the belligerents, the rights of both to be clearly and precisely defined in the law of nations.

Colonel House and his advisers in Europe had evidently not thought out the bearing of neutrality upon any permanent organisation of non-war, under the League or otherwise. While leaving intact the right of blockade they wished to do away with the holding up of neutral trade on the high seas which had caused so much tension between the United States and the Allies in 1915-16. Their purpose was to abolish contraband of war and to gain recognition for the immunity of private property from seizure on the high seas. But to these ideas the British Government took strong exception. It was convinced that the President's Second Point would destroy the right of blockade which, it felt, had done as much as military pressure on land to bring Germany to her knees. The Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, declared that he and his colleagues could not accept the abolition of the right of blockade under any conditions, though he might be ready to waive it if a League of Nations were established and made a reality.

Colonel House, for his part, refused to budge from the Fourteen Points, and even suggested that, if they were not accepted, the United States might have to make a separate peace with Austria-Hungary and Germany. Mr. Lloyd George was prepared to accept the other Thirteen Points if the freedom of the seas was left in suspense. On October 30, however,

President Wilson cabled that he could not consent to take part in the negotiation of a peace unless it included the freedom of the seas, "because we are pledged to fight not only Prussian militarism but militarism everywhere." He added: "I hope that I shall not be obliged to make this decision public." Still the question hung fire; and on November 4 President Wilson sent a message from Washington authorising Colonel House to say that unless the Allies would explicitly accept the principle of the freedom of the seas they could "count on the certainty of our using our present equipment to build up the strongest navy that our resources permit and as our people have long desired." Mr. Lloyd George answered that Great Britain would spend her last guinea to keep up a navy superior to that of the United States or of any other Power, and that no Cabinet Minister could retain office in England if he took up a different position.

Then, at last, Colonel House eased the strain by asking whether the British would be ready to discuss the freedom of the seas freely at the Peace Conference or whether their opposition implied a peremptory challenge to President Wilson's principle. Mr. Lloyd George answered that the British objections did not in the least challenge the position of the United States but meant only that "we reserve the freedom to discuss the point when we go to the Peace Conference." Mr. Lloyd George therefore wrote a letter to Colonel House undertaking that the freedom of the seas should be fully discussed. After this compromise the other Thirteen Points were accepted as the basis of the Armistice.

The published documents bearing on these negotiations fully confirm the impressions I gathered in Paris at the time. Some three months later, on February 14, 1919, I heard President Wilson read to the Peace Conference the provisional Covenant of the League of Nations upon which the Drafting Commission had agreed the day before. By my side stood two American officers who criticised the draft with some bitterness because it contained not a word about the freedom of the seas. They said: "Our people will never stand for it, because we came into the War to uphold the freedom of the seas."

That evening President Wilson left Paris on his brief visit to the United States. In reply to representations made to him, before he left, upon the failure of the draft Covenant to mention the freedom of the seas, he said that "In future there would be no freedom of the seas because in the League of Nations there would be no neutrals." Mr. Ray Stannard Baker confirms this information in his *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (vol. ii., p. 319) in the following passage:

"As for . . . the 'freedom of the seas,' the President considered that it would be met without specific provision by the organisation of the League of Nations, 'in which there would be no neutrals'—as he declared in a public statement, February 14. Although it appeared in the final American draft of the Covenant, it was not by the President's initiative, and the subject was never even discussed in the League of Nations Commission—or elsewhere."

In a sense Mr. Ray Stannard Baker is right in saying that the freedom of the seas "was never even discussed

in the League of Nations Commission—or elsewhere” during the Paris Peace Conference. Nor was the British undertaking that it should be discussed ever mentioned by the American Delegation. On the other hand, the question of neutrality—which involved the freedom of the seas—was repeatedly discussed by the League of Nations Commission at the Hôtel Crillon, and seems to have been decided unanimously. From the minutes of the Commission’s ninth meeting on February 13, 1919, it appears that the First Delegate of France, M. Léon Bourgeois, stated that neutral Switzerland would not be disposed to join the League unless her neutrality were recognised. He added: “Since we (*i.e.*, the League Commission) have accepted the principle that neutrality disappears within the Society of Nations, the people of Switzerland see a real danger to their independence and to their long-standing traditions if they enter into the League unconditionally.” President Wilson, who was present, did not challenge this statement that the disappearance of neutrality within the League had been accepted; and it is a significant fact that, when Switzerland did enter the League, her position was specifically protected by a resolution which the League Council adopted, exactly one year later, on February 13, 1920.

This resolution was moved by the principal British delegate, Mr. A. J. (afterwards the Earl of) Balfour. While recognising the special position of Switzerland, the resolution affirmed that “the conception of neutrality of the Members of the League is incompatible with the principle that all members will be obliged to co-operate in enforcing respect for their engagements.” It released Switzerland from any obligation to take

part in military action on behalf of the League or to allow the passage of foreign troops or the preparation of military operations within her territory, but it took note of the Swiss declaration that "Switzerland recognises and proclaims the duties of solidarity which membership of the League of Nations imposes upon her, including therein the duty of co-operating in such economical and financial measures as may be demanded by the League of Nations against a covenant-breaking State, and is prepared to make every sacrifice to defend her own territory under every circumstance, even during operations undertaken by the League of Nations."

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At the time when the League Covenant was drafted and adopted unanimously by the Paris Peace Conference President Wilson was clearly entitled to say that "in the League there will be no neutrals" and that, therefore, the "freedom of the seas" no longer existed. He is understood to have added that, if any member of the League should break the Covenant by resorting to war, all the other League members would act swiftly against such a member and that neutrality would thus disappear. This was the view generally taken. Nobody then expected that the United States, which had been foremost in promoting the League of Nations, would decline to become a member of it and would thus be, potentially if not actually, neutral towards any action which the League might take against a covenant-breaking member. Great Britain, in particular, accepted the obligations of membership laid down in Article 16—the "sanc-

tions" Article of the Covenant—because American membership of the League would preclude any future Anglo-American dispute over the freedom of the seas.

Consequently Great Britain and the other signatories of the Versailles Treaty were confronted with a fateful dilemma when they learned that the United States had rejected the Treaty in which, as in the other Peace Treaties, the League Covenant had been embodied at President Wilson's request. Should they allow the League to perish, after President Wilson had called it into being in pursuance of Article 5 of the Covenant, or should they, who had both signed and ratified the Peace Treaties, go on with the effort to organise the world against war?

They chose the latter alternative. It is true that, in the League Assembly of 1921, Great Britain hastened to propose amendments to Article 16 of the Covenant, seeing that a main condition of her acceptance of it had been nullified. Though these amendments never took full effect, the League was born under a cloud. Those nations which put their trust in it, and in its Covenant as a new charter of freedom from war, felt that the approach to non-war must remain halting and doubtful unless the provisions of the Covenant could be restated so as to fortify the principle of collective security against aggression and to diminish the danger of neutrality among League members.

Yet, here again, the freedom of the seas turned out to be a stumbling-block. Great Britain was unwilling to "stop the loopholes" in the Covenant lest she find herself in conflict with the United States over the immunity of neutral seaborne trade in the event of a League decision to blockade a Covenant-breaking

State. There were in England groups of earnest men who thought that this risk should be run for the sake of what they called "peace"; but there were other groups who believed that the re-emergence of the United States as a partisan of neutrality must defeat collective action against war. The former groups held it impossible that the American people would ever wish their Government to aid an aggressor by stabbing in the back other peoples who might be eager to restrain or to punish aggression. The latter groups argued, on the contrary, that American devotion to the freedom of the seas was so passionate in its nature, and coincided with so many financial and economic interests, that no degree of goodwill on the part of the American public would avail to bring the Government of the United States into line with League action.

Despite the controversy which arose between these groups, faith in the League as a new ideal, and attachment to it as the only result of the Great War commensurate in value with the loss and suffering that had been caused, grew steadily among the British people as a whole until the League became for many of them an object of semi-religious fervour. Doubters and sceptics, on the other hand, were not altogether sorry that the defection of the United States had provided them with at least a pretext for thinking pre-war thoughts and pursuing national policy by pre-war methods. Partisans and critics of the League were, however, united in a desire for security against war. Upon the best means of gaining it they differed. While some believed that the only true path towards it lay in collective measures for the prevention of

war or the restraint of aggression, others put their faith in a system of alliances for the defence of specified regions, and others again in a policy of detachment from Europe and of closer association with the Dominions of the British Commonwealth. All, in their several ways, were engaged in a quest for security, and this quest determined the character of British foreign policy during the next decade.

CHAPTER VI

THE QUEST OF SECURITY

THE refusal of the United States to ratify the Versailles Treaty and to enter the League of Nations was felt to have blighted the prospects of lasting peace in the world and especially in Europe. It had been hoped that the presence of American delegates at Geneva would have tended to mitigate the extremer claims of France and other countries, and gradually to round off the rougher edges of the Peace Treaties. Nor were the motives which inspired American policy favourably judged in Europe, all the less because the United States reserved to itself the benefit of various sections of the Versailles Treaty, including the reparations section, in the separate Treaty of Peace which it subsequently concluded with Germany.

Worse still, the Anglo-American Convention of June 28, 1919, for the safeguarding of France against German aggression until such time as the League of Nations should have organised a superior degree of general security, fell to the ground in so far as the United States was concerned, and left the British Government legally free to withdraw in its turn from that joint compact. This Great Britain short-sightedly did. Inasmuch as the French Prime Minister, M. Clemenceau, had accepted the Anglo-American Convention as a substitute for the effective control if not the annexation by France of German territory down to

the left bank of the Rhine, which Marshal Foch and other French soldiers had persistently demanded, the French felt that the lapsing of the Anglo-American Convention had cheated them of a security for which they had paid in advance. Had Great Britain upheld the Convention single-handed after the defection of the United States, she would have gained at one stroke French goodwill and would have obtained a moral though none the less decisive control over French policy in Europe. Her failure to take this course embittered Anglo-French relations and opened a period of undisguised animosity between Paris and London which culminated, early in 1923, in the French decision to occupy the Ruhr.

The picture presented by what had been "the Allied and Associated Powers" was thus the reverse of edifying. No atmosphere could well have been less favourable for the consolidation of whatever ground had been won by the League Covenant in the approach to a state of lasting non-war. All trace of idealism seemed to have vanished from international relations, and selfishness and bickering to have supervened, with the result that the sturdiest believers in the possibility of organising non-war found their faith sorely tried.

Nor was it only general circumstances that had changed. With one important exception the statesmen who had been in charge of affairs at the end of the War and during the Peace Conference had given place to others. The exception was Mr. Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister. Feeling that he alone had survived the storm and stress, he tended to look upon himself almost as a dictator. According to a

story which may or may not be apocryphal he went to Paris in the hope of being present at the election of M. Clemenceau to the Presidency of the Republic in succession to M. Poincaré. When Clemenceau's candidature fell through Mr. Lloyd George departed ; but before leaving he is alleged to have apostrophised M. Tardieu thus : " We play dirty tricks in England, but not like that ! [meaning the rejection of M. Clemenceau]. Now it is you Frenchmen who have burned Joan of Arc. And henceforth I am alone ! "

It was not long before Mr. Lloyd George found that to be " alone " was not essentially different from being isolated. He might strive to dictate policy to a disorganised world, as he did at the International Economic Conference of Genoa in the spring of 1922, but he could not secure respect for his dictates. M. Poincaré, who had accepted the presidency of the Reparations Commission only to resign rather than give countenance to any idea of fixing the German reparations debt at a definite total, took office again as Prime Minister of France with a distinctly nationalist and anti-Lloyd George policy. Meanwhile the hostilities between Greece and Turkey had come to a disastrous conclusion, Mr. Lloyd George having backed the Greeks against the Turks whom France was backing, and an open breach between Great Britain and France was only avoided by a British Conservative revolt which overthrew the Lloyd George Cabinet in October, 1922.

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How far these things were seen in the United States to be consequences, direct and indirect, of

American policy it is impossible now to guess. To European observers of American affairs at that time there seemed some reason to suppose that, while the prevailing tendency in the United States was to look upon European animosities as proof that America was well quit of European entanglements, a strong under-current of feeling was devoid of pride in the post-war record of Washington diplomacy. Even President Harding's Republican Administration may not have been wholly free from this feeling. At all events it desired to do something to stave off war, at least in the Pacific Ocean, and to limit rivalry in naval armaments. With these ends in view it issued invitations in the summer of 1921 to an International Conference at Washington upon naval armaments and the problems of the Pacific.

How nearly these invitations came to being forestalled by British invitations to a similar conference in London I have told elsewhere.¹ Mr. George Harvey, the United States Ambassador in London, was certainly anxious—and not without reason—lest Mr. Lloyd George and his colleagues, with the support of the Dominion Prime Ministers then assembled in London, should attempt to “jump President Harding's claim” and damage Anglo-American relations in the process. With some help which, as editor of *The Times*, I was able to render, this misfortune was averted. The Washington Conference met and, thanks to careful preparations and bold tactics on the part of Mr. Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of State, resulted in the Washington Naval Treaty for the limitation of capital ships, in the Four-

¹ *Through Thirty Years*, vol. ii., pp. 362-64.

Power Agreement in the Pacific, which replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and in the Nine-Power Treaty for the protection of China.

But the Washington Naval Treaty did nothing to improve Anglo-French relations which, indeed, became progressively embittered; and though Mr. Lloyd George offered the French Prime Minister, M. Briand, at the Cannes Conference of January, 1922, a revised edition of the defunct Anglo-American Convention for the safeguarding of France, M. Briand was overthrown before the offer could be fairly considered. French distrust of Mr. Lloyd George was too deep. Even when he had fallen in the following autumn, his successor, Mr. Bonar Law, was unable to come to terms with M. Poincaré and the French Nationalists who demanded at all costs "security" for France and the payment of reparations by Germany.

The idea of occupying the German industrial region of the Ruhr, and of holding it as a pledge for reparation payments, had lain in the background of French policy for at least two years. Behind this idea stood the unconfessed design of gaining for France permanent control of the German territory which Marshal Foch had wished her to retain as a pledge of safety against future German attack. Insistence upon huge reparation payments merely masked this design. In vain did the British Treasury and Mr. Bonar Law work out in December, 1922, a provisional settlement of the reparations problem, a settlement which, despite its complicated character, was so favourable to France that M. Poincaré's summary rejection of it in January, 1923, filled the British Government with dismay. Mr. Bonar Law and his colleagues sympathised with

the French desire for protection against another German attack and were anxious that France should receive adequate financial help in the restoration of her devastated regions. But neither they nor British public opinion as a whole felt certain that France could, in the long run, attain security either by territorial acquisition or by the project, dear to M. Poincaré, of detaching the Rhineland from Germany under the guise of an autonomous Rhenish Republic.

So, without the approval of Great Britain, and equally without her active opposition, France and Belgium occupied the Ruhr early in 1923. I thought then and still think that their action was ill-advised, and I criticised it at the time not only in England, where such criticism was easy, but in France and Belgium, where it was less easy. As a private individual I had done all in my power to promote an understanding between the British and French Prime Ministers, Mr. Bonar Law and M. Poincaré, but had found the gap between them too wide to be readily bridged. People in Great Britain saw clearly the drawbacks and dangers of French and Belgian policy, though, as Great Britain had never suffered actual invasion, they underestimated the passionate resentment and the fierce fears by which that policy was inspired. Nor might I have understood the intensity even of Belgian feeling had I not experienced it in unexpected fashion.

In February, 1923, shortly after the occupation of the Ruhr, I was invited to address a large gathering in Brussels. I had made no secret of my dislike of Franco-Belgian action, and proposed to tell my Belgian audience why I disliked it. But on reaching Brussels I became conscious that the atmosphere was altogether

different from the atmosphere in London. It was impregnated with so positive a hatred of Germany as to be overwhelming and oppressive. In these circumstances I could not question the wisdom of my Belgian hosts in arranging for me to address a smaller gathering of Belgian editors and writers instead of the large public meeting to which I had been invited to speak. Nevertheless, more than one Belgian newspaper had the courage to publish my criticisms in full.

On the morning when they were published, a Sunday, I received a command from the late King Albert, the great sovereign to whom Belgium and the European Allies owed an immeasurable debt of gratitude, to visit him at his Palace of Laeken. Though I started in good time my car was held up in the streets for more than half an hour by a procession of 30,000 Belgian deportees—that is to say, of the survivors of the men who had been carried off, under conditions of severe hardship, by the Germans during their occupation of Belgium, and compelled to do forced labour in Germany. So long was the procession and so thick the crowd in the streets that I reached Laeken late for my audience of the King. When I apologised for this involuntary discourtesy King Albert said :

“I am glad you have had this experience. It may help you to understand some of our difficulties. Those 30,000 men, whom you saw marching in procession, represent at least as many families whose members are filled with hot resentment, not to say deep hatred, of Germany and the Germans for the barbarous ill-treatment they suffered during the War. Under that treatment large numbers of them perished.

I have read what you said last evening. I agree with every word of it and am glad you were bold enough to say it here instead of writing it in London. Yet, I repeat, you and your country must take account of feelings that remain strong in Belgium, throughout the devastated regions of France and among millions of the French people. In such circumstances it is not always easy for the Government of a country, or even for its Sovereign, to act wisely."

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German "passive resistance" to the Ruhr occupation, the deliberate inflation of the German currency, the stimulus given to German hatred of France by the employment of French coloured troops, and all the other ill-effects of Franco-Belgian policy lie outside the scope of this chapter save in so far as they bear upon the French quest of security and the obstacles that were accumulating on its path. Suffice it to say that, by the spring of 1924, French feeling had turned so emphatically against the Ruhr adventure that the Poincaré Administration was overthrown in the general elections and an Administration of the Left took office under M. Herriot. Six months earlier a change of Government has also occurred in Great Britain. Mr. Stanley Baldwin, believing that British economic interests required the abandonment of free trade and the immediate introduction of a protective tariff, suddenly dissolved Parliament upon this issue in the autumn of 1923—and was very soundly beaten at the ensuing general election. For the first time the British Labour Party, led by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, controlled enough seats in the House of

Commons to render feasible the formation of a Labour Government.

The prospect filled British Conservatives and not a few Liberals with dismay. They hoped that the veteran Liberal leader and former Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, would put himself at the head of a Coalition Government strong enough to keep Labour out of office. Though, as Mr. Asquith said, he had been "begged, cajoled and almost threatened," he refused to take this course. He insisted that the Labour Party must be given power, even if it held no majority, because it was the moral victor of the election, and that the spirit of the British Constitution would be violated if Labour were to be excluded. He was convinced, moreover, that it would not be in the national interest to prevent a body of public men, no matter what their views might be, from gaining experience of administrative responsibility. On these grounds he thrust aside his last chance of returning to power, and promised the Labour Party full Liberal support as long as its policy should be conducive to national welfare.

In the long history of British Parliamentaryism I can think of no truer act of statesmanship than this. It set the course of British politics in a constitutional direction; and it brought about a far-reaching change both in British foreign policy and in the international quest of security against war.

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Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, who became Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in the first Labour Government, had long professed a semi-pacifist creed

and was known to sympathise with Germany. On the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 he had opposed British participation in it, and up to the autumn of 1917 he had behaved as a pro-German. But when he realised, late in 1917 and early in 1918, that the very existence of his country was at stake and that the dimensions of the struggle were deeper and wider than he had before seemed to understand, he showed marked reticence until the end of the War and ceased to challenge the feelings of his fellow-countrymen. Though nominally a Socialist he was really a romantic Scottish Highlander with many of the qualities and defects currently attributed to men of Celtic blood. As an orator he delighted in high-sounding phraseology, which sometimes masked his inmost thoughts. In short he was a man upon whom many Britons looked doubtfully because they had not yet perceived how strong was Mr. MacDonald's attachment to traditions and institutions for which Socialists, as a rule, professed little reverence.

Upon such a man the attainment of high office, albeit without the power which the control of an independent majority in the House of Commons would have given him, was bound to exert a modifying influence. It quickened his sense of responsibility toward the nation as a whole. Unlike the bulk of his followers he had not gone through the Trade Union mill, and had therefore escaped its narrowing yet in some respects sobering effects. In a sense he stood above if not outside the party to whose leadership he had succeeded ; and, once chosen as leader, he led his party without meticulous regard for the views of its more prosaic members.

One of his first—unexpected—acts as Foreign Secretary was to establish friendly relations with the French Prime Minister, M. Poincaré, and thus to ease the tension between London and Paris. The wisdom of this step appeared when in May, 1924, M. Poincaré's Nationalist Administration was defeated in a general election and M. Herriot, the leader of the Left, became Prime Minister. Had Mr. MacDonald waited for the overthrow of French Nationalism before cultivating the goodwill of France, both he and M. Herriot might have been suspected of having put their democratic convictions above their countries' interests. Before long M. Herriot met Mr. MacDonald in England and sought ways and means of furthering Franco-British co-operation by a settlement of the reparations problem and by the evacuation of the Ruhr. As early as December, 1922, the American Secretary of State, Mr. Charles Evans Hughes, had suggested that Reparations should be removed from the sphere of politics and put in the hands of a commission of experts who would judge it solely in the light of Germany's capacity to pay. The mediocre results of the Ruhr adventure had caused this idea to gain ground even in France, and M. Poincaré had ended by agreeing to the appointment of an expert commission under the chairmanship of General Charles Dawes. Out of its deliberations came the "Dawes Scheme" for a reparations settlement.

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Notwithstanding their friendly disposition toward Germany, Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot had been disquieted by various official German utterances and

by the rapid growth of nationalist and militarist organisations of which the aims and character were not compatible with German obligations under the Peace Treaty. Having drawn the attention of the German Chancellor to these matters in June, 1924, the British and French Prime Ministers agreed that a Reparations Conference, which the United States would be ready to attend, should be held in London. This Conference met on July 16. By August 1, when it had reached a preliminary agreement, Germany was also invited to attend it. Dr. Marx, the German Chancellor, and his Foreign Secretary, Dr. Stresemann, therefore came to London. On August 5 the negotiations began which led to the adoption of the Dawes Scheme.

But Dr. Stresemann was by no means satisfied with a settlement of the reparations problem alone. He sought to persuade the German Delegation that the question of "war guilt"—as the Germans had always called the attribution (in Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty) of responsibility to Germany and her allies for having by their aggression brought on the War—must be raised, and he urged the Chancellor to discuss this issue with the British Prime Minister. As this, much to Stresemann's annoyance, could not be done before the Conference ended, the following declaration was made in Berlin by the German Chancellor as soon as the Reichstag had ratified the London Convention which embodied the Dawes Scheme :

"The Government cannot and will not allow this significant moment to pass, in which it assumed heavy obligations for the execution of the Versailles Treaty, without a clear and unambiguous definition of its stand-

point in regard to the war guilt question which has weighed heavily upon the soul of the German people since 1919.

“The admission, imposed upon us in the Versailles Treaty under pressure of overwhelming force; that Germany had let loose the world war by her aggression, contradicts the facts of history. The German Government therefore declares that it does not recognise this admission. To be freed from this false accusation is a just demand of the German people. As long as this has not been done, and as long as a member of the international community remains branded as a criminal against humanity, true understanding and reconciliation among the peoples cannot be complete.

“The German Government will take occasion to bring this declaration to the knowledge of foreign Governments.”

This declaration, and Dr. Stresemann's desire that it be communicated officially to the principal Governments of the world, had a singular—and hitherto little known—sequel during the League Assembly in September, 1924. To that Assembly Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and M. Herriot went with the intention of promoting concordantly the pacification of Europe and of paving the way for the admission of Germany to the League. They understood that progress in this direction would depend upon British readiness to join in giving some collective guarantee of security against war. Though the Labour Government had rejected a Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance to this end which had been worked out at Geneva in 1923—and rejected it for the ostensible reason that the Draft Treaty offered “no serious prospect of advantage sufficient to compensate the world for the immense complication

of international relations which it would create"—France had approved of the Draft Treaty as being, in principle, in conformity with her own policy and as tending to facilitate the reduction or limitation of armaments. The question was how far Mr. Ramsay MacDonald would be prepared to go in bringing Great Britain into line with France.

As a basis for the London Reparations Conference in July the British and French Governments had agreed jointly to seek means of safeguarding French security, through the League of Nations or otherwise, and to continue the search until a solution should be found. This "search" could not be undertaken during the Reparations Conference, and it was therefore arranged that the French and British Prime Ministers should submit their views to the League Assembly. At the Assembly Mr. MacDonald spoke first. On Thursday, September 4, nearly a week after the publication of the German repudiation of "war guilt" in Berlin, he delivered an address which sounded like an exhortation to an international pacifist meeting. The British Prime Minister forgot that the League Assembly is a hard-headed gathering of Prime Ministers, Foreign Secretaries, diplomatists, international lawyers and officials representing half a hundred Governments. When he insisted that military force cannot give security, that alliances are a snare, that Germany and even Soviet Russia should be brought speedily, if not unconditionally, into the League, and indulged in general "uplift," he caused something like dismay among his hearers. His final suggestion that the League convoke an International Disarmament Conference startled the Assembly, which seemed to fear that,

in the absence of some positive provision for security against war, such a Conference might do more harm than good.

No member of his audience was more perturbed than M. Herriot, who replied to him on the morrow. Without controverting Mr. MacDonald's harangue, he discredited it by marked sobriety of language and tone and demolished it indirectly by precise reasoning. He insisted that a nation which should have recourse to war without submitting its claims to arbitration must be treated as an aggressor. Linking together the three terms "Arbitration-Security-Disarmament," he declared they would be vain abstractions unless they corresponded to a reality which it was the business of the League to create. War, he said, had long been an abominable reality. Peace, in its turn, must become a reality; and arbitration must never be a trap for nations that accepted it in good faith. Righteousness without might was powerless. The righteous must be made mighty, and the mighty righteous. As to the admission of Germany to the League, M. Herriot said:

"In fighting against Germany we fought destructive militarism and the atrocious doctrine, publicly proclaimed in her Parliament, that 'necessity knows no law'—a doctrine which is the exact contrary of all that we believe. We have never wished to plunge the German people into misery. France knows no hatred, does not live by hatred or in hatred. We are ready to welcome honest proof of a wish for conciliation. But we want sincerity. . . . Articles 1, 8 and 9 of the Covenant, which presuppose the fulfilment of engagements for disarmament, define the conditions for the admission of States into the League. They apply to Germany as to

other nations. In our League there must be neither exception nor privilege. Respect for treaties and pledges must be the law for all. The aim of the French Government is characterised by complete impartiality, by a sincere desire for appeasement, and by the will to reconstruct, if possible, the unity of Europe, at least. It is an aim clear and definite, which I express without any ulterior motive."

The precision and the restrained eloquence of M. Herriot's speech delighted the Assembly—and nettled Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. While the British Prime Minister was listening to a—very inadequate—translation of M. Herriot's speech, he was obviously displeased and perturbed; and the chance of any concordant Anglo-French policy seemed to have vanished.

Late on that afternoon, September 5, 1924, Mr. MacDonald told me of his surprise and annoyance at M. Herriot's failure to back him up, particularly in regard to the admission of Germany to the League. He asked whether I knew why M. Herriot had "let him down." I undertook to ask M. Herriot in his turn; but not until 11 p.m. could I put the question to him. Then M. Herriot said: "Before I spoke this morning I was officially informed from Paris that on Monday next the German Government intends to issue a circular note to the Powers repudiating all 'war guilt.' This repudiation is aimed at Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty, which is the basis of all reparation claims, including the Dawes plan itself. I simply could not embrace a Germany who is about to repudiate her treaty obligations."

Wondering whether Mr. MacDonald knew of this

German project, I sought him out before midnight. He assured me that he was totally unaware of it, and that he had not had time to read despatches which had come from the Foreign Office in London. He read one of them on the spot and, finding that it confirmed M. Herriot's information, he exclaimed that the Germans were always their own worst enemies, and that to repudiate responsibility for the War at such a juncture would ruin any chance there might be of getting Germany into the League. He thought that a vigorous protest against the German intention should be made immediately.

Shortly after midnight Mr. MacDonald accompanied me downstairs when, as luck would have it, the servant of Dr. Beneš, the Czechoslovak Foreign Secretary whose rooms were in the same hotel, told me that Dr. Beneš was still up and wished to see me. Therefore Mr. MacDonald and I entered Dr. Beneš's room and discussed the position with him. The British Prime Minister accepted Dr. Beneš's conclusion that a joint Anglo-French declaration of policy ought to be made to the Assembly that day, and the two statesmen began to draft the terms of it. I reminded them that M. Herriot must be consulted before any declaration were framed; and Mr. MacDonald agreed that Dr. Beneš and I should inform M. Herriot without loss of time.

Again by good fortune we were able to tell M. Herriot of the proposal in the small hours of that Saturday morning, September 6. He concurred with the suggestion; and, despite sundry hitches, the French and British Prime Ministers were able jointly to recommend that afternoon to the Assembly a

resolution instructing the competent Committees of the League to consider all the available material bearing upon security and the reduction of armaments, including the provisions of the League Covenant and the compulsory arbitration clause of The Hague Court Statute, with the object of strengthening the solidarity and promoting the safety of all nations by binding them to use pacific means for the settlement of international disputes.

This Franco-British resolution was unanimously adopted by the Assembly. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and M. Herriot were able to leave Geneva that night in the knowledge that their visit had not been fruitless. Out of their joint resolution emerged, after three weeks of tense labour, the famous Geneva "Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes," which the Assembly adopted on October 1.

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Since I was an eye-witness and, in some important respects, an ear-witness of the exchange of views that led to the Anglo-French resolution of September 6, 1924, and, through it, to the Geneva Protocol, I am able to affirm that neither the resolution nor the Protocol would have come into being had Germany not made known her intention of repudiating responsibility for the war by an official communication to all the Powers.

Dr. Stresemann, her Foreign Secretary, was chiefly answerable for this step. He had wished the repudiation to be notified to the other Powers simultaneously with the ratification of the Dawes Reparations Scheme by the Reichstag on August 29. Protests from the

French and Belgian representatives in Berlin thwarted this procedure; and the British Ambassador, Lord D'Abernon, suggested that the German Chancellor should write private letters to Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot. These letters were written and sent. On receipt of the Chancellor's letter Mr. MacDonald told Dr. Stresemann's semi-official representative at Geneva that the official presentation of a German note on "war guilt" would ruin everything that had hitherto been done to improve Germany's position; and Mr. Arthur Henderson, the principal British delegate to the League Assembly, announced that, in view of the contemplated German note, he would be unable to make the speech in favour of Germany which he had intended to deliver. The Norwegian delegate, Dr. Nansen, telephoned from Geneva to Dr. Stresemann to beg him "in the name of the future of Europe" to postpone the notification. Dr. Marx, the German Chancellor, strongly advised Stresemann in the same sense.

Yet, on Saturday, September 6, 1924, Dr. Stresemann telegraphed to the Chancellor that, after Mr. MacDonald's speech to the League Assembly and in view of the Chancellor's letters to the British and French Prime Ministers, he proposed no longer to postpone the notification. By midday on Sunday, September 7, when the Anglo-French resolution had been adopted by the League Assembly, he changed his tone and undertook to wait until September 20. In point of fact the notification was never made in the form originally proposed, though a German declaration on the subject of "war guilt" was included in a memorandum upon the admission of Germany to the League

of Nations which was addressed to foreign Prime Ministers on September 25, 1924.

Why should Dr. Stresemann have been so eager to repudiate German responsibility for the outbreak of the War? The answer lies partly in his own war record and partly in his failure to understand the effect of repudiating Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty. Dr. Stresemann was, in many respects, a typical North German on an unusually large scale. Before and during the War he was an active German Nationalist if not a pan-German. He approved of the German invasion of Belgium, and to the end opposed the evacuation of Belgian territory. He favoured the unrestricted submarine campaign which brought the United States into the War against Germany. Without stultifying himself he could not look upon any of these things as especially blameworthy; and he resented, as a slur upon his own and his country's morality, the charge that Germany had been "guilty" or, as Article 231 of the Peace Treaty put it, "responsible," together with her allies, "for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals" had "been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."

Article 231 was not, and was not intended to be, an affirmation of German "war guilt" in the moral sense—as the German Delegation were informed at Versailles when they made enquiry upon this very point. It was a legal statement of claim against Germany and her allies for such reparation as they could make for damage done in a war which their

aggression had brought on. Indeed, the next Article, 232, recognised that "the resources of Germany are not adequate . . . to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage."

But from the very beginning the word "responsible" was rendered into German by the ambiguous word "schuldig," of which the current meaning is "guilty." Months passed before the German Government could be induced to issue a proper German translation of Article 231. If it be argued that the words "imposed" and "aggression" amounted to an affirmation of German and Austro-Hungarian "war guilt," the counter-argument cannot be gainsaid that Austria-Hungary was under no constraint to declare war against Serbia nor was Germany forced to violate the neutrality of Belgium—as she had long intended to do. Otherwise there would have been no meaning in the German Chancellor's words to the Reichstag on August 4, 1914: "The wrong—I speak openly—that we are doing, we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached."

The truth is that the agitation against the so-called "war guilt lie" in which the Governments of the Weimar Republic engaged from the outset, was mainly directed against the Allied claim for reparations. Had it been otherwise, had their main anxiety been to relieve "the German soul" of the reproach of war guilt, they would assuredly have fastened upon the real "war guilt" Articles of the Versailles Treaty—Articles 227 to 230—which begin by arraigning "William II. of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties" and provide for

his trial by a special tribunal and for the trial of other persons "accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war." But these Articles entailed no financial or economic consequences, nor was any attempt seriously made to enforce them. Besides, the Governments of the Weimar Republic might disavow responsibility for the acts of William II., seeing that he had ceased to be the ruler of Germany. It was otherwise with the heavy burdens imposed upon Germany in legal form by Article 231; and the concentration of German propaganda against that Article as being an intolerable offence to the German conscience was, to say the least, disingenuous. There can be few more striking examples of the nemesis that dogs the steps of those who prevaricate in great matters such as these than the undeniable fact that the German agitation, at home and abroad, against the so-called "war guilt lie" ended by convincing the German people not only of its freedom from its responsibility for the War, but by inducing in it an acute sense of injured innocence which developed into the very persecution mania that Herr Hitler and his associates played upon so successfully in their campaign for the overthrow of the Weimar Republic itself.

Neither Dr. Stresemann nor his colleagues perceived that in their eagerness to repudiate "war guilt" they were asking for trouble. They wished to get rid of reparations and to prepare for the admission of Germany to the League of Nations on a footing of equality with the other Great Powers, so that the occupation of the Rhineland zones by British, French and Belgian troops, and the disarmament of Germany

under the Versailles Treaty, might be presented as intolerable humiliations which no equal could be called upon to bear. Like many patriotic Germans, Dr. Stresemann resented these humiliations keenly. His ignorance of feeling outside Germany, and his inability to understand the effects of anti-war-guilt propaganda upon the German people itself, blinded him to the consequences which his action must entail.

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No sooner had the joint Anglo-French resolution been adopted by the League Assembly on September 6, 1924, than Dr. Beneš began to embody its recommendations in a draft scheme which the competent Committees of the League might consider. On September 7 he gave me a copy of his first effort and asked me to revise it. As I thought it too elaborate to be readily comprehensible by the British public I put my pencil through a number of its provisions—perhaps because I failed to understand that account had to be taken of the earlier Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and of other attempts to strengthen the Covenant by defining the obligations of League members. I thought then, and think now, that the Geneva Protocol, born of Dr. Beneš's efforts and of those of a number of international lawyers and other experts, would have stood a better chance of acceptance had it been simpler and less juridical. Be this as it may, the Protocol was hammered out in a League Committee during the next three weeks, was adopted by the Assembly on October 1, and was then submitted for ratification to the Governments of countries belonging to the League.

The Geneva Protocol began by "recognising the solidarity of the members of the international community" and by "asserting that a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this solidarity and an international crime." Then, as a means of reducing armaments to the lowest point consistent with Article 8 of the League Covenant—"the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations"—it proposed that signatory States should use every effort to amend the Covenant on the lines which it set forth.

These lines were that States signatory to the Protocol should in no case resort to war either with one another or against a State which should accept the obligations of the Protocol; that they should recognise as compulsory the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague in cases specified; that they should establish a committee of arbitrators upon disputes, and apply the penalties foreshadowed in Article 16 of the League Covenant, to a State which might resort to war in defiance of the Covenant or the Protocol. The powers of the League Assembly were to be extended beyond those bestowed upon it by the Covenant; and States signatory to the Protocol were required to undertake, in the event of a dispute between them, not to increase their armaments or effectives above the level to be fixed by a Conference for the reduction of armaments. Under the Protocol this Conference was to be convened at Geneva on June 15, 1925, and to comprise representatives of all States whether members of the League or not.

The Protocol went on to charge the League Council with the duty of making prompt enquiry into all disputes upon the level of armaments. If such enquiry should show that armaments had been unlawfully increased, the guilty State or States would be called upon to put an end to the violation and, in the event of failure to comply with this summons, the League Council would declare the State or States guilty of a breach of engagements and decide, by a two-thirds majority if necessary, upon the measures to be taken to remedy as soon as possible a position threatening to the peace of the world.

The Protocol further recommended the establishment of demilitarised zones between States mutually consenting thereto, declared that "every State which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol is an aggressor," and that "violation of the rules laid down for a demilitarised zone shall be held equivalent to resort to war." A State engaging in hostilities should be presumed to be an aggressor unless a unanimous decision of the League Council should declare otherwise. It would also incur the penalties of aggression if it refused to submit a dispute to pacific settlement, to comply with a judicial sentence or arbitral award or with a unanimous recommendation of the League Council, or if it violated provisional measures prescribed by the Council while proceedings for pacific settlement were in progress.

Under the Protocol, States signatory to it would agree that the whole cost of operations undertaken to repress aggression, and of repairing all losses caused by the operations on both sides, should be borne

by the aggressor up to the extreme limit of his capacity.

In conclusion the Protocol laid its signatories under an obligation to take part in an International Conference for the Reduction of Armaments in June, 1925, provided that a majority of the permanent members of the League Council and ten other League members should have ratified the Protocol by May 1, 1925. It was stipulated that, in case a plan for the reduction of armaments were not adopted by this Conference, the League Council should make a declaration to this effect, and that "this declaration shall render the present Protocol null and void."

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This Geneva Protocol, designed to stiffen the League Covenant in several important respects, marked the farthest point ever reached in the quest for security against war. Even before the League Assembly adopted it on October 1, 1924, it was wildly denounced in the British Conservative press as dangerous and intolerable because it would "put the British Navy at the disposal of the League." More serious seemed the argument that the Protocol interpreted Article 16 of the League Covenant in a way that would destroy the safeguard of unanimity in the League Council, and might therefore bring Great Britain into conflict with the United States over the freedom of the seas. But the critics of the Protocol ignored both the fact that the safeguard of unanimity does not apply to "sanctions" under Article 16 (since they are "automatic" against a recognised Covenant-breaker), and the express provision that the Protocol could not

be valid until international armaments should have been successfully reduced by a Conference in which the United States would take part. Nor were those critics prepared, then or for long afterwards, to face the certainty that no Disarmament Conference could succeed unless international security against war were more stringently safeguarded than it had been by the League Covenant.

Amid the British outcry against the Protocol, complications arose in British domestic politics over the withdrawal by the Labour Government of proceedings that had been taken against a Communist journal. The demand for a Parliamentary enquiry into the reasons for this withdrawal having been supported by the Liberal leader, Mr. Asquith, and rejected by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the King granted Mr. MacDonald's request for a dissolution of Parliament. The ensuing general election went decisively against the Labour Government, mainly as a result of the scandal caused by the publication of a "Red Letter" alleged to have been written by Zinovieff, head of the Third International, to a British Communist. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and his colleagues were heavily defeated, and the Conservative leader, Mr. Stanley Baldwin, found himself unexpectedly at the head of a large majority in the House of Commons.

Thus a Conservative Administration came into power. Though Lord Robert Cecil, the foremost British supporter of the League, accepted office in it, and though the new Foreign Secretary, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, was not a whole-hearted opponent of the Geneva Protocol, the Cabinet decided to reject the Protocol entirely on the fallacious plea that it

sought to maintain peace by organising war on the largest scale. Both Lord Robert Cecil and Mr. Austen Chamberlain would have preferred to propose amendments to the Protocol ; but under the influence of Lord Balfour their wishes were overruled and Mr. Austen Chamberlain was sent to Geneva in March, 1925, to reject the Protocol unconditionally in a speech which Lord Balfour had drafted and the Cabinet had approved of.

After a time Lord Robert Cecil marked his disapproval of this course by resigning office. He felt that the quest for security had, for the time being, ended in failure and that, in these circumstances, the prospects of any reduction of armaments were poor. Mr. Austen Chamberlain, whose experience of the League was then limited, retained office in the hope that some other means might be found to promote international security. Of his efforts, which led to the Locarno Settlements of October 16, 1925, some account will be given in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VII

LOCARNO

IF the affairs of men and nations always worked themselves out according to plan, the writing of history would be a dull task. Of all the plans made since the end of the War to foster international security the Geneva Protocol was the most comprehensive. Its rejection by the British Government seemed to have made an end of it ; yet, even before it could be officially repudiated by the British Foreign Secretary at Geneva in March, 1925, it had begun to bear fruit in an unexpected quarter.

This quarter was Germany. Her Foreign Secretary, Dr. Stresemann, was watching and waiting in the hope—as he afterwards put it in his famous memorandum to the ex-Crown Prince at the beginning of September, 1925—of doing something to “get the grip of the strangler” off her throat. He meant the Allied occupation of the Rhineland zones which, under the Peace Treaty, might continue till 1935. In principle, Dr. Stresemann had already made up his mind that Germany must enter the League of Nations. On September 23, 1924, while the Geneva Protocol was being hammered out, the German Cabinet decided unanimously to enter the League on condition that Germany be given a permanent seat on its Council and the right to take part in the international control of her armaments. As Dr. Strese-

mann's posthumous "Testament" shows, this unanimity was inspired by a conviction that the questions affecting Germany which came within the competence of the League could not be satisfactorily dealt with from the German standpoint should Germany remain absent from Geneva. Among these questions were those of the Saar Basin, the protection of German minorities abroad and the promotion of general disarmament as a corollary to the international control of German armaments.

But the position was not altogether simple. While Germany thought it self-evident that she could only join the League and help to deal with these matters on a footing of complete equality with the other Great Powers, she demanded for herself release from the obligations which the other League members had undertaken. Therefore, in a memorandum to Foreign Governments, she attached two reservations and one claim to her expression of willingness to enter the League. The first reservation consisted of an affirmation of her right to remain neutral, as a disarmed country surrounded by armed neighbours, in case other League members should be called upon to apply penalties or "sanctions" to a Covenant-breaking member under Article 16. The second reservation took the form of a warning that German entry into the League must not be construed as implying the acceptance of obligations that could involve any moral reflection upon the German people. The object of this warning was to preclude the suggestion that by adherence to the League Covenant, which formed part of the Versailles Treaty, Germany had subscribed voluntarily to other parts of that Treaty,

and in particular to Article 231 upon which the Allied case for reparations was founded. And the claim that accompanied these reservations took the form of a demand that, at a given moment, Germany should be given an active share in the colonial mandate system of the League, seeing that she had been cut off from all colonial activity as a result of the War.

The most serious of these contentions was the suggestion that Germany, as a League member, should be granted the right to remain neutral in case the League should be obliged to apply "sanctions" in restraint of Covenant-breaking. At a moment when the League, through the Geneva Protocol, was endeavouring to remove the weakness of the Covenant by re-establishing President Wilson's principle that in the League there could be no neutrals, the German proposal was obviously unacceptable. Consequently the replies of foreign Governments to the German memorandum disappointed Berlin. On December 12, 1924, Dr. Stresemann returned to the charge in a lengthy communication to the Secretary-General of the League in which he insisted upon the incompatibility of Article 16 of the Covenant with Germany's actual position. He added that while this position might be eased if the Geneva Protocol should come into force, the Protocol would still deprive all League members of any right to remain neutral in a conflict between the League and a Covenant-breaking member. It was therefore indispensable that the question of German neutrality in any future conflict must be cleared up.

The record of a conversation on March 12, 1925, between the British Ambassador in Berlin and the

Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office suggests that Dr. Stresemann's insistence upon Germany's right to remain neutral referred especially to Stresemann's belief that, in a not distant future, hostilities would again break out between Soviet Russia and Poland. In this event Stresemann thought that Germany should at once proclaim her neutrality and, having done so, should propose measures to localise the conflict and to bring it before a European Conference at which German demands for a revision of the German-Polish frontier could be put forward with a good prospect of success. He did not favour any direct German attack upon Poland. He hoped rather that complications between Poland and Soviet Russia might be turned to account without armed intervention by Germany; and his main anxiety was to prevent any international arrangement under which France would be entitled to help Poland by sending troops across German territory.

At this juncture, however, Soviet Russia protested strongly at Berlin against the idea that Germany might enter the League, and argued that such a step would favour Poland and damage Russia. This protest was based upon the Russo-German Treaty which had been concluded in April, 1922, at Rapallo during the Genoa Economic Conference. Stresemann was the more anxious to dispel Russian misgivings because he credited the new British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Austen Chamberlain, with a desire to conclude an Anglo-French alliance as the surest safeguard of European peace. Stresemann, for his part, wished to avoid at all costs a revival of the Anglo-French alliance in any form, and at the same time to retain the intimacy which

had grown up between Germany and Soviet Russia after the Rapallo Treaty. In January, 1925, he instructed the German Ambassador in London to sound Mr. Austen Chamberlain upon the possibility of negotiating a pact between Germany, Great Britain and France that would guarantee the security of Western Europe and of the Rhineland in particular. Mr. Chamberlain answered that he could not consider such a proposal if it were addressed to Great Britain alone—for he was on his guard against any attempt to drive a wedge between Great Britain and France.

This reply may have accounted for Stresemann's view of Mr. Austen Chamberlain's policy. He probably knew enough of the British Foreign Secretary's outlook to be sure that, unless some move were made by Germany, Great Britain might seek to remove French fears of future German aggression by reverting to the principle on which the Anglo-American Convention of June 28, 1919, had been based. Mr. Chamberlain certainly understood that the British failure to uphold this Convention, after the United States had dropped it, had deprived Great Britain of the power she would otherwise have possessed to exercise a moderating influence upon French policy in Europe, and that this failure had led directly to the French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923.

Whatever his personal wishes may have been, Mr. Austen Chamberlain soon perceived that his colleagues in the second Baldwin Cabinet were not disposed either to ratify or to amend the Geneva Protocol, of which a main object was to organise, in and through the League, that greater degree of

security for France which the Anglo-American Convention had foreshadowed as an eventual substitute for the Anglo-American Convention itself. But he felt that to reject the Geneva Protocol without offering France some other form of security would merely be to throw the European situation, and especially Franco-German relations, back into chaos. Therefore he may well have cherished the idea of a defensive Anglo-French alliance as an alternative to the Geneva Protocol. He was resolved to keep faith with France, and for this reason gave a cold reception to the proposal which the German Ambassador in London made to him in January, 1925, for a Western Security Pact between Great Britain, Germany and France.

Either under instructions from Dr. Stresemann or on the spur of the moment, the German Ambassador sought to reassure Mr. Austen Chamberlain by saying that it was Germany's intention to make a similar proposal in other capitals. Perhaps as a result of Mr. Chamberlain's observations Dr. Stresemann drew up and, on February 9, 1925, forwarded to Paris and London—and presently to Rome and Brussels—a memorandum of great importance. It suggested that Germany might agree to a pact by which all the Powers interested in the Rhineland—that is to say, in the security of Western Europe—should give to each other severally, and jointly to the Government of the United States as trustee, a pledge not to make war upon each other for a term of years to be agreed upon. This pact might be flanked by a far-reaching treaty of arbitration between France and Germany, and the pact itself might expressly guarantee the territorial intangibility of the Rhineland, and declare that its

signatories would look upon any action contrary to this engagement as a matter affecting them jointly and severally. At the same time the signatories might guarantee the demilitarisation of the Rhineland as defined by Articles 42 and 43 of the Versailles Treaty ; and the pact itself might be so framed as to prepare the way for a world pact, on the model of the Geneva Protocol, in which the Rhineland Security Pact might be embodied.

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The reference to the Geneva Protocol in this remarkable German document is of peculiar interest. Dr. Stresemann's "Testament" justifies the assumption that, if the Geneva Protocol had not been adopted by the League Assembly on October 1, 1924, his memorandum of February 9, 1925, would have been written in a different spirit if, indeed, it had been written at all. Among the many ironies of modern history few are stranger than the probability that, without the Geneva Protocol, the Western Security Pact which became the nucleus of the Locarno Settlements would hardly have come into being, and that the decisive impulse which urged Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and M. Herriot to present to the League Assembly on September 6, 1924, the joint Anglo-French resolution out of which the Geneva Protocol grew, was given by Dr. Stresemann's own eagerness to destroy the legal basis for reparations by repudiating German "war guilt" in an official communication to the Great Powers !

Further ironies and accidents were to follow. When the French Prime Minister, M. Herriot, received the Stresemann memorandum of February 9, 1925, he

liked it no better than Mr. Austen Chamberlain had liked the original German soundings. He locked up the memorandum in a drawer and left it there—where M. Briand presently found it. Mr. Austen Chamberlain thought it unwise and premature. Meanwhile, on February 28, 1925, the first President of the German Republic, Herr Ebert, died; and despite Stresemann's efforts, Field-Marshal von Hindenburg was elected President in Ebert's place. Ebert was a simple man, a saddler by trade, a Social Democrat in politics and, all in all, a dignified and reassuring figure who inspired full confidence. Field-Marshal von Hindenburg was an East Prussian Junker, a soldier through and through, and was looked upon as a symbol of renascent German militarism. After his election feeling abroad again became distrustful of Germany. Stresemann, who had feared that this might be so, had therefore supported against Hindenburg the non-military candidature of Dr. Jarres, Mayor of Duisburg, one of the Ruhr cities which had been under French occupation.

In these circumstances it was not without misgivings that Stresemann met the new President. Public allusion had already been made in London to his memorandum of February 9, and Stresemann feared lest its tenor affect his own standing and policy disadvantageously. He had written it in the belief that the British Conservative Government would not reject the Geneva Protocol. In point of fact the decision to reject it was not taken until February 18, 1925, and was first announced in the House of Commons on February 24. In reply to criticisms from Mr. Arthur Henderson—who had been the

chief delegate of the Labour Government to the League Assembly and, as such, one of the authors of the Protocol—Mr. Austen Chamberlain declared that repudiation of the Protocol did not imply any lack of friendship for France, and urged that serious consideration be given to the German proposals for an international guarantee of the Rhineland. This he thought the more important because Germany was prepared to renounce war on her eastern borders as a means of changing them. The outstanding feature of any agreement upon these proposals, Mr. Chamberlain added, would be the entry of Germany into the League of Nations.

How Dr. Stresemann interpreted this utterance is shown in his "Testament," which reproduces two (apparently confidential) statements that he made to representatives of the German Press on March 7, 1925, and to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag on March 11. To the German Press he said: "England's difficulty was that she wanted to cut loose from the Geneva Protocol and was glad of another opportunity to satisfy French wishes"; and to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Reichstag he explained that he wished to avert any lengthening of the Rhineland occupation by Allied forces and was anxious lest Great Britain and France agree on this point. Mr. Austen Chamberlain, he added, was anything but warm in his feelings for Germany and must be reckoned as a supporter of an Anglo-French understanding that would have an anti-German point. Therefore the question arose whether it would not be well "to insert a German initiative into the situation" and not merely to await developments.

In other words, the German proposal for a Western Security Pact was originally designed to prevent England and France from coming too close together, and to make the most of the divergence between British and French views upon the possibility of confining Germany within her eastern frontiers as fixed by the Peace Treaties. But it was not until November, 1932—that is to say, seven and a half years later—that full light was thrown upon the ambiguity of Dr. Stresemann's "German initiative." Speaking then in the House of Commons, Sir Austen Chamberlain dwelt upon the difficulty he had found in ascertaining Dr. Stresemann's real intentions. He had made to the House on March 24, 1925, the following statement upon the German proposals :

"If I understand them rightly, they amount to this That Germany is prepared to guarantee voluntarily what hitherto she has accepted under the compulsion of the Treaty, that is, the *status quo* in the West; that she is prepared to eliminate, not merely from the West but from the East, war as an engine by which any alteration in the Treaty position is to be obtained. Thus not only in the West, but in the East, she is prepared absolutely to abandon any idea of recourse to war for the purpose of changing the Treaty boundaries of Europe. She may be unwilling, or she may be unable, to make the same renunciation of the hopes and aspirations that some day, by friendly arrangement or mutual agreement, a modification may be introduced into the East, which she is prepared to make in regard to any modification in the West."

Hardly had Austen Chamberlain made this statement when he was told that the German Ambassador in London urgently desired to see him. The Ambassador

informed him that what he had just said in the House of Commons went beyond anything authorised by the German Government. Austen Chamberlain asked the Ambassador whether he meant that the German Government reserved to themselves the right to use war as a means of changing Germany's eastern frontiers and said : " If that be so, I have indeed misunderstood you, and there is but one thing for me to do. I must go back to the House . . . and say that I have misunderstood your proposals and that the whole situation must be reconsidered."

The German Ambassador could not say exactly what his Government's claim was. Therefore the Prime Minister, Mr. Stanley Baldwin, repeated the substance of the Chamberlain statement to the House of Commons and telegraphed the two statements to the British Ambassador in Berlin asking whether they went beyond the intentions of the German Government. Under this pressure the German Government confirmed the accuracy of the British statements, that is to say that Germany voluntarily abandoned any idea of revising her western frontiers and that, while she could not abandon hope of securing revision of the eastern frontiers, she excluded war as an instrument of obtaining it.

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It is curious that neither Dr. Stresemann's " Testament " nor the Diary of Lord D'Abernon, who was then British Ambassador in Berlin, contains any reference to this significant episode, which, as I have said, was only revealed in November, 1932. Yet it bore directly upon the question of German good faith,

the very question that underlay the negotiations for the Western Security Pact. At that time, as many passages in Dr. Stresemann's "Testament" go to prove, his sincerity was not beyond suspicion. Later on, and especially in the last year before his death in October, 1929, he discarded many of his mental reservations and worked whole-heartedly for peace. But it was during this very period of his life and work that he met with increasing opposition from his own countrymen and even from the members of his own party whom he had failed or neglected to persuade that the true interest of Germany required not only the renunciation of war but of the thought of war as an instrument of her policy.

There is no need now to follow the negotiations that culminated in the conclusion and the initialling of the Locarno Agreement on October 16, 1925, or to record all the difficulties that had to be overcome. They would certainly not have been overcome if M. Briand (the French Foreign Secretary who had discovered Stresemann's memorandum of February 9 in M. Herriot's drawer and had acted upon it) or Mr. Austen Chamberlain had been aware of the interpretation which Stresemann was putting upon his own proposals. Careful study of the impassioned controversy that arose when the first two volumes of Stresemann's "Testament" were published in 1932, and no less careful reading of the volumes themselves, have led me to conclusions which, I believe, can hardly be gainsaid. They are these :

Up to the year 1927 it may be a psychological error either to affirm or to deny Stresemann's "sincerity." He was an opportunist striving to get for Germany

all that could be got in the circumstances of the time. He had no vision of the constructive part which a regenerate Germany might play in a Europe set for peace. This lack of vision was common to him, to his colleagues and to the great majority of the German people. By 1927 he had begun to acquire this vision, thanks in part to frequent intercourse with M. Briand, Sir Austen Chamberlain and other responsible foreign statesmen at Geneva and elsewhere. He was beginning to escape from the narrowing influence of his own past—and to lose touch with German public feeling. Thus it came about that in the improvised peroration of his last speech to the League Assembly in September, 1929—less than a month before his death—there was a note of passionate idealism which those who heard it will never forget. For once he put aside the manuscript (revised and corrected by the German Cabinet) which he had been punctiliously reading, and spoke with his whole mind and heart. With him the League Assembly caught a glimpse of what Germany and Europe might be could they rise to the level of his thought at that moment. This was doubtless the Stresemann whom Briand and Austen Chamberlain felt to be growing within the opportunist of 1925, the Stresemann in whom they put their trust. But it was emphatically not the Stresemann whose doings and writings are recorded in the first two volumes of his "Testament," or the Stresemann who negotiated the Locarno Settlement and, nearly a year later, led the German Delegation into the League Assembly of 1926.

The world outside Germany, and some Germans, were genuinely shocked by the revelation in his "Testa-

ment" that Stresemann had always been an ardent admirer of the Crown Prince and had made a point of keeping him informed, if not of consulting him, upon the main aspects of German foreign policy. To the Crown Prince Stresemann wrote on September 7, 1925, shortly before going to Locarno, an explanatory statement that seemed to justify the worst suspicions of his straightforwardness. In it he said: "The (Western) Security Pact carries with it renunciation of a fight with France for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, a German renunciation which, however, is theoretical only inasmuch as there is no possibility of making war upon France." And again: "By entering the League the question of choosing between East and West does not arise. Besides, one can only choose if one is backed by military might. Unhappily we lack this might. . . . The great movement which is now running through uncivilised peoples who are turning against the colonial rule of Great Powers will not, I believe, be influenced in a way detrimental to these peoples by our entering the League. But our weightiest task is the first I have mentioned—to free the German land from foreign occupation. We must first get the strangler's grip off our throat. Therefore, in this respect, German policy will have to be, for the present, what Metternich said about Austria after 1809—to use finesse and to dodge big decisions."

It cannot be doubted that if this statement had become known before or during the Conference at Locarno in October, 1925, it would have blown the Conference and the Western Security Pact sky high. It seemed to suggest that, in Stresemann's eyes, the whole value of a Western Security Pact was to gain

time while Germany renewed her own strength and that, should there in future be a possibility of making war upon France, her renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine would prove to have been theoretical only. The statement may have been the work of a patriotic opportunist, but it was hardly the kind of missive which the British and French Foreign Secretaries thought Stresemann capable of writing at that juncture. They, at least, acted in good faith, and consented to certain ambiguities in the Western Security Pact because they attributed an equal degree of good faith to Stresemann.

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This said, it remains to consider the Locarno Settlement itself both as a step toward the organisation of security against war in Europe and as a means of bringing Germany into the League of Nations.

The Settlement falls into seven parts which are mutually interdependent :

(1) A treaty (Western Security Pact) between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy.

(2) An arbitration convention between Germany and Belgium.

(3) An arbitration convention between Germany and France.

(4) An arbitration treaty between Germany and Poland.

(5) An arbitration treaty between Germany and Czechoslovakia.

(6) A "Final Protocol."

(7) A collective note to Germany upon Article 16 of the League Covenant.

By the main Treaty, or Western Security Pact, the Contracting Parties guarantee jointly and severally the maintenance of the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and Germany and France, and the inviolability of those frontiers as fixed by or in pursuance of the Versailles Treaty, and also the observance of Articles 42 and 43 of the Versailles Treaty which created the Rhineland demilitarised zone. Germany and Belgium and Germany and France mutually undertake that they will in no case attack, invade or resort to war against each other save in the exercise of the right of legitimate defence, that is to say, in resisting a violation of the Security Pact or a flagrant and unprovoked breach of Articles 42 and 43 of the Versailles Treaty ; and save also as regards action in pursuance of Article 16 of the League Covenant or of other action decided upon by the League of Nations against an aggressor.

Therefore Germany and Belgium and Germany and France undertake to settle by peaceful means all questions of every kind which may not be susceptible of settlement by the normal methods of diplomacy, each of the parties undertaking to submit to and abide by a judicial decision in case of conflict over their respective rights.

If one of the Contracting Parties alleges a breach of these stipulations, or of Articles 42 and 43 of the Versailles Treaty, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League, which, as soon as it is satisfied that such breach has been committed, will notify its findings without delay to the signatory Powers " who severally agree that in such case each of them will come immediately to the assistance of

the Power against whom the act complained of is directed."

Up this to point the Western Security Pact seems plain sailing. But then comes the third clause of Article 4, the exact meaning of which has been the subject of much controversy. It runs :

"(3) In case of a flagrant violation of Article 2 of the present Treaty or of a flagrant breach of Article 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by one of the High Contracting Parties, each of the other Contracting Parties hereby undertakes immediately to come to the help of the Party against whom such a violation or breach has been directed as soon as the said Power has been able to satisfy itself that this violation constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and that by reason either of the crossing of the frontier or of the outbreak of hostilities or of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarised zone immediate action is necessary. Nevertheless, the Council of the League of Nations, which will be seized of the question in accordance with the first paragraph of this article, will issue its findings, and the High Contracting Parties undertake to act in accordance with the recommendations of the Council provided that they are concurred in by all the members other than the representatives of the Parties which have engaged in hostilities."

This clause seems open to interpretation as taking away with one hand what it gives with the other. It may be read as bestowing upon each Contracting Party the right, and enjoining upon it the duty, of "satisfying itself" that an unprovoked act of aggression had been committed, and therefore of leaving it free to come or not to come to the help of the aggrieved party according to its own judgment. On the other

hand, it may also be read as authorising the aggrieved party to call upon the others for help as soon as it should have "satisfied itself" that aggression had taken place. Further, whatever these other Contracting Parties might or might not have done, they undertook presently to act in conformity with the recommendations of the League Council, provided the recommendations were unanimous—a unanimity which either of them could prevent.

The common sense of this clause seems to be that, if it were interpreted with a maximum of good faith and goodwill by all parties other than the potential offender, it would be a valid guarantee against successful aggression; but that if, for reasons or interests of its own, any of the Contracting Parties should not wish to act up to the spirit of these obligations, the obligations themselves would have little value.

The other provisions of the Security Pact preserved the rights and obligations of the Contracting Parties under the Versailles Treaty and supplementary arrangements; upheld the League's freedom to safeguard peace in all respects; stipulated that the Treaty should remain in force until the League Council decided by a two-thirds majority that the League itself ensured sufficient protection to the Contracting Parties; and exempted the British Dominions and India from any obligation under the Security Pact which would come into force as soon as ratified and when "Germany has become a member of the League of Nations."

The arbitration treaties and conventions attached to the Western Security Pact set forth in detail the procedure for the peaceful settlement of "all disputes of every kind" which may arise between their signa-

tories. Obviously their value depended upon that of the Security Pact itself, and was doubtful in so far as its value was doubtful. To some extent the practical effect of the Security Pact was governed both by the Final Protocol appended to the Locarno Settlement and by the Collective Note which its other signatories addressed to Germany in regard to Article 16 of the League Covenant.

Of these two documents the Collective Note was the more important, although the Final Protocol concluded with a declaration that the Locarno Settlement would, by strengthening peace and security in Europe, hasten the disarmament foreshadowed in Article 8 of the League Covenant, and thus reinforce the moral obligation involved in the preamble to the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty. But the Collective Note informed Germany of the interpretation which its signatories placed upon Article 16. This Article, they said, "must be understood to mean that each State member of the League is bound to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant and in resistance to any act of aggression to an extent which is compatible with its military situation and takes its geographical position into account."

The object of this Collective Note was to meet, in so far as they could be met, Dr. Stresemann's misgivings lest membership of the League constrain Germany to abandon her neutrality by acting with other League members against an aggressor. Believing as he did in the likelihood of war between Poland and Russia, he wished both to prevent the passage of French troops across German territory on their way

to help Poland and to avoid taking sides against Russia. If German neutrality in such a conflict could be preserved, he hoped that, in the course or at the end of it, Germany would be able to secure a revision of her eastern frontiers at the expense of Poland. As his (then unknown) statement to the German Crown Prince on September 7, 1925, explained, he thought that one of the great tasks which lay before German policy in the immediate and calculable future must be "the rectification of our eastern frontiers . . . the recovery of Danzig, of the Polish Corridor, and a revision of the frontier in Upper Silesia."

The French, Polish and Czechoslovak representatives at Locarno may or may not have guessed what was in Dr. Stresemann's mind. In any event they concluded between themselves—and made public—treaties stipulating that they would assist each other immediately in applying Article 16 of the League Covenant in case either of their countries should suffer from a failure to observe the undertakings between them and Germany and if such failure were accompanied by an unprovoked recourse to arms. Moreover, in case the League Council should be unable to make a unanimous report upon the conflict, and Poland, France or Czechoslovakia were attacked without provocation, each country bound itself immediately to lend the other aid and assistance in virtue of Article 15, paragraph 7, of the League Covenant, which authorises League members in such circumstances to "take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice."

However problematical the worth of the Locarno Settlement might seem to be in the light of these various diplomatic undertakings, it was hailed as an immense contribution to the work of organising international security against war. Throughout Europe and elsewhere, not excluding the United States of America, the "spirit of Locarno" was extolled as the true spirit of peace. If the statesmen of France and Germany, Great Britain and Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Belgium could resolve never to seek a solution of their differences by recourse to war, surely, it was claimed, the statesmen of other countries could emulate their example, and carry through elsewhere the task so auspiciously performed in Western Europe.

This mood of roseate faith in progress towards the goal of frank and fair co-operation between peoples, with goodwill to all, lasted several months. When Dr. Stresemann came to London for the signing of the Locarno Treaties on December 1, 1925, he was hailed as the bringer of peace. In the United States a wave of enthusiasm bore the American people nearer than they had ever been since 1919 to active membership of the League of Nations. The barometer was at set fair. In England the bestowal upon Mr. Austen Chamberlain of the Knighthood of the Garter, one of the highest distinctions in the gift of the British Crown, was felt to have placed a fitting seal upon his achievement. A Special Assembly of the League of Nations, to which Germany was to be triumphantly admitted, was summoned for March, 1926; and to Geneva a throng of eager optimists hurried to witness this great event and to share the uplifting emotion of so auspicious an hour.

Events were soon to dash these high-hearted expectations. Disputes arose over the demands of various countries, Spain and Brazil in particular, for permanent seats on the League Council alongside of Germany. Sir Austen Chamberlain unfortunately promised his personal support to the candidature of Spain ; and as the British Cabinet felt unable to make good this promise, Spain withdrew temporarily, and Brazil permanently, from the League. At the Special Assembly in March, 1926, the wrangling over the future composition of the Council became so fierce that the Assembly was obliged to disperse without having admitted Germany to its midst. Throughout the summer a League Committee strove to reorganise the Council, and succeeded sufficiently to enable Germany to enter the League during the regular annual Assembly in September.

But meanwhile much of the glory had departed from "Locarno." In the United States enthusiasm ebbed more swiftly and farther back than the point from which it had flowed towards the League. Germany, too, felt humiliated. Her admission to the League took place in an atmosphere of doubt and scepticism very different from that which would have surrounded it in March, 1926. On all hands it was asked what "Locarno" had really achieved. In substance the answer was that the frontiers of Western Europe had been recognised as inviolable by Germany, Belgium and France ; that these countries had likewise undertaken to submit to peaceful settlement "all disputes of every kind" that might arise between them; and that these undertakings had been guaranteed by Italy and by Great Britain—albeit by Great Britain

alone, without the pledged support of the British Dominions or of India. Germany's eastern frontiers had not been declared inviolable, save in so far as the arbitration treaties and conventions bound Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia peacefully to settle "all disputes of every kind" between themselves. On the other hand, Germany had stipulated that her co-operation in support of the League Covenant, and her resistance to any act of aggression, must be compatible with her military and geographical position, while France, Poland and Czechoslovakia had reserved for themselves freedom of action in case the League Council should not be able unanimously to adopt a report upon the merits of any dispute.

Taken together these stipulations left room for doubt whether "Locarno" had, after all, settled anything except the entry of Germany into the League. Negatively, it had precluded, as Dr. Stresemann wished a Western Security Pact to preclude, any revival of an Anglo-French alliance or even Entente which might appear to be directed against Germany. Negatively, also, it marked an unprecedented distinction, if not a severance, between the European obligations of Great Britain and the general obligations of the British Empire or Commonwealth. If this severance was to some extent offset by the fact that all the British Dominions and India belonged individually to the League, and further by the approval which the Imperial Conference gave to British foreign policy in November, 1926, it appeared nevertheless to bring an element of weakness into the British imperial polity.

More serious was the danger involved in the semi-recognition of the principle that a member of the

League might be entitled, in its own judgment and discretion, to remain neutral should the League feel bound to take action in restraint of a Covenant-breaking State. From the very outset the efficacy of the League as an instrument of collective security against war had been seen to depend upon its members' renunciation of neutrality; and here was Germany admitted to membership of the League with something like a right to judge for herself whether she would join in League action or not. More than ever the earnest partisans of collective security against war were persuaded that, unless and until the problem of neutrality could be tackled and solved, the whole structure of the League must remain shaky, and the hopes founded upon it remain little more than pious aspirations.

Neither the advent of National Socialism in Germany at the end of January, 1933, nor Herr Hitler's repudiation of "Locarno" and reoccupation of the Rhineland demilitarised zone on March 7, 1936, could then be foreseen, and still less the circumstance that France would have put a premium upon Hitler's high-handed deed by failing to support whole-heartedly the effort of the League, under British leadership, to uphold the principle of collective security by restraining Italian Fascist aggression against Abyssinia in the autumn of 1935. The crisis of "security," and of the League itself, which was thus brought on is far from having run its course. For the time being German action has transformed the main Locarno Treaty, or Western Security Pact, into an Anglo-Franco-Belgian defensive alliance. How and when it will emerge from this condition, and whether it will form the basis of a new and larger settlement, no man can yet presume to say.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR

IF the year 1926 brought disappointment to believers in the progressive organisation of collective security, 1927 came almost to an end before giving them aught to sustain their faith. Not until December 28, 1927, did Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, Secretary of State in President Coolidge's Administration, put forward proposals which, eight months later, took final shape in the Treaty of Paris, or Briand-Kellogg Pact, for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.

It would be untrue to say that the original Kellogg proposals found favour with the British Foreign Office or, indeed, with the British Government as a whole. In the closing months of 1926, and during 1927, reactionary tendencies had gained the upper hand in Mr. Stanley Baldwin's Conservative Cabinet. The influence of Sir Austen Chamberlain, which had been great after the Locarno Settlement, never quite recovered from the blow it received when the Special Assembly of the League broke down in March, 1926. Though a Preparatory Commission of the League had been set up at Geneva to study ways and means of fostering disarmament, it made little progress, and the well-founded impression spread that the hands of its principal British member, Lord Cecil of Chelwood (better known as Lord Robert Cecil), were tied by

hampering instructions from his colleagues in the Cabinet. Thus the atmosphere was not favourable to the success of a Conference at Geneva for the further limitation of naval armaments to which President Coolidge, on behalf of the United States, issued invitations in the spring of 1927. The political preparation which had ensured the success of the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-22 was entirely lacking.

At Washington a ratio of 5-5-3 in "capital ships," as between Great Britain, the United States and Japan, had been agreed upon, and France and Italy had reluctantly accepted a corresponding ratio of 1.75 for themselves. These ratios applied to battleships, battle cruisers and aircraft carriers only, smaller cruisers, destroyers and submarines being left unregulated. Before long a movement arose in the United States to demand equality or "parity" with Great Britain in all classes of vessels, and modern cruisers in particular. British naval opinion opposed this demand on the ground that Great Britain needed a relatively higher level of cruiser strength than the United States for the policing and protection of maritime trade routes. In the background of these conflicting claims lay the old bugbear, the freedom of the seas—that is to say, the immunity of American seaborne trade from search or seizure, and the ensuring of respect for the interests of the United States as a neutral in time of war.

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The "Coolidge" Naval Conference met at Geneva on June 20, 1927. France, still smarting under the low ratio of 1.75 assigned to her at Washington,

declined to attend it; and Italy was represented only by an "observer," though, on the strength of the Washington ratio, she demanded "parity" with France in all classes of vessels. No sooner had the Conference assembled than a clash occurred between the British and the American Delegations. The United States proposed that the ratios and principles of Washington should henceforth be applied to cruisers, destroyers and submarines, whereas the British Delegation suggested a revision of the Washington arrangements in regard to battleships as well as cruisers. There were also wide differences between British and American views upon the tonnage of future battleships and the calibres of their guns. Japan, for her part, claimed that no new naval programmes should be sanctioned, and no new ships be bought to increase naval strengths, building or buying being confined to replacements of obsolete vessels within the limits laid down at Washington.

The United States met the British case by declaring officially that nothing short of parity with Great Britain in all classes of ships could or would be accepted, and that the United States was animated by "an unflagging determination to secure the legal right to build a fleet in every respect as strong as that of Great Britain." Unscrupulous propaganda by agents of the American "Big Navy" party and armament firms spread irritation and confusion among the delegates, with the natural consequence that, after some weeks of wrangling, the "Coolidge" Conference ended in failure. It had revealed an almost total lack of vision on the part of the British and the United States Governments.

Yet the main cause of its failure was not so much Anglo-American naval rivalry as the spirit in which the delegates met. At Washington in 1921 an anti-war spirit had prevailed. At Geneva in 1927 the thought of eventual war was uppermost, and there was little or no disposition to take risks for the sake of peace. Nor was there any understanding of the effect which an Anglo-American quarrel must have upon the future armaments of the world, military as well as naval.

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Under these conditions the prospects of the League Assembly in September, 1927, were not bright. The smaller League members were filled with resentment of what they, not altogether without warrant, took to be the tendency of the British, French and German Foreign Ministers—Sir Austen Chamberlain, M. Briand and Dr. Stresemann—to look upon themselves as a triumvirate and to settle great international matters behind the back of the League. Besides, the resignation of Lord Cecil from the British Cabinet, after the failure of the "Coolidge" Conference, strengthened suspicion that Great Britain had lost interest in the League and in the organisation of peace. Wincing under the criticisms of British policy in the Assembly, Sir Austen Chamberlain replied in a speech which, contrary to his intention, sounded menacing and dictatorial. He spoke to the delegates of "your League," and warned them that, if they should insist on seeking peace by means of the Geneva Protocol, or of some other general obligation which Great Britain could not and would not incur, his country

might have to revert to the "smaller but older League," the British Commonwealth of Nations. Great Britain, for her part, had done everything she possibly could do, and it would be a good thing if some of her critics did a little more before venturing to assail her. Great Britain, he added, had a habit of keeping her word. She had kept it in the case of Belgium when other nations had not kept their word. She would keep it again should need arise. She had signed the Covenant and meant to observe it. Surely that was enough.

This admonition, and especially the tone in which it was delivered, estranged and chilled the Assembly. Sir Austen Chamberlain, to his astonishment and regret, found himself isolated. It had not occurred to him that, in using the words "your League" he would be understood as meaning that Great Britain looked upon herself as standing outside the League. But the general effect can best be described in the witty words which the late Mr. Frank H. Simonds, who was famous for his inimitable drawl and caustic humour, said to me on the morrow: "I have just witnessed a pa-thet-ic and mel-an-choly spectacle. I have seen *poor* Sir Austen, walking *alone* down to that Assembly, looking like a *high-minded* and con-scientious por-cu-pine in search of af-fec-tion."

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I had gone to Geneva that year for a special purpose. I hoped to find, by rubbing brains with the leading delegates and with the chief officials of the League Secretariate, some idea which I could usefully put forward in a series of addresses which the "World

Alliance for the Promotion of International Fellowship through the Churches" had invited me to give in several cities of the United States during October and November. I wanted something that would help to improve the international atmosphere, not excluding Anglo-American relations. But in Geneva I discovered only what I had long known—that the halting support which Great Britain was giving to the organisation of collective security through the League was paralysing the League itself, and that British half-heartedness was due, in the main, to the risk of conflict with the United States over the freedom of the seas in case the League should attempt to restrain an aggressor by applying Article 16 of the Covenant. Since I felt that it would be worse than useless to dilate upon this theme in the United States, I left Geneva in mid-September somewhat disconsolate and doubting whether I ought to go to the United States at all.

On the way back to London what seemed to be a promising notion occurred to me. It was that I should tell Americans exactly how Europeans looked upon their country—and the description would not be soothing to American pride. In effect it would be that, in Europe, the American people were thought to be as sincere in their commercialism as they were hypocritical in their idealism; that only a small minority of Europeans ascribed the scuttling of the United States out of the Peace Settlement and its refusal to enter the League to any motive more lofty than a desire to wash its hands of burdensome responsibilities while swamping the world with its manufactured goods, keeping foreign goods out of the American

market, and striving to collect in gold the debts owed to it by its European associates in the War.

I thought that, when I had painted a picture frank enough and black enough to rile an American audience, I could say, with perfect truth, that I was one of the small minority of Europeans who believed the people of the United States to be as sincere in their idealism as in their commercialism, and who did not doubt that both the people and the Government of the United States were as anxious to promote peace as they had been at the end of the War. In conclusion I proposed to ask my American hearers whether I and the small minority of Europeans were right, and the great majority wrong. I could add that, if I and the small minority were right, would it not be possible for the United States, without incurring any commitment or entanglement, save towards its own conscience, to say or do something that would prove the great majority of Europeans to be in the wrong? I was not pleading for any American entry into or association with the League of Nations. For one thing, I was not sure that American institutions would permit the United States to play other than a hampering part in the League. But I wished the people of the United States to think over and to answer two main questions, which would run :

“(1) If we in Europe assume that the American people are today as desirous of peace and as firmly opposed to aggressive war as they were on November 11, 1918, Armistice Day ; if we suppose that the United States will never help an aggressor nation by treating with it, lending it money or allowing it to have access to American resources, shall we be right or shall we be wrong ?

“(2) If we are right, is it not possible for the United States, in its own good time and in its own way, to lay down as a fundamental principle of American policy the doctrine that it will not aid or abet, support or comfort, directly or indirectly, any nation that takes up arms and makes war without having submitted its case to arbitration, conciliation, mediation or some other form of peaceful settlement ?”

What I had in mind was the formulation of an American Peace Doctrine which might become as cardinal a principle of American foreign policy as the Monroe Doctrine gradually became. I knew that in June, 1927, Professor James T. Shotwell, of Columbia University, had suggested to M. Briand the idea of proposing a bilateral treaty between France and the United States for the total and lasting renunciation of war between the two countries, and that M. Briand had made a communication to this effect to the United States Government. To that communication there had been no reply, and it seemed unlikely that President Coolidge and his Secretary of State, Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, would consider it favourably after the failure of the Naval Conference at Geneva and in view of the French decision to hold aloof. So it seemed expedient to break new ground, and this I hoped might be done by putting forward the idea of an American Peace Doctrine.

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Toward the end of October, 1927, I spoke on these lines to a large gathering of influential New Yorkers. What I said made some noise in the Press next day, and more noise when I repeated it at a luncheon of the

English-Speaking Union at Philadelphia a day or two later. The *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, in particular, printed an excellent report of my speech and commented upon it favourably. From Philadelphia I went on to Washington, where I was to speak on the evening of November 1. My first visit was to the British Ambassador, Sir Esme Howard (now Lord Howard of Penrith), an old friend whom I had not seen for some years. I found he would be absent till the morrow; but the porter of the Embassy told me that, according to a message from the State Department, President Coolidge wished to see me with the Ambassador at 10 a.m. on the morning of November 2.

My surprise was the greater because I had not expected to meet the President. Two of his predecessors, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Harding, I had seen, the one in Paris and the other in Washington; and I had long known ex-President William Howard Taft, who was then President of the Supreme Court. But Mr. Calvin Coolidge's reputation for taciturnity led me to suppose that conversation with him would be neither feasible nor profitable. Still, as the message had been sent, there was nothing for it but to obey; though, obviously, it would be necessary to consult the Ambassador.

When I saw the Ambassador next day he seemed perplexed. He warned me earnestly to say nothing to the President of the ideas I had been putting forward in New York and at Philadelphia and proposed to repeat in Washington, St. Louis, Buffalo, Chicago and other cities. He said: "The President will receive us for ten minutes and will say 'No' twice, as he did to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and afterwards

to Lord Cecil when they were here. If he says 'No' to your American Peace Doctrine your mouth will be closed, for no foreigner in this country can speak against the veto of the President."

"Then I would rather not go to the White House," I answered.

"We must go," said Sir Esme; "it is a command. But I warn you to say nothing."

Notwithstanding my respect for the Ambassador's experience I told him that there was one man in Washington whose advice I should also wish to take—my old friend, William Howard Taft. So to Wyoming Avenue I went, and saw "Big Bill." After I had told him of the Ambassador's advice and asked what I ought to do, Mr. Taft said: "Go to it, my boy. Tell him everything. It will please him"; and as this counsel was to my taste I resolved to act upon it.

In point of fact President Coolidge left me no choice. Almost before the Ambassador and I were seated in the famous Oval Room at the White House, the President began:

"I have read what you said at Philadelphia. Will you explain more fully?"

When I had "explained" for some ten minutes the President mused awhile. Then he said: "Would it be helpful if I made a speech?"

"Nothing could well be more helpful, Mr. President."

"Or sent a message to Congress?"

"That might be better still."

At this point the Ambassador remarked that if the President were to send a message to Congress, the

Senate might endorse it in a resolution ; but the President, whose faith in the goodwill of the Senate seemed weaker than the Ambassador's, reminded him that "the Senate of the United States is a *very curious body*." Then, turning to me, Mr. Coolidge asked :

"Would a message to Congress bind the people of this country ?"

"The Monroe Doctrine," I answered, "did not bind the people of this country when it was laid down nearly a century ago ; but it binds them today. Like Topsy, it 'growed.'"

"We have now no time to let things grow," the President objected. "You give me an American Constitutional means of doing this thing, and I will do it."

"That is *your* business, Mr. President ; I am not an authority on the American Constitution."

"No doubt. But I want a Constitutional way out," Mr. Coolidge insisted.

"You have the Briand proposal for a Franco-American treaty in renunciation of war," I suggested. "That might be a beginning."

"I will not have it, I will not have it !" Mr. Coolidge exclaimed, almost testily. "I will not bind the United States by any arrangement of that sort with any single country. I trust Briand, and have some faith in Poincaré ; but who can promise me, if I make this treaty with them, that a Nationalist, militarist French Government won't go and do some damfool thing ten years hence, something which we ought to stop, and will do it all the more because we should have bound ourselves not to interfere with France ? Wouldn't it be better if every country were quite

uncertain whether it would not find the United States against it if it broke the peace?"

"Sir Edward Grey, now Lord Grey of Fallodon, could best answer you on that point," I replied. "He could not tell Vienna and Berlin in July, 1914, that England would be against them if they broke the peace; and people have since—unjustly—been accusing him of having brought on the war because he left Germany and Austria in doubt whether Great Britain would take part in it or not."

"That sounds conclusive," said President Coolidge. "But we must find an American Constitutional way out."

I began to think that the audience was at an end. Mr. Coolidge had certainly not lived up to his reputation for taciturnity. After a pause he began again, with a fierce tone in his voice:

"I am bitterly disappointed at the breakdown of the Geneva Naval Conference. Now we shall have to make large naval appropriations."

"Partly your fault, Mr. President," I answered.

"How, my fault?"

"You entrusted the Conference to naval experts whose nature it is to wrangle and disagree. Each of them wants to get something for his own country. You made no political preparation for it. It was political preparation, of which I knew a little, that enabled the Washington Conference to succeed so largely six years ago."

"I did tell Kellogg he ought to go," the President returned. "He said that if he went to Geneva, Briand and Chamberlain would have to go too. The world would expect miracles, and there could be

no miracles because it was only a matter of a few old cruisers anyway. Perhaps he was wrong, perhaps he was right. But now we shall have to build."

"The Ambassador," I remarked, "though physically present at this conversation, is officially absent from it. So he need not listen when I tell you that you can build a hundred thousand cruisers if you like, and we shall not compete with you. Conflict with the United States does not enter into our calculations."

"Are you quite sure of that?" Mr. Coolidge asked eagerly.

"Quite sure, Mr. President."

"Then we can go slow. Appropriations are not the same thing as building. I tell you I want to see things in such shape that the people of the United States will look upon every British cruiser as an addition to their security, while the British people will look upon every American cruiser as an addition to *their* security, and that, both of us looking upon cruisers in this way, we can afford to have as few of them as possible."

By this time the audience had lasted nearly an hour, and the President was warned that the German Ambassador was waiting to see him. He rose, took leave of Sir Esme Howard, whom he accompanied to the door, and then, turning to me, invited me to return at 1 o'clock to have luncheon with him and Mrs. Coolidge. This was not altogether unexpected, as I had received a hint before going to the White House that it might be well to make no engagements for lunch that day.

During luncheon I noticed that Mr. Coolidge had no "small talk." He sat silent while Mrs. Coolidge

chatted brilliantly. But at 1.30 he took me upstairs to his private study where, for nearly three hours, he questioned me about the condition of the world. Then he reverted to the "American Peace Doctrine." He assured me that he was "deeply interested," but had thought of several objections to it. These I did my best to dispel, though I was unable to help him in his search for a "Constitutional way out." He knew the constitutional difficulties so much better than I that I felt it would be impertinent to make amateurish suggestions. As a final argument, however, I urged Mr. Coolidge to remember that whereas, in normal times, statesmen might be able to calculate how the factors in a given situation would work themselves out, it might be impossible, at moments of acute crisis or when passions were aroused, to settle policy according to a nice balance of probabilities. At such moments only the great outstanding features of a situation would count; and an American Peace Doctrine would be so outstanding a feature of the international situation that it might prevent any unmanageable crisis from springing up, and might even save the peace of the world. Then, as our talk ended, I asked the President whether I could go on putting my questions to the American people. He answered emphatically: "You can go right on. I thank you for having come to this country. Your visit is going to be very helpful."

Thus encouraged I went "right on"—at Buffalo, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, Des Moines, Pittsburgh, by radio, and again in New York. Under the influence of a powerful speech by Mr. Newton D. Baker, who had been Secretary for War in President

Wilson's Administration, the St. Louis National Convention of the "World Alliance for the Promotion of International Fellowship through the Churches" unanimously resolved on Armistice Day, 1927, that :

"There should be a solemn pronouncement upon the part of our Government proclaiming it to be a principle of American policy that when, in the judgment of our Government, the case arises of a nation going to war in violation of its previously given pledge to take its disputes to some tribunal for peaceful settlement, or to international conference, we shall not insist upon the continuance of our rights to treat with the covenant-breaking State."

At the moment of sailing from New York on November 16, 1927, a message reached me through the British Consul-General in New York. It consisted of three words : "Things are moving." The Consul-General was not authorised to tell me who had sent the message. I suspected that it came from the neighbourhood of the White House.

On December 28, 1927, the proposals made to France by Mr. Kellogg, President Coolidge's Secretary of State, showed the direction in which things had begun to move. Professor James T. Shotwell, Professor Chamberlayne and other American peace-lovers had been working assiduously to push them forward. Under their inspiration, and with the President's encouragement, Mr. Kellogg proposed that France should join the United States in promoting a multilateral treaty in renunciation of war. M. Briand hardly liked this enlargement of his suggestion ; and despite my attempts to persuade British statesmen that the true aim of the Kellogg proposals

was to make it plain that the United States would not be a friendly neutral towards any Covenant-breaking member of the League of Nations, Downing Street was even less disposed than the Quai d'Orsay to welcome unreservedly the American initiative. But early in 1928 Mr. Kellogg amplified and defined his proposals. They were presently embodied in the Briand-Kellogg Pact, or Treaty of Paris, in renunciation of war that was signed at the French Foreign Office on August 27, 1928.

In June, 1928, two months before this Pact was signed, a well-known member of the American Republican Party called upon me in London. He had seen Mr. Coolidge ten days before and said he had a personal message for me from the President. When I asked him to deliver it he hesitated, saying: "The funny thing is that I don't understand it. It is: 'Tell Steed I think this is the Constitutional way out.'"

I understood the message. It referred to my talks with the President on November 2, 1927. Though I never saw Mr. Coolidge again, I corresponded with him at intervals in 1928 and after he left the White House in March, 1929. So little did he resent a deliberate indiscretion which I committed in October, 1928—when, without authorisation from him, I made public what he had said to me upon Anglo-American naval relations—that he sent me, on New Year's Day, 1929, a copy of his collected essays *The Price of Freedom*, with a cordial dedication. The gift was not less welcome because the copy of the book was dusty, with one-half of its pages cut, and had obviously been taken from the President's own library.

Naturally my intercourse with President Coolidge, and especially his message to me upon the Kellogg proposals, coloured my reading of them and, presently, of the Briand-Kellogg Pact both in itself and in its bearing upon neutrality. Gradually a simple idea—for which Mr. Coolidge had no responsibility whatever, took shape in my mind and could not be got rid of. Like many simple ideas it may seem fallacious to those who have not thought it out; yet I confess that, after much reflection upon it, I am still unable to find a flaw in it. It ought to have occurred long before to anyone who, like me, had followed the drafting of the League Covenant in Paris and had pondered the problems of war and peace. The fact is, however, that it dawned upon me slowly and, unless I err, even more slowly upon others—with one outstanding exception of which I was not then aware.

Briefly, the idea was this: Nations which renounce war as a crime or, at best, as a grave misdemeanour, cannot remain neutral toward the criminal or the misdemeanant. In other words, those Governments which had renounced war, by signing and ratifying the Briand-Kellogg Pact, really renounced at the same time their right to be neutral towards a war-maker. I was not at first aware that this idea merely extended to an international community of war-renouncing States the established doctrine of English Common Law which not only forbids all English subjects to behave neutrally when law and order are threatened, but holds them guilty of an indictable offence unless they support the custodians of the law in suppressing disorder or repressing crime. It may perhaps help to

clarify the thought of others upon the organisation of peace if I describe the genesis of the idea in my own mind.

After the Briand-Kellogg Pact had been signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, I attended the League Assembly at the beginning of September. Not unnaturally I supposed that so notable a step in the direction of ostracising war would be hailed with delight in Geneva, and that the Assembly would open amid general enthusiasm. This supposition turned out to be totally wrong. Instead of enthusiasm I found at Geneva bewilderment and almost dismay. Instead of the usual rush to open the debate in the Assembly upon the Secretary-General's annual report, there was something like a strike of orators. For thirty-six hours no delegate could be persuaded to "open the ball."

I remember meeting M. Briand in the Assembly lobby on the second day and saying, in answer to his remark that he had never known so dull an Assembly, that I had never known an Assembly so interesting, since it showed that, in the past, the League had turned its back on peace and had thought only of war, whereas now the renunciation of war had brought it face to face with the problem of peace, and had scared it into silence. M. Briand laughingly agreed that what he called my "quip" had more than a grain of truth in it.

Next year at Geneva there was another change of scene. The Baldwin Conservative Administration had been defeated in the British general election of May, 1929. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald was again Prime Minister, and attended the opening of the Assembly.

He had accepted an invitation to visit President Hoover, Mr. Coolidge's successor, at Washington in October, and it was known that the calling of another international conference for the limitation of naval armaments, this time in London, was likely to be the outcome of their meeting. But at that moment a hitch occurred. Mr. MacDonald received official information that the American "Big Navy" party were inclined to lay down in advance conditions unacceptable to Great Britain. He showed me the despatch in question and asked whether I thought that, in these circumstances, it would be wise for him to go to Washington. On the assumption that his information was accurate, and final, I advised him not to go; but I added that, before he made up his mind, it might be well for me to make confidential enquiry in the United States through a personal channel and to await the answer.

Mr. MacDonald accepted my suggestion, stipulating only that the enquiry should be so made as not to compromise him in any way. I sent at once a cable to a friend in New York who, I knew, would be able forthwith to consult Washington by telephone. Within twenty-four hours I got a reply that dispelled the Prime Minister's misgivings. He asked me, however, to see him in London before he sailed for the United States, saying that there were some points upon which he would value my opinion. When I saw him again he seemed to be in some doubt as to the best way in which to broach the subject of naval limitation, and especially of "parity," with President Hoover. So I made bold to offer advice which, had it been fully followed, might, I still think, have put

the London Naval Conference of January, 1930, on a different footing. Roughly, it was this :

“If you begin to discuss the technique of naval parity with the President, he will be obliged to call in his naval experts and you will be at once involved in a maze of arguments about cruiser tonnage, gun calibres, gun elevations, radius of action and a dozen other intricate points. On this basis it will be hard to reach even a preliminary agreement, and the London Conference will resolve itself into a technical wrangle out of which no full measure of success can come. But if you say to Mr. Hoover : ‘Your predecessor and his Secretary of State invited us to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. This we have done by solemn treaty ; and unless we are all the veriest humbugs, and have signed this undertaking without any intention of keeping it, we live henceforth in a warless world. The main question we have therefore to answer is what the lawful function of navies may be in a warless world. It cannot be war, seeing that we have renounced war. It can only be a police function to be discharged in prevention or restraint of war. If you agree, does not the further question of Anglo-American naval parity resolve itself into a search for equality in the contribution which Great Britain and the United States should make respectively to the policing of the seas in a world that has abandoned war ?’ ”

Mr. MacDonald asked how I thought President Hoover would receive such a question. I admitted that it might embarrass him at first, but that he would probably see that a Naval Conference, convened not for the purpose of finding an equilibrium between

international suspicions or ambitions in terms of naval strength but of settling the share which the various naval Powers would be prepared to take in giving effect to the Briand-Kellogg Pact, might yield much bigger and more beneficent results than those of the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-22. It would bring the whole naval problem into a new dimension. In any event, and even if President Hoover and his advisers should be unwilling to approach the naval problem from this angle, the fact that the British Prime Minister had thus approached it would certainly become known and would be bound to influence international opinion.

Unless my information is faulty Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Hoover did not approach their task precisely in this way, though the declaration which they signed and issued jointly at Washington on October 9, 1929, proves that the implications of the Briand-Kellogg Pact were more or less vaguely in their minds. Its salient passages ran :

“ In signing the Paris Peace Pact, 56 nations have declared that war shall not be used as an instrument of national policy, and have agreed that all disputes shall be settled by pacific means. Both our Governments resolve to accept the Peace Pact not only as a declaration of our good intentions, but as a positive obligation to direct our national policy in accordance with its pledge.

“ The part of each of our Governments in the promotion of world peace will be different, as one will never consent to become entangled in European diplomacy, and the other is resolved to pursue a policy of active collaboration with its European neighbours ; but each of our Governments will direct its thought and influence towards securing and maintaining the peace of the world.

“ Our conversations have been largely confined to the mutual relations of the two countries in the light of the situation created by the signing of the Peace Pact. Therefore, in a new and reinforced sense, the two Governments not only declare that war between them is unthinkable, but that distrusts and suspicions arising from doubts and fears which may have been justified before the Peace Pact must now cease to influence our national policy.

“ We approach the old historical problems from a new angle and in a new atmosphere. On the assumption that war between us has been banished, and that conflicts between our military and naval forces cannot take place, these problems have changed their meaning and character, and their solution in ways satisfactory to both countries has become possible.”

The declaration concluded with a statement that, in view of the security afforded by the Peace Pact, Great Britain and the United States had been able to end all competitive building between themselves by agreeing to a parity of their fleets, “ category by category.”

Unluckily the Naval Conference, when it met in January, 1920, soon found itself enmeshed in the rival claims of limitation by “ categories ” and by “ global tonnage,” of six-inch guns and eight-inch guns, and almost foundered in a sea of complications. France and Italy could not be induced to sign the whole of the London Treaty which ultimately emerged from it, and the United States, Great Britain and Japan were obliged to content themselves with a mediocre three-fifths of what might have been a great success.

Before the Conference ended I received an urgent invitation from the American Society of Newspaper Editors to attend their annual Convention at Washing-

ton in April, 1930, and to speak at the closing banquet in the presence of President Hoover, who was to be its chief guest of honour. I took the opportunity to say frankly that the London Naval Conference had never had a chance of full success because nobody connected with it had asked or answered publicly the fundamental question what the lawful function of navies might be in a world which, in response to the initiative of an American Government, had solemnly renounced war. I added :

“What are navies for? We have all renounced war. Are they for war or are they for peace? If they are for peace, shall we all be so generous as to contribute as much as possible to this mainstay of peace? I do not think so. I think that on the day when we are all certain that peace is not going to be broken we shall try to restrict our navies pretty rapidly so as not to have to contribute more than anybody else.

“But nobody has yet said: ‘What are navies for?’ Nobody has yet raised the question: Is the Kellogg Pact worth the paper it is written on? Does it mean anything? We do not know, and we in Great Britain are still half-paralysed. Up to the signing of the Kellogg Pact we were totally paralysed. We had to choose, in prospect, between trouble with you and fidelity to the Covenant of the League of Nations by which we were committed to cut off, to sever, all commercial and financial relations with the State that breaks the Covenant (and not only with that State but between it and any other State, whether that other State be a member of the League or not—that is you!). If we do it, are you going to say: ‘Freedom of the seas!’ and shoot us in the back? We do not know. We do not know even today, when the Kellogg Pact is nearly a year old from the date of its ratification.

“One thing we want to know—whether somebody, somehow, with authority to speak for the United States will say to the world: Let no nation, signatory to the Kellogg Pact or not, imagine that, if it goes to war without having exhausted every possible means of conference, of conciliation, of arbitration, of appeal to the World Court or any other form of pacific settlement, let no such nation ever imagine that it can count upon the United States of America as a friendly neutral.”

Many members of the United States Senate were present. All eyes were upon President Hoover, who was expected to reply, though it was understood that what he might say would not be reported. When he rose he seemed embarrassed. He reminded his hearers that I had put them some “very moving questions” which he could not and would not attempt to answer. He warned them, however, that they were “moving questions” which, sooner or later, would have to be answered. Let no man think, he continued, that we can avoid them or get past them. They have got to be answered. It might be easier to answer them if the news which reached the United States from Europe brought tidings of fewer bickerings, hatreds and animosities in many European nations, if it did not deepen the impression in the minds of the American people that Europe was a good place to keep away from. But, he repeated in conclusion, the questions that had been asked would have to be answered.

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At that time the idea that the renunciation of war must necessarily imply the renunciation of neutrality was not fully developed in my own mind. Otherwise I should doubtless have expressed it in my speech

at Washington. The growth of an idea is a subtle and often unconscious mental process which may begin with the intellectual acceptance of a notion yet may make no noticeable progress until the notion has been, so to speak, thoroughly chewed, swallowed and assimilated. Indeed, it was not until August, 1930, when I was about to attend the next Assembly of the League at Geneva, that I stated in the *Sunday Times* of August 31 the problem of neutrality in what I was coming to feel were its true terms. Pointing out that "the pace of international thought and feeling about peace has long exceeded the speed-limit of international lawyers," I wrote that behind the League's "General Act" of 1928—an open treaty which binds its signatories to settle all international disputes, without exception, by peaceful means—as behind the movement for disarmament and the Kellogg Pact itself, lay a riddle hitherto unanswered: "Can any member of the League, and any signatory of the Kellogg Pact, claim neutral rights in regard to, that is to say in favour of, a Covenant-breaking State or an eventual violator of the Kellogg Pact? If not, what becomes of the old international-legal conception of neutrality?" And I suggested that, under the general supervision of the League Secretariate, a reformed Institute of Intellectual Co-operation could undertake no more important or positive task than that of "ascertaining and co-ordinating international thought upon the nature and the implications of neutrality in a world that has renounced war but has not yet established peace."

Among the eminent workers for peace who were at Geneva in September, 1930, was Professor James T. Shotwell. When he read my article in the *Sunday*

Times he protested that it went too far, and that there was no warrant for my contention that the renunciation of war must imply the renunciation of neutrality if it were to mean anything at all. Presently he mobilised a professor of international law to confute my arguments—without much success. So, in the *Sunday Times* of September 14, 1930, I wrote, impenitently :

“The awkwardest fact of the disarmament problem is that no Government has yet dared officially to define the true functions of national armaments as instruments of peace. Fifty-five nations have solemnly renounced war. Therefore, unless they have all signed the Kellogg Pact with dishonourable mental reservations, they live in a warless world. What are the true functions of armies and navies in a warless world? Evidently they are police functions in the service of international law, from which the right to make war for national purposes has been expunged.

“The abolition of the right to wage national war abolishes the right of neutrality. It is true that the United States has not yet recognised this irrefutable conclusion. But must European disarmament therefore wait upon the formal decision of the United States to act up to the spirit of the Kellogg Pact, or will the European nations take the risk of implementing the renunciation of war on their own account, and of leaving the United States to disavow them to its own eternal discredit? . . . Till this question is faced, with or without the express consent of the United States, there will be no serious disarmament in Europe, and England and France may pursue divergent paths to the dire peril of the peace of the world.”

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It was not to be expected that this idea, which had grown so slowly in my own mind, would be every-

where welcomed. In the *Christian Science Monitor* of Boston I was roundly taken to task by its editor, the late Mr. Willis J. Abbot, for having gone beyond what I had said at Washington in April, 1930. My answer to his strictures seems, however, to have made an impression; for in August, 1931, I was asked to expound my thesis in the *Christian Science Monitor* itself, and I have reason to believe that it was thoroughly discussed at the Williamstown Summer School that year. The thesis as I then developed it was that, if the renunciation of war be taken seriously, it involves reconsideration of the legitimate function of national armaments. For self-defence their function becomes that of an individual police force; and the armaments of all other parties to the Kellogg Pact—save those of the unlawful aggressor—become elements of an international police force, working actively or passively against the pact-breaker and helping to deny him the status of a lawful belligerent. This change of function is the only conceivable basis for the sense of security from attack which is a main postulate of disarmament. Security does not reside in armaments. It is a feeling induced by disbelief in the likelihood of attack. Insecurity, on the other hand, arises from belief in the likelihood of attack, a belief which rivalry in armaments tends to increase. No nation would be likely to make war if it knew that all other nations would stand, actively or passively, against it. The prospect of war would recede. Changes in the *status quo*, territorial or other, that might be expedient in order to strengthen international goodwill, could then be approached and undertaken in a less distrustful spirit; for the main obstacles to changes in the *status quo* lie in the as-

sumption that they would weaken some nations in the waging of inevitable war. With the growth of the sense of security the reduction of armaments to a "safety level"—the level at which they cease to inspire fear—would become practicable; and, fear being progressively eliminated, outlay upon superfluous precautions against war would be discounted everywhere.

Before writing this I had taken occasion to consult a leading British Prize Court Judge upon the proposition that the sincere renunciation of war must entail the renunciation of neutrality. After mature reflection he said to me: "Your thesis is flawless, though it is too simple to be really appreciated." An eminent Belgian authority on international law, Baron Deschamps, also dealt with it in a course of lectures to the Paris Academy of International Law, and reached conclusions similar to my own. He denounced as untenable the hypothesis that the Kellogg Pact is merely a moral gesture, and insisted that it is a strictly legal international contract "concluded in the customary form of conventions that constitute legal engagements." The Pact, he insisted, was intended to solve a positive legal question—that of the legality or illegality of war. If war occurs, he added, the old rules relating to the rights of war and of neutrality are no longer applicable, since the theory of impartiality between belligerents no longer holds good.

Not less emphatic was the well-known Spanish expert, Don Salvador de Madariaga, in a speech to the League Assembly in September, 1931. Before becoming the principal delegate of Spain he had long

been the Secretary to the League's Preparatory Disarmament Commission. "After the conclusion of the Kellogg Pact," he declared, "neutrality is dead; the discussion of neutral rights has no more justification than there would be for an enquiry into the right of honest citizens to aid and abet criminals." The prospect of disarmament, he concluded, must depend upon the recognition of these truths by powerful countries outside the League of Nations.

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Little by little the idea gained ground among serious thinkers upon war and peace, though statesmen could not be persuaded to face its implications. Had they, and especially Mr. Arthur Henderson, Foreign Secretary in the second British Labour Government and President-Elect of the International Disarmament Conference which was to meet at Geneva in February, 1932, frankly recognised that disarmament must be impracticable until international security against war had been provided by the renunciation of neutrality towards a war-making State, the prospects of that Conference would have been brighter, and the Japanese aggression in Manchuria which overshadowed it might never have taken place. So convinced was I that, in these circumstances, the Disarmament Conference could not achieve any tangible measure of success that I stayed away from Geneva during the whole period covered by its long and futile labours. It seemed more important to work out the idea itself in fuller detail and to co-operate with those who were doing likewise. Therefore it was with satisfaction that I read the "Articles of Interpretation" of the

Briand-Kellogg Pact which were adopted by the Budapest Conference of the International Law Association in September, 1934. They ran :

“Whereas the Pact is a multilateral law-making treaty whereby each of the High Contracting Parties makes binding agreements with each other and all of the other High Contracting Parties, and

“Whereas by their participation in the Pact sixty-three States have abolished the conception of war as a legitimate means of exercising pressure on another State in the pursuit of national policy and have also renounced any recourse to armed force for the solution of international disputes or conflicts :

“(1) A signatory State cannot, by denunciation or non-observance of the Pact, release itself from its obligations thereunder.

“(2) A signatory State which threatens to resort to armed force for the solution of an international dispute or conflict is guilty of a violation of the Pact.

“(3) A signatory State which aids a violating State thereby itself violates the Pact.

“(4) In the event of a violation of the Pact by a resort to armed force or war by one signatory State against another, the other States may, without thereby committing a breach of the Pact or of any rule of International Law, do all or any of the following things :

“(a) Refuse to admit the exercise, by the State violating the Pact, of belligerent rights, such as visit and search, blockade, etc.

“(b) Decline to observe towards the State violating the Pact the duties prescribed by International Law, apart from the Pact, for a neutral in relation to a belligerent.

“(c) Supply the State attacked with financial or material assistance, including munitions of war.

“(d) Assist with armed forces the State attacked.

"(5) The signatory States are not entitled to recognise as acquired *de jure* any territorial or other advantages acquired *de facto* by means of a violation of the Pact.

"(6) A violating State is liable to pay compensation for all damage caused by a violation of the Pact to any signatory State or to its nationals.

"(7) The Pact does not affect such humanitarian obligations as are contained in general treaties, such as The Hague Conventions of 1889 and 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1894, 1906 and 1929, and the International Convention relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 1929."

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What is the good, it may be asked, of putting down a flawless thesis and drawing legal conclusions from it on paper when the movement of international affairs tends to run in a contrary direction? Legalistic hair-splitting is doubtless an amusing exercise for spinners of brainy cobwebs, but has it any bearing upon the grim facts of international discord? To these questions the answer is that the progress of mankind, from barbarism even to our present embryonic civilisation has always lain in the direction of thinking out and substituting rules of law for arbitrary violence, and that this process has gone on with a logical force of its own which, sooner or later, has proved irresistible. In England, at all events, this process has established and upheld the principle of English Common Law that individual citizens are not entitled to be neutral as between the guardians of the law and law-breakers; that they are bound to assist the police against criminals, should the police need their help; that failure to do this duty may entail indictment for

a punishable offence ; and that no personal or individual sovereignty is exempt from curtailment by the operation of this fundamental principle.

If this be the basis of law and order, and of the suppression of civil strife in a free community, it is hard to see how strife among individual nations belonging to an international community can be otherwise impeded or restrained. But just as the principle of non-neutrality towards wrongdoers does involve curtailment of individual sovereignties, so non-neutrality in the international sphere cannot be disjoined from a corresponding curtailment of national sovereignties. Every nation is so jealous of its own sovereign prerogatives that it will sacrifice them only under pressure of dire necessity or in the hope of gaining an advantage greater than the exercise of sovereignty is likely to procure. Few questions are weightier than that of the relationship between neutrality and sovereignty. To some consideration of it the next chapter will be devoted.

CHAPTER IX

NEUTRALITY AND SOVEREIGNTY

ONCE upon a time I was asked, at short notice, to turn a well-written French essay into English. The rendering had to be both precise and readable; and it gave me no little trouble. It taught me—what others knew already—that good French goes best into English words of Anglo-Saxon origin, and that it is usually a mistake to render French derivatives from Latin roots by English words derived from the same roots. Presently I came also to understand that English-speaking peoples do not, as a rule, readily grasp ideas that are not or cannot be put into Anglo-Saxon words or concepts.

One instance will suffice. The French make much of *la justice*, which Englishmen are tempted to translate as “justice,” whereas it often means “righteousness”—an Anglo-Saxon word surrounded by a moral atmosphere similar to that which *justice* carries with it in French. For this reason the Elizabethan translators did well to take “righteousness and peace have kissed each other” as the true English rendering of the line in the tenth verse of Psalm lxxxv., which, in Latin, runs: “*justitia et pax osculatæ sunt.*”

On the same principle I wish that Anglo-Saxon words or concepts could be used to convey the ideas of “neutrality” and “sovereignty.” “Lordship” or “overlordship” might do for “sovereignty,” but

there seems to be no single Anglo-Saxon term for "standing aside" or "holding aloof" or "keeping out of it." So, for lack of something better, one must make shift with the hackneyed Latin or Franco-Latin name for "neutrality," though its real meaning may vary widely in different circumstances.

In the foregoing chapter I tried to show how closely neutrality or, rather, non-neutrality is linked up with the organisation of non-war. Though this was nothing new—for the same idea had come into the foreground while the League of Nations Covenant was being drafted at Paris in January and February, 1919—statesmen and lawyers lost their grip upon it during the early post-war years, and it had fallen into the background. Otherwise it would be hard to say why a weighty debate upon the need for a League of Nations which had taken place in the House of Lords on March 19, 1918, should have been overlooked. Early on that day I left London for the Italian front in charge of a special inter-Allied mission, and consequently heard nothing of the debate. Nor did I hear of it afterwards, in any quarter, until an eminent Oxford scholar spoke to me of it in February, 1936. Now I find that Professor Sir Alfred Zimmern has also mentioned it in his recent thoughtful work *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law*.

A comparison of dates may help to explain why this memorable debate, and above all the speech made in the course of it by one of the foremost English lawyers of modern times, the late Lord Parker of Waddington, should so soon have been forgotten. On the morning of March 21, 1918, less than two days after the debate, the fierce German offensive began

in the West. It drove back and, for a time, broke through the British lines. Under its shock, unity of command was at last established on the Western front, Marshal Foch being appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated armies. For the next three months the military situation remained doubtful, and it was not until July, 1918, that Marshal Foch began to roll the German armies back and to open the conclusive phase of the War. Lord Parker of Waddington, whose ripe wisdom might have been of great service after the Armistice and in the drafting of the League Covenant, unfortunately died on July 12, 1918.

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The debate on March 19, 1918, was opened by Lord Parmoor, a Liberal lawyer of standing, who moved "That this House approves the principle of a League of Nations and the constitution of a Tribunal whose orders shall be enforceable by adequate sanctions." He urged that the world was suffering from international anarchy and that the time had come for a more settled order "founded on the restraint which comes from the recognition of mutual obligation as between one country and another. The principle is that ordinary restraint means freedom as between nations, when properly adjusted, as it is recognised to be the only basis of true freedom as between individuals in any particular country." A League of Nations, he insisted, must involve the acceptance of a common public law imposing upon nations the obligation of mutual restraint in their international relationships. Were this common public law not

accepted, the development of "scientific" warfare would destroy the distinction between combatants and non-combatants and reduce humanity to barbarism.

Yet, Lord Parmoor added, there was a difficulty of principle which ought to be met. It lay in the sovereign rights of individual nations. Unless a League of Nations did, in some respects, restrain the rights of individual sovereignty it would be ineffective; and there was a strong school of thought which would object to any interference with individual sovereignties. The doctrine of that school had been carried in Germany to the extent of State-worship, to the point of saying that, as regards international relationships, no morality, and no Christian morality, ought to prevail at all but solely the supremacy of force. He hoped that Great Britain and the United States of America, which had carried the rule of law and the supremacy of law farther than any other countries and had put their legal systems substantially on the same basis—the old Common Law principles of England—would jointly earn the glory of bringing those principles to fruition in a League of Nations.

The Marquess of Lansdowne, a Conservative statesman who had been successively Governor-General of Canada, Viceroy of India, Secretary for War and Foreign Secretary, supported Lord Parmoor's motion. He urged that a League of Nations must comprise, if possible, every important Power, and that it must be armed with an executive authority sufficient to secure obedience to its decisions. It might apply three forms of constraint to a recalcitrant country: (1) moral pressure with a resort to conciliation; (2) economic pressure; (3) the pressure of

material coercion. No League of Nations could be completely efficacious unless it were able to apply pressure in all these forms. Then it might guarantee the peace of the civilised world or, at the very least, secure delay, opportunities for discussion and conciliation which in many cases would avail to ward off a threatened danger.

Very significant, as coming from the same Lord Lansdowne who, in November, 1917, had proposed a peace of conciliation with Germany, was his reply to the argument that Germany could not be trusted to enter, in good faith, a partnership of nations. Lord Lansdowne said :

“ In this case nobody proposes to rely upon a German pledge or a German signature. The essence of the proposal is that the Powers which are to be admitted to membership of this League will, to some extent, part with their sovereign rights, and enter into a compact which will bind them jointly and severally to conform to whatever code of International Law is laid down by the League itself. I cannot help believing that, if a League of this kind were set up with the power of pronouncing what would in effect be a sentence of international outlawry upon any one country that broke away from its obligations, you would have a material guarantee for the maintenance of peace unlike anything which we have yet been able to imagine.

“ . . . If we are told that this is an untenable dream, I am inclined to reply with a question. I say, If we are not to look forward to the realisation of this dream, to what are we to look forward? Are we to travel again along the old road which we have been travelling of late years, past the same forlorn milestones, travelling the same weary stages? Are we still to have periods of unrest, periods of suspicion and intrigue, periods of

sullen hate until at last there come the crisis and the collision, provoked by people who desire, for interested motives, that the peace of the world should be broken? And are we to have the same kind of internecine struggles as that which is now going on—struggles ruinous to the combatants and calamitous to the whole world, which is impotent to put an end to them? And are these internecine struggles to continue until one adversary or the other has been crushed to the ground, so crushed, that is, that he will submit to any terms, no matter how humiliating, that might be dictated by the victors? . . . If we are simply to revert to the old order of things may the victors in this war not find that when they have beaten their foe to his knees they are still very far from the accomplishment of the object with which they have set out. . . . The moral of all this is that success in the field is not a guarantee, cannot be a guarantee, of permanence. It may give you a breathing space, but it cannot give the world a permanent and secured relief from the ills from which we have been suffering. I myself believe that there is only one way in which you can obtain such a permanent relief. It is the way to which Lord Parmoor has pointed in his speech tonight. This is not, as some people would have you believe, the baseless fabric of a vision. It is not a mere mirage which will fade as you advance towards it. I believe that what some of us think we see in the distance is the outline of a real Promised Land. I earnestly hope that we shall see to it that we get there.

This peroration from one of the most experienced of British Conservative statesmen was followed by Lord Parker of Waddington's pregnant speech. While agreeing with the aims of Lord Parmoor and Lord Lansdowne, and saying that the only thing we have to look forward to is ultimately something in the nature of a League of Peace as the natural develop-

ment of international law, Lord Parker said he feared one thing—that the advocates of a League of Nations might be in somewhat too great a hurry. They were paying more attention to the details of the superstructure than to the stability of the foundations. Impressed by the fact that municipal law is administered by legal tribunals and based ultimately on organised force, they set themselves in the first place to evolve schemes for international tribunals and an international police force. He added :

“I think they forget that every sound system of municipal law, with its tribunals and its organised police, is a creation of historical growth having its roots in the far past. It is supported in reality not so much by organised force as by that sense of mutual obligation and respect for the rights of others which lies at the root of and forms the foundation of those settled rules of conduct among individuals which alone make law and order in the community possible. At the present day, a law may perhaps be defined as a ‘rule of conduct generally observed, and exceptional deviations from which are punished by tribunals based on force’; but certainly the last part of this definition would have been inexplicable in earlier stages of our history. And I think a little consideration will show that, even at the present day, though tribunals based upon force may deal with exceptional deviations from a general rule of conduct, no tribunal and no force is of any avail at all when once the exceptions are so numerous that the rule cannot be said to be generally observed.”

Upon this introduction followed passages still more notable :

“I should like to go to the root of this matter. What we are all aiming at is the prevention of war. According

to the war-philosophy current among some writers in Germany, this is quite impossible. War, they say, is the result of tendencies so ingrained in human nature that they may be considered as biological laws ; nor in their opinion is war really contrary to the higher interests of humanity. The worthiest and more virile nation will, they say, survive each struggle and ultimately establish a World Empire in which a permanent peace, for the first time, will become possible, and in which law and order, literature and philosophy, art and science, will have their best chance, and man, the individual man, will attain his highest perfection. I believe this theory to be scientifically unsound, but it will serve no useful purpose to deny that it has some plausibility. The tendencies on which it is based are really tendencies which have been, and are, playing a considerable part in the history of nations. In order to combat such tendencies we must know exactly what they are and how they work, and if I shall not be wearying your Lordships I should like to illustrate that point by one or two references to facts in legal history.

“ Social life, communal life as it is called, is obviously quite impossible unless each member of the community can count, with more or less certainty, on the action of his fellows under circumstances of everyday occurrence. The first step, therefore, in the development of law is the establishment of ‘ customary rules of conduct ’ a breach of which will disappoint and give rise to a grievance on the part of the person who is injured by the breach. One branch of the history of law concerns the growth and development of these customary rules of conduct, and another concerns the growth and development of remedies for their breach. It is with the latter branch that I am now concerned.

“ There is no doubt that the most primitive remedy for a breach of customary rules of conduct lay in the direction of self-help. The injured party, aided perhaps

by his family and friends, exacted forcible reprisals. Those members of the community who were not immediately concerned stood aloof and observed neutrality. Public opinion, it is true, soon gave rise to certain general precepts as to how and to what extent reprisals ought to be taken. The old law of 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth' gave way to a customary tariff regulating the compensation which might be exacted for loss of life and limb, and behind these precepts there was nothing but public opinion. Individual force as a remedy for wrongs is of uncertain efficacy; it may be that the wrongdoer is stronger than the party injured. This gave rise to the tendency for the weak to attach themselves to the strong, becoming their retainers, surrendering a portion of their own independence for the sake of the protection the strong could afford and increasing their lords' strength and resources. I remember in one of Stevenson's novels, the scene of which is laid in this country during the Wars of the Roses, the advice given by an old retainer to a youth who had to make his way in the world was summed up in the phrase 'See you get good lordship.' And we find, in fact, a number of powerful lords, each preserving peace among his own retainers and each maintaining an armed force, nominally for the purpose of defence, but which could, quite as easily, be used for aggression whenever interests or ambition might so dictate. It was not until one of these lords gained supremacy over the others that a universal peace, a universal system of law and order, became possible throughout the realm. Then the peace, theretofore maintained by each powerful lord, merged in the King's peace, and we find traces of this in the fact that in legal processes wrongs are still charged as 'contrary to the peace of our lord, the King.'"

Continuing, Lord Parker said he thought that precisely the same tendencies were at work in the

international sphere. Such communal life as exists between nations is based, and must be based, upon customary rules of conduct. These customary rules are dignified by the name of international law, but there is no remedy for their breach otherwise than by war. During a war those nations not immediately concerned remain neutral. There may be general precepts purporting to regulate what is, or what is not, lawful to belligerents; what they can or what they cannot do. Yet there is nothing save public opinion behind these precepts, and they may easily be disregarded in the stress of war.

But war, again, is an uncertain remedy. It inflicts as often as it redresses a wrong. Victory is generally on the side of the big battalions. Hence international competition in armaments, though armaments may be used for aggression as well as for defence. Hence, too, the growing conviction among smaller nations that they cannot stand alone. They must get "good lordship," attach themselves to stronger nations and surrender a portion of their independence for the sake of the protection which a stronger nation can afford. Wars result; and on this line of development it is clear that international law, as an instrument of peace, can have no permanency. It may bridge over the intervals during which nations are weary of war or are preparing for the fray; but when war breaks out international law will be disregarded, and it will vanish altogether when one nation has attained superiority over the others, established a World Empire, and founded universal peace.

Such are some of the considerations, Lord Parker observed, which are put forward in support of the

German war philosophy. To some extent they account for the excesses of Prussian militarism. Let the weak nations accept German lordship. Thus will Germany at last attain the Empire of her dreams and establish a permanent peace, a *pax germanica*. But if tendencies such as those which give plausibility to the German war-philosophy are recorded in the history of law, other tendencies, or at any rate a tendency, can be found in it which points to the possibility of development along different lines. There have been periods in the history of nations when, in the absence of legal tribunals, in the absence of any organised police force, the sense of mutual obligation which lies at the root of every legal system has been so strong that an act of violence done to the person or property of one member of the community has been resented as a wrong done to all its members.

"In such a case," Lord Parker went on, "neutrality is impossible. It is a disgrace, a crime. The hand of every man is against the wrongdoer. He becomes an outlaw. No one may feed him or succour him or assist him to escape. Everyone must join in his arrest and punishment. The remedy is still force, but force administered by collective action, not by an individual. This strong sense of mutual obligation, leading to a wrong to one being considered as a wrong to all, has played a considerable part in the history of law. To it we owed in this country what is known as the 'hue and cry,' long regarded as an effective deterrent against crimes of violence. From it arose, on the other side of the Atlantic, that system of communal justice which, however rough and ready, contributed so largely to the establishment of law

and order in the Western parts of the American continent. From it legal tribunals and an organised police will readily develop. Without it no reign of law is possible."

Having thus built up the framework of his thesis, Lord Parker agreed with Lord Lansdowne in the belief that international relations were approaching a new stage—the stage of the "hue and cry" in English municipal law. He said :

"The last three years have shown us that war is a danger which may well be fatal to our common civilisation. Neutrality has become increasingly difficult. Those nations which at first desired to remain neutral have been one after the other dragged into the fray. The neutrality of others is secured only by fear. If we could once make it clear that in future there will be no neutrality the danger of war will be minimised, because its risk is increased. Many think that Germany would not have embarked upon the present struggle had she not counted upon British neutrality, but it is almost certain that she would not have done so had she been fully convinced that both this country and the United States and others would have fought against her."

From this probability Lord Parker drew the conclusion that, as soon as the risk of waging war should become overwhelming, nations would begin to settle their differences by other means—by arbitration or international conciliation boards, for instance—but he thought that tribunals, in the ordinary sense of the word, legal tribunals for the administration of international law based upon an organised international force, would be very different matters which must be left to grow out of the sense of mutual obligation that was beginning to exist among nations. If the

part of the problem which concerns the administration of international law were first tackled he feared that the whole structure they were trying to build might fall about their ears. Any dispute between the British Government and, say, the United States of America could probably be settled otherwise than by war; but it would be a very different matter to ask great nations to agree beforehand to submit disputes of whatever nature to the arbitrament of a tribunal consisting of representatives of a large number of States many of whom might be indirectly interested in casting their votes one way or the other. Lord Parker continued, impressively :

“ The point I really wish to emphasise is this. Hitherto the efforts of those to whom war is hateful have been directed on the one hand towards laying down rules for the conduct of belligerents in order to make war less dreadful and more humane, and on the other hand to laying down rules for the benefit and advantage of neutrals. What is the result? There is hardly a provision of The Hague Conventions or of the Convention of Geneva, touching the way in which war may be properly waged, which has not, so far as Germany is concerned, proved a dead letter. There is hardly a rule or precept of International Law concerning neutrality which Germany has not infringed. I venture to say that the labour which we have expended in formulating such documents as many of The Hague Conventions and the unratified Declaration of London has been for the most part labour thrown away. *The true line of development lies, not in regulating the hateful thing, but in bringing about conditions under which it becomes increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible, not in consulting the welfare of selfish interests of neutrals but in abolishing neutrality. Murders would increase*

if the murderer could count upon the neutrality of bystanders, and it is the same with war. The neutral, in fact, shirks his share of the burden of humanity."

The passage I have italicised contains the sober truth upon neutrality in its relation to war. On this truth Lord Parker based a number of concrete proposals which, he thought, should be included in any constitution of a League of Nations. Five of them are of especial interest in view of circumstances which arose when Italy attacked Abyssinia in October, 1935. They should be read in the light of Lord Parker's warning that "it will be necessary to have a careful definition of what amounts to an act of war." I reproduce them with the numbers they bore in his speech :

"(8) Any member of the League who is guilty of an act of war against another member of the League should be deemed to have ceased to be a member of the League immediately before the commission of such act.

"(9) Every member of the League who is guilty of an act of war against a nation which is not a member of the League (without having obtained from the League Council a special resolution that the former has taken while the latter has refused or failed to take reasonable steps for the settlement of the matter in dispute by peaceful means) should be deemed to have ceased to be a member of the League immediately before the commission of such act.

"(10) If any act of war be committed by any nation against a member of the League, the Council of the League should forthwith notify the fact to the other members of the League, and thereupon every member of the League should (a) break off diplomatic relations with the nation guilty of such act ; (b) prohibit and take effective steps to prevent all trade and commerce between

itself and the guilty party ; (c) place an embargo upon all ships and property of the guilty nation found in its territorial waters or within its territory. The application of this clause should be expressed to continue until the guilty nation has compensated the party injured to the satisfaction of the League.

“(11) Certain members of the League, specified in the schedule, and to consist of the chief Military and Naval Powers, should further agree, if required to do so by the special resolution of the League, to commence war against the guilty nation, and to prosecute such war by land and sea until the guilty nation shall have accepted terms, including compensation for the party injured, which shall be approved by the Council of the League.

“(12) If, in the fulfilment of the obligation under either of the two preceding clauses, any member of the League is likely to suffer, or actually suffers, undue hardships, the Council of the League should have power, by special resolution, to suspend such obligation, either wholly or in part, and either permanently or temporarily, or to award compensation, to be contributed by the other members so as to secure equality of sacrifice. In any event any member of the League should endeavour, by according special trade facilities or otherwise, to mitigate any undue hardship on other members.”

In conclusion Lord Parker claimed that an agreement on these lines would have several advantages. No member of the League could go to war, while still retaining membership, without the approval of the League. No member of the League could remain neutral in a war approved by the League. Every member of the League would be guaranteed against an act of war from outside by all the force of the League. Every member of the League would have certain economic advantages such as most-favoured-nation

treatment in the matter of tariffs, shipping and trading facilities. To every member of the League the freedom of the seas, in any legitimate sense of the term, would be secured. On the other hand, no nation could permanently be excluded from membership; and, should all nations ultimately join the League, armaments would tend to decrease, and some other way than that of war would be found to settle international disputes. Possibly international tribunals might begin to arise. International morality, principles of right and justice in international affairs, would be taught in the schools. The sense of mutual obligation which lies at the foundation of all law would then be strengthened, and upon that foundation a system of judicial tribunals in international matters might at last be reached.

At this point the debate stood adjourned. It was never resumed. Apart from the intrinsic weight of Lord Parker's opinions, it derived importance from the fact that it took place in the atmosphere of war when the minds of men were fully mobilised, the dangers to which war as an institution must expose civilised life were clearly apprehended, and post-war lassitude and disillusionment had not blunted the edge of understanding. The abolition of neutrality, and the sacrifice of sovereignty which the abolition must imply, were seen to be inevitable and, indeed, desirable steps toward the development of a truly communal sense in a community of nations; and though no substitute was suggested for the words "neutrality" and "sovereignty"—save in Lord Parker's reference to "good lordship"—those conceptions were cast

in Anglo-Saxon terms by the reminder that the institution of "hue and cry," which entailed both non-neutrality and the sacrifice of sovereignty on the part of individual members of the community, had been a main source of common law in England and in the United States. The principle that war, "the hateful thing," could not be regulated and that it could only be overcome by an international community acting, in case of need, upon the "hue and cry," was clearly and firmly laid down for the first time by a great English lawyer.

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Earlier knowledge of Lord Parker's insight into the nature of the problem I had long been brooding over might have saved me years of puzzled thought. Yet, in some ways, I am not sorry to have had to find the key to it by myself. The very effort to find it allows me now to agree with Lord Parker more whole-heartedly than I could have done had I merely adopted his conclusions and found "good lordship" in his authority. It is doubtless true that the sayings and writings of eminent lawyers in other countries show reasoning analogous to his, though I doubt whether any of them revealed, at the time when he spoke, the same essential relationship between the abolition of neutrality and the outlawry of war.

One counterpart to his speech may, indeed, be found in the letter which the veteran American lawyer and statesman, Mr. Elihu Root, wrote to Colonel House, President Wilson's chief adviser, on August 16, 1918. Mr. Root wrote it, at Colonel House's request, so as to place on record certain arguments he had put

forward in conversation. While there is no evidence that he had seen or heard of Lord Parker's speech he may have known of the discussions in the Phillimore Committee which, since the end of March, 1918, had been considering in London a scheme for a League of Nations; and his letter may have been influenced by this knowledge. In any event the letter is a noteworthy document which deserves to be placed alongside of Lord Parker's speech even if it failed expressly to mention the bearing of neutrality upon war. It proves how firm was the great American lawyer's hold upon many essential principles and how closely he agreed with Lord Parker's estimate of the need for caution in assuming that rules of international behaviour would be generally obeyed before the communal life of peoples had grown strong enough to make them "customary rules of conduct."

Mr. Root's main postulates were that "the first requisite for any durable concert of peaceable nations to prevent war is a fundamental change in the principle to be applied to international breaches of the peace"; and that the view taken by Germany in July, 1914, when she insisted that the invasion of Serbia by Austria-Hungary was a matter which concerned solely those two States, and therefore refused to agree to the Conference proposed by Sir Edward Grey, must in future be abandoned in favour of "a universal formal and irrevocable acceptance and declaration of the view that an international breach of the peace is a matter which concerns every member of the Community of Nations—a matter in which every nation has a direct interest, and to which every nation has a right to object."

These past and future views, Mr. Root went on, correspond to the "two kinds of responsibility in municipal law which we call civil responsibility and criminal responsibility. If I make a contract with you and break it, it is no business of our neighbour. You can sue me or submit, and he has nothing to say about it. On the other hand, if I assault and batter you, every neighbour has an interest in having me arrested and punished, because his own safety requires that violence shall be restrained. At the basis of every community lies the idea of organisation to preserve the peace. Without that idea, really active and controlling, there can be no community of individuals or of nations. It is the gradual growth and substitution of this idea of community interests in preventing and punishing breaches of the peace which has done away with private war among civilised peoples."

Up to this point Mr. Root is substantially on the same ground as Lord Parker. Then, taking up the Monroe Doctrine, which "asserted a specific interest on the part of the United States in preventing certain gross breaches of the peace on the American continent," he wrote :

"When President Wilson suggested an enlargement of the Monroe Doctrine to take in the whole world, his proposal carried by necessary implications the change of doctrine which I am discussing. The change may seem so natural as to be unimportant, but it is really crucial, for the old doctrine is asserted and the broader doctrine is denied by approximately half the military power of the world, and the question between the two is one of the things about which this war is being fought. The

change involves a limitation of sovereignty, making every sovereign State subject to the superior right of a community of sovereign States to have the peace preserved. The acceptance of any such principle would be fatal to the whole Prussian theory of the State and of government. When you have got this principle accepted openly, expressly, distinctly, unequivocally by the whole civilised world, you will for the first time have a Community of Nations, and the practical results which will naturally develop will be as different from those which have come from the old view of national responsibility as are the results which flow from the American Declaration of Independence compared with the results which flow from the Divine Right of Kings."

Here again Mr. Root was saying much the same thing as Lord Parker had said. His argument implied the disappearance of the old concept of neutrality or of the right of nations to hold aloof and stand aside when peace was threatened or broken. Nor did he depart seriously from Lord Parker's standpoint in going on to say that "the public opinion of the free peoples of the world in favour of having peace preserved must have institutions through which it may receive effect." No lesson from history, Mr. Root thought, is clearer than this. Very strong public feeling may produce a mob which is simply destructive, or a multitude of expressions of opinion which get nowhere by themselves. But to accomplish anything affirmative some particular person must have delegated to him authority to do some particular thing in behalf of the multitude. "The original form of the institutions of government have grown from very simple beginnings developing to meet requirements from generation to generation. The important thing is that

there are officers who have the right to act and the duty to act in doing things which are necessary to preserve the peace."

In the remainder of his letter Mr. Root appeared to attach more importance than Lord Parker had done to the rudimentary institutions which had already been developed by agreement among the nations, notably The Hague Convention and the usage under the Concert of European Powers that made it a natural and customary thing for those Powers to meet in conference in case of serious emergency. But all these rudimentary institutions—the Arbitral Tribunal, the Commission of Enquiry, the Conference of Nations—depended entirely upon individual national initiative. The first step, after the adoption of the new principle of community interests in the preservation of peace, would be an agreement upon some one or some group whose duty it would be to speak for the whole community in calling upon any two nations, which should appear to be about to fight, to submit their claims for consideration to the Tribunal as it might be organised by the Commission of Enquiry or the Conference. Taking what has proved to be a somewhat sanguine view, Mr. Root argued that :

"It would be exceedingly difficult for any nation which has explicitly acknowledged the community interest and right, to refuse such a demand in the name of the community, and it could not do so without clearly putting itself in the wrong in the eyes of the entire world. I do not say that it would be impossible for a nation to reject such a demand, but it would be much more difficult than it is now, and much more improbable ; for example, the whole contention upon which Germany

sought to save her face while she was using the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia as the occasion for going into a general war would be completely destroyed. Behind such a demand of course should stand also an agreement by the powers to act together in support of the demand made in their name and in dealing with the consequences of it."

In conclusion Mr. Root uttered a warning with which Lord Parker would have agreed. He urged that "no agreement in the way of a league of peace or under whatever name should be contemplated which will probably not be kept when the time comes for acting under it. Nothing could be worse in international affairs than to make agreements and break them." And he pointed out that :

"It would be folly, therefore, for the United States, in order to preserve or enforce peace after this war is over, to enter into an agreement which the people of the United States would not regard as binding upon them. I think that the observation applies to making a hard and fast agreement to go to war upon the happening of some future international event beyond the control of the United States. I think that the question whether the people of the country would stand by such an agreement made by the President and Senate would depend upon the way they looked at the event calling for their action at that future time when the event occurs—that they would fight if at that time they were convinced they ought to, and they would not fight if at that time they were convinced that they ought not to. It may be that an international community system may be developed hereafter which will make it possible to say 'We bind ourselves to fight upon the happening of some particular event,' but I do not think that system has so far developed that it is now practicable to make such an

agreement. Of course it may become so before this war is over. No one can tell. We are certainly rather nearer to that point than we were two or three years ago."

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Mr. Elihu Root's letter, of which the full text is printed on pp. 42 to 47 of vol. iv. of *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, is indeed a striking counterpart to Lord Parker's speech. Both dwell upon the importance of developing a community sense in international affairs, at least as regards the prevention or the restraint of breaches of the peace; both show anxiety lest arrangements for the expression of the community sense outrun the growth of an international community itself; and both make it clear that the sovereignty, or lordship, of individual nations must be curtailed in proportion as the community sense is efficiently expressed. And both Lord Parker and Mr. Root thought it obvious that, just as the "hue and cry" principle, with its obligation of non-neutrality upon individual members of a community, resolved itself in course of time into tribunals sustained by police forces, so effective will on the part of an international community to outlaw war-makers must precede, not follow, the setting up and the authoritative working of international tribunals or police forces.

This effective will cannot yet be said to exist. In Professor Philip C. Jessup's lucid work on *International Security*, issued by the New York Council on Foreign Relations, an interesting summary is given of the instances in which various States have invoked or claimed neutral rights since President Wilson and the

other makers of the League Covenant accepted the principle that "neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its peoples." Mr. John Bassett Moore, the American conservative authority on international law, wrote in July, 1933: "So far as I am aware, not a single party to the Versailles Treaty or a single member of the League of Nations has ever taken the position that the law of neutrality is a thing of the past" (*Foreign Affairs*, July, 1933, p. 561). As a man who has long and consistently upheld the doctrine of neutrality, and has protested against attempts to enfeeble it, Mr. John Bassett Moore may have rejoiced to think that this should be so, and may not have perceived that failure to abjure neutrality helps to maintain war as a lawful institution. In substance he was right in his claim, notwithstanding the speeches made to the League Assembly by the late M. Venizelos on behalf of Greece and by Señor Don Salvador de Madariaga as chief delegate of Spain in 1931. Both these statesmen proclaimed the truth that the sincere renunciation or effective outlawry of war is incompatible with the retention of neutral rights by sovereign Powers.

In any event, as Professor Jessup records, Germany declared her neutrality in 1920 during the Russo-Polish war; and on August 17, 1923, the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague discussed Germany's neutral duties without making any suggestion that neutrality was no longer a possible status. Likewise, at the League Conference on Freedom of Transit which was held at Barcelona in 1921 a statute was drawn up with the following proviso: "This

statute does not prescribe the rights and duties of belligerents and neutrals in time of war." In the following year the International Convention for the Navigation of the Elbe made provision for "the rights and duties of belligerents and neutrals"; Article 6 of the Nine-Power Treaty in regard to China which was concluded at Washington on February 6, 1922, respected China's "rights as a neutral in time of war to which China is not a party"; and, between 1923 and 1933, a number of international conventions and treaties retained the conception of neutrality.

On the other hand, the American Secretary of State, Mr. Henry L. Stimson, expressed the view, in his famous declaration to the New York Council on Foreign Relations of August 8, 1932, that the Briand-Kellogg Pact in Renunciation of War had put an end to the old rights of neutrals. He said :

"War between nations was renounced by the signatories of the Briand-Kellogg Pact. This means that it has become illegal throughout practically the entire world. It is no longer to be the source and subject of rights. It is no longer to be the principle around which the duties, the conduct and the rights of nations revolve. It is an illegal thing."

Nevertheless the United States Government continued to insist on its neutral rights, albeit with the proviso mentioned by Mr. Norman Davis, the chief United States delegate to the Geneva Disarmament Conference in May, 1933, that, in the event of international disarmament, his Government would be willing to waive its neutral rights by withholding protection from American citizens who sought to trade with "an aggressor" if the United States con-

curred in the general conclusion of the members of the League that a particular State had resorted to war in violation of its Treaty obligations.

In point of fact the growth of a community sense among nations has been and is being checked by the unwillingness of individual Governments and peoples to forego absolute sovereignty in their dealings with other countries, except in so far as they may consent voluntarily to limit it by the conclusion of treaties. One able American writer, Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong, went so far as to say, in the review *Foreign Affairs* for October, 1935, that :

“ The conception of a peace system based on collective action of States which prize full sovereignty but which participate in an assembly possessing real legislative powers (*i.e.*, where the requirement of unanimity has been discarded) rests on irreconcilable contradictions. Nor does it seem likely that States will spontaneously divest themselves of the privileges of sovereignty within any measurable space of time. Failing that, it is hard to conceive of a ‘Parliament of Man’ able to transfer territories, allocate resources and direct movements of population.”

Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong is on strong ground in saying that so long as great States are unwilling to renounce the privileges of full sovereignty, it is not easy to imagine that a “Parliament of Man” or a League of Nations will be able to transfer territories or to exercise communal sovereignty over individual States. His argument would have been even stronger had he recognised that no “Parliament of Man” can wield executive authority until it becomes the instrument of a community of nations which feel

the need for an international legislative organ. As Lord Parker and Mr. Root showed, the desire to put an end to war must be strong enough to make nations undertake some form of common action, something in the nature of an international "hue and cry," in order effectually to outlaw wrongdoers. No international body can impose its will upon nations unless those nations themselves authorise it to express their will and to recommend ways and means of enforcing that will.

* * * * *

In this respect the American Neutrality Act of August 31, 1935, even as amended in 1936, and President Roosevelt's proclamations of October 5, 1935, in pursuance of that Act, mark a distinct change in the pre-war theory and practice of the United States. While purporting to affirm American neutrality, and to limit presidential freedom of action, the Neutrality Act of 1935 and the proclamations based upon it enabled the President, in effect, to discriminate against an aggressor. The Act of 1935 authorised the President to impose, upon the outbreak or during the progress of war—as soon as the President should have proclaimed the existence of such a war—an embargo upon the export of arms, munitions and implements of war to all belligerents either direct or to a neutral port for transshipment. The President was given discretion to extend the embargo to other States as and when they became involved in war. The Act also established a system of registration of arms and munitions manufacture, and the licensing of the export and import of arms and munitions.

Further, it gave the President power to withhold protection from American citizens travelling on any vessel flying the flag of any belligerent nation, to prohibit the entrance of foreign submarines during war into American ports or territorial waters except on conditions prescribed by the President, and to require bond of vessels suspected of leaving an American port for the purpose of delivering up to any belligerent warship or supply ships, men or fuel, munitions or other supplies.

When the administrative machinery for registration and licensing had been set up on September 21, 1935, the President defined by proclamation the meaning of arms, munitions and implements of war, and, on October 5, two days after Italy had attacked Abyssinia, issued two Proclamations. The first declared that a state of war existed, and put into operation the Arms Embargo. It contained the following significant paragraph: "In these specific circumstances I desire it to be understood that any of our people who voluntarily engage in transactions of any character with either of the belligerents do so at their own risk. . . ." The second Proclamation required American citizens to refrain from travelling in vessels of belligerent nations, and warned them that such action would be at their own risk. On October 9 the Government Export-Import Bank announced that it was not prepared to grant any credits to firms desiring to trade with Italy. Despite their strictly legal neutrality these dispositions were clearly directed against Italy, who had been guilty of aggression, since Abyssinia has no sea coast and no sea-going vessels of any kind upon which American citizens could

travel. Furthermore, the denial of credits to firms which might desire to trade with Italy was not extended to Abyssinia.

This discrimination against one of the belligerents aroused opposition among those members of the United States Congress who wished to uphold the traditional American doctrine of the freedom of the seas and the American claim to the maintenance of a neutral's right to trade with all belligerents. Early in 1936 President Roosevelt defended, in his Annual Message to Congress, the position he had taken up, and caused bills to be introduced into both Houses of Congress to support his reading of neutrality. Alternative bills were, however, introduced by his opponents, with the result that a compromise was reached in the form of a Resolution which was adopted by the Senate and the House of Representatives in February, 1936. This Resolution extended the Neutrality Act of 1935 until May 1, 1937, and restricted the President's discretionary power in some important respects. It obliged the President to impose the Arms Embargo whenever he should find that "there exists a state of war" and compelled him to extend the embargo to other States as they became involved in war. The Resolution further made it unlawful "for any person within the United States to purchase, sell or exchange bonds, securities or other obligations of the Government of any belligerent country" that might be issued after the date of a proclamation of the embargo, or to make any loan or extend any credit to any such Government or person except in the case of an American Republic or Republics engaged in war against a non-American State or States, "provided

that the American Republic is not co-operating with a non-American State or States in such war."

These restrictive provisions did not prevent President Roosevelt from announcing that his earlier neutrality policy would be "maintained in effect," since the "giving actual assistance to the carrying on of war would serve to magnify the very evil of war which we seek to prevent." Therefore he renewed his appeal to the American people so to conduct their trade with belligerent nations that it could not be said that they were seizing new opportunities for profit, or that by changing their peace-time trade they were giving aid to the continuation of war.

The practical result of the amended Neutrality Law is, however, that the President is no longer entitled to use his own discretion in regard to the extension of the Arms Embargo to belligerents, even if they are the victims of aggression or of a violation of the Kellogg Pact in renunciation of war. Further, the proviso excluding from the exception under the amended law an American Republic or Republics that might be co-operating with a non-American State or States tends to hamper the Latin-American members of the League of Nations in supporting League "sanctions" against an aggressor.

How long matters can remain in this position is a very open question. By warning American citizens that if they should voluntarily engage in transactions of any character with either Italy or Abyssinia they would do so at their own risk, President Roosevelt had departed from the old doctrine of the freedom of the seas. He had reversed the policy (of protecting American neutral seaborne trade) which had

involved the United States in the Napoleonic Wars and in the World War. Notwithstanding official denials at Washington that he was seeking to support the action of the League of Nations against the Italian aggressor, his action had undoubtedly given strong moral and some material support to the League.

This support might have gone farther, particularly in regard to an embargo on oil for Italy, had not French policy, under the guidance of M. Laval, sought to shield Italy, and had not the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, stultified himself and the British Government in December, 1935, by joining with M. Laval in putting forward "peace proposals" which were wholly at variance with British official declarations and with the obligations of France and Great Britain as members of the League. In November, 1935, there was good reason to assume that, if Great Britain and France had been steadfast in enforcing a League policy designed to restrain the Italian aggressor, they would have received very definite encouragement from the United States.

The revolt of British feeling against the Hoare-Laval "peace proposals"—a revolt so swift and strong that Sir Samuel Hoare was compelled to resign and the Baldwin National Administration was shaken to its foundations on the morrow of an electoral victory—did something to restore respect for British sincerity though without restoring the moral credit of the British Government. As Messrs. Dulles and Armstrong said in their book *Can We be Neutral?*: "We see that the sentiment for peace and for co-operative action to maintain peace was powerful enough in Great Britain and in other parts of Europe

to defeat the program of two strong Governments to sacrifice the League of Nations in order to satisfy the appetites of a third great European Government. It is sufficient for Americans, in studying the neutrality policy of the United States in its relation to this dramatic event, if they can feel sure that at no point in the autumn of 1935 did American policy force Great Britain, France and the other chief executors of the League to hold back from acting as vigorously as they wished to maintain the sanctity of international agreements and restore peace."

Competent British observers require no persuasion that American policy did not force Great Britain, France and the League, in the autumn of 1935, to hold back from acting as vigorously as they might wish. On the contrary, it is unfortunately clear that one of the effects of French unwillingness and of British hesitation to act vigorously against Italy was to rebuff the United States Government and to thwart its desire to stand by the nations whose membership of the League bound their Governments to restrain aggressive war. Thus another discouraging episode was added to the chapter which records European misunderstanding, not only of American limitations, but of the American desire to escape from those limitations in such measure as not to hinder whatever action the League of Nations might be able to take against breakers of its Covenant and violators of the Kellogg Pact.

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Still the chief question remains : Can nations organise the world against war while they cling to "neutral

rights"? I think they cannot. So long as individual nations insist upon their sovereign right to hold aloof from action against a war-maker, so long as they refuse to outlaw an aggressor by extending the "hue and cry" principle to an international community, no definition of neutrality and no interpretation of it in favour of a victim of aggression can prevent wars from recurring or can save neutral nations from the risk of being entangled in war. In their book *Can We be Neutral?* Messrs. Dulles and Armstrong hit this nail shrewdly on the head. They say: "The only sure way for the United States to escape entanglement in foreign wars is for there to be no wars. We can stay out of wars between minor States; but minor wars easily become major wars; and we have no assurance that any expedients we might adopt to insulate ourselves against wars between Great Powers will really work."

On this point a distinction is necessary. It is no part of the doctrine of non-neutrality that every State everywhere should rush into every local fray and help to defeat the aggressor. Even in the days of the "hue and cry" it was the duty of the people on or near the spot effectively to outlaw the wrongdoer. More distant members of the community were bound only not to aid or abet the wrongdoer or to be neutral in regard to him. In the same way modern States have abjured their "neutrality" in regard to felons by concluding treaties of extradition. Should the felon escape from one country to another he is liable to arrest in the country of refuge and to extradition from it. It is the principle of non-neutrality in the presence of acknowledged crime that really matters.

Nations which profess to look upon aggressive war as a crime, yet decline to abjure their neutrality towards an acknowledged aggressor, stultify themselves and foster wars.

This was what Lord Parker of Waddington meant by saying : " Murders would increase if the murderer could count upon the neutrality of bystanders, and it is the same with war. The neutral, in fact, shirks his share of the burden of humanity." Today, as when he spoke, the main " burden of humanity " is the onerous task of suppressing war, war being understood as the enforcement of a claim by individual nations to be judges in their own case and to assert their will by the right of the stronger. This right of the stronger, in its turn, is at once an affirmation of unlimited sovereignty and a denial of the equally sovereign right of the weaker to be judges in their own case. Conflict between unlimited sovereignties can only be resolved by force of arms ; and unfettered national sovereignty, expressed as a right to remain neutral, is, and in the modern world must increasingly become, incompatible with the prevention of war.

If nations that are still free do not understand this truth in time ; if they be not ready to make as much sacrifice of their individual lordships as may be necessary to get better lordship as members of a community of peoples freed from war, they may find that they have answered in advance, and to their own undoing, the question whether mankind is or will be fit for peace on the hither side of dire disaster.

CHAPTER X

THE ENEMY

WHY write of "The Enemy" in a book upon "Peace"? The answer is that since the end of the World War political philosophies and systems inimical alike to peace and to freedom have been established or strengthened in more than one great country. Some of these philosophies, tricked out with economic and social doctrines and propagated by dictatorial systems of government which threaten or suppress the rights and liberties of individuals, extol war as the highest and worthiest form of national and, indeed, human activity. I look upon these philosophies and systems as "The Enemy"—not, I need hardly say, the peoples who suffer under them and upon whom they are imposed by every means that sedulous propaganda, police supervision, spying and terror can adopt or devise. The spirit of these potent conspiracies against freedom of thought, of enquiry, of speech and of criticism—through which alone can men ascertain such truth as may be discernible by human intelligence—is a constant negation of the spirit of peace. For peace, conceived as free helpfulness among law-abiding individuals and peoples grouped in an international community, can be sustained only by enlightened public opinion; and enlightened public opinion is the abiding safeguard of free institutions, national and international.

Nor can I believe any efficacious organisation of peace, or even of non-war, to be attainable by the linking together of dictatorial systems of unfreedom. Otherwise the Holy Alliance, a coalition of absolutisms, need not have broken down. Its professed principles, as distinguished from its actual aims, were by no means ignoble. And the reason is plain. There is nothing absolute in human affairs. Since no man can know the Absolute Truth, all human truth (political and other) is relative; and absolute or dictatorial systems of government can tolerate no theory of political relativity.

This is doubtless what Lord Parker of Waddington and Mr. Elihu Root meant by their reasoning in the speech and the letter analysed in the preceding chapter. They saw clearly the difference between a peace enforced by a ruling power, and a peace, or a state of non-war, established in a community of nations whose members no longer claim to be a law unto themselves and who abjure neutrality in the presence of crime. Autocratic systems of government, armed with some mystic doctrine—the Divine Right of Kings, or the Divine Blood of a Nordic Race, or the Divine attributes of a Heaven-sent Leader—cannot assent to the limitations of sovereignty which faithful membership of an international community would place upon them. Mystic assertions of transcendental nobility of race or blood may flatter national vanities and engender ecstatic enthusiasms; but they are scarcely compatible with the right to criticise which is the hall-mark of political as of intellectual freedom, a safeguard of sanity and a pledge of progress.

Should civilised mankind ever succeed in organising

non-war, while understanding that non-war is insufficient save as a prelude to the adventure of peace, it will do so only after a hard contest between what is politically sound and what is unsound. Out of this contest may come "the survival of the fittest"; and it is a matter of some consequence that philosophies and systems of peace in freedom should prove themselves fitter than philosophies and systems of unfreedom and war. The latter are still strong, stronger maybe than the former. The war-philosophers say, as Lord Parker observed, that war is the result of tendencies so ingrained in human nature that they may be considered as political laws expressing the higher interests of humanity; that the worthiest and most virile nation will survive each struggle and ultimately establish a World Empire in which permanent peace will for the first time become possible, and in which law and order, literature and philosophy, art and science will have their best chance, and man, individual man, will reach the highest perfection.

Despite its superficial resemblance to Darwinian theory, I believe, with Lord Parker, that this philosophy is scientifically unsound because it is vitiated by a self-contradictory premiss—that violent intolerance can be a step towards the reign of law and freedom of the mind. Nevertheless it is plausible, as were the arguments formerly employed to uphold the Divine Right of Kings. Mr. Elihu Root claimed in his letter to Colonel House that the first postulate of any durable concert of peaceable nations for the prevention of war is a fundamental change in the conception of international responsibility which, he thought, must be brought into harmony with what is

called criminal responsibility in municipal law. The acceptance of this principle, he added, would be fatal to the whole Prussian theory of the State and of government; and when this principle had been accepted "openly, expressly, distinctly, unequivocally by the whole civilised world" there would arise a community of nations from which would flow practical results no less important than those which flowed from the American Declaration of Independence as compared with the results of the Divine Right of Kings. At the end of his letter Mr. Root roundly declared that until military autocracies based on mystical assumptions had been "wiped out," free nations would need to be constantly on the alert against "unrepentant professional criminals" whose "agreements will always be worthless" and whose purposes "will always be sinister."

Both he and Lord Parker referred to philosophies and systems which were then characteristically German. What they said applies today to the doctrines and political structures of Italian Fascism and German Nazism, as well as (with sundry present reservations) to Russian Bolshevism, of which the original theory if not the actual practice was derived directly and indirectly from German sources. Among these sources none has been more productive than the philosophical teachings of Hegel, which profoundly influenced the nineteenth century and still cast a spell over the minds of men in the twentieth.

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The disciples of Hegel are legion. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the joint parents of Communism,

hold high place among them. In 1894 Engels told me that he had been studying Hegel for fifty years, and believed that he had "almost mastered Hegel's vocabulary"! Georges Sorel, the French apostle of violent syndicalism, began by absorbing Marxist doctrine and ended by going back to Hegel as the fountain head; and Sorel's syndicalist doctrine helped to shape the ideas of Mussolini, who was already a revolutionary Socialist. Some students of modern thought are, however, inclined to put Charles Darwin alongside of Hegel as a prophet of force and struggle. It is true that Darwin's phraseology, rather than his scientific reasoning, has been widely drawn upon by believers in war. Indeed, if the main law of life is the instinct of self-preservation, if the struggle for existence ends in the survival of the fittest, if Nature "shrieks against" a humaner creed, is there not, as Lord Parker put it, "some plausibility" in the contention that war is a biological law which men will ignore at their peril? At every turn of an enquiry into the apologetics of violence and unfreedom these ostensibly Darwinian concepts will be found to recur.

How deeply Darwin himself would have resented such perversions of his scientific method those can imagine who know with what modesty he looked upon his own work and how alien to him was dogmatic assertion or any assumption of infallibility. At the close of his Autobiography he said simply that it was remarkable, in view of the "very moderate powers" he possessed, that he should have been "able to influence the opinion of scientific men on several important points"; and so little dogmatism was there

in his conception of the Universe that he summed it up in the following passage :

“ I may say that the impossibility of conceiving that this grand and wondrous universe, with our conscious selves, arose through chance seems to me the chief argument for the existence of God ; I am aware that if we admit a First Cause, the mind still craves to know whence it came and how it arose. The safest conclusion seems to me that the whole subject is beyond the scope of man’s intellect ; but man can do his duty.”

Here speaks a great scientific mind as far removed from an “idealism” which, like that of Hegel, sets out by begging the question, as from the materialism, philosophic and other, which gained ground in the later half of the nineteenth century and in the earlier years of the twentieth. It is a curious paradox that the materialist interpretation of history, propounded by Marx and Engels under the direct influence of Feuerbach, should have been deduced by them, with Hegelian dialectic, from an inversion of Hegel’s doctrine of Reality. The tendency to place material facts, especially economic facts, in the forefront of political and social thought fostered a belief that the desire for material gain determines the conduct of men and nations, and that the study of economics opens the path to wisdom. However true it may be that men and nations are eager for wealth and for the well-being which it can procure, and however strong the argument that hunger has played a large part in the history of mankind, it is emphatically not true that, when once elementary hunger has been stilled, men and nations will always do what their economic self-interest may suggest. The “economic man” is

a phantom who haunts the brains of economists and is rarely to be found in actual life. Hence the futility of most of the reasoning based upon him and upon his hypothetical behaviour in given circumstances. It is the emotional man, the man of passionate faith, of deep-seated conviction, the believer in ideas—which may be sound or unsound—who moves the world; and when their feelings are sufficiently stirred men and nations will throw material welfare to the winds in the hope of realising some ideal or upholding beliefs that are dear to them.

If only for this reason it is necessary to take account of ideas, for ideas are among the most potent springs of feeling. And ideas are often bound together by a subtle, inherent logic that makes them work themselves out to definite conclusions. This, at least, has been my experience in the course of more than forty years of political thought and observation; and this experience it is which leads me to attach so much importance to the ideas which Hegel propounded, more frankly than any other philosopher, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. True though it be that the conduct of men and nations is not as a rule governed by abstract thought, and that attempts to retell the results that will flow from the adoption of certain principles rarely sway the minds of the multitude, it is not less true that those results can be foretold so accurately as to foreshadow the course of future events.

Here is a case in point. The late Dr. L. T. Hobhouse, Professor of Sociology in the University of London, gave at the London School of Economics in the autumn of 1917 a course of lectures which were

published later in a volume called *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*. In these lectures Professor Hobhouse drew from the study of Hegel conclusions which were afterwards vindicated by the advent of Bolshevism in Russia, of Fascism in Italy and of Nazism in Germany. The indwelling power of ideas can rarely have been more strikingly demonstrated. Hardly less interesting is Professor Hobhouse's dedicatory letter to his son, an airman in the Great War, which explains how the lectures came to be written.

In July, 1914, Professor Hobhouse and his son had been reading Kant, Hegel's great predecessor, in what seemed to be peaceful surroundings. Three years later, in 1917, Professor Hobhouse was reading and annotating Hegel's theory of freedom when his meditations were interrupted by a German air-raid on London. The raid was soon over. The fire of the anti-aircraft guns died down and London picked up her dead. Professor Hobhouse wrote to his son :

"As I went back to my Hegel my first mood was one of self-satire. Was this a time for theorising or destroying theories when the world was tumbling about our ears? My second thoughts ran otherwise. To each man the tools and weapons that he could best use. In the bombing of London I had just witnessed the visible and tangible outcome of a false and wicked doctrine, the foundations of which lay, as I believe, in the book before me. To combat this doctrine effectively is to take such part in the fight as the physical disabilities of middle age allow. Hegel himself carried the proof-sheets of his first work to the printer through streets crowded with fugitives from the field of Jena. With that work began the most penetrating and subtle of all the intellectual influences which have sapped the rational

humanitarianism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and in the Hegelian theory of the god-state all that I had witnessed lay implicit. . . . 'To make the world a safe place for democracy,' the weapons of the spirit are as necessary as those of the flesh."

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What was, in essence, Hegel's theory of freedom? He took "freedom" as the starting-point of his doctrine of "the State," but his freedom turned out to be willing conformity on the part of individuals with the dictates of the State—the State which he called "God's movement in the world." He claimed that it is false to look upon freedom as merely equivalent to the absence of compulsion or constraint, and that positive freedom lies in freedom of the will, the free will being the will which wills to subordinate itself to the State. Going a step farther he then asserted that this freedom or self-determination of the will cannot be achieved by individuals on their own account. It needs to be "conditioned" by law and custom, and finally to be expressed by the will of the State itself, the State being its own supreme end, and the highest duty of the individual being faithful membership of the State. Beyond the State, Hegel insists, there is no higher human association, and States have no duties to one another or to humanity. Therefore the State must judge for itself what it will treat as a matter of honour, especially when, after a long period of peace, it has to seek an occasion for activity beyond its borders. It need not wait for any actual injury. The idea of a threatening danger is enough. Preventive or anticipatory wars are

therefore justified. They need not be waged for any humanitarian purpose, since the State has to think of its own well-being, and its well-being is superior to that of any individual, within its own confines or without.

This doctrine bears a singular resemblance to the theory and the practice of Italian Fascism and of German Nazism which admit only one party, one leader, one will controlling and embodying all the resources of the State—including physical constraint and a monopoly of education—one press, one radio, one economic system. Nor is there much difference between Hegel's State (with an absolute monarch at its head) as a super-personal entity to which individuals, their private consciences or rights, their happiness or their misery, were to be wholly subordinate, and Hitler's claim that the State is the indispensable means of securing the purity of the Nordic "Aryan" Germanic race which, by the inborn transcendental virtue of its blood, is entitled to rule the world. In both cases the result is much the same, since, on its way to achieve race-purity and universal domination, the Nazi Party and its Leader are as absolute as was the ideal Prussian State which Hegel deified.

In contradistinction to these doctrines, which prescribe like-mindedness among individual citizens who willingly subordinate themselves to the State and whose willingness thus to do is "conditioned" by the State itself, it may be well to set down Professor Hobhouse's own definition of political freedom. He writes :

"Essentially, political freedom does not consist in like-mindedness, but in the toleration of differences ; or, positively, in the acceptance of differences as con-

tributing to richer life than uniformity. Freedom, as something shareable by all members of a community, involves restraint upon that which prevents such sharing. A society is on the whole free not because there is in it little law or much law, but because the law is such as to secure scope for personal development and free association as a common possession by restricting those developments, and those only, in which the fulfilment of one is the frustration of another. It is free, not where a common mind shapes the individual, but where all minds have that fullness of scope which can only be obtained if certain fundamental conditions of their mutual intercourse are maintained by organised effort.

“In a second and more specific sense, political freedom implies active citizenship. The claim of the free individual is not the impossible one that the common decision should coincide with his own, but that his decision should be heard and taken into account. He claims his part in the common councils; he takes his share of responsibility. In so far as he makes this claim effective he contributes to the common decision even though in a particular case it goes dead against him. He is free, not because the social will is his own, but because he has as much scope for expression as any one man can have if all are to have it and yet live and act together. More than this is the beginning of tyranny, less is the beginning of slavery.”

In fundamental agreement with Professor Hobhouse is another outstanding liberal philosopher, Professor Masaryk, the founder and the first President of the liberated Czechoslovak State. The practical value of his reflections cannot be gainsaid, since he himself actually made a State before writing a theory of it. In his great work *The Making of a State* Masaryk draws a genealogical tree of German political thought.

He looks upon Hegel as an anticipation of Bismarck, for Hegel accepted the Prussian idea of the State as the highest expression of nationality and, by his Pantheism and fantastic philosophy, prepared the transition from the idea of the Universe held by Goethe and Kant to the mechanical materialism and violence of Prussianism. By his doctrine of "absolute idealism" Hegel supported the claim of the Prussian State to absolute authority, forsook the universal outlook and humaneness of Goethe and Kant, and laid the foundations of a policy of force in theory and in practice.

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The outstanding virtue of Professor Hobhouse's work is that it diagnosed the essential Evil, and identified "the Enemy," a full year before the end of the World War, at a time when the establishment of a League of Nations seemed to most people a pious aspiration. He pointed out that the doctrine of the State as an incarnation of the Absolute, a super-personality absorbing the real, living personalities of men and women, sets the State above moral criticism, constitutes war a necessary incident in its existence, contemns humanity, and repudiates a federation or League of Nations. When he wrote few could feel sure of the victory over German arms which enabled President Wilson to insist that the constitution of a League of Nations must be the first point on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference. Still less could the subsequent hostility of militarist Japan, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany to the League be foretold. Events have since conspired together to vindicate his fore-

sight. More than ever, if we would understand the nature of war, and the outlook upon life from which war springs, is it necessary to see wherein the falsity of the Hegelian theory lies, since false ideas can only be overcome by ideas that are true.

In the fourth chapter, "The Causes of War," I have said that the Hegelian, and the Hitlerite, doctrine implies that individual States must struggle and fight until the strongest imposes its will upon others; and, as Hitler puts it, founds peace 'upon "the victorious sword of a ruling race bending the world to the service of a higher *Kultur*." This is "the struggle for life" in a political form. One of its rules, among those who take the Hegelian or the "totalitarian" view of the State, is that there shall be no free play of individuality within the State, since the State is the source of all individual rights, and possesses attributes superior to those of any person or section of persons within it.

This concept is in flagrant contradiction with the Anglo-Saxon idea which regards the State as the executive organ of a free community, and as being endowed with no other powers or attributes than those which the community bestows upon it. It is the authorised instrument of the common will. It is the common safeguard of individual freedom under laws which representatives of the community are empowered to make, to amend or to repeal. In Kipling's words, the Anglo-Saxon State leaves men "free to live by no man's leave, underneath the law." His poem "The Old Issue" also designated "the Enemy"—whom he called "the old King," and bade men

“not to suffer under any name”—with prophetic vision more than thirty years ago :

“ Here is naught unproven—here is naught to learn.
It is written what shall fall if the King return.

He shall mark our goings, question whence we came,
Set his guards about us, as in Freedom’s name . . .

He shall peep and mutter ; and the night shall bring
Watchers ’neath our window, lest we mock the King. . . .

Cruel in the shadow, crafty in the sun,
Far beyond his borders shall his teachings run. . . .

Long-forgotten bondage, dwarfing heart and brain—
All our fathers died to loose he shall bind again.

Here is naught at venture, random nor untrue—
Swings the wheel full-circle, brims the cup anew.”

Thus Kipling gave a faithful forecast of what has come to pass in the totalitarian States of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, not to mention what was done in the earlier phases, at least, of Bolshevik Russia. In the international sphere the practice of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany has fully borne out the Hegelian doctrine that the absolute State cannot be bound by treaties or obligations, since these are matters of temporary expediency to be repudiated or thrust aside whenever the State, in the exercise of its absolute sovereignty, may wish to discard them in order to gain some advantage or to ward off some hypothetical danger. From the Anglo-Saxon concept that the State is not absolute and is merely the organ of a free community it follows, on the contrary, that such a State can enter into and observe treaties and contracts with other free communities, and by observing those contracts accept limitations of its sovereignty and thus foster the development of a true international community.

This is the deepest reason why absolute systems of government are and must remain incompatible with any permanent organisation of non-war, to say nothing of the pursuit of constructive peace. President Wilson saw truly when he insisted that a League of Nations could only be based upon the principle of equal right between peoples self-governed under representative and democratic institutions. The same conviction inspired Mr. Root's claim that there could be no secure peace until the military autocracies which brought on the World War were "wiped out" and the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs, with their assertion of Divine Right, should cease to hold sway. Yet neither of these men foresaw that whole peoples could be so thoroughly controlled by armed factions in totalitarian States, or be so constrained by terror or influenced by propaganda, that the wills of individuals would cease to count and free public opinion, the safeguard of democratic government, would no longer exist.

It was, indeed, assumed by the makers of the League of Nations that the Governments of the countries belonging to it would be controlled by free public opinion, and that this control would be chief among the agencies for the prevention of war. As recently as August, 1932, the importance of this agency was dwelt upon in the address given by Mr. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State in President Hoover's Administration, to the New York Council on Foreign Relations. He argued that the League Covenant and the Briand-Kellogg Pact (or Pact of Paris) in renunciation of war "signalise a revolution in human thought" and are "the product of a consciousness

that unless some such steps are taken modern civilisation would be doomed." Thus, he insisted, the "entire central point" of vision has been changed. War had been made illegal throughout practically the entire world. But the Kellogg Pact, Mr. Stimson went on, does not provide for sanctions of force. "It rests upon the sanction in public opinion, which can be made one of the most potent sanctions of the world. . . . Public opinion is the sanction which lies behind all international intercourse in time of peace. Its efficacy depends upon the will of the people of the world to make it effective. If they desire to make it effective it will be irresistible. Thus critics who scoff at it have not accurately appraised the evolution in world opinion since the Great War."

Less than six months after Mr. Stimson spoke Hitlerite National Socialism, or Nazism, came into power in Germany. After burning the Reichstag, and charging its opponents with this felony, it obtained dictatorial powers from a subservient or terrorised Parliament and proceeded to arrest and maltreat the opposition parties, to dragoon the Press, to control the radio, to persecute Jews, Protestants and Catholics alike, and effectively to block every channel through which untainted news could flow or free public opinion be formed. At length things reached a point at which Herr Hitler's Propaganda Minister, Dr. Goebbels, could proudly say at Breslau on March 19, 1936, on the eve of the "election" in which Hitler sought approval for the repudiation of the Locarno Treaty: "We do not have to appeal to the people. We have the Army, the police, the wireless, the Press, the Nazi organisations. Who could

do anything against us? Nobody should think that by withholding his vote he can overthrow National Socialism."

Which view of the position today is nearer the truth—that of Mr. Stimson or that of Dr. Goebbels? Since Mussolini and, perhaps, Stalin, could repeat the Nazi Minister's claim without exaggeration, it is obvious that those who rely upon free public opinion as a safeguard against war are a little over-confident. In a community of nations, governed mainly or entirely on democratic principles, with systems of representative government, with freedom of speech, of public meeting, of writing and the free dissemination of knowledge, Mr. Stimson would probably be right. But he and those who think with him may be less than right in a world where powerful nations, heavily armed, are ruled by autocratic leaders and allowed to know only what those leaders, and the State which they control, think it expedient that the people should know. The quality of public opinion depends upon the quality of public information. Opinion that can be swung in one direction or another by a State monopoly of the Press, the radio, education and all other means of spreading, withholding or perverting knowledge, becomes an instrument of absolutist policy. Hitherto statesmen have paid too little heed to the effects of partial information or of downright ignorance upon the minds of the people. It is not merely that facts remain unknown; it is the twist given to such facts as become known which lends a special bias to public thought and causes feeling to run in prescribed directions. And if national feelings are sedulously and shrewdly bent in

directions that lead to conflict with other peoples, otherwise informed, war may be the inevitable result—war, moreover, in which the most ignorant or misinformed nation will most fervently believe in the righteousness of its cause.

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Is there a remedy for this state of things? How can its menace to what we understand by "civilisation" be met? Were it merely a matter of redressing tangible grievances it might be easier to handle. But such phenomena as Italian Fascism and, still more, German Nazism belong to a domain of abnormal psychology in which national ambitions or racial vanities turn into mystical ecstasies, and "inferiority complexes" are transformed, by a sort of mass hypnotism, into strutting and blaring "superiority complexes." It is a curious fact that both Italian Fascism and German Nazism grew out of a persecution mania, artificially fostered in the case of Italy who was a victorious power, more spontaneous in the case of the German people who had suffered defeat, without quite knowing why, and had thereafter gone through years of humiliation and hardship.

In the last year of the War, and at the Peace Conference, Italy had a chance to gain for herself an influence and a position in the south and centre of Europe that would have been hardly second to those of France and Great Britain elsewhere. Her leaders missed this chance. They clung to the narrow conception of Italian interests which the secret Treaty of London had reflected in April, 1915; and when, by their insistence upon demands that bore no true

relation to Italian needs or opportunities, they had estranged President Wilson and the British and French Governments alike, the Italian Government deliberately fomented among its people a belief that Italy had been defrauded and betrayed by her allies. In this mood, and amid the economic difficulties of the early post-war years, not a few Italian spirits turned towards Fascism as offering a way of escape from social disorder and moral depression into an atmosphere of nationalist self-adulation and intolerant violence—an atmosphere wholly alien to the liberal convictions that had inspired Italy's redemption from servitude and her achievement of national unity in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The German people, on the other hand, were bewildered by defeat and bereft of clear-sighted leadership. They had been content, before the War, to leave their national affairs in the hands of an Emperor and a clique of military and economic advisers who gravely misjudged Germany's position in the world. As Herr Theodor Wolff, the eminent writer who edited the *Berliner Tageblatt* from 1906 to 1933, says in his work, *The Eve of 1914*, which I have already cited: "The nation's business was conducted before the War by the Kaiser and a few persons who, for one reason or another, were in favour with the Monarch; their clients, whose property and whose lives were involved in their speculations—the whole nation, 65 million human beings—had no opportunity of inspecting the books." Nor did they really wish to inspect them. Herr Wolff truthfully observes:

"Even among those Germans who were full of distaste for caste arrogance, by far the greater number

took it for granted that the quality of the leadership of the armed forces was pre-eminent, that they were invincible and in sole possession of the secret of a special science. There were very few who did not surrender themselves to mystical assumptions of this sort."

This state of mind helps to explain both the coming of the Great War and the potency of Hitlerite propaganda after defeat. Did not that propaganda soothe wounded national pride by assuring the German people that they had really been invincible, that their armies had never been defeated, that victory would have been theirs had they not been betrayed and stabbed in the back by Marxists, Jews, Liberals and all the non-Nordic riff-raff of which the Nazi fan would throughly purge the Germanic floor?

This reading of post-war German psychology is borne out by the evidence of Mr. Edgar Ansel Mowrer, one of the most experienced and discerning of American observers, in his book, *Germany Puts the Clock Back*, which was published in 1933 soon after Hitler came into power. He believes that Germany also missed her chance after the War, for he writes :

"Modern Germany really dates from the World War, in losing which Germany, unlike the victorious countries, had an opportunity to achieve historical leadership through self-renewal—and missed the chance. Then was the moment to have realised the subsequent demand of Hitler—'everything must be different!' Instead of a limping compromise between the former Prussian autocracy and the somewhat shop-worn parliamentary democracy of the West, it was not beyond the capacity of the German genius to have evolved a new kind of democracy, successfully combining the historical claim for more concentrated efficiency with a none the less

genuine expression of the popular will. For under modern conditions government against the will of an educated people can produce, not efficiency, but only weakness."

For such a revolution, Mr. Mowrer thinks, the Germans were emotionally ready but intellectually unripe. Throughout the nineteenth century a procession of professors had filled the popular mind with a noxious breed of fancies, myths and desire-symbols, such as "absolute State," "Germanic Mission," "Aryan supremacy," and "creative function of war." These notions failed to stand the test of actual war against the ideas of the Allied Powers. The fact was, Mr. Mowrer believes, that with the possible exception of Japan the civilised world had outgrown the Prussian conception of society.

Yet in the name of this conception the Germans had fought the war which first really made a nation of them. Therefore—they reasoned—something of the medieval German and autocratic Prussian traditions must be carried over into the new State. Herein lay the defect of the Weimar Republic. Eager young people consequently felt that the "real revolution" was still to come; and clever reactionary demigods found little difficulty in persuading them, during the economic depression, that what they wanted was a Third Empire similar to the "glorious past."

Nevertheless, Mr. Mowrer explains :

"It was not imperialistic scheming but vanity, amounting almost to a vital need, that caused the German people to deny reality in the form of its own war responsibility and defeat. What to foreigners seemed wrong-headedness or sheer duplicity was mere incapacity to face a truth incompatible with the national self-esteem. . . .

"It is astonishing the way the people of Goethe repudiated everything he had stood for. Liberalism? A disruptive ideology of a bygone age! Europe? A geographical expression! The League of Nations? A cackle of geese! World peace? A dream of girls, of pacifists and Jews! The only reality was the Nordic race and its noble German incarnation."

And, I would add, *Kultur*. What *Kultur* may be no non-German mind has ever fully grasped. It connotes at once ideas that are vaguer and facts that are more concrete than those which English-speaking or Latin nations understand by "culture." Nor does "civilisation" imply the same concept, or series of concepts, as *Kultur* implies in German. One eminent German-Swiss historian and philosopher, Dr. Jacob Burckhardt, defined it thus in his *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen* or "Observations on World History":

"We call *Kultur* the sum total of those developments of the spirit which occur spontaneously and do not claim universal or compulsory validity. . . . Further, *Kultur* is the process that goes on in a million forms and through which simple-minded racial action is transformed into reflected capability, nay, in its last and highest stages, into science and especially into philosophy, which is pure reflection.

"Society, in the widest sense of the word, as distinguished from the State and Religion, is the outward comprehensive form of *Kultur*. Each one of its elements has, no less than the State or Religion, its own development, its own blossoming, decline and ulterior life in the general tradition (in so far as it is capable and worthy thereof). Countless factors also live on, even unconsciously, as acquisitions, contributions of peoples long forgotten which may have found their way into the blood

of mankind. One must always take account of this unconscious adding-up of the results of *Kultur* in peoples and in individuals."

This painstaking definition of *Kultur*, to which my attention was first drawn by an eminent German writer, does not strike me as readily intelligible; though when I submitted it to another competent German he found it clear and satisfactory. The well-known French authority upon matters Germanic, Professor Edmond Vermeil of the University of Paris, gives, however (in the *International Mind*, April, 1936), a somewhat ampler explanation of *Kultur* both in itself and in relation to the Western idea of "civilisation." He enquires why modern German thought has been systematically hostile to Western ideas of international co-operation and has obstinately supported historical realism against the constructive idealism of the West. He answers by drawing attention to the external conditions which have affected German thought in so far as it dwelt upon the destiny of the German nation. The soil of Germany, he says, comprises the northern plain which is without natural limits on the east and west, and the southern highlands which give access to the south-west toward the Rhine and to the south-east along the Danube. The northern plain is not naturally fertile. It is rather a region of passage than a fixed abode for its population. Across it, Germany, who is far from being an ethnic unit, felt the thrust of the northern tribes which plunged like a wedge between the Celtic or Latin masses on the west and the Slavs on the east. If the western border stabilised itself little by little, the eternal contest between Germans and

Slavs fretted out, in flat country, a zigzag frontier which is, so to speak, pregnant with perpetual conflict. To the south the Italians and the Magyars mount guard against German expansiveness and oppose to it barriers apparently insuperable. In order to triumph German expansion needs to overcome all these barriers so as to escape from territorial limitations and to gain greater relative unity.

Professor Vermeil continues :

“ This explains the meaning which German thought gives to *Kultur*. Here, *Kultur* means mastery, effort ceaselessly renewed, constant struggle without final satisfaction in principle. By ‘ civilisation ’ the West understands the sum total of the institutions which came at once out of Antiquity and Christianity, the acknowledged sources of Western thought and of Western universalism. But Germany only learned late, and indirectly, the thought of Antiquity. Nor was she so strongly impregnated by Christianity as were the other peoples of Western and Southern Europe ; and, perhaps for this reason, she has preserved her original traits. It is, above all, this double tardiness which leads her to set up the concept of *Kultur* against the concept of ‘ civilisation ’ and, not without disdain, to throw back the latter concept on to the West.”

If Western Europe, international in mind and tendency, looks upon “ civilisation ” as a given system of spiritual values which are both humane and universal, as a rich and solid order of things wherein mankind may dwell, Germany understands by *Kultur* something very different. She sees in it, on the one hand, an intimate and necessary union, constantly adjusted or renewed, between the natural forces whose action in the Universe men intuitively apprehend, and

a human discipline designed to moderate and control them; and, on the other hand, the realisation of this union by methods of which Germans alone have the secret, since those methods are the outcome of their temperament and their history. Thus, Professor Vermeil concludes, it will be perceived why Fichte felt it his duty to remind the Germans that they are the "original people" (*Urvolk*) who speak the "original tongue" (*Ursprache*). In point of fact Germany feels that she is closer than other nations to the primitive world, and returns to it more easily, as to the fount of her own genius. This she does by seeking to rid herself of the alien influences which have emanated from Judaism, Antiquity and Christianity. In a word, Germany is disposed to reject those values which to us seem the most precious.

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Have we not here, in germ, the reason why the prospect of war, which fills the more progressive Western peoples with dismay lest it destroy "civilisation," is by no means so abhorrent to Germans, who feel that war would not destroy, nay, might even spread *Kultur*? Hitler conceives a *Pax Germanica* as "bending the world to the service of a higher *Kultur*"; and in his latest work, *Total War*, General Ludendorff, the famous German commander, puts forward a philosophy and, indeed, a religion of war that has already appealed powerfully to wide sections of the German people. Extravagant and even fantastic though Ludendorff's thesis may seem, it should not on that account be dismissed as meaningless, for it is in line with a current of German thought of which

the older exponents of pan-German ideals, as well as the newer prophets of the Third Reich, have been faithful interpreters.

General Ludendorff seeks and, to his own satisfaction, finds the cause of German failure to win the Great War in blind worship of a Christian God whose Jewish antecedents were wholly un-German. In his unhappiness he turns to the heathen gods of the races that formed the ethnic conglomerate which he calls the "Volk," that is, the Germanic race. Ignoring the fact that this race was formed of various elements, including Goths, Slavs (with some Mongol admixture) and Celts, he looks to it for the salvation of Germany through a war in which every energy and resource, moral and material, of the whole people shall be engaged to the utmost. He does not believe in mere dictatorship from above, though he postulates unity of command under a supreme Leader. The soul of the people must be stirred and inspired, as well as disciplined to withstand strain and hardship for an indefinite period. Alongside of this moral factor, industrial organisation must be thoroughly prepared for an instantaneous change over from peace to war production. This can only be done by awakening in the people a common consciousness of race, and of god-life in a German deity whom the race embodies. Therefore Jews and Jewish thought must be got rid of, no less than papal influences and Christianity in general, which are channels for the spread of Jewish ideas. By means of a truly German religion the Fatherland can be purged of the accumulated poisons injected into it by Judaism and Christianity, and can build up, on truly German moral and

religious foundations, the system which will enable "Total War" to yield complete Nordic victory.

While agreeing with Clausewitz that war is an act of force by means of which one State seeks to subject another to its will, Ludendorff rejects the Clausewitz theory of war. Clausewitz, he argues, spoke only of destroying a military enemy in battles and campaigns—an idea now obsolete, since even in the World War whole peoples were involved, and will be involved more fully in future. Every means—aircraft, bombs of all kinds, wireless broadcasting, leaflets and other forms of propaganda—must henceforth be used to break the enemy's will. The destruction of his moral energies will be as important as the annihilation of his armed forces. "Politics must be broadened and politics must be changed. They must take on, like Total War, a character of totality."

Hence the idea of Clausewitz, that war is only the handmaid of policy, must, Ludendorff insists, be thrown overboard. War and politics alike serve the self-preservation of the "Volk," and war is the highest expression of the people's will to live. To it politics must be subordinated. Ludendorff writes textually: "As war is the highest effort of a people for its self-preservation, so total politics in time of peace must be a preparation for the life-and-death struggle of a people in war. Total politics must so fortify the basis for this struggle that it cannot be wholly destroyed either by the grimness of war or by enemy measures."

To this end the people must regain race-consciousness. The more it does so, the more its own soul becomes manifest, the clearer will be its discernment of the fundamental hostility of the international

forces—Judaism and Christianity—that threaten it. The more, consequently, will the people pursue the aims which the ideal of Total War sets before them.

Through 120 pages General Ludendorff works out this thesis. He extols the glad devotion of the Japanese to their divine Emperor and their community of life with their ancestors. He denounces the un-German Christian doctrines which ascribe importance to the individual soul and lead to the neglect of armaments. He affirms the need for a revival of the spiritual wisdom inborn in the Germanic race, a wisdom which Christianity has for centuries overshadowed. The German religion of race and blood is not based upon promises of a life to come but on deep knowledge of the natural sciences and of the national soul steeped in god-experience. He says: "Let no man believe that he can overlook the significance of god-experience (*des Gotterlebens*) in the shaping and the upholding of the people's life. It is fundamental, as the Jew and the Christian priests know. Christian doctrine allowed men and peoples to forget it. Racial awakening has given it back to them. German god-knowledge, which ensures German god-experience and is the foundation of the close spiritual cohesion of our people, fashions and furthers the preservation of the people's life. Like all the god-experience of a people that is true to type it does not work abstractly; rather, as I shall show, it fosters manly self-control and military training, and works thus in favour of the grave necessities of Total War."

Total War, Ludendorff insists, is pitiless. It demands the last ounce from men and women. All energies, all economic resources must be laid under

contribution for it, and reserves of munitions, oil, food and of every war requisite must be accumulated in advance. War, even mechanised war, needs strong souls. It is the spirit that creates victory, and German racial god-knowledge begets a strong soul in a strong body. Thus prepared, Total War can be waged. Surprise must play a great part in it. Attack by surprise at decisive points must be utterly ruthless—on land, on water and in the air—and be followed by pursuit so that defeat may be turned into rout. It is a mistake to suppose that war must begin with a declaration. Superior air squadrons must assail the enemy; and, at the decisive hour, the bombing squadrons must operate continuously and remorselessly. Above all, the will of the supreme commander—the source of spiritual solidarity, the incarnation of the German religion and the well-beloved of the German god—must prevail and lead the “Volk” to triumph for the German blood and race.

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In this work, of which scores of thousands of copies have been sold in Germany with the approval of the Nazi Government, the “blood and soil” mysticism of Hitler, the blood and race “Mythos” of Rosenberg and the doctrine of the totalitarian State are summed up and given drastic expression. What longing lies in the background of minds which can entertain and glory in such ideas? It may not be solely a military longing, though militarism, extended to a whole race and governing their thoughts and lives from the cradle to the grave, may be its necessary instrument. Were the idea of Total

War merely military, the late Marshal Foch, who, as commander of the Allied and Associated armies, vanquished those of Germany in the Great War, might have advocated it more persuasively. But Foch was a "Westerner" who believed in "civilisation"; and if only as a counterpoise to those of Ludendorff it may be well again to record his considered views upon war and peace.

Early in 1921, when the centenary of Napoleon's death was approaching, I asked Marshal Foch, as the leading French authority upon Napoleonic strategy and tactics, whether he thought Napoleon would have been more successful under modern military conditions than the commanders in the Great War had been. He answered :

"In the dark hours of the War we often asked ourselves : ' If Napoleon were to rise from his tomb at the Invalides, what would he say to us, what would he do with our armies of today ?'

"He would have said : ' You have millions of men : I never had them. You have railways, telegraphs, wireless, aircraft, long-range artillery, poison gases : I had none of them. And you do not turn them to account ? I'll show you a thing or two !'

"It would have taken him about six weeks to study and master all these things. Then he would have changed everything from top to bottom, reorganised everything, employed everything in some new way, and would have knocked the bewildered enemy head over heels.

"Presently he would have come back at the head of his victorious armies—and would have been a terrible nuisance."

Marshal Foch added that the triumphs of Napoleon are not the most enlightening. They have been

thoroughly studied. His failures, and the reasons for them, are less known, though his unsuccessful campaigns of 1812, 1813 and 1814 are the most interesting of all. He concluded :

“ Napoleon failed, they say, because Berthier was no longer with him. I do not think so. In 1814, it is explained, he was already a sick man. Perhaps.

“ In my view the deep reason for the disaster that overwhelmed him must be sought elsewhere. He forgot that a man cannot be God ; that, above the individual, there is the nation ; that, above man, there is the moral law ; and that war is not the highest goal since, above war, there is Peace.”

This is a weighty judgment, for Foch was no mean soldier. I set it down after several conversations with him, sent it to him for correction or amplification, got it back with one or two slight emendations, and published it under his name in the “ Napoleon Centenary Number ” of *The Times Literary Supplement* in May, 1921. I still possess my original French manuscript, with his notes upon it, and a letter in which he assured me that I had given exact expression to his thought.

If, above war, there is peace—and Ludendorff seems to take no account of peace—what is the purpose behind German “ totalitarian ” thought ? It may not be so much a purpose as a will or a desire, the lust of power which, as a human motive, is far more potent than many peace-lovers imagine. A passage from a recent work, *The End of Illusions*, by a German-Jewish writer, Herr Leopold Schwarzschild, bears on this point. Speaking of the present German desire to build up a formidable military power so as to attain

military superiority, and criticising Karl Marx's materialistic interpretation of history, which many German Socialists still accept, Herr Schwarzschild writes :

"It is true that this idea (the potency of the lust of power) contradicts the materialist theory, for the materialist theory knows only one source of history, the economic. But never was it clearer than it is today that other things bear upon the lives of peoples and weigh in the balance at least as heavily and automatically as things economic. Questions of power may be such things, for the will to power is not less a material fact than the will to profit, and yearning for power is not always a subsidiary phenomenon of the yearning for gain. It can appear as an end in itself ; and the German will to power today is, in high degree, of this quality."

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Few will contest this statement. The lust of power is often an end in itself, among individuals no less than among nations. Nor is it always a mean impulse. Power may be desired for noble ends—though there seems to be an unwritten law that those who seek power by inferior methods shall be debarred, for reasons inherent in the very inferiority of those methods, from using it to the best advantage for themselves or others when once they have gained it. In practice, at any rate, the end does not invariably justify the means.

Yet the German lust of power, even if its object be the bending of the world to the service of a higher *Kultur*, raises an urgent question : How to meet the menace to the ideals of responsible freedom and to the sanctity of the human personality which it in-

volves? The answer can only be: By truer philosophies and sounder systems than the "totalitarian," and by upholding them with even greater firmness and determination. If clash there must be, far better that it should be faced in a spirit of devotion to lofty beliefs than that it should arise only from the defence of material possessions. Indeed, the clash need never come in the form of physical strife if the supporters of civilisation, as distinguished from *Kultur*, are so united and resolute as to diminish the likelihood of successful attack upon them. It is only by weakness, faint-heartedness and division that they will compass their own undoing. They need to know the faith that is in them and to be ready to vindicate it.

There is no sufficient reason to think that civilisation is doomed or that it must succumb to the onslaught of the Enemy. Nearly two centuries ago prognostications of doom were widespread, and were more widely believed than they are today. They were not fulfilled. On January 1, 1935, one of the foremost of British philosophic theologians, Dr. Vernon Bartlet of Oxford, explained in a letter to *The Times* why they were falsified. He said: "What actually averted further degeneration was the new sense of the sanctity of the human personality—'the soul,' as it was then called—latent in every individual, whether rich or poor, cultured or otherwise." This new sense grew up in the latter half of the eighteenth century, at least in the English-speaking world, mainly as a result of religious revival. And in the first half of the nineteenth century it gained in clearness from the diffusion of Kant's philosophic doctrine—which was itself an interpretation of the Christian doctrine—of the human

person, or moral ego, as an end in itself in virtue of its capacity to respond to the inner glow of a duty to strive towards nobler spiritual ideals. In the first quarter of the twentieth century this sense suffered under the shock of the Great War and its secondary psychological and moral effects; and Dr. Bartlet expressed his conviction that "nearly everything in the way of stable and lasting recovery in the material as well as moral health of nations today, including our own, depends on how far and how soon we are able to replace the lost conception of the incomparable value of the human personality in a world where lower but urgent values have also their place and function."

In his own way Dr. Bartlet thus defined and designated "the Enemy." He stated the case against the systems of unfreedom that subject the human personality and the content of men's lives to the authority of a totalitarian State, to a rigid economic or social system or to some absolutist creed of efficiency. Discipline and efficiency are not in themselves the highest ideals. Representative democracy, ensuring freedom under the law to individuals, may be less efficient as a political system than intolerant dictatorships. But the margin of inefficiency in representative systems is the insurance premium they pay against catastrophe when change is needed or political and social structures have to be adjusted to new conditions. In the long run, ordered freedom is more economical, because less wasteful, than dictatorial systems, if only for the reason that the latter, uncontrolled by public supervision and unchecked by public opinion, foster corruption and inevitably run to seed.

But the present question is not so much that of the merits or demerits of rival philosophies as whether systems of unfreedom may not employ the resources of science and technology to wreck the world by violence before those systems break down. It is this possibility that lends poignant urgency to the choice which now confronts mankind—the choice between “total war” and “vital peace.”

Sometimes I think I see what mankind might do in a world beyond war and the fear of war, how high and thrilling might be the adventure of creative peace. Yet between the vision and its fulfilment I see the Enemy in threatening form, an Enemy whose destructive power is derived not alone from the quality of his ideas but still more from the mental blindness and feebleness of heart of those who, in the years after the Great War, might have laid foundations, deep and sure, whereon to build a better world for a loftier human race. They allowed “what might have been” to lapse lamentably into “what is.” It may not yet be too late to learn from their errors, or too early to show what men may gain if they should now have the heart to set out on the adventure of peace. Overbold though the attempt may be, I shall essay to point the lesson of those errors, and to foreshadow the adventure of peace, in two concluding chapters.

CHAPTER XI

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN

IF men could never learn the lessons of the past, if experience played no part in the shaping of their lives, there would be little sense in the study or the teaching of history. Mankind would blunder blindly on, making the same mistakes over and over again until, at last, some supreme mistake, some crowning error, wrought havoc beyond repair. There could be no such thing as rational progress, no belief in the perfectibility of human ways and institutions, no striving towards ideals of which the pursuit, even if it fail of its ultimate purpose, sets the feet of men on an upward path.

Thus it may not be wholly unprofitable to think of "what might have been" had vision been clearer or resolve more steadfast at moments of historical decision. Though there is truth in the Italian saying, "Of wisdom after the event the ditches are full," it is none the less pertinent to ask why wisdom was lacking before the event. Towards the end of the Great War, before the conclusion of the Armistice and the opening of the Paris Peace Conference, more vision and wisdom were shown in many quarters than were to be apparent in the making of the Peace. This is not to say that the wisest and strongest of statesmen could have coped successfully with the chaotic forces which the military overthrow of Germany and the

collapse of Austria-Hungary let loose almost overnight. There is such a thing as *force majeure*, of which the action may be invoked as an extenuating circumstance for human fallibility. Yet history is likely to pass severe judgment upon those who did not use what power they had as wisely as they might have used it in circumstances that were not beyond their control. They can only plead in extenuation of their shortcomings that they themselves were the prisoners of their past and the victims of their own, or of their people's, defects.

I lived in Paris during the greater part of the Peace Conference and attended most of its public sittings. Accident rather than design took and kept me there, and made me witness the breakdown of cherished hopes and imaginings. In so far as these hopes and imaginings were my own, they were the result of a habit, good or bad, formed in the course of the twenty years I had passed as a newspaper correspondent in France, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary and elsewhere. A foreign correspondent worth his salt is constrained not only to study the country where his work lies, but to seek, as it were, common ground between that country and his own. He tends naturally to conceive ideal policies for both, if only as a background and a warrant for whatever criticism he may feel bound to offer.

In Germany and in France I found it easier to imagine ideal policies for those countries because I enjoyed the initial advantage of knowing something of their chief universities and centres of philosophic, historical and political thought. In Italy, too, I was helped by the companionship of some of the ablest men, in various

spheres, whom it has ever been my good fortune to meet. More than one of those men had lived through the Italian struggle for national redemption and unity in the nineteenth century, and they led me to share their faith when I was trying to understand what course Italy had best pursue in future. In Austria-Hungary the task was harder. There the deceptiveness of very complex appearances drove me to seek the realities which lay behind them; and when, with the guidance of experienced and thoughtful subjects of the Hapsburg Crown, I had found those realities, and believed that I could see a way of escape for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy from the fate that threatened it, knowledge of its traditions and circumstances forbade me to feel confident that this way would be taken.

The way would have been to solve the problem of Yugoslav unity in favour of the Hapsburg Monarchy, by generous treatment of Serbia and of the Austro-Hungarian Yugoslavs, within the framework of a Danubian Confederation under Hapsburg leadership; and, as a consequence, to place the whole Monarchy on a federal basis. If this were not done, on account of Magyar opposition or otherwise, and if Austria-Hungary, in the service of a pan-German idea, were resolved to crush Serbia and to suppress the Yugoslav unitary movement, nothing could avert a great European war. It was not done; and the Great War came, as it was bound to come. In April, 1916, before the War was half over, the thought of peace, that is to say of the essential conditions of an enduring peace which should be more than an interval between wars, forced itself upon my mind. At that moment,

after a visit to Verdun in the first days of the six months' battle, I wrote and published a tentative *Programme for Peace* which I afterwards revised and amplified. Upon the Yugoslavs and Italy it proposed :

“ The constitution of an ethnically complete Serbia in the form of a United States of Yugoslavia ;

“ The completion of Italian unity by the inclusion within the frontiers of Italy of all Italian districts in the Trentino and the Carnic Alps, on the Triestine littoral and the Istrian coast ;

“ The establishment of Italian naval control in the Adriatic by the possession of Pola, Lissa, and Valona.”

Parts of this *Programme* were taken into consideration in October, 1918, by an official British Inter-Departmental Committee which outlined the main requisites of a peace that should fulfil the war ideals of the Allied and Associated Powers.

During the last year of the War I had been an unpaid official in the Department of Propaganda against the Enemy, of which Lord Northcliffe was Chairman. My special task was to suggest lines of propaganda policy and to help in applying them. Indeed, before joining the Department, I had stipulated that propaganda must foreshadow British and Allied policy, so that events should progressively bear out every statement that might be made.

Thus only, I felt, could propaganda be justified. On this principle my colleagues and I worked throughout the spring and summer of 1918, with results not inconsiderable ; and, at the end of a successful inter-Allied Propaganda Conference in London during August, 1918, we were officially asked to help in drafting a peace policy. To this end an Inter-Departmental

Committee, representing eleven official Departments and composed of outstanding men, met on October 4, 1918. After careful consideration it drew up a memorandum upon "indisputable" and "negotiable" conditions of peace. Among the "indisputable" conditions were the complete restoration, territorial and political, of Belgium with adequate compensation for civilian losses and injuries; the liberation of French territory, likewise with reparation for damage by enemy occupation and with compensation for civilians, and the return of Alsace and Lorraine to France, "not as a territorial acquisition or part of a war indemnity but as reparation for the wrong done in 1871"; the "readjustment of the northern frontiers of Italy as nearly as possible along the lines of nationality," assurance being given to *all* the peoples of Austria-Hungary of their place among the free nations of the world "and of their right to enter into union with their kindred beyond the present boundaries of Austria-Hungary"; the evacuation of all territory formerly included within the boundaries of the Russian Empire, and the annulment of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; the formation, with access to the sea, of an independent Polish State which should include "the territories inhabited by predominantly Polish populations"; the abrogation of the Treaty of Bucharest, and the evacuation and restoration of Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro; the replacement of merchant tonnage sunk by Germany and Austria-Hungary in their unlawful submarine campaign; and a provision—inserted at the instance of the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. A. J. Balfour—that "the former colonial possessions of Germany, lost by her

in consequence of her illegal aggression against Belgium, shall in no case be returned to Germany."

The "negotiable" conditions included the adjustment of claims for damage necessarily arising from the operations of war; and "the establishment of a constitution and conditions of membership of a League of Free Nations for the purpose of preventing future wars and improving international relations," with the object of creating "a world in which, when the conditions of the peace shall have been carried out, there shall be opportunity and security for the legitimate development of all peoples."

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The Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, objected to this draft memorandum. He said it "invaded the sphere of government"—as though it had not been sanctioned by representatives of official bodies, including the War Cabinet itself—and bade us refer it to Mr. Balfour who, however, accepted it on behalf of the Government with the one addition in regard to the German colonies. On October 22, 1918, it was therefore announced in an address given by Lord Northcliffe to American officers in London; and on November 4, 1918, its principles were expounded in an article which appeared in leading newspapers throughout the world.

In this article, which also bore Lord Northcliffe's signature, emphasis was laid upon the expediency of allowing Germans, and other parties chiefly interested, to share directly in the demarcation of new frontiers and in the negotiation of other features of the peace. It suggested, in particular, that a commission, con-

sisting largely of Poles and Prussians, should be asked to work out the future frontier between Prussia and Poland; and it added: "This may be thought the suggestion of an idealist. But I claim that in this instance the idealist is the realist. If our goal be lasting peace, then let us give every opportunity for arrangement and mutual accommodation before we resort to compulsion."

Dealing then with the future government of Germany, the article said that the transformation of autocratic into responsible government was as necessary to Germany herself as to the final attainment of a just and lasting peace. It went on: "I frankly admit that the perfect form of government does not exist, and that the genius of Germany may evolve some form as good as, or even better than, existing constitutions. But Germany must understand that it will take time to convince the world, which has so much reason to distrust her, that this sudden change is to be a permanent reality. . . . For the last stage (of the peace) will mean nothing less than reconstructing the organisation of the world and establishing a new policy in which a League of Free Nations shall replace the old system of the balance of rival powers. . . . In the very act of seeking the foundation for a League of Free Nations, and in slowly building up the fabric, we shall get rid of the passions and fears of war."

On November 4, 1918, when this article was published, the terms of the Armistice were being drawn up in Paris. I had gone to Paris some days earlier and met Lord Northcliffe there on November 3. On the morning of the 4th we laid before the head of the

French Military Propaganda Department a plan which had occurred to me after a conversation with Dr. Beneš, the Foreign Secretary of the Provisional Czechoslovak National Government. In this conversation Dr. (now President) Beneš had told me of his surprise and dismay on meeting in Switzerland the members of a deputation which had been sent from Prague to confer with him as soon as Czechoslovak independence had been proclaimed on October 28. He had found that his views of the War and its meaning, formed during his three years' life and work in Allied countries, differed so widely from those of his fellow-countrymen who had lived in Central Europe that it had been hard to reach an understanding. He thought that a long process of unlearning as well as of learning would have to be gone through before even the Czechoslovaks could perceive why Germany and Austria-Hungary had been defeated, or could gain a sound knowledge of the past or a constructive outlook upon the future.

This prospect startled me. If Czechoslovaks who had worked abroad for the freedom of their people found it hard to see eye to eye with Czechoslovaks from home, how much harder would it not be for the Allied and enemy peoples to understand each other! Ought not Allied propaganda organisations to be transformed forthwith into arrangements for the promotion of mutual understanding? Otherwise the peace might be vitiated by lack of ideas common to the nations which had fought against each other.

A beginning, I thought, could be made with the Press on both sides. Certain regions of Germany were likely to be occupied by Allied troops. The

chief German newspapers in those regions might be approached, by responsible Allied journalists, with an offer to put at their disposal a news-service supplied, free of charge, by the leading British, French and American journals. Commercially, such a service might be worth many thousand pounds a year, but the German newspapers in question would get it for nothing—on two conditions. One condition would be that they should use it, or any selections from it, fairly and honestly; the other, that once a week they should publish articles explanatory of the war aims of the Allied and Associated peoples, such articles to be written by Germans who had lived in neutral countries during the War and had been free to form their own opinions.

By this means, I hoped, the beginnings of a common outlook might be created. The Allied journalists who would be in touch with the German newspapers might learn much of German views and feelings and be able to interpret them to the public of their own countries. On the other hand, those German newspapers which might enter into the suggested arrangement would have a great advantage over other German newspapers, and these might, presently, also wish to come into it. After a year or two of this system, confident co-operation might be possible for the organisation of a world free from the obsession of war and able to understand the requirements of lasting peace.

Like Lord Northcliffe, who jumped at this scheme, the head of French military propaganda accepted it enthusiastically and promised to place all his resources and those of the French civil organisations at our

disposal. We agreed that the headquarters of the work should be set up in Paris, and Northcliffe returned to London in order to get British official approval for it.

Exactly what happened in London I could never find out. The only certainty is that Northcliffe and Mr. Lloyd George quarrelled. Mr. Lloyd George has since assured me that Northcliffe never explained to him the true nature of the plan, but spoke in a dictatorial tone which he, as Prime Minister, resented. Northcliffe evidently lost his temper, and came back to Paris on November 12 saying that he had resigned his chairmanship of the "Enemy Propaganda Department," which would now be wound up. On November 15, 1918, he sent us all a letter containing the following passage:

"In the opening remarks by the Chairman at the first meeting it was pointed out that, as the War approached its end, war propaganda would change into peace propaganda. This change took place with even greater rapidity than was at the moment anticipated, and the Policy Committee had at once to undertake the task of devising a propaganda policy with regard to peace. . . . All questions of policy have now, however, passed from the hands of the Committee to those of the Council of Nations, and there seems to be no immediate sphere for our action."

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Thus the plan fell through. I have never ceased to regret it. Among the things which "might have been" it has its place. Northcliffe, who was already ailing and was obliged to rest in the south of France pending an operation, hoped that *The Times* and the

Daily Mail might be able to work unofficially for a sound peace. This hope I could not share. No newspapers could take the place of an international organisation in carrying out an agreed official policy. As a *pis aller* I undertook to comment upon the doings of the Peace Conference daily in the Paris edition of the *Daily Mail*—the principal English journal on the spot—and in *The Times*, and to do what in me lay to work in the desired direction. I accepted also an invitation from Colonel House to act as confidential adviser to the American Delegation upon the requirements of peace in Central and South-Eastern Europe.

Meanwhile the prospects of a good peace grew rapidly worse. The British Government dissolved Parliament and, in December, 1918, held a “khaki” general election which brought into Parliament a majority of what were aptly described as “hard-faced men who looked as if they had done well out of the War.” The former Liberal Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, was heavily defeated in his constituency; and Mr. Horatio Bottomley, a blatant “patriot” and a convicted rogue, was triumphantly returned in another. Mr. Lloyd George declined to include Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey and other experienced Liberal statesmen in the British Delegation to the Peace Conference, much as President Wilson failed to invite outstanding Republicans, like Mr. Elihu Root and ex-President Taft, to join the American Delegation. While the European situation was daily getting out of hand, weeks were wasted in triumphal celebrations in Paris, London, Brussels and Rome.

Thus the Conference met on January 18, 1919, in an atmosphere of impatience. Beyond deciding that

the first point on its agenda must be the establishment of a League of Nations, it worked neither quickly nor well. One of the worst of its methods was the arrangement that heads of Governments should personally conduct enquiry into the various questions awaiting settlement instead of holding themselves in reserve as the supreme judges of the work of expert committees. In this way more time was lost, vexation increased and confusion confounded. By January 29 I felt bound to write that "it has become uncertain whether the Conference means to make *a* peace or *the* peace," and to utter a warning that the War would merely be suspended for some years if, instead of *the* peace to which the free peoples of the world had earned a right, the Conference should bring forth only "a patchwork, ramshackle project from which the breath of life would have departed ere it came into being."

On January 29, indeed, President Wilson admonished the Conference. In moving the appointment of a Commission to draft the League of Nations Covenant he said :

"The United States in entering the War never for a moment thought it was intervening in the politics of Europe, Asia, or of any part of the world. Its thought was that all the world had now become conscious that there was a single cause which turned upon the issues of this war. That was the cause of justice and of liberty for men of every kind and place. Therefore the United States would feel that its part in this war had been played in vain if there ensued upon it merely a body of European settlements. It would feel that it could not take part in guaranteeing this European settlement unless that guarantee involved the continuous superintendence of the peace of the world by the Associated Nations of the world."

Under pressure of this admonition the Covenant Drafting Commission set to work. When President Wilson presented the result of its labours to the Conference on February 14 everybody felt that something big had been done. That evening I wrote :

“ It was impossible to listen to the document which President Wilson read, to his comments upon it, and to the declarations of the Allied representatives without feeling that the affairs of the world were being lifted into new dimensions. The old dimensions of national individualism, secrecy of policies, competitive armaments, forcible annexations for selfish purposes, and unqualified State sovereignty were raised, if only for an instant, to a higher plane on which the organised moral consciousness of peoples, the publicity of international engagements, and of government by the consent and for the good of the governed, became prospective realities.

“ How long will the instant last . . . no man can yet say. All that can be said is that a sense that something new, something irrevocable, had been done pervaded the Conference Hall. All the speeches were made in the tone of men who were not, indeed, afraid of their own handiwork but were obviously conscious of the boldness of attempting to frame a new charter for civilised and uncivilised humanity.”

The instant did not last long. President Wilson started that night on a flying visit to the United States. There he had to face the consequences of his own error in having turned the successful national war effort into a party issue by urging the American electorate to support the candidates of his Democratic Administration in the biennial elections of November, 1918. He had then suffered a setback which weakened his authority as the spokesman of the whole American

people when he came to Europe in December; and on his return to Washington at the end of February, 1919, he found the leading Republican Senators up in arms against "his" League Covenant. Instead of conciliating them, as Colonel House had advised him to do, he browbeat them and, in view of their resentment, sought to circumvent them by asking Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clémenceau to incorporate the League Covenant in all the Peace Treaties.

Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clémenceau consented. Having consented, they asked for something in return. Thus a spirit of bargaining began to enfeeble fidelity to principle. Little by little what might have been *the* peace degenerated into *a* peace of which the two redeeming features were the League Covenant and the liberation of subject peoples in Central and Eastern Europe. By means of the League, it might be hoped, the defects of the peace would in time be remedied and real grievances redressed.

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It would serve no purpose now to describe the phases of the Paris Peace Conference. It passed from one to another in a detestable atmosphere which official records do not reveal. Indeed, many of the records were toned down and even expurgated. The chance was lost of pursuing either an ideal peace policy in general or ideal policies for the principal countries concerned. Throughout the War British feeling had favoured a peace in which no territorial or other material advantage should accrue to Great Britain as the result of her vast effort, huge expenditure and the loss of a million lives. It had been hoped

that we should come out of the struggle with clean hands, counting sacrifices well made and treasure well spent if they had helped to remove from Europe the curse of militarism and to guide the feet of nations along paths of peace.

This was the spirit in which the British people had fought the War. But, as the end drew nigh, another spirit spread among certain British Ministers, and the notion prevailed that the advantages we held ought to be nine-tenths of the law. If, during the War, it had been said with truth that war is too serious a business to be left entirely to soldiers, the tactics of Mr. Lloyd George and some other members of the British Delegation at the Peace Conference proved that peace is too weighty a matter to be entrusted solely to politicians. The delegates of other countries were doubtless unequal to their task; those of Britain had it in their power to give the world a lead comparable to the part her soldiers, sailors, airmen and people had played in the winning of the War—and failed to give it.

The United States was in somewhat different case. It had come into the War late, avowedly for the defence of a specifically American tradition, that of the freedom of the seas, though not without some regard to the future safety of the United States and to the high degree in which many, perhaps most, American citizens shared the idealism that inspired the people of Great Britain and, very largely, of France. President Wilson may not have been at all times a faithful interpreter of his countrymen's thought and feelings. Yet the resounding echoes which his statements of war aims found in Great Britain, in France

and, partly, in Italy showed how firmly the hearts of Western European peoples were set upon making a peace that should fitly crown a "war to end war." As I have said, those echoes constituted him, for a time, First Citizen of the World, not because he was President of the United States but because he had given articulate expression to lofty aspirations widely shared. When things began to go wrong in Paris, and rumours spread of bickerings and intrigues among the Allied delegates, an eminent prelate came from a Balkan country in the hope of adjuring President Wilson to be "a thunderstorm of honesty"! His desire was the desire of multitudes.

Even the British Government or, at any rate, its Foreign Secretary, Mr. Balfour, trusted that President Wilson would stand firm on his principles and would insist upon a plain answer to a plain question. This question was whether European countries which had concluded between themselves, in the earlier stages of the War, secret treaties incompatible with their subsequent acceptance of war aims defined by President Wilson, intended or not that their later public engagements should take precedence of their earlier secret engagements. Though he had been informed by Mr. Balfour, on April 30, 1917, of the existence and nature of those treaties, President Wilson could never be persuaded to put this question. Had he done so, Great Britain and probably France would have welcomed it as releasing them from undesirable territorial bargains, and as setting them free to promote better arrangements with advantage to all concerned.

This applied in particular to the Secret Treaty of

London signed on April 26, 1915, between Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy. Mr. Balfour saw clearly that no lasting peace in South-Eastern Europe could be based upon it; though, as the representative of a country whose former Government had signed the Treaty, he felt in honour bound not to disavow or to attempt to escape from it. President Wilson could have put down his foot upon this Treaty from the beginning; and, in so doing, he would have served the best interests of Italy herself. He would have been on strong moral ground. He lacked either the vision or the courage to stand upon it. And when, at length, he sought to bring the Italian Government to reason by other methods he found himself outwitted and defied.

No doubt the malady which presently laid him low was already upon him. Had he been in normal health he would hardly have broken with his most faithful and devoted adviser, Colonel House, nor would he have given ear to sycophants who persuaded him that any suggestion, or report of a suggestion, that he was not infallible was a sort of "insult to majesty." Of all the disappointments of the Peace Conference the setting of President Wilson's sun was the severest. He might have put his veto on any proposal of which the righteousness was not beyond dispute. France, Great Britain and Italy owed vast sums to the United States; and, without further material and financial help from America, the recovery of Europe from the havoc of the War would have been slow indeed. Yet President Wilson held his hand on really lofty issues while he showed obstinate ill-temper on some minor matters. Thus he destroyed his own authority and

deprived the world of what might have been a far wiser, if not an ideal peace.

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When once the security of France against unprovoked German attack had been guaranteed by the Anglo-American promise of assistance, and French military demands for the annexation of German territory had been quashed, the main obstacle to a sound territorial settlement was the policy of Italy. Of this policy Baron Sidney Sonnino, the chief author of the Secret Treaty of London, was the parent. His personal integrity and passionate devotion to a narrow conception of his country's interests were not open to doubt. From the beginning he had been a firm supporter of the Italian agreement with Austria-Hungary and Germany which, in 1882, created the Triple Alliance. On the outbreak of war in 1914, when the Italian Government declared its neutrality, on the justified plea that Austria-Hungary was engaged in a war of aggression, Sonnino protested and declared that Italy ought to have entered the War on the Austro-German side. A few months later, on taking office as Foreign Minister, he strove nevertheless to extort from Austria territorial concessions as the price of Italy's continued neutrality. Simultaneously he opened negotiations with Great Britain, France and Russia for the eventual entry of Italy into the war on their side. His conception of Italian interests was partly Irredentist and partly strategic. He desired to gain for Italy the Italian-speaking portion of the Southern Tyrol with the city of Trent and, if possible, a military frontier more favourable

to Italian defence. Without understanding the economic position of Trieste and its dependence upon a wide hinterland of trade in Central Europe, he wished to make Trieste an Italian port and also to secure territorial and strategic advantages in the Istrian peninsula as well as on the Dalmatian shore and among the Dalmatian islands.

Sonnino, who had hardly gone outside Italy since his youth, knew little of the true position in Austria-Hungary. Of the strength of the various movements for freedom and independence among the subject Hapsburg races he was unaware. He shared the profoundly mistaken views of most Italians that the eastern shore of the Adriatic was Italian by race and sympathy, that the Yugoslavs—96 per cent. of its inhabitants—were barbarous opponents of Italian culture, and that both tradition and geography made Italy the rightful heir of the Roman Empire and of the Venetian Republic. He ignored the prospect that, inasmuch as the Austro-Hungarian territories and positions he coveted were inhabited chiefly by Yugoslavs, his claims would tend to strengthen the Hapsburg Monarchy in the War by enabling it to act as the champion of its Yugoslavs against Italian ambitions.

The Italian Government may have reckoned, as the British, French and Russian Governments did, that the Treaty of London would remain a profound secret, and would not therefore hamper Italy in the prosecution of "her" war. If so, the reckoning was as foolish as the Treaty itself. So swiftly did the "secret" leak out that it became known in Austria-Hungary within a week of its conclusion. Naturally it brought

about an anti-Italian movement among the Yugoslavs (Croats, Serbs and Slovenes), which strengthened the Hapsburg armies. Under these conditions Italy could make little headway when she entered the War (as the Treaty stipulated) at the end of May, 1915, though the value of her belligerency in freeing the south-eastern frontier of France from danger and in keeping strong Austro-Hungarian forces away from the Russian front caused the Allies to overlook Italy's failure, for fifteen months, to fulfil her further obligation to declare war upon Germany as well as Austria-Hungary.

Upon public opinion in Allied countries the effect of the Secret Treaty of London was deplorable. It was seen that Great Britain and France had departed from the principles they had proclaimed at the outbreak of war and that, while professing to be fighting for the freedom of small nations, and of Belgium in the first place, they had consented to carve up the territory of another small people who were aspiring to freedom and to unity with their Serbian kinsfolk in a Yugoslav kingdom. Worse still, in the eyes of those who knew something of political dynamics in Central Europe, was the consideration that no lasting agreement between Italy and the Yugoslavs could be hoped for if the terms of the Treaty of London should be carried out, and that the ultimate control of the Adriatic might lie neither in Italian nor in Yugoslav hands, but in those of a pan-Germanic Central Europe.

Thus the people of Italy were led into the War for the sake of territorial gains more hurtful than helpful to their real interests. This they only began to perceive after the disaster of Caporetto had overwhelmed their armies, and almost opened the route across

Northern Italy to the south of France, in October, 1917, a few months before the great German offensive was due to begin in North-Western France and Flanders. Under the impact of this smashing blow, the more perspicacious Italians and Yugoslavs alike awoke to their common peril. They came together and agreed in principle upon a joint policy, which was confirmed and proclaimed at the Rome Congress of the Subject Hapsburg Peoples on April 8, 1918.

In these developments I took some part, first individually and afterwards as a member of the British Department for Propaganda against the Enemy. Early in January, 1918, I arranged and was present at a meeting between the Italian Prime Minister, Signor Orlando, and the Chairman of the Yugoslav National Committee, Dr. Trumbitch, in London. Before the meeting Signor Orlando had pressed me to tell him my "bottom thought" on the policy Italy should follow, and, when I had outlined a policy, he promised to support it. Roughly, I said:

"Italy has now a chance of gaining an independence she has never enjoyed since she attained unity by the occupation of Rome in 1870. Until 1875 she was under the direct menace of a French attempt to restore the Temporal Power of the Pope. From 1875 to 1882 she wavered between France and Germany; and Bismarck finally coerced her into joining Germany by encouraging the French to occupy Tunis and by threatening, in his turn, to espouse the cause of the Pope. Thus Italy had been driven into the Triple Alliance; and from 1882 until 1898 she had felt the drawbacks of French resentment. Despite the substantial agreement of her policy with that of Great Britain and France from 1898 to 1910, she did not escape from German tutelage until she broke

away from the Triple Alliance in 1914, and entered the Great War in 1915. Even then she foolishly sought to safeguard her security by extorting from the Allies terms that must be harmful to herself. The only policy which could give her at once security and an honoured place in Europe would be frankly to espouse the cause of the subject Hapsburg peoples, and to be their champion and advocate at the Peace Conference. There she would find herself ranged alongside of the United States as an upholder of peace in freedom. Her moral and political influence would extend across the whole Danubian region, and she would secure the friendship of Yugoslavia, Roumania and Czechoslovakia, who would look upon her as their guide and protectress. Then she need fear the hostility of no Great Power, quite apart from the fact that she would have established a claim upon the Allied peoples for having been chiefly instrumental in the overthrow of Austria and thus, indirectly, in the defeat of Germany. But the essential preliminary to such a policy must be sincere agreement and co-operation with the Yugoslavs and the Czechoslovaks."

While these considerations appealed so strongly to Orlando that he wished at once to meet the Yugoslav leader, Sonnino opposed them obstinately and clung to the letter of his Treaty of London. He actually said to me at Rome in April, 1918: "I do not accuse you of having invented the Yugoslav question in order to bother me, for what you are saying today you wrote in your *Hapsburg Monarchy* in 1913. But I wish it did not exist." He could not, however, check the new policy at that moment. It was only when the War had been won and the Peace Conference met that he found means of thwarting it. Had Orlando, the Italian Prime Minister, been a man of character he would have stuck to the ideal policy and would

have won, besides the goodwill of France and of Great Britain, the steady support of the United States for Italy's legitimate aspirations. In Paris he went so far as to accept, in principle, the proposal that President Wilson should act as umpire between Italy and Yugoslavia (or the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes which had been proclaimed on October 28, 1918, with Dr. Trumbitch as its Foreign Minister); but in practice he allowed Sonnino to reject it by announcing that Italy would uphold her territorial claims "based on the conventions that regulated Italian participation in the War" albeit "in full conformity with the fundamental principles of President Wilson.

As these two conditions were mutually exclusive they were little less than an affront to President Wilson, who, irritated and estranged by Italian tactics, issued an appeal of his own to the Italian people. This appeal the Italian Government forbade the Press to publish until an Italian official repudiation of it had first been printed together with violent Press attacks upon President Wilson. Simultaneously, by way of putting pressure upon the Peace Conference, the Italian Delegation withdrew from Paris. Not only did these blackmailing tactics fail but President Wilson, M. Clémenceau and Mr. Lloyd George decided that the final draft of peace terms for presentation to Germany should be completed without further consultation with Italy; and it became known that a big American loan, for which the Italians had been pressing, would be withheld, and other economic arrangements unfavourable to Italy would be made, if she persisted in her "strike."

Under this counter-pressure Orlando and Sonnino

returned to Paris and took part in the presentation of the Versailles Peace Terms to Germany. Unluckily the Italo-Yugoslav dispute remained, and ran its chequered course for many a year. It poisoned the closing stages of the Peace Conference and left bitter feelings between Italy and her allies. If the Italian Government, and especially Baron Sonnino, were chiefly to blame, it is difficult to acquit President Wilson and the British and French Governments of all guilt. While Italian narrow-mindedness and obstinacy were irritating in the extreme, and the memory of Caporetto told against full recognition of Italian sacrifices and services in the War, a more generous and far-sighted policy on the part of Great Britain and France might have prevented the Italian Government from seeking to cover up its own errors by fomenting among its people a semi-hysterical persecution mania that was not least among the causes of the Fascist movement. As I wrote to Northcliffe from Paris on May 14, 1919, when the Italian Delegation was still "on strike," and Great Britain, France and the United States were preparing to put pressure upon Italy :

"Frankly, I do not think that these tactics are altogether wise. If they had been accompanied or preceded by a positive policy in regard to Italy, and not merely by a negative policy based at once on unwillingness to go beyond the Treaty of London, and on unwillingness to tell the Italians flatly that its execution would be diametrically opposed to the best interests of Italy, there might have been something to say for cumulative tactical pressure. In dealing with Italy, one has not only to think of what she ought not to have but to think also

of what she ought to have. That the Allies and the United States have never yet done. Consequently, the Italian Government may be able to denounce, to their people, the tactics of England, France and the United States as definitely anti-Italian—unless at the eleventh hour some positive settlement is found.”

No positive settlement was found. British and French statesmen, who had been incapable of thinking out ideal policies for their own countries or of realising that Germany should be treated with mingled firmness and large-heartedness if she were presently to take her place in a new European order designed to foster constructive peace, seemed equally unable to look upon the needs of Italy in a large and helpful way. It is true that Italy was poor and that the War had reduced her almost to penury, true also that any opening for Italian activities oversea, in the form of a mandated territory or otherwise, would have entailed financial help for her as well as goodwill from her partners in the War. Yet it would have been worth while, from the broader European standpoint, to have purchased at this price Italian agreement to a wholesome revision of the Secret Treaty of London or to the substitution for it of arrangements tending to promote the future welfare of the Italian people. It was as though the men who made the Peace had exhausted during the War their capacity to care for the common cause of establishing peace on firm and just foundations.

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No estimate of “what might have been,” had things been otherwise, can be approximately accurate unless

full account be taken of the Secret Treaty of London and of its untoward effects upon the future of Europe. It is a curious fact that among the Italian members of the Congress of Subject Hapsburg Peoples at Rome in April, 1918, was a somewhat revolutionary journalist named Benito Mussolini. He worked on one of its sub-committees and appeared to share its aims. At the end of April, 1918, when I conferred with him at Milan, he certainly understood those aims and the advantages which a policy in accordance with them might bring to Italy. Yet his understanding of them struck me as purely intellectual, not moral, and his whole bearing made a sinister impression upon me. Soon after the end of the War he joined in the agitation which persuaded the Italian people that they had been defrauded and betrayed by their Allies. This agitation, indeed, gave Mussolini a background for the organisation of black-shirted Fascist groups or gangs which, originally intended for revolutionary Syndicalist purposes, were afterwards subsidised by big industrialists and financiers and turned into an anti-Socialist and anti-Liberal faction to whose members the Italian General Staff, at the instance of the Government, distributed arms. More than two years of civil strife and bloodshed ensued until Mussolini and his gangs were enabled, by the support of the General Staff, to make their so-called "March on Rome" in October, 1922, and to seize power. The sequel is writ large in the history of Europe and of North-East Africa; and the end thereof is not yet.

It is a pertinent question whether either Fascism or Nazism would have arisen if peace had been made on sounder lines in 1919, and if the true interests of

Italy had been more generously considered. My own belief is that Fascism could not have triumphed—indeed, it might never have arisen—if the Italian Government had held to a wise policy or if, in default of Italian wisdom, Great Britain and France had helped President Wilson to solve the Italo-Yugoslav problem. In any event Italy would have passed through some troublous years, but she would have emerged from them with her liberal traditions substantially intact. The example and propaganda of Russian Bolshevism could not have made permanent headway against the practical sense of the Italian people, despite Mussolini's attempts in September, 1920, to turn risings of workmen and peasants into a Syndicalist revolution with the help of his Fascist gangs. It was only when the Italian workmen refused his help that he put himself at the service of "big" industry and finance, and persuaded the Government to give him arms.

Then it was that he found full scope for his remarkable talents as a faction leader, talents which the gangsters of his native province of Romagna had developed through centuries of lawlessness. He has admitted more than once that his actual methods were copied from those of the Russian Bolsheviks who had taken over and "improved" the technique of the Tsarist *Okhrana* or secret police. Hitler and the German National Socialists, or Nazis, presently took Italian Fascism as their model and likewise "improved" its methods. The main distinction between Fascism and Nazism, on the one hand, and Bolshevism on the other, is that the latter has been directed against "capital" and private property whereas the former ostensibly respected "capital"

and, within limits, the property of individuals. Hence the lively—and short-sighted—sympathy shown to Fascism and Nazism by “money” in many quarters. But a further distinction is that while Fascism and Nazism inflame nationalist passion and foster militarism in its service, the tendency of Bolshevism is international and does not necessarily run, in virtue of its inner nature, towards warlike adventure as a diversion from the embarrassments that beset its rivals.

True though it be that Soviet Russia attacked Poland in 1920, and was only repulsed at the gates of Warsaw, it is not less true that Poland had given provocation by raiding South-West Russia. Since then, Soviet Russia has not engaged in foreign war. However disturbing the propaganda and the intrigues of the Third International may have been, the Soviet Union has not only not sought glory in military enterprise but has had valid reason to avoid war. It has understood that military triumph might bring on a military dictatorship, or defeat involve the Soviet system in collapse. Account must be taken of these distinctions in any appraisal of future possibilities, especially when it is claimed that Fascism and Nazism, which have brought Italy and Germany to the verge of economic and financial ruin and have laid rough hands on “capital,” stand as a bulwark against the swamping of Western Europe by Bolshevism.

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It has become a truism—which is too often accepted as the essential truth—that it was the defection of the United States from the Peace Settlement which bedevilled the whole subsequent course of international

affairs. In support of this plea it is contended that the League of Nations was hamstrung from the outset, that France was bereft of the security which had been promised her, that the problem of reparations and of war debts was rendered intractable, and that the disarmament contemplated in Article 8 of the League Covenant and in the Preamble to Part V. of the Versailles Treaty was placed beyond the reach of practical statesmanship. However well or ill founded these claims may be they cannot serve to condone the shortcomings of Great Britain and France at the Paris Peace Conference. The defection of the United States could not then be foreseen. Nor, after that defection, was Great Britain under any obligation to withdraw from her part of the Anglo-American Convention of guarantee to France. Had the British Government upheld this guarantee single-handed it would have retained a moderating and probably decisive influence upon French policy in Europe. This advantage it threw away, and thus put a premium upon the French Nationalist tendencies which culminated in the ill-starred occupation of the Ruhr early in 1923, in the collapse of the German currency, and in the economic distress which favoured the rise of Nazism.

Nor was Great Britain obliged to promote amendments restrictive of Article 16 of the League Covenant, and therefore of collective security, at the League Assembly in 1921. In so doing Great Britain enfeebled belief in collective security against war, and thus helped to discredit the only principle on which disarmament could be hoped for. So far were British statesmen from grasping, even in 1925, the

importance of the collective security to which they were tardily to pin their faith in 1935 that they rejected the Geneva Protocol and sought to provide for eventual British neutrality in case the United States should be neutral towards League action in restraint of aggressive war.

Undeniably American neutrality constituted a risk. Risk for risk, it should have been faced. The whole problem of peace is a study of comparative risks; and the risk of British non-neutrality in support of collective security would have been the lesser. Against the risk of trouble over "the freedom of the seas," in the event of a League embargo or blockade, stood the chance, not to say the likelihood, that the better feelings of the American people would prevail against action so contrary to American idealism and interests alike. At lowest, the United States would not have wished to let Great Britain alone lead the world in restraining aggression. At best the American people would have urged their Government not to obstruct, nay, even to take a hand in, the work of peace. One of the most serious counts against British statesmanship in the post-war years is that it failed to accept whatever risk there might have been, and that it used the prospective neutrality of the United States as a cloak for British reluctance to bear the responsibility of leading the nations towards the effective outlawry of war.

This reluctance, and this alone, explains the rejection of the Geneva Protocol by the British Conservative Government in March, 1925, as it had explained the refusal of the first British Labour Government in 1924 to accept the "Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance" which had been initialled in

1923. It explains also the progressive failure of the Disarmament Conference that met at Geneva on February 2, 1932. Of that Conference the less said the better. Even if its opening had not been overshadowed by the Japanese onslaught on Shanghai—which the British Dominions Secretary, Mr. J. H. Thomas, euphemistically called “war in all but name”—it would not have had a chance of success. A year earlier its President-elect, the late Mr. Arthur Henderson, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had opened a national disarmament “drive” in London by saying: “To us the Pact of Paris (the Kellogg Pact) is the renunciation of force in international affairs, and we believe that the renunciation of force in international affairs should carry with it the renunciation of the means of war.” He did not and could not answer a question which I then put to him publicly—whether he would say: “To us, as citizens, the renunciation of robbery and murder means the renunciation of force in private affairs, and we believe that this should carry with it the abolition of Scotland Yard.” I added:

“Could he not have said: ‘Neutrality or “keeping out of it” was possible when war in pursuit of national policy was regarded as a lawful undertaking. If it means anything, the renunciation of war in pursuit of national policy has killed the right to “keep out of it.” We believe, therefore that the renunciation of force in international affairs should carry with it the renunciation of rights derived from the legality of war. We believe, further, that international agreement upon this point is the only means of getting and giving the security which is the price and condition of disarmament?’”

“If he had said this, or something like it, the outline

of a policy would have appeared, such a policy as propaganda for disarmament could effectually support. And if Great Britain were to take her stand upon this kind of policy the world would begin to get out of the fog of emotion into the sunlight of clear thinking. Then any nation which should demand a special meed of security for itself would be hard put to it to justify its claims."

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In point of fact the failure of the Disarmament Conference did but add one more item to the long list of things which "might have been" had clear thought, in the service of a firm resolve to have done with war, prevailed among European statesmen and their peoples even after the Peace Treaties had been signed. The civilised world might by this time have been on the high road to peace, for nations would not have been content to tarry in a mere state of non-war. Disarmament would have come about in the only way in which it can ever be achieved—that is to say, by the pressure of taxpayers on their Governments to cut down outlay upon weapons and fighting services no longer needed for the pursuit of individual national policies. The stage might already have been reached of fixing a minimum level for armaments—as it will one day be fixed—lest nations insufficiently armed be unable to play their part as active or passive non-neutrals in the policing of the world against law breakers. This is what actually happened after the setting up of the North Atlantic Ice Patrol to police icebergs as a result of the disaster to the *Titanic* in 1912. Seafaring nations then agreed that, in their common interests, a watch must be kept upon the

aggressive tendencies of Arctic ice ; but not all were ready to keep up their contributions to this police force. So it will be if the peoples and Governments of the world ever cease to believe in the likelihood of war. Only when war is felt to be unlikely will "security" be found. Yet the price of "security," as of freedom, is eternal vigilance ; and vigilance unarmed may be the wrongdoer's opportunity.

Civilised mankind is still so far from this point that to speak of it sounds Utopian. The lessons of the past have not yet been learned, and the "adventure of peace" has hardly been thought of, let alone planned. All in all, the aptest comment upon "what might have been" remains Oxenstjerna's paternal injunction that his son should remember with how little wisdom the world is governed.

CHAPTER XII

THE ADVENTURE OF PEACE

THE Headmaster of a great public school that stands on a hill not far from London invited me two or three years ago to discuss the prospects of peace with his older boys. After some talk and many questions a boy of eighteen asked: "If war can be got rid of, will life be worth living in a world at peace?" On the spur of the moment I answered: "Since the attempt even to get rid of war is one of the riskiest things men have ever tried to do, the task of building up, or creating, active peace in a world beyond war can hardly fail to be a thrilling adventure. War cannot be got rid of without changing so many of our notions and habits that our particular way of life might go to pieces unless a better way could be found; and the search for this better way will be risky, exciting and worth while."

The boys found this answer to their taste. When they had gone back to their "Houses" the Headmaster said: "These boys are unlike the generation that came here just after the War. Then they were inclined to be sceptical, cynical, scornful of elders who had got the world into a mess. Now they look upon those of their elders who fought in the Great War as having been lucky to have had a hand in it. They themselves are sorry to have missed it. The common idea of peace, as the mere prevention of war, attracts

them not at all. If peace is to appeal to them it must be explained, more or less as you have explained it, as a 'great lark' or, in other words, an adventure."

At yet another public school, which nestles beneath the towers of England's most famous Abbey, I had spoken a short time before to all the boys together. Some dozens of them wore khaki, for they had just come from a parade of their Officers' Training Corps. Between these budding soldiers and the rest of the school—in which a branch of the League of Nations Union had been formed—there were differences of feeling. When I alluded to the appeal which war had often made to the nobler qualities of men, the boys in khaki turned in their seats and rubbed it into their schoolmates; just as, when I dwelt upon the unworthiness of modern war as a means of settling quarrels between nations, the others "got their own back." But all of them cheered long and lustily the idea that the creation of peace would call for not less efficiency, discipline, and readiness to take risks than had been needed in war.

In this respect, at any rate, our great schools are microcosms of the nation. One more instance may be given. A worthy Bishop asked me some time ago to address his Diocesan Conference in a Northern English city upon the League of Nations and the prevention of war. He opened the Conference with a homily on the blessings of peace and the wickedness of international strife. He seemed surprised when I spoke instead of the dangers of peace. I suggested that, if people knew what real peace must mean they might not be quite so ready to pray the Almighty to

give it in their time. So many of our cherished institutions, as well as our scale of social and moral "values," I argued, so much of our outlook upon life, had been determined by war and the thought of war that, if we were able to get rid of war itself and to put the thought of it out of our minds, we should find we had landed ourselves in a revolution. The very foundations of the State might be undermined were we to abolish war without putting in its place something that would minister to man's inborn love of adventure. The worthy risks of creative peace, as distinguished from the wish for safety which lay behind the current idea of non-war, I concluded, could alone replace with advantage what, in the past, had seemed strong and virile in war.

This Conference, a gathering of hard-headed Northern folk, responded so eagerly that my Lord Bishop admonished it gently. Thereupon an outstanding member of his clergy, the vicar of a populous industrial city, supported me with a warmth that took the meeting by storm. Much more than horrified piety, he declared, was needed to put life into the peace movement. The people were not cowards; and they would never be won unless they were told the truth, with the utmost frankness and sincerity, and were given a constructive ideal.

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It is good for those who brood over intellectual or political problems—"men of the study" as they have sometimes been called—to plunge now and again into a bath of living public opinion, and to temper their minds by communion with "ordinary" men.

The result is apt to be at once sobering and gratifying—sobering because “ordinary” men think quite as shrewdly as the “men of the study,” and gratifying because ideas seemingly abstract turn out to be far more widely shared than recluse “thinkers” may have supposed. What “ordinary” men often lack is the power or the habit of self-expression; and it is here that the written or the spoken word of others may be of service to them.

If so much “peace propaganda” has fallen flat it is because its psychology has been wrong. The ideal of a fat, riskless existence, in safety from outside attack, warms nobody’s blood. Education for peace, as for a high and thrilling adventure, has hardly begun—for the very good reason that nobody has yet thought much about it. It is time that it should be thought about. The concept of “keeping the peace” is too negative. It stops short of the point where the vital human forces come into play. These forces make for incessant change. They have never respected institutions, or orthodox beliefs—political, social or intellectual. They always tend to vindicate the telling phrase of the late Henry B. Brewster—one of the most finely-poised minds of the past half-century—“The sub-title of man’s history might be: *Annals of the Discomfiture of the Orthodox.*”

“Pacifist” orthodoxy is already wearing thin. It has never recovered from the blow dealt it by Japanese aggression in Manchuria during the autumn of 1931 and afterwards, and it was shattered by Italian aggression against Abyssinia in the autumn of 1935. So thin has it worn that a logical British philosopher, Professor Broad of Cambridge University, gives

pacifists the grim advice (*The Hibbert Journal*, April, 1936) to commit suicide rather than fight for their countries in the next war. "This," he writes, "is the course which I should recommend to those of them who do not think that there is an overwhelming obligation not to take one's own life." He goes on to say: "The next life, if there be one, must be bad indeed if it is worse than this life will be in time of war; and the gas in your oven, if not less deadly, is far more merciful than that which you will encounter on the battlefield or in the streets of your own town if it should be bombed."

In writing thus Professor Broad may have meant to give a jolt to pacifist minds by reducing *ad absurdum* the self-righteousness with which "conscientious objectors" and their apologists often claim that those who refuse to approve of or to take part in war, for any reason whatever, are really more heroic than their fellows who may be ready to face all the perils of the battlefield for the sake of their countries or of their ideals. It looks as though there were something to be said for Major-General J. F. C. Fuller's contention in the Prologue to his work, *The Dragon's Teeth*, that civilisation will not be destroyed by war but by its "unfitness to wage peace." By "the waging of peace" he means determined effort to improve the quality of human life so that it may approach more nearly to life in a perfect world. Though a perfect world is unattainable, this, he says, "is no reason why it should not be striven after; for the more we strive the nearer we approach it. We know that in space we can never penetrate to infinity, but this does not prevent us inventing

telescopes, and yearly penetrating deeper and deeper into this mystery."

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General Fuller wrote of "inventing telescopes" before there was news of the great adventure of making the 200-inch telescope for the Mount Wilson Observatory in the United States, which has stirred the minds of men more deeply than any other triumph of science and technology in the past five years. It sheds the brighter lustre on the human race because it serves no mercenary or utilitarian purpose. It is pure glory of the spirit.

The Mount Wilson telescope may not strike "pacifists" as advancing the cause of peace even by the width of its lens, for most of them are sadly lacking in imagination. Yet it may, as the British Astronomer-Royal has shown, extend knowledge of very remote universes and give men—at the cost of only £2,000,000—a clearer view of the place of this small planet in our universe and, indirectly, ask them what the meaning of their lives on it may be. This, indeed, is the very riddle which war puts to them on another plane of thought. By helping to lessen human ignorance and showing what can be done by indomitable minds, the Mount Wilson telescope may prove to be a work conceived in the truest spirit of peace. It is the fruit of a conception not far removed from that which John Ruskin put forward in 1865 when he lectured "On War" to the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. He claimed that all great art had been inspired by the emotions which war—of the self-sacrificing, personal kind—had aroused in

men and that, in this sense, conflict is the foundation of all the arts—that is to say, of all the higher virtues and faculties of men. He went on :

“ The creative, or foundational, war is that in which the natural restlessness and love of contest among men are disciplined, by consent, into modes of beautiful—though it may be fatal—play ; in which the natural ambition and love of power in men are disciplined into the aggressive conquest of surrounding evils ; and in which the natural instincts of self-defence are sanctified by the nobleness of the institutions, and the purity of the households, which they are appointed to defend. To such war as this all men are born ; in such war as this any man may happily die ; and out of such war as this have arisen, throughout the extent of past ages, all the highest sanctities and virtues of humanity.”

For “ creative war ” write “ creative peace,” and we have here a good account of the kind of adventure to which peace-lovers are called. Ruskin thought the quest of beauty, in art and conduct, the worthiest adventure, inasmuch as it offered the noblest way of escape from the ugly and the commonplace, the fullest activity for the loftier faculties of the human soul. Men are ever seeking some such way of escape. They may find it in art or in scientific research, in religion or philosophy, in clean sport, or in devotion to a cause greater than themselves. But it is always something that raises them above the level of material cares. I am convinced that they will never overcome war unless they seek an escape from its senseless destructiveness and inhumanity in the understanding that peace, conceived as an adventure, will offer them openings for individual prowess and national glory

more exalted than any which conquerors of fame have ever descried.

The fatal flaw in the non-war conception of peace is that it fails to lift men above their ordinary selves. So fatal is this flaw that not even the abolition of mass-killing, by mechanics or chemistry, will be achieved unless non-war be approached as a phase preliminary to the waging of peace. If men can be brought to feel the thrill of the adventure which lies beyond war they will take non-war in their stride. With their eyes upon the goal they will spring lightly over the stumbling-blocks at their feet. Hardly will they pause to question whether the outlawry of war entails the renunciation of neutrality, or to insist upon their individual and national sovereignties to the point of denying that they and their peoples are their brothers' keepers. They will readily admit, and act upon the admission, that all members of an international community are bound, alike in self-interest and in honour, to join, actively or passively, in upholding a common law of nations by any needful threat or exercise of lawful force. They will grasp instinctively the truth that, in a world set free from war, the only rightful function of armaments, reduced to a minimum, is to serve as elements of an—increasingly superfluous—police force, and they will turn their minds to the major task of purifying and beautifying a war-scarred "civilisation."

* * * * *

This will be in the future. Whether it be near or distant none can yet say. It may be nearer than many imagine. On the other hand, Mr. H. G. Wells

may be right in putting the dawn of non-war beyond a universal disaster. Men may not learn in time. True it is that the thought of war has fashioned the very fabric of human institutions, determining their structure in ways unsuspected. The idea of sovereignty, national, social and personal, runs through them all. There is uncomfortable cogency in the claim of a French writer, M. Julien Benda, that the revolt of the French bourgeoisie against the effort of the League of Nations, under belated and wavering British leadership, to check Italian aggression in Abyssinia was prompted by the thought that, should the League succeed in chastising an aggressor and in making his violence unprofitable, it might in the end suppress war. Evidently, M. Benda wrote, there exists in France—and, he might have said, in other countries also—a whole class of citizens who deeply hate the League of Nations. It is not that they love war. They have no special vocation for heroism, nor do they wish to see their children killed or taxation heavily increased. They desire only that “the people” should believe war to be possible and even likely, and they object to the enfeebling of this belief which, they feel, preserves in the people a latent readiness to uphold a social and political hierarchy, to obey orders and to recognise superiors. In reality, says M. Benda, they reason thus: “The people must have something to fear. They no longer fear God; they must fear war. While keeping them in fear of it let us at all costs avoid war which, for us as for the people, has become hard to endure.”

Though this is not the whole truth it is part of the truth, the part which affects possessors of privilege

and sovereignty ; and the yearning for unmitigated sovereignty lies deep in human hearts. Resistance to the plea for an international common law springs mainly from the thought that such a law, as the acknowledged rule of conduct in an international community, must circumscribe national sovereignties. These sovereignties are economic as well as political. Little might have been gained if warlessness, in the form of freedom from outside attack, were to imply only the limitation or the suppression of the right to make war, and were to leave room for unfettered economic nationalism. The limitation of a nation's sovereign right to wage economic war would, however, carry with it the admission that the property of nations and, to some extent, the personal property of citizens, are not absolute sovereignties ; that they are held under "servitude," as a trust. Such a spectacle as has been witnessed during the past few years when some regions of the world have stifled in unsaleable abundance, while others have hungered in penury, would be accounted so grave a scandal, so burning a reproach in a world set free for peace, as to be deemed intolerable.

Politically and socially the foremost need in such a world would be to give a new stability, at once elastic and dynamic, to civilised communities. The present instability of industrial communities in which tens of millions of political citizens live in economic dependence (when work can be found for them) and in thinly disguised or actual pauperism (when it cannot) would be spurned as incompatible with social well-being and with personal freedom. The danger that the economically unfree—ignorant and misled—

might, by taking counsel and acting together, enforce their rule upon the whole community, would be seen in all its menace. Economic citizenship, without which there can be no true social stability, would be recognised as a postulate of self-preservation. The very philosophy of freedom would be recast in the light of the truth that real freedom lies in opportunity for individual development and in the toleration of individual opinions under laws and institutions so good and just that every citizen would feel guilty were he supinely to suffer them to be assailed.

Yet salvation may not come from thought alone. Intellectual movements sometimes need the stimulus of material interests, or of fear, before they can gather momentum and make headway. Just as fear of aerial attack with poison gas and incendiary bombs has given the spur to thought upon non-war and has clothed it with feeling, so the sense of impending social, political or economic catastrophe may be wanted to teach men, once again, faith in freedom. As Mr. Hamilton Fish Armstrong contended in a weighty article upon "Power-Politics and Peace" (*Foreign Affairs*, October, 1935), Rousseau preached democracy, and the French bourgeoisie found that their welfare would be served by this political doctrine. The unexpected success of Cobdenism was due to a "union of morals and money bags." On the other hand, Mr. H. A. L. Fisher is undoubtedly justified in saying, as he says in his *History of Europe*, that "it would be too great a simplification of issues to regard the European story as nothing but a struggle of classes, a clash of economic interests." Yet he recognises that "the tides of liberty have now suddenly

receded over wide tracts of Europe" and that "an insane racialism threatens to rupture the seamless garment of civilisation" by war. Perhaps his hope that the future will "replace our squandered treasure of humanity, toleration and good sense" is inspired by the reflection that the menace of destructive modern warfare may bring a philosophy of vital peace into honour and once again reveal the saving virtue of liberal thought.

One reason why men who pride themselves upon being "practical" reject liberal thought and despair of peace is that, at moments of stress or doubt, they choose what they imagine to be the easiest course. They counsel obedience to some kind of forceful authority, and extol dictatorial systems which, they fancy, will "deliver the goods" of security and efficiency. It is only when the consequences of acquiescence in unfreedom are borne in upon them that they begin to wonder whether the easiest path may not be a short cut to disaster. Not a few of these "practical" men, in several countries, gave their support to the League of Nations as long as they thought it a kind of insurance company against the disturbance and the losses inseparable from war. They turned upon the League when they saw that, having no authority of its own, its power must be derived from the willingness of its member-States, including their own, to take risks. Then they cried aloud: "Sanctions mean War!" and drew back in alarm, forgetting that sanctions only mean war when there is doubt whether they will be collectively and firmly applied. They were not ready to pay the price of peace. These men really wished for temporary

non-war which they called "the blessings of peace"—blessings they were eager to enjoy provided the cost were small. And they were too indolent of mind, or too dull-witted, to perceive that even the "blessings of peace" would pall upon mankind if the ultimate "blessing" should be no better than a riskless existence in slothful ease.

* * * * *

The economic aspects of the peace adventure are, indeed, hardly less weighty than the political. In an essay on "The Economic Causes of War" Sir Arthur Salter declared in 1932 that, if preventive machinery could restrain political resentments from causing another war for a considerable period of time, the economic struggle would be the main concern of mankind. The contest between individuals and groups, whether of the same or of different countries, would, he thought, remain a basic element in human lives since economic forces are potentially the strongest in the world; and "if they are so developed and directed that their collective might comes into conflict with any human institution (such as the League of Nations) it is difficult to conceive the institution that should withstand the strain." For these reasons he felt that, in case economic competition should inspire policies and lead to the adoption of methods such as to create a growing sense of injury and injustice, and if such policies and methods were backed by the authority of national Governments, no preventive machinery would be likely to fulfil its purpose. Hence peace would depend not only upon the character of the machinery designed to prevent war but upon the

answer to the question whether the normal economic life of the world were or were not such as to create "deep and intensely felt divergences of policy and interest."

The words "intensely felt" are important. The causes of war are mainly emotional, and it is always in the power of absolute Governments, ruling over unfree peoples, to engender racial or nationalist passions and to foster resentment of alleged injustices the reality of which those peoples have no means of judging. This applies especially to claims based upon pressure of population. Such claims need to be considered on their merits; and it is only when fear of war has been exorcised that explosive issues connected with local surpluses of population can be examined and dealt with. Since there is no surplus of world population the question of local surpluses involves the further question whether the pressure of an increasing population (which may be artificially increased) gives a country a moral right to demand an extension of its territory or, alternatively, to insist either upon the admission of its nationals as emigrants to other countries or upon wider scope for its trade.

Alongside of the population problem, in its bearing upon peace, runs that of tariffs and export duties. In April, 1919, the well-known French political economist, M. André Siegfried, laid down the principle, in a memorandum prepared for the League of Nations, that the free disposal of a country's natural wealth entails the sovereign right to regulate or to forbid exports, and to subject imports to tariff restrictions. But he asked whether the exercise of this right might not appear aggressive if a producing country, holding

a monopoly of a certain commodity, should forbid its export, and if there existed also a principal buyer who could not do without it. Would not the would-be buyer, if powerful, be tempted to make sure of getting the product of which it would fear to be deprived? And if its needs were thwarted, would it not intervene even by force to get it? It might be tempted to seize the territory of the producing State or to establish a protectorate over it.

Where would the right lie? M. Siegfried answered that, given the accepted idea of national independence and sovereignty, the State which desired to retain the whole of the raw materials that it produces is within its rights; but that if it is a question of raw materials of which the possession or the control constitutes a sort of monopoly, it is obvious that reason, if not virtue, would counsel a producing State not to insist upon its sovereignty to the extent of thwarting a powerful importing State. This he thought a matter rather of economic good manners than of international morals, and he hoped that a code of international good manners might come to be accepted by the strong as well as by the weak—a hope shared by the eminent German economist Dr. Moritz Bonn, who, in dealing with restrictions upon migration, wrote that “manners, after all, count for something in the economic world as well as measures.”

* * * * *

This mention of “good manners” touches on an essential point. There used to be “good manners” in war. Even after the age of chivalry, knightly usage and behaviour were held in high esteem. In the

social sphere the principle that "noblesse oblige" reflected the same spirit. Nor is the value of good manners belittled by proof that they arose originally from some necessity or, at least, from a wish to avoid drawbacks which the untrammelled assertion of individual power or right might entail. To forgo this assertion is, indeed, to accept a limitation of personal sovereignty for the sake, in the first instance, it may be, of general convenience or in order to avoid resentment, though the limitation may gradually be established as a code of conduct for the good of others. By the idealisation of this process the conception of "gentleness," in the sense of nobility of feeling and behaviour, spread and permeated the upper strata of society. "Gentle," or gentlemanly, manners became a sign of "good breeding," as distinguished from boorishness or ostentatious display of power or wealth. Bayard, the "knight without fear and without reproach," was accounted a paragon of good manners, and Sir Philip Sidney earned like fame. Cervantes made his "Don Quixote" ludicrous by taking as his model Don Juan of Austria who had sought to practise knightliness in a degenerate and treacherous world.

The adventure of peace will demand sustained knightliness among members of an international community. It will be a new era of chivalry calling for a new order of knighthood. Nations belonging to this order will accept, nay, they will seek openings for self-devotion, occasions to prove their merit and to get honour. It will be a point of honour on the part of stronger and wealthier communities to help the weaker, to succour the needy without thought of material reward. This may be easier when the cost

of armaments shall have ceased to be a heavy drain upon national resources, and the vast sums now spent unproductively under the stimulus of fear can be devoted to knightly works. Nor will these works be charitable only. They will be organised campaigns to subdue the forces of nature and to turn them to human account. International standards of honour will be determined by the readiness and the ability of nations greatly to serve mankind.

Whom do we honour today more highly than the men and women who, flashing through the skies in fragile aircraft, swiftly put a girdle round the earth—unless it be such men as the Nova Scotia miners who answered the call to stake their lives in the attempt to rescue three other men entombed in a gold mine? Who, among the heroes of old, outshone in steady fearlessness the men and women who struggle obscurely to vanquish disease, and daily court death in advancing the sum of human knowledge or human mastery over physical evil? Yet present achievements may seem humble in comparison with what will be done when the resources and the courage now mortgaged to preparation for war can be pledged to the adventure of peace.

In this adventure men will find at last the meaning of life, and will answer triumphantly the riddle which war puts to them. They will then understand—what seers have long known—that the true purpose of life, its supreme sanction, is to serve others in high endeavour which, whether it succeed or fail, bears the ennobling stamp of selfless effort. In war, born of ambition or greed, the answer can never be found. War in righteous self-defence may suggest it; but not

until the need for self-defence has disappeared, and the ugly lusts that bid nations and men attack others have been placed under iron constraint or tamed by sheer necessity, will the meaning of life on this earth be fully revealed.

* * * * *

The civilised world is fast approaching if, in truth, it has not reached an hour of fateful decision. Its choice—not yet between war and peace but between war and non-war—trembles in the balance. For want of clear-minded and high-hearted understanding of adventurous peace, the thoughts and feelings of more than one great nation are again being turned towards “profitable” war. This is not only because pestilent philosophies have been revived and placed in the service of an insane nationalism or an equally insane racialism. It is because our present “civilisation” offers too few outlets for lofty endeavour to too small a proportion of mankind. At the end of his thought-provoking book *The Shape of Things to Come* Mr. H. G. Wells suggests the transformation which “ordinary” men might undergo if needless impediments to their freedom were removed. Though he puts their emancipation from war on the yonder side of devastating catastrophe, his vision of the future might well come true on the hither side if the leaders of nations could rise to the height of their opportunity. Speaking of the release of human energy from primary needs, by applied science and mechanical power in a warless world, he says that this “is a process that seems likely to continue indefinitely. . . . There is a continual sublimation of interest. Man becomes

more curious, more excited, more daring, skilful, and pleasantly occupied every year. The more we learn of the possibilities of our world and the possibilities of ourselves, the richer, we learn, is our inheritance. This planet, which seemed so stern a mother to mankind, is discovered to be inexhaustible in its bounty. And the greatest discovery man has made has been the discovery of himself. Leonardo da Vinci with his immense breadth of vision, his creative fervour, his curiosity, his power of intensive work, was the precursor of the ordinary man, as the world is now producing him."

"Now," in Mr. Wells's computation, is some two centuries hence. There is no sufficient reason why it should not be two generations hence if the initial price of peace be paid by the organisation of non-war in the next few years. Though, in the belief of one of the foremost living mechanicians, our knowledge of mechanics is still rudimentary, we have reached a point at which the industrial machinery of the world could turn out in six months all the goods mankind would be able to consume in a year. Unemployment and economic dislocation, threatening to social stability, are among the preliminary consequences; nor have "planning" and "new deals" yet done more than tinker at the problem which these phenomena reveal. This problem, in terms of mechanical production, resolves itself broadly into the question whether civilisation is to be the master or the slave of its machines. Are machines, by "saving labour," to destroy human lives and livelihoods? Surely there is something wrong with a system so unhappy-go-lucky. Maybe we have allowed the principle of respect

for private property to run mad ; maybe that, just as we have curtailed individual sovereignties in other directions, we shall have to subordinate the private ownership and use of machinery to the general welfare. We dare not allow our machines to master us, no matter whether they be machines for production or machines for war ; nor, if we care for the quality of our civilisation, dare we deny human beings the right to acquire the skill and craftsmanship which ennoble toil.

To enhance the quality of human life in a warless world is the main task of civilisation. In the last resort it is a task more moral than political, though, in the first place, it may be more political than economic. Belief that men live by bread alone, that what Marx and Engels denounced as the " cold cash nexus between man and man " can serve to cement any enduring social or international structure, is a heresy at once degrading and false. When the plain duty of any civilisation has been discharged—that of producing and fairly distributing enough food and material necessities to supply the elementary wants of men—a question may arise of providing openings and incentives for effort in a society burdened with too much leisure. Work, solely for the sake of work, will be no solution. True though it be that leisure, in the shape of unemployment or hopeless idleness, is an unmixed evil, work that is soulless drudgery may be little better, save in so far as it and its results are recognised and rewarded as indispensable services to the community ; and there is much force in the claim that unattractive work, done as a form of social discipline, should replace military conscription in a warless world.

One day, it may be said, more machines will do this work. However this may be, there is likely long to remain a sufficiency of monotonous toil for the performance of it to be looked upon as an honourable form of service in which all should share for a term of years. Unwittingly, the methods of social constraint employed by present systems of unfreedom may be tending in this direction. The evil of those systems—of which the aim is to enforce herd-like unanimity in support of racial or national ambitions—and the deepest reason why they are incompatible with peace is that they deny both the intrinsic worth of human freedom and the principle of political tolerance which is a condition of it. The ideal of peace implies constant, non-violent adjustment between contending claims or assertions in the light of ascertainable truth, and toleration of differences in a spirit of charitable equity. Absolute systems, upheld by armed minorities and working by dictation and forcible intolerance, cannot countenance even the measure of international disarmament that is needed for the establishment of non-war, lest disarmament restrict their own power to hold down the peoples under their rule.

A community, national or international, organised for peace and careful of the quality of life, may have to revive some of the higher concepts of the feudal system under which property was held and privilege enjoyed in return for sworn readiness to do a given duty. To some extent these principles have been rediscovered by enlightened business men, in the United States and elsewhere, during the past generation; and in many countries the Boy Scout and Girl

Guide movements are schools of knightly service. The memorable phrase of an English leader of Girl Guides—"Service is the rent we pay for our room on earth"—puts the thing in a nutshell.

If there still be time the seed thus sown in young and eager minds will germinate and bear good fruit. We are moving towards a new, or a new-old, conception of property and sovereignty, national and individual. It springs from belief that material possessions and individual talents are a trust, not solely means for self-assertion or self-gratification. "Noblesse oblige" underlies it—the sense that special aptitudes, special skill in thought and deed, special possessions and special privileges entail obligations to others, and that only by the discharge of these obligations can honour be justly won. In a world beyond war this sense would foster a new knightliness in the service of a new chivalry. Its ample reward would be the consciousness that duty had been done without fear and without reproach.

* * * * *

I foresee the criticism that I take for granted ideal conditions, and that it is futile to dwell upon what might be in a world beyond war when the world today seems smitten with the madness that drives men and nations to self-destruction. My answer is that, by discerning what might be, men and nations may yet find courage to stay the rush towards disaster. The hour is dark. It should become the hour before the dawn. Though unpunished aggression in North-East Africa appear triumphant, though the rearmament of Nazi Germany has thrown Europe into a

paroxysm of fear, the doom of peace may not be irrevocable. It need not be unless faint-heartedness invite an evil fate. Then, indeed, the lines of Arnold Toynbee's Greek "Epitaph on Abyssinians and Europeans" (in Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy's English rendering) may prove prophetic :

" Without our arms or art, these men could dare
War's utmost frightfulness, since men they were ;

But we, whose science makes us strong and great,
Are doomed to share the tortures of their fate,
Yet not their soldiers' grave ; the gods in scorn
Withhold that privilege from men forsworn."

Forsworn, or all but forsworn, though we be, the gods may perchance spare us awhile till it appear whether or not we have the heart and the wit boldly to face the risks of non-war, and to keep such vigil in arms as may be ordained before we can test our knighthood in the adventure of peace. I have been careful not to assume that mankind will be fit for this adventure until avoidable woe has taught it another hard lesson. In that event "the shape of things to come" will be hidden from this generation. Yet, soon or late, men will turn their minds from murderous folly towards creative risk and will find the upward path. I would have them seek it forthwith as a company of gentleman adventurers in quest of vital peace.

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