

CIVILIAN MORALE

Second Yearbook of the Society for the
Psychological Study of Social Issues.

Goodwin Watson
Editor

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Preface

"Morale" has been an abused word. The eager desire of citizens to be of more service to their country, in this hour of great danger, tends to concentrate on something supposedly having to do with "morale." Baseball, sermons, night clubs, red-white-and-blue posters, uniforms, vitamin pills, martial music, V symbols, boys' clubs, morning calisthenics, news reels of enemy atrocities, and hundreds of other activities have been defended as "building morale." Some thoughtful people have come to wonder whether it might not be better to drop the word entirely.

With all the talk, there has been too little scientific understanding. No one can doubt the basic importance of morale. Our whole national effort—in factories, in Washington, on ships at sea and in air, and in the army lines—depends upon morale. If the war is long drawn out, the importance of sound morale will increase. Only we shall need facts and sound analysis, not loose propaganda, pep talks, and rationalization of whatever may be traditional, pleasant, or profit-bringing.

The main purpose of this book is to tell America what scientific investigation of morale has thus far demonstrated. The research is still, of course, unfinished. It is hoped that this book may itself stimulate more and better studies of morale. But we cannot wait until the facts are all in. Research has a frontier but no final boundary. Meanwhile a war must be won. Here then, is an interim report on what psychologists now think about morale problems.

The book appears as the second yearbook* of the Society for

* The first yearbook, edited by George W. Hartmann and Theodore M. Newcomb, was entitled *Industrial Conflict: A Psychological Interpretation*, and was published in 1940.

Psychological Study of Social Issues. This Society is an affiliate of the American Psychological Association, with two main purposes. One is to turn the attention of psychological research toward the urgent problems of our present social, economic, and political life. The other is to make available to citizens, and especially to officials in a position to determine policy, the conclusions which can be drawn from scientific study of human behavior.

Concern with American morale in the face of a developing world crisis was evidenced at the meeting of the S.P.S.S.I. in September, 1940. At that time a Committee on Morale was appointed, under the chairmanship of Professor Gardner Murphy. During the year 1940-1941 interest in morale grew, and at the 1941 meetings several programs of the American Psychological Association and of the American Association for Applied Psychology were devoted to discussions of morale. In accord with its purpose to communicate psychological findings on public questions, the S.P.S.S.I. decided, in September, 1941, to postpone some other yearbooks, and to concentrate immediate effort on a volume dealing with civilian morale. Professor Goodwin Watson of Teachers College, Columbia University, was appointed editor, and the book was planned in collaboration with the president of the S.P.S.S.I., Professor Kurt Lewin, University of Iowa, and the Society's secretary, Professor Theodore Newcomb, University of Michigan.

Psychologists, disciplined in careful scientific reserve, are reluctant to draw from their data the kind of conclusions which make newspaper headlines. Men in responsible posts of government and business must, however, make decisions even though the evidence is not 100 percent conclusive. The writers in this volume have been urged not only to use their research findings to the maximum, but also to go on to express their own judgment on what those facts should mean in social action. The result is a book which rests on foundations of science, but which includes also the wisdom and recommendations of men speaking as citizens of a democracy.

These findings and recommendations being of chief importance, it has been decided to avoid a distracting profusion of footnotes by placing the bibliography at the end of the book, where each chapter bibliography is separately listed and numbered, complete within itself. Numerical references in the text are to this bibliography; asterisks, etc., refer to the relatively few footnotes which appear on the text pages.

The attack on Pearl Harbor and the declarations of war came after most of the chapters had been prepared. Publication was necessarily delayed while manuscripts were revised to fit the war-time situation. It is a tribute to the foresight of this group of social scientists, however, that no changes in position or argument were required. Revisions consisted only of changes in phraseology and occasional illustrations. The development from defense of democracy to war against fascism had been anticipated, and the principles stated were as fundamental after we became a belligerent as they had been before, and as they are likely to be for peacetime reconstruction.

Especial acknowledgement is due to Katherine L. Bruner (Mrs. Jerome S. Bruner) for her assistance in putting manuscripts into proper form. The public should know also that the editor and all authors in this book have contributed their services without any financial return. Earnings from books prepared by the Society for Psychological Study of Social Issues are all used to further the objective of closer working relationships between psychological research and the pressing problems of our changing society.

G. W.

April, 1942.

Foreword

THE following set of principles governing the publication of its Yearbooks has been officially adopted by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues :

The Yearbooks of the Society are cooperative attempts to assemble psychological research and thought on specially designated social problems. They report new researches, summarize existing knowledge on the given topics, and, so far as justified, submit conclusions and recommendations in the form of plans of action. An important aim of the Yearbooks is to show that scientific methods can be helpfully applied in areas of social controversy. Since the Yearbooks aim to contribute to the solution of pressing problems and to stimulate further research upon them, available information will seldom be conclusive.

The Society sponsors these projects in the conviction that it is important to attempt psychological investigations on the issues represented. The Society makes every reasonable effort to secure as adequate and unbiased treatment of the problems as possible. However, the Society does not officially sponsor any findings, conclusions, or implications which the authors of the particular chapters or the editors report.

In presenting material of this type, it is especially important that every effort be made to adhere to the usual standards of scientific inquiry and discussion. Several more specific principles follow :

1. On any controversial issue, effort should be made to report all relevant evidence so far as this can be done. Where there is a dearth of evidence on certain phases of the problem, or where certain types of evidence are omitted, this fact should be pointed out.

Likewise, indication should be given of the extent to which conclusions go beyond the available evidence.

2. All evidence which is presented should conform as far as feasible to accustomed canons of scientific procedure. This refers to such matters as valid sampling, adequate statistical practices, statements of assumptions, and description of the sources and conditions under which data were obtained. Insofar as evidence falls short in these respects, appropriate note should be made of the fact.

3. In the interpretation of evidence concerning which competent analysts arrive at different conclusions, it is essential that the major differences be made explicit. The attempt should be made to state the alternative views in a way that will be acceptable to the adherents of the several views, although the space allotted to such statements must, of practical necessity, be determined by the judgment of the editors.

The undersigned have been elected by the members of the Society to serve as the Committee of Editorial Review. We have read the chapters submitted to us by the Editor, for inclusion in this volume, with the foregoing set of principles in mind. We hereby attest our approval of its publication.

JAMES J. GIBSON

ROBERT B. MACLEOD

ERNEST R. HILGARD, *Chairman.*

Table of Contents

PART ONE—THEORY OF MORALE

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	<i>The Nature of Democratic Morale</i> GORDON W. ALLPORT	3
II.	<i>The Psychodynamic Problem of Democracy</i> THOMAS M. FRENCH	19
III.	<i>Five Factors in Morale</i> GOODWIN WATSON	30
IV.	<i>Time Perspective and Morale</i> KURT LEWIN	48
V.	<i>Morale and National Character</i> GREGORY BATESON	71

PART TWO—HOW MORALE DEVELOPS

VI.	<i>Children are Important to Morale</i> LOIS BARCLAY MURPHY	95
VII.	<i>The Morale of Youth Groups</i> RONALD LIPPITT	119
VIII.	<i>Morale and the Training of Leaders</i> ALEX BAVELAS	143
IX.	<i>Propaganda and Morale</i> S. S. SARGENT	166
X.	<i>News and Morale: A Miniature Experiment</i> THEODORE NEWCOMB	175

PART THREE—THE STATE OF AMERICAN MORALE

CHAPTER	PAGE
XI. <i>American Morale When the War Began</i> DONALD RUGG	189
XII. <i>Student Morale</i> JOE AND EUGENIA BELDEN	208
XIII. <i>Morale and the Jewish Minority</i> OTTO KLINEBERG	218
XIV. <i>Morale Among Negroes</i> KENNETH B. CLARK	228
XV. <i>Morale in Canada</i> J. D. KETCHUM J. S. A. BOIS	249

PART FOUR—MORALE IN INDUSTRY

XVI. <i>Morale During Unemployment</i> GOODWIN WATSON	273
✓XVII. <i>Morale on the Job</i> RICHARD L. HULL, ARTHUR KOLSTAD	349
✓XVIII. <i>Labor Unions and Morale</i> GOODWIN WATSON	365

PART FIVE—RECOMMENDATIONS

XIX. <i>Essentials for a Civilian Morale Program in American Democracy</i> GARDNER MURPHY	405
<i>Bibliography</i>	437
<i>Index</i>	449

Part One: THEORY OF MORALE

- I. *The Nature of Democratic Morale*
- II. *The Psychodynamic Problem of Democracy*
- III. *Five Factors in Morale*
- IV. *Time Perspective and Morale*
- V. *Morale and National Character*

CHAPTER I

The Nature of Democratic Morale

GORDON W. ALLPORT

Harvard University

IT SEEMS that only in times of national peril do we take an interest in morale. After the Armistice of 1918 the term virtually disappeared from use. Bit by bit it crept back when a few years ago the ravages of the depression among the unemployed became a matter of national concern. But it was not until the summer of 1940 that "morale" seemed almost overnight to become the most fashionable and arresting of terms—the theme of countless lectures, conferences, articles. It is now the theme of a book, and will be the theme of more books to come. The sharp turn in events from a period of indecision to a state of war alters, but by no means eliminates, the problem of building a sound and invincible democratic morale in America.

Morale, like health and sanity, has to do with a *background* condition in living. It is found in the fringe rather than in the focus of consciousness, and in describing fringes of consciousness our scientific language is poor and inept. What, for example, is the psychologist to do with the "Jeffersonian tradition" that lies somehow recessed in the intellectual and emotional life of a hundred million American citizens? That this tradition is an important factor in daily conduct no one can deny, but its effects are so diffused that we can neither describe its structure in our minds nor measure its influence upon our behavior. When to the teachings of Jefferson and other founding fathers we add the impact of orthodox and reformed Christianity, the traditions of libertarianism, intellectualism, and humanism—all intermingled to form a faith in the sacredness of the human person and in popular government—we are forced to conclude that the really im-

portant supports for our national morale reside in remote corners of our personalities, and are not easily accessible to analysis.

Yet even with this handicap the psychologist feels that he has something to contribute to the common cause of building and maintaining the morale of America so that it may be fully equal to the storms and dangers that lie ahead. His habits of observation and fact-collecting do help him to assess the mental and emotional strength and weakness of the people, and he hopes that his insights will assist administrators and educators actively engaged in the task of building resistance, courage, and a positive will.

Morale Defined

Morale has to do with individual attitude in a group endeavor. Two of its essential features are predominantly personal and private in character, and the third is predominantly social. A satisfactory definition must include all three.

The first ingredient of morale is the possession by the individual of a solid set of convictions and values which for him make life worth living. Because he believes that he is able to meet whatever emergencies the future has in store for him, his emotional tone is high. He is prepared to put forth a zestful defense of those values that to him engender meaning in life.

Second, the individual is aware of specific tasks that he must carry through, of problems that he must solve, in order to defend and extend his store of values. His immediate purposes are held clearly in view, with the result that his convictions are channelized into co-ordinated, skillful, and decisive action. Without a task to be performed, a plan to be carried through, morale would be little more than an oceanic feeling of bliss, agreeable no doubt, but ineffectual.

Third, in times of common peril there must be an essential harmony between the values and aims of the individual and those of his group. There must likewise be an essential harmony and co-ordination in their output of effort. A group commits suicide

if in times of common danger each member pursues his own course oblivious of the common good and common safety.

These three necessary ingredients of morale have to do respectively with the *preparation* of the individual, with his *participation*, and with the *solidarity of the group*. From them we can construct a definition of national morale.

By high national morale we mean (a) the healthful state of the convictions and values in the individual citizen that endows him with abundant energy and confidence in facing the future; (b) his decisive, self-disciplined effort to achieve specific objectives that derive from his personal convictions and values; and (c) the agreement among citizens (especially in times of crisis) in respect to their convictions and values and the co-ordination of their efforts in attaining necessary objectives.

Are Democratic Morale and Totalitarian Morale Alike?

If human nature is everywhere basically the same, and if the requirements of social cohesion are essentially similar from culture to culture, then the above definition of morale applies in principle to national groups whatever their political tradition, whether totalitarian, democratic, monarchic, or nomadic. Such a universal interpretation of the definition is correct, so far as it goes. But it is not very helpful if we are interested in the particular requirements of high morale in a specific culture. Since our special interest lies in the upbuilding of a sturdy *democratic* morale in the United States, we must continue our analysis for the purpose of specifying just what forms of preparedness, participation, and solidarity are appropriate to *our* national group.

First, however, we are confronted with a grimly realistic objection. Some thoughtful people, psychologists among them, believe that to talk about "democratic morale" at the present time is intolerable sentimentalism, a futile gesture of sweetness and light in the face of grisly reality. These hard-headed counselors warn us against being too academic, too fearful of our own aggression

and not fearful enough of the enemy's aggression. It is vain, they say, to emphasize the spiritual and peace-loving components of democratic morale when wolves and jackals threaten. They point out that in a life-and-death struggle it is brute strength that counts, and that the side using the most bestial and least democratic of tactics is likely to win. A strictly democratic morale, they insist, can be no match for the macabre indecency of totalitarian attack.

This forceful argument applies fairly well to conditions of actual combat where blind obedience, primitive emotional excitement, and hate prevail. Many of the qualities demanded on the field of battle have no place in the ethics of democracy. Be it said, however, that face-to-face encounters with the enemy are relatively brief in their duration, and that the strength of moral reserve in the combatants is drawn from deep regions in the personality. The soldier of a democracy, even though in combat superficially indistinguishable from his frenzied opponent, finds himself sustained by unique springs of energy. His background, his hopes, his values, his objectives are different from those of the Fuehrer-enslaved totalitarian. And it is from these unique features of his morale that we expect his superiority to stem, especially under conditions of adversity.

It is true that the fully developed person, provided he finds in democracy satisfactions for his basic wants, ordinarily harbors few impulses of aggression. The conditions of freedom under which he develops leave little dammed-up hostility to release upon an out-group. But unfortunately, peace-loving people tend to ascribe their own peaceful intentions to others, to trust where they should not trust—a form of projection that might be called “Chamberlain's error.” As long ago as 1822 President Monroe pointed out that by their very nature democracies do not provide at the proper season for great emergencies, that for war they are always caught unprepared—a form of self-deception that might be called “the Pearl Harbor error.” But Monroe believed—as all

democrats must believe—that, once aroused, their own form of morale can be equal to any demands upon it.

It is, therefore, psychologically sound to distinguish in essence between the morale of a true democrat and the morale of a subject living under a dictatorship. Even though in actual combat the distinction is blurred and a purely democratic type of morale is difficult to preserve, still the contrast is vitally important. To keep it in mind not only enables us to build on the unique strength of democracy, but also enables us to keep our moral purposes straight, so that after the period of confusion and unavoidable lapses, the nation may return (as thus far it always has) to its own guiding ethic. The mark of a true democrat is that he sees no progress in any social action unless it is based upon sincere respect for the individual, and unless it results ultimately in the growth of human personality. From this fundamental creed of living (utterly opposed to the creed of all dictatorships) democratic morale draws both its power and its meaning.

The Unique Features of Democratic Morale * 1, 2, 3

The analysis that follows is intended to provide criteria for testing concrete programs of action. Psychological principles and normative standards are brought together in what we may call ethical-practical rules for the advancement of democratic morale. Without presuming to condemn any individual practice that violates one or more of these rules, we can nevertheless assert that a practice is ordinarily to be commended for abiding by these rules and to be criticized for departing too widely from their spirit.

* None of these features is found in totalitarian morale. The characteristics of the latter are set forth in the studies listed in the bibliography; see page 437. In the preparation of the present study Dr. C. L. Golightly has given valued assistance.

Superior numbers here, and others similarly inserted throughout this book, refer to books, articles, etc., listed in the Bibliography at the back of the book before the Index. Items in the Bibliography are arranged and numbered alphabetically by chapter. This reference, for example, refers to items 1, 2 and 3 under the references for Chapter I in the Bibliography.

Democracy is not a fixed and absolute array of moral scruples to which unswerving obedience is demanded. It is an unrealized ideal, a light from beyond the horizon. Exigencies of the moment delay our progress. Strategy may momentarily deflect our course. But in general the unique strength of morale in a democracy can be fully realized only if these psycho-ethical criteria are kept in mind when we develop our programs of morale-building.

VOLUNTARY, WHOLEHEARTED PARTICIPATION

A program is good if it arouses in Americans a sense of personal responsibility for sharing in the task of protecting democracy.

This criterion does not approve the practice of dictators who coerce obedience through police power, through fear, or through the arousal of hypnotic frenzy in personalities prepared by rhythmic drill, dervish-like chanting, and oratory. It does approve campaigns for securing a voluntary mobilization of talents for national defense. It approves appeals to the public to express appreciation (as well as criticism) of their government, to express gratitude for the benefits they have received. It approves campaigns to secure prompt and willing payment of taxes as the dues all citizens owe for the privilege of living in a country that serves them well. It advocates education respecting the obligations of citizenship. Being as a rule more alert to our privileges than to our duties, we need, especially in times of war, to have the latter kept constantly before our minds.

RESPECT FOR THE PERSON

A program is good if its aim and practice are intended to further the well-being, growth, and integrity of each individual personality.

A democracy believes that the maximum development possible in each individual is for the best interests of all, and it imposes

only such regulation upon this development as is judged necessary for safeguarding equal privilege of development in others. A morale-building program, therefore, should take pains to prevent hysterical persecutions. Unlike the dictatorships, a democracy can countenance no intentionally planned state crimes: dissenting opinion cannot be a ground for persecution. An individual and he alone (never his family or his race) can be held accountable for his misdoings. Charity and love are tonic emotions in wartime as well as in peace. Morale-building programs should give encouragement to benevolent organizations to extend their work.

Respect for the person is not altogether a principle of lenience. It engenders a sentiment of powerful hatred of oppression. Respect for the person is the motive power behind Jefferson's oft-quoted pledge, "I have sworn upon the altar of God eternal hostility to every form of tyranny over the mind of man." Especially in wartime is it well to stiffen the militant fiber of the nation by arousing this very sentiment. Already strong, it can be stimulated and augmented until it becomes the dominant factor in winning the war. Militant and psychologically effective, it is at the same time entirely consonant with the ethics of democracy.

UNIVERSALISM

A program is good if it stresses the basic tenet of democracy that all persons have equal rights to the pursuit of happiness, to liberty, and to life; and also if it includes, beyond the demand for national defense, a prevision of a better world after the war for all peoples, regardless of race and nationality.

Even though the defense of democracy is at the moment bound together with the defense of this nation, yet it is impossible to conceive of democracy as a purely nationalistic creed. The strengthening of morale at home legitimately entails the hope for a better world. The assertions of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter were of necessity statements of universal aims for the common man everywhere. To attempt to build morale on the basis

of fanatic nationalism is to exclude the peculiar strength of the universal inherent in the democratic appeal.

Realism compels us to admit that in this country millions of our own people still live behind discriminatory barriers. Their accusation is that while we preach democracy for the world we make little attempt to achieve it at home. The morale of these citizens can be raised only by programs that honestly put forth an effort to make democracy reach into every realm of human association inside America. We cannot expect immediate and final success, but the mere fact that injustices are being fought will strengthen the morale of those whose cause is recognized as just. The Negro, for example, does not ask a complete prior solution of his problems before he participates in national defense; he asks merely that the democratic idea extend itself in his direction even while it is reaching across the seas.*

ECONOMIC SELF-RESPECT AND SOCIAL STATUS

A program is good if it provides for reasonable security, fair treatment, and honorable status in the group for all individuals.

If a nation has many unemployed, its morale is inevitably low. Many recent studies have clearly established the fact that in our culture a job, in addition to being a provision of security, is a symbol of status, a source of self-respect. A morale-building program is to be commended if it helps to obtain adequately paid and socially acceptable jobs for as many people as possible.

Status is obtained through a standard of living that enables the individual to take his place unabashed in community endeavors. It is also provided through adequate recognition of the contributions of those whose work is essential to the welfare of the nation. The soldier, the factory worker, the shipbuilder, should be accorded the prestige that their services merit. The laborer is too often cited for strikes and too seldom for his productive industry. Newspapers carry too few stories of the accomplishments

* See further discussion of Negro morale in Chapter XIV.

of factory workers. Prestige, of which there seems to be a limited amount in competitive cultures, in any co-operative endeavor becomes almost limitless; the contributions of each member can be praised, and there is honor enough to go around.

If democracy and capitalism are historically linked, so too are democracy and the protest against capitalism. Therefore it is false to identify the morale of a democracy with allegiance to the profit system. Public corporations, co-operatives, private or public collectivism are entirely compatible with democracy. It is accordingly consistent with a morale-building program to advocate those economic reforms that will best guarantee the continued expansion of the democratic view into all aspects of our national life.

MAJORITY RULE

A program is good if it expresses the majority will of the people, and if it enhances the acceptance of the principle of majority rule.

No morale-building policy can advocate schemes that would set up rule by an elite, whether of family, of race, or of wealth. The criterion calls for willing acceptance, by all, of the pooled judgment of the maximum number of interested and informed individuals. It calls also for the acceptance of a representative government, which has been found to be an economy necessitated by the size of the population. Loyal oppositions are encouraged. The multiparty system is defended, but the losing groups are expected to co-operate with the government in all essential matters.

It is a psychological fact that most people agree on vaguely stated propositions but incline to quarrel over specific objectives and immediate policies. It is here that good sportsmanship is especially needed, for it is particularly hard for us to accept detailed decisions formulated by our opponents. Even in wartime there are impulses to favor one's own subgroup within the nation and to force upon the latter special policies and solutions not desired by the majority.

REPRESENTATIVE AND EVOCATIVE LEADERSHIP

A program is good if it raises the confidence of people in their chosen leaders.

Democracy and a strong central government are not incompatible. Morale-building programs should make this point clear. In the modern world the complex creed of democracy demands more rather than less leadership and more rather than less centralization. A leader should be accorded respect in proportion to his strength, and in proportion to his ability to articulate and carry out the will of the people.

So negative are Americans toward the "leadership principle" that leaders of any type are likely to be suspected and handicapped by criticism and abuse. Our president is our favorite scapegoat. It was carefully planned that he should not be a king, a beloved father around whom all might rally in times of trouble. Although in England it appears that this symbol of security is not in the slightest degree incompatible with democratic morale, the problem of leadership in America is different. There are no symbolic personages to evoke reverence and faith.

The responsibilities of democratic leadership stand in marked contrast to those of dictatorial leadership. In the latter case the individuals at the top confer, interpret, and withdraw rights; the individuals at the bottom assume all obligations. The system is unilateral, stratified, and capricious. Its acceptance by the common man can be explained only in terms of a regression on his part to the point where, like a child, he surrenders his own conscience and externalizes it upon the leader-parent. The weakness of this identification lies in the danger that when the leader fails there is likelihood of a sudden panic. The leader cannot admit his mistakes; to do so would be to weaken his unstable power. It is for this reason above all that tyrannies, as Aristotle observed, tend to be short-lived. By contrast, the rise and fall of a democratic leader create few perturbations. Yet while in office or in authority he needs and deserves respect in proportion to the extent to which

he expresses and carries out the will of the majority. He needs to be protected from overwork and from serious abuse and capacious criticism that may handicap his efforts. While the war lasts, programs of morale-building should take these facts into account.

TOLERANCE

A program is good if it recognizes the creative role played by minorities in a democracy, and if it diminishes hostility among the in-groups of the nation.

This rule clearly endorses programs that make Americans aware and proud of their ability to live together peacefully although possessed of the most diverse racial, religious, and cultural standards. Because in times of tension there is danger of growing irritation within the nation, small groups may suffer in consequence. Morale-building must combat every sign of disruption and persecution. In particular the Negro, the Jewish, the loyal Japanese, and the labor groups require protection; so too the conscientious objector, who is usually a thoughtful and humane individual anxious and willing to serve his country in a civilian capacity. Since totalitarian propaganda is often a matter of wedge driving, of setting group against group, its insidious influence must be counteracted.

It is necessary to draw a distinction between minority groups that are harmless (or helpful) and those that are subversive. In ordinary times, so great is the resilience of democracy, the latter are tolerated and absorbed. But in times of peril it is not possible to condone practices which contradict the spirit and purposes of democracy. Civil rights may have to be restricted to those who if they themselves were in power would extend the same rights to others. A democratic state cannot afford to be weak and suicidal in its policies. Tolerance is the guiding rule up to the point where it cannot safely be extended to forces that would destroy the possibility of tolerance forever.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

A program is good if it respects the principles of freedom of thought and uncensored communication.

One of America's assets is the confidence our citizens feel in existing channels of communication. President Roosevelt has wisely promised all the news to the people provided it is verified and not of military assistance to the enemy. But people need also to feel a sense of obligation to profit from the news, to develop from it an awareness of the problems confronting the nation and a true estimate of the dangers that threaten. Hence morale-building programs should see to it that listening becomes creative; that discussion, debate, and forums are stimulated; that education be encouraged to focus its attention upon the basic issues of democracy, and to set an example by practicing democracy in the schools. The desires of the common man who alone should dictate *this* peace should be freely discussed. Unlike 1918, we are now intent not only on winning the war, but on winning the peace as well.

It should be observed that in times of unusual tension it is particularly important to arrange special periods for questioning and complaint. Lessons concerning the merits of such safety valves can be learned from Great Britain.

THE WHOLE MAN

A program is good if it utilizes the full intellectual equipment of each individual, so that his morale may involve the *whole man* and not merely an emotional segment of his nature.

Morale in a democracy will never be enhanced through the burning of books or through the insulation of the public from facts. News, both good and bad, must be spread. If disillusionment and anxiety are the penalty of unrestricted news, then disillusionment and anxiety must be incorporated somehow into the stuff of morale. In their private lives people learn to face the

grimmiest of facts and somehow to rise above them in courage and faith. And they can do so when the problems confronting them are national problems rather than exclusively personal problems.

It is significant that today there are demands that the government repudiate the discredited type of morale service employed in World War I with its prime emphasis upon immediate emotional results. The Creel Committee somehow offended our sense of democratic dignity even though its activities did not begin to approach the mendacious and hysterical performances of Hitler and Goebbels.

However defective the intellectual operations of a democratic citizen may be, still he counts on them to pull him through an emergency. Alien to him is the nonsensical creed of Nazism with its demand for fanatical obedience, Aryan science, compulsory hatred of the Jews, raciologv, a new male aristocracy, glorification of Hitler, *Blut und Boden*, *Kraft durch Freude*, *Gleichschaltung*. Instantaneous is the democrat's repudiation of Goebbels's advice to "forget such terms as humanitarianism, civilization, international rights, and international confidence." "For us Nazis," says Goebbels, "these arguments no longer have any appeal, since we long ceased believing in them." Equally unacceptable to a democrat is Nietzsche's assertion that "the criterion of truth lies in the enhancement of the feeling of power." Such irrationalism is not the foundation for a democratic morale, and programs of action cannot be based upon it.

WAR NEVER AN END IN ITSELF

A program is good if it recognizes that democracy is not a violent process, but is a matter of "piecemeal and retail" progress; if it regards war as a means to be employed only as a last resort in self-defense.

Dictatorship develops a perpetual war economy and relies on a constant state of aggression; democracy deplores the use of force,

and resorts to it (in principle) only as a means of survival. Democracy believes in the possibility of appeal to reason; it believes that aggression may be eradicated by a training in self-discipline and the creation of an environment that is not excessively frustrating to the individual.

Nazi morale is founded upon a Messianic conviction that demands proof of its own rightness through an array of successes that crescendo without end. Whether it could survive long periods of uneventfulness is questionable. A democratic morale may countenance war, but only as a means, never as an end in itself. It is sometimes said that our dislike of war will weaken our national morale, that dreading the means we shall not vigorously employ it in our defense. Yet a surgeon may be skillful and effective without craving to cut into his patients. He has learned to make a virtue of necessity, to master a means that will avoid a larger evil.

It is important to say again that peaceful democratic change has not brought a solution to some of our domestic problems, for example those involving the Negro, unemployment, crime. Faith in meliorism requires that evidence be at hand for improvements under way, else a plea that we fight to preserve the method of peaceful change becomes unconvincing. It is essential, therefore, for morale-building programs to include in their scope the extension of peaceful democratic change at home in order that the ideal of a melioristic democracy may seem to be worth every sacrifice demanded for its realization.

VOLUNTARY CO-ORDINATION OF EFFORT

A program is good if it aids in achieving a co-ordinated and voluntary division of labor for the solution of common problems.

In spite of the disillusionment of the last war and the miseries of the depression, the Japanese attack forged new bonds of allegiance within the nation and cemented old ones. Now that the unity of purpose is high the problem is to help each person find

his appropriate role. In peacetime we are used to meeting threats and frustrations in our own lives with a requisite output of effort and adaptive skill, but in wartime new habits and new vocations are required, geared to those of our neighbors.

The spectacular feats of co-operation of which Americans are sporadically capable require genius in organization. Planning co-ordinated tasks for every citizen is the spearhead of morale.

Be it noted that verbalization is often a substitute activity for those who feel their duties keenly but are unable to discharge these duties in action. Morale-building programs should be on their guard against this particular form of futility, likewise against busy-work and preoccupation with irrelevant detail. Yet another danger is that in working for one's own profession, club, organization one comes to think that one is working for the nation. To advance Rotary, the ladies' aid, or to draw governmental subsidy for one's neighborhood may be an altruistic act, but it does not necessarily advance national interest. Altruism and enthusiasm are not synonymous with effective national service. Morale-builders should see to it that each man and each woman has a job that is useful and adapted to his talents. This assignment requires a great deal in the way of vocational education, vocational placement, and shrewd practical management in factory, office, neighborhood, school, and government.

Conclusion

These eleven characteristics of democratic morale mark it off from the uniformitarian, tribalistic, regressive morale of the dictatorships. It must not be thought, however, that human nature is utterly distinct under the two contrasting social systems. A long list of resemblances in morale could be appended. Both groups, for example, of necessity rely upon slogans, for the obvious reason that the human mind demands both clarity and simplicity in the framing of issues. Both groups have fatigue and lassitude to combat, and physical health to safeguard. Likewise, as has been

pointed out, in conditions of actual combat considerations of skill, strength, and primitive emotional excitement are virtually identical. Finally, in military and civilian populations everywhere the principles of suggestion and crowd psychology operate; demagoguery is present on both sides. Temporary emotional frenzy looks alike in Madison Square Garden and in the *Sportpalast*.

Even though these similarities exist, we must believe that the man who can best stand the strain of modern warfare, whether it be of guns or of nerves, is the individual who *of his own will* is determined to resist and to win. The conditions for a superior personal will are potentially with the democracies, for the "whole" man has a more integral strength than has the "segmentalized" man. In a democracy every personality can be a citadel of resistance to tyranny. *In the co-ordination of the intelligences and wills of one hundred million "whole" men and women lies the formula for an invincible American morale.*

CHAPTER II

The Psychodynamic Problem of Democracy

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IN THE great struggle for existence in which we are now engaged, one of the most potent psychological weapons employed by our enemies has been a direct attack upon the fundamental philosophy of democracy. The danger of such an attack lies of course in the fact that it appeals to doubts and feelings of disillusionment that have already been undermining our own faith in democratic institutions. Such doubts might conceivably become a serious threat to our morale in the war that we are now waging. It is important, therefore, that we face them frankly and courageously. Not only must we examine carefully the reasons for our skepticism, but it will be well also to inquire into the deeper sources of our faith in the principles of self-government.

Doubts as to whether it is possible for a people to govern themselves well are as old as the democratic dream itself. Indeed, during a great part of the world's history, it has been quite taken for granted that the task of government could safely be entrusted only to a divinely ordained ruler, or at best to some sort of superior ruling class. In the last century, however, following upon the American and French Revolutions, there developed a rapidly spreading enthusiasm for democratic ideals and parliamentary institutions. By the end of the century, many of us were already developing a complacent and shallow faith that the world was progressing steadily toward universal acceptance of democratic principles. Even the Communists dreamed that a transitional period of dictatorship would be followed more or less automatically by the extension of the principle of self-government beyond the political field into the economic field as well.

In the last two decades this shallow complacency has been rudely shaken. With a new content appropriate to our modern problems, the old doubts rise again. Democracy may indeed have worked fairly well so long as we were a nation of small and independent farmers; but in the world of today our social and economic life has become so much more complex. The whole world has become interdependent to a degree that could hardly have been dreamed in previous times. Industry and our whole social life are, therefore, inevitably becoming much more highly and complexly organized. We have all become little cogs in a vast machine, and economic independence in the sense that our ancestors knew it has become a thing of the past. How, then, can it be possible that a whole people could be sufficiently well informed to be able to make intelligent decisions about such highly technical problems as those that face the governing bodies of the nations of the present day?

If democracy were a religious faith and nothing more, we should repudiate such doubts promptly and turn with renewed energy to battle for our democratic ideals; but the task of self-government requires intelligence as well as enthusiasm, and it would seem better, therefore, to meet the challenge of these questions by attempting to analyze the interplay of forces upon which the successful operation of a democracy depends. If we can gain some notion of this interplay of forces, then we ought to be able to estimate more carefully the conditions under which the experiment of self-government by a whole people is most likely to be successful.

Such problems in social dynamics obviously belong in the field of the sociologist and the political scientist who have experience in the study of dynamic interactions between social trends and institutions, and between mass movements and their leaders, in the light of the broad perspective of history. The psychologist's interest in such problems arises, of course, from the fact that the behavior both of leaders and of masses must ultimately be accounted for in terms of human motives. As psychologists, therefore, we shall do well to circumscribe our problem. In attempting to throw

light upon the interplay of forces in a democracy, it will be well for us to restrict ourselves to a few rather elementary problems concerning motivations. What motives impel men to desire or to dream of democracy? What psychological problems must men face if they attempt to realize their democratic dreams? What attitudes and habits of mind are most conducive to the success of a democracy?

To answer these questions adequately would require a thorough study of the story of successful and unsuccessful attempts at self-government throughout world history. What follows is merely a sketch for such a study, a few reflections upon historical facts that are known to all of us, in the light of what we know about human motives.

Rebellion Against Tyranny

From a superficial reading of history, one inevitably gains the impression that rebellion against despotism plays a very important role in the motivation of the proponents of democracy. Enthusiastic democrats delight in such phrases as "give me liberty or give me death," and love to picture themselves with their feet upon the necks of tyrants. Indeed, most democracies cherish the tradition of a struggle against the arbitrary power of some individual or privileged class. Upon reflection it is not difficult to understand why this should be so. One can sense how the struggle against a common enemy tends to solidify the members of a group, to drain off their antagonisms against each other by turning them against the common enemy, and to give to the members of the group every rational motive to co-operate in a common cause.

It is equally plain, on the other hand, that the motive of rebellion alone cannot teach a people how to govern themselves successfully. Only too many tragedies of history make it very plain that even the need to unite in the face of a common enemy is not always a sufficient motive to make co-operative action possible; and even if the common hatred of a despot is able to unite men in rebellion against him, certainly this motive can no longer be

trusted when once the despot has been removed. When once the arbitrary power of a tyrant has been ended, there is only too much danger that some leader of the rebel forces will himself wish to seize despotic power ; or widespread fear of such despotic usurpation of authority may divide the group into a number of warring factions and make impossible further co-operative action. As example, we may recall that our own American colonies in the Revolution were not always united in their struggle against the common enemy and that for a number of years after the war was over, their very existence seemed to be threatened by jealousies and strife both within and between the states.

Learning Self-Government

Self-government is self-restraint. If a people are to govern themselves, they must be able and willing not only to rebel against the arbitrary authority of others, but also to submit to the legitimate authority of the laws that they themselves make and of those persons whom they choose to enforce them. In order that there may be sufficient mutual trust and confidence to make possible effective co-operation, it is necessary not only that the members of a democracy should be alert to resist despotic usurpation of power, but also that they should be willing themselves to renounce the desire to seek arbitrary power over others.

It is important for our purpose to inquire into the motives that make possible this sort of community self-restraint. In attempting to answer this question it is necessary to realize that this capacity is probably never acquired suddenly or all at once. One of the most significant teachings of history is the fact that the art of self-government is something that has to be learned. Before the thirteen American colonies were able to throw off the authority of the mother country, they had had a century and more of training in self-government in local affairs and in legal and parliamentary struggles with the royal governors. Just as a child does not step from the cradle into the responsibilities of adult life, so a com-

munity is not born with the capacity for self-government, but must acquire by gradual steps the proper habits of mind and the necessary experience. One of the most interesting conclusions from Kurt Lewin's recent experiments in group activity is the fact that if a group has been accustomed to an autocratic regime, it takes time for it to adjust to a democratic organization of its activity.^{8, 9, 10} Adjustment to an autocratic "atmosphere" takes place much more quickly; but democratic attitudes are a product of learning and growth.

The Ideal of Political Equality

Few people now take seriously the romantic notion of an in-born urge toward social equality. The evidence all points in the opposite direction. The little boy envies the care that the mother bestows upon the baby in the cradle; if he is able to overcome this wish to be the baby again, he is apt to seek consolation in the fact that he is bigger and stronger than the baby and able to assert himself in the competitive struggle with others. As everyone knows, the struggle to gain preference and domination over others continues also into adult life and plays an exceedingly important role in shaping our social institutions. In the communities with which we are most familiar, business is organized very largely upon a competitive basis, and within both political and industrial organizations there are ever-present struggles and intrigue for dominance and preferment.

There is much to suggest that the democratic ideal must arise as a reaction formation against these widespread motives that set every man against his fellow. As evidence for this conclusion, we may cite the enthusiasm of nascent democracies like the early American and French republics for the philosophical doctrine that all men are equal. Such doctrines imply not only protest against the aristocratic pretensions of others, but also a renunciation of one's own desires to get the better of his fellows. In some communities this intolerance of inequality may even tend to inhibit

achievement and to put obstacles in the way of the acceptance of leadership. Both the conscience of an individual and a strong community pressure demand that he who achieves something noteworthy or who aspires to be a leader must take great care to make it clear that he is really no better than his fellows. In the burst of enthusiasm of the early Jacksonian democracy, it was the boast of one western town that there were no "principal citizens."

The motive for this reaction formation against inequality would seem to be some need for the security of solidarity with the group. In a considerably different emotional setup, we encounter a similar reaction formation in early childhood. The children of a family do not govern themselves. Nevertheless we find that here, as in the democratic community, great importance is likely to be attached to the idea of equality. Father and mother must not love any one child more than the others. The mechanism is simple. Each child renounces his own desires to get the better of brothers and sisters on condition that the other children must also content themselves with an equal place in the parents' affections.

There seems good reason to believe that similar mechanisms underlie the insistence of democrats upon the idea that all men are equal. Sometimes democratic leaders appeal to such motives quite consciously and frankly. As an example I may cite one of Lincoln's principal arguments against slavery: "If *A* can prove, however conclusively, that he may, of right, enslave *B*, why may not *B* snatch the same argument, and prove equally that he may enslave *A*? . . . You say *A* is white, and *B* is black. It is color, then: the lighter having the right to enslave the darker? . . . Take care. By this rule, you are to be slave to the first man you meet with a fairer skin than your own. . . . You do not mean color exactly? You mean the whites are intellectually the superiors of the blacks, and therefore have the right to enslave them? . . . Take care again. By this rule, you are to be slave to the first man you meet, with an intellect superior to your own." ¹¹

In this argument, we see Lincoln appealing quite frankly to the

motive to renounce the claim to superiority over others, lest one be compelled on the same principle to accept domination by others. On the other hand, the attitudes against which Lincoln is protesting show plainly the underlying emotional conflict out of which these conflicting philosophies arise. Each person would like to be assured that he is at least the equal of others, while he finds at the same time excuses for restricting as far as possible the number of those whom he will be constrained to recognize as equals. Logically, obviously, Lincoln has a very good case, but the problem is one not of logic but of emotional and sociodynamic equilibrium, and in the logic of many peoples' emotions the case for inequality is very strong.

Leadership in Democracy

Freud many years ago suggested that what binds together such integrated groups as the church and the army is the common devotion of the members of the group to the leader and the confidence of each member that the leader is caring for all alike.⁷ Under these circumstances strong bonds of identification develop between each group member and the leader and between the several members of the group with each other. So long as this devotion to the leader continues, the group maintains its solidarity, but if anything occurs to shake the confidence of the group in the leader or in his equal regard for each of the members, then the group suddenly disintegrates. This principle is illustrated by a number of recorded instances of acute panic spreading rapidly through an army when the supreme leader was killed or discredited.

The above analysis by Freud obviously fits an autocracy much better than a democracy. In a democracy there is a tendency to become resentful or suspicious of any leader who seems likely to gain too dominant an influence over the group. The leader must always remember that he has been chosen by the group and that from this fact solely he derives his authority. Obviously this is a

point of danger in the sociodynamic equilibrium of a democracy.* As we have seen, if this reaction against inequality is excessive, it may put obstacles in the way of achievement and necessary leadership; but even if it is not excessive, the members of a democracy must renounce the security of knowing that they will be provided for by a good father. In renouncing the security of this common dependence upon a fatherlike leader, they tend also to undermine the basis of their solidarity with each other. Since the solidarity of the group can no longer rest upon common devotion to a supreme leader, some other principle must be found to bind its members together in co-operative effort. Freud and others have tentatively suggested that this unifying principle might be a common devotion to an idea. Is it possible perhaps that the love of democracy itself might be the bond best fitted to unite a people in the task of governing themselves?

The transition from autocratic to democratic institutions would seem to involve for a people much the same emotional readjustment as does the departure of the young man from the parental home to establish an independent economic existence and to found a home of his own. As in the case of the individual, the community that throws off autocratic rule must renounce the security of being children in the parental home, to substitute in its place the pride of independence and achievement and the satisfaction of mutual devotion to each other and to the group as a whole.^{1, 2, 3, 4} As in the case of the individual, too, this readjustment cannot take place suddenly in one step, but can only be the product of a long training in the art of self-government.

We come thus to the realization that the success of a democracy depends upon a somewhat delicate psychodynamic equilibrium. On the one hand, it is of the very essence of democracy that it implies a renunciation of the more extreme forms of competitive struggle between its members. In order that all may be secure against being ruled by a tyrant, it is necessary that everyone must also re-

* This point is particularly stressed by Robert Waelder in an article as yet unpublished.

nounce the desire to be a tyrant. Especially the potential leaders must be trained, from youth on, to aspire to be the servants and not the masters of the people whom they lead, and to be loyal always to the principle that their authority is derived from the fact that they are the chosen and temporary representatives of those whom they govern.

On the other hand, danger threatens if the self-assertive impulses of the members of the community are too much inhibited. A community whose members are ready too easily to surrender their individual interests to the supposed welfare of the state may become only too ripe to succumb to the usurpations of the next would-be tyrant. "The price of liberty is eternal vigilance." In a really vital democracy, every citizen must be alert to detect and resist any attempt at arbitrary and unwarranted use of authority.

In recent years there has been much to remind us of the danger of a democracy's becoming soft, of its losing its will to self-assertion and self-defense against its enemies both outside and inside its borders. Now that we are at war, we are becoming aroused to the necessity of aggressive action to defend our institutions against open attack. Times of war, however, put democratic institutions to their most severe test. The necessity of secrecy and the imperative need for effective leadership in acute emergencies make it necessary to put restraints upon public discussion and tend to encourage attitudes that are more appropriate in an autocracy. At no time is it more important to maintain the tradition that a people's leaders are its servants and not its masters and that a people must be alert against attempts to abuse authority. We must not forget, on the other hand, that a rebellious spirit can foment revolutions and divide a people into warring factions; but if a people is to become capable of self-government, the spirit of rebellion must be supplemented by a strong loyalty to the common task of building a unified nation.

Solidarity by Mutual Sacrifice

I believe that history and common experience make it sufficiently plain that fear and rational expediency are not adequate motives to weld together a people in co-operative effort even in the face of common danger. If a people has not already some sense of solidarity, then fear is apt to result in panic rather than in common action. The outlook is much better, however, if a people already have a memory and a tradition of successful communal effort. It seems to be a principle of rather general validity that people learn to love the activities they habitually and successfully practice, and nothing seems to bind together a group so effectively as the consciousness or memory of having successfully braved dangers or performed difficult tasks together. Upon this principle we can understand why it takes time for a people to learn the art of self-government. The very rivets that bind together the structure must be forged one by one. Each difficulty successfully overcome, each conflict satisfactorily adjusted, becomes a sort of reservoir of confidence, of community pride, a bond uniting a people in common loyalties that may serve to prepare them for even greater difficulties in the future. Starting with practice in local self-government in the early town meetings, our early American ancestors elected Colonial legislatures that carried on parliamentary struggles with royal governors; finally united, though often somewhat halfheartedly, to wage what was ultimately a successful revolution; and, after a period of threatened disintegration, later succeeded in agreeing upon a governmental framework that made possible a really effective Federal structure. Thus, step by step, if we took the time, we could trace the process by which we grew in a sense of national unity and of our capacity to reconcile our differences and govern ourselves.

From all of this it follows that a people's capacity for self-government tends to grow with practice. Correspondingly the greatest danger to a democracy arises when different sections of the people get out of touch with each other, when they seek to out-

wit each other by clever propaganda and become fascinated with the dishonest art of selling people something which it is against their interest to buy. If democracy is to survive, we must cultivate the art of confronting divergent views in lively public discussion and in a spirit of readiness for mutual sacrifices for the common good. We must develop a keen and widespread interest in the problem of how the great mass of us can be stimulated to question the source and motives of propaganda and to think for ourselves about public questions instead of being merely passive recipients of opinions that someone wants to plant in our minds. We are now engaged in the task of defending democracy against external enemies. But even now and increasingly in the postwar period we must realize that this is not enough. The art of self-government must be practiced and developed and loved if it is to survive. If we can learn to adapt the art of vital public discussion to the complexities of modern life, then we too shall have made our contribution to the faith of our people that even in these difficult times we can govern ourselves.

CHAPTER III

Five Factors in Morale

A SUMMARY AND ELABORATION OF A ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION *

MORALE is a multiple-meaning term. In this discussion it is used to describe what people do rather than merely the way they feel. Good morale is shown by the stamina with which people stand up under punishment and by the energy with which they strive to realize their ideals. Poor morale is evidenced by those who "can't take it," and who become easily discouraged and disillusioned.

Defining the Goal

The first essential for good morale is a positive *goal*. People who have nothing to look forward to will show poor morale. One of the most destructive consequences of our prolonged economic depression was that so many young people came to feel that there was no hope ahead. Bakke has described the deterioration of morale in fairly distinct stages.¹ At first the unemployed youth followed leads intelligently and hopefully. Gradually they lost hope, but plodded wearily on in a blind, persistent effort to find

* During the meetings of the American Psychological Association at Evanston, Illinois, in September, 1941, The Society for Psychological Study of Social Issues arranged for a Round-table Discussion on the theme, "The Psychological Bases of National Morale." The participants were: Chairman, Dr. Rensis Likert, Division of Program Surveys, U. S. Department of Agriculture; Dr. Gregory Bateson, Committee for National Morale, New York; Dr. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Department of Sociology, Columbia University; Dr. Kurt Lewin, University of Iowa; Dr. Goodwin Watson, Teachers College, Columbia University, now with the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service. This summary was prepared by Goodwin Watson, using the conclusions of the round table as an outline, but with the incorporation in the present chapter of supporting arguments in addition to those brought out in the discussion.

work. Eventually they gave up the futile quest and sank into apathy. Lazarsfeld's study of a village where nearly all were unemployed showed that loss of other goals accompanied the deterioration in morale from vocational frustration.⁸ Women maintained morale better than did the men, because the women still had something to live for, in caring for homes and children.

A potent source of poor morale in the United States during the period before our entrance into actual fighting was uncertainty about the future. People didn't feel sure that better times were coming. As new factories were built, workers wondered whether they would be standing idle "after this is all over." Business men took the higher profits of defense spending without any confidence that the improvement would be more than temporary. "How shall we ever pay our staggering national debt?" they asked, and, "Who will buy the products of our mills when government orders decrease?"

In the international scene also, the goal is still uncertain. Many remember the high intentions of Woodrow Wilson and the sorry results. The Four Freedoms and Eight Points are attempts to help the people formulate more clearly and effectively the goal they seek. If we may judge by reactions in the press and in opinion polls, neither set of aims goes far enough to inspire new hope in the disheartened. The aims seem good, but they do not deal definitely and constructively with the worries which still obscure the future and prevent formation of impelling goals.

Even the most conservative minds recognize that profound changes are taking place in our society. The reminder is frequently offered that the world is experiencing not only a war but also a revolution. A recent (October, 1941) *Fortune* poll showed more than 90 per cent of business leaders convinced that we would not return after the war to the kind of private enterprise which they personally preferred. Where are we headed? For what goals can we work and fight? American youth, especially, are asking for "time-perspective" forward. They want to know, if they are to

postpone their careers, to defer marriage, and to sacrifice their lives: "What is it all for?"

An answer in general terms has been proposed by Wendell Willkie:*

We must begin now to shape in our minds the kind of world we want. We must not await the war's end to make these purposes clear. For then some men will feel the gloat of victory, and others the bitterness of defeat; demagogues will capitalize the passions of the people and the greedy grasping of some will teach only an immediate material advantage; and superpatriots among us all again will shout the shibboleths of nationalism and isolationism. We must have the imagination to dare and the vision to see that from such cataclysms as we are experiencing today, great ventures are possible. . . . We can, if we have the will, convert what seems to be the death rattle of our time into the birth pains of a new and better order.

It is not the function of psychologists alone to define more clearly the outline of the "new and better order" which so many long to see emerge from the world catastrophe. Psychologists can help, perhaps, to correct some common fallacies such as overemphasis upon nationalism, race distinctions, or material goods as the basis for happiness. Psychological investigations in laboratory and clinic confirm the common-sense observation that a society adapted to human nature must provide for struggle and the joy of achievement alike. Happiness, indeed, more often accompanies the sense of moving toward goals than the full attainment of them.

In a democracy, definition of goals is a task to which all citizens contribute. Each must have a voice in formulating the ends for which he is going to live. Educators, economists, political leaders, sociologists, writers, clergymen, artists, and others have special contributions to make.

The urgent thesis of our discussion is that too little attention has thus far been given to defining postwar goals. Morale has been based too largely on negative factors: fear, hatred, anger. Those

* A talk delivered at Maple Leaf Gardens, Toronto, March 24, 1941.

have their place, as we shall see, but they are not enough. It is significant that an executive, responsible for organizing conferences among the more alert and progressive educators of the country during the fall of 1941, found them relatively uninterested in immediate matters of defense training. Teachers wanted to work on postwar planning. The seniors at Antioch College, preparing for their 1941 commencement, set aside traditions to arrange a panel on economic planning after peace. Youth organizations, at least until the Pearl Harbor explosion, expressed more concern with what the National Resources Planning Board was envisioning by way of future possibilities for sustained abundance than in any other aspect of defense.

A pamphlet issued recently by the National Resources Planning Board ⁵ brings what will be, to many, welcome reassurance. Professor Alvin H. Hansen here offers assurance that "we shall have when the war is over, the technical equipment, the trained and efficient labor and the natural resources required to produce a substantially higher real income for civilian needs than any ever achieved before in our history." He goes on to offer "a positive program of postwar expansion and full employment." It is a favorable sign that government agencies are thus recognizing that morale depends upon programs which look beyond the defeat of the enemy to the creation of hope-inspiring conditions at home and abroad.

Morale, first of all, demands a magnetic pole toward which the aspirations of men are drawn.

Mutual Support

A *second* fundamental factor in morale is *togetherness*. Morale is stronger in those persons who feel themselves a part of a larger group, sharing a common goal. Convictions are firmer when it is felt that other people join in them. An individual who, alone, might easily become discouraged or intimidated, can sustain his faith and keep on fighting if he is with his gang. A study reported

later (in Chapter XVI) shows that those individuals among the unemployed who kept up better morale were the ones with better social integration. Studies of industrial morale have shown that a major contribution to job satisfaction comes from the comradeship with fellow workers. Every mass meeting, whether directed toward patriotic action, or labor gains, or religious zeal, or some other purpose, makes use of the psychological truth that morale is reinforced by social support. A study by Sherif has shown experimentally that when our first experience of a confusing situation is shared with others, we take out of that experience a set which influences our individual outlook, and that even when we bring unique viewpoints into the group, those differences have their sharp edges and corners rubbed off, until we become more and more like the group.

The togetherness which fosters morale is more than the fact of being in the same room or the same organization. The vital factor is a sense of shared purpose. When America was divided in its policy about the war, and in its hopes for the future, morale was weak. When no overarching end commands the loyalty of citizens, they seek the goals of conflicting subgroups. As J. F. Brown has pointed out,² in normal peacetime the family, school, labor, religious, recreational, and other groupings are dominant, and the sense of national citizenship is weak.

Under the stress of emergency the subgroup boundaries become less pronounced while the boundary including all who share the national purpose grows stronger. One of Hitler's most successful techniques has been to accentuate the divisions within an enemy country at the expense of national solidarity. Lincoln quoted an earlier authority, "A house divided against itself cannot stand."

To share a hatred seems easier than to share an aspiration. Unity can be secured for the defeat of a common enemy, even though the groups thus united have little constructive purpose in common. The usual consequence is that after victory over the enemy has been attained, the unity is lost and the victors fall out

among themselves. They may well, indeed, as some believe happened for America in 1918, even lose the fruits of victory.

The morale problem, therefore, calls upon us to find purposes which unite the American people, and which will carry on beyond



Fig.1 Peace Structure



Fig. 2 War Structure

the defeat of some particular external threat. A morale built on the type of national purpose expressed in slogans like "Hang Hitler" or "Revenge Pearl Harbor" will not carry us far in either domestic or international co-operation.

The process by which common purposes can be discovered and created becomes of vital concern for national morale. Gordon Allport in our first chapter asserts that a Creel-Committee type of propaganda, even if raised to the Goebbels level of efficiency, will not build solidarity in America. We have learned, partly from propaganda analysis in the teaching of social science, but more fully from bitter experience, that we cannot trust all that adver-

tisers or newspapers or radio speakers proclaim. That modern youth has remained so cynical has been more than a little disturbing to some adults who have tried to use again the flag-waving speeches of 1917. On the other hand, experiences with panel discussions of youth, where they were encouraged to express frankly their own fears and hopes for the future, have brought out tremendous resources of aspiration and will for world reconstruction. The contribution of psychology in improving techniques of conference and discussion will be discussed further under another heading of this chapter.

The importance of a sense of shared living raises a question about such military traditions as those intended to keep barriers between officers and men. In the American Revolution, in the War of 1812, in the Mexican Expedition of 1836, and as late as the Civil War, there were many effective companies in which officers and privates shared the same living arrangements, and co-operated on a basis of substantial social equality. The election of officers by the soldiers was a common practice. It is rather surprising that the military forces of the countries with democratic political traditions have in recent years lagged behind totalitarian states in building group solidarity. The camaraderie of the Russian army was frowned upon by our military leaders, at least until the summer of 1941. William L. Shirer has reported that even in the Nazi army, despite the stress on "leadership" and the autocratic ideal, the old Prussian caste tradition has been broken down.¹⁰ "The gulf that used to exist between officers and men had almost completely disappeared in the German army and even in the navy. Privates and captains ate the same food and drank beer in the same cafes, at the same tables." A report on Vice Admiral Karl Doenitz, "creator and commander of Germany's U-boat fleet," attributes part of his successes to a policy of emphasizing "democratic relationships between officers and men to avoid the difficulty with mutinous officer-bullied crews which helped break down the German U-boat service in World War I." * Hitler has sometimes claimed

* *Time*, February 2, 1942, p. 28.

that his army in fact practices more democracy than the armies of the self-proclaimed democracies. In March of 1942 new orders introduced a common mess for officers and men of the Italian army. The Japanese army claims to have "no officer caste."

When social barriers are introduced, it is probable that both military and civilian morale suffer. British experience on the home front has shown that morale is better if food and clothing are so rationed that distinctions in wealth or rank are minimized. In later chapters we shall be considering other divisive factors in American life—those of race, for example. Despite our melting-pot tradition, there are substantial groups unassimilated in our national psyche. A major assignment for those agencies, public and private, which are concerned with building morale, is to batter down all the barriers which prevent us from feeling that we are one people, sharing common purposes and a common fate. Edward R. Murrow, after experiencing war in Spain, Britain, North Africa, and in the Pacific, drew the significant conclusion that the first essential for morale during hardship is that everyone shall feel that all are sacrificing in substantial equality.

Knowledge of Common Danger

The *third* factor in morale is awareness of some *danger* in which group members feel themselves involved. It is significant that, as shown in Chapter XII, American readiness to sacrifice increased with the increasing defeats and hardships suffered by the cause with which our interests were most identified. Reports of British victories, on the contrary, left us freer to indulge our personal and small-group preferences.

The experience of France and England during that period of 1939 sometimes called the "phony" war, shows that morale is not built simply by a declaration of war. It took disaster in Norway, the doom barely escaped at Dunkirk, and the mass bombing of British cities to put steel into British resolution.

The most striking illustration of the effect of a threat upon morale occurred in the United States on that memorable Sunday afternoon of December 7, 1941. In the space of a few hours, the isolationist bloc dissolved; disputes among ourselves suddenly became trivial; out of the shock of the news from Pearl Harbor arose a grand and thrilling sense of unity. The historians may well conclude that any military advantage which Japan gained from her surprise attack was far outweighed by the instantaneous wave of anger which transformed America into a solid determined fighting force. The raid on Hawaii may well have been one of the costliest psychological blunders in all history.

Danger mobilizes the emergency resources of the organism. The classic work of Cannon³ has shown that threats arousing anger and fear increase the output of adrenalin and stir up the autonomic nervous system. The body goes into preparation for vigorous action. A faster heart rate sends the blood circulating more rapidly, carrying food and oxygen to hard-working skeletal muscles. The heaving chest of strong emotion indicates the increased intake of oxygen and expulsion of waste products from the lungs. The liver releases glycogen to furnish increased energy. Some of the changes, appropriate to conditions of personal combat under which they evolved, no longer help in the struggle fought with complicated mechanical weapons.

Military efficiency today may require a cool head rather than emotional excitement. But both popular writing and scientific research show many instances in which individuals under exceptional stress have attained unprecedented heights of achievement. Horses or oxen can pull out of the mud a motor vehicle with many times their "horsepower," partly because as living organisms the animals can adapt their efforts to demands and can concentrate to meet an emergency. Experience with committees, boards, and other social organizations shows quite as clearly that when the life of a vigorous institution is threatened, a higher quality of effort and group co-operation results. It is notoriously unsafe to inter-

vene in a family quarrel, for the most antagonistic parties may unite vigorously against the intruder.

The mobilizing factor is necessarily psychological. It is not danger but awareness of danger which heightens morale. While the American people were threatened, but disregarded the threat as remote, improbable, unreal, or easily counteracted, it proved very difficult to get defense work taken seriously. Although from almost every point of view a war geographically remote is preferable to one which strikes at our own cities and factories, nevertheless, morale is more of a problem when the fighting is far away. We read of dive bombers and scorched earth, and perhaps the first time our emotions are stirred. But nothing follows. The stimulus does not serve to prepare us for a developing emergency. The next time such a story comes to us over the radio or in our reading, we pass over it with less effect. The psychologist speaks of "negative adaptation" or "experimental extinction"; the layman understands well enough that we gradually become calloused and indifferent. Real danger is a developing situation in which, if we do nothing, the peril noticeably increases. When nothing special happens after warnings, the warnings lose effect. Mass observation in Britain has testified to the ineffectiveness of warnings about carrying gas masks when little or no poison gas has actually been employed. The psychological principle is as old as the "Wolf, Wolf" parable. The danger of using air-raid warnings for purposes of training is that they are likely to be taken less and less seriously.

There is a natural tendency, when a warning is not observed, to repeat it with increased emphasis. But, as we have seen, exaggerated threats by alarmists produce an effect quite contrary to what is sought. If awareness of danger is to contribute to morale, and is to lead to emergency mobilization of personal resources for the defense of threatened values, then the greatest care must be used in presenting the remote dangers. Either minimize them or overdraw them, and the threatened citizens may shrug their shoulders and go about their business as usual. An evasive retreat

behind shrinking oceans proved no answer to international aggression. A blind complacency over a war boom is no answer to a malfunctioning economy. Panic and hysteria are no more adequate; they may even by exaggeration lead people to ignore serious warnings. The British tradition of muddling through and the American optimism which assumes that no international calamities can destroy our democracy, because that never has happened before—these are liabilities in the face of a truly grave menace. A major concern, in the improvement of morale, must be to aid citizens in discovering for themselves and making realistic in their own feelings, the authentic dangers amid which we live.

Something Each Can Do

The *fourth* factor in our psychological analysis of morale is the conviction that *we can do something* to improve matters. Granted a goal, membership in a group of comrades who share this goal, and some threat to the security of the on-going quest, the next essential is some recourse adequate to meet the threat. If the danger appears to be too great, people may be overwhelmed, paralyzed, and demoralized.

Among psychological studies which contribute to our understanding of the importance of a channel for action are those of children in fear situations. "Although skill alone may fail to root out fear," writes Jersild,⁷ "in general it may be said that . . . the child who has acquired the widest range of competence and the best array of skills is likely to have the fewest fears." Interviews with parents showed that attempts to promote competence in dealing with the feared stimulus succeeded much better than did reassurance, explanation, example of courage, enforced contact with the fear situation, ridicule, protection, or ignoring the fear.

Clinical experience often demonstrates the transformation of demoralizing fear into a vigorous drive for action, once a promising course of action against the danger has been discovered. One counselor taught shy, anxious clients who were afraid of social

encounters, some simple tricks of magic. With these as devices for making a contribution to social affairs, the subjects became willing and even eager to join in group life. High-school and college counselors report similarly that when boys have learned techniques of calling for dates on the telephone, greeting the girl's family, dancing, ordering in a restaurant, and making introductions, some students who were afraid "to go out" became enthusiastic in the pursuit. A teacher whose job was threatened found himself at first chilled with fear, but once his union committee met with him to plan what looked like a promising campaign of action to prevent the dismissal, his morale was transformed and he worked indefatigably.

National morale in a time of crisis depends largely upon the ability of national leaders to show us how we can help, and to carry to us the conviction that if we work hard enough we may win out. From a failure to achieve this result, two problems of morale have already arisen. One is national and the other individual. The need for a clearer program of national action is illustrated in those citizens who are aware of the strength of the Axis armed forces, but who do not see what the United States is likely to be able to do to stop their advance. To develop just such a state of funk has been one objective of Axis propaganda. The prolonged period of inaction after war was declared in 1939 led some Britishers to feel that the Chamberlain government had no plan for winning victory. Even today the plans which have been communicated to civilians seem to center more on defense than on any program for winning the war. Perhaps evasiveness is necessary, for reasons of military strategy, but morale would be very much stronger in the United States if the average man could see a little more clearly just how Hitler is likely to be defeated. Reports that the United States is now producing a thousand airplanes a month; that production is ahead of expectations; that production may go up to a thousand a week—these have had a tonic effect upon the morale of some Americans. President Roosevelt's

announcement of a Victory Program, early in January, 1942, was an excellent stimulus to morale.

Both military secrecy and the exigencies of internal politics have prevented full revelation of American contributions to the struggle. News emphasis has too often been laid upon shortages of certain raw materials, handicaps due to strikes, and instances of bad planning, wasteful expenditure, and bureaucratic red tape. The defects in our program should not be covered up—that would have a particularly poisonous effect upon morale—but they should be seen in the perspective of the whole. What America needs is not detailed knowledge of the plans for victory, but a certainty that the plans have been drawn, and a general understanding of the progress being made. It may be a characteristic of democracies anywhere, or it may be especially true of Missouri and her forty-seven sister states, that the citizens want to be shown. They don't go in heavily for faith in Washington or even in Providence. Perhaps widespread experience with complicated machines which yield only to competent techniques and never to emotional persuasion has deepened the distrust for oratory. "Hitler must be defeated," says Churchill. "All well and good," say millions of Americans, "but how is this to be done? What is the layout, the setup, the timetable?" Rightly or wrongly, the impression is widespread that only Hitler has a timetable, that initiative lies with the Axis, that the United Nations haven't got beyond opportunistic hopes of somehow "muddling through." Morale demands greater awareness of workable methods for carrying out national purposes.

The conviction that "something can be done" needs to be personalized until it becomes, "You can do something that helps!" The other morale difficulty, in relation to this fourth factor, is individual rather than national. People who share the purposes of American democracy, who feel those values threatened, are in many instances quite unclear about what they themselves can contribute. Eager to help though they have been, no channel has been open to them. Many, of course, now go into the armed forces.

Others are taking responsibilities in Washington. Some collect warm clothes to send to England, others practice first aid or fire fighting, while some, unfortunately, revert to vigilanteism and attack anyone with a strange accent or an unorthodox view of economics. Knitting was an outlet for some, but its value was more psychological than productive, and now a wool shortage cuts off that form of expression. Buying Defense Bonds helps, but it is not fully satisfying. People want to be in on the fight—they want to feel needed. Busy work is not enough; they demand that their efforts shall really make a difference. One of the chief problems of the Office of Civilian Defense is to find ways of harnessing the driving energy of millions of American men and women whose morale is dependent, in part, upon their finding some way to help.

In this connection we may raise a question about the range of activities which are thought of as "defense work." Perhaps the morale of citizens eager to contribute could be better sustained if government officials and agencies affecting public opinion—but Congress especially—were to conceive of the defense of democracy in broader terms. A teacher of physical education may be contributing to American physical fitness quite as effectively in a small-town high school as in an army camp. A labor union which achieves conditions making for more democracy in American industry, higher morale among workers, and eventually greater output, may then be contributing to defense quite as genuinely as by donating a day's output to England. Communities which are able to catch an incipient race conflict in its earliest stages, and to prevent the development of prejudice, hostility, and schism should be as proud of this contribution as they are of funds given to the United Service Organizations. If more of our everyday activities as parents, molders of public opinion, producers, and citizens could be seen to contribute in a vital way to the defense of democracy, the result might be a significant rise in morale.

Approaching the Goal

Fifth and finally, morale is dependent upon a *sense of advance*. It is not enough to have a goal and to know that there are techniques for getting toward it. We need actually to feel ourselves moving. There may be dangers threatening, and hard times ahead; but if there is hope of a way through, and if we can feel some slightest measure of success in our efforts to overcome the obstacles, then we are encouraged.

Again we may look to the clinic for numerous cases which illustrate the folk maxim that "nothing succeeds like success." Discouraged and depressed individuals who were quite unmoved by verbal reassurances have often begun their recovery by a very little success. Every good teacher has seen a child's face light up when he discovered that he actually was making progress and getting a grasp of the previously baffling reading or multiplication or shorthand or Spanish. Psychological studies of learning agree that pupils who feel themselves succeeding progress more rapidly than do those who may get a similar amount of practice but without any basis for judging how well they have done. Studies of level of aspiration* have demonstrated a general tendency for success in a task to stimulate ambition for still higher achievement. "Success," of course, must be defined in relation to the goals which the individuals or group may have set for themselves.

It is the victories we have already achieved which sustain our confidence in the future. Hitler's oratory has often been organized to recount the steps of Nazi advance. We in the United States have a story of progress more inspiring and better validated than the history Hitler invents. Our faith in democracy, in American enterprise, and now in American military strength, is nourished by awareness of the success of our American Revolution against heavy odds, the transformation of a continent from wilderness to industrial supremacy, the maintenance of unity despite tragic rift

* One of the earliest studies was by Happe.⁶ A more recent summary is that of Gould.⁴

in the 1860's, the decisive role played by America in 1917, and by the spirit of unity and determination which almost all experienced after Pearl Harbor. It is events, as Harold J. Laski has said, which are the great tutors of public opinion. Our morale can be as strong as our sense of significant advance.

Every belligerent nation understands the psychology of progress and endeavors to give its citizens as favorable a picture as possible of the successes attained by its arms and leaders. In the effort to carry the public through periods which perhaps seem difficult for morale, there may be a temptation to "slant" the news, or even to invent victories. Experience has shown that any such distortions are apt to boomerang. The sense of success arises from favorable news only if the news report is trusted. German claims of successes at Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov, in the fall of 1941 may have had a temporary effect of encouraging the German people, but this short-lived boom was more than offset when the Nazis failed to make good on their reports and promises. There may arise on the part of some news writers or radio commentators in the United States a conscious or unconscious inclination to "play up" the victories and to gloss over depressing news. If so, they should be warned that the long-term effect will be bad. Far more important than any momentary "lift" due to anticipated success is continuing faith in the trustworthiness of our sources of information. The frankness with which Churchill and Roosevelt have acknowledged bad news contributes to the effectiveness of their reports to the democratic peoples when successes have been achieved.

The sense of advance is important not only in winning the war, but also for winning the peace. Our faith in democracy increases as we experience success in the use of democratic processes. When we as a people, under the leadership of Henry Wallace, tackled the co-ordination and planning of a chaotic and depressed agriculture, we tried to avoid the apparently easy route of dictatorship, and to use instead democratic processes of discussion, conference, referendum, and elected local leadership. Our success en-

courages us to believe more strongly in democracy and its workability, despite complications of numbers. Totalitarians, at home and abroad, tell us that the people are only a great beast, to be led around by the nose through skillful propaganda. Every success which we achieve in the use of democratic methods makes such subversive talk less dangerous. The T.V.A., for those people who have experienced how a vast enterprise of planning can function from the grass roots up, and not just from the top down, is stronger than any antidemocratic arguments from *Mein Kampf* or from our drawing-room elite. The success already attained by the United Nations, and in Western Hemisphere co-operation, constitutes a powerful contribution to morale when we think about postwar international co-operation. In the economic area, our hope for the future is strengthened by the realization that already we are producing more, per man hour of labor, than any nation at any point in history has ever done before. Our curve of productivity did not reach any inevitable ceiling in 1929—rather, it has risen since 1929 quite as rapidly as it did from 1900 to 1929. There have been dips and lags along the way, but our hopes are well-founded for higher standards of living in the future than have been experienced in the most prosperous periods of the past.

In the area of international relations, despite the bitterness of war, there are grounds for hope. It is unnecessary defeatism to assume that wars and more wars will inevitably disrupt life. True, we suffered disillusionment following 1918, but one failure does not prove the task to be beyond our powers. We can profit, when this war ends, by a critical understanding of the mistakes made at and after Versailles. But, in keeping with the fifth fundamental factor of morale, let us stress the fact that positive gains have been made. Let us remember that in its decade of existence the League of Nations, "product of a thousand years of slow ethical growth," did settle peacefully more than forty international disputes. Let us remember the International Labor Organization which has so effectively advanced the standard of living for backward peoples. Let us take new confidence from the astounding

growth of political, economic, and cultural co-operation among the American republics. The United Nations should be interpreted to all lands—allied, enemy, and neutral—as more than a military coalition. Outlines of world organization should be formulated and put into operation, even while the war goes on; for the conviction that our cause is worth all sacrifice depends in part upon a sense that through the travail a new order is actually coming to birth.

CHAPTER IV

Time Perspective and Morale

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STUDIES in unemployment show how a long-drawn-out-idleness affects all parts of a person's life. Thrown out of a job, the individual tries to keep hoping. When he finally gives up, he frequently restricts his action much more than he has to. Even though he has plenty of time, he begins to neglect his home duties. He may cease to leave the immediate neighborhood; even his thinking and his wishes become narrow.¹¹ This atmosphere spreads to the children, and they, too, become narrow-minded even in their ambitions and dreams. In other words, the individual and the family as a whole present a complete picture of low morale.

An analysis of this behavior shows the importance of that psychological factor which commonly is called "hope." Only when the person gives up hope does he stop "actively reaching out"; he loses his energy, he ceases planning, and, finally, he even stops wishing for a better future. Only then does he shrink to a primitive and passive life.

Hope means that "sometime in the future, the real situation will be changed so that it will equal my wishes." Hope means a similarity between the individual's "level of expectation" and his "irreality level of wishes." The picture presented by this "psychological future" seldom corresponds to what actually happens later. The individual may see his future as too rosy or too bleak; frequently the character of the psychological future vacillates between hope and despair. But, regardless of whether the individual's picture of the future is correct or incorrect at a given time, this

picture deeply affects the mood and the action of the individual at that time.

The psychological future is part of what L. K. Frank has called "time perspective."⁹ The life space of an individual, far from being limited to what he considers the present situation, includes the future, the present, and also the past. Actions, emotions, and certainly the morale of an individual at any instant depend upon his total time perspective.

The conduct of the unemployed, then, is an example of how time perspective may lower morale. How morale may, on the contrary, be heightened by time perspective is illustrated by the conduct of the Zionists in Germany shortly after Hitler came to power. The great majority of Jews in Germany had believed for decades that the pogroms of Czarist Russia "couldn't happen here." When Hitler came to power, therefore, the social ground on which they stood suddenly was swept from under their feet. Naturally, many became desperate and committed suicide; with nothing to stand on, they could see no future life worth living.

The time perspective of the numerically small Zionist group, on the other hand, had been different. Although they too had not considered pogroms in Germany a probability, they had been aware of their possibility. For decades they had tried to study their own sociological problems realistically, advocating and promoting a program that looked far ahead. In other words, they had a time perspective which included a psychological past of surviving adverse conditions for thousands of years and a meaningful and inspiring goal for the future. As the result of such a time perspective, this group showed high morale—despite a present which was judged by them to be no less foreboding than by others. Instead of inactivity and encystment in the face of a difficult situation—a result of such limited time perspective as that characteristic of the unemployed—the Zionists with a long-range and realistic time perspective showed initiative and organized planning. It is worth noticing how much the high morale of this small group contributed to sustaining the morale of a large

section of the non-Zionist Jews of Germany. Here, as in many other cases, a small group with high morale became a rallying point for larger masses.

Time perspective seems, indeed, to be sufficiently important for morale to warrant a more thorough analysis.

Development of Time Perspective

The infant lives essentially in the present. His goals are immediate goals; when he is distracted, he "forgets" quickly. As an individual grows older, more and more of his past and his future affect his present mood and action. The goals of the school child may already include promotion to the next grade at the end of the year. Years later, as the father of a family, the same person will often think in terms of decades when planning his life. Practically everyone of consequence in the history of humanity—in religion, politics, or science—has been dominated by a time perspective which has reached out far into future generations, and which frequently was based on an awareness of an equally long past. But a large time perspective is not peculiar to great men. A hundred and thirty billion dollars of life insurance in force in the United States offer an impressive bit of evidence for the degree to which a relatively distant psychological future, not connected with the well-being of one's own person, affects the everyday life of the average citizen.

Aside from the broadness of the time perspective, there is a further aspect important for morale. The young child does not distinguish clearly between fantasy and reality. To a great extent wishes and fears affect his judgment. As an individual becomes mature and gains "self-control," he more clearly separates his wishes from his expectations: his life space differentiates into a "level of reality" and various "levels of irreality," such as fantasy and dream.

Tenacity and Time Perspective

"Tenacity in the face of adversity is the most unequivocal index of high morale." ¹⁴ This is an idea widely accepted as the essence of military morale. While there may be some question as to whether the ability to persist in the face of difficulties is actually the most fundamental aspect of morale, unquestionably it is one aspect of either civilian or military morale, and as such is a good starting point for discussion.

If morale means the ability to "take it," to face disagreeable or dangerous situations, one must ask first, "What constitute disagreeable or dangerous situations for an individual?" Ordinarily, we are accustomed to think of physical pain or bodily danger; yet anyone who climbs mountains or explores jungles for pleasure, any boy who drives an automobile fast, or who plays football, shows that this answer is too simple.

(a) *The disagreeable and time perspective.* Under ordinary circumstances, an individual will strongly resist an order to pick up mercury from the floor with a wooden spoon, or to eat three dozen unsalted soda crackers. As "subjects" in an experiment, on the other hand, individuals were found ready to "take it" without either hesitation or resistance.⁸ In other words, whether or not an activity is disgraceful or unpleasant depends to a high degree on its psychological "meaning,"¹⁸ that is, on the larger unit of events of which this action forms a part. In the role of a patient, for example, the individual permits as "treatment" by the doctor what would otherwise be vigorously resisted because of bodily pain or social unpleasantness.

A good example of the degree to which the meaning of the larger psychological units and the time perspective affect the felt pain and the morale of the individual is provided by a study of suffering in prison.⁶ It was found that the prison work which the individual has to do day by day has no appreciable correlation with the amount of his suffering. Individuals who suffered much were quite as likely to hold advantageous jobs so far as power

and leisure were concerned (such as editor of the prison magazine or runner for the deputy warden) as to hold the most disadvantageous or unpaid of prison jobs. (The correlation between the amount of suffering and the "objective" advantage of the prison job was .01.) There was little negative correlation between the subjective satisfaction which the prisoner felt in his prison job and the amount of his suffering ($r = -.19$). A definite relation, on the other hand, did exist between the amount of suffering and certain factors connected with the future or past—a man's feeling, for instance, that his sentence was unjust ($r = .57$), or his hope of "getting a break" in regard to release ($r = -.39$). This relation held true, moreover, in spite of the fact that the release might be expected to take place only after a number of years. The *actual* length of the sentence and the length of the time served do not correlate strongly with the amount of suffering; however, a marked relationship does exist between the suffering and a man's *feeling* that he has served longer than he justly should have served ($r = .66$).

Not present hardships in the usual sense of the term, then, but rather certain aspects of the psychological future and the psychological past, together with feelings of being treated fairly or unfairly, are most important in determining the amount of one's suffering. A factor of considerable weight for the amount of suffering in this case was uncertainty in regard to when parole might be granted ($r = .51$). This factor, too, was one not related to the present immediate situation of the individual but was an aspect of his time perspective.

In solitary confinement, too, it has been frequently reported, one of the most painful experiences is the uncertainty as to how much time has elapsed. Once again, it is not a present hardship but certain characteristics of the time perspective which lend the situation its anguish.

(b) *Persistency and Time Perspective.* Even more than suffering, persistency depends on the time perspective of the individual. As long as there is hope that difficulties may be overcome for that

price in effort and pain which the individual is ready to pay, he goes on trying. If the objective is worthy, indeed, the effort is not even felt to be a "sacrifice." Persistency, then, depends on two factors: the value of the goal and the outlook for the future. This holds both for child and adult, for soldier and civilian.

A few facts pertinent to morale, drawn from experiments with children, ^{4, 12} might be mentioned here. How soon the individual will give up in face of an obstacle depends, according to these experiments, on three factors: (1) the strength of the psychological force toward the goal (the persistency will be greater if the goal is more highly cherished or if the psychological distance to the goal is smaller); (2) the felt probability of reaching the goal (which, in turn, depends on past successes and failures and on the intellectual capacity of the individual); and (3) the degree of initiative of the individual.

The first point is identical with the felt value of the cause for which the effort is made. The second refers to the psychological future. The means whereby one can influence the psychological future so that a man's outlook will be optimistic is a point much discussed in regard to military morale. Everywhere the effect of the past on the future is emphasized; whereas nothing is more difficult than to keep up morale after a defeat, persistency is greatly strengthened by past victories. Nor need this past necessarily be one's own past. When the individual joins a "Fighting 69th," the tradition and history of this regiment become a part of his life space. And only after he has demonstrated this fact will he be recognized as a true member.

Experimental data show ⁴ that although past successes are most effective if they have been won in the same field of activity, nevertheless "substitute successes" and, to a lesser degree, mere praise and encouragement still bolster persistency. An individual may likewise be taught to be more persistent and to react less emotionally to obstacles if encouraging past experiences are built up.¹² Persistency, indeed, is closely related to the social position of the individual, to his feeling of strength and security.

Passive individuals are on the average less persistent than active individuals;⁴ there are, however, certain exceptions. Individuals with low initiative sometimes show a kind of passive perseverance; they remain vis-à-vis the obstacle and keep up a gesturelike activity toward the goal. And some active individuals, on the other hand, quit very soon. Instead of waiting to be driven away slowly by an increasing number of failures, these individuals have sufficient initiative to make their decision as soon as realistic considerations indicate that the goal cannot be reached. The ability to make just such active decisions is recognized as one of the basic requirements for military leaders. A weak individual's gesturelike perseverance deprives him of the flexibility necessary for arriving at new, more efficient solutions. The readiness to make "realistic decisions" may sometimes, of course, be merely a front for a lack of willingness to see things through. We shall come back to this question later.

Group Morale

Group morale depends on time perspective as much as does individual morale. Clearly demonstrative of this fact are certain controlled experiments with groups of individuals of college age who were placed in a physically disagreeable situation.¹⁰ The subjects were set to work in a room which slowly filled with smoke oozing in from under the door; and they knew that the doors were locked. After a while, the smoke became rather disagreeable. The reactions of the group varied from panic to laughter, depending mainly upon whether the smoke was construed as arising from an actual fire or as a hoax of the psychologist. The difference between these interpretations lies mainly in a difference in time perspective and in the felt degree of reality of the danger. The recent history of morale in France, England, and the United States is a vivid example of how much the degree to which the reality of a danger is acknowledged determines group goals and group action.*

* See the postscript to this chapter.

A comparative study made of previously organized and non-organized groups in a situation of fear and of frustration¹⁰ showed the organized groups to be both more highly motivated and more persistent. They were less likely to disintegrate, although as a result of this stronger motivation they felt more highly frustrated in regard to group goals which could not be reached. Contrary to usual expectation, however, fear spread more quickly through the organized than the unorganized group, because of the higher interdependence among the members of the former. In a highly specific way these experiments verify our everyday experience that the morale of an individual faced with danger is highly dependent on the atmosphere of his group.

Initiative, Productivity, Goal Level, and Time Perspective

In Nazi Germany, morale is considered to be "a driving force which propels every unit of the political and military organization to exert maximum effort and capacity"; it "implies a positive state of mind of the individual and the mass toward a uniform goal."⁵ Such a concept of morale mirrors the training necessary for an offensive war and totalitarian uniformity. Experimental psychology indicates, however, that one element in this concept is correct for every type of morale. Tenacity in the face of obstacles, the ability to "take it on the chin," is merely one aspect of a more fundamental state of the person which may be characterized as a combination of initiative and a determination to reach certain goals, to realize certain values.

Given comparable settings, the morale of an individual or a group might be measured by the quality and quantity of its achievement, that is, by its productivity. Initiative and productivity, dependent as they are on the proper balance of a variety of factors, are highly sensitive to changes in this balance. Here physical well-being plays a significant role. Today, every country is aware of the importance of sufficient food and vitamins for civilian morale. An over-satiated individual, on the other hand,

is by no means likely to show the greatest initiative and productivity. Subtle psychological factors play a great role in morale, and Hitler's plans of offensive warfare rightly consider the civilian morale of the enemy country as one of its most vulnerable and important points for attack.

*Productivity and a Time Perspective of Insecurity
and Uncertainty*

Experiments with children help us isolate some of the psychological factors determining initiative and productivity. For the situations of childhood are easily controlled by the all-powerful adult, and children probably show more quickly than adults those basic reactions on which the psychology of large masses depends.

If the free play activity of a child is interfered with, his average level of productivity may regress, for instance, from the age level of five and a half years to the much lower level of productivity of the three-and-a-half-year-old child.² This regression is closely related to the child's time perspective. Because the adult has stopped the child in the midst of play of great interest and productivity, now he feels himself to be on insecure ground; he is aware of the possibility that the overwhelming power of the adult may interfere again at any moment. This "background of insecurity and frustration" not only has a paralyzing effect on long-range planning; it also lowers initiative and the level of productivity.

The effect of interference is particularly severe if the individual is left in the dark as to the character of the new situation. The negative, nonspecific command, "Don't!" lowers initiative and productivity considerably more than a command to change to a different but specific task.¹⁷ Indeed, one of the main techniques for breaking morale through a "strategy of terror" consists in exactly this tactic—keep the person hazy as to where he stands and just what he may expect. If in addition frequent vacillations

between severe disciplinary measures and promises of good treatment, together with the spreading of contradictory news, make the "cognitive structure" of the situation utterly unclear, then the individual may cease to know even whether a particular plan would lead toward or away from his goal. Under these conditions, even those individuals who have definite goals and are ready to take risks will be paralyzed by severe inner conflicts in regard to what to do.

Pairs of strong friends, it is interesting to note, regress less in a background of frustration than do pairs of children who are not friends.²² Their greater tolerance for frustration seems to be due to a feeling of greater security among friends, as indicated, for instance, by a greater readiness to attack the experimenter as the source of frustration. Here is an example of how group "belongingness" may increase a feeling of security, thereby raising the morale and the productivity of an individual.

The initiative of a child and his productivity have been found, moreover, to be greater in the co-operative play of pairs of children than in solitary play—both in situations of frustration and in situations of nonfrustration. The increased productivity of an individual as a member of a group as compared with his productivity as a lone individual is a factor of prime importance for civilian morale. Bearing out this point, a study of factory workers¹⁸ indicates that, aside from security, personal attention given to the individual plays a role in raising the level of productivity, probably because of the resultant increase in his feeling of "belongingness."

This finding is but one of many which pertain to age differences, individual differences, the effect of different situations, and the difference between the activity of individuals and groups—all of which indicate that productivity depends upon the number of diversified abilities and needs that can be integrated into an organized, unified endeavor.² It is the principle of "diversity within unity" which dominates productivity, the principle that is so basic to a democratic solution of the problem of minorities and to

democratic living in all types of groups, from small face-to-face groups to world organization.

In some cases, paradoxically, a certain amount of frustration or difficulty actually increases productivity; such seems to be the case if the individual previously has not been fully involved and if the difficulty serves as a fuse to touch off an all-out effort. Closely related to this result is one of the most fundamental problems of morale, namely: where will the individual or the group set its goal? What will be its level of aspiration?

Level of Aspiration and Time Perspective

The three-months-old infant is as happy when someone hands him a toy as when he gets it by his own efforts. But the child of two or three years frequently rejects the help of another person, preferring to get by his own action an object that is difficult to reach. He prefers, in other words, a difficult path and a difficult goal to an easy path and an easy goal. This behavior of human beings, seemingly paradoxical, is certainly contrary to a belief which is widely accepted and which deeply influences thinking, even about politics—the belief that human beings are led by the “pleasure principle” along the easiest road to the easiest goal. Actually, from childhood on, the goals which an individual sets in his daily life and for his long-range plans are influenced by his ideology, by the group to which he belongs, and by a tendency to raise his level of aspiration to the upper limit of his ability.

On this problem experiments have yielded considerable knowledge—how the level of aspiration develops during childhood,¹ how success and failure in one field affect the level of aspiration in other fields, how the individual reacts to “too difficult” or “too easy” tasks, and how the standards of groups influence his own goal level.

The setting up of goals is closely related to time perspective.¹³ The goal of the individual includes his expectations for the future, his wishes and his daydreams. Where the individual places

his goals will be determined fundamentally by two factors, namely, by the individual's relation to certain values and by his sense of realism in regard to the probability of reaching the goal. The frames of reference which determine the values of success and failure vary considerably from individual to individual and from group to group. By and large, there is a tendency in our society to raise the level of aspiration toward the limit of the individual's ability. The principle of realism, on the other hand, tends to safeguard the individual against failure and to keep ambition down to earth. How high the individual can set his goal and still keep in touch with the reality level is one of the most important factors for his productivity and his morale.

A successful individual typically sets his next goal somewhat, but not too much, above his last achievement.²⁰ In this way he steadily raises his level of aspiration. Although in the long run he is guided by his ideal goal, which may be rather high, nevertheless his real goal for the next step is kept realistically close to his present position. The unsuccessful individual, on the other hand, tends to show one of two reactions: he sets his goal very low, frequently below his past achievement—that is, he becomes intimidated and gives up reaching out toward higher goals—or he sets his goal far above his ability. This latter conduct is rather common. Sometimes the result is a gesturelike keeping up of high goals without serious striving; it may at other times mean that the individual is following blindly his ideal goal, losing sight of what in the present situation is possible. To develop and to maintain high goals and, at the same time, to keep the plan for the next action realistically within the limits of what is possible, seems to be one of the basic objectives for and a criterion of high morale.

How high a person will set his goal is deeply affected by the standards of the group to which he belongs, as well as by the standards of groups below and above him. Experiments with college students⁷ prove that, if the standards of a group are low, an individual will slacken his efforts and set his goals far below

those he could reach. He will, on the other hand, raise his goals if the group standards are raised. In other words, both the ideals and the action of an individual depend upon the group to which he belongs and upon the goals and expectations of that group. That the problem of individual morale is to a large extent a social-



FIG. 1. The effect of the level of aspiration and degree of reality of a goal on the achievement of factory workers. Each group contains 40 workers.
(From a study by A. J. Marrow.)

psychological problem of group goals and group standards is thus clear, even in those fields where the person seems to follow individual rather than group goals. Such a connection between individual and group morale is, of course, still closer in regard to the pursuit of group goals.

An experiment again clarifies the issue. Experiences with sewing-machine workers in a newly erected plant in a rural area of the South demonstrate the manner in which level of aspiration influences learning and achievement in factory work.* After a week's training, the output of the novices ranged from 20 per cent to 25 per cent of the quantity accepted as a standard for skilled operators. (See Figure 1.) When, nevertheless, the novices were informed that this standard was one which they ought to reach in ten to twelve weeks, the disparity between the level of their performance at the end of the first week and the stated goal was too great—so great, indeed, that the subjects invariably expressed skepticism of ever reaching it. Since the plant was newly organized, there were no skilled workers actually doing the job at the standard speed; hence the goal seemed to be "too difficult," unattainable. Inasmuch as the wage these novices earned was already greater than that to which they were accustomed, there was nothing either outside or inside the plant to give the higher standards social reality for the group. As a result, the individuals were pleased with their progress in spite of the dissatisfaction of the supervisors; improvements were slow, learning plateaus common, and after fourteen weeks only 66 per cent of the standard had been reached.

For a second group of novices who started at the same level, a definite goal was set each week, to be reached at the end of that week, in addition to the information about the general standards. At that time, too, a large number of the older workers in the plant had achieved the standard. This combination of an immediate goal for the near future and the acceptance of the final goal as a real standard for the group led to a much more rapid improvement on the part of this group of novices. With but few learning plateaus, the average of the group had more than reached the goal standard at the end of the fourteenth week.

* I am indebted to Dr. Alfred J. Marrow for making these data available.

Morale in the Pursuit of Group Goals and Time Perspective

Unfortunately there are few studies available which permit scientific conclusions about the relation between group morale and time perspective. A comparison of groups with democratic and autocratic structures,^{15, 16} however, suggests certain conclusions. These groups, for example, showed very striking differences during periods when the leader left. Whereas the work morale of the democratic group was sustained at a high level, that of the autocratic group fell rapidly. In a short time, the latter group ceased entirely to produce. This difference may be traced to the relation between the individual and the group goals and to certain aspects of time perspective.

The organization of work, like any other aspect of the organization of the autocratic group, is based on the leader. It is he who determines the policy of the group; it is he who sets the specific goals of action for the members within the group. That means that the goals of the individual as well as his action as a group member are "induced" by the leader. It is the leader's power-field which keeps the individual going, which determines his work morale, and which makes the group an organized unit. In the democratic group, on the contrary, every member has had a hand in determining the policy of the group; every member has helped to lay out the plans. As a result, each is more "we-centered" and less "ego-centered" than the member of the autocratic group. Because the group goes ahead under its own steam, its work morale does not flag as soon as the power-field of the leader is eliminated.

"Acceptance" of the group goals by the member of the autocratic group means giving in to a superior power and subordinating one's own will. In the democratic group, "acceptance" of the group goal by the member means taking it over and making it one's own goal. The readiness to do so, in the latter case, is partly based on the time perspective of the individual; in the past, that is, he himself has participated in setting up that goal and now he

feels his individual responsibility in carrying it through. Not less essential is the difference in time perspective of the members of both groups in regard to planning the future. For the distant future, to be sure, the autocratic leader frequently reveals to his subjects some high, ideal goal. But when it comes to immediate action, it is one of the accepted means of autocratic leaders to reveal to his followers not more than the immediate next step of his actual plans. In this way not only is he able to keep the future of the members in his own hands; in addition he makes the members dependent on him, and he can direct them from moment to moment in whatever direction he wishes.

The member of a democratic group who himself has helped to lay out the long-range plan has a rather different time perspective. In a much clearer situation, he is able to take not only the next step but also the following step quite independently. Because he knows his position and action within the larger group plan, he can modify his own action with the changing situation.

In contrast to both democratic and autocratic groups, the *laissez faire* group, where the leader keeps hands off,¹⁵ shows only sporadic flare-ups of group planning or of long-range individual projects. The work morale of such a group is very low compared with either that of the democratic or the autocratic group—an indication of the importance of definite goals for group morale. Not those goals which can be reached easily but a psychological future with obstacles and high goals is conducive to high morale.

Quakerlike groups in the work camps for conscientious objectors, who as a rule pay for their own upkeep, are frequently permitted to plan by themselves how to reach the work objectives set for them. If reports are correct, these groups, with their self-planned organization, produce many times as much as groups under ordinary methods of supervision. One factor behind this achievement seems to be a long-range time perspective combined with the definiteness of their goal: the conscientious objectors attempt to train for the difficult task of reconstruction in Europe after the war.

Leadership, Morale, and Time Perspective

In another chapter of this book, the results of an experiment in retraining of leaders are reported.* The importance of time perspective is apparent in this study both for the morale of the leaders themselves and for the effect of the leaders in turn on the group morale. The striking change in the morale of the leaders from "low morale" before training to "high morale" after three weeks of training is related to the fact that the goals of these individuals changed from a day-to-day attempt to keep their insecure W.P.A. jobs to a broader—and actually more difficult—less personal goal of giving children the benefit of experiencing genuine democratic group life. Such a change in goal level and time perspective was brought about partly by the experience of membership in a democratic training group which had itself set definite goals and laid out its plans, and partly by the experience of leaving a depressive, narrow, and meaningless past for a future which, with all its uncertainty, contained a goal worth striving toward.

A positive time perspective, a time perspective guided by worthwhile goals, is one of the basic elements of high morale. At the same time, the process is reciprocal; high morale itself creates long-range time perspective and sets up worthwhile goals. At the end of the training process, the leaders mentioned above had set for themselves goals far above those of which previously they would have dared dream. We are dealing here with one of those circular types of dependencies which are frequently found in social psychology. The highly intelligent person, for example, is better able than the feeble-minded person to create situations which will be easy to handle. As a result, the feeble-minded, with his low ability, frequently finds himself in more difficult situations than the normal. Similarly, the socially maladjusted person creates more difficult social situations for himself than does the well-adjusted person and, doing badly in the difficult situation, easily goes from

* See Chapter VIII, "Morale and the Training of Leaders," by Alex Bavelas.

bad to worse. Again, poor morale makes for a poor time perspective, which in turn results in still poorer morale; whereas high morale sets not only high goals but is likely to create situations of progress conducive to still better morale.

This circular process can be observed also in regard to the morale of the group as a whole. The interdependence among the members of a group, in fact, makes the circularity of the processes even more unmistakable. In one experiment, for instance, a group of children, having been together for one hour in a democratic group, spontaneously demanded the continuation of that group.³ When informed of the lack of an adult leader, they organized themselves. Their morale, in other words, was high enough to broaden their time perspective; they set themselves a group goal extending over weeks—and later included a half-year project.

Realism, Morale, and Time Perspective

One aspect of time perspective which is essential for morale is realism. Here again we encounter the same paradox as that underlying productivity: one criterion of morale is the height of the goal level which the individual is ready to accept seriously. For high morale, the objective to be reached will represent a great step forward from the present state of affairs. The "realistic" politician who always keeps both feet on the ground and his hand in the pork barrel is a symbol of low morale. On the other hand, the "idealistic" individual who has high ideals without making serious efforts to attain them can likewise make few claims to being a person of high morale. Morale demands both a goal sufficiently above the present state of affairs, and an effort to reach the distant goal through actions planned with sufficient realism to promise an actual step forward. One might say that this paradox—to be realistic and at the same time be guided by high goals—lies at the heart of the problem of morale, at least as far as time perspective is concerned.

TOO IMMEDIATE AND TOO DISTANT GOALS

What an immediate or a far distant goal means for realism and morale and how it is related to the time perspective of the individual or of a group might best be illustrated by certain aspects of development. The normal healthy child in the elementary school lives in groups of children whose standards and values, whose ideologies and goals, will be of utmost importance for his own goals and his own conduct. If he is fortunate enough to be born in the United States, there will be a good chance that his school group will have a sufficiently democratic atmosphere to give him a clear, first-hand experience in what it means to be a leader as well as a follower in a democratic group, what it means to "play fair," to recognize differences of opinion and differences of ability without intolerance or bossiness and equally, too, without softness or lack of backbone. Only a few children will have experienced anything approaching a perfect democracy; still, they will have experienced frequently a group atmosphere which approaches democracy sufficiently to give them a better taste of democratic procedures than the vast majority of the citizens of European countries are likely ever to have experienced.

Experiments indicate that children at eight years are more altruistic than adults, and that children at ten years are strongly guided by an ideology of fairness.²¹ In short, the conduct of the average child at that age follows relatively closely the standards and values of the groups to which he belongs; but these groups are the face-to-face groups of his school, his family, his gang. The period of time to which these standards and goals are related in a realistic manner is a matter of weeks, months, or at most of a few years. The scope of time and space in which national politics takes place in the social world of the adult is, for the young child, something too large and too overpowering to be considered by him in any but a highly abstract or naive manner.

Growing through adolescence to young manhood or womanhood means enlarging the scope and the time perspective of one's

psychological world. In a measure, it means also leaving the small face-to-face groups, such as the family, or else assigning these small groups a secondary place in a larger social world with which the young person now seriously has to come into grips. It is the eternal right of every young generation to consider critically the standards and values of this larger world of the older generation. The better and the more democratic the education during childhood has been, the more serious and the more honest will these critical considerations be.

For the young person growing into problems of such magnitude—in fact, for anybody facing for the first time problems of a new order of magnitude—two reactions are typical. The individual may, in the first place, shrink from making decisions of such importance, trying rather to restrict himself to the smaller time perspective which he was just outgrowing. His low morale will then lead him to place his main emphasis on the small day-by-day goals. An example is the college girl who, because she is so disgusted with the war “over there in Europe,” will not even look at the newspapers or listen to the radio.*

At the other extreme is the individual who refuses to think in a time perspective of less than a thousand years. He thinks in terms of “what ought to be”; his goals as such are frequently excellent, and he refuses to take any action which might run counter to his principles. In so far as his goals are characterized by a high discrepancy between “what is” and “what should be,” between the wish level for the future and the present reality level, his time perspective is opposite to that of an individual who is satisfied with the status quo. But the very weight which the distant goal has for the individual who takes it seriously, the very fact that he is dissatisfied with the present situation, make it difficult for him to give sufficient consideration to the actual structure of the present situation, or to conceive realistically what step in the present world can be taken to achieve this end. For one growing into problems which deal with a new scope of time perspective, it is difficult, at

* See postscript to this chapter.

first, to distinguish between the cynic, who is ready to use any means to his ends, and the person of high morale, who takes his goal seriously enough to do what is necessary to change the present state of affairs.

TWO FOUNDATIONS OF ACTION

The conviction that a certain action will lead toward the direction in which the individual wants to go and not in just the opposite direction is based partly on what is called technical knowledge. But for the individual this knowledge is very limited; his actions are always based, in part, on some type of "belief." There are many types of such beliefs on which the principle of realism within morale can be based. We shall mention but two.

The exigencies of modern warfare have compelled the armies to give a fair measure of independence to the individual private. In some respects, the army of Nazi Germany can be said to have more status-democracy between officers and men than had previously existed in the army of the Kaiser. On the whole, however, and particularly in regard to civilian life and to civilian education, Hitler has placed the relation between leader and led on a basis of blind obedience to a degree unheard of in modern life outside of certain monasteries. Ever since Hitler came to power, the nursery school teacher, for example, has been instructed never to explain an order to a child, even if he could understand the reason, because the child should learn to obey blindly. "There are many things which can be forgiven, no matter how evil they may be. But disloyalty to the Fuehrer can never be pardoned."⁵

The belief that one's action goes in the correct direction is, in such an atmosphere, based primarily if not exclusively on the trust in the leader. The area in which independent thinking is permitted is small, more or less limited to the execution of the immediate next step as objective. Blind obedience means abandoning, in all essential areas, that measure of reasoning and independent judgment which prevailed in Germany before Hitler's rise to power

and which, to a much greater extent, has been one of the traditional rights of the citizen in the United States.

It is not chance that the fight against reason and the replacement of reason by sentiment has been one of the unfailing symptoms of politically reactionary movements throughout the centuries. To recognize reason socially means that a sound argument "counts," no matter who brings it forth; it means recognizing the basic equality of men. In an autocracy, only the leader needs to be correctly informed; in a democracy, popular determination of policy can work only if the people who participate in goal-setting are realistically aware of the actual situation. In other words, the emphasis on truth, the readiness to let the people know about difficult situations and failures, does not spring merely from an abstract "love of truth" but is rather a political necessity. Here lies one of the points on which democratic morale can, in the long run, be superior to authoritarian morale. A far more stable ground for morale than the belief in the ability of any leader individually is truth itself.

Postscript

This chapter was written before December 7, 1941; now we are at war. The effect on the morale of the country has been immediate and striking—a circumstance which bears out some of the points we have discussed.

The attack on Hawaii has shown that Japan represents a much more serious danger than many had thought. But this feeling of increased and close danger has heightened rather than depressed morale, being as it is in line with the general finding that morale changes not parallel with but rather inversely to the amount of difficulty, so long as certain goals are maintained.

The experience of attack upon our own country has overnight brought war down from the cloudy realms of possibility to the level of reality. Although the college girl whom we mentioned above may still be far from realizing fully what it means to be at war, nonetheless war is no longer something "over there in

Europe." It is here. Thus as a result of our being in the war, the will to win has become a clear and unquestioned objective.

Before December 7, what was a realistic outlook for one individual was doubted by a second and ridiculed as impossible by a third. Now the situation has been clarified. Countless conflicts, whether among factions in the population or within each individual himself, have ceased now that the major aspects of the time perspectives are definitely set.

Being within this new and definite situation means that certain basic goals and necessary actions are "given." In such a situation no special effort is required to keep morale high. The very combination of a definite objective, the belief in final success, and the realistic facing of great difficulties is high morale. The individual who makes extreme efforts and accepts great risks for worthwhile goals does not feel that he is making sacrifice; instead, he merely feels that he is acting naturally.

When a major decision has been made, it frequently happens that the individual or the group will show high morale in the new situation because of a sudden clear awareness of the objectives of the enterprise as a whole. As the effort proceeds, however, a variety of detailed problems and difficulties is bound to arise and to occupy a more prominent position. There is danger that groups which started out with enthusiasm may yet lose their "punch" when the clearness of the situation at the time of decision has been clouded by such a multitude of details, problems, and immediate difficulties. Group morale during a prolonged effort depends much on the degree to which the members keep clearly in view the total task and the final objective.

In the months and years to come, then, civilian morale can be expected to depend much upon the clarity and the value of our war goals, and upon the degree to which such values come to be deeply rooted within each individual.

CHAPTER V

Morale and National Character

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IN CASUAL conversation it is popularly assumed that national groups have characteristic differences—Germans are said to crave authority; the British are thought to be low in sense of humor and in foresight, but arrogant and possessed of bulldog tenacity; the French are thought to be gay and volatile; Latin emotions are supposed to predominate over reason; the Japanese are regarded as crafty; the Chinese as honest and tranquil. If such differences exist, they are of tremendous importance for the “public-relations program” of the United States.* Our own distinctive American character might demand a rather different kind of propaganda from that which would encourage our allies in Britain, China, or the Soviet Union. Appeals for support, directed to Latin America or to wavering “neutrals” like France, Portugal, Turkey, and Sweden, should be based on an understanding of their different “national” psychologies. Counter-propaganda for German consumption might have to be distinct from that for Italy or Japan. Provision has indeed been made in several governmental organizations for social psychologists whose duty it is to interpret communication from or to other lands in the light of the mental characteristics of those peoples.

* In this connection we may quote a recent editorial article based on a speech by Professor Morris Ginsburg (*Nature*, vol. 148, no. 3741, July 12, 1941). The article concludes: “To the statesman who must handle the broad issues of future policy, the enduring features of national character and the trends of its development are equally significant. There can be few more important tasks for the social sciences than to contribute to the full understanding of the character, mood, and prevailing interests of the nations among which the War is being fought, and by which an international order must be reconstituted, wherein all nations of the world may be able to advance along the road of civilization in peace and security.”

One example of the approach through research is provided by Efron's study of gesture,⁵ a book which gives us a good critical survey of recent German and other literature dealing with differences in posture and gesture in terms of racial theory.* Dr. Efron points out that the propaganda contributions of racial and typological theory are: (a) unsupported by empirical data; (b) phrased in such a way that it is not very clear what sort of observations would either support or disprove the descriptive statements (how, for example, shall we verify the "clarity" of Nordic gestures, or the "energy" of Dinaric?); and (c) obscured by compromise phrases, whenever racial theory has met the fact that environment affects gesture (e.g., Hans Gunther's dictum: "The environment may pattern the racial characteristics of Nordic movements, but cannot eradicate them entirely."⁶)

Dr. Efron goes on to a careful empirical study of gestural behavior in unassimilated eastern Jews in New York City, unassimilated southern Italians, assimilated eastern Jews, and assimilated southern Italians. The assimilated individuals, he shows, "(a) appear to differ greatly from their respective traditional groups, and (b) appear to resemble each other"; in short, the postulates of racial theory are not born out by empirical study.

For the present paper, however, it is not sufficient to show that conspicuous differences in habit occur between various groups and that these differences are conditioned by cultural environment rather than by racial descent. Dr. Efron has, to be sure, performed a valuable service in documenting these two points, but we have to go a step further and consider the implications of such culturally conditioned differences for the common character of the individuals who exhibit them.

* For a more general survey of the argument between racial and environmental theories to account for physical and mental characteristics, see Klineberg.⁷ Dr. Klineberg's work, like Efron's, is, however, focused upon this controversy. He shows satisfactorily that such psychological differences as have been claimed are either unsatisfactorily demonstrated or that the demonstration had not ruled out the probability that the differences are due to factors of use and environment. He does not go on to any systematic examination of the results of use and environment, such as would be relevant to the present paper.

For this further step, there exists a vast mass of relevant material, both scientifically collected observations of psychologists and sociologists, and raw documents by naive subjects who have indulged in international comment or fantasy. But, so far as I know, none of this material has been systematically analyzed for the light which it would shed upon our particular problem. The psychologists and sociologists who have studied European and American communities have done their work without attempting to build up any coherent picture, either of the character structure of the individuals whom they studied or of how these individuals differed in character structure from other individuals in other cultural environments. The psychiatrists, on the other hand, have gone to the other extreme. For therapeutic purposes it is necessary to study the individual in such extreme detail that, in the end, every case appears special and different from every other, and the wood cannot be seen for the trees.*

To rearrange and reanalyze all the collected material so that it shall illuminate the problems of national difference will require a great deal of research, which, despite its great importance, cannot be undertaken in the present paper. The most we can attempt here is to lay out an abstract frame for such future research, a frame which will be useful only in so far as it suggests hypotheses which can be empirically tested.

We shall therefore proceed as follows: (1) We shall examine some of the criticisms which can be urged against our entertaining any concept of "national character." (2) This examination will enable us to state certain conceptual limits within which the phrase "national character" is likely to be valid. (3) We shall then go on, within these limits, to outline what orders of difference we may expect to find among western nations, trying, by way of illustration, to guess more concretely at some of these differences. (4) Lastly,

* An exception to this generalization is Erich Fromm's *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941). This work, however, is oriented to the broad outlines of historical process, and not to the problems of national differences.

we shall consider how the problems of morale and international relations are affected by differences of this order.

Barriers to Any Concept of "National Character"

Scientific enquiry has been diverted from questions of this type by a number of trains of thought which lead scientists to regard all such questions as unprofitable or unsound. Before we hazard any constructive opinion as to the order of differences to be expected among European populations, therefore, these diverting trains of thought must be examined.

It is, in the first place, argued that not the people but rather the circumstances under which they live differ from one community to another; that we have to deal with differences either in historical background or in current conditions, and that these factors are sufficient to account for all differences in behavior without our invoking any differences of character in the individuals concerned. Essentially this argument is an appeal to Occam's Razor—an assertion that we ought not to multiply entities beyond necessity. The argument is that, where observable differences in circumstance exist, we ought to invoke those rather than mere inferred differences in character, which we cannot observe.

The argument may be met in part by quoting experimental data, such as Lewin's experiments (unpublished material), which showed that there are great differences in the way in which Germans and Americans respond to failure in an experimental setting. The Americans treated failure as a challenge to increase effort; the Germans responded to the same failure with discouragement. But those who argue for the effectiveness of conditions rather than character can still reply that the experimental conditions are not, in fact, the same for both groups; that the stimulus value of any circumstance depends upon how that circumstance stands out against the background of other circumstances in the life of the subject, and that this contrast cannot be the same for both groups.

It is possible, in fact, to argue that since the same circumstances

never occur for individuals of different cultural background, it is therefore unnecessary to invoke such abstractions as national character. This argument breaks down, I believe, when it is pointed out that, in stressing circumstance rather than character, we would be ignoring the known facts about *learning*. Perhaps the best documented generalization in the field of psychology is that, at any given moment, the behavioral characteristics of any mammal, and especially of man, depend upon the previous experience and behavior of that individual. Thus in presuming that character, as well as circumstance, must be taken into account, we are not multiplying entities beyond necessity; we *know* of the significance of learned character from other types of data, and it is this knowledge which compels us to consider the additional "entity."

A second barrier to any acceptance of the notion of "national character" arises after the first has been negotiated. Those who grant that character must be considered can still doubt whether any uniformity or regularity is likely to obtain within such a sample of human beings as constitutes a nation. Let us grant at once that *uniformity* obviously does not occur, and let us proceed to consider what sorts of *regularity* may be expected.

The criticism which we are trying to meet is likely to take five forms. (1) The critic may point to the occurrence of subcultural differentiation, to differences between the sexes, or between classes, or between occupational groups within the community. (2) He may point to the extreme heterogeneity and confusion of cultural norms which can be observed in "melting-pot" communities. (3) He may point to the accidental deviant, the individual who has undergone some "accidental" traumatic experience, not usual among those in his social environment. (4) He may point to the phenomena of cultural change, and especially to the sort of differentiation which results when one part of the community lags behind some other in rate of change. (5) Lastly, he may point to the arbitrary nature of national boundaries.

These objections are closely interrelated, and the replies to them all derive ultimately from two postulates: first, that the individual,

whether from a physiological or a psychological point of view, is a single *organized* entity, such that all its "parts" or "aspects" are mutually modifiable and mutually interacting; and second, that a community is likewise *organized* in this sense.

If we look at social differentiation in a stable community—say, at sex differentiation in a New Guinea tribe*—we find that it is not enough to say that the habit system or the character structure of one sex is *different* from that of another. The significant point is that the habit system of each sex cogs into the habit system of the other; that the behavior of each promotes the habits of the other.† We find, for example, between the sexes, such complementary patterns as spectatorship-exhibitionism, dominance-submission, and succoring-dependence, or mixtures of these. Never do we find mutual irrelevance between such groups.

Although it is unfortunately true that we know very little about the terms of habit differentiation between classes, sexes, occupational groups, etc., in western nations, there is, I think, no danger in applying this general conclusion to all cases of stable differentiation between groups which are living in mutual contact. It is, to me, inconceivable that two differing groups could exist side by side in a community without some sort of mutual relevance between the special characteristics of one group and those of the other. Such an occurrence would be contrary to the postulate that a community is an organized unit. We shall, therefore, presume that this generalization applies to all stable social differentiation.

Now, all that we know of the mechanics of character formation—especially the processes of projection, reaction formation, compensation, and the like—forces us to regard these bipolar patterns as unitary within the individual. If we know that an individual is

* Cf. Margaret Mead,⁹ especially Part III, for an analysis of sex differentiation among the Tchambuli; also G. Bateson⁸ for an analysis of sex differentiation among adults in Iatmul, New Guinea.

† We are considering here only those cases in which ethological differentiation follows the sex dichotomy. It is also probable that, where the ethos of the two sexes is *not* sharply differentiated, it would still be correct to say that the ethos of each promotes that of the other, e.g., through such mechanisms as competition and mutual imitation. Cf. M. Mead.⁹

trained in overt expression of one half of one of these patterns, e.g., in dominance behavior, we can predict with certainty (though not in precise language) that the seeds of the other half—submission—are simultaneously sown in his personality. We have to think of the individual, in fact, as trained in dominance-submission, not in either dominance *or* submission. From this it follows that where we are dealing with stable differentiation within a community, we are justified in ascribing common character to the members of that community, provided we take the precaution of describing that common character in terms of the motifs of relationship between the differentiated sections of the community.

The same sort of considerations will guide us in dealing with our second criticism—the extremes of heterogeneity, such as occur in modern “melting-pot” communities. Suppose we attempted to analyze out all the motifs of relationship between individuals and groups in such a community as New York City; if we did not end in the madhouse long before we had completed our study, we should arrive at a picture of common character that would be almost infinitely complex—certainly that would contain more fine differentiations than the human psyche is capable of resolving within itself. At this point, then, both we and the individuals whom we are studying are forced to take a short cut: to treat heterogeneity as a positive characteristic of the common environment, *sui generis*. When, with such an hypothesis, we begin to look for common motifs of behavior, we note the very clear tendencies towards glorying in heterogeneity for its own sake (as in the Robinson Latouche “Ballad for Americans”) and towards regarding the world as made up of an infinity of disconnected quiz-bits (like Ripley’s “Believe It or Not”).

The third objection, the case of the individual deviant, falls in the same frame of reference as that of the differentiation of stable groups. The boy on whom an English public-school education does not take, even though the original roots of his deviance were laid in some “accidental” traumatic incident, is reacting *to* the public-school system. The behavioral habits which he acquires may

not follow the norms which the school intends to implant, but they are acquired in reaction to those very norms. He may (and often does) acquire patterns the exact opposite of the normal; but he cannot conceivably acquire irrelevant patterns. He may become a "bad" public-school Englishman, he may become insane, but still his deviant characteristics will be systematically related to the norms which he is resisting. We may describe his character, indeed, by saying that it is as systematically related to the standard public-school character as the character of Iatmul natives of one sex is systematically related to the character of the other sex. His character is oriented to the motifs and patterns of relationship in the society in which he lives.

The same frame of reference applies to the fourth consideration, that of changing communities and the sort of differentiation which occurs when one section of a community lags behind another in change. Since the direction in which a change occurs¹ will necessarily be conditioned by the *status quo ante*, the new patterns, being reactions to the old, will be systematically related to the old. As long as we confine ourselves to the terms and themes of this systematic relationship, therefore, we are entitled to expect regularity of character in the individuals. Furthermore, the *expectation and experience of change* may, in some cases, be so important as to become a common character-determining factor * *sui generis*, in the same sort of way that "heterogeneity" may have positive effects.

Lastly, we may consider cases of shifting national boundaries, our fifth criticism. Here, of course, we cannot expect that a diplomat's signature on a treaty will immediately modify the characters of the individuals whose national allegiance is thereby changed. It may even happen—for example, in cases where a preliterate native population is brought for the first time in contact with Europeans—that, for some time after the shift, the two parties to such a situation will behave in an exploratory or almost random

* For a discussion of the role played by "change" and "heterogeneity" in melting-pot communities, cf. M. Mead;² also F. Alexander.³

manner, each retaining its own norms and not yet developing any special adjustments to the situation of contact. During this period, we should still not expect any generalizations to apply to both groups. Very soon, however, we know that each side does develop special patterns of behavior to use in its contacts with the other.* At this point, it becomes meaningful to ask what systematic terms of relationship will describe the common character of the two groups; and from this point on, the degree of common character structure will increase until the two groups become related to each other just as two classes or two sexes in a stable, differentiated society.²

In sum, to those who argue that human communities show too great internal differentiation or contain too great a random element for any notion of common character to apply, our reply would be that we expect such an approach to be useful (a) provided we describe common character in terms of the themes of relationship *between* groups and individuals within the community, and (b) provided that we allow sufficient time to elapse for the community to reach some degree of equilibrium or to accept either change or heterogeneity as a characteristic of their human environment.

Differences Which We May Expect between National Groups

The above examination of "straw men" in the case against "national character" has very stringently limited the scope of this concept. But the conclusions from this examination are by no means simply negative. To limit the scope of a concept is almost synonymous with defining it.

* In the South Seas, those special modes of behavior which Europeans adopt towards native peoples, and those other modes of behavior which the native adopts towards Europeans, are very obvious. Apart from analyses of "pidgin" languages, we have, however, no psychological data on these patterns. For a description of the analagous patterns in Negro-white relationships, cf. J. Dollard,⁴ especially Chapter XII, Accommodation Attitudes of Negroes.

We have added one very important tool to our equipment—the technique of describing the common character (or the “highest common factor” of character) of individuals in a human community in terms of bipolar adjectives. Instead of despairing in face of the fact that nations are highly differentiated, we shall take the dimensions of that differentiation as our clues to the national character. No longer content to say, “Germans are submissive,” or “Englishmen are aloof,” we shall use such phrases as “dominant-submissive” when relationships of this sort can be shown to occur. Similarly, we shall not refer to “the paranoid element in German character,” unless we can show that by “paranoid” we mean some bipolar characteristic of German-German or German-foreign relationships. We shall not describe varieties of character by defining a given character in terms of its position on a continuum between extreme dominance and extreme submissiveness, but we shall, instead, try to use for our descriptions some such continua as “degree of interest in, or orientation towards, dominance-submission.”

So far, we have mentioned only a very short list of bipolar characteristics: dominance-submission, succoring-dependence, and exhibitionism-spectatorship. One criticism will certainly be uppermost in the reader’s mind, that, in short, all three of these characteristics are clearly present in all western cultures. Before our method becomes useful, therefore, we must try to expand it to give us sufficient scope and discriminatory power to differentiate one western culture from another.

As this conceptual frame develops, no doubt, many further expansions and discriminations will be introduced. The present paper will deal with only three such types of expansion.

ALTERNATIVES TO BIPOLARITY

When we invoked bipolarity as a means of handling differentiation within society without foregoing some notion of common character structure, we considered only the possibility of simple

bipolar differentiation. Certainly this pattern is very common in western cultures; take, for instance, Republican-Democrat, political Right-Left, sex differentiation, God and the devil, and so on. These peoples even try to impose a binary pattern upon phenomena which are not dual in nature—youth vs. age, labor vs. capital, mind vs. matter—and, in general, lack the organizational devices for handling triangular systems; the inception of any “third” party is always regarded, for example, as a threat to our political organization. This clear tendency towards dual systems ought not, however, to blind us to the occurrence of other patterns.*

There is, for example, a very interesting tendency in English communities towards the formation of ternary systems, such as parents-nurse-child, king-ministers-people, officers-N.C.O.’s-privates.† While the precise motifs of relationship in these ternary systems remain to be investigated, it is important to note that these systems, to which I refer as “ternary,” are neither “simple hierarchies” nor “triangles.” By a pure hierarchy, I should mean a serial system in which face-to-face relations do not occur between members when they are separated by some intervening member; in other words, systems in which the only communication between *A* and *C* passes through *B*. By a triangle I should mean a threefold system with no serial properties. The ternary system, parent-nurse-child, on the other hand, is very different from either of these other forms. It contains serial elements, but face-to-face contact does occur between the first and the third

* The Balinese social system in the mountain communities is almost entirely devoid of such dualisms. The ethnological differentiation of the sexes is rather slight; political factions are completely absent. In the plains, there is a dualism which has resulted from the intrusive Hindoo caste system, those with caste being discriminated from those without caste. At the symbolic level (partly as a result of Hindoo influence) dualisms are much more frequent, however, than they are in the social structure (e.g., Northeast vs. Southwest, Gods vs. demons, symbolic Left vs. Rights, symbolic Male vs. Female, etc.).

† A fourth instance of this threefold pattern occurs in some great public schools (as in Charterhouse), where the authority is divided between the quieter, more polished, intellectual leaders (“monitors”) and the rougher, louder, athletic leaders (captain of football, head of long room, etc.), who have the duty of seeing to it that the “fags” run when the monitor calls.

members. Essentially, the function of the middle member is to instruct and discipline the third member in the forms of behavior which he should adopt in his contacts with the first. The nurse teaches the child how to behave towards its parents, just as the N.C.O. teaches and disciplines the private in how he should behave towards officers. In psychoanalytic terminology, the process of introjection is done *indirectly*, not by direct impact of the parental personality upon the child.* The face-to-face contacts between the first and third members are, however, very important. We may refer, in this connection, to the vital daily ritual in the British Army, in which the officer of the day asks the assembled privates and N.C.O.'s whether there are any complaints.

Certainly, any full discussion of English character ought to allow for ternary, as well as bipolar patterns.

SYMMETRICAL MOTIFS

So far, we have considered only what we have called "complementary" patterns of relationship, in which the behavior patterns at one end of the relationship are different from, but fit in with, the behavior patterns at the other end (dominance-submission, etc.). There exists, however, a whole category of human interpersonal behavior which does not conform to this description. In addition to the contrasting complementary patterns, we have to recognize the existence of a series of *symmetrical* patterns, in which people respond to what others are doing by themselves doing something similar. In particular, we have to consider those competitive † patterns in which individual or group *A* is stimu-

* For a general discussion of cultural variants of the Oedipus situation and the related systems of cultural sanctions, cf. M. Mead;¹⁰ also G. Roheim.¹¹

† The term "co-operation," which is sometimes used as the opposite of "competition," covers a very wide variety of patterns, some of them symmetrical and others complementary, some bipolar and others in which the co-operating individuals are chiefly oriented to some personal or impersonal goal. We may expect that some careful analysis of these patterns will give us vocabulary for describing other sorts of national characteristics. Such an analysis cannot be attempted in this paper.

lated to *more* of any type of behavior by perceiving more of that same type of behavior (or greater success in that type of behavior) in individual or group *B*.

There is a very profound contrast between such competitive systems of behavior and complementary dominance-submission systems—a highly significant contrast for any discussion of national character. In complementary striving, the stimulus which prompts *A* to greater efforts is the relative *weakness* in *B*; if we want to make *A* subside or submit, we ought to show him that *B* is stronger than he is. In fact, the complementary character structure may be summarized by the phrase “bully-coward,” implying the combination of these characteristics in the personality. The symmetrical competitive systems, on the other hand, are an almost precise functional opposite of the complementary. Here the stimulus which evokes greater striving in *A* is the vision of greater *strength* or greater striving in *B*; and, inversely, if we demonstrate to *A* that *B* is really weak, *A* will relax his efforts.

It is probable that these two contrasting patterns are alike available as potentialities in all human beings; but clearly, any individual who behaves in both ways at once will risk internal confusion and conflict. In the various national groups, consequently, different methods of resolving this discrepancy have developed. In England and in America, where children and adults are subjected to an almost continuous barrage of disapproval whenever they exhibit the complementary patterns, they inevitably come to accept the ethics of “fair play.” Responding to the challenge of difficulties, they cannot, without guilt, kick the underdog.* For British morale Dunkirk was a stimulus, not a depressant.

In Germany, on the other hand, the same clichés are apparently lacking, and the community is chiefly organized on the basis of a

* It is, however, possible that in certain sections of these nations, complementary patterns occur with some frequency—particularly among groups who have suffered from prolonged insecurity and uncertainty, e.g., racial minorities, depressed areas, the Stock Exchange, political circles, etc.

complementary hierarchy in terms of dominance-submission. The dominance behavior is sharply and clearly developed; yet the picture is not perfectly clear and needs further investigation. Whether a pure dominance-submission hierarchy could ever exist as a stable system is doubtful. It seems that in the case of Germany, the submission end of the pattern is masked, so that overt submissive behavior is almost as strongly tabooed as it is in America or England. In place of submission, we find a sort of parade-ground impassivity.

A hint as to the process by which the submissive role is modified and rendered tolerable comes to us out of the interviews in a recently begun study of German life histories.* One German subject described how different was the treatment which he, as a boy, received in his South German home, from that which his sister received. He said that much more was demanded of him; that his sister was allowed to evade discipline; that whereas he was always expected to click his heels and obey with precision, his sister was allowed much more freedom. The interviewer at once began to look for intersex sibling jealousy, but the subject declared that it was a greater honor for the boy to obey. "One doesn't expect too much of girls," he said. "What one felt they (boys) should accomplish and do was very serious, because they had to be prepared for life." An interesting inversion of *noblesse oblige*.

COMBINATIONS OF MOTIFS

Among the complementary motifs, we have mentioned only three—dominance-submission, exhibitionism-spectatorship, and succorance-dependence—but these three will suffice to illustrate the sort of verifiable hypotheses at which we can arrive by describing national character in this hyphenated terminology.†

* G. Bateson, unpublished research for the Council on Human Relations.

† For a fuller study, we ought to consider such other motifs as aggression-passivity, possessive-possessed, agent-tool, etc. And all of these motifs will require somewhat more critical definition than can be attempted in this paper.

Since, clearly, all three of these motifs occur in all western cultures, the possibilities for international difference are limited to the proportions and ways in which the motifs are combined. The proportions are likely to be very difficult to detect, except where the differences are very large. We may be sure ourselves that Germans are more oriented towards dominance-submission than are Americans, but to demonstrate this certainty is likely to be difficult. To estimate differences in the degree of development of exhibitionism-spectatorship or succorance-dependence in the various nations will, indeed, probably be quite impossible.

If, however, we consider the possible ways in which these motifs may be combined together, we find sharp qualitative differences which are susceptible of easy verification. Let us assume that all three of these motifs are developed in all relationships in all Western cultures, and from this assumption go on to consider *which individual plays which role*.

It is logically possible that in one cultural environment *A* will be dominant and exhibitionist, while *B* is submissive and spectator; while in another culture *X* may be dominant and spectator, while *Y* is submissive and exhibitionist.

Examples of this sort of contrast rather easily come to mind. Thus we may note that whereas the dominant Nazis preen themselves before the people, the czar of Russia kept his private ballet, and Stalin emerges from seclusion only to review his troops. We might perhaps present the relationship between the Nazi Party and the people thus:

<i>Party</i>	<i>People</i>
Dominance	Submission
Exhibitionism	Spectatorship

while the czar and his ballet would be represented:

<i>Czar</i>	<i>Ballet</i>
Dominance	Submission
Spectatorship	Exhibitionism

Since these European examples are comparatively unproved, it is worthwhile at this point to demonstrate the occurrence of such differences by describing a rather striking ethnographic difference which has been documented more fully. In Europe, where we tend to associate succoring behavior with social superiority, we construct our parent symbols accordingly. Our God, or our king, is the "father" of his people. In Bali, on the other hand, the gods are the "children" of the people, and when a god speaks through the mouth of a person in trance, he addresses anyone who will listen as "father." * Similarly, the rajah is *sajanganga* ("spoilt" like a child) by his people. The Balinese, further, are very fond of putting children in the combined roles of god and dancer; in mythology, the perfect prince is polished and narcissistic. Thus the Balinese pattern might be summarized thus:

<i>High Status</i>	<i>Low Status</i>
Dependence	Succoring
Exhibitionism	Spectatorship

And this diagram would imply, not only that the Balinese feel dependence and exhibitionism and superior status to go naturally together, but also that a Balinese will not readily combine succoring with exhibitionism (that is, Bali completely lacks the ostentatious gift-giving characteristic of many primitive peoples) or will be embarrassed if forced by the context to attempt such a combination.

Although the analogous diagrams for our Western cultures cannot be drawn with the same certainty, it is worthwhile to attempt them for the parent-child relationships in English, American, and German cultures. One extra complication must, however, be faced; when we look at parent-child relationships instead of at relationships between princes and people, we have to make specific allowance for the changes in the pattern which occur as the child grows older. Succorance-dependence is undoubtedly a dominant

* M. Mead and G. Bateson, unpublished researches.

motif in early childhood, but various mechanisms later modify this extreme dependence, to bring about some degree of psychological independence.

The English upper- and middle-class system would be represented diagrammatically thus :

<i>Parents</i>	<i>Children</i>
Dominance	Submission (modified by "ternary" nurse system)
Succoring	Dependence (dependence habits broken by separation—children sent to school)
Exhibitionism	Spectatorship (children listen silently at meals)

In contrast with this, the analogous American pattern seems to be :

<i>Parents</i>	<i>Children</i>
Dominance (slight)	Submission (slight)
Succoring	Dependence
Spectatorship	Exhibitionism

And this pattern differs from the English not only in the reversal of the spectatorship-exhibitionism roles, but also in the content of what is exhibited. The American child is encouraged by his parents to *show off his independence*. Usually the process of psychological weaning is not accomplished by sending the child away to a boarding school; instead, the child's exhibitionism is played off against his independence, until the latter is neutralized. Later, from this beginning in the exhibition of independence, the individual may sometimes go on in adult life to show off succorance, his wife and family becoming in some degree his "exhibits." •

Though the analogous German pattern probably resembles the American in the arrangement of the paired complementary roles, certainly it differs from the American in that the father's dominance is much stronger and much more consistent, and especially in that the content of the boy's exhibitionism is quite different. He is, in fact, dominated into a sort of heel-clicking exhibitionism

which takes the place of overt submissive behavior. Thus, while in the American character exhibitionism is encouraged by the parent as a method of psychological weaning, both its function and its content are for the German entirely different.

Differences of this order, which may be expected in all European nations, are probably the basis of many of our naive and often unkind international comments. They may, indeed, be of considerable importance in the mechanics of international relations, in as much as an understanding of them might dispel some of our misunderstandings. To an American eye, the English too often appear "arrogant," whereas to an English eye the American appears to be "boastful." If we could show precisely how much of truth and how much of distortion is present in these impressions, it might be a real contribution to interallied co-operation.

In terms of the diagrams above, the "arrogance" of the Englishman would be due to the combination of dominance and exhibitionism. The Englishman in a performing role (the parent at breakfast, the newspaper editor, the political spokesman, the lecturer, or what not) assumes that he is also in a dominant role—that he can decide in accordance with vague, abstract standards what sort of performance to give—and the audience can "take it or leave it." His own arrogance he sees either as "natural" or as mitigated by his humility in face of the abstract standards. Quite unaware that his behavior could conceivably be regarded as a comment upon his audience, he is, on the contrary, aware only of behaving in the performer's role, as he understands that role. But the American does not see it thus. To him, the "arrogant" behavior of the Englishman appears to be directed *against* the audience, in which case the implicit invocation of some abstract standard appears only to add insult to injury.

Similarly, the behavior which an Englishman interprets as "boastful" in an American is not aggressive, although the Englishman may feel that he is being subjected to some sort of invidious comparison. He does not know that, as a matter of fact, Americans will only behave like this to people whom they rather

like and respect. According to the hypothesis above, the "boasting" pattern results from the curious linkage whereby exhibition of self-sufficiency and independence is played off against overdependence. The American, when he boasts, is looking for approval of his upstanding independence; but the naive Englishman interprets this behavior as a bid for some sort of dominance or superiority.

In this sort of way, we may suppose that the whole flavor of one national culture may differ from that of another, and that such differences may be considerable enough to lead to serious misunderstandings. It is probable, however, that these differences are not so complex in their nature as to be beyond the reach of investigation. Hypotheses of the type which we have advanced could be easily tested, and research on these lines is urgently needed.

National Character and American Morale

Using the motifs of interpersonal and intergroup relationship as our clues to national character, we have been able to indicate certain orders of regular difference which we may expect to find among the peoples who share our western civilization. Of necessity, our statements have been theoretical rather than empirical; still, from the theoretical structure which we have built up, it is possible to extract certain formulas which may be useful to the builder of morale.

All of these formulas are based upon the general assumption that people will respond most energetically when the context is structured to appeal to their habitual patterns of reaction. It is not sensible to encourage a donkey to go up hill by offering him raw meat, nor will a lion respond to grass.

A. Since all western nations tend to think and behave in bipolar terms, we shall do well, in building American morale, to think of our various enemies as a single hostile entity. The distinctions and gradations which intellectuals might prefer are likely to be disturbing.

B. Since both Americans and English respond most energetically to symmetrical stimuli, we shall be very unwise if we soft-pedal the disasters of war. If our enemies defeat us at any point, that fact ought to be used to the maximum as a challenge and a spur to further effort. When our forces have suffered some reverse, our newspapers ought to be in no hurry to tell us that "enemy advances have been checked." Military progress is always intermittent, and the moment to strike, the moment when maximum morale is needed, occurs when the enemy is solidifying his position and preparing the next blow. At such a moment, it is not sensible to reduce the aggressive energy of our leaders and people by smug reassurance.

C. There is, however, a superficial discrepancy between the habit of symmetrical motivation and the need for showing self-sufficiency. We have suggested that the American boy learns to stand upon his own feet through those occasions in childhood when his parents are approving spectators of his self-sufficiency. If this diagnosis is correct, it would follow that a certain bubbling up of self-appreciation is normal and healthy in Americans and is perhaps an essential ingredient of American independence and strength.

A too-literal following of the formula above, therefore, a too-great insistence upon disasters and difficulties, might lead to some loss of energy through the damming up of this spontaneous exuberance. A rather concentrated diet of "blood, sweat, and tears" may be good for the English; but Americans, while no less dependent upon symmetrical motivation, cannot feel their oats when fed on nothing but disaster. Our public spokesmen and newspaper editors should never soft-pedal the fact that we have a man-sized job on our hands, but they will do well to insist also that America is a man-sized nation. Any sort of attempt to reassure Americans by minimizing the strength of the enemy must be avoided, but frank boasts of real success are good.

D. Because our vision of the peace is a factor in our warmaking morale, it is worthwhile to ask at once what light the study of

national differences may throw upon the problems of the peace table.

We have to devise a peace treaty, (*a*) such that Americans and British will fight to achieve it, and (*b*) such that it will bring out the best rather than the worst characteristics of our enemies. If we approach it scientifically, such a problem is by no means beyond our skill.

The most conspicuous psychological hurdle to be negotiated, in imagining such a peace treaty, is the contrast between British and American symmetrical patterns and the German complementary pattern, with its taboo on overt submissive behavior. The allied nations are not psychologically equipped to enforce a harsh treaty; they might draw up such a treaty, but in six months they would tire of keeping the underdog down. The Germans, on the other hand, if they see their role as "submissive," will not stay down without harsh treatment. We have seen that these considerations applied even to such a mildly punitive treaty as was devised at Versailles; the allies omitted to enforce it, and the Germans refused to accept it. It is, therefore, useless to dream of such a treaty, and worse than useless to repeat such dreams as a way of raising our morale now, when we are angry with Germany. To do that would only obscure the issues in the final settlement.

This incompatibility between complementary and symmetrical motivation means, in fact, that the treaty cannot be organized around simple dominance-submissive motifs; hence we are forced to look for alternative solutions. We must examine, for example, the motif of exhibitionism-spectatorship—what dignified role is each of the various nations best fitted to play?—and that of suc-coring-dependence—in the starving postwar world, what motivational patterns shall we evoke between those who give and those who receive food? And, alternative to these solutions, we have the possibility of some threefold structure, within which both the allies and Germany would submit, not to each other, but to some abstract principle.

Part Two: HOW MORALE DEVELOPS

VI. *Children Are Important to Morale*

VII. *The Morale of Youth Groups*

VIII. *Morale and the Training of Leaders*

IX. *Propaganda and Morale*

X. *News and Morale*

CHAPTER VI

Children Are Important to Morale

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SOME believe that the struggle between democracy and dictatorship has come because democracy has failed. In the United States we claim that it has not failed. The proof of whether we are right or wrong will come in the next five or ten or twenty-five years. And when it comes, the answer will depend in large part on the physical and mental health of our people and on the satisfactions in living which they have as members of a democracy; these are the basic conditions which underlie effective work in time of peace, and strength in war.

We know now that the physical and mental health of adults, their capacity for a satisfying life, is directly related to their earlier childhood experiences. What is the actual situation here today among adults in the United States?

At present, democracy is carrying a load of several million "unemployables" in addition to more than a million psychotics and neurotics requiring special institutional or private medical care. These figures do not tell us how many more vulnerables there are, people who will break down under the more severe strains we have ahead. Such groups weaken our democracy.

At a more subtle level, there are thousands of compulsive, rebellious, neurotically power-driven personalities who contribute to irrational and unproductive hostility between class, race, religious, and working groups. These groups are incapacitated for genuinely democratic life. They further weaken our democracy.

Other millions have inadequate wages, the housing of poverty, bad work conditions. These people have little basis for feeling that democracy has succeeded and little energy for making a

sound contribution to its further development. Improved housing, more recreation, more food (including vitamins and minerals) can go far toward increasing their satisfactions, their health, and their faith.

Today's Children Our Postwar Citizens

But attention to adults and to economic problems alone is not enough. The roots of many of these adult difficulties in the future lie in basic experiences of children today—experiences of frustration and insecurity that are producing unsocial, distorted personalities maturing into inadequate adulthood year by year. Nationwide records of children's problems likely to present hazards to a democracy five, ten, fifteen years from now do not exist. We do have some clues to trends, based on studies of samples at different levels. It is also true that the Social Security Act has made possible important advances in the care of dependent and crippled children, children "in danger of becoming delinquent," and in giving aid to the states for maternal and child health services. These are all aimed at the correction of obvious "breakdown" situations, but they are pitifully inadequate to meet the needs of children over the country. For instance, the appropriation of \$1,510,000 authorized for grants to states for welfare services for the protection and care of homeless, dependent, and neglected children and those in danger of becoming delinquent would not be adequate to do what is needed for New York City alone, with its current depression crop of delinquents. We must also look to the basic experiences of children not at the point of breakdown into delinquency or physical symptoms. We have been too long content with trying to correct conditions after breakdown occurs instead of planning for physical and mental health. We pay no attention to less dramatic forms of unsocial distorted personality maturing into inadequate adulthood year by year.

W.P.A. nursery-school teachers, for example, frequently find two types of personality patterns appearing in reaction to eco-

conomic insecurity and inadequate parental love and attention. They report the withdrawn, shy, anxious, "shut-in" child, the youngster who cannot make adequate contacts with other children, who is likely always to have difficulty as a member of a social group—unless he can get help. The existence of such a type gives us concern because life in the United States becomes each year more and more a life of co-operating in the group. The isolated individualist finds less acceptance of his eccentricities than he did in pioneer days. W.P.A. teachers also report the hyperactive, aggressive child, the youngster who reacts to frustration by a compulsive effort to "get his." This type of child, as an adult, will be an even greater threat to democracy, for he is the potential "slave driver" or gangster—unless his needs as a child can be better met.

In addition to these two marked types of reaction to frustration and insecurity, W.P.A. teachers report other patterns: rigidity, dependence on adults, repression of individual spontaneity. We must add to these the sapping of physical strength. For there are many children who respond to insecurity, not in terms of unsocial behavior (either excessively withdrawn or excessively aggressive) and not in terms of diminished creativeness. These children show physical symptoms which take their toll in strength: gastric disorders, allergies, organic weaknesses resulting from prolonged and excessive emotional strain; or emotional reactions of a more extreme character leading to an actual break with reality.

Other clues to trends come from preschool children with superior backgrounds. Among 70 such youngsters in one group, all averaging well above norms for height and weight, 10 per cent presented extreme personality deviations which made happy adjustment to normal group life at any subsequent period unlikely unless special help, in most cases involving psychiatric work with the child, was made available. In order to make this point more concrete, I will illustrate a few instances of these extreme personality deviations.

Albert was the son of ambitious parents, his father a business man, his mother an actress. His mother had been ill most of his

first year, and he was cared for by a series of maids all of whom were very repressive; the last and longest one kept him in his carriage except when he was in his own room, until the age of two. By that time he was afraid to set foot on anything but his own linoleum floor. By the time he was three, his mother realized that he did not behave quite like other boys of his age: his speech was limited, he did not play as other children did, he seemed to be in a daze much of the time, talked in a strained unreal voice, was unresponsive to adults; the few contacts he had with other children were apt to end in biting or in some other aggressive attack. Taken to a clinic, he was found to have an intelligence quotient of about 65. When he was brought to nursery school, it was impossible for him to be kept in a large group of 25 children because of the violence of his aggression toward them; and also because of the obvious need for affectionate attention from one insightful adult who could give him a great deal of time. Experts who observed him considered his withdrawal to be schizophrenic in character and were dubious about the outcome. As a result of carefully planned companionship and supervision, however, including a long period of encouragement to enjoy the explorations, aggression, and primitive messing and manipulative experiences that had been so severely repressed for so long, he began to play in the crude way that a younger child would, then learned some of the controls that children usually acquire in the period between three and six, and gained better contacts with other children. At eight his intelligence quotient is 116, and although he is still a slightly odd child, he is within the range of children who can participate in normal life.

Bernice, a little girl of ten, has had a somewhat similar development; brought up literally with rubber gloves, if not with kid ones, by oversensitive parents who conscientiously obeyed the injunction never to kiss or hug their baby, she was a lonely withdrawn child at three in nursery school and even at six was still remote from other children. She would play in parallel fashion, moving in a dreamlike way, unconscious of the lack of integration of her activity with that of the rest. Her writing was shadowy and vague, and she seemed unable to do anything that involved physical pressure or give and take. Probably because there was no

aggression in her case, parents were loath to accept psychiatric help, and it is an open question whether the wholesome understanding of her present teachers can alone help her enough.

These are two instances of the "extreme personality deviations" which make the outlook for future adjustment very grim, if children are not given help during the early years when personality is still flexible, reachable, and capable of responding to guidance.

Another type, more familiar perhaps through the child-guidance literature because of his obvious predelinquent behavior, is George. With both parents working at low-paid jobs to earn enough for a decent home, he resented the lack of attention from those closest to him and, feeling frustrated, began to steal before the age of six; this at least brought him some attention. Actually more likely to obtain help because of the obviousness of his problem, he is probably also more likely, with this help, to develop soundly than either of the two withdrawn children first described.

In addition to the 10 per cent of this preschool group who showed extreme personality deviations, approximately another 10 per cent showed reaction patterns of aggression or repressed "shut-in" behavior which jeopardize their future health, creativeness, and capacity for stable relations with people. Often neither parents nor teachers know how to help these children; their compulsiveness or withdrawal makes them inaccessible to everyday contact.

This "serious 20 per cent" should not be confused with the widespread incidence of early childhood "problems," such as ordinary insecurities, fears, temper tantrums, nervous habits. Although estimates of the incidence of problems of this sort run as high as 60 per cent of nursery-school children, many of these are "outgrown" if the child has understanding guidance during early and later childhood. Often they are less important than parents think, frequently being natural concomitants of growth and periods of getting adjusted to social life. Parents can sometimes help best simply by not worrying about them; but the more serious personality distortions are not so easily outgrown.

Developmental Hazards that Can Be Avoided

In upper-class groups many of the more serious patterns are due to developmental hazards also, but it must be stressed that these are not inevitable hazards; they are simply ones that are now common:

1. *Unsatisfactory experiences with early nourishment.* Our mental picture of the young baby affectionately supported in his mother's arms while he nurses at her breast is rapidly coming to be a picture of a myth. In one upper middle-class group only one-sixth of the children were nursed two months or longer. Some mothers, to be sure, make the feeding experience a happy one when the child is bottle-fed; but bottle-feeding often means a mechanical and sometimes frustrating experience.

2. *Isolation.* Today we often leave our youngsters alone in cribs or playpens for most of the first eighteen months. Children need companionship, play, and the stimulus of being sung or read to during infancy if they are to grow into happy social relationships. Both in upper middle-class groups and in groups where mothers help support the family, babies may be left alone a large part of their waking hours, deprived of the stimulus and experience that make human contact familiar and satisfying.

3. *Constriction of activities and excessive discipline.* We stop our children from exploring, from handling things, from playing with mud and with dough during the normal stage of expanding contact with objects and materials from eight months to three years. Such restriction is often the later counterpart of extremely rigorous or forced toilet training in the first year. The total pattern is based on excessive concern with order.

4. *Inadequate emotional experience.* Our young ones lack contact with other children or adults from six months to three years. The result is sometimes emotional starvation and often, as a part of it, a sense of lack of love. This comes from all three of the common deprivations just discussed but it is also a result of a fear of

love, and a dependence on "objective" techniques of bringing up children advocated by certain "experts." Children need loving.

In upper-class groups some of this situation can be corrected by a changed emphasis in parental education or by parental release-therapy which will stimulate parents to feel and express more affection for children. But even well-to-do communities seldom have adequate provision for guidance or correction of serious problems such as those included in the "serious 20 per cent" referred to above—the children with anxiety, phobias, withdrawal patterns of a severe sort.

Economic Factors in Personality Development

In underprivileged groups, economic and emotional insecurity reinforce each other. There is little compensation to offset the expected early anxieties. Active help is needed here if our next generation is to be strong, courageous, and capable of participating in a satisfactorily democratic life.

Look at the facts: There are over thirty million children under 14 in our country. Nearly two-thirds of them grow up in families with incomes of less than \$1500 a year. Several million of them, the children of sharecroppers, of migrant workers, of our rural and city relief groups, grow up in families with less than \$500 a year!

For these children adequate food and companionship with warm, sustaining, interested healthy parents is impossible. To be sure, the odds against the poor child are not 100 per cent all of the time. Some of these parents can maintain a level of devotion and understanding in the face of extreme deprivation which actually gives a few of their children more emotional security than the offspring of compulsive upper-class parents. But the number is few. America must face the fact that many of these parents are too exhausted, too embittered, too hungry, too tired to have anything to give a child.

Great progress has been made in decreasing the death rate and

improving the health of young children. Yet almost half of the sick children in small towns in families with incomes of less than \$1000 a year receive *no care* from a doctor. Several million school-age children have uncorrected eye defects and other difficulties. And yet we are much further advanced in physical care than we are in mental hygiene and care of children.

Let us look at what nursery-school teachers report about the experiences of children in different sections of the country. It is important, we must admit at the outset, not to neglect the important values for small children in the warmth of foreign-born parents who are as yet unimpressed by the emphasis on routines characteristic of many groups. This reassuring affection, even when it accompanies rather extreme domination, is one of the chief sources of wholesome development of children in lower economic groups. But the "poor little rich girl" philosophy must not blind us to the grimmer aspects of child development in some working groups.

At one extreme, teachers have repeatedly recorded the anxiety and distorted personalities that are bred in the migratory camps. "Burrell feels very keenly the stigma of living in a tent." "The children from the oldest to the youngest seem to feel that they do not have the sort of clothes that other children have. Their shaggy uncut hair damps their personalities." "Living on a platform with a tent over it does away with all privacy. There are no yards to play in; consequently all children have the run of the camp from daylight to dark." "Mary misses a home—a house. Every day spent in a tent seems to take something from her happiness and sense of security. The constant talk of moving, of being 'sent on' keeps her in a state of turmoil at home, and this is bound to reflect in her school life." "Betty feels her whole life is insecure. She cannot forget the ordeal of the trip from Missouri in a flimsy old car, begging for food and for gasoline. She often says, 'We have to move pretty soon. We ain't got nothin' for keeps.'"

Records from mill and factory towns are scarcely less extreme: "Eldora, a shy, sad little girl, refused to eat except with her fingers. We made a home call and found the children ate with their

fingers in the home because of the total lack of silverware." The little home had practically no furnishings of any kind. "The parents work and leave the children with relatives"—or someone else. "These children do not have . . . their parents at home with them to supervise their play, singing, or storytelling. At a very early age these children have been left to play by themselves, or in the streets with other children."

It is not surprising that experiences like this breed behavior like the following:

From the migratory camps in California:

Mary-Faye seemed rather stealthy and sullen during her first months at school. She did not care for vegetables and would slyly throw them under the table. She had a great aversion to colored children and showed it at all times. Her attitude toward adults was guarded, and when corrected, very sullen. Yet she was very sensitive and cried easily when thwarted.

Margaret cried very easily and was backward and shy. She had long hair which hung in bangs that made her appear repulsive. She clung closely to her older brother and screamed whenever he moved from her side.

Loice-Lee's attitude when first seen seemed to be one of fear of punishment. Each time an adult neared him he dodged and rolled his eyes. Sometimes he would throw up his hands to guard his head. There is some inner force which seems to drive him constantly.

Merelene's behavior was one of extreme antagonism. She was given to temper tantrums at the slightest provocation, throwing herself upon the floor, screaming, pulling her hair, swearing.

Perry was extremely timid, afraid of everyone. He hid from children. He became totally negative, sulked, cried, refused food, resisted bed. Many days he was completely exhausted, even ill.

Carl cried a great deal, was negative, fatigued, had food problems. He undressed before children to attract their attention. His mother said he never masturbated at home for she had threatened to cut off his penis if she ever caught him. He threatened everyone with death and jail.

Warren was antagonistic toward everyone. He didn't want any-

one around him. When a child approached, he struck at the child. He grabbed toys from children, and when they cried, he laughed contentedly. A real bully.

From factory towns in Ohio:

Dottie was easily fatigued, underweight, undernourished. She was passive with both children and adults. She was carried into the room because she was too weak to walk. She immediately sat down on the floor and never attempted to get up unless moved. When given a doll she held the doll in her arms but made no attempt to play with it.

Billy was a nervous highstrung child. . . . While resting he would roll from side to side on his cot. One day as a result of his rolling his cot fell. He became rigid with fright. When approached by an adult Billy would hold both hands over his ears. . . . Many times he would sit quietly without moving until told to change his position.

Connie was very shy and showed much sullenness and hostility and was very helpless.

Glen spent his first months in nursery school under great restraint, having nothing to do with either teachers or children. He refused his medical examination each morning, clinging to his mother and crying. He refused to eat. He was very shy and nervous.

Cliffy seemed completely passive, he would not even watch other children; he would soil his pants daily even though placed on the toilet at intervals.

Nursery school teachers in the W.P.A. nurseries find that even such difficult behavior as we have described yields in a few weeks or months, or sometimes in a year or two, to the stable friendly understanding of a teacher and group life with children. Concretely:

After about four months Glen is getting over his shyness. We think that being out of the one room in which he lived (*sic*) and associating with other children in Nursery School where there are people of a happy frame of mind, has changed his attitude.

By the end of the year Dottie "was more independent." Does

not like to be helped and likes praise when she does well. When she washes and combs her hair, she usually remarks, "Now I look pretty, don't I?"

Billy has undergone an extreme change in behavior. From a tense, nervous, and dependent little boy he has gained initiative and independence to a certain degree.

It should be a matter of simple common sense to begin with the children, not only to organize their enthusiasm and faith but to plan for the development of bodies, personalities, and attitudes that will, from the cradle, give strength to our nation. What are we in America doing to build a wholesome morale? Are we meeting the needs of early childhood in a way that will insure sound bodies and healthy minds, five, ten, twenty-five years from now?

Urgent Need for Greatly Extended Services

W.P.A. nursery schools for children from two to five have provided social contacts, shelter and supplementary food for a limited group of children at this level. These schools must be extended. They need more adequate equipment, they need more food and vitamins, their teachers need more training, and psychiatric guidance needs to be made available. At present the teachers have little or no expert help for children with serious psychological or behavior problems. Understaffed, they do not have the time to give children the extra loving and extra friendly attention they so sorely need.

Nothing, virtually, is being done for children too young to go to nursery school. Because of this fact, serious psychological and behavioral difficulties are established before the children come to the few nursery schools we have. Infants and even somewhat older children who are still too young for nursery school are often cared for by young girls of doubtful responsibility and understanding. In some families where mothers must work, there is a "new girl every week or so," so that the baby has no continuous love or security in his earliest relationships.

Between the few who are cared for in W.P.A. nursery schools and the still fewer who are able to afford private nursery schools, there is a great gap. As a minimum step toward future safety we must supplement our W.P.A. schools by schools which would be available for working mothers generally. These would be public nursery schools available to all and not just to families on relief.

Is it too much for America to provide enough schools with the kind of equipment which meets the developmental needs of young children, and which would serve food, supplemented with vitamins, so that these youngsters can have a chance to grow to be strong?

Is it too much for America to plan also so that her working mothers are enabled to stay at home and care for their young children, at least through a generous nursing period, so that children need not start their lives deprived of their first experiences with love and people?

Is it too much for America to provide at least regional child guidance workers who could consult with teachers in W.P.A. and our new needed supplementary schools, helping them with therapy and providing psychiatric consultation for extreme cases?

Is it too much for America to carry out a nationwide survey of children's problems, to get the facts on the emotional needs of young children, so that we at least can have a basis for knowing what steps we must take if, on the morale front, we are to produce children equipped by personality to be democrats in the years of their lives still to come?

A Census of Young Children's Needs

One inevitable reply to these questions may be: But do we know enough to make wise plans for young children? Do we know who needs help most, or how it can best be given? I have to admit that we don't, in detail, although the large outlines are clear. Intensive studies of individual children have been undertaken only by a few groups, such as child-guidance groups reporting on delinquents; welfare agencies; and the child-study centers at the universities of

California, Minnesota, Iowa, and a few colleges like Harvard, Yale, Antioch, Sarah Lawrence, Smith, and Vassar. These studies have provided material for the most part on metropolitan children; we do not know enough about the typical problems resulting from pressures among rural children, or children in small industrial and mining towns. The records which I quoted from W.P.A. teachers were part of a small spontaneous co-operative project to which these teachers gave time voluntarily. They surely indicate the need for more adequate information about children and the developmental hazards to which they are exposed. A census of children with an appraisal of developmental status in terms of health, growth, and mental hygiene is just as important as a census of manpower in this country, for the census of children is a census of future adjusted, delinquent, hospitalized citizens. Such a census should provide information regarding the areas where medical help and mental hygiene are most needed, and should be accompanied by a census of those workers (social psychiatric workers, clinically trained psychologists, psychiatrically trained pediatricians) able to see the child as a growing person.

The basic ideas implicit in what I am saying are implicit also in much of the current literature in the field of orthopsychiatry and pediatrics. Dr. Benjamin Spock and Dr. Margaret Fries have given special attention to the need for an integrated health and mental-hygiene approach to children on a nationwide scale. The obstacles, if we wait for the initiative of individual communities, are the inevitable obstacles of lack of funds, and of the cultural lag which means that by slow intellectual osmosis it would take a generation or two to make people aware that emotional vitamins are just as important as the food vitamins we have been educated to over the past twenty-five years. Can we afford to indulge cultural lag? The skeptic will say that the public is not ready. But where the public has been given a chance—as in the instances of the child-guidance centers in New Hampshire, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in Walworth County, Wisconsin, and other centers described in recent issues of the monthly bulletin of the Children's

Bureau, *The Child*—the public has been responsive. Parents are not so slow to welcome real help for children as we sometimes think. The same forces that have turned the nation into a tooth-brush-conscious country and that send children to high school “so they’ll be able to have a better job than I have” will be ready to welcome workers who know how not only to help children be happy, but to grow up into healthy-minded citizens of our democracy.

Education for Democratic Living in Groups

In addition to these gross problems which will determine the ability of these children to swim, rather than sink, as adults in any future structure which our society may have, there are also important questions to be raised about the kinds of preparation which children are receiving for participation in a democratic society when they become adults. At present, the number of family units is increasing at the same time that the number of children per family is decreasing. This creates changes in family structure, with direct implications for the type of relationships which children will have, their emotional experience, amount of practice in carrying responsibility, sharing of work activities, and adapting to varying personalities. It is a widespread pattern in middle- and upper-class families for infants to be almost completely isolated during a large part of the waking day, hygienically protected from infection, usually by limiting contacts both with adults and with other children to a minimum. Such early experiences of isolation, of restricted contacts and activities, are probably major factors in the slow and tedious adjustment to social life in preschool and early school years. Russia has recognized the relation of early socialization to later capacity for social participation. Anthropologists, such as Margaret Mead, have pointed out the socializing effect of early proximity to family activities and neighborhood activities among certain primitive groups. The correction of our prevailing patterns is probably largely a matter of substituting a

socially oriented psychology for the narrow "hygiene" approach to the development of infants.

Other factors in the social development of children are less external in origin. The ignorance of contemporary parents about child development and their lack of ease with children are possible of correction by widespread parent education which is also socially oriented; but even such a campaign cannot correct the unconscious conflict in individual parents who project their own insecurities and hostility on their children without realizing what they are doing. Parents who are afraid to give a child patterns in the early years when they are needed, or who cannot succeed in guiding children because of their own ignorance of the normal experience to which their children are exposed—such parents may unwittingly create self-centered and chaotic habits of response which will make later co-operative behavior virtually impossible. Other parents, on the contrary, reacting against the bad results of this type of failure to acculturate the child, may be so determined to make the child "behave" that they impose unreasonable demands unsuited to the child's age level. This type of handling may bring a complete submission, as a result of which the child becomes precociously adult and gives up his birthright of spontaneity and individual judgment—a result which is not likely to enrich a democratic society—or it may bring rebellion and bitterness towards all authority identified with the parent. The latter would be likely to carry over in the form of adult hostility which makes co-operative effort impossible.

The development of democratic personality, then, calls for planning just as careful as is needed for well-nourished bodies, stable emotions, and attitudes of identification with the democratic ideal in the nation as a whole.

Summary of Needs of Young Children

I have certainly said enough about what we do not know to make it clear that accurate estimates of specific needs cannot be

made. If there are thirty million children in the United States under 14 (twenty million of whom are growing up in families of incomes lower than that necessary to maintain a minimum standard of decency), it is surely a modest enough estimate to guess that 10 to 20 per cent need help with varying degrees of urgency. That would make three to six million. Under the present Social Security Act, an appropriation of \$1,250,000 would allow an expenditure of less than 25 cents for each of these children. If we realize that we are fighting delinquency, mental breakdown, and the kind of personality distortion that produced Hitler, we see that it would be like trying to fight a Japanese armada of twenty battleships with one little tugboat.

It is not my job to discuss the details of administration in Washington. Perhaps the best procedure would be to have the appropriate individuals in the Department of Agriculture take over the problem for rural children, and let the W.P.A. expand to include these services for children in mining and factory towns where nursery schools have been established. Or perhaps more could be done under the aegis of Civilian Defense. The Children's Bureau at present has not money enough to do the job that is needed across the Potomac in Virginia alone. Perhaps a special division should be created, concerned with Children in Wartime, in charge of a co-ordinated board of pediatricians, psychiatrists, educators, and social workers. Whoever does the job, these things must be included as part of the plan:

1. *Direct help to children:* (A) Physical care: impetigo and other physical troubles calling for medical help are not uncommon in the migratory camps; children are undernourished in workers' groups everywhere.

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- (B) Direct therapy, through guided play, interviews, and other now established methods in the hands of psychiatric social workers and clinically trained psychologists is needed in many areas.

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- (C) Help with environmental problems, such as is now available through trained social workers, should be extended.

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2. *Education of the public, especially parents and teachers:*

(A) To recognize the meaning of children's difficulties and understand the emotional problems underlying psychosomatic symptoms such as nervous vomiting, enuresis, some allergies, delinquent or aggressive behavior.

(B) To be encouraged to give affection along with clear direction, more spontaneously.

3. *Direct help to the mother* through making health and mental-hygiene guidance available from pregnancy through delivery, infancy, and childhood of her children. The simplest way might be through the addition of psychiatric guidance to the health guidance now available in Well Baby Centers and clinics and the extension of such joint mental and physical health clinics.

4. *Research to improve both diagnostic and therapeutic methods* for dealing with children, and to give a more adequate base for planning help where it is most needed. As a result of studies in the last ten or fifteen years we are on the verge of being able to use paintings, play, Rorschach and intelligence-tests, records of behavior for diagnosis of children's problems, and to develop the equipment to handle them. Research grants to centers working on these problems of diagnosis could speed the formulation and validation of diagnostic and therapeutic procedures.

How About School-Age Children and Adolescents?

Chiefly we have spoken about the needs of young children. If we look at needs of school-age children, beginning with New York, we find, for example, eighty thousand children in Harlem (which illustrates the situation in many cities). Because of inadequate homes, and because of schools which can provide no more than the school routine itself, nearly all of these children are in sore need of supervised play and hobbies. The Harlem Boys' Club takes care of three thousand out of the eighty thousand. Not at all unique, unfortunately this situation is characteristic of many metropolitan areas. Normal play is important for normal growth. It is important too for energy and physical development, for providing normal motivation in accepting the social standards of one's group, for experience in democratic give and take, and the sub-

limating or redirecting of emotional tensions arising at home. The fact that so many children need therapeutic help as a preventive for delinquency or emotional maladjustment is, of course, in part due to the lack of decent play facilities for so many of them. This deficiency builds on the deprivation and frustration which we pointed out in relation to the infancy and preschool years. Conversely, be it noted, deeply satisfying play and activity outlets can release hostility and channel energies that have been distorted in the preschool years.

During adolescence "new strength, new hungers, new associations, new insights and new social demands bring a Renaissance to personality. Sometimes early childhood patterns persist; usually they are modified; occasionally they are transformed for better or for worse. The course of any civilization in crisis depends rather directly and immediately upon the hopes and fears, tolerances and resentments, enthusiasms, and aggressions, understandings, goals and purposes of its adolescent citizens. . . . Hitler's *Mein Kampf* shows how adolescent years in Vienna shaped the outlook which today dominates the continent of Europe. It is common knowledge that this amazing conquest has been made possible and is sustained by the fanatical devotion instilled in Hitler Jugend, S.A. boys, and the Bund of German Girls. The strength of the Soviets rests upon the idealism and sacrificial service of the Young Consomols. Every revolution for national freedom, including our own American Revolution, has been the outcome of passionate self-dedication by youth."

Thus wrote the editor of this book in the May issue of *Progressive Education*. And he continued, "The ineptitude of the United States in providing for youth will leave historians aghast. Everything else has been pushed in ahead of any comprehensive program for youth. We will conserve spruce trees, scrap iron, top soil and tinfoil before we get around to human resources." The same author summarized some of the findings of the various studies of youth by the American Youth Commission, the Educa-

tional Policies Commission, the Progressive Education Association, the N.Y.A. We know that:

Although national totals have not yet been reported, something like one in four of our young men will be rejected for Selective Service because of physical defects.*

Less than one adolescent in ten normally gets one physical examination a year.

90 per cent of high school students get no physiology, hygiene, or public-health course.

Half of our urban youth get inadequate exercise.

One young person in five has uncorrected or inadequately corrected visual defects.

Four out of five young people don't go to a dentist once a year.

Each year 70,000 die from tuberculosis; five times that many suffer from it; and the deaths of young people from tuberculosis are twice as frequent in the homes of skilled workers as among upper-income families.

Life expectancy for youth in industry is eight years less than for non-industrial workers.

Nearly 3,000,000 young people live in counties with no general hospital.

One in twenty will spend some time in a hospital for mental disease.

More than one in ten is badly handicapped by preventable personality maladjustment.

One in five is a social isolate, seldom chosen as a companion for work or play.

Half of American youth get their only sex education from the talk of friends.

One in six will seek divorce, and half the group will consider their marriage (or celibacy) a mistake.

Three-quarters of American youth frequently feel inferiority, guilt, and inadequacy so burdensome as to constitute a handicap in school, work, and social life.

The unemployment rate is higher in the youth group than for any other working age.

* By the standards initially required, half of the boys were being found unfit.

Three out of four young people growing up on farms in America will not be needed for agricultural production.

For the past decade, half the young people out of school and ready to work have been unable to find work.

Half of the young people working (in Maryland in 1936) were paid less than \$13 a week.

Nine out of ten of the Maryland young people working in factories disliked their work and wished they could get something better.

The C.C.C. and N.Y.A. have never provided for more than a fifth of the unemployed youth.

The chief reason why youths leave school is that they have to go to work.

75 per cent of the youths who leave school for work do so with no vocational guidance.

The number desiring to enter professions is four to five times as large as the number of available openings.

90 per cent of the jobs youths get require less than a year's preparation; most, less than a month.

Not more than 2 per cent of unemployed youth are content to be idle, and these have been discouraged by frustration of their previous efforts.

Favored sections of our communities are overrun with competing youth-serving agencies, while underprivileged sections show few clubs.

In rural America, except for churches, nine out of ten young people belong to no organization.

Youth listens to the radio more than it reads.

Playfields and athletic fields number less than a third of what are needed.

"There is a 90 per cent deficiency in the public recreation personnel of urban communities and a 96 per cent deficiency for rural communities."

A third of all persons arrested are under 25 years of age, whereas among those charged with auto theft, nearly 75 per cent are under 25.

85 per cent of high school pupils will not go to college but, espe-

cially in small communities, sterile academic college requirements dominate their high-school curriculum.

School curricula only rarely deal directly and helpfully with the major life activities of youth.

Less than half of the young people entering ninth grade in New York State, where expenditures for education are highest, finish their high-school course.

In some school districts taxable values per child are 100 times as great as the resources available in other districts, even in the same state.

The farm population, with 9 per cent of the nation's income, must educate 31 per cent of the nation's children.

The southeastern states educate one-fourth of the nation's children with only one-tenth of the nation's income.

2 per cent of our young people are illiterate, but ten times that number could well be called subliterate, doing practically no reading.

More than half of American youth would welcome opportunity for more education than they see a chance to get.

For Negroes, and to some extent for other minority groups, all these problems are aggravated.

Disability due to serious illness is 40 per cent higher among Negro than among white workers.

Mortality rates from respiratory tuberculosis are ten times as high for Negroes under 20 years of age as for whites in the same age range.

More than half of Negro youth have never been to a dentist.

The proportion of unemployment among Negro youths in their early twenties is a third higher than for whites.

The median wage for Negro young people (in Maryland) is slightly more than half the low wage paid to white youths.

Four Negro farmers out of five are tenants.

160,000 Negro youths live in counties where there is no high school for them.

In five Southern states, less than 10 per cent of the Negro population between 15 and 20 years of age are in high school.

In South Carolina and Alabama, in 1930, one Negro out of every four was reported as illiterate.

In 12 Southern states, four out of five Negro youths have no access to a library.

Arrests for Negro youth are two to four times as frequent as among whites.

Per capita expenditures for Negro education in 11 Southern states are only about one-fourth of the provision for whites.

In 15 states, from the day of his birth the Negro is segregated, with unequal accommodations.

When the Negro becomes 21 he may not vote in the primary elections of 10 states; he is taxed without representation, discriminated against in sanitation, housing, and recreational facilities.

In spite of all of our information, of the appallingly stark clarity of the need for training, for recreation, for guidance in problems, for work opportunities, little effort has been made to meet these needs. City governments are responsible for sewers and for fire departments—not for any of those activities for youth which will keep them out of personality conflagrations and the sewers of apathy and disillusion. That each community needs its Board of Youth just as it needs a Board of Health has been suggested by Watson. Health and guidance services to youth could certainly be co-ordinated with the plans for health and guidance of children as a whole. Recreation, vocational preparation, preparation for marriage, and other needs of youth might better be handled separately. An over-all program would therefore include the following:

1. Health and guidance centers which would make available help for the child and his parents from pregnancy through the whole growing-up period of the child. Both prophylactic and therapeutic work would be available.

2. Extension of activity programs from nursery school through adolescence, through the extension of nursery schools themselves, the establishment of clubs for out-of-school hours of elementary-school children, and training and recreation centers for adolescents.

Education of parents and teachers so that these services could be

co-ordinated with home and school facilities would be an important part of the job of workers in both kinds of centers.

Postscript Under Bomber Patrols

Most of this chapter was written with the war only a threatening shadow. As I conclude the writing, war has been declared, first by Japan, then by Germany and Italy. Tuesday * many people in the New York area were intensely disturbed by the air-raid alarms; by Wednesday, healthy children, even from families who were sending no sons into the army or navy, were already showing the effects of tension. I had been working for some weeks with Robert, a sensitive and eager boy just three. An impressionable child, he had become very constrained as a result of his oversensitive response to pressure in his comfortable though rather tense home. At first he had conversed only with yes and no. Although he would excitedly touch fingers to finger paint, looking up with a smile of delight, he could go no further. His play with toys was equally constricted. After a few sessions of play, together with discussions with his mother by our parent consultant, he had begun to paint with real freedom; in fact, he got into the paint in an all-over way, backs as well as fronts of hands, and up to his elbows. He played with the toys, alternating rigid lines of cars and people with messy piles of unorganized playthings. He had begun to talk in phrases and occasional sentences instead of yes and no. Now, the first day after the anxiety of possible air raids, the progress was all lost. Again he would not paint, he would not play, he would not talk. The parent consultant remarked that his mother had said that morning that "it was hard not to get terribly irritated with the children when one was so upset about what was happening."

There are thousands of Roberts in this country—no, millions. For many of them the hazards of war—insecurity, anxiety, ten-

* December 9, 1941.

sion—are merely a slight exaggeration of the hazards of our so-called peace. “We ain’t got nuthin’ for keeps.” “There isn’t any place for myself.” “I don’t like anybody, much . . . because I’m afraid.”

A recent national conference of workers with young children took as the keynote of the conference, “Life, liberty, and happiness for children, now.” This means, at least, in addition to a decent home in which to eat, sleep, and grow, *adequate recreation* and work opportunities for all children, *adequate health guidance*, together with the actual food and the correctional work to give point to such guidance, *adequate mental-health guidance*, both *for children*, directly (which means too the training of more workers, more psychiatrically trained pediatricians and nurses, as well as more nursery schools and guidance centers), and *for parents*, through co-ordinating mental-health services with medical services now available and additional ones needed.

England has had to add eight or ten child-guidance centers to its provision for child care, since the outbreak of war, because of the difficulties and strain experienced by children in wartime. Why should we wait until we also are flooded with problems of disturbed, enuretic, aggressive, war-shocked children? All of the provisions for child care which bombs may force upon us sooner or later are needed now, and will be needed not only by the bombed-out or evacuated children of San Francisco or New York, but even more by the children of the sharecroppers in Arkansas, the miners in West Virginia, the factory workers in Ohio.

CHAPTER VII

The Morale of Youth Groups

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THIS chapter will attempt to interpret the findings of those studies which have focused upon the behavior of face-to-face youth groups. The discussion of attitudes among college students is the subject of a separate section.*

There are rather great limitations imposed upon the present discussion by the fact that only within the past few years have social scientists and group workers become interested in studying intensively the interpersonal dynamics of primary child and youth groupings. Rather than make any effort to summarize separately the findings of the several studies, the aim of the following discussion is to present a series of derived generalizations about "youth morale." These statements and interpretations are an attempt to tie together under headings which have seemed appropriate to the writer the various strands of data he has run across which are relevant to the topic of this volume. The volume of data upon which the various generalizations are based varies greatly, and of course the realm of youth groups to which a particular generalization will be applicable will vary also.

Definition of Youth-group Morale

The majority of the definitions of morale—which are multiplying so rapidly—tend either to emphasize "personal morale" and deal with individual attitudes, hopes, etc., or to discuss "group morale" in terms of goals, the meeting of frustration, trust in

* See Chapter XII, "Student Morale," by Joe and Eugenia Belden.

leadership, etc.* The writer finds these two aspects of the definition so interdependent that no clear-cut distinction will be attempted in the present discussion; rather, morale will be defined in terms of the following subheadings of the chapter:

1. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction with group life.
2. Interpersonal relations and group structures.
3. Origin of the forces making for group cohesion and unity.
4. Meeting of group emergencies and frustrations.
5. Group and individual goals, productivity, and time perspective.

If these categories do not touch on certain major emphases in the reader's definition of group morale, it is unfortunately the case that few research workers who have been studying the primary group process in youth groups have been oriented by the "morale concept" in carrying on their observations and experiments. "Leadership" too would most certainly be included as a category if another chapter were not dealing with this area.† As it is, the relation of adult leadership in group functioning in all of the above-mentioned areas will be obvious at every turn of the discussion.

Satisfaction or Dissatisfaction with Group Life

GENERALIZATION 1: *A goodly proportion of American youth groups, up through the college ages, adjusts with evidences of unquestioning satisfaction to dominating adult leadership †† which is "benevolent" and friendly but nevertheless initiative-destroying and completely controlling most areas of potential freedom—including that of the formation of policy.*

* For a definition combining the two aspects, see Chapter I, "The Nature of Democratic Morale," by Gordon W. Allport.

† See Chapter VIII, "Morale and the Training of Leaders," by Alex Bavelas.

†† "Leadership" as used in this discussion is an all-inclusive term to denote the behavior of all persons occupying "central roles" in the life of children's groups—whether adult or child, democratic or dominative.

In practice, if not in our more lucid moments, many of us as leaders of youth groups in the classroom, on the playground, or in the club rooms, are tempted to use symptoms of "group satisfaction" as the chief criteria as to whether there is a healthy state of morale in the groups we are dealing with.

In one of the writer's classes a general discussion was under way on the topic, "What do adults do to keep high school students from growing up?" The participants were adolescents and a number of their high-school teachers. One of the girls on the panel came to the point of the discussion rather suddenly with the remark, "They [adults] try to keep us happy and think they are playing fair." A teacher on the panel responded, "If you are happy in school, doesn't that mean you are learning lots of things?" The girl came back quickly, "It doesn't mean we are growing up!" The teacher pushed the point a little further: "Well, if the teachers weren't here, do you think you would grow up better?" "I don't know," was the reply. When at this point one of the college students from the floor remarked that maybe the rebels were the healthy children in some school systems, he was frowned out of court by the participating teachers on the panel.

During the course of an experiment¹¹ with several clubs of sixth-grade boys who had both democratic and authoritarian club leadership, one of the boys remarked to an interviewer: "I like him—he's a swell leader. I'd rather have somebody plan a job for me any day than to have to plan it out by myself." Between 60 per cent and 70 per cent of the behavior of this particular leader fell in categories which could be labelled "direct control of child behavior" and "nonconstructive criticism." *

In another experiment with a class of college sophomores¹⁵ an attempt was being made by the instructor to get the class to assume new areas of self-responsibility. At the end of the second week a committee of students approached him with the request

* For a further discussion of the behavior of children in democratic and autocratic groups, see also Chapter IV, "Time Perspective and Morale," by Kurt Lewin.

that he resume his practice of taking roll at the beginning of the class. They were finding it too hard to get out of bed and to class on time for this rather early morning class, when they knew no record of their attendance was being taken.

Mowrer¹⁹ notes in his observations on group life in the cottage of a children's institution that authoritarian adult practices call forth docilely dependent and nondiscontented behavior on the part of some of the children observed. Such an observation is in line too with the findings of Lewin, Lippitt, and White¹² that three of their five clubs under authoritarian leadership showed a submissive nonrebellious response to a strongly dominated club atmosphere; even in personal interviews with the leader absent about half of the club members gave no evidence of piled-up tension as the result of such domination. The observations of Bavelas³ as well, reported elsewhere in this volume, indicate that children come voluntarily to play without rebellion under adult leaders whose behavior is made up largely (from 50 per cent to 70 per cent) of "direct control" over the child members of the group (e.g., he "gives orders," "refuses permission," "makes a strong suggestion").

These and other studies lead to the generalization that in our present American culture groups of children ranging from the preschool ages up through the college years seem often to react with satisfaction to adult domination of their group life. There are still other observations to indicate that many of these youth react even with considerable dissatisfaction to what group workers and progressive educators would call democratic leadership.

In order that the terms authoritarian, democratic, and laissez-faire or let-them-alone leadership may be used in a more meaningful context during the rest of this discussion, Figure 1 has been inserted at this point to supply an "operational definition" in terms of actual observed behavior under these three descriptive phrases. The figure indicates the number of incidents of leader-behavior in each of the categories of leader-child contact during the course




FIG. 1. An "operational definition" of democratic, authoritarian, and laissez-faire leadership of a group of sixth-graders.

of six club meetings. These examples come from three of the Iowa clubs studied by Lewin, Lippitt, and White.¹²

It seems evident that the presence or absence of satisfaction with group life on the part of the group members does not serve as a symptom for discriminating between dominated and democratically led child groups in our culture. The particular focus of the groups' satisfaction and dissatisfaction will need to be examined further in relation to other criteria of group morale.

GENERALIZATION 2: Groups of youth given nearly "complete freedom" seem to evidence more symptoms of frustration and dissatisfaction than those groups under authoritarian domination.

We haven't been doing much in the club, just loafing along. I'd rather be given something to do.

Our leader lets us do mostly what we want to do. He doesn't give us many ideas.

The Club is pretty good but we ought to organize better.

I don't like our clubmaster. He lets us do what we want to do and that's no fun. He doesn't make any suggestions.

These comments are examples from interviews¹³ with eleven-year-old boys about their laissez-faire club leaders who, though supplying their groups with materials and technical information, were withholding leadership in discussion and other guidance.

We aren't given any definite topics for discussion. I would prefer to use a text and have something definite to study each day.

The weakness of the course was that the instructor left it up to me and the rest of the students. . . . I believe the instructor should get up there and talk.

I think we should have things more definite rather than being given suggestions and left on our own.

And these are excerpts from the statements of college sophomores¹⁵ about a college course which many progressive educators would have rated as only "mildly democratic."

There is considerable evidence, then, statistical as well as qualitative, to bear out the interpretation that giving out "areas of

freedom" to youth who, as a group, do not have the social techniques to deal with freedom or, as individuals, the personal techniques to "structure the unstructured field," results in greater disruption of group and personal morale than subordination to a dominating leader who "makes things definite" and "gives you things to do."

Group observations have noted a rather definite cycle of boredom and outbreaks of horseplay in the atmosphere of a group under conditions of total freedom. Perhaps having something to do serves as a channel for release in autocratic atmospheres. But beyond this there is in addition evidence of less tension in groups under a "benevolent autocracy." Clearly, then, freedom for the child or the child group must be thought of in positive rather than in negative terms—the extension of the child's control over his environment and his adjustment to larger responsibilities rather than the mere withdrawal of adult permissions or of restrictions upon activity.

GENERALIZATION 3: The groups which show highest dissatisfaction with authoritarian leadership are those able to contrast this experience with contiguous or simultaneous democratic group memberships.

We may raise the question, in the light of Generalization 1, as to what kind of educational experience youth groups can be given which will bring about intelligent rebellion against authoritarian domination whenever it is imposed upon them. Several recent observations would seem to offer one clue to this problem of stimulating a readiness for rebellion.

One group in the study by Lewin, Lippitt, and White started out with an authoritarian leader, next had a democratic adult, and ended their club history with another authoritarian leader. The group showed a completely submissive, dependent response to the first authoritarian leader. After an experience of genuine democratic freedom, however, the group showed only half as much dependence on its second autocratic leader, tripled the amount of

activities looking toward escape from the present situation, and gave evidence of considerably more frustration (e.g., interpersonal aggressiveness doubled). The first individual interviews with the boys—just after their first experience with autocracy—indicated considerable contentment with their child life and no insight into the leader's behavior pattern. The final interviews—after the democratic experience and a renewed autocracy—tell a different story:

Mr. D. A. [second autocrat] was just the opposite of R. L. [democratic leader]. I think R. L. was the finest . . . he let us choose what we wanted to do . . . he'd mention things and then we could decide on them. D. A. knew who should do things. He thought of things we couldn't have thought . . . but he knew how he wanted things done.

I like R. L. best of all. If we were started on something, we could finish it without being interrupted. If he had an idea or we had an idea, then we'd vote on them and take the best idea. . . . D. A. [second autocrat] had things to do that were interesting all right . . . but he was too strict.

It is interesting to note in reading the interviews of this group that the boys reacted with dissatisfaction to their second autocratic leader but did not recall their first authoritarian leader as of the same sort. Actually the behavior patterns of the two leaders were very similar.

A relationship between the club leadership and the behavior of the adults in the boys' own homes was in several cases also discovered. Boys coming from either *emotionally warm, consistently lenient* or *emotionally cold, inconsistently strict* homes reacted most rebelliously to domination by the club leader. The former type of boy was reacting against domination on the strength of his experience with parental democracy; the latter was rebelling because all adults were to be distrusted, and you "should see how far you can go with them."

Might it not be that planned experiences in genuine classroom

democracy *and* autocracy, followed by analysis in discussion of the contrasting experiences, would be one of the best educational projects for building in youth a tough-fibered intelligent resistance to domination? Would it, one may ask, make things too tough for lots of teachers, parents, recreation leaders, and college professors? Well, and why not?

Interpersonal Relations and Group Structures

The "sociometric questionnaire"¹⁸ has been a significant impetus in revealing some of the important relationships between lines of friendship and rejection and group functioning. Other observers of group structure have focused their attention on communication groupings, activity subgroupings, and the evidences of status hierarchies. A research toehold has been won in this area—but most of the climbing is yet to come.

GENERALIZATION 4: *Spontaneity, friendliness, "depth of interpersonal relationships," and a minimum of interpersonal irritations result from a group situation where children are given an optimum (not a maximum) of freedom.*

Curfman,⁴ who made a careful experimental analysis of the effects of contrasting leadership on two clubs of children in a recreation center, includes in her interpretation of results the following:

The children in the authoritarian group seemed to behave more as automatons than as personalities. . . . There was little conversation and long periods of silence . . . not more than three or four times throughout the entire series of meetings did the conversation concern anything but the task at hand . . . it was doubtful if the group knew each other any better on the last day than they did at the first club meeting, judging from the results of the personal interviews.

The children who presented themselves at the first meeting of the democratic group gradually emerged as personalities, each

making a definite contribution to the total behavior pattern. The active interplay of egos lent a quality of animation. . . . There was a constant stream of conversation which strayed frequently out-of-field with accounts of personal oddities, ambitions, experiences, etc. Friendships developed which led to plans for getting together outside the club.

This finding by Curfman concerning the greater breadth and the more intensely personal quality of the conversation in the democratic atmosphere is upheld by the findings of Lewin, Lippitt, and White, who used a similar category in their own observations. Similarly, Kephart discovered in an experiment with self-government in a cottage of a children's institution^{9, 10} that interpersonal problems arose much less frequently in this type of social organization than in the other cottages.

The development of close interpersonal relationships in the child group means, of course, that channels of social control from within the group have been established. Jennings⁸ shows this fact clearly in her important study of child leadership, and Mowrer¹⁹ comments from his study of a cottage of "problem children":

In the self-government situation the children became much freer in their relationships with the adults, able to share their phantasies and to speak about matters which, because of previous anxieties or resentments, would have been impossible to discuss. Soon cottage meetings came to be used as an occasion for reporting commendable as well as objectionable behavior, and an additional motive for good behavior, in the desire for group praise, was thus added to the already existing influence of group disapproval. . . . Children seem to react to the autocratic atmosphere . . . either by a surrender of individuality and a lifelong seeking after and dependence upon so-called "leaders" however demagogic, or by identifying themselves with this system and struggling, by means foul or fair, to become "leaders" themselves.

Yet it does not follow from the above observations that "the greater the freedom, the more beneficial the results in child interpersonal relations," as other findings reveal. The findings on

groups under laissez-faire leadership, for example, reveal a heightened interpersonal irritability as compared to the more "adult-sheltered" democratic clubs. For each particular child group one must think in terms of an optimum rather than a maximum freedom from adults.

GENERALIZATION 5: *Dependence on an adult dominator results in a member-leader type of group structure which inhibits the formation of spontaneous member-member subgroupings of high interdependence (in communication or activity).*

Two types of subgroup structure have been observed in several of the group studies^{7, 11, 13}—subgroupings based on interdependence of activity, and structure based on conversational subgroupings. The observations reveal that in the atmosphere of an authoritarian group the main channels of interdependence are in the relationship of each group member with the dominator. This circumstance is revealed, for example, in the frequency with which the children make dependent "direction-demanding" approaches to the leader as well as the frequency with which the members make demands on him for attention as compared to demands on their fellow members.

TABLE I. Comparison of the behavior of an average member in different social climates

Social climate	Dependent approaches to leader	Approaches seeking attention from leader	Approaches seeking attention from 4 fellow members
Aggressive autocracy	14	11	14
Submissive autocracy	16	6	4
Democracy	6	5	18
Laissez-faire	4	2	19

The type of leader-member group structure suggested by the high dependence on the dominator in the table above is borne out by other observations which indicate that in such a social structure

few member-member subgroupings of a stable type develop. Rather, the individual member's relationship to the "central person" pervades the entire group structure. The implications of this finding for the prediction of change in group morale when the leader is removed will be discussed in a later paragraph. It should be noted in the table, however, that the members of the democratic and laissez-faire groups seek (and receive) most of their "social response" from fellow members rather than the dominator.

GENERALIZATION 6: *Too much freedom or too little freedom in the leadership of child and youth groups both seem to result in the rise of "status consciousness" and tendencies toward the development of a "status hierarchy" in the group structure.*

Observations of groups given "too much freedom" have indicated that the members had a strong need to "get things organized" and to "know where I stand" in the group organization. One group of eleven-year-olds in an atmosphere where they were very much let alone, spent a great deal of time giving one another military ranks and then quarreling over which ranks were higher and "who could tell who." It was noted that several boys from very firm "adultish" homes were especially preoccupied with the problem of just where they stood in the group and were most meticulous about "official relationships."

In the social climate of the authoritarian group, the bases for striving toward self-centered status seem quite different. The observations of Curfman, Mowrer, and Lippitt and White indicate that probably a psychology of status-climbing develops not in the "submissive autocracies" but only in the "aggressive autocracies," where frustration is strong. In these latter situations a higher percentage of personal pronouns, "I, me, mine," as compared to collective pronouns "We, our, us," has been found, together with more frequent attempts to beat one another in seeking the attention of the leader and in gaining the privileges of bossing the rest. It is interesting in this connection to note that the two boys who were picked on as scapegoats in one club were boys who in the

original sociometric test, before the experiment began, had been selected as leaders by their fellows. Getting the best of someone higher up seemed to offer a satisfaction which could not be gained from picking on the weakest members of the group.

Origin of the Forces Making for Group Cohesion and Unity

In the writer's opinion too little attention has been paid to the distinction between what might be called "negative" and "positive" morale, i.e., the distinction between groups which stick together because of hostile pressures from without the group and groups whose source of cohesion lies chiefly in the mutual clicking of their personalities or their joint enthusiasm for certain goals (other than the defeat of an out-group). Wright²⁰ discovered some very interesting results when he placed children together in a negative frustration field.

GENERALIZATION 7: *Whether the group's interpersonal unity is derived from mutual resistance to external pressures or from spontaneous inner sources of cohesion is a fact of considerable importance both in determining the extent to which the group will resist disrupting forces and persist in its efforts toward goal attainment, and in determining what channelization the tension resulting from group frustration will take.*

Each of the phases of the above generalization will be mentioned in the following section on emergencies and frustrations. It is of interest at this point, however, to raise a question concerning the seeming lack of either positive or negative forces of cohesion in some of the groups showing a submissive reaction to adult dominations; but, because the mechanism of giving up seemed to diminish to a minimum any felt needs for status, strong disruptive forces did not develop either. It was as though these group members were to quite an extent individuals living alongside one another rather than with one another in their group rela-

tionships—and were held together largely by the material privileges of group membership and dependence upon the adult dominator.

Meeting of Group Emergencies and Frustrations

GENERALIZATION 8: *When the individual having leadership status is removed from the child group, the purposeful activity of the authoritarian groups tends to disintegrate; whereas the democratic and laissez-faire groups are little affected.*

To the writer one of the best criteria of satisfactory or unsatisfactory democratic morale in a youth group is found in the manner in which the group functions in the absence of its adult leader. The whisper, "teacher is out of the room," is an important symptom in our educational system.

In an analysis of three groups showing a submissive "conscientious" response to adult domination, the portion of time spent in seriously working dropped from 74 per cent while the leader was in the room to 29 per cent while he was out of the room. "Distracted work efforts" increased from 6 per cent to 20 per cent. The qualitative observations of these periods when the leader had been called out of the room describe a gradual increase in physical activity, an increasing turning away from the club work for short periods, and a rise in the amount and loudness of the conversation as the period of absence lengthened. The speed with which boys loosened up, to be sure, revealed great individual differences. For certain boys the leader appeared to be psychologically present for quite a while—even after he had departed physically. The two groups showing an aggressive reaction to autocracy showed even a greater proportionate drop in work motivation during the absence of the adult, and their substitute activities were likewise a much more aggressive type of "release" than those of the submissive autocracy. As contrasted to these 60 per cent and 70 per cent drops in motivation, the democratically led clubs dropped only 8 per cent in serious work during the

periods of absence of their adult leader; and in the laissez-faire clubs, as would be expected, the adult's presence or absence made little noticeable difference. "Cohesion through mutual dependence" on a central person is a frequent phenomenon in American youth groupings, one which to the writer constitutes a danger signal to our morale.

GENERALIZATION 9: *Groups united by positive cohesive forces show greater persistence when meeting failure in striving toward group goals than groups united by negative external pressures.*

French's very significant study of the reaction to the frustration of group goals in organized (presence of positive interpersonal relationship) and unorganized (no basis of interpersonal relations) groups of youth of college age^{5, 6} reveals greater motivation in meeting difficulties on the part of the organized groups. Similarly, the club records from Lippitt's¹⁴ study reveal the manner in which a democratic club and an aggressive authoritarian club met work frustrations. In the first case the group spontaneously organized its efforts for a new attack, whereas in the second case recriminations and reactions of personal blame so disrupted the group effort as to destroy the goal-directed motivation.

Comparative observations of a group united by rebellion against their leader¹¹ and a club united by a keen interest in mutual work⁷ are to the point here. Although in the former case frustration seemed to bring out group disruption along the potential lines of cleavage (scapegoat, minority group, etc.), in the latter cases the group actually resisted the efforts of the experimenter to set up lines of cleavage which would offer the chance for group disruption. This study of Gordon's is discussed more fully in the next paragraph.

GENERALIZATION 10: *In meeting frustrations, child groups united by positive cohesion offer more resistance to disruption and cleavage, and usually relieve frustration tensions through more appropriate channels, than do groups held together by negative cohesion.*

In Gordon's study, girls' marionette clubs were organized on a basis which would encourage lines of in-group cleavage. Six girls came from one school and three from another. The three, given tasks which were labeled as less important, were made subordinate to the "majority group." From the conversation of the girls it was clear that lines of differentiation had been successfully established, yet, on the other hand, the whole group was both highly motivated by its group goal and interdependent in its communication and work. When group frustrations were introduced, the group proved remarkably resistant to disruption. To the observers the situation presented a striking picture of discrimination against a clearly set-up minority group which did not result in much group disruption, and this because of the "positive cohesive forces" derived from a very attractive group goal.

In the study of 12 club atmospheres by Lewin, Lippitt, and White,¹¹ a controlled group frustration was introduced into each type of social structure. A strange adult, entering the club during the absence of the leader, criticized the work of individual members and the group as a whole. Several channels of release of tension were here possible: (1) acceptance of the criticism as warranted and the establishment of a self-critical attitude; (2) occurrence of a group cleavage, so that group blame could be expressed toward a scapegoat or minority group; (3) a general pattern of in-group irritability with "everyone against everyone"; (4) attack against an out-group (the club meeting in the adjacent club space); (5) attack against the source of frustration, the strange adult; (6) taking it out on the leader when he came back; (7) attack against inanimate objects (furniture, etc.). For other groups there are doubtless other channels available.

Figure 2 gives a sample analysis of the manner in which three clubs handled their tension in this situation of group frustration. The analysis of each club meeting is broken down into ten-minute units (Normal = leader and boys present, L. out = leader out, Str. in = stranger in). The reader will probably agree that taking it out on the stranger himself, or on inanimate objects (the de-




FIG. 2. Channels of group tension release in clubs of eleven-year-old boys under different types of leadership.

struction of a large club sign in this case), as was the case in the democratic club (see figure 2), are more constructive channelizations of frustration tensions than such in-group aggression or uninstigated out-group attacks as were the predominant outlets of the submissive autocracy and the aggressive autocracy. Although self-criticism did not occur frequently enough to place on the graph, it did occur in the reactions of several of the members of the most submissive autocracies. The boys who showed this most unhealthy reaction to unjustified criticism were boys coming from what might be called "adult-value-centered" homes where there existed also, as it happened, a warm relationship between parents and child, so that a strong conscientiousness about living up to adult expectations had developed without, however, any exercise of individual evaluation of these expectations.

If group frustrations can be as effectively released against "depersonalized" objects (the club sign) as is evidenced in this particular example, the question may be posed as to whether it may not be possible for educators and group therapists to provide more productive and creative channels of group outlet having equal substitute value. This statement does not imply that the writer believes an attack upon the stranger to have been a nonconstructive channel in the situation described above; it was certainly the most appropriate in that case. But there is great educational need for the development of a "hierarchy of appropriateness" of substitute group releases which can be utilized in the progressive leadership of youth groups as they face inevitable frustrations.

Group and Individual Goals, Productivity, and Time Perspective

In the writer's opinion too much of our thinking about morale has been focused upon such factors as resistance to disintegration (see Generalization 10 above) rather than upon such factors as productivity, enthusiasms for member responsibility, personal

sacrifice for group goals, and so on. The data in such areas as group creativity are almost nonexistent.

GENERALIZATION 11: *More "we-centered" constructive suggestions for the improvement of group practices and group policy arise from youth groups under democratic adult guidance and having spontaneous cohesion than from groups in a freer (laissez-faire) or less free (authoritarian) climate.*

French⁵ found a higher level of participation by all members in meeting group problems in his organized groups than in his unorganized groups. Lewin, Lippitt, and White had in their analysis a category, "contributions to group thinking," which indicated that the democratic and laissez-faire groups were much more we-centered in their thinking than clubs under authoritarian leadership. Although the group-centered orientation of the laissez-faire members was high, the number of constructive decisions arrived at was low, because of the lack of social techniques needed for carrying through the formation of policy. Strong evidence in favor of the generalization above comes from the data of Anderson^{1,2} on integrative and dominating teacher behavior and its effect upon the co-operation and productiveness of the classroom group. Bavelas, in his study reported more fully elsewhere in this volume, found that as certain leaders went through a training process to carry out more democratic procedures of leadership in recreation, the child groups improved both in "the efficiency of work organization" and "the quality and output of the work."

GENERALIZATION 12: *Significant gains in positive democratic group morale (enthusiasm for the responsible use of new freedoms, motivation to productive group thinking, etc.) have been made by providing for youth groups a genuine experience under authoritarian leadership followed by comparative analysis of their democratic and authoritarian experience.*

Miss Mariann Marshall¹⁶ in a progressive camp school was faced one day by the following questions from her group: "If

the dictators died, would everything be all right in Europe?" "What does democracy—or whatever it is—mean?" The ensuing discussion led to a culminating decision; "Let's try having a dictator for a day; then we'll try the other kind." The following day the teacher carried through a genuine authoritarian schoolteacher pattern. There was no attempt to "imitate Hitler," but rather an attempt to interpret the authoritarian pattern as adapted to the situation of a child group in the classroom—this is in contrast to the foolishly uneducational "dictator 'days'" which some schools have attempted, where the imitation of an unreal, for the children, political pattern rather than a genuine childhood autocracy has been attempted.

Following this experience, the children held a discussion on their reactions. Such comments were forthcoming as: "It felt funny down here (indicating his chest); I couldn't breathe very well." "I feel as if I'd been dragged through a hole." "It was all right in the morning, but I felt sick in the afternoon when I had to do art and you kept telling me what to do all the time." "I was mad at you [the teacher]." "I felt like hitting somebody." "I'll never vote for a dictator again."

As a result of this experience Marshall observed significant changes in the functioning of her classroom group. Much more importance was attached to handling freedom wisely and responsibly, and group controls functioned more significantly. Clearly a positive growth in "democratic literacy" *at the behavior level* had taken place.

One of the groups studied in the Iowa club experiment had a democratic leader followed by an authoritarian adult and finally another democratic person. The data reveal a significant drop in dependent approaches to the adult in the second democracy as compared to the first, more friendliness and appreciation for their leader as a person rather than just a "provider," a sharp drop in in-group aggressiveness from first to second democracy, and a significant rise in friendliness and willingness to depend on one another for suggestions and approval rather than on the leader.

Although they had been lukewarm toward the first democratic experience, the boys were enthusiastic about the second after they had their experience with a benevolent autocrat.

One genuine school "dictatorship day" with which the writer is familiar supports the observations described above. There was a clear growth in the enthusiasm for handling freedom responsibly and for co-operating with reduced ego involvement in group decisions. Here is a challenge for teachers and group workers.

GENERALIZATION 13: An adequate time perspective—both in the past dimension (traditions, shared experiences) and the future dimension (hopes, expectations, plans, determined goals) is important for a high and stable group morale.

An entire chapter of the present volume is devoted to an analysis of the importance of individual and group time perspective for the development and maintenance of high morale.* A brief comment should suffice here.

One of the dimensions of behavior on which the authoritarian and democratic leaders differed in the study by Lewin, Lippitt, and White was that of giving time perspective to the child group. A typical example will clarify this difference:

Authoritarian Club:

Leader: We are going to start making a mask for the club.

Jim: How do we do that?

Leader: I'll tell you how as we go along. John, you take this board and pound ten nails in it, and Jack go get a pail of water.

John to Jim: I wonder what this board is for?

Democratic Club:

Leader: You have mentioned several different things we might do for our next meetings. Shall we decide now which one we'd like to do?

Jack: I vote for the mask like the ones in the pictures we looked at. (Other boys chime in to make it a majority vote.)

* Chapter IV, "Time Perspective and Morale," by Kurt Lewin.

Dick: How big will we make it? Is it out of clay or what?

Leader: Would you like me to give you a general idea of how they generally make masks? (All nod and leader outlines general steps of the mask-making process.)

One of the surest ways of ensuring a persistent "self-feeding" motivation in group activities has been found to be the setting up with the group of the steps into the future. "Signposts of progress," they serve thus as renewers of motivation and interest. Shared experiences and certain group traditions also seem to serve as important focal points in the developing and maintaining of group cohesion.

GENERALIZATION 14: *The pattern of adult stimulation and guidance which will result in optimum productivity and positive group cohesion must usually differ significantly with the particular youth group and its activity—even with children of the same age.*

It is important to realize at every step of our work with youth groups that there is no such thing as *the* democratic pattern of group leadership. Even working with five different clubs of the same age group, as the Iowa experimenters did, it was discovered that the same pattern of adult leadership was too free for some and frustratingly inhibiting for others. One group from a university experimental school accepted the responsibility of voting on group decisions as a matter of course; for another club from a different background of experience voting was a meaningless formality. After the vote was over, the attitude of the minority was, "All right, now you go ahead and do what you were going to do, and we'll do what we voted to do." It was clear that the behavior of a leader toward a genuine extension of freedom in these two groups had to be quite different.

There has been, as far as the writer knows, no investigation of the way in which the type of group activity conditions the type of adult behavior which could be called genuinely democratic in that situation. What is genuinely democratic football coaching

like? How different is democracy in the craft shop and in the classroom for this same group that was on the football field?

It has been found¹¹ that children coming from different types of home background see the behavior of the same leader quite differently—to the extent that for some it is too easy-going and for others too inhibiting. How to take these different “attitudinal spectacles” into account is one of the major concerns of a genuinely democratic leader. What seems to be vitally needed is a scale of democratic literacy up which leaders can climb with their groups—starting with them at whatever level they find them. This would mean that a leader would not be judged as “democratic” or “undemocratic” according to the level at which the child group was functioning at a particular time but rather that he would be judged in terms of the *rate at which he was making himself progressively unnecessary to responsible group functioning*.

GENERALIZATION 15: *In order to maintain and stimulate a growing positive democratic morale in groups of children and youth we need to develop criteria by which we can know when we are leading at the “upper fringe” of stimulation of democratic competence for a given group rather than at the “lower fringe.”*

Probably it is safe to say that most of the giving of new areas of freedom on the part of teachers, parents, and club and recreation leaders is motivated by symptoms of discontent with the *status quo* on the part of the group rather than by a positive interest in seeing how much new freedom the group can be helped to handle responsibly and without undue strain. The difference in leadership between the level of this “*status-quo* democracy” and “upper-fringe democracy” is great.

A significant experiment in the field of intellectual stimulation carried out by McCandless¹⁷ has important implications for our practices of building democratic morale in youth groups. It had been found over a period of years that children at the upper end of the intelligence distribution in preschool groups showed fewer upward gains in intellectual functioning (I.Q.) than was

the case with the other members of the group. McCandless developed the hypothesis that this fact was due to the particular "ceiling of stimulation" which the teachers had set in the situation—a ceiling adapted to the stimulation of the average group member. Thus for about two hours a day he took this high group of four-year-olds as a special project group and raised the level of stimulation greatly, at the same time developing criteria of overstimulation (signs of frustration and fatigue, emotional irritability, etc.) by which he could be guided in staying at, but not going over, the upper level of intellectual stimulation from which this particular group could profit as total personalities.

To the writer it seems high time that we thought in similar terms about the stimulation of democratic group functioning on the part of classrooms, clubs, teams, and recreation groups. A democratic morale for our youth cannot grow and wax sturdy on tidbits of freedom meted out with reluctance by those responsible for the fiber of our future democracy.

The War and Group Morale

Since this chapter was written American youth have become members of a nation at war. At first the writer felt this might call for some revisions or additions to this chapter. Further thought led to the conclusion that war, for the groups we have been talking about, is another type of emergency situation. It is another type of demand for personal sacrifices and identification with certain new group goals—but the new group interests and situational demands only accentuate more cogently the need for newer active consideration of the bases of democratic youth group morale which have been revealed in recent researches and summarized here.

CHAPTER VIII

Morale and the Training of Leaders

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THE connection between leadership and group morale is too obvious to require comment. It can hardly be overlooked in the observation of any type of group life or co-operative endeavor. No ancient army, or, in our time, political faction has willingly foregone the opportunity to strike a blow with impunity at the opposing group's most vital spot—its leader. The enemy broadcasters in this present war concentrate their most vicious attacks upon Churchill and Roosevelt. In the area of civilian defense, it is well recognized that the establishment of any efficient community program depends largely on finding the proper leadership and the winning over of the "leaders" in the community.

A survey of what has been written about leadership and group morale leaves one with contradictory and somewhat confusing details. It is true that some groups "fold up" when their leaders are lost; it is true also that other groups seem to be little affected, while still others appear actually to rally and to redouble their efforts. It is true that getting a new leader raises the morale of some groups to new levels; it is also true that groups may change their leaders many times, with their morale sinking lower with each change.

The importance which leadership has for the group is not a phenomenon peculiar to authoritarian societies. Not infrequently, in discussions of social systems, emphasis on leadership is regarded as synonymous with totalitarianism, and the democratic ideal with leaderless equalitarian groups. One may speculate as to how far this idea is a result of totalitarian propaganda. Actually, de-

mocracy, in theory or in practice, has never minimized leadership. The president of the United States has always had more power than did the German Kaiser, although the manner in which the power was used was essentially different. Throughout the social organizations of this country, from boys' clubs to political parties, it has been traditional to place, for a limited time and in a restricted area, both the power and the responsibility of leadership upon an individual. The downfall of the German Republic is a good illustration of the fallacy of seeing the ideal democracy as a "liberal" leaderless society.

While democratic as well as authoritarian societies are distinguished from anarchic individualism by a recognition of the importance of strong leadership, there are striking differences between democratic leadership and authoritarian leadership. These differences lie not so much in the amount of power which the leader may hold, but in the function and position he occupies in the group.

In the authoritarian setting, the leader of a group is not usually a member of the group itself, but is often a member of a "higher" class. He is set over the group without consultation of the group's wishes. Responsible only to those who are organizationally above him, he is not accountable for his actions to the group. He allows the group to know only what he feels is good for them; reverses are not reported, and the future is made as rosy as is suitable for his purpose. His stay in office does not basically depend upon the support of the group. He jealously keeps the power of decision and formation of policy in his own hands, and criticisms of his decisions by the group are considered acts of rebellion.

The typical democratic leader is a member of the group he leads and has been "elected" by that group. Deriving his power to act from the group, he is responsible to the group for his actions. His term of office is usually predetermined, and only by the group's support can he remain in the position of leadership. He is only one element in the policy-determining system of the group and usually insists that the members understand the problem at hand

and help to make the decision required. He serves to clarify issues and to focus the attention of the group on important aspects. He expects criticism from the group—criticism which is regarded not as a crime but as a civic virtue.

Any discussion of the relation between leadership and morale must therefore take into consideration the particular function of the leader in the particular group structure. It has also to take into account the specific situation in which the group finds itself. Scientific knowledge in this field is rather meager. The bulk of the data is anecdotal and is difficult to evaluate.

Rather than dealing with generalities it may be appropriate for our purpose to analyze in detail a concrete case where the change of the morale of a group as a function of leadership was created experimentally under controlled conditions.*

Retraining of Leaders with Low Morale

Large organizations, such as the W.P.A., Boy Scouts, Y.M.C.A., school systems, factory organizations, all require leadership for the organization as a whole (head leader), and leadership for the smaller groups which actually make up the body of that organization (subleader). This experiment deals with the latter type of leadership, although we believe that the former does not present fundamentally different problems.

Poor leadership can be eliminated either by careful selection

* The experiment was conducted as a co-operative project of the Child Welfare Station of the State University of Iowa (George D. Stoddard, Director), the W.P.A. of the State of Iowa (George J. Keller, Iowa State Administrator), and the Jewish Community Center, Des Moines, a nonsectarian service affiliated with the Community Chest (Mrs. Max Mayer, Director). We gratefully acknowledge the co-operation of Mrs. Max Mayer, who gave impetus to the experiment by offering the facilities of the Center during the "Home Camp" period for a scientific study, and the co-operation of the associate director, Louis Williams, and the other members throughout the experiment. The study owes much to Helen Cresswell, State Director, Division of Community Service Programs, W.P.A., to Fred O. Erbe, Chief, Public Activities Programs, and to other staff members of the W.P.A. This investigation has been carried out under the scientific direction of Kurt Lewin.

and, if necessary, dismissal of personnel, or by training. The difficulty of predicting leadership ability is known to be great. Dismissal involves much waste and expense. In recognition of this situation, the training of leaders has been widely attempted. Frequently, however, it has not been very satisfactory. Also, there is no actual scientific knowledge about either the percentage of poor leaders that can be improved by training, or about how far the improvement can go.

The following experiment tries to test under controlled conditions the efficiency of certain methods for rapid retraining of leaders in a particular field. The leaders were picked so that their age and habits of long standing should present particularly difficult cases for retraining. The results of this experiment are useful in a discussion of group morale from at least two points of view: (*a*) the effect of the training on the morale of the retrained leaders, and (*b*) the effect of the shift in methods of control used by the trainees on the morale of the groups which they led.

THE LEADERS

The selection of the mediocre leaders was made on the basis of five sets of information given by those officers of the W.P.A. who were familiar with the leaders' present work. It is technically necessary in such experiments to have a "control group," which is not trained. This control group should be composed of individuals similar to the experimental group. The pairs were equalized on age, sex, length of time on W.P.A., length of time on present W.P.A. project, rating of technical skill, rating of leadership ability, and as far as possible on the relevant factors in their life history. The objective measurements, taken later on these leaders when at work, verified to a remarkable degree the pairings which were made. (See Figures 1-*a*, 2-*a*, and 3-*a*.)

All the subjects felt rather keenly the personal-status implications of working on the W.P.A. Although their relationship with the two W.P.A. leader trainers was good, they would speak with

considerable resentment about the timekeepers—or “stool pigeons,” as they were referred to when speaking to one on the “inside.” One of the most serious factors contributing to the general insecurity of these leaders was the strain of “not knowing for more than two weeks” in advance how long their job would hold out. They often said that if their job were more “sure,” they could do much better work. In the minds of the leaders the job depended in a great measure on co-operating fully with the administration of the center, and there were signs of tenseness.

Being on the experiment was unquestionably regarded at first as an undesirable situation. Up to the third day of training there were veiled questions about the project which revealed considerable suspicion. One of the women was so afraid that they were being “examined” and would probably lose their jobs, that she broke down and cried after the second training meeting.

By the fifth or sixth meeting of the group, this attitude had reversed itself, and each of them felt it a distinct advantage to be “in on it.” Factors which contributed to this change of heart were these: the feeling that they gained knowledge about their job; that somehow their job would be more secure and that there might be a possibility for promotion; and finally the new experience of being a member of a genuinely co-operative group working toward a high social objective. Just as much change of heart took place in the leaders who were not included in the experiment; instead of being glad to have been left out, they became increasingly jealous and even aggressive toward the trainees.

Leader A: A was the only man in the trainee group. He was a playground supervisor. His behavior before training was that of a typical “commanding” leader. He maintained a gruff exterior, maintaining by word and action that “the boys” had to be shown that you meant “business.” His lifelong ambition was to be a policeman. He had once had a job as a special guard at the state fair, a job to which he always referred with considerable pride. He had made application for a job as prison guard, and his spirits could

be seen to go up and down with the fluctuation of his chances of getting that job.

Leader C: *C* taught the making of artificial flowers. A very quiet but determined woman, she prided herself upon being "hard" and seeing things "straight." The other workers always praised her for what she had "been through." Her husband gone, she had persisted in doing what she could to bring up properly her two sons. She was not sorry for herself and "didn't ask favors from anyone." When she led her classes, she was subdued both in her manner and voice. This quietness was reflected in the behavior of the children. No one spoke loudly or even in a "normal" tone. Another striking fact about *C* was her "poker face." Throughout the observations before training she was never observed to smile. This conduct seemed to be a part of her "teacher role," for at lunch with the other leaders she was definitely more relaxed.

Leader E: *E* was the younger of the two women and a more approachable person. A relative newcomer to the center, she was somewhat more insecure socially than the rest. Before any training had been given, she would encourage interaction between the children more than the other two leaders. The children could approach her much more easily and did so. In general, she seemed to be the most promising of the three at the beginning of the experiment.

EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE

The experiment proceeded in the following manner: Six leaders were paired by means of rating scales and life-history data. The pairs were then split to form an experimental group of three which was trained, and a control group which was not trained. All six leaders were tested by observing and quantitatively recording their actual behavior with the children "on the job." Such records included the effects of this behavior on the way the children formed work groups. The experimental group was then trained for three weeks (twelve days), not more than two hours on each day. During these three weeks the experimental and the

control groups continued their work at the recreation center. At the fourth week, both the trained and the nontrained leaders were tested again "on the job" by the same methods as at the beginning of the experiment.

BEHAVIOR OF THE LEADERS BEFORE TRAINING

Behavior with the children. The treatment of the children by these leaders was not unfriendly, and sometimes the leaders showed a measure of personal involvement. Every leader was relatively well-trained in the skills of his particular field—flower-making, clay-modeling, playground supervision. In the craft classes the leader saw to it that every child followed the same uniform pattern of work. The productions of the children were closely supervised from step to step. When a child encountered difficulties, the leader would help him, usually by doing the operation himself.

It was interesting to notice that the lack of democratic feeling between the leaders and the children was more noticeable when the leader was not in the craft room or on the playground. During the lunch hour or before the center was officially open, or at any time when the leader was not strictly "on the job," he showed a decidedly authoritarian attitude. These leaders had all gone through a period of training by the W.P.A., and the emphasis on a democratic and friendly attitude seemed to have changed their "natural" inclinations to some degree when they were "on the job." The whole atmosphere was different while the person was working as a leader. It seemed as if the "power field" of the leader immediately grew larger and stronger if he stepped out of his leader role, even temporarily.

Figures 1-*a*, 2-*a*, and 3-*a* present the quantitative data about the ways in which the leader controlled his children.

Leaders *A* and *B* (Figure 1-*a*), who did playground work, controlled the children predominantly (60 per cent) by direct "leader-initiated commands." The somewhat milder form of direct control which consisted of giving commands after having been ap-

proached by the child occurred relatively infrequently (16 per cent). Less dominating and more evocative than these two direct methods of control is the guiding of the child by praising or by




Fig. 1-a




Fig. 1-b

FIG. 1. Retraining of Leader *A*. The frequency with which leader *A* uses authoritarian methods of direct control drops as a result of retraining from 77 per cent to 4 per cent. Instead, he uses a democratic, initiative-stimulating method, 73 per cent.

making the leader's preference known. *A* and *B* used this method seldom (12 per cent). The democratic, initiative-stimulating method of placing the responsibility of a wise choice upon the children themselves was practically never used (5 per cent). In summary, before training *A* and *B* used the authoritarian methods of direct control in about 80 per cent of their action.

Leaders *C* and *D* show a similar predominance (66 per cent) of "direct" methods of control (Figure 2-a). Having to deal with handcraft (flower-making) rather than with the traditionally




Fig. 2-a




Fig. 2-b

FIG. 2. Retraining of Leader *C*. The frequency with which leader *C* uses authoritarian methods of direct control drops as a result of retraining from 77 per cent to 7 per cent. Instead, he uses a democratic, initiative-stimulating method, 73 per cent.

"tougher" playground work, they used mainly the somewhat milder authoritarian form of giving commands after they were approached. Directing the group with praise and by vesting the children with responsibility occurred in 12 per cent and 22 per cent of the cases, respectively.

E and *F*, who were also leaders in handcrafts, show a pattern

quite similar to that of *C* and *D*. *E* and *F*, however, show a tendency to divide their behavior more or less equally between the authoritarian direct control (51 percent) and the more democratic




Fig. 3-a




Fig. 3-b

FIG. 3. Retraining of Leader *E*. The frequency with which leader *E* uses authoritarian methods drops as a result of retraining from 51 per cent to 11 per cent. Instead, he uses democratic methods, 89 per cent.

control through praise and giving of responsibility (49 per cent) (Figure 3-a).

Amount of co-operative work in the children's groups. The effect of the method of control used by the leader can be seen reflected in the structure of the groups with which he worked. One person on the observation crew took continuous records of group structure from minute to minute. In this way, it was possible to

determine how frequently the children worked co-operatively in subgroups of two or three, or worked each for himself.

For the experimental group, which was retrained, the average size of subgroup observed was: for leader *A*, 1.1; leader *C*, 1.3; leader *E*, 1.0. The data for the control group are: leader *B*, 1.1; leader *D*, 1.2; and leader *F*, 1.3. The average size of subgroups for all leaders—trainees and nontrainees—is slightly above one. Practically all the time, in other words, the children worked singly.

Morale of the leaders. There was every indication that the morale of the leaders was low. Many of them, in fact, actually disliked their work, felt insecure for the reasons mentioned above, and were extremely suspicious of the organization. Openly they stated that most of the people they knew felt that this work was drudgery, that it had to be done just well enough to keep one's job. The facial expression and bodily postures of these leaders while they worked indicated a mixture of apathy, worry, and unhappiness. This may be clearly seen in the film records, taken at the beginning and the end of the experiment.

LEADER BEHAVIOR AFTER TRAINING

Before discussing the method of training, we would like to view the effect it had on the leaders and children after a period of three weeks.

Behavior with children. Figure 1-*b* shows the methods of control used by leaders *A* and *B* after training. Leader *A* had three weeks of retraining; leader *B* had no retraining. *B*'s methods have not changed, have even, indeed, become a bit worse. The frequency with which *A* uses authoritarian control has dropped from 77 per cent before training to 4 per cent after training. Instead, he uses a democratic method of stimulating initiative (73 per cent).

A similar shift may be seen in the retrained leader *C* as compared to the nontrained leader *D* (Figure 2-*b*). *D*'s methods have not changed or, if anything, have become a bit worse. The fre-

quency with which the retrained leader *C* uses direct commands has dropped from 77 per cent before training to 7 per cent after training. Instead, he uses a democratic method (73 per cent).

Leaders *E* and *F* follow the same pattern of shift as the pairs above. *F*, who has not been trained, has become definitely worse.




FIG. 4. Average Size of Subgroups for Retrained Leaders. The increase in the size of co-operative work subgroups is much larger in the groups of the retrained leaders *A*, *C*, *E*, than in the groups of leaders *B*, *D*, *F*.

The frequency with which leader *E* uses authoritarian direct control has dropped from 51 per cent before training to 11 per cent after training. The frequency with which *E* uses democratic methods of control has, on the other hand, risen from 49 per cent before training to 89 per cent after training.

The methods of teaching which the nonretrained leaders used showed no change. The trained leaders, for their part, shifted from a "classroom" technique, characterized by dependence of the

children and uniformity of procedure, to "group methods" which created an atmosphere of productivity and co-operation. The success of this "group method" was evidenced in various ways: (a) a doubling of the number of children attracted to participate, (b) the enthusiasm and persistence of the group, (c) the "holding power" of the group for individuals, (d) the efficiency of the work organization, (e) the high degree of self-discipline, and (f) the quality and output of the work.

Amount of co-operative work in children's groups. The data on the structure of the groups indicate a significant shift in the average size of subgroups in which children worked.

For the retrained leaders, the values are as follows: leader *A*, 2.4; leader *C*, 2.3; leader *E*, 2.8—that is, an average of 2.5. For the nonretrained leaders, the values are: leader *B*, 1.5; leader *D*, 1.8; leader *F*, 1.8—that is, an average of 1.7.

Both groups thus show an increase in the average size of subgroup. One reason, probably, is that the children became better acquainted with each other. The average size of the subgroup was, however, in every group led by the retrained leaders, larger than in any group led by nonretrained leaders.

EFFECT OF TRAINING ON MORALE: LEADERS' GROUPS

One of the most striking results of the retraining was the change from a definitely low morale to a definitely high morale.

At the start, as mentioned above, all the leaders on the experiment were low in morale as to their present work. It was not, for one thing, work in which they were personally very deeply involved; on the contrary, it was work done only as well as it had to be done in order to keep the job. Typical of the attitude of most was this statement taken from the stenographic record of the third discussion meeting: "The leaders here work without thought to really helping the children. They come at eight, quit at twelve for dinner, and quit at four for the day." Typical of the feeling that it was no use to try is another statement from the records of

the same meeting. "When I came here I had a lot of ideas for helping the community. The first year I was here I went where angels fear to tread; the second year I had my wings clipped; and the next year I knew better than to do anything but what I was told to do."

Toward the end of the experiment, these same leaders showed evidence of being very deeply involved in their work. Not only did they go to considerable effort and expense to help their groups get materials, but they were willing to commit themselves to long-range plans with their clubs. One leader was highly elated that a group of girls had asked her to be the leader of their club outside of hours. Such extra work she would carefully have avoided before.

The attitude of the group towards being part of an experiment likewise underwent radical change. At first the idea of being a guinea pig was thoroughly unpopular. At the third meeting traces of suspicion about the whole project were still present. At about the fourth meeting, however, there was a rather rapid swing to the other extreme—to such a degree, indeed, that confidences poured out regardless of the presence of the two stenographers, of whom the group had originally been suspicious. Some of these man-to-man statements were derogatory of the administration of the center and of the other leaders. Some were stories of past experiences. Whether factually correct or not, these stories indicate the state of mind of the leaders at that time.

Very soon after the fourth meeting the trainees began to show strong "we" feeling. There were many instances of mutual aid in regard to both the training work and their individual club programs. Toward the end of the experiment all the leaders wanted to continue, avowedly feeling that they had "just begun."

Still another important change in the morale of these leaders was related to their future perspective. In the end each of them had enthusiastic plans for getting a better job, or getting more education, or even going into another more needful community. One leader made determined efforts to get a chance to organize a

recreation center in the resettlement area in Alaska. Another was getting books on play schools and studying "modern" methods of caring for young children. A third wanted to train other leaders.

EFFECTS OF TRAINING ON MORALE; CHILDREN'S GROUPS

The changes in morale, far from being confined to the leaders alone, affected strongly the morale of the groups which they led. Before the experiment began, there were no groups of constant membership; at the end of the experiment there were four groups of about twelve to eighteen members each which met daily with high consistency of membership. The success of the trainees with the children was so striking that the other leaders, in a kind of self-defense, tried repeatedly to lure children away from these groups. The failure of such attempts, even when they were bolstered by threats, indicates how cohesive had become these groups led by the trainees.

All the groups led by the trainees showed great initiative in reaching new levels of productivity. Although "the big show," a musical comedy put on by the whole center under the direction of the dancing teacher, was always completely planned by her, a number of girls from a group led by a trainee worked out and practiced a dance which they tried to get permission to perform in the show. Thus the increase in morale, far from being confined to the activities led by the trainees, spread into other areas as well. A playground group invented a game of bowling and voluntarily went to a great deal of work to build a backstop to protect the glass in a nearby door. Another group made plans to use the money they had in their club treasury to "adopt a baby for Christmas." Their money they got by making flowers, for which the boys got customers—the first time in the history of the center that boys had been connected with flower-making.

Perhaps the best example of group morale was the club which was making puppets. They decided on this project in the full knowledge that the leader knew no more than they about puppets.

An attempt by the leader to get help from a leader not on the experiment who knew how to make puppets was indignantly refused with the words, "I'm not going to do myself out of my job!" Thereafter the children and the leader experimented together and got the information they needed from library books. In spite of such obstacles, this group completed some clothing, began to paper their stage made of two orange crates, and by the end of the experiment were beginning to get people to buy tickets to their puppet show.

The Training Method

Democratic methods are not easily learned without actual practice in social situations. Many training courses for leadership in groups for children, young people, parents, or in any other field, arrange for "real life" application, but neglect to make the course itself the very first source of experience in democracy for the trainee. It is not an unusual thing to find groups being taught democracy in a completely authoritarian manner.

It was the intention of the present experiment that the trainees should be able to make use in their later work of their personal experiences as members of a democratic group during training. The experimenter, therefore, was in the role of group leader; in fact, his conduct had to be illustrative of the type of leadership the trainees were learning to use.

Such an arrangement was found to be efficient in at least three ways: it gave the trainees "subjective" data about what it means to work in a group which is led democratically; it proved to be a main factor in convincing the trainees about the value of such methods of leadership; and it built up within the training group a sufficiently high morale to withstand the considerable adverse pressure which was brought to bear upon them during the training period.

The policy of maintaining group democracy throughout the training meant that although the trainer had a definite program,

the particular course of each meeting was not predetermined. No systematic series of "lessons," his program was, rather, a consideration of high points which should not be overlooked. In many of the problems discussed, particularly those involving local or organizational factors with which the trainer was not familiar, the group made its own way and developed the specific techniques required. It is sufficient to say that the training method included all of the points which had been listed in the original program of the trainer, and in addition some points for which the group itself must be credited.

The following is an analysis of the training as it actually took place. For purposes of description, it is convenient to distinguish various aspects of the program. It must be remembered, however, that this does not imply a chronological order, and that the various units overlapped extensively.

Attitudes versus Techniques. The attitudes, objectives, and philosophy of recreational group work, it was decided, should be thoroughly explored before any serious attention was given to techniques of leadership. In the beginning it was the policy of the trainer to avoid discussion on "what to do in a particular situation," to encourage instead discussions of underlying principles. The result was that techniques which the leaders actually used later in working with groups never became a "set of tricks," but, rather, remained flexible and easily modifiable to meet specific situations.

"Sensitizing" the leaders. First the group was asked to make a list of the qualities a leader should have. After some discussion the following five points were the ones set forth: tolerance, patience, understanding, good discipline, and skill. In order to make the group aware of the haziness of these concepts in their own minds, and in order to determine whether these widely accepted concepts actually provide any tangible means for judging the quality of the actual conduct of leaders, these five points were used as a check list without any addition or criticism from the trainer.

The group was allowed to try this check list on another leader—the result being complete disagreement. The behavior of the leader under observation was labeled differently by each of the different observers. A more detailed discussion of leadership behavior ensued, after which further check lists were again tried out by direct observation. In this way, the concepts about leadership not only were clarified in the minds of the trainees, but, at the same time, became more realistic.

Along with the clarification of concepts, there was an elaboration of the leader's possibilities for action. During the observations, examples were collected of what different leaders did, examples which afforded a basis for discussing what different types of leaders might have done. Such discussions as these served to make vivid to the leaders the many possibilities of action which are presented to the leader at every point of group life.

Finally, after repeated requests, the leaders were given reading material in group leadership. Some of the most spirited of the early discussions arose from such reading.

Broadening and Restructuring the Goal Region. The group made a concrete formulation of the objectives of their work: recreation leadership with children. No criticism was made by the trainer, the only stipulation being that the final statement of these objectives should be acceptable to all. The final list named three objectives: the production of good craft articles, the entertainment of the children, and the keeping of good discipline.

The ways in which these objectives could be attained, once elicited from the group, were documented without any attempts at evaluation by the trainer. At this point, in the minds of the trainees, the objectives and the ways of reaching them were isolated—practically independent—areas.

When the trainer then induced the group to think of other possible objectives in their work, the group responded by bringing out a great number of such goals. Many of the objectives mentioned were clearly broader in meaning, more inclusive, more "important" than others.

Next, of course, the need for integrating the many objectives which were now on the table quickly arose, and a complete restructuring followed. Various goals were interrelated, made subordinate, etc. For instance, "entertainment" and "good discipline" were given at first as unrelated and partly contradictory objectives. At a later stage, after a discussion of the manner in which low discipline and little entertainment often go with lack of interest, it became clear to the trainees that one way to get both good discipline and gratifying entertainment was to achieve an atmosphere of high interest.

The restructuring of goals led to a re-evaluation of the ways in which various objectives of group work could be attained. Eventually, the discussion led into a study of the "paths to the goals"—in other words, techniques.

Development of Techniques. Various procedures contributed toward the building up of suitable techniques. The leaders observed the trainer leading a group, for example; such observation was followed by a discussion and criticism of his methods. For another thing, they watched each other at work, discussed and evaluated the procedures they saw used. The trainer for his part "cruised" the center at odd hours to watch the leaders at work, often finding it possible to discuss some particular event just after it had occurred. Then at the end of each afternoon, there was a thirty-minute "clinic" wherein problems of leadership which had occurred that afternoon were discussed.

The leaders, moreover, were given the experience, as a group, of being themselves the "children" under different conditions of leadership. The trainer deliberately employed autocratic techniques or laissez-faire techniques in situations which made the shift from the democratic methods seem natural. Although at first the trainees were not aware that the trainer was "acting," later they became markedly sensitive to changes of atmosphere. Their increased sensitivity went along with a more self-critical attitude while they themselves were on the job.

The trainees were also shown the film records of the experi-

ments in democratic, autocratic, and laissez-faire atmospheres,¹ as well as the films made of themselves before the training program had started. These films served as a means of bringing the techniques and effects of certain types of leadership into sharp contrast. In addition, the pictures probably helped to convince the trainees of the practicability and the worth of the change of method they were attempting.

Integration of work with broader social objectives. At many points along the training program, the trainer encouraged the bridging of the objectives of "group work in recreation" with two different levels of objectives: values for the child as an individual, and values for the community and society as a whole. The effect of embedding the objectives of the job in this larger setting was noticeable in terms of increased self-respect and, consequently, higher morale.

Sensitivity of morale to leadership. Morale, far from being an extraordinary property which must be added to certain types of groups, is a characteristic of the atmosphere of all groups. Related to group goals, time perspective, clearness of planning, group structure, work organization, etc., it is affected to some extent by a change in any of these and other properties of the group.

Group morale is affected by changes in any part of the group. Because a leader is an important subpart of the group he leads, any change in the leader will, therefore, affect the morale of the group. There seems, on the other hand, to be no definite relation between the various levels of morale and any single aspect of leadership, such as power, knowledge, or the ability to make quick decisions.

The rapidity and depth of change in group morale that the leader may effect is illustrated by the experiment reported above. The change in morale which took place in the leaders' own group is one example. After only a few days, the members of this group showed evidences of heightened morale; after three weeks they had definitely changed from a very low to a very high morale. A second example is the change of morale which took place in the children's groups led by the trainees. These changes,

likewise very definite, paralleled the changes of morale in the leaders. The change of attitude, technique, and morale on the part of the leader, was immediately reflected in the morale of the group. Since later measurements of leader behavior were not made, we cannot determine how permanent was the influence of this short period of training.

How deeply and how rapidly changes of morale may spread through an entire country and how sensitive the morale of even so large a group of people is to the quality of its leadership, is borne out by still other examples. Ordway Tead² draws a clear picture of one such change: "On March 4, 1933, when Franklin Delano Roosevelt stepped to the microphone to deliver his inaugural address as President, he faced a country which was plunged into confusion and discouragement. As his voice rang out clear and confident, as he said that the thing most to be feared was fear itself, as he set forth the outline of policy he proposed to follow, there came an almost instantaneous response of public support and public trust. . . . A leader was felt to be at the helm!"

An instance of rapid and surprisingly deep change of morale is the following. In the experiment reported above, the trainer led a pickup group of children for forty minutes, to give the trainees an opportunity to observe techniques in beginning the development of a group program. These children had been asked to meet "for a while," with no word of any possible continuation as a group. The involvement of the group in what they had started was so great, however, that the following day at the same time they were back for another meeting. Even though no leader could be found for them for several days, they nevertheless went ahead getting more members, selecting a club name, and organizing themselves.

The results of the experiment caution against an overevaluation of the factor of personality in leadership. The leaders who were used as subjects had been poor leaders for years, and they changed in the short period of three weeks into very good leaders. Al-

though the importance of personality in leadership cannot be denied, the limits it imposes are less hard and fast than commonly supposed. The experiment shows, on the other hand, that attitudes, techniques, and morale are decisive for leadership, and that by changing a person in these respects one can change his effect as a leader.

The effect that a certain type of leadership will have upon the morale of the group depends, of course, upon the type of group in question. To heighten morale in an autocratic group requires techniques different from those required to heighten morale in a democratic group. What are described as "autocratic methods" in this experiment, be it remembered, would probably in a totalitarian state be considered very democratic. The totalitarian states, notably Germany, have themselves developed authoritarian methods for creating high morale—techniques based partly upon the "leader myth," both in regard to Hitler as the source of all leadership power and in regard to the more general "leader principle"; and partly upon methods which resemble, at least on the surface, democratic techniques. Within certain specific areas, a kind of status democracy has even been developed; in the army, for instance, comradeship is now emphasized, with the more familiar *du* replacing the formal address.

Since morale depends upon all the properties of a group, however, it should be clear that, whatever the temporary level of morale may appear to be, there will be a difference in morale between groups led in an authoritarian manner and groups led in a democratic manner.* In the experiments on group atmosphere,¹ there was very little to differentiate the autocratically led group from the democratically led group in morale so long as the leader was present. But when each group was left leaderless for a short period of time, the autocratic group very quickly stopped working

* For other discussions of behavior in democratic and autocratic groups, see Chapter IV, "Time Perspective and Morale," by Kurt Lewin, and Chapter VII, "The Morale of Youth Groups," by Ronald Lippitt.

and waited; the democratic group continued its work in the same way as when the leader was present.

To appraise the depth and endurance of the morale of a group, one has to be aware of the wide discrepancy possible between superficial techniques and real spirit. Morale is one aspect of social well-being where it is extremely dangerous for a leader to build upon a foundation of falsehood.

CHAPTER IX

Propaganda and Morale

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“**F**OR the flag, for the home, for the family; for the future of all mankind!” So runs the theme of George M. Cohan’s new song hit composed for America in World War II. Is this propaganda? And will it help build American morale?

In most current discussions of morale little attention is given to propaganda and the role it plays, or should play, in building and maintaining American morale. To most people morale seems good, and propaganda seems bad; therefore, the two should not be related. A few years ago the writer asked each member of a forum audience to write on a card his definition of propaganda. Over two-thirds of the 65 respondents indicated their suspicions of propaganda either because they thought it warped facts or served special interests or both.³ It has often been noted that Americans speak of promotional efforts they favor as “education” or perhaps “publicity,” reserving the term “propaganda” for causes with which they do not sympathize.

The recent popularity of propaganda analysis may also have something to do with current reticence about speaking of morale and propaganda in the same breath. Thousands of subscribers to Consumers Research and Consumers Union have become aware of the tricks of advertisers and have learned to depend upon scientific analysis in selecting and buying their products. The Institute for Propaganda Analysis, which recently discontinued its publications until the end of the war, announced in the final issue of its bulletin that its monthly circulation has been 10,000 and that, in addition, 18,000 copies of annual volumes have been sold. Since a large proportion of subscribers were libraries, schools,

colleges, editors, clergymen, lecturers, and the like, the influence of the Institute upon American thought has been considerable. The most concrete illustration is the widespread use of the Institute's "Seven Devices" in analyzing potential propaganda. Without doubt many persons feel that stressing a connection between morale and propaganda may lead to the analysis and criticism of morale-building efforts, an effect which would be unfortunate in wartime.

The relationship between propaganda and morale is, however, an important question which cannot be overlooked. It demands an answer for the very simple reason that propaganda has been used, is being used, and will continue to be used in boosting American morale—both civilian and military—to a point which will make victory possible. Government bureaus, business organizations, social groups, and private individuals are striving to build national morale. The technique they are using is propaganda, though they prefer not to have their efforts so characterized because of the unpleasant connotations of the term. If they understand American attitudes and if they know the potentialities and limitations of propaganda they may be successful, singly or together, in contributing greatly to American morale. If they do not, they may bungle the job. There is always the possibility that our major morale-building functions may gradually become centralized in a great patriotic sales campaign run by advertising and publicity men—a sort of streamlined Creel Committee with slogans, posters, parades, up-to-date Four-Minute Men, handouts, leaflets, and all the other paraphernalia of highly emotionalized appeals. Such a reversion to the rather primitive propaganda methods of World War I might conceivably prove disastrous to national morale in World War II. Social scientists, particularly psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists, have an important function to perform in studying the situation and helping to guide our morale effort into the most constructive channels.

Two Sources of Morale

Broadly speaking, civilian morale may be heightened either by environmental changes or by people's changed interpretations of their environments. That is to say, it may be heightened by the impact of events or by changed evaluations of and attitudes toward situations, whether or not the latter have themselves changed. Such events as the bombing raids and the threat of invasion did wonders for British morale, which had been only lukewarm during the "Sitzkrieg." Invasion of her frontiers and the German approach to Moscow raised Russian morale to unexpected heights. American morale, confused and divided at the time, was welded and galvanized into action by the attack on Pearl Harbor. ("Remember Pearl Harbor" is the only slogan of significance produced thus far since America entered the war.) In all these cases the effect on morale was an indirect consequence of military events.

Obviously the determination of civilian morale cannot be left to the mercy of more or less unpredictable military and naval events; each belligerent nation undertakes the task of consciously and deliberately attending to its morale. A government does so by guiding its people's opinions and attitudes—hence their actions—in desired directions. This is the job of propaganda.

Propaganda is not necessarily bad, though it can often be criticized on various counts. Essentially it consists of an attempt to bring about desired attitudes by means of suggestion. Though distinctions can be made between propaganda and education, these tend to become unimportant in wartime because of the all-compelling need to produce specific results like confidence, hope, enthusiasm, and willingness to make sacrifices. The more a social process is designed to bring about particular attitudinal states, the more it tends to become propaganda.

In wartime, workability becomes the criterion for propaganda. Such important yardsticks as factuality, degree of emotionality, candor, and even long-range social utility tend to be ignored and

all attention centers on immediate efficacy. If a piece of propaganda (even though it contains wishful thinking, unverified rumor, and the like) seems likely to raise morale and thereby to help win the war, it is used; if it doesn't, it is rejected. This may seem to be an unduly Machiavellian interpretation. Yet the story of propaganda in World War I, as related by Lasswell and others, leads one to suspect that as the war proceeds such a pragmatic view will become increasingly the order of the day.

Selection, evaluation, and interpretation of news is an important function of propaganda, though news reporting *per se* belongs in a different category. When a censor holds up bad news and lets it trickle out in small judicious doses, or when a writer does an article on the significance to Americans of Japanese conquest of Singapore, he is putting out propaganda; in each case an attempt is made to produce a desired effect upon public opinion. Propaganda may be used to aid American morale by stating and interpreting war aims, by fostering good will toward allies and hatred toward enemies—in fact by any appeal to reason or emotion which may evoke confidence, enthusiasm, and determined effort.

How successful can such propaganda be in achieving its goal? Doob has shown that successful propaganda follows the "principle of related attitudes." The propagandist seeks to arouse "pre-existing attitudes which will serve as the basis for the desired integration."² Putting it in another way, we may say that propaganda is maximally effective only when it operates within boundaries determined by widespread attitudes and common recognition of facts.

It thus becomes necessary to analyze the content of American attitudes, by polls and other scientific methods if possible, so that those who are seeking to promote morale can utilize the findings in their work. Although this has been done to a slight extent, and results of some studies appear in later chapters, the surface has only been scratched.*

* See Chapter XI, "American Morale when the War Began," by Donald Rugg; also Allport.¹

American Predispositions

Some American attitudes are clear—attitudes toward Hitler, Mussolini, the Japanese, and their military aggressions. But there are many less obvious attitudes which play a part in current thinking; frequently vague, they are found in the fringes of consciousness rather than at the center. They are, nevertheless, tremendously important; those who would build American morale must know them and know how to deal with them. Some are given here with their implications; the catalogue is not complete, nor is the evidence entirely conclusive, but it may at least furnish some important hypotheses for effective propaganda work at a time when complete evidence is hard to obtain.

Americans hate war. Seeing war as a major human and economic disaster, they doubt that it can settle the world's problems. Disillusioned by the consequences of World War I, they have since 1920 been more pacifist than militarist—as shown, for example, by country-wide opposition to compulsory military training.

In the presence of such a deep-seated attitude, one could predict that propaganda which glorifies war—which tells how noble it is to die for one's country—will be unsuccessful as a morale-building technique. A recruiting poster that urges young men to enlist by saying, "Come on, get into the fight!" may swing over a few of the more hot-blooded, but by and large this type of appeal will call forth little enthusiasm. The successful propagandist, on the other hand, will agree that war is a dirty business. But he will stress the fact that America, having been forced into it against her will, must now do her best under the circumstances to win a military victory in order to insure continuance of freedom and democracy and the achievement of other positive goals.

Americans do not believe that the end of the war will usher in the millennium. They expected some sort of Utopia after the "war to make the world safe for democracy"; they know what

happened at Versailles and afterwards. Propaganda which depicts the "parliament of man, the federation of the world" as the outcome of the present conflict is likely to be received with an "Oh yeah? We heard that one before." If concrete plans and promises are made, however—plans which are reasonably possible of fulfillment—that kind of propaganda should have morale-inducing power. In December, 1941, President Roosevelt promised to re-establish the invaded democracies of Europe. Before the war is over the United Nations may need, for the sake of morale, to state clear policies of freedom for colonies as well as former nations.

Americans do not hate the German or the Italian people, or even the Japanese people. They do hate the fascist-military regimes in power in those nations. Whether a war can be waged and won without hate is a moot point. But so far, at least, an attempt is being made to treat loyal aliens justly. We have not banned the writings of Goethe or the music of Verdi.

From present indications it seems unlikely that atrocity stories purporting to show that German, Italian, or Japanese soldiers or civilians are inhuman brutes would be believed by the American people. Our people would welcome, on the other hand, the real story of how dictators seized and extended their power, how they stifled freedom, persecuted minorities and indoctrinated youth, and what attempts fascist groups have made to gain power and sow dissension in the United States.

Americans do not believe their allies in this war are angels. Most notably is this fact true in the case of the Soviet Union; many are the protests against an "alliance with Communism." But it is also true in a milder degree in the case of Great Britain; many Americans believe she is fighting to save her empire and for no other reason. Propaganda which clothes our allies in shining raiment, which speaks of them as "warriors for liberty," and "defenders of the faith," is probably foredoomed to failure. It can, however, be re-emphasized that none of our present allies has ever threatened American democracy and that their continuance

is essential to our own preservation and to the permanence of democracy in the world.

Americans doubt that everyone is sacrificing alike in this war, or is likely to do so. Sons, brothers, and sweethearts go off to camp and across the seas, perhaps never to return; their sacrifice is out of all proportion to the rest. The soaring taxes, prices, and food shortages of 1917-1918 come to mind as Americans begin to feel the pinch now. They dimly recall the war profiteers and the more recent exposés of munitions-makers; they are not convinced that such errors will be avoided in this war. They are willing to suffer if they know everyone is bearing a share of the burden. But they have to be shown. They note with some misgivings the reports of the Truman Committee and other investigating groups; they wonder whether the historian of the future may uncover a fine collection of unsavory details about graft and profits and special privilege in America during World War II.

What is the best propaganda in this area? Obviously the propaganda of facts themselves. If it can be shown that all groups, classes, sections, and individuals are contributing their utmost, that the draft is really selective and really democratic, that government contracts are not resulting in vast profits—this is the most powerful propaganda of all. As the old adage has it, “Actions speak louder than words.”

Americans do not believe their democracy is perfect. Too many have suffered these past years—from depression, from unemployment, from discrimination, and the like. Propaganda which glorifies the *status quo* before the war will draw a blank, particularly with groups like youth, labor, and Negroes, who have suffered the most. As Louis Wirth suggests, our propaganda efforts with minority groups can stress the diverse origin of our peoples, our democratic traditions, our common aspirations.⁵ It can make a realistic comparison between life in even an imperfect democracy and life under dictatorship. But the most powerful propaganda of all is that which can point to evidence here and now of our practise of democracy. This will carry many times more weight

than the most elaborate blueprints for a better social order at some distant future time.

Emotions, Facts, Goals

Three *features* of current American attitudes, in addition to the attitudes themselves, stand out with reference to the building of morale by consciously directed effort. They are: first, a suspicion of purely emotional appeals; second, a demand for factual evidence; third, a desire for realizable goals.

Americans can be touched by appeals to emotions, yes, but certainly not to the degree they were in 1917-1918. The slogans, songs, pep talks, and other devices used successfully by the Creel Committee will have to be replaced by a type of propaganda which uses a judicious mixture of reason and emotion, which presents facts and figures to buttress the appeals for action. Already there are some indications of the use of these newer techniques of propaganda,* but the total picture is not yet clear.

Considerable suspicion of censorship and propaganda in the news is a recent indication of the American demand for facts. As Rugg has pointed out elsewhere in this volume,† results from polls taken last November showed that 40 per cent of those in the sample were dissatisfied with the government's policy of dispensing news. An essential of morale is confidence in one's leaders; one of the best ways to destroy that confidence is for Americans to discover they are being kept in the dark, or being fooled by "doctored" news. Censorship of news for military reasons is agreed upon, but omission and distortion of news for any other reason—if discovered, as indeed it is likely to be—will prove destructive to morale.

All the warring nations, says Saunders in a recent article,⁴ have failed to produce good morale because they have been unable or

* See, for example, an eight-page illustrated leaflet entitled "Our America," put out by the Treasury Department to encourage the sale of Defense Bonds.

† See Chapter XI.

unwilling to provide significant positive goals for which their people can strive. All are defending something rather than fighting for an ideal. This situation has not changed since the United States entered the war. Perhaps the most important issue confronting those today who are seeking to build and maintain civilian morale is this: can goals be set up which harmonize with the common aspirations of Americans, which have the stamp of sincerity upon them, and which have a reasonable chance of attainment? If these conditions can be fulfilled, the task of morale-building becomes relatively easy.

CHAPTER X

News and Morale: A Miniature Experiment

THEODORE NEWCOMB

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ONE of the most debated issues, in the effort to keep American morale at a maximum, is the censorship of news. Most American news and radio programs, like all that we hear from Germany, Italy, and Japan, tend to play up favorable news. Our great victories and the smashing blows dealt to the enemy make up the largest headlines. On the other hand, Dr. Bateson, in discussing American and English character, suggests (see Chapter V) that we should not soft-pedal disasters. What is the effect of good news or bad news on American public opinion? The miniature experiment here presented cannot hope to answer the general question but it points to a line of investigation which might well be pursued on a much larger scale by such a government agency as the Office of Facts and Figures.

The experiment was designed and executed by a class in Public Opinion and Propaganda.* It deals with the effects of reported events in Europe upon the willingness of students in a small women's college to approve of increased American aid to Britain.

The time was late April, 1941, more than six months before American entrance into the war. Student opinion in this college, following in general the results of nationwide polls, was gradually veering toward favoring more aid to Britain. But opinion was still divided. Those who favored aid most strongly felt that the

* The following students participated actively in the experiment: Nancy Cole, Petie Cummings, Anne Eaton, Joan Hyatt, Helen Masenheimer, Eleanor Metcalfe, Jean Short, and Nancy Victor.

change was too slow. "Too many people think Britain's is already a lost cause," was a common diagnosis by such students of what they regarded as the pathetically slow course of public opinion. There had been Dunkirk, and then in rapid succession the retreat in North Africa, and the failure in Greece.

Those who were alarmed at the too rapid rise of "interventionism" offered a precisely reverse explanation. "They're jumping on the bandwagon because the succession of British defeats convinces them that Germany can't be beaten without us. One resounding British victory would stop the American procession to war," was the verdict of many of this group.

For some weeks the class had been conducting, by sampling methods, more or less regular opinion polls regarding the issue of aid to Britain. It should be possible, reasoned the class, to discover whether British defeats made for more or less "interventionism"; we needed only to wait for another German victory and repeat the poll. About the German defeat which was needed for purposes of experimental control they were less sanguine. The solution finally arrived at was an obvious one: let's create, experimentally, both a German victory and a German defeat.

The matter was arranged as follows. Each of two instructors appeared, armed with mimeographed ballots, at each of two student dining rooms just after the evening meal had begun. (All students took meals in these four rooms, choosing any table in any room for any meal.) Each instructor requested all students in each room to fill out the ballots, using practically verbatim the following words:

I have come to ask your help in the matter of the Bennington College public opinion polls. Previous polls have been conducted by the method of interviewing a carefully chosen sample, but not all, of the student body. Some of you, therefore, but not all of you, have already been interviewed. The method is being altered this time, so that we are asking all of you to participate, and all at

once. I have come here primarily to explain just why this is necessary.

In recent weeks world events have crowded themselves upon the headlines so thick and fast that it is hard for any one to know whether or not he is keeping abreast of the latest developments. Between today and tomorrow some world-shaking event may radically change your opinions. Thus it simply will not do to have some of you give your answers today, and some tomorrow. The dining room seems to offer the only opportunity of presenting the same questions to all of you at the same time.

As an example of this, let me tell you that only an hour ago the news came over the radio that: [German forces have captured Alexandria, in Egypt, and may be expected to take possession of the Suez Canal within a few days, or even a few hours. . . . The Russian government has denounced its treaty with Germany, and has announced that it will attack Germany with all its military might if German forces make any move whatever against Syria or Turkey. According to London this will end the German threat in the Mediterranean].* Since some of you have probably heard this already, it seems better to pass on the information to all of you than to complete the poll while some of you have heard it and others have not.

Will you therefore indicate your opinion on the papers which are being passed around? They are anonymous; please do not indicate your name, but only your major and class in college.

The ballot itself read:

You are asked to make *three* responses to *each* of the following items: first, your opinion three weeks ago (when the first poll was taken); second, your opinion one week ago; third, your opinion now.

Indicate your opinion by encircling A if you agree, D if you disagree, ? if you are uncertain.

* Each instructor included the first passage appearing in brackets in one dining room, and the second passage appearing in brackets in the other dining room.

Three weeks ago	One week ago	Today	Question
A ? D	A ? D	A ? D	1. I am in favor of aiding Britain by providing American convoys for British shipping.
A ? D	A ? D	A ? D	2. I favor giving Britain any and every kind of help she needs now, before it is too late to save her from defeat.
A ? D	A ? D	A ? D	3. It's already too late for the British to hope to defeat the Germans, and so there is no sense in our going any further in joining up with a lost cause.

The procedure was unusual. No instructor had ever before appeared in the dining rooms to make such a request. Were the reasons offered for the novel procedure accepted as plausible? For the great majority of students two lines of evidence suggest an affirmative answer. First, the announcement was followed in each of the four rooms by a deep hush, and then by excited talking. In two of the rooms (those in which the "German defeat" * was announced) there was applause and noisy rejoicing. Secondly, inquiry by the class, one week later, indicated that less than 10 per cent of students claimed not to have been taken in by the announcements. Since it is almost certain that some of these later claims were spurious, and that no one who suspected the announcements at the time would have claimed later not to have suspected them, it seems safe to say that only a very small percentage did not accept the announcements at face value.

* The "German defeat" or "British victory" announcement was not a military operation, strictly comparable to the alleged German occupation of Alexandria. It involved the possible entrance of Russia into the war—a contingency likely to be complicated by emotions other than those related to Britain or Germany.

The first tabulation of results (Table I) revealed almost no differences between the pairs of rooms in which contrasting announcements had been made. Not much was gleaned from this

TABLE I. Degrees of agreement, by number and percentage, with three items in two groups in which contrasting announcements were made.

	"German Victory" groups						"German Defeat" groups					
	Three weeks ago		One week ago		Today		Three weeks ago		One week ago		Today	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<i>Item 1</i>												
Agree	27	24	38	33	58	51	20	23	27	30	44	49
?	25	22	27	24	21	19	19	21	23	26	15	17
Disagree	61	54	48	43	34	30	50	56	39	44	30	34
<i>Item 2</i>												
Agree	34	30	43	38	59	52	34	39	37	42	43	49
?	36	32	36	32	28	25	28	32	30	34	27	31
Disagree	43	38	34	30	26	23	26	29	21	24	18	20
<i>Item 3</i>												
Agree	8	8	7	7	5	5	5	6	6	7	4	5
?	15	14	16	15	22	21	8	9	9	11	12	14
Disagree	81	78	81	78	77	74	72	85	70	82	69	81

tabulation except a steady self-reported shift during the preceding three weeks toward favoring more aid to Britain, as indicated by responses to Items 1 and 2. Item 3 was evidently so strongly worded that very few accepted it, and little self-reported shift occurred for this item. That these recalled shifts are reasonably accurate is indicated by the responses to Item 1 gathered exactly three weeks earlier: 21 per cent agreed, 62 per cent disagreed, and 17 per cent were uncertain on the earlier date. These figures are to be compared with later, self-reported attitudes for the same date by the entire group of 24 per cent, 55 per cent, and 21 per cent, respectively. Items 2 and 3 had not previously been asked.

Although the responses of the two groups, thus tabulated, show no differences, a further observation is conspicuous: most of the self-reported shifts in attitude (all of which are in the direction of favoring more British aid) occurred during the week immediately preceding the experiment. This fact obviously suggests that the experimental announcements had a good deal to do with the very recent shifts. This conclusion receives confirmation from another poll, held three weeks after the experiment, with the results shown in Table II for a 40 per cent sample * of the student

TABLE II. Number (and percentage) of various responses by 100 subjects to items included in experimental poll, as given three weeks later.

	Item 1	Item 2	Item 3
Agree	45	42	4
?	43	30	79
Disagree	12	28	17

body; i.e., with no particularly stirring events in Europe to which the attitude shifts could plausibly be attributed, there was a lesser degree of favoring aid to Britain three weeks after the experiment than at the time of the experiment. Some, if not most, of the pro-British shift at the time of the experiment is thus to be attributed to the experimental announcements.

The most interesting aspect of this finding is that it occurred in both groups. In other words, announcements of presumably opposite import had the effect of increasing the degree of favoring aid to Britain. Psychologists may interpret this as an instance of "dynamogenesis." Whatever the interpretation, it is evident that in a given attitude atmosphere opposed kinds of stimuli may, if sufficiently intense, have similar effects.† It suggests too, though it

* Samples were selected so as to represent accurately the entire student body with respect to class and college major. Previously gathered evidence indicated that this gave very accurate results.

† There are other instances of this phenomenon in the literature of attitude measurement, e.g., Kulp.¹

does not prove, that among these subjects attitudinal readiness was such that for most of them change in only one direction—more aid to Britain—was possible.

To return to the experimental data, analysis showed that the four dining-room groups were by no means of similar composition. One of them was composed largely of juniors and seniors, and another largely of freshmen. These two groups, unfortunately, had heard opposite experimental announcements. A further tabulation was therefore made, as shown in Table III, of the experimental responses, classified by class groups. (Percentages have been corrected, in this table, to include only those having opinions. Responses to Item 3 were so nearly uniform in all groups, as thus computed, that they are not presented in this table.)

TABLE III. Percentage of those having opinions who favor more aid to Britain.

	Freshmen				Juniors-Seniors			
	"German Victory" group (N 41)		"German Defeat" group (N 40)		"German Victory" group (N 35)		"German Defeat" group (N 24)	
	Item 1	Item 2	Item 1	Item 2	Item 1	Item 2	Item 1	Item 2
Three weeks ago	40	53	28	56	14	25	28	63
One week ago	45	69	37	68	22	33	53	80
Today	73	84	58	78	42	43	68	86

With the responses thus segregated by classes, certain differences appear between the groups which heard contrasting announcements. First, the response differences between those groups hearing contrasting announcements are greater for upper classmen than for freshmen; the two groups of freshmen do not differ at all in response to Item 2. Secondly, where differences do appear (i.e., in response to Item 1), the differences are in opposite directions for the two class groups. That is, freshmen hearing the

report of "German Victory" are somewhat *more* favorable to British aid than freshmen who heard the report of "German Defeat." But, on the contrary, upperclassmen who heard the report of "German Victory" are decidedly *less* favorable to British aid than those who heard the report of "German Defeat." These differences appear more clearly in Table IV, where they are expressed in terms of ratios.

TABLE IV. Differences between groups hearing contrasting announcements, expressed in terms of ratio between percentage of those favoring British aid in "German Victory" group and in "German Defeat" group.

Time	Freshmen		Juniors-Seniors	
	Item 1	Item 2	Item 1	Item 2
Three weeks ago	1.43	.95	.50	.40
One week ago	1.22	1.00	.42	.41
Today	1.26	1.08	.62	.50

The fact that these differences appear not only for the experimental responses, but also for the self-reported earlier attitudes, demands brief comment. Judging by the 40 per cent sample responses obtained three weeks earlier to Item 1, both the "German Defeat" freshmen and the "German Victory" upperclassmen made very accurate self-reports of their attitudes as of three weeks earlier (27 per cent of freshmen and 12 per cent of upperclassmen having opinions at the earlier time favored convoying). But the other two groups, i.e., the "German Victory" freshmen and the "German Defeat" upperclassmen, exaggerate the degree to which they had favored convoying at the earlier period. That these reports represent distorted recall seems clear. The motivation must have been strong to make it appear that attitude shifts had been gradual, rather than dictated exclusively by the announcement just heard. What seems to have happened is that those who were most influenced by the announcement were most moved to exaggerate their earlier degree of favor for convoying. This

statement is not in contradiction with the previous statement that self-reported shifts are reasonably accurate; the previous statement had to do with the total group, for which the various degrees of distorted recall tend to cancel each other. The present statement has to do with selected groups, for which distorted recall is rather obvious. The writer is inclined to interpret this distortion as additional evidence for the efficacy of the experimental announcements, for these particular groups.

It is worth noting that responses to Item 3, though showing no differences in percentage of agreement, show differences in percentage of uncertainty which are congruent with the above results. These are shown in Table V. Here, as in response to the other

TABLE V. Experimental Responses to Item 3, in percentage.

Time	Freshmen						Junior-Seniors					
	"German Victory" group			"German Defeat" group			"German Victory" group			"German Defeat" group		
	A *	?	D	A	?	D	A	?	D	A	?	D
Three weeks ago	5	8	87	5	11	84	9	24	67	8	0	92
One week ago	5	8	87	5	11	84	9	21	70	8	0	92
Today	3	16	81	3	19	78	9	24	67	8	0	92

* A, ?, and D refer to agreement, uncertainty, and disagreement, respectively.

items, there are no differences between the two freshmen groups, whereas the difference between the two upperclass groups is marked. One quarter of those in the "German Victory" group are uncertain as to whether the British cause is hopeless, while not one junior or senior in the "German Defeat" group is uncertain. The lesser uncertainty and the greater disagreement with this item on the part of the "German Defeat" group is clearly related to the nature of the announcement which it heard.

Why are freshmen and upperclassmen differentially affected by the nature of the announcements which they hear? And, in par-

ticular, why are the contrasting effects of the two announcements greater for upperclassmen than for freshmen? The following suggestions cannot be documented here, but there is ample evidence for them in material previously gathered by the writer in the same college community.* In a college where great stress is laid on the contemporary world, upperclassmen are very much better informed concerning contemporary events than freshmen. And in a college where individual prestige is closely related to degree of concern over the outcome of such events, upperclassmen feel themselves more directly involved; they care more. The lesser degree of favoring aid to Britain on the part of upperclassmen than of freshmen does not mean that they were more indifferent to a German victory. On the contrary, as shown by other evidence, they feared it more. But they were sufficiently aware of the complexity of the problem to be also aware of the dangers to this country of intervening in a cause which was already hopeless.

In short, upperclassmen wanted a German defeat more desperately than did freshmen, but they had been more discouraged than had freshmen by the succession of German victories. Their very superiority in information and understanding had been in part responsible for their discouragement. Thus it happened that the news of a "German defeat" stimulated the upperclassmen who heard it to favor far greater aid to Britain. The chief inhibiting factor, their discouragement, had been thus far reduced.†

Which of the two initial hypotheses was the more nearly correct? Obviously a "resounding British victory" did not have the effect of "stopping the procession to war" for either freshmen or upperclassmen. For both groups, indeed, it tended to have the opposite effect. But it is axiomatic for those who study differential influences upon public opinion that "the public" cannot be considered a single "mass." Rather, a given sort of influence has one effect upon this group, another upon that. The chief significance of the present experiment seems to be that one of the differ-

* See the writer's forthcoming *Personality and social change*.

† Upper classmen may also have been more favorable toward Russia.

entia which must be borne in mind in considering varying effects of the same influence upon different groups is degree of information, understanding, and concern.

To the extent that conclusions from such a limited group are applicable to other groups, and to the extent that the conditions of April, 1941, are still present, the following deductions may be drawn: (1) the belief that Germany can be defeated without American aid is not an important deterrent to favoring increased efforts by America to defeat Germany; and (2) those who are best informed and most concerned (and who, perhaps, wield more than average influence) are primarily deterred from favoring increased efforts by America to defeat Germany by their discouragement in the face of continued German successes. By release from discouragement and futility, the latter group, even more than the total group, was stimulated to favor such American efforts.

Part Three: THE STATE OF AMERICAN
MORALE

- XI. *American Morale When the War Began*
- XII. *Student Morale*
- XIII. *Morale and the Jewish Minority*
- XIV. *Morale Among Negroes*
- XV. *Morale in Canada*

CHAPTER XI

American Morale When the War Began

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TODAY the course of American foreign policy has been set irrevocably by the impact of recent events. Our nation stands united in all-out opposition to the Axis, firm in its resolve to triumph over the forces of fascism. This new-found unity sprang from righteous indignation at an unprovoked attack upon our outposts, an attack which ruled out any alternative but war. United now in our goals, we are willing to make whatever sacrifices our leaders demand of us; possessed as we are of a common will to victory, our morale is at present excellent. Whether it will continue to be high, whether we will avoid complacency as a result of imagined impregnability, or become dispirited as a consequence of initial defeats, whether the transformation from business as usual to a complete war economy will entail dissatisfactions which will endanger our unanimity, are questions whose answers are not yet in. While we cannot predict with certainty the future state of morale, we can review the condition of morale at the time of our entrance into the war, as well as trace its development since the original outbreak of hostilities in 1939. Such an historical survey may provide us with an understanding of the conditions which must be met if our morale is to be sustained at its present high level.

Just as the Japanese attack on Hawaii was no single, isolated incident, but part of a larger Axis plan of aggression, so our morale was not suddenly born, full-grown like Minerva, as a consequence of this attack. True, instant unity and tremendously heightened morale did result, but these could be likened to a

swiftly completed superstructure which was erected on an already existing foundation of antipathy for Axis philosophy and actions, and a broad sympathy for the Allied cause. It is the purpose of the present chapter to examine the nature of this foundation, to analyze the state of prewar morale in terms of: (1) what the American people wanted to happen with reference to the present world struggle; (2) what we expected would happen; and (3) what we thought we should do about it, both with respect to the general aims and objectives which should guide our policies, and also with respect to the specific implementation of these aims.

The data on which this study of morale is based have been collected by the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton University. They are the results of public-opinion surveys made by this office and by the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll). In the tables which follow, Institute questions will be labeled "A.I.P.O.," while those devised by this office will carry the legend "O.P.O.R." The surveys conducted by both organizations use the method of stratified sampling, which means that the various population groups are represented in the poll sample in the same proportions that they occur in the total voting population of the country. Thus the poll sample is an accurate miniature which reflects the opinion of the populace as a whole. For each question dates are given. They indicate the day on which this question (as part of a larger questionnaire) was sent out to the interviewers. The opinion represented would be that which was current during the following week to ten days, by which time the interviewing would have been completed.

What the American People Wanted to Happen

From the very beginning of the war, American sympathies have been overwhelmingly on the side of the Allies. In September, 1939, 84 per cent of the people wanted to see England and France defeat Germany, whereas only 2 per cent favored the Germans (Table I); 14 per cent made no choice, probably in the attempt to

preserve a strictly neutral attitude—a popular reaction at that time. As the war progressed, and the United States became increasingly interventionist, it is safe to assume that the majority of these no-opinion voters swung to the side of England and France.

Early in 1940, a similar question on the Sino-Japanese conflict elicited nearly as overwhelming a majority wanting to see China triumph (Table I). The no-choice vote was somewhat larger in this case, probably because at that time this war seemed more remote to the average American.

When Germany declared war against Russia, the great majority of Americans, despite their dislike of the communist form of government, expressed sympathy with the Russian cause. Again the percentage of those unwilling to make a choice was high, presumably because many found it difficult to determine whether communism or fascism was the lesser evil. Nearly three-fourths of the population, however, guided by the considerations of *Realpolitik*, expressed hope for a Russian victory (Table I). This attitude remained stable over the period from June to September.

TABLE I

Which side do you want to see win the war? (A.I.P.O., Sept. 19, 1939)

England and France	84%
Germany	2
No choice	14

In the present war between Japan and China, which side do you want to see win? (A.I.P.O., Feb. 20, 1940)

China	76%
Japan	2
No choice	22

In the present war between Germany and Russia, which side would you like to see win? (A.I.P.O., June 24, 1940 and Sept. 9, 1941)

	June	Sept.
Russia	73%	70%
Germany	4	4
Neither	18	19
No opinion	5	7

What We Expected Would Happen

We have seen that the American public strongly desired the defeat of the Axis partners. Good morale, however, entails not only the desire for victory, but also the faith that victory will ultimately be achieved. It is pertinent, then, to inquire what people *expected* would happen, as well as what they *wanted* to happen.

Chart I shows graphically the trend in the percentages of a national cross section who thought that England would win the war (together with the counterparts of this question—the percentages believing Germany and Italy would win, and those who were undecided), and the percentage who, at different periods, thought the United States would eventually enter the war.*

Confidence in an English victory has fluctuated with events, declining sharply at the time of the French debacle and the German successes in the Balkans. Usually, however, there has been a quick return to a more optimistic attitude following these periods of pessimism, and, by the fall of 1941, confidence in the ultimate victory of Allied arms had reached a 70 per cent level. In late November, just prior to our entrance into the war, 86 per cent foresaw an eventual German defeat; in December, after we had declared war, this figure climbed to over 90 per cent.

At the outset of the war, about half the population believed that the United States would eventually become involved. This percentage fell off somewhat in the following weeks, when the theory of a “phony war” was current, then rose, only to drop again when the French defeat made it appear that the war would soon end. Since that time, however, this curve has risen steadily until, in late October, it reached a high point of 83 per cent (Chart I).

Table II shows opinion on the probable victor in the Russo-

* This chart was prepared by the Office of Public Opinion Research from trend data which have been compiled on these as well as many other important war issues. The curve representing Dow-Jones market averages (these points were selected to correspond to the dates of the “Which side will win” question) is included because of its interesting correlation with the trend line of “England will win.” The numbers at the top of the chart refer to the list of events.

German war. At the beginning of the war, people were not sanguine about Russia's chances; past experience made it appear likely that the German military machine would continue to roll. Yet by September, although the undecided vote was still high, there was much greater confidence in a Russian victory. Even among those who did not foresee an eventual Russian victory, a majority (60 per cent) believed that Russia would be able to continue fighting for six months or more (Table II).

TABLE II

Which side do you think will win—Germany or Russia? (A.I.P.O., June 24, 1941 and Sept. 9, 1941)

	<i>June</i>	<i>Sept.</i>
Germany	48%	20%
Russia	22	41
Stalemate	9	9
Undecided	21	30

If "Germany," "Stalemate," or "Undecided," ask:

Do you think Germany will defeat Russia in the next six months, or do you think Russia will keep on fighting for six months or longer?

	<i>Sept.</i>
Germany will win in six months	13%
Russia will keep on fighting	60
Don't know	27

Table III shows that, just previous to the actual onset of hostilities, a majority of people felt that a clash between the United States and Japan was inevitable. There was, at the same time, almost unanimous confidence that the outcome of such a war would be a victory for the United States; indeed, a majority predicted that the war would be a short one, and relatively easy for us to win (Table III).*

* Much of this rather easy optimism was dispelled by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. An A.I.P.O. ballot sent out three days after the attack on Pearl Harbor found 50 per cent (whereas the figure in Table III was 20 per cent) saying that it would be a long war, and 64 per cent (35 per cent in Table III) that it would be a difficult one for us to win. Undoubtedly this change in attitude was a healthy sign, for it indicated that a rather dangerous overconfidence had been replaced by a more realistic conception of the magnitude of the task confronting us.

TABLE III

Do you think the United States will go to war against Japan in the near future? (A.I.P.O., Nov. 25, 1941)

Yes	52%
No	27
Undecided	21

If this country should get into a war against Japan, do you think we would win, or lose? (O.P.O.R., Nov. 19, 1941)

Win	92%
Lose	1
Stalemate	1
Undecided	6

If the United States goes to war against Japan, do you think it will be a long war, or a short one? (A.I.P.O., Nov. 25, 1941)


Long	20%
Short	57
Qualified answer	3
Don't know	20

Do you think a war between our country and Japan would be a difficult one for us, or a comparatively easy one? (A.I.P.O., Nov. 25, 1941)

Difficult	35%
Easy	48
Qualified answer	3
No opinion	14

In summary, people in this country were virtually unanimous in desiring Germany's defeat, and at the same time were confident that this would eventually be accomplished. Hitler's attempt to divert American sympathies by engaging in a Holy War against communism completely missed fire. Despite its dislike of communism, the public accepted Russia as an ally and hoped that she would be able to stall the new German *Blitzkrieg*. For a long time, the American people have fatalistically held the conviction that we would eventually enter the war (and, more recently, have come to regard our entrance as a *sine qua non* of an Allied victory), though at the same time they have been reluctant to endorse a policy of full military participation. The implications of this dilemma of contradictory expectations and desires will be considered more fully in the next section. Suffice it to say here that, although we were amazed by the suddenness of the attack on us, we had really expected the war to come sooner or later; it was with

CHART 2. How public opinion stepped to war—the change of issues.



a sense of relief we realized that now we knew just where we stood. Anticipated too was a war with Japan, in which we felt that our military and general economic superiority would insure a not too difficult victory. Many foresaw, however, that the war would be no pushover, and the sobering disaster at Pearl Harbor kept the rest from succumbing to a dangerous overconfidence.

What We Thought We Should Do About It


While our sympathies have been outstandingly pro-Allied ever since the outbreak of the war, our willingness to go the limit to insure an Allied victory has evolved very gradually. Our attitude toward participation in the struggle has pursued a course from complete neutrality to a declaration of war, as Chart II indicates. In September, 1939, the issue which most concerned us was whether we ought to modify our neutrality to the extent of selling war materials to England and France. In the month following the French armistice, the basic issue was whether we ought to give up our neutrality entirely in order to aid the British. By midfall, 1940, we were wondering whether we ought to resist Hitler by all possible aid short of war. After the Axis successes in the Balkans the problem became: shall we resist Hitler at any cost? By November the question had taken a more ominous form: when will we fight? The answer came in December.*

Although American public opinion has become increasingly interventionist since 1939, the degree of interventionism shown in a poll is distinctly a function of the way in which the issue is presented, and varies with the contingencies involved. Chart III shows graphically this variation in interventionist sentiment with variation in contingencies.

It will be seen from this chart that, although more than 70 per cent of the people were agreed that our primary job was to

* The author is indebted to Dr. Hadley Cantril of the Office of Public Opinion Research for this analysis of changing issues. For a more complete account, see his article.¹

CHART 3. Variations in war sentiment.



defeat the Axis and 68 per cent considered this task more important than our keeping out of war, only 31 per cent said they would vote to go to war if a referendum were held, only 24 per cent thought we ought to enter the war, and the very small minority of 13 per cent approved of sending an expeditionary force to aid Britain. There was, then, no single index of the degree of interventionism at the time these questions were asked. The majority of us were in accord on the general objective of aiding the Allies, and thus insuring the defeat of Germany; but there was usually less unanimity on proposals providing specific implementation of this objective, particularly if such proposals stated or implied that our armed forces were to be sent abroad. Strongly interventionist in terms of general objectives, we were isolationist on the matter of direct military participation. It should be noted, however, that if our participation were to become or were made to appear a necessary condition of defeating Germany, 70 per cent of the population said they would agree to our entering the war (Chart III, question reading: "If our present leaders, etc."). As it happened, there was no need for our leaders to argue this point.

In any analysis of morale, it is important to know not only the over-all percentages of agreement with objectives, but also whether there are groups which differ significantly from others in the degree to which they endorse these objectives, since such divergent groups could easily prove a stumbling block to national unity. In general, the South and Southwest regions of the country have been most interventionist, the Middle West least so; men have been more interventionist than women, upper-income groups slightly more so than lower, well-educated people more than the poorly educated, and Protestants more so than Catholics. The differences, varying with the particular issue concerned, have very rarely been more than 20 per cent. Their average would probably be in the vicinity of 10 per cent or less.

Although the scope of this chapter does not permit any complete documentation of these group differences, an illustrative comparison is presented in Table IV, which contains an analysis of re-

ligious differences on several questions about the war and United States policy in relation to the war. It will be seen that the differences between Protestants and Catholics ranged from about 4 per cent to 15 per cent, with Catholics consistently more isolationist. Catholic attitudes toward Japan, however, have not differed significantly from those of Protestants, inasmuch as there is no religious conflict involved when Catholics look to the Far East. Some reasons for the greater isolationism of Catholics with reference to the European struggle were these: (1) the fact that the Church advocated among nationals of each side support for their respective countries; (2) fear of greater secular influence if the Allies should win; (3) a traditional dislike of England growing out of the long struggle of the Catholic and Anglican churches.

TABLE IV. Religious Differences in Attitudes on War Questions. (These questions were all included in a ballot sent out September 17, 1941.)

Which is more important for the United States to try to do: to keep out of war ourselves or to help Britain (defeat Germany) even at the risk of getting into the war?

	<i>Catholic</i>	<i>Protestant</i>	<i>No Church</i>
Keep out	40.3%	25.3%	28.6%
Help (defeat)	55.4	68.3	65.5
No choice	4.3	6.4	5.9

So far as you personally are concerned, do you think President Roosevelt has gone too far or not far enough in his policies of helping Britain (in opposing Germany)?

	<i>Catholic</i>	<i>Protestant</i>	<i>No Church</i>
Too far	29.1%	21.1%	22.6%
About right	44.6	55.2	48.6
Not far enough	20.0	16.6	21.3
No opinion	6.3	7.1	7.5

Should the Neutrality Act be changed to permit American merchant ships with American crews to carry war materials to Britain?

	<i>Catholic</i>	<i>Protestant</i>	<i>No Church</i>
Yes	37.6%	48.4%	48.6%
No	46.8	36.3	37.0
No opinion	15.6	15.3	14.4

In general, do you agree or disagree with Lindbergh's viewpoint on aid to Britain and foreign policy?

	<i>Catholic</i>	<i>Protestant</i>	<i>No Church</i>
Agree	19.7%	13.4%	15.2%
Disagree	57.3	65.1	63.6
No opinion	23.0	21.5	21.2

If you had to choose, which kind of government would you prefer to live under—the kind in Germany or the kind in Russia?

	<i>Catholic</i>	<i>Protestant</i>	<i>No Church</i>
Germany	18.9%	11.2%	9.7%
Russia	30.2	35.7	41.5
Unable to choose	40.2	43.5	39.0
No opinion	10.8	9.6	9.8

Some people say that if the United States is to be a free and democratic country, the Nazi government in Germany must be destroyed. Do you agree or disagree?

	<i>Catholic</i>	<i>Protestant</i>	<i>No Church</i>
Agree	67.0%	72.6%	70.2%
Disagree	24.6	20.9	21.3
No opinion	8.4	6.5	8.5

This outline of group differences should not obscure the fact that the similarities of opinion are much more striking than the differences. What is really surprising is not that there were differences, but that they were so small. With our entrance into the war, we can expect a considerable narrowing of these differences. The absence of any serious dissension on the part of a sizeable minority group in the country is, of course, an essential condition of good morale.

CONFIDENCE IN LEADERS

Prosecution of our war objectives has inevitably entailed increasing centralization of power in the executive branch of the government, a process which has been accelerated with our entrance into the war. Such increase of power means, of course, that there is less opportunity for the control of legislation and government action through the normal democratic channels. That people feel the newly acquired authority to be exercised in the best interests of themselves and of the country as a whole is in this situation necessary for high morale. *Confidence in the leaders* is, then, an important component of morale, particularly in war-time. To investigate this element of morale two questions were used specifically by the O.P.O.R. The results obtained are given in Table V. To give a combined index of confidence, the results

TABLE V

In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way Roosevelt is handling his job as president today? (O.P.O.R., Nov. 19, 1941)

Approve	72%
Disapprove	21
No opinion	7

Some people say that President Roosevelt is taking advantage of the war situation to carry out some of his pet plans which have nothing to do with defense. Do you agree, or disagree, with this? (O.P.O.R., Nov. 19, 1941)

Agree	23%
Disagree	55
No opinion	17
Don't understand question	5

If "Agree," ask: Do you approve, or disapprove, of President Roosevelt's taking advantage of the war to carry out his plans not connected with defense?

	% of "Agree"	% of Total Population
Approve	12%	3%
Disagree	82	19
No opinion	6	1

(77% did not answer this part of the question)

Degree of confidence	National	Democratic *	Republican *
High	51%	70%	27%
Medium	39	28	49
Low	10	2	24

* Political affiliation was determined in this case by the way the person voted in the 1940 election.

were grouped in this way: Those who answered "Approve" on the first question and "Disagree" or "Agree-Approve" on the second were considered to have high confidence in the President. Low confidence was defined as a combination of "Disapprove" on the first question, and "Agree-Disapprove" on the second. Persons who were favorable to the President on one question but not on the other were classed as having "medium" confidence. The national totals in terms of degree of confidence, and a breakdown of these by political affiliation (determined by vote in 1940) are given in Table V. It will be seen that almost exactly half the population were favorable to the President on both questions, and are consequently rated as having high confidence, whereas only 10 per cent fall into the "low" category. A sizeable group of 39 per cent is found, however, in the medium category, indicating something

less than wholehearted approval of Roosevelt in the country as a whole. As would be expected, Democrats and Republicans differ sharply in the amount of confidence they have in the President.

While these figures may not seem to show as great a degree of confidence as would be desirable for high morale, it should be remembered that the questions concern the President's conduct of domestic as well as foreign policy. Other questions have shown that many more people approve his handling of the defense program and foreign policy than endorse all his domestic policies. With our entrance into the war, and the dwindling of many domestic issues into distinctly secondary place, it is probable that many people who were withholding approval of Roosevelt because of dissatisfaction with his conduct of domestic affairs are no longer doing so. Table V does indicate a fairly substantial base of support, which was undoubtedly broadened as the exigencies of the war situation took precedence over the more minor sources of dissatisfaction with the President.

CONFIDENCE IN THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION WE ARE GETTING

Another important element in morale is the feeling that one is being accurately and adequately informed as to the general situation and his government's activities in relation to it.* Although people are aware of the need for secrecy in areas where the divulging of information might play into the enemy's hands, they are resentful of any attempts to hoodwink them or to conceal or edit news for the purpose of influencing their opinion. In answer to an O.P.O.R. question ("Do you think the government is giving the public as much information as it should about the war?"), polled in late November, 1941, 48 per cent of the sample answered "Yes," 40 per cent said "No," 3 per cent gave qualified answers,

* For other references to the necessity of accuracy in information, see Chapter IX, "Propaganda and morale," by S. S. Sargent; and Chapter IV, "Morale and national character," by Gregory Bateson.

and 9 per cent didn't know. Such incidents as the occupation of Iceland, the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, and the activities of the Navy in the Atlantic—none of which was revealed until after its occurrence—were mentioned by some respondents as the source of their dissatisfaction with the way news was being handled. The amount of dissatisfaction revealed by the results of this question clearly pointed to a need for clarification, by the government, of its policy on the release of information. The need for secrecy could be stressed and, at the same time, reassurances given that no misinformation or deliberately misleading information would be released.*

PERSONAL SACRIFICES FOR AND PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE PROGRAM

Two of the best indices of the state of morale are the extent to which people are willing to make sacrifices in the interest of attaining the objective, and the extent to which they are personally participating in an effort to achieve the objective.

Table VI shows that over 60 per cent of the people were willing, in November, 1941, to see wage-fixing measures put into effect, provided that at the same time price-control legislation was adopted. About 40 per cent said they had bought or intended to buy Defense Bonds. Only about 30 per cent, however, favored compulsory buying of Bonds and Stamps.

The question on helping in the defense program showed that a good majority who were willing to help had very few definite ideas of just how they could fit into the defense effort. In any event, there is plenty of willing personnel for civilian defense; the problem of how to utilize it effectively is obviously one for governmental agencies.

* A poll on this same question in the week following our declaration of war on Japan and Germany found that 77 per cent of the people thought the government was giving enough information about the war (9 per cent said it was giving out too much), while only 14 per cent were still dissatisfied because of too little information.

TABLE VI

A recent law in Canada keeps wage and salary rates from going higher than they are now and also keeps all prices, including prices of farm products, from going higher. Would you approve, or disapprove, of such a law in the United States? (A.I.P.O., Nov. 25, 1941)

Approve	63%
Disapprove	28
No opinion	9

Have you any definite plans to buy any Defense Bonds or Stamps? (A.I.P.O., Nov. 22, 1941)

Have already bought	14%
Yes	24
No	62

Would you favor a law for buying Defense Bonds and Stamps which would make it compulsory for everybody to invest 2 cents out of every dollar of their salary, wages, or other income in Defense Stamps and Bonds? (A.I.P.O., Nov. 22, 1941)

Yes	30%
No	64
No opinion	6

Would you favor a law which would make it compulsory for everybody to buy Defense Bonds or Stamps, in proportion to income? (A.I.P.O., Nov. 22, 1941)

Yes	29%
No	64
No opinion	7

Would you like to do something in your spare time without pay to help national defense? (A.I.P.O., July 10, 1941) (Asked of those whose present work is not connected with national defense)

Already am	6%
Yes	67
No	19
Undecided	8

If "Yes" or "Undecided": Can you think of anything that you, yourself, could do to help the defense program?

Yes	28%
No	61
No answer	11

The willingness of people to do more, to make more sacrifices than are being asked of them, is strikingly illustrated by the results of an A.I.P.O. poll, made shortly after we entered the war.*

* In this connection, it is significant that, from the very beginning of the war, the public has been ahead (about five months ahead on the average) of Congress in approving successively more interventionist policies. Cf. Cantril.¹

On this poll,

75 per cent of the people said the government should have the right to tell factory owners and business men what they can make and what prices they can charge.

66 per cent said the government should have the right to tell workers what jobs they are to work at, what they will be paid, and how many hours they should work.

38 per cent of the people whose work is connected with the war effort believed the company for which they work could turn out more work with its present group of employees.

68 per cent were in favor of drafting single women between the ages of 21 and 35 for training in wartime work.

92 per cent of those whose work is directly or indirectly connected with the national defense program were willing to work 8 hours more a week at their present job (this means 92 per cent of approximately 21 per cent of the total population who said their work is directly or indirectly connected with national defense).

From these figures it is evident that people are willing to do much more than they are being asked to do, willing to work longer hours, take whatever jobs they are asked to, have wages regulated by the government. In other words, the government has from the public a mandate to do whatever is necessary to win the war, regardless of the disruptions and dislocations of normal civilian life which such a program may entail.

Interpretation

From the beginning of the war in Europe, the American people have wanted to help England and at the same time have wanted to keep out of war. As event has followed event, it has become more and more apparent that it would be impossible both to help England and to keep out of war. When forced to make a choice, a clear majority of the people were, by the fall of 1941, willing to choose war if that was the only way the Axis could be defeated. But even up to the time we entered the war, almost half the American peo-

ple still thought some means could be found to defeat the Axis without our having to become fully involved. Though willing to have us enter the war if absolutely necessary, these people were not yet convinced that the time for us to go in had come. They were, however, sufficiently undecided to be willing to follow the advice of their leaders.

At the time this country entered the war, the unity of opinion with respect to the major objective—defeat of the Axis—was high. The attack on Pearl Harbor drew even more Americans together in the desire to defend themselves against the common enemy. People were confident of victory, confident of their leader. Morale, high on December 6, was even higher on December 8. It is important, however, to place this state of morale in perspective and to realize that it existed during a period when this country was on the defensive. When this country, as a major power of the United Nations, begins to take more aggressive action, when casualty lists increase, when sacrifices mount, and when Axis propaganda attempting to divide the United Nations intensifies, our present unity is apt to be strained.

The danger points to be watched, as indicated by poll results, are the following:

First, everything possible must be done to maintain and to increase the confidence people have in their sources of information. On this matter young people are especially skeptical. If the aims of the United Nations are to be clearly distinguished from the Axis aims, then the methods used by the United Nations to communicate with their peoples must clearly differentiate themselves from the means of the Axis.

If confidence in the news is established, then a second danger point may more easily be overcome, namely the failure to provide for the common man a clear conception of what he is asked to fight for. As this chapter is written, no clearcut positive program has uniformly impressed the common man. When he thinks of the purposes of the war, he tends to think mostly in terms of negative purposes—defeat of the Axis.

A third danger point, and one which also relates to the confidence people have in their news sources, is the inadequate conception people have of the real magnitude of the job ahead of them. There are strong indications that most people are still relatively complacent, that awareness of the magnitude of the task ahead is not found in a significantly greater degree among the more educated people or among those who before the war were most interventionist.

Finally, people must be convinced that the sacrifices they are asked to make are sacrifices genuinely needed, and that others of the group are sacrificing to the same extent as they are. Under these circumstances people are, as we have seen, willing and eager to do anything which the government says is necessary to win the war.

CHAPTER XII

Student Morale

JOE AND EUGENIA BELDEN

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UP TO the minute when Japanese bombs crashed into Pearl Harbor, American college youth had been practically unmoved by any call to join the war. Although sympathetic with the English and the Russians, as many studies of student opinion had indicated, collegians had failed to mobilize their spirit. The complete revolution the student mind has undergone since the United States was attacked has been revealing of those characteristics some people thought were lost. Undergraduates, long criticized for their pacifist clamorings, have united and are ready for the personal sacrifices that war demands of everyone, but especially of youth.

The nature of the attack upon this nation undoubtedly brought about the determination and unity that is being expressed everywhere in countless ways. An examination of student attitudes prior to United States participation may be useful as an appraisal of student morale, perhaps not so much to determine what the problems might have been, were we still at peace in the Pacific, but to keep us aware of attitudes which may become important again if events are too discouraging. The previous chapter has shown that old prejudices may re-emerge. Here, then, is a prewar view into the state of student morale, a picture taken with a national sampling recurring at monthly intervals for three years.

On the American college campus stood a figure at the same time amenable to and defiant toward the world into which he must go, a youth reared in a postwar period, chastened by a depression, and not exactly sure what was worth dying for. Gone was the raccoon-coated Joe College of the roaring 'twenties. In the wake

of the economic upheaval of 1929 many a small college had to close its doors, but the state universities bulged with young men and women who, unable to find work, were looking for an education at the lowest possible cost. A new type of student filled the campuses, more representative of all Americans. His bull sessions now included labor, social theories, and the N.R.A. A new seriousness had set in.

Out of the first war and later out of the depression also were engendered much discussion and agitation about the "isms." It became almost fashionable to be labeled a "pinko." But American students generally never became the radical street-demonstrators of European universities, and even Martin Dies was able to find few college communists to expose. Left imprinted on college thought, however, was a stamp of pacifism, the indirect effect of the disillusioning 1930's.

The debacle in Europe and the cry for national defense soon drowned out the appeals of such groups as the Veterans of Future Wars and other more serious organizations like the Youth Committee Against War. With antiwar theories no longer a popular philosophy, leaders of the National Student Council for Democracy and Education of the American Youth Congress, the American Student Union, and others were compelled to reorient their policies and programs. The war-sourness left on the campuses by the students of ten, even five years ago, although not always evident on the surface, none the less still underlay student opinion on the war.

Undergraduates of the early 1940's were ill-schooled for this seismic era. "Looking at the majority of collegians," ran a recent commentary,¹ "one finds an American Youth of high hopes and a sane, optimistic outlook, in spite of a topsy-turvy world."

Some students themselves admit that they came to college "because my parents made me," "because of social pressure," and "to get married" (about 2 per cent of the co-eds). But the majority is there "to get an education" or "to prepare myself for a job." Most students maintain that they enjoy their courses and have

definitely decided what their life work is to be. "An ominous future apparently does not deter college men from hoping for economic advancement. A majority would like to go into business for themselves, prefer taking their chances in the competitive struggle to being handed life-long security with no opportunities for personal success. Students believe that their moral standards are about the same, perhaps higher, than those of young people in their home towns who did not go to college. Only 12 per cent say they never go to church. Two in every five declare they attend regularly. But 46 per cent confess they go to religious services less often than they did when they lived at home. Three-fifths . . . believe that collegians do not drink too much. Forty per cent say they never drink, and many others indulge only in occasional beer."¹

These conclusions are derived from actual face-to-face interviews with thousands of collegians during the three years that Student Opinion Surveys of America has been in operation. The organization is a nonprofit national poll sponsored by the University of Texas through its student publications board and conducted in co-operation with 168 college editors* who exchange local surveys for national tabulations to be published in their newspapers. Uniformity and accuracy are insured by having all questionnaires and instructions as to interviewing techniques supplied by the national headquarters and by assigning the statistical requirements for each school. The polls are modeled much after the Gallup survey, sampling a minutely selected cross section of the 1,400,000 college students, controlled in proportion to the number of men and women, working and nonworking students, freshmen and upperclassmen, distributed geographically over the six census districts. Nearly a hundred different topics have been used, ranging from dance bands to American neutrality. This systematic and recurring compilation of statistics on student opinion, perhaps the most extensive effort ever undertaken to fathom the

* December, 1941.

undergraduate mind, provides an excellent background against which student morale may be defined in the months of crisis preceding the American declaration of war.

Since the European conflict started, the question of how to stay out had been the first consideration of most people all over the country. The government itself appeared to be exerting every caution against rushing post-haste into anything. Americans were ready to fight, if the fighting day arrived, "but the man on the street does not seem to have a grand conception of the issue," reported the *Fortune* Survey of August, 1941. "He does not march under such banners as 'making the world safe for democracy' or preserving to all people 'the four freedoms.' Up to a point his reasoning checks closely with that of the noninterventionists and 'appeasers.' He has come to believe that war is necessary to win his own security—to win, indeed, his right to be an isolationist." Still, he would not give his consent to United States "participation" in war openly as a belligerent. Collegians were responding to the national direction in the same tempo, and perhaps even more slowly than was generally believed.

A high wartime morale in the student world should be extremely important, for not only are colleges and universities supplying most of the new crop of officers and pilots, but they must produce as well the technicians with the knowledge necessary to operate with precision a modern war machine that becomes more scientific every day. A wide appraisal of college opinion as expressed in the Student Opinion Surveys and compared with national public opinion on the eve of Japan's thrust left this unmistakable conclusion: college youth pressed toward the same ideals as their elders but were several steps behind in their response.

"At present, opinion among college youth appears to be running behind the rest of the country as regards the war," the Institute for Propaganda Analysis reported in summarizing the results of Student Opinion Surveys in its October, 1941, bulletin. "The last Gallup poll of general opinion in which the public was asked to say

whether it thought the U. S. would go in or stay out of the war showed 82 per cent believing we would go in. This was in April, 1941. The last sampling of student opinion . . . showed only about 60 per cent of the students believing the U. S. would go in. Three-quarters thought it more important to stay out and help Hitler's enemies. (Eighty-one per cent had opposed the Selective Service Act in February, 1940.) But there was nearly an even division of opinion on repealing the Neutrality Act to allow U.S. ships to take cargoes to Britain. The majority was slightly against. Even here student opinion was behind adult opinion. A Gallup poll of general opinion, announced on October 23, showed 54 per cent favoring repeal, 37 per cent opposed, and 9 per cent undecided."

After further examination of campus sentiment as expressed by college editors, the Institute concluded that ". . . from the standpoint of the propagandists for all-out aid or active intervention, student opinion is not crystallizing rapidly enough. From the standpoint of the opponents of intervention it is slipping away from them."

Students were becoming more and more convinced that the United States could not avoid war, as indicated by the trend manifest in the figures below. In April, 1941, 76 per cent thought we were "in effect already at war with Germany," a Student Opinion Surveys poll showed.

Students Believing the U. S. Could Stay Out of War		
<i>Date</i>		<i>Percentage</i>
December, 1939	68
December, 1940	63
February, 1941	49
October, 1941	42

Despite this foreboding, in many ways student morale has been high regarding the ultimate future of America. Nearly three-fourths of the students interviewed say they believe democracy will survive even if the British Empire falls. That the Allies will eventually be the winners they also have little doubt. This was before the war hit America; there is little reason to believe that attitude has changed.

Contributing toward this feeling-tone of courage over the war, however, has been the bland attitude with which the average undergraduate contemplates his personal future. A majority would tell you, even after the Nazis' apparent intentions were known, that their opportunities for getting ahead in the world appeared to be better than those their parents had. In April, 1939, to be sure, while the taste of the great depression was still in everybody's mouth, a bare majority of 52 per cent believed their prospects for success were better than those of thirty years ago. But in November, 1941, with unemployment an almost forgotten word, the optimistic group had swelled to 71 per cent.* The boom which our double-quick defense plans had created seemed to overshadow the threat of Hitler's *Panzers* to the world. Though half of the students felt "less secure personally than they did two or three years ago," the other 50 per cent felt more secure or just about the same.

It seems almost incredible that at least half of the undergraduates—up to early December—were apparently unaffected by the world-wide changing events since the *Anschluss*. Or it may be that the American defense effort had brought a new sense of comfort. Then too, many an American long ago had convinced himself that "it can't happen here."

America, declares Norman Cousins,² regards itself as a country of destiny, immune from danger, out of reach. We think in comic-strip terms, entertaining vague hopes that a crisis will solve itself; peculiarly American is the manner in which the automatic happy ending has been used again and again until, he fears, it has become "part of the public consciousness," affecting attitudes not only in our daily tasks but in our thinking about national and world affairs.

From such wishful thinking students are not exempt. But are they wholly to blame? President Roosevelt himself told male un-

* The *Fortune* Survey for December, 1941, provided a timely comparison with adult opinion: during the last year there was a sharp decline among those who believed opportunities for their sons looked better than those they had had themselves. Most people said opportunities looked bad or about the same.

dergraduates at the time the Selective Service system went into effect that they were more useful in the classroom than in the army; draft boards have been given special instructions for deferment of many students; a Gallup poll in April, 1941, showed that the voters would approve deferment of students until they complete their education. The public had failed to steel itself into an all-out effort, and students knew it. Perhaps student opinion had been conditioned too by events themselves, such as the failure of the German air offensive over England, the stubborn Russian resistance, and the apparent apathy of their elders at home. Or have we here a recurrence of Scarlett O'Hara's I'll-think-about-it-tomorrow attitude of which the undergraduate world has so often been accused?

Wide contact with students, however, impresses one with two important factors which, aside from whatever immaturity may exist in the student mind, must be considered in any inspection of prewar student morale. First, with many students there was still left a nausea from World War I and a feeling of mockery over the futility of war. Brought up in an atmosphere permeated with the idea that the A.E.F. really did not save the world for anything, the response of students to a plea to save the world for freedom, with nothing real to fight for yet, was naturally slow. Now that we have the Pacific incidents, reaction is quite the opposite.

Second, the defense program was calling on college men, along with all other American youth, to make the highest personal contribution, that of placing their lives in the service of their country. An answer to the draft call was not popular, especially when the young men entering the service knew not whether they would be in for one year or ten years, whether they would spend their time in a tent on home soil, or whether they would have to fight in Belgium, Africa, or the Malay Peninsula. Compulsory military training made students recoil doubly, for they realized that in most cases college education means little when they are submerged to the rank of privates along with the soda jerker, the oil-well driller, and the grocery clerk who never finished high school.

Student Opinion Surveys revealed this antipathy. Universal military service had been opposed in every poll before the war. In November, 1941, only 4 per cent believed that "simply being a student is no grounds for deferment," whereas a majority (54 per cent) favored complete deferment until their education was finished.* Should the United States declare war and send out an expeditionary force, 64 per cent of college men that same month declared they would rather wait for the draft than volunteer. What they would actually do under future circumstances was, of course, another matter, as the rush to the recruiting stations has amply demonstrated. But never had Student Opinion Surveys tabulated anywhere near a majority in favor of joining the armed forces—with one exception, "if this country were in danger of invasion."

While America-Firsters would have found that only a small minority would accept their purposes, neither would the all-out interventionists have found the bulk of the students on their side. In one of the national college surveys before the United States was in the war, these percentages were tabulated:

Which of these statements comes closest to expressing your attitude about the place of the United States in the world today:

- | | |
|--|-----|
| 1. The United States comes first; it is none of our business what happens elsewhere in the world | 11% |
| 2. While the United States comes first, we cannot escape being concerned with what goes on with the rest of the world..... | 47 |
| 3. The United States is one of the leading nations of the world and as such must take active participation in the affairs of the world | 37 |
| 4. Something else | 5 |

The students, in other words, liked the idea of their country's being a leader in the family of nations, but they were not quite sure whether it should assume the responsibilities that fall to leaders.

American college youth was willing and able to fight for de-

* Other proposals were: defer only those being trained in fields vital to national defense—science, medicine, 24 per cent; make students subject to draft between high school and college, 12 per cent; something else, 5 per cent; undecided, 1 per cent.

mocracy—if necessary. But if we apply G. Stanley Hall's definition of morale—"When we face reality gladly and with a stout heart even if it is grim and painful, and never doubt that it is good at the core and all evil is subordinate to good, that even if we are defeated and overwhelmed in a good cause all is not lost; when we feel that we live for something that we would die for if need be"³—if this be high morale, then the average collegian on December 6, 1941, had not reached the state of mind desirable in a nation at the crossroads. As remarked not long ago,⁴ our minds told us that this was a crisis requiring brave action, but our hearts were not in it.

After Pearl Harbor

That was before the United States was actually in the war. Overnight, "defense" has taken a new meaning, and morale has bolted forward. While college students had previously been reluctantly willing to serve, they are now eagerly seeking ways to get into action. A national survey completed since Congress declared war on the Axis shows that:

Seven out of every ten approve of drafting women to do non-military defense work; co-eds themselves significantly are more in favor of such a draft than are the men;

More than four in every five favor drafting men who are not in the armed forces to take over nonmilitary duties in their communities;

Only 9 or 10 per cent are unwilling to give several hours of their time daily to work on local defense committees, and most of these say it is because they have no time left after work and studies;

Most interesting of all, however, is the revelation that the majority of college men would have preferred to have the draft age lowered to 18 rather than raised to 44, as Congress recently voted.

This sudden enthusiasm, or, better still, indignation against the Japanese and their partners, may well be based on the manner in

which the country was plunged into war. Military reverses, civilian curtailments, impediments on education, and other physical or moral setbacks that we have begun to see even in one month of war, may in the future have a negative effect on the morale of college youth. An ounce of précaution would here perhaps be worth the proverbial pound of cure. Our defense programs should be so planned that young minds which have experienced none of the rigors of warfare before may not revert, even subconsciously, to the false security pattern of the 1920's and the 1930's.

CHAPTER XIII

Morale and the Jewish Minority

OTTO KLINEBERG

Columbia University

THE morale of any nation necessitates unity within that country. From this point of view the presence of minority groups—racial, cultural, religious, political—has frequently been regarded as a threat to national morale. As Louis Wirth¹⁵ expresses it: "The existence of such groups in our midst calls attention to the fact that our society has not yet been fully knit together into a single, integrated, national unit."

Yet, on the other hand, it may be argued that, although these various minorities create a lack of uniformity within the national group, such a circumstance does not necessarily mean a lack of unity. It is obviously possible for an individual to be distinguished from others by the food he eats or the clothes he wears or the religious ritual he follows, without constituting a menace to the common purpose or to the common pursuit of that purpose. Although it may be true that those who owe allegiance to a country which is at war with the United States represent in individual cases real or potential enemies, this rule undoubtedly does not apply to the large bulk of the ethnic minorities within this country. In the case of the latter, the threat against national morale lies not so much in their own differentiation from the majority as in the attitudes which the majority holds towards them. It is the prejudice, not the existence of the minorities, which represents the principal divisive factor.

In this latter category the Jews seem clearly to belong. That Jews do not and cannot represent, in more than the rarest individual instances, fifth columnists, saboteurs, or enemies of the United States in the present crisis, can be said without much fear

of contradiction. This is so not because there is any special sense of honor among Jews which is not shared equally by others, or because they have any peculiar love for democratic institutions which is more typical of them than of others, but because they have everything to lose in an American defeat, and every reason to wish for an American victory. If they are Americans, they probably share with other Americans in equal degree the feelings of patriotism for the United States and its institutions; but even when they are foreign-born, and even when they have lived the larger part of their life in what is now an enemy country, they must still feel a sense of identification with American democracy and with the promise that it holds for them as individuals. If their presence in the United States constitutes a problem for civilian morale, it is not because of their own attitudes, but because of the attitudes of others towards them.

The problem of civilian morale and the Jews can, therefore, be considered under the following general heads. First, to what extent is anti-Semitism found in the United States, and in what ways does it constitute a threat to national unity? Second, what are the prospects in this regard for the future? Third, what effects, if any, does this situation have upon the morale of the American Jews themselves?

The Extent of Anti-Semitism

Probably no one would deny that there has always been in the United States a certain amount of anti-Semitism. Our present concern is rather with the question as to whether it has been on the increase during the past few years, particularly since the accession of Hitler to power in 1933. To answer this question with any certainty is difficult, since the evidence is, for the most part, of an indirect and often of an anecdotal character. There has apparently been an increase in the number of organizations and of publications openly supporting the position of anti-Semitism,¹⁰ and there is some indication that criticism of the Jews has entered with increasing frequency into discussions in "high places," includ-

ing the Congress of the United States.⁶ In this last connection, however, it is important to note that anti-Semitism has been frequently associated with isolationism,⁷ and that at least this aspect of the problem has more or less been solved, at least temporarily, with the actual entry of the United States into the war against Germany and her allies.

As a partial offset against these indications of growing anti-Jewish prejudice, it should be pointed out that there are also many organizations devoted to combating anti-Semitism in the United States.¹¹ These include a number of religious groups, as well as lay organizations acting upon the conviction that any kind of intolerance, including that directed against the Jews, interferes with the strength and unity of American democracy. To give the names of all of these organizations or those to which they are opposed, would be fruitless, since any estimate of the relative strength of the two groups is subject to a tremendous possibility of error. It does seem reasonable to state, however, that parallel with the increase in the one group has come an increase, and an added feeling of responsibility, in the other.

At a slightly more objective level, mention may be made of two specific phenomena which appear to indicate that Americans are not willing to accept completely the anti-Semitic position. The first of these is the large chorus of denunciation which met the suggestion by Charles A. Lindbergh, in his speech at Des Moines on September 11, 1941, that the Jews were among those trying to lead the United States into the war. So clear was the reaction in the American press and in influential organizations such as the American Legion that the Lindbergh speech was regarded in many quarters as responsible for definite disintegration among the isolationist forces. A check of American sentiment on this issue by the Institute of Public Opinion, reported in *The New York Times* of October 25, asked for answers to the following question: "What persons or groups do you think are most active in trying to get us into war?" The answers, in decreasing frequency, made reference to (1) the Roosevelt Administration and the Democratic Party,

(2) big business, industrialists, profiteers, (3) British organizations and agents, (4) American organizations with pro-British sympathies, (5) Jews. Only 1 person out of every 16 interviewed mentioned the Jews as belonging in this category.

A second indication that Americans are prepared to repudiate at least the more obvious manifestations of anti-Semitism is to be found in the results of the last general elections in 1940. As Nathaniel H. Goodrich⁸ expressed it: "The completeness with which voters expressed their rejection of the attempts to make anti-Semitism a campaign issue cannot be ignored." Probably the most spectacular of these candidates was Joseph E. McWilliams of New York, leader of the Christian Mobilizers, and a collaborator with the German-American Bund. McWilliams, defeated in his attempt to obtain the Republican nomination for Congress in Yorkville, failed also to obtain a sufficient number of valid signatures when he tried to run as an independent candidate. There were other outspokenly anti-Jewish candidates for election in many parts of the country, some in sections where there are few Jews, some where there are many; they did not succeed in election to public office.

Since all of this is in the nature of indirect evidence, it is difficult to draw from it any conclusions as to whether anti-Semitism is on the increase. There is, however, another type of evidence available which may be somewhat more satisfactory. It consists of the attitude studies which have been undertaken by psychologists, and which, in many cases, include material relevant to the amount of prejudice shown against specific minority groups, including the Jews. Inasmuch as these investigations cover a span of years, it should be possible, by examining them in chronological order, to determine whether there has been any marked change in the amount of anti-Semitism in the United States. Even with this material, however, conclusions must be tentative, since the individual studies were conducted on populations which are not strictly comparable, with attitude scales that differ considerably, and with much variation in the minority groups included in the compari-

sons. At the same time, it appears worthwhile to examine the material for any clear trends which may emerge.

In 1928, E. S. Bogardus² reported the results of an extensive investigation in which 1725 Americans in California answered questions as to the degree of "social distance" at which they would like to keep members of 40 different ethnic groups. The scale of social distance used in this study consisted of seven different steps, indicating that members of the particular group would be admitted (1) to close kinship by marriage, (2) to my club as personal chums, (3) to my street as neighbors, (4) to employment in my occupation, (5) to citizenship in my country, (6) as visitors only to my country, and (7) would be excluded from my country. When the 40 groups were ranked according to the percentages which would admit them to close kinship by marriage, German Jews ranked 26th and Russian Jews 28th in the list of 40. The order varies somewhat for the other categories of the scale, but the positions with reference to the first question seem to the investigator to be most diagnostic.

Also in 1928, Thurstone¹⁴ published the results of an investigation of the "nationality preferences" of 239 students at the University of Chicago, using his own scale of attitude measurement. In all, 21 ethnic groups were included, among which the Jews ranked 11th or exactly at the mid-point of the list. In 1932, N. C. Cole³ in Colorado applied a simpler scale to 190 girls and 160 boys, who were simply asked to indicate which of a list of ethnic groups they disliked. The results showed that Jews ranked 12th in a list of 14 groups, only the Chinese and the Mexicans being disliked more frequently.

The editors of *Fortune*⁵ report that a poll conducted by the National Conference of Jews and Christians in October, 1935, indicated that 95 per cent of those questioned thought there was less anti-Semitism in their communities at that time than there had been at the beginning of the depression. A month later, the following question was asked in a *Fortune* Survey: "Do you believe that in the long run Germany will be better or worse off if it drives

out the Jews?" The answers were as follows: worse, 54.6 per cent; don't know, 31.4 per cent; better, 14.0 per cent. The large size of the "don't know" category indicates that a substantial proportion of the community had not made up its mind about the problem, or was indifferent to it. In any case, the results appear to show that only a relatively small proportion of those polled had very definite anti-Jewish feelings.

In 1936, E. Monjar¹³ used a modification of the Bogardus technique of social distance in the case of 269 students in Los Angeles, reporting the Jews to rank 4th in a list of 10 groups. Monjar concludes that for native white Christian students there are four principal levels of social distance; Nordics; Jews and Italians; Armenians, Japanese, and Mexicans; Filipinos and Negroes.

In 1939, H. Meltzer¹² used the method of paired comparisons in connection with a study of ethnic preferences in 2,058 white children in St. Louis, Missouri. His results showed the Jews to rank 12th in a list of 21 groups which were included in the study. This, be it noted, is almost exactly the same position which they held in Thurstone's 1928 study, in which they ranked 11th out of a list of 21.

Also in 1939, a *Fortune* Survey, at the suggestion of the Carnegie Corporation study, *The Negro in America*, included this question: "Is there any group—racial, religious, economic, or social—in your city (county) which represents an important problem?" Of the total sample of 5,108 people interviewed, 22.5 per cent said "Yes," 59.0 per cent said "No," and 18.5 per cent indicated that they did not know. When they were asked to specify the group which constituted the problem, they mentioned the Negro most frequently, although this was not true of all parts of the country. The frequency with which the Jews were mentioned also varied with the region studied. In the New England and Middle Atlantic States, the Jews were mentioned by 3.6 per cent of those interviewed; in the East North Central States by 3.2 per cent; in the West North Central States by 3.2 per cent; in the West South Central States by .8 per cent; and in South Atlantic and

East South Central States by .5 per cent. In the Mountain and in the Pacific areas the Jews were not mentioned as a problem group. In general, this careful survey seems to indicate a relatively small degree of awareness of the Jews as a problem group. It is to be noted, however, that the type of question used in the *Fortune* Survey is less likely to elicit an unfavorable response than one in which a specific question is asked about a particular minority group. As Horowitz⁹ has pointed out, the prejudice may exist without having particular "salience" or importance for those who admit that they have the prejudice.

This list is by no means exhaustive, and many other studies could be cited. If there were, however, any clear and unmistakable trend towards an increase in anti-Semitism, even a brief review of this type should have given some indication of it. The fluctuations in prejudice, on the contrary, seem irregular and not very marked. The Jews occupy a position midway between those ethnic groups which are most liked and those most disliked. Material of this kind might be supplemented by other indications of the extent of such prejudice—opportunities for employment, admission to professional schools, etc.—but it seems unlikely that even in these areas there has been any marked change during the last few years. Anti-Semitism has been a continuing phenomenon, presumably varying somewhat in degree. The current crisis has probably made Americans more aware of the problem, just as it may have suggested to politicians the possibility of making greater capital out of it than was formerly thought advisable; there is little indication, however, that the situation with reference to Jews in America has undergone any radical alteration.

At the same time, it cannot be overemphasized that any kind of prejudice against any ethnic minority in the United States represents a threat to the unity and integration of the total American community. Prejudice constitutes a rift, not only between the majority and the minority, but also between those individual members of the majority group who hold different conceptions of the meaning of democracy and who battle over their respective viewpoints.

During the heated argument over isolationism and intervention, for example, the problem was certainly confused by the injection of the Jewish question. There were those who saw in isolationism the only true Americanism; there were others who saw in it merely a tool of Nazism, and this latter view was strengthened by the frequency with which isolationism and anti-Semitism appeared to be conjoined. In any event, the anti-Semitism of some of the isolationist leaders certainly served to becloud the issue.

As was pointed out so often at the time, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor may have served no other useful purpose, but it did at least unite the nation. A by no means unimportant consequence was the immediate public abandonment by isolationists of their position, and apparently with it of their thesis that Jewish international bankers and warmongers were behind the interventionist policy. So far, at any rate, few in the United States have suggested that the bombs on Pearl Harbor were part of a gigantic Jewish plot to embroil the United States in the war.

The Prospects

That Jews might have a great deal to lose in the event of American participation in the war was the tenor of several of the statements by isolationist leaders during the past few months. Lindbergh, for example, in the Des Moines speech referred to above, suggested that the Jews would be the first to feel the consequences of intervention; other speakers too have stressed the likelihood that the Jews might again serve as the most convenient scapegoat for the misfortunes of war. Since even a victory could be won only with much privation and loss, the consequent unhappiness of millions of Americans, according to this view, would lead them to express their aggression against a convenient minority such as the Jews. That a defeat would greatly increase the scope and severity of such aggression goes without saying. On this assumption, the isolationists have said, Jews more than any others must hope that we stay out of the war.

But now we are in the war. What are the prospects for the Jews? As was indicated above, the nature of our entry into the war makes it unlikely, at least for the present, that any direct responsibility for our participation will be attached to the Jews. In the long run, however, the situation certainly has its elements of danger. If frustration leads to aggression,⁴ not necessarily in every case but certainly with some probability, the losses which the war will inevitably entail do render more likely an increase in the prejudice against those individuals or groups who can be singled out for the position of scapegoat. And this means the Jews—although, to be sure, other minority groups, such as the Negro and the foreign-born, will by no means be safe from similar danger.

The situation, on the other hand, also holds a certain promise. Our participation in the war has meant a greater unity of all Americans—Americans varying, to be sure, in physical appearance and cultural and religious background, but filled with a common determination to preserve freedom for the individual. It is true that this freedom for which democracy stands has not been granted equally to all individuals, and that in particular it has been denied, at least in part, to members of minority groups. It is true that a complete democracy can be regarded as achieved only when discrimination against individuals who belong to such minorities has been eliminated. For this very reason, however, there is hope for minorities in this present battle for democracy. Against the background of the fascist alternative, the rights and privileges included in the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the various Amendments stand out in bolder relief. We are made more conscious of our democracy and of its implications now that we are forced to defend it against an enemy. For the Jews in particular, there is hope in the fact that those who have stood most clearly for anti-Semitism, both in Europe and in the United States, are equally clearly the enemies of the democratic way of life. In the fight against fascism, there is a good chance that we shall fight it in all its aspects.

Morale Among the Jews

Enough has already been said to indicate that, at the present time, morale among the Jews constitutes no special problem. Until recently, however, the situation from this point of view could have been regarded as very serious. The spread of official anti-Semitism throughout the Nazi-dominated world had made many an American Jew feel his own position as an American to be also in jeopardy. Salo Baron, for example, wrote in 1940¹: "The panic in the Jewish community, however, on top of developments increasingly discouraging since 1914, but especially since 1933, has all the earmarks of a destructive feeling of utter hopelessness and proneness to give up the battle." Though Dr. Baron refers here mainly to the attitude of American Jews toward what was happening in Europe, it seems fair to assume that the panic was spreading to include even their own prospects in this country.

The situation has changed, however—although precise information on a question of this kind is difficult to obtain. The increase in American unity and the clearer alignments have undoubtedly reduced or eliminated whatever panic there may have been, and largely restored to American Jews their self-respect, their confidence, and their feeling of belonging to the whole American community as full participants in the struggle against a common enemy. With the in-group thus clearly defined and markedly strengthened, the Jews will certainly feel that they belong in it and that they have a real stake in the preservation of American democracy.

CHAPTER XIV

Morale among Negroes

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MARGINAL men have marginal morale. And in our society the American Negro has been made socially and psychologically marginal. It is, therefore, impossible to approach the problem of civilian morale among Negroes during a time of national emergency without a clear picture of the usual everyday struggle of Negroes in their attempt to participate in and contribute to the society which is now threatened. In a consideration of civilian morale, it is not only pertinent but imperative that one be concerned with the racial tensions of our American society and the dynamic force of these tensions upon the attitude and behavior of Negro and white Americans.

Such a chapter as this, dealing with Negro morale *per se*, would be superfluous and completely unnecessary were it not for the fact that the Negro has not yet been permitted to function uninhibitedly within the political and social organism of the state. Because of this restriction, we must continue the necessary distortion of thinking in terms first of white morale and then of Negro morale, rather than of the morale of the American people. Such a fact is undoubtedly relevant to a discussion of the problem of American civilian morale in general and specifically the morale of the Negro.

The Nature of Morale

Before one is able to make an analysis of the civilian morale of the Negro, it is necessary to examine closely the meaning of the concept of morale. Is "morale" something peculiar to times of national emergency, and relatively independent of the qualities of

the society during "normal" conditions? If this were wholly true, we should be concerned not with morale essentially, but with the problem of the immediate motivation of people's behavior in a given direction by means of the intrinsic qualities of the emergency itself or by force or the threat of force. Such immediate manipulation is apparently much easier to execute, particularly in dealing with minority groups, but should not be confused with the problem of morale.

The morale of a group is a highly focused reflection of the attributes of the society under which the people live. During periods of national emergency when it is necessary to harness the power of each individual for the common good, when a high social motivational level is required if the immediate goals of the society are to be achieved, then it appears that the degree of response obtained from the group indicates the level of its morale.

This intrinsic relationship of morale to normal social conditions is clearly indicated by the fact that during periods of national emergency individuals become more deeply concerned with the problems of their everyday existence. They begin to examine the society under which they live; they are confronted with the dilemma of choosing between conflicting ideas. At such a time, too, ordinary indecision becomes generally less tolerable; ideas and personal convictions must be transformed into action. The psychological—and often physical—integrity of the individual appears to be at stake. The individual tends toward a more frequent and penetrating questioning of the principles and practices of the society of which he is a part. During these periods of national emergency, their inconsistencies, inadequacies, values, and advantages all loom the larger and call forth more vigorous reactions.

The qualities of civilian morale during times of national emergency are a direct consequence of the desirability of the social conditions under which the civilian group ordinarily lives. During those periods of intense stresses and strains of the society the concept of the "good life" becomes clothed in the concept of "morale." Such a continuum of morale and ordinary life is reflected in the

definition of G. Stanley Hall: "It is simply this—to keep ourselves, body and soul, and our environment, physical, social, industrial, etc., *always* at the very tip-top of condition. . . .* When we feel that we live for something that we would die for if need be—this is morale."

Any analysis of morale among Negroes may well use this definition as its basic reference point. For the crucial question in such an analysis seems to be: to what extent do Negroes believe that they live for something in our American culture which they "would die for if need be"?

The Negro's Place in American Life

Negro life in America is fraught with tensions due to race. Scarcely an area of the Negro's ordinary social or personal activity exists untouched by some aspect of these problems. The very pattern of racial segregation in America with its attendant complicated ritual of interracial etiquette bombards the Negro constantly. Such institutionalized or crystallized forms of racial segregation appear to be intensely imbedded in the mores of certain areas of the United States.

Segregation takes, of course, many forms. Racially segregated schools, with the Negro schools usually inferior in equipment and standards, are required by law in 19 states and the District of Columbia.⁵ Travel throughout the southern states is impossible for a Negro except under segregated conditions in a Jim-Crow car or bus, or in a segregated Pullman compartment, or in his private car. Adding their sting to the inherent humiliation of this type of segregation are the usually inferior conditions of the segregated coach for Negroes. Hotels, well-known restaurant chains, ordinary white eating places, and wayside tourists' homes maintain a fixed policy of denying accommodations or the use of their facilities to Negroes—often in defiance of the Equal Rights laws of the particular state. Some insurance companies deny all Negroes

* Author's italics,

the opportunity of availing themselves of the more desirable types of insurance policies. White hospitals will not admit Negro patients, often will not even give a Negro emergency treatment. In the realm of religion itself, the white church is guilty of a systematic segregation or exclusion of Negroes from white congregations.

In the area of recreation this pattern of separation of the races is quite as definite. Negroes are either segregated in the balconies of some theaters or completely excluded. Some southern cities provide separate and inferior parks for Negroes—or none at all. While the rigidity of this pattern of segregation is more noticeable in the South, it is unfortunately not altogether absent in the North.⁴

Combined with these institutionalized forms of racial segregation are the more permeating aspects of interracial relations and etiquette which not only complement the forms of segregation mentioned above but also contribute independently to the general humiliation and resentment of the Negro. In the South it is common to observe seemingly innumerable signs with the words "White" or "For White Only" and "Colored." These signs appear in stores, railroad stations, on boats, and in army camps. The psychological implications of the omnipresence of these signs go beyond a consideration of the problem of morale into the realm of the basic dynamics of the interracial problem of America. These signs cannot be dismissed merely as innate reactions of the white people toward Negroes. Rather, they, together with other manifestations of racial prejudice, can be most fruitfully interpreted as stimuli for both the white and the Negro peoples to maintain in themselves the mental attitude necessary for the continuance of such a system of racial segregation.

This interpretation appears to be substantiated by the existence of Jim Crow facilities in general. In certain stores in the South, for example, the management maintains separate drinking fountains side by side—one for Negroes and the other for whites. Sometimes there is a white porcelain fountain for whites and a

black porcelain one for Negroes. The fact that black porcelain is generally believed to be more expensive than white porcelain does not detract from the implicit humiliation of this form of discrimination; it merely affords the Negro the opportunity of making a compensatory response of ridicule for the stupidity and irony of the whole Jim Crow situation. The following extract from a paper written for a class in racial psychology by a Southern Negro college girl illustrates the operation of this mechanism:

I know that you have to take, whether or not you want to, some very unpleasant insults and cracks from the majority (whites). *Some we find are quite amusing and very ignorant. . . .* For instance: Last summer I was in a railroad station in which there were two different fountains, one for the colored, and one for the white. *Of course, I tasted the water from both to see if there was a difference, but there wasn't.**

The prevalence of statues, pictures, and other representations of the Negro Aunt Jemima, mammies in general, and Uncle Tom slave types; the perpetuation of the stereotype of the Negro in children's school books (Little Black Sambo); the distortion of Negro news in the white dailies; the continual presentation of the Negro stereotype in novels, moving pictures, and over the radio—these are potent factors in determining the nature and expression of racial relations in America.

Still another indication of the pathological quality of Negro-white relationship throughout a large part of America, particularly the South, is the existence of a differential personal etiquette in the relations between an individual white and an individual Negro. In these person-to-person relations it is tacitly assumed that the Negro will be deferential to the white, however subtly. The postulate finds its most extreme expression in the custom whereby whites consider it perfectly natural to address practically any Negro, in spite of age or position, either by his first name or by such terms as "boy," and "sister." In certain portions of the

* All italics by the author.

country, indeed, it is a rather rigid aspect of the mores that no Negro may be addressed by any white with the title of "Mr." or "Mrs." On the other hand, however, it would be a gross breach of interracial etiquette were a Negro to address a white person by his first name or without the title "Mr.," or even without adding "Sir."

Patent, then, is the psychological import of these and other manifestations of the differential status of whites and Negroes, as defined by our American culture, for the problems of civilian morale among both whites and Negroes. It should be noted that this presentation is by no means complete.² The greater intensification among Negroes of the difficulties of the ill-housed, ill-clothed, and ill-fed one-third of our nation we have not dealt with here because it has been pointed out often by Negro and white economists, sociologists, and public administrators, and because it has social significance beyond the limits of race.

The fact that each of the above indices of racial conflict do not apply to every region of the United States with equal intensity, does not in any significant way destroy the validity of their consideration in an analysis of civilian morale among Negroes. That they exist in any part of the country and that their existence contradicts the basic premises of democracy make it necessary that they be considered as integral aspects of the problems of civilian morale.

Negroes in National Defense

Even more direct a determinant of morale than social discrimination is job discrimination. Specific intensification of such discrimination against the Negro has come in national-defense industries, in the United States Army, and in the Navy, Marine, and Air Corps.

The Kansas City Star for March 17, 1941, carried a news story with the following headline: LIMIT NEGRO AIR JOBS—SOME WORK AS CUSTODIANS MAY BE OPEN FOR NEGROES. In the story below the headline, the president of that

particular airplane manufacturing company was represented as saying that "under no circumstances would Negroes be employed as aircraft workers or mechanics in the plant." He was directly quoted as follows: "There will be some jobs as janitors for Negroes. Regardless of their training as aircraft workers we will not employ them in the — plant."

For an understanding of the present morale of the Negro it is significant to know that the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People distributed thousands of reprints of this story among Negroes under the following caption: IS THIS THE WAY OF LIFE THAT CONGRESS HAS VOTED 24 BILLION DOLLARS TO DEFEND? COULD HITLER BE WORSE?

As for the armed services, we may quote from the report of the Committee for Military and Naval Defense of the Hampton Institute Conference on the Participation of the Negro in National Defense (November, 1940), in which it was stated: "The Negro, to date, has not been accorded equitable participation in any branch of the arms and services of the army, navy, and marine corps of the United States. . . . In contrast to the restricted opportunities for Negroes in the United States Army, we regret that the navy limits the enlistment of Negroes to the messman branch where the ceiling of promotion is that of officers' stewards and cooks. . . . We deplore the fact that whereas Negroes were included in the fighting personnel of the United States navy in all of the wars of this country, at present they are denied this opportunity. *The navy and the marine corps represent the most undemocratic and un-American aspect of our government.*"

The crux of the problem seems to lie in the traditional social caste which is the basis of officer-man relationship in these services, particularly in the Navy. The rigid limitation of the number of Negroes permitted to attend West Point and the absolute exclusion of Negroes from the Naval Academy at Annapolis must be taken as related to this basic condition.

Segregation of the Negro or his complete exclusion is the stated

policy of each branch of the armed forces of the United States. The following extract from a letter written to two Hampton students who had applied (at the request of a Naval Reserve recruiting agent) for flight training in the United States Naval Reserve, unequivocally states the position of the Navy Department with reference to the acceptance of Negroes:

We beg to inform you that it has been the policy of the Navy Department, for some time past, to accept applications for enlistment from Negroes in none but the messman branch. . . . The principles which dictated the adoption of that policy apply equally to the appointment of negroes [*sic*] as officers either in the regular Navy or Naval Reserve. . . . That, frankly, covers the Navy Department's attitude on this question. Negro officers aboard ship would form a small unassimilable minority which, despite anything we could do, would inevitably form a source of discord that would be harmful to the Service.

. . . we regret that for the reason stated above, we can neither lend encouragement nor offer support to your application for flight training in the U. S. Naval Reserve.

Very truly yours,

Naval Aviation Cadet Selection Board,

(Signed)

Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

These conditions of segregation and exclusion in all branches of the defense efforts of the United States must be considered as specific stimuli giving rise to responses of Negroes which determine the tone of their civilian morale. Knowing this, one is able to understand the observable morale pattern.

How the Negroes Feel

The basic factor of Negro morale, an analysis of the relevant material indicates, is frustration, complicated by deep-seated bitterness and resentment at the mockery of democracy of which so much of their lives is a constant reminder. The evidence for this

conclusion is not always clear and absolute. A systematic analysis of the Negroes' pattern of morale often betrays much confusion and inconsistency of ideas and feelings. Surely this condition is not surprising, however, when we remember that the stimuli to which they are exposed are likewise fraught with contradictions and inconsistencies. Then, too, as in all groups, honest differences of opinion, perspective, and approach among Negroes make it impossible to generalize concerning *the* morale of the Negro population as a whole. There are probably as many different levels and shades of morale among Negroes as among whites. The significant problem for analysis, therefore, would be concerned with differences in proportion of Negroes at the higher or lower levels of morale, and the extent to which there are common factors of "racial agreement" clustered around a core of common racial experiences and aspirations of Negroes which in themselves are either conducive or inimical to high morale.

In order to make an objective analysis of the civilian morale of Negroes it was necessary to tap those primary sources of information which reflect or lead Negro thought. The files of the established Negro organizations—the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the National Urban League—yielded rich sources of information which were used for the basic data of this report. Editorial opinion in two Negro magazines, *The Crisis* and *Opportunity*; relevant speeches of outstanding Negro labor, political, organizational, and intellectual leaders; and the literature of a number of smaller and specific organizations were all analyzed in this attempt to present a picture of the pattern of civilian morale among Negroes. Samples of the Negro press were likewise examined, their relevant contents indicating no essential disparity with the data obtained from the sources utilized.

Upon the basis of these data it is possible to make: first, a specific analysis of the civilian morale of the Negro during this immediate period of national emergency; and, second, an analysis of the general morale of the Negro population as a whole, against which the specific attitude of the Negro must be interpreted.

The attitude of Negroes toward the present war efforts of the United States is varied. If the purposes of various organizations, as outlined in their propaganda literature, are to be accepted as expressions of these attitudes, there is no more homogeneity of opinion among Negroes than among whites. Their attitudes before America entered the war ranged all along the scale—from support of an outright American declaration of war against the Axis powers; through advocacy of aid to all countries engaged in the fight against Hitlerism; on toward moderate pro-democracy-anti-Axis leanings; and finally either to organized expressed isolationism, which was probably determined to some extent by an anti-British, anti-imperialist attitude, or to the extreme of expressed pro-Hitler and pro-fascist sentiment. To make any quantitative estimate of the prevalence of any one of these attitudinal patterns among Negroes as a whole is difficult. A qualitative analysis and description of the points of view of each may, however, give a general perspective to the immediate morale of the Negro population.

The New York Chapter of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies published a small leaflet entitled "Colored People Have a Stake in the War." Negroes should be vitally concerned with the outcome of the war, runs the basic argument of this appeal, since the treatment which Negroes would receive at the hands of the Nazi and Fascist dictators would be "far worse than the treatment England or the United States has given us, even where that treatment falls far short of the democratic ideal." One of the three authors of this leaflet, Frank R. Crosswaith, is the Negro educational director for the International Ladies Garment Workers Union. In a personal interview he expressed his belief that the Negro trade unionists are vitally concerned about the outcome of the war; that, when the contrast is made between democracy—"with all its faults"—and fascism, they are bound to hope that the principles of democracy may triumph and survive. The average Negro trade unionist, he goes on to say, realizes that it is only through democracy that he has a chance to "right every

wrong against him and achieve real equality with other human beings."

The Negro Provisional Committee to Defeat Hitler represents a group of Negroes whose approach to the present conflict is crystallized in the belief that "Hitler and Hitlerism represent the main danger to the possible fulfillment of the Negro's aspiration." * The full program of this group is geared toward the end of mobilizing the forces of the American Negro in the fight against Hitlerism. In line with this program the committee unequivocally endorsed the foreign policy of President Roosevelt, "in all-out aid to Great Britain, [and] the forces which would bring about the defeat of Hitler and Hitlerism." The core of this broad anti-Hitler program is thus a primary concern with the future welfare and improvement of the lot of the Negro. The following quotation clearly indicates this fact: "We stand for the full democratic right of the Negro people along with all other Americans. . . . We must guarantee a greater future for America and the aspirations of the Negro people."

It appears, from the available evidence, safe to say that the bulk of Negro thinking and feeling about the present emergency is not so directly or so out-and-out anti-Hitler in orientation as the program and contentions of the above two organizations indicate. Rather, a close examination of the literature and activities of the established non-partisan Negro organizations (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the National Urban League) reveals that their main effort has been an intensification of their usual fight against injustice and discrimination—an attempt to integrate the Negro into all phases of National Defense, and a constant demonstration of those phases of America's present treatment of Negroes which are all too similar to the fascist policy toward minority peoples. Primarily they are concerned with full social justice for the Negro, only secondarily with

* Personal communication, Nov. 13, 1941, from Alan B. McKenzie, Acting Secretary, Negro Provisional Committee to Defeat Hitler, 2460 Seventh Ave., New York City.

the specific issues between the democracies, on the one hand, and the Axis forces on the other.

Elmer Carter, in commenting on the discrimination and exclusion of Negroes from national defense industries, writes:¹

This is the picture of democracy which has become fixed in the minds of the thousands of Negro young men eligible for the draft, subject to the call for service in the armed forces of the nation. This is the United States of America which presumes to condemn Hitler for racial persecution and oppression.

In the March, 1941, issue of *Opportunity*, this editor writes in a similar vein:

Does the young Negro American, deprived of the right to earn an honest living in industry, limited and segregated in the armed forces of the nation—does he think the American way of life is worth fighting for and perhaps dying for?

That editorials on this theme are the rule rather than the exception is significant; for the past year at least one has appeared in every issue of this magazine. The editor himself, recognizing the tendency, stated that "he started to write an editorial without a 'squawk'! But he knows he failed." That these "squawk editorials" are an inevitable aspect of the Negro's continual struggle for justice he implied but did not state.

One of the most controversial of the relevant editorials written by Negroes appeared in the March, 1941, issue of the *Crisis*, of which Roy Wilkins is editor. It was an editorial captioned, "Nazi Plan for Negroes Copies Southern U.S.A." Mr. Wilkins, in commenting upon an article entitled "The Nazi Plan for Negroes" by Hans Habe, which had appeared in the March, 1941 issue of the *Nation*, compared point by point the six principles outlined by Mr. Habe—those set up by the Germans as their policy toward dark peoples—with the actual "treatment of Negroes in many parts of the United States of America, particularly the southern states." After this point-by-point comparison the editorial concluded: "The *Crisis* leaves to its readers the question of whether there is a great

deal of difference between the code for Negroes under Hitler and the code for Negroes under the United States of America—the leading democratic nation in the world.”

The Richmond *Times-Dispatch* and the *Nation* took issue with the *Crisis* editorial, pointing out that here in America Negroes still have the right of protest and that it is necessary to differentiate between injustices toward minorities which are sanctioned by the government and those which do not have governmental approval. In refutation of these arguments the *Crisis* published in its May issue another editorial. The following extracts indicate its basic arguments :

The truth is that the South has set up a government of its own on the Negro. It disdains to pay any attention to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. By and large, it has won acquiescence in this policy from the rest of America. . . .

When the *Crisis* speaks of the similarity of the Nazi code and the *practice* in America, we speak not of the principles of America, but of the everyday habit. . . .

To put the final touch to our argument, the southern states are mentioned favorably not only in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, but in several Nazi pronouncements since that party has been in power. The Nazis like the South's treatment of the Negro. . . . In other words, the South approaches, more nearly than any other section of the United States, the Nazi idea of government by a “master race” without interference from any democratic process.

This argument of pointing out the similarity between the Nazi policy for darker peoples and the American treatment of the Negro does not, of course, necessarily indicate pro-Axis sentiment. On the contrary such a point of view may be a part of a liberal, truly democratic policy. Both the N.A.A.C.P. and the *Crisis* have been in the forefront in the Negroes' struggle for complete integration in America's effort to aid the democracies and to prepare for defense against aggression. In commenting on the War Department's announcement of the formation of an Army Air Corps

squadron with an all-Negro personnel, for example, a *Crisis* editorial (February, 1941) states:

This is a step in the right direction in the sense that it does open up to Negro Americans a branch of the armed service from which they heretofore have been barred. But it is by no means the answer to the demand of colored people for full integration into all branches of the arms and services of the nation.

That there was some definitely expressed "isolationist" sentiment among Negroes is clear. But the fact that the basis of this isolationism differed essentially from the isolationism of whites, as represented by such an organization as the America First Committee, is not often stated. The isolationism of the Negro appears to be a restricted racial isolation patent in such phrases as "This is a white man's war," and "What have we got to fight for?" Often this attitude approaches the point of genuine neutrality, sometimes apparently even without bitterness, but with some degree of racial fatalism or defeatism.

Ernest E. Johnson, a prominent Negro newspaperman, writing in an avowedly antiwar periodical, expressed somewhat this point of view when he said:³

In the present upsurge of emotion (National Emergency) we find the American Negro less impassioned than any other people or group in these United States. . . . We look to our flag not with a just pride, but with wonder, confusion, frustration. . . . We will probably do our share in the present emergency insofar as we are permitted, but not without the conviction that our effort is a pointless one so long as the concept of government for which we would be fighting has not yet been brought home to us as it has to other loyal Americans.

An extreme isolationist point of view is taken by the organization called Negroes against War Committee. George S. Schuyler, executive secretary of this committee and author of one of its pamphlets,* states:

* "Why We Are against War."

Thousands of Negro youths will be killed and many thousands will be wounded in mind and body. And, yet, there is no evidence that discrimination and segregation because of color will be ended. . . . As a matter of fact, war will bring about a more rigid stratification of the Negro American life.

This pamphlet includes the argument that the British and the Germans are alike in regard to their attitude toward darker peoples. In support of this statement, British imperialistic policy and practices in Africa and India are cited. Mr. Schuyler concludes with a series of questions among which are the following:

Why should Negroes fight for democracy abroad when they are refused democracy in every American activity except taxpaying? Why should Negroes help pay for warships for Britain when Negroes cannot even man those warships? Or even get jobs building them?

Such a point of view, although subtly anti-British and intensely concerned primarily with the past injustices and future welfare of the Negro, is, nevertheless, neither overtly nor implicitly pro-Axis in sentiment.

There is, however, some evidence of definite pro-fascist, pro-Nazi, and pro-Japanese groups among Negroes. Although the present influence of such groups appears to be negligible, the extent of their potential power in the face of the seething discontent of the masses of Negroes cannot be lightly dismissed without careful analysis of their basic arguments or appeal. Here, again, the motive force appears to be resentment against the general treatment of the Negro. In an attempt to give meaning to their experiences of segregation, discrimination, and all their attendant social ills, these groups resort to anti-Semitism. From this basis of an anti-Semitic sentiment stems their approach to the pro-fascist and pro-Nazi point of view. The leaders of these groups are the street-corner speakers of Harlem. They do not publish but orally convey their messages to fairly large groups of people who gather to hear them nightly.

The Hour, a confidential newsletter, published in New York, presented in its August 23, 1941, issue a report on pro-Axis propaganda in Harlem. This periodical quotes (and the author has personally verified) some of the leaders of this group as follows: "Adolph Hitler offers the only solution for the Negro people." "Jews are responsible for the present war." "The Japanese is the friend of the Negro. Racially we are both the same. Japan has done wonders for China. . . . It has fought communism and it has fought the British. We nationalist Negroes are fighting them both." "This war is a white man's war." "Jewish warmongers are at the bottom of this war."

A confidential report * on these pro-axis leaders indicates that, according to the evidence, these street-corner orators have no direct connection with pro-axis propaganda agencies; rather, their eulogy of Hitler "is vicarious revenge on the Jewish merchants."

The above survey of the relevant attitude of the Negro during the period of National Emergency has indicated, then, a variation in the immediate pattern of response ranging from all-out aid to the democracies through to pro-fascist and pro-Hitler sentiment. In any attempt to understand the basic dynamics of the civilian morale of the Negro, however, these differences should not be overemphasized. For it must again be remembered that each point of view is primarily concerned with the goals and struggles of the Negro against immediate oppression, and only secondarily with the broader issues of theoretical democracy versus foreign fascism. Yet the fact that Negroes, through common racial oppression, have been forced to restrict their field of vision, to consider all issues ethnocentrically (in spite of the conclusions arrived at) is an ominous sign of the basic pattern of their civilian morale.

* Submitted to Walter White, Executive Secretary of N.A.A.C.P.; examined by the author at the New York offices of N.A.A.C.P., and quoted with permission.

Factors Underlying Negro Morale

In the light of the above survey it is possible to make a more detailed analysis of the facets of the morale pattern among Negroes. The basic factor, as stated above, appears to be a deep-seated frustration complicated by bitterness and resentment. Other related factors are undoubtedly hope, psychological conflict, suspicion, and a more or less fatalistic apathy and indifference, this latter particularly among the masses of the more underprivileged and exploited Negroes.

In order to understand the nature of the frustration among Negroes, one must realize that Negroes are a part of the general population who in time of war are stimulated to exert maximum effort for the common victory: to join the Navy; to join the Marine Corps; to join the various branches of the Air Corps; to donate blood for emergency blood banks; to join the various branches of the Army; in short, to participate fully in democracy's efforts to save itself from destruction by its foes. The Negro, like other loyal Americans, responds naturally to these stimuli. He wants to do everything within his power to show that he too is an American with rights to preserve. By and large, he is prone to forget past injustices in his attempt to come to the aid of his threatened country.

But in his very attempt he finds himself still balked. Although he has been stimulated in the same manner as whites, he is not permitted to respond fully. The old frustrating patterns of Jim Crow which had built up within him seething resentment in his civilian life meet him, probably even more rigidly, when he enlists in the Army. From the Marine Corps he is excluded completely. He is a servant in the Navy. And, a crowning indignity, he is not even allowed to give his blood which might probably save a fellow American wounded on the field of battle. This blockage of a normal response to a general stimulation, plus the Negro's inability to understand such obvious inconsistency between demo-

cratic principle and democratic practice, build up in him feelings of despair, futility, and frustration.

The resentment of the Negro follows logically from his frustration. He resents the fact that he is frustrated. He resents the agencies which are responsible for, or aid and abet, this blockage. His resentment over immediate injustices has roots deep in his past, fed by the festering resentment against his past treatment in the industrial, social, and political life of the nation. In times of war he tends to focus the bulk of his resentment against what he considers the arrogant attitude of the Army and Navy in refusing to accept the offer of his life and service on the basis of equality with others. He probably goes further; he may resent any opportunistic use of the Negro during times of national emergency and war while his basic problems are ignored during intervals of peace and reconstruction. Above all, he resents the seeming inaction of the officers of government in counteracting those forces which tend to perpetuate, often in defiance of the American Constitution, these contradictions of the principles of democracy.

One of the basic issues of the present war is totalitarian treatment of minorities as opposed to democratic treatment. Of the implications of this issue for their future in America Negroes are definitely aware. Many of the Negroes who unequivocally expressed themselves in favor of the democracies, even before the United States entered the war, appear to have done so primarily in terms of their attitude on this issue. Yet the factor of suspicion in the morale of the Negro creeps in precisely at this point. His general suspicion of the motives of whites in their intercourse with him and other minority peoples cannot but influence his present attitude toward America at war. Even in the event the democracies win, he is suspicious of the postwar treatment of the Negro. Transferred and generalized, his attitude of suspicion toward those whites who have exploited and debased him applies now to the government itself and to the very concept of democracy. Both the government and democracy he looks on as symbols of whites—and he is suspicious of whites.

Conflict, in the psychological meaning of the term, appears to be a real factor in the morale of the Negro. In the face of the welter of contradictory stimuli, Negroes as a whole appear at present unable to decide definitely which methods to employ, which philosophy of struggle to accept, or which leaders to follow. At the core of this conflict, however, appears the stable feeling of ethnocentrism—a feeling of racial militancy. Upon analysis, this racial militancy (not to be confused with a more narrow ideological racialism, e.g., Garveyism) appears in itself stable enough to constitute the basis upon which the potential power of the masses of Negroes may be galvanized for unified action, thereby dissipating what now appears to be a situation of general conflict. The question, then, is: will truly democratic and wholesome forces discover and utilize the clue to this vast reservoir of potential strength, or will it be ignored and left to be tapped by antisocial, reactionary, and destructive forces? In the answer to this question may lie the secret of stability in the future course of democracy in America. Directly related to this point is another phase of the Negro's existing conflict—namely, his attempt to maintain some form of expressed or genuine loyalty to the American government in the face of obvious and systematic prejudice and discrimination against him.

One cannot ignore hope as a factor in the morale of Negroes. But upon closer examination, this hope reveals itself to be two-edged, both positive and negative. The Negro hopes that out of the present war will arise such conditions as to make mandatory the fuller participation of Negroes in the political and economic life of America. This may come about, he hopes, in either one of two ways. First, this being primarily a "white man's war," a long and destructive war may so weaken all combatants that they will be unable to subjugate the darker races. Second, a victory for the forces of democracy may actually result in the development of a more liberal treatment of minority peoples. The feeling is widespread that the inevitable wartime disturbances of the usual social patterns—sometimes bordering even upon disintegration—may be

the source from which a positive, dynamic, and honest attitude toward them will arise.

Each of these facets just described was culled from the writings and expressions of patently articulate Negroes. Undoubtedly there are masses of Negroes who are inarticulate. These are the most underprivileged—the industrial serfs and the sharecroppers. An attempt to interview them meets with a stolid, inexpressive exterior. To be uncommunicative to strangers has become a condition of their very survival. Inasmuch as these Negroes are primarily concerned with the day-to-day struggle for immediate survival, one can expect from them little if any expression of morale conditioned by national or international events; they show only apathy and indifference.

The Prospects for Negro Morale

This picture of morale among the Negroes tends for the most part to be an unfavorable and negative one. But it appears from the evidence that this is not immutably so. The possibilities for raising the morale of the Negro to a point compatible with a truly democratic way of life, in the framework of which his own contributions to American culture may be increased, seem good. For it is important to remember that the Negro is constantly seeking to be able to contribute his share to the common good.

The morale of the Negro cannot be raised by asking him to be content with an inferior, Jim Crow, or unjust role in the war efforts of the nation. Even if this policy be accepted for purposes of convenience, it should be recognized for what it actually is; namely, a storing-up of those tensions of resentment and bitterness which must some day explode in an expression of the ultimate in detrimental, unwholesome morale.

The building of an adequate morale in the Negro group entails a sudden, dramatic, and honest reversal of the present American policy of racial exploitation and humiliation. Such a program adopted and prosecuted in good faith by the government

of the United States would change almost immediately the present pattern of Negro morale from the negative and confused to the positive and dynamic. In order to achieve such an end it would be necessary for the officers of the legislative and executive branches of our government to attack the problem with zeal, honesty, and definiteness. It would be necessary to utilize every medium of propaganda and education—moving pictures, radio, newspapers and magazines; thus could one build favorable racial attitudes and establish racial unity rather than permit a perpetuation of unfavorable racial stereotypes and misconceptions.

To begin this attack within the armed forces of the nation would be essential. The readjustment of the individual's ordinary social patterns and habits when he enters a branch of military or naval service may well include—and with little loss in efficiency—his adjustment to the presence of Negro fellow Americans fighting by his side for the preservation of those principles of democracy which they all alike hold vital and significant. Such a development would undoubtedly have an influence upon the traditional pattern of racial relations in America; and objective indices indicate that this influence would be favorable and desirable.

Psychologists in their researches have accumulated data which strongly suggest the possibility of change in the attitude of the American white toward the Negro—the possibility that such attitudes may be changed from those of blind and irrational prejudice with its attendant economic, social, and political injustices, to the wholesome, normal attitudes which stem from understanding and a sincere respect for the rights of every human being. If the civilian morale of the Negro is to be raised, some such change is imperative.

CHAPTER XV

*Morale in Canada**

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THIS is not a factual report on civilian morale in Canada; there is probably no one in the country able to make such a report. We have no Gallup Poll,[†] nor is any other systematic sampling of public opinion in progress. In addition, the fact that we are at war prevents the release of certain relevant data—for instance, detailed figures on the response to army recruiting campaigns.

The article is, accordingly, little more than a discussion of the problem of morale as it affects Canadian civilians in general. Those aspects of it which are peculiar to French Canadians are taken up separately.* While I have canvassed the opinions of several other persons interested in the question, the views expressed must be regarded as my own.

CANADIAN MORALE IS SEEMINGLY ADEQUATE

On the record in general, there is no apparent weakness in Canadian civilian morale. All political parties are agreed on the necessity of fighting the war through, and open opposition by minority groups is at present almost entirely lacking, except for the passive resistance of such bodies as the British Columbia Doukhobors. It is true that we have wartime regulations which penalize opposition, and that a considerable number of noncon-

* Two contributions make up this chapter, Prof. Ketchum's being the first part, and that of Dr. Bois the latter; see page 262.

† This chapter was written in November, 1941. A Gallup poll has since been reported.

formists are interned; but our police are not so highly efficient that they could suppress all evidences of agitation, were it in any sense widespread. As a matter of fact, prosecutions under the Defense of Canada regulations average only about twenty cases a month—a figure which includes many charges of membership in the banned organization called Jehovah's Witnesses, and also technical infringements such as taking photographs in a forbidden area.

On the positive side we have the fact that up to September 1, 1941, 320,000 men had enlisted for active service overseas, in addition to large numbers serving with the Royal Air Force and other British forces. This figure, quite independent of the 170,000 drafted for preliminary training and Home Defense, would be equivalent to a voluntary enlistment of some 3,200,000 men in the United States. Women have responded quickly and almost universally, and are doing an astonishing amount of voluntary work, most of it now efficiently organized.

Over \$2,000,000,000—some 40 per cent of the national income—is being spent during the present fiscal year on the Canadian armed forces, on purchases of war material in the United States and elsewhere, on financing British purchases in Canada, and on Canada's share of the great British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. Taxes, already three times as high as before the war, are still rising, and many hundreds of millions have been secured in the form of war loans. While the impact of these vast expenditures has been softened by increased employment—national income is running about 11 per cent higher this year than last—the restrictions and sacrifices which they entail are beginning to be sharply felt in many classes. They are accepted, however, if not with enthusiasm, at least with complete public approval.

SOME WEAKNESSES ARE APPARENT

On the other hand, the picture is not quite as satisfactory as these facts would suggest. Recruiting for the army, in spite of

energetic campaigns, is admittedly very slow. Newspaper files of 1914 and 1915 contain photographs of long lines of men waiting to enlist; I have seen no such pictures this time. Against this observation, however, must be weighed the fact that the Royal Canadian Air Force and Navy, which possess more glamor and are already in action, have all the recruits they can use, at least in most categories.

The Victory Loan of 1941 finally went over the top, but only after rather painful lagging and in response to a greatly stepped-up campaign costing \$2,000,000 exclusive of commissions. Appeals to reduce consumption have had fair success in the case of certain commodities such as bacon, none at all as regards general buying; department-store business is booming as never before. An elaborate effort to cut consumption of gasoline by 50 per cent brought a reduction of 15 per cent; an appeal for 6,000 blood donors in one large city resulted in less than 2,000 volunteers. No doubt Dr. Goebbels would put our "morale quotient" at only 30.

The removal of the original 5 per cent limit on war profits is reliably stated to have been due to a "sit-down strike" on the part of certain industrialists, who refused to tender for government contracts on these terms; organized labor has also shown itself in several instances determined to secure tangible benefits from the war situation, even at the cost of serious interruptions in defense production. However adequate the grounds for such actions, they suggest that "winning the war is all that matters" is not yet a universal conviction; and the failure of Ottawa to take direct measures to secure troops, restrict spending, and prevent strikes seems to reflect governmental recognition of the fact.

THERE IS MUCH CRITICISM OF MORALE

If this be the view of the government, it is supported by widespread criticism of the general level of Canadian morale. Indeed, the same newspapers which denounce Ottawa for not conscripting

manpower and outlawing strikes often provide it with the best excuse for not doing so by lamenting in the next column the apathy and indifference of the general public. This tendency to bewail the low morale of others has several interesting aspects.

(a) In part it is probably a healthy manifestation, the sign of a quickening pulse in the body politic, inseparable from the slow and piecemeal process by which a democracy stirs itself into action. It is inevitable that the man who has left his car in the garage should question the patriotism of those whom he sees driving to work, and that the soldier's wife, trying to support herself and her children on the maximum allowance of \$79 a month, should bitterly criticize dollar-an-hour workers who go on strike for more. These anomalies should decrease as our war effort approaches totality.

(b) A second form of criticism is more serious; it is of that sectional type which reflects our still imperfect national unity. One cannot go far in the more "British" areas without hearing that the French Canadians, the Jews, the foreigners or some other group are not doing their part in the war. Such attitudes indicate a weakness in our democracy which only time and education can fully remedy.

(c) Finally, there is a great deal of criticism—mainly by older people, certain editorial writers, and spokesmen of veterans' organizations—which seems to me to rest upon a serious misconception of the nature of this war, and a complete failure to recognize the great social changes which have occurred since 1914. These critics, alarmed by what they feel to be the emotional apathy of the Canadian people, are convinced that the shortcomings in our war effort will only be removed when the feelings of the population are aroused to fever pitch. This point of view demands careful attention, for it will probably be equally in evidence in the United States.

CANADIANS ARE NOT "FIGHTING MAD"

It is quite true that Canadians in general are taking this war far more coolly and unemotionally than they did the last. There is to all appearance less hatred of the Germans here today, after all that they have done, than there was after their invasion of Belgium in 1914. We have had scarcely a trace of the petty persecution and gross violence against enemy nationals which characterized the last war; German music and literature are not boycotted as they were then, nor has German been dropped from the school curricula. Women are not sending white feathers to young men still in civilian clothes, or stopping strangers on the street to ask why they are not in uniform. There are frequent complaints that Canadians do not hang out flags or otherwise advertise their patriotism, and that soldiers marching through the streets arouse scarcely any attention, let alone a cheer.

Such facts are naturally regarded by the older and more "British" sections of our population as indications of a dangerously low level of morale; and, while no one urges that we should start German-baiting or spy-hunting, most morale-raising efforts are aimed at securing the same black-and-white definition of the situation, the same emotional participation, which underlay both the magnificent sacrifices and the less creditable manifestations of the earlier struggle. An exception should be made in the case of the material issued by the Bureau of Information at Ottawa, which is for the most part restrained and dignified; but the majority of broadcasts, speeches and editorials reflect the belief that our chief need is for a more passionate upsurge of feeling than has yet occurred.

1941 WAS NOT 1914

Deliberate efforts to arouse the emotions of the public, and to paint this war as a holy war against satanic foes, began in November, 1939, with a series of nationwide broadcasts by a newspaper publisher. They have continued in one form or another ever

since. Their success in two years has been very small, and I do not expect it to be greater in the future. Heavy Canadian casualty lists may bring a more intense emotional response, but I doubt it; the losses of the Royal Canadian Air Force are already well over the thousand mark.

To say that the war is too far off explains nothing; it was much farther away in 1914, when no plane could fly the Atlantic. The truth is that the patterns of thought of our present population are so drastically different from those of 1914 as to make the traditional type of propaganda almost useless. If a higher level of morale is to be achieved it will have to be by new methods, appropriate to the changed psychological milieu in which they have to operate. Some of the more significant changes in our national mentality are listed below; almost all will apply with equal or greater force to the situation in the United States.

(a) *We are better educated.* The present population of Canada is far better educated, far more intelligent in the ordinary sense of the word, than that of 1914. We have had an average of three more years of schooling than the population represented by the 1911 census, and almost all this increment has been at secondary and university levels. In addition, the vastly increased scope of press, radio, movies, magazines, and travel has made us far better informed about the world in general. We are less suggestible, more critical; better aware of the lights and shadows in all national groups, less willing to believe that whole nations are ever either "good" or "bad."

(b) *American influence is greater.* Since 1914 the influence of the United States has tremendously increased. We share the closest of commercial relations, we listen to the same radio programs, watch the same movies and read the same literature; hundreds of thousands of tourists feel almost equally at home on either side of the border. In many respects we are one nation; had the United States accepted the German definition of this war, many Canadians would have felt some disquiet as to our own alignment. As it is, the manifold communications between the two countries preclude

that isolation from outside influences which is essential if intensive propaganda is to be effective; the statements of a Canadian broadcaster can be checked against American interpretations by merely twisting a dial. Short of drastic interference with such freedom of communication, it is improbable that the psychological temperature of Canada can ever again be raised more than a few degrees above that of the United States—rather a striking contrast to the situation in 1914-1917.

(c) *Propaganda is more difficult.* Since 1914 the great American advertising business has made the task of the propagandist almost inconceivably more difficult. In the first place, twenty-five years of high-pressure advertising have caused ulterior aims to be suspected and appropriately discounted in even the most innocent statements of fact, while in other than commercial fields the very suggestion of propaganda is enough to arouse a negative attitude. Secondly, those who wish to affect public attitudes to the war find themselves almost entirely without the necessary weapons—sharp and powerful verbal symbols. What the advertisers have done to abuse and destroy the delicate mechanisms of communication can only be paralleled by what the early timber barons did to our forests. Every vehicle open to the war propagandist—speech, poster, letterpress, cartoon—has been exploited to the point of exhaustion; ringing words and phrases which once pierced the very soul of the listener now drop at his feet with a muffled plop. The radio voice which tells us that our lives and liberties are in danger has no more intrinsic authority than that which warns us against unpleasant breath; the terrible issues of this war come to us wrapped in cellophane. Under such conditions only great personalities can any longer challenge the listener's attention; and Canada, unfortunately, possesses neither a Churchill nor a Roosevelt.

(d) *The mores have been weakened.* Since 1914 the progressive decay of primary groups has greatly weakened traditional moral sanctions in almost every area of life, while their total disappearance in international conduct has become a commonplace.

The invasion of Belgium in 1914 aroused a moral indignation which was a powerful factor in making the war a kind of crusade, but recent aggressions against China, Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia and Poland—to mention only a few—are dismissed by many with a shrug of the shoulders. Such actions have lost their power to shock us; and when they cease to shock us, they are no longer morally wrong. For considerable sections of our population expediency, rather than abstract rightness, is becoming the criterion of others' conduct.

(e) *War has lost caste.* On the other hand, those persons whose moral sentiments are still lively are precisely the ones who are most affected by the changed moral status of war. Ever since 1919 powerful voices in the churches, the universities, the labor unions, the women's and youth organizations, have been driving home the idea that war can never be right in any absolute sense. The circumstances of its outbreak have left few doubts as to the entire justification of this war; but while we have few who oppose it on moral or religious grounds, we have many who can no longer bring themselves to complete emotional identification with it. Such incidents as the bombing of German cities tend to compel the admission that the moral difference between ourselves and the Germans is one of degree only; this is a poor foundation for anything like a holy war.

(f) *Individual responsibility has declined.* Most important of all is the steady but little-recognized shift of our whole social order from a community to an institutional basis. The rapid growth of cities at the expense of rural areas is as familiar a phenomenon here as in the United States, and all the most thickly populated areas of the country are now largely dominated by urban patterns of living and thinking. This revolutionary change has had two results which are of cardinal importance to morale.

In the first place, barring the creation of crowd solidarity by such means as wholesale bombing, we can no longer count upon the contagious spread of warlike spirit from a few convinced citizens to the whole population. It was the still existing community

life of 1914 which underlay the 100 per cent recruiting records in many small towns, the sacrificial giving for war purposes, the conscientious self-discipline in thrift campaigns, and also the mobbing of German shopkeepers and boycotting of German music. The tone of life in our urbanized culture is profoundly different; we no longer know our neighbor in the vital sense which would permit us to urge him to enlist or warn him against defeatist opinions. Effective condemnation or approbation of others has largely vanished; our motto is, "You mind your own business and I'll mind mine."

In the second place, leadership in the institutional groups in which most of our present life is lived is vested in functionaries appointed for the purpose, and more and more we are content to let them run the show and take the responsibility for it. Compare the operation of a large city church with that of its rural prototype, or machine city politics with those of the cracker-barrel era. Since 1914 the community, the watchdog of the mores, has receded, and with it has gone the sense of personal, individual responsibility. From running a club to fighting a world war, we are now largely content to "let George do it."

TWO GENERALIZATIONS

Factors such as the above are a real challenge to all who still believe democracies capable of fighting for themselves. Properly understood, they serve both to explain the apparent ineffectiveness of much of our propaganda in the past two years, and also to provide a framework in terms of which a more intelligent campaign may be projected. On the basis of what has been said, and particularly of paragraph (f) above, two predictive generalizations may be hazarded:

(a) We shall probably not see in this war that great upsurge of warlike feeling for which many persons are hoping, save in the unlikely event that the United States should set the pattern. This lack will be anything but a loss, provided that we can still achieve

results comparable with those in Britain, where people are not excited about the war either, but are working coolly, unitedly, and determinedly to win it. What was done there by the imminence of armed invasion will have to be done here by imaginative and persuasive education, closely integrated with the planned, comprehensive use of all our resources.

(b) Though our people are less capable of spontaneous initiative than they were in 1914, they are probably more prepared to do whatever authority requires of them. It will have been noted earlier that the shortcomings in our war effort are entirely in the realm of voluntary response, and are quite compatible with the ready acceptance of heavy burdens and restrictions imposed by law. I think much heavier demands will be complied with just as willingly, provided that they fall equally on all sections of the population; indeed, most people would prefer such methods. One often hears it said: "If they need our money, why don't they take it, instead of putting on all these damned campaigns?" Though this docile attitude is the subject of widespread censure, it is entirely in keeping with the character of our present institutionalized life, and of obvious value in a war which requires the utmost in far-sighted planning.

MORALE IS STEADILY IMPROVING

The relative failure of verbal appeals only throws into higher relief the proverbial dominance of facts and actions over mere ideas and feelings. For, in spite of our obvious shortcomings, in spite of apparent apathy and inertia, there can be no doubt that morale in the true sense—that of all-out concentration on the task of winning the war—has been steadily growing in Canada, at least since the fall of France. Its growth has had but little relation to the intensity of our propaganda efforts; it has been largely a function of two other factors, both more effective now than they were in 1914. First is an increasingly clear perception of the hard facts of the situation, and of their unmistakable implications. Our

higher general education, though hampering to traditional propaganda, is here an undoubted help. Second, there is increasingly widespread participation in war activities, thanks to the total character of present-day conflicts. No matter how our morale may appear to lag, this latter factor will ultimately have its effect. It is not so much that we are working for the war because we believe in it; it is rather that we are coming to believe in the war because we are working for it. Blood donors may visit the clinic reluctantly and only under social pressure; but that simple act will do more for their morale than all the war publicity ever issued. Some interpretative propaganda is, of course, still needed, especially to emphasize the equal importance of many tasks not obviously connected with the war; but much of the energy directed to telling us facts which we already know, and trying to arouse emotions which are no longer appropriate, might better be employed in so organizing our national life as to give each individual something meaningful to do for the war.

MORALE IN A STUDENT BODY

What has been said seems to be born out by investigations on a group of university students who, though contemptuous of all bellicose posturing, show a remarkable rise in conviction about the war.

As will be seen in Graph I, Figure 1, before the *Blitzkrieg* opened the morale of this group was anything but high, in spite of at least five months of intense anti-German propaganda. The marked shift towards conformity shown in Graph II must be credited to the unequivocal logic of intervening events. The "phony" war was over and done with. Graph III, however, shows a still more marked rise in "entire conviction"—due in part, no doubt, to the steady pressure of innumerable propaganda agencies, but much more to the fact that all the men have now had at least a year of military training, while the girls are almost all engaged in some form of war work. Students are, of course, in no sense rep-




FIG. 1. Conviction in regard to war. Out of 180 arts students (30 per cent men), who were asked to state, "I am convinced that it is in Canada's best interests to put everything she has into this war, and to continue the fight, whatever it may cost, until Germany is defeated," the indicated percentages answered, on three successive occasions, by filling in the blank, that they were "entirely convinced," "pretty well convinced," "not quite convinced," or "not convinced at all." The changes in the "entirely" and "not at all" categories are highly reliable statistically ($d > 3 \sigma d$).

representative of the general population, and such pointed changes in their attitudes reflect the influence of factors which are almost certainly at work in much wider areas.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Canadian morale is not yet all that we could wish for, but it is improving and will almost certainly continue to do so. Morale-raising efforts, couched largely in the stereotypes of the last war, have been conspicuously ineffective in arousing the emotional response sought for, have probably, indeed, contributed to the confused attitudes and mutual criticism which have tended to characterize the civilian front. With a clearer understanding of the social changes which have created our present mental patterns, these efforts should become more intelligent; in the meantime, morale is inevitably being generated by the mere fact that we are actually participating in the war on a vast and increasing scale. Timidity in our national leadership is probably quite unjustified; for the same factors which are responsible for our apparent indifference to the war are also the best guarantee that we will do everything which has to be done, if and when it is unmistakably demanded of us. It is to be hoped that our American friends, when the need arises, may be able to profit by our experiences and mistakes in this important field.

J. D. KETCHUM

French Canada and the War

In ordinary circumstances French Canadians are practically ignored by the rest of the country. It is generally known that they speak a language different from that of other Canadians and that they are eager to preserve that language. But what are the characteristic features of their mentality, what their reactions to world events—these are questions of little interest to outsiders.

The war has changed all this. News writers, politicians, and sociologists now occasionally focus their attention on the Province of Quebec. Their appreciation may be based on plain misinformation (or is it prejudice?) as in the case of *Life Magazine*; or on an evident desire to be agreeable, as in that of the United States Secretary of the Navy, who said in Montreal a few weeks ago: "I especially congratulate and felicitate this great Province of Quebec on its noteworthy contribution to Canadian effort to help defeat the Hun, and may I employ the sterling example which you men of Quebec have provided to cry shame upon the numerically few but noisy isolationists, who cry out for an impossible isolation for us, while Quebec, having far more profound reasons for an isolationist posture, is setting an inspiring example to the free men of other bloodstreams in Canada and in the United States."

It is not only strangers who interpret in such widely different terms the behavior and the morale of French Canada in the present conflict. Voices which can be accepted as reliable expressions of French Canadian public opinion broadcast in their turn messages that do not agree. Cardinal Villeneuve and Premier Godbout speaking in Toronto assure the rest of Canada of their compatriots' devotion to the common cause, while the St. Jean Baptiste Society, the recognized French Canadian national association, sends to Prime Minister Mackenzie King and publishes in the press a resolution which demands a slowing down in our war effort.

A mere observer would be very presumptuous if he claimed that his own view is truer to facts than any of such widely circu-

lated pronouncements. A careful survey of French Canadian public opinion, based on a representative sampling of the whole population and repeated at regular intervals to show the trends as they are modified by the rapid changes that occur in this warfare—truly mobile on the home front as on the fighting line—would be the only scientific means of solving the problems. Short of this, one has to depend on some basic characteristics of the French Canadian *Weltanschauung* and on impressions one has gathered here and there in the papers or in casual interviews with people of all classes. To put these findings in order, we may adopt the division given by the editor of the present yearbook in his article on “Five Factors in Morale.” *

A positive goal: something to look forward to and to work for. This motivation is rightfully taken as fundamental. And on this very point the average French Canadian sees things differently. From his early infancy to his old age he is constantly and persistently conditioned to the other world, not to this one. In rural communities life is centered around the church, and in the cities numerous organizations keep reminding the young and the old that “the image of this world passeth and eternity lasteth forever and ever.” If an outsider expects this very real other-worldliness of outlook to be often expressed in so many words, he will fail to find it. If he looks for it in definitely higher public or private morals on all points that he considers of paramount importance, he may be sadly disappointed.

But it is there all the same, as a powerful source of mass energy which, when it is geared to a social movement, may give it an overwhelming momentum. French Canadian women ignore birth control because they don’t want to miss going to heaven; most families boast of having a son or a daughter in a religious order because this is an ennobling accomplishment; laymen of all classes go and spend three days of “closed retreat” in silence, prayer and meditation, because they value the salvation of their souls beyond everything else; all educational institutions, from grade school to

* Chapter III.

university, are professedly Catholic in their program, training and outlook, because science without religion is dangerous; national labor unions are termed Catholic and have a chaplain, because labor questions are moral issues which must be decided in the light of religious principles.

The consequence is that a war, to be consistent with such a philosophy of life, must be viewed as a religious and a defensive war—religious because moral issues are worth fighting and dying for; defensive because peace is the primary objective.

What I maintain here is evidenced by the enthusiasm with which French Canadians sent the very first Canadian troops to fight beyond the seas. It was in 1870, when the Papal States were invaded by Garibaldi. Pontifical zouaves were recruited in the Province of Quebec, and with the blessing of Bishop Bourget of Montreal they left for far-away Rome. They arrived late on the scene and had little to do with actual fighting. But on their return home they were welcomed like crusaders of old. Any visiting American can see their names displayed on tablets in St. James Basilica, Montreal. Even to this day zouaves of the original contingent are revered in their respective communities, and new regiments have been recruited and maintained in various towns. These have no other purpose but to keep alive the memory of the expedition of 1870 and to add color to the public religious demonstrations. Up to the present war they had their annual camping and drilling.

The present conflict is a clash of moral values, rightly called by Prime Minister King a crusade. But French Canada does not consider it as such, and a politician, even if he deserves as much personal respect as Mr. King, has little chance of being accepted as an authoritative leader on religious issues. If the Vatican ever takes sides against Nazism, as it formerly condemned communism, Quebec would surely awaken to a sense of moral responsibility. It is most probable that, when President Roosevelt revealed Hitler's plan to ban all religions in order to establish his own Nazi church, he helped give French Canadians a war aim consistent with their conscience.

Togetherness: sense of belonging in a group with a common purpose. In spite of the federation of the provinces, French and English in Canada live in two worlds with little communication between them. As an American sociologist well conversant with the situation in Quebec, Professor Everett C. Hughes of the University of Chicago, wrote recently to the author: "It isn't merely that they differ, but rather that they are looking at quite different things in the news and in the world generally, and think in different terms."

The terms in which one thinks are acquired in the family environment and at school. We have seen that the home environment of the young French Canadian is permeated with a vivid consciousness of the hereafter. His educational world, from grade school to university, is a system complete in itself, having little or no communication with the English Canadian world of learning. Even today there is no direct relationship between the distribution of cycles in the two programs of studies. For instance the matriculation of the English high school has no equivalent in the French system. At the university level an English Canadian student may reach the highest degrees without knowing the language of his French fellow citizen any better than would an American student in New York or Toronto. There is little or no exchange of students or professors between the English and the French universities. No national system of schools imposes a common Canadian mentality. In English and French classrooms, sometimes less than a block distant from each other, textbooks of Canadian history are used which give to each group of pupils a widely divergent view of the evolution of the country.

Some legal holidays in Quebec differ from those of the rest of the Dominion; one is celebrated on the same day, but while it is called *Victoria Day* in English Canada, it is *Dollard Day* for the French. As a consequence a Torontonion or even an English Montrealer who goes as a tourist to the thoroughly French parts of the Province feels, as much as an American, that he is visiting a strange land. For the average *Canadien*, moreover, they are both

in the same category; they are *des Anglais*. There is a corresponding attitude on the English side: the author has attended many a meeting of English Canadian scientists where Canadian social problems were discussed without any references whatsoever to the fact that one-third of the population is French. A test of general intelligence published in Toronto, exclusively in English of course, is entitled *Dominion Test of General Intelligence*, as if this instrument could apply in its original form to all individuals in the country.

Politically, of course, Canada is one. But psychologically the average French Canadian does not look upon Ottawa as his capital. The center of his cultural world does not lie within the boundaries of English-speaking democracies either. France is still the source of his intellectual inspirations. Rome is the center of his international universe. Canada, and by this I mean French Canada, is his only spiritual home. The British Empire as such has no appeal to him. For a whole generation imperialism has been considered as a real danger to his liberties, until today he will readily speak in terms of the British Commonwealth of Nations but will resent the attitude of his English-speaking fellow citizens who have kept the legally obsolete term, British Empire.

On that motley background of conflicting attitudes of the French and the English toward the political framework of the British world, a salient feature arrests the attention of the observer: the French in Canada have a profound respect for Their Majesties and the Royal Family. This corresponds to a political reality, as the King is personally the bond which unites the various sister nations together. And the visit of King George and Queen Elizabeth in the spring of 1939 provided French Quebec with an opportunity to express with real enthusiasm its attachment to the Crown. The heart of every French Canadian man, woman, and child was stirred with unforgettable emotion when Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Elizabeth, in her parting message, spoke to them with a genuine ease in their own language.

In Canada, as in Britain, the Crown is above politics, and poli-

ticians have often made themselves a target for French antipathy when they have played the Quebec vote for or against certain measures. If the feeling of togetherness is not what it should be in Quebec, much of the blame rests with party politics.

Awareness of danger: alarm and concern; sense of important values seriously at stake. The impact of a brutal attack from outside brings into a solid block a nation otherwise divided. The awareness of an immediate danger works the same, though less spectacularly. Because they are geographically far from the scene of actual combat, French Canadians are not fully conscious of the threat of Nazi domination. The psychological factors which we have already reviewed make that distance even greater, and the recital of German atrocities evokes scant reaction; it is like reading in the papers about an earthquake in Afghanistan or a famine in China.

The democratic ideals and way of life are at stake. But what do these mean to French Canadians? Little. It is an historical fact that after the Cession they adapted themselves to British parliamentary institutions and conquered one by one the privileges they now enjoy. Some of their leaders, both in politics and outside, are keenly aware of the protection of the British flag. "Should this flag cease to wave victoriously over Canada, we would sustain a formidable setback liable completely to wreck our social structure," declared the head of the Quebec Bar in Toronto recently.

But at the very time when this is said, there are at work in French Canada various currents of opinion and new social doctrines which are not easily reconciled with the ideals of capitalistic democracy. Corporatism is an example. It would be unfair to assimilate any of the French Canadian varieties of corporatism to the fascist type. It is true, nevertheless, that it gradually becomes a concrete objective which distracts the masses from the existing socio-economic system. Social Credit is another instance. Born in England and adopted in only one province, far-away Alberta, this theory has had a strange appeal for certain classes of our population. As late as in 1939 a survey of public opinion, conducted in

French Canada by the Psychological Institute of Montreal, revealed that Premier Aberhart of Alberta was spontaneously mentioned as an outstanding figure in Canadian life—this in answer to a question demanding a rating of a list of prominent personages in politics and business, among which his name did not appear. Although the acceptance of Social Credit has logically no relation to a lack of willingness to pursue the war effort, it has for French Canada a special significance. It is a reaction against banks and big business. And finance is associated with *les Anglais*. A reform in financial policies involves a change in the controlling power of national life. When one is looking for such fundamental changes, one is not ready to sacrifice all for the existing system and for English predominance in the world.

A realistic sense that something helpful can be done: awareness of steps to be taken. Social machinery to facilitate action: skill in using the processes of democratic co-operation. In the case of French Canadian morale as regards the present war, these two factors may well be considered jointly. As war goes on, some of the following considerations may prove out of date, but some will surely be confirmed by the very changes that are likely to occur.

Early in the fall of 1939 a meeting was held in Maisonneuve Market, Montreal, where a group of young nationalist extremists received the applause of thousands of listeners when they advocated a policy of selfish trade on a cash basis with embattled Britain. Without any intervention of the authorities, that attitude has disappeared today. Official figures have been published which show that French Canada has done its share in enlistment for overseas service, for War Savings Certificates, for loans, and for all Auxiliary Services. Strikes in war industries are no more frequent, probably less so, in Quebec than in the rest of the Dominion. Taxes are paid willingly, and the restrictions concomitant with the war effort are accepted without a grudge.

But there is still a lurking feeling that French Canadians are not having their full share in the framing of Canada's war policies. Wrongly or not, they picture themselves as unwelcome in the

higher circles where far-reaching decisions are taken. Unaware that their educational system has not prepared them for technical posts, they resent the slowness of their promotion in the various services, both within the army and outside.

In the Auxiliary Services they have no organization which they can justly consider as their own. For instance the Y.M.C.A., the Salvation Army, the Canadian Legion, and the Knights of Columbus keep huts where soldiers are welcome in camps, in cities, and right close to the battlefield. No purely French Canadian association has anything of the kind. Even when he relaxes from his intensive training, the French recruit lives in an atmosphere that is strange to him. Nothing of his home has followed him, and he has no opportunity to welcome his English-speaking buddy into his own world.

The machinery which, according to a growing number of English Canadians, would greatly facilitate action and distribute equitably the task of defending the country at the outposts of democracy, is conscription of manpower for service overseas. Now, this very word *conscription* provokes a most unpleasant reaction in the vast majority of French Canadians. Is it that they are afraid of fighting? Not at all. From the early settlers, who held the plow handle with one hand and the musket with the other, to the officers and privates of the deservedly famed Vingt-deuxième Battalion in World War I, they have lived up to a high standard of gallant bravery. But they are an independent race; they resent coercion. Feeling that they have had little to say in the conduct of Canadian war policies, they are ready to seize this opportunity to assert themselves. They are all the more eager to do it on the question of conscription, inasmuch as during the last war that same measure was sprung upon them without the necessary preparation. For years they have been building an attitude of resistance against it—and their political leaders have encouraged them to do so. Now the whole group is taking pride in saying no.

Will this state of affairs end in a clash that will disrupt Canadian unity or crush the valiant three million Frenchmen who hold the

valley of the St. Lawrence? I do not think so. The education which makes a French Canadian what he is has instilled into him a keen sense of duty. When the American revolutionists tried to bring him to their side against England, he was loyal to his new masters. He fought to stem the American invasion of Lower Canada in the War of 1812-1815. If he asserts himself with energy, he does not easily become a rebel. He has, moreover, the Norman shrewdness; experience has taught him to accept the inevitable and prepare patiently for better days. If he momentarily follows politicians and yields to their schemes, he knows how to recognize his real leaders at the hour of crisis.

The reader of these pages will realize how trying are these days for French Canadians. They can be excused when they fail to jump quickly to the aid of *les Anglais* who have ignored them so consistently. There is some truth in the rather blunt statement made to me by an elderly workingman, father of two sons who are now with the Canadian Corps in England: "Of course, we don't want the British to be beaten; but I don't mind their getting a good thrashing!"

Sincerely desirous to fulfill their duty toward themselves as a group and toward their country as a whole, the *Canadiens* are grouping along cautiously on their way to the battlefront. They will carry on without flagging or failing, hoping that their contribution to the rebirth of a free world will be acknowledged and will give them a better chance to live their own life in Canada, their only home. As one of their poets wrote it in verses which became the national anthem, they know that valor is the guarantee of freedom.

*Et ta valeur, de foi trempée,
Protégera nos foyers et nos droits.**

J. S. A. Bois.

* From the original version (French) of "O Canada."

Part Four: MORALE IN INDUSTRY

CHAPTER XVI

Morale During Unemployment

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WHEN Army, factories, and offices are clamoring for men, unemployment seems remote. There are still, however, some millions of unemployed men. Lack of raw materials has closed down many consumer-goods industries, and not all have been able to change over to defense production. It is not primarily because of these workers who need jobs that this chapter is written. Neither is it the purpose of this discussion to sound a warning about possible postwar unemployment, important as it will be to plan to prevent such a breakdown.

This study is based on the hope that we may learn something about sustaining morale through a time of hardship by turning back to a recent crisis in American life to see how our citizens responded during a previous period of stress. We shall attempt to find out what factors enabled some men to keep up their morale while others, facing an external situation no more serious, lost faith and courage.

We go back to January and February of 1934. Unemployment had risen to an unprecedented high point. The hopes engendered by the early months of the New Deal and the N.R.A. had waned; the Blue Eagle was no longer soaring; and no social security or W.P.A. program cushioned the shock. Many felt that our traditional economic system was in its death throes.

That winter, in New York City, an Adjustment Service¹ was organized to give aid and counsel to men and women seeking to find some way of improving their lot in this difficult situation. In all some sixteen thousand people were given interviews, tests, and guidance. From the records of that organization we hope to

find out some of the differences between those morale was high, despite their difficulties, and those who more quickly lost their faith and courage. Our study, except for a few comparisons, has been limited to *unemployed men*. The most serious limitation in numbers was occasioned by the fact that one of the tests most important for our study was not given until the latter part of the career of the Adjustment Service, and the demand for complete records limited us necessarily to 538 cases. Among these, however, there were all degrees of apparent optimism and despair. Subjects ranged in age from the late teens to more than sixty, with a median at twenty-six. Some had had less than eighth-grade schooling, while others had done postgraduate study. The median man in our group was a high-school graduate. They had formerly held jobs which ranged in pay from less than \$10 a week to over \$90 a week, with a median best job (for jobs held a year or longer) as high as \$35 a week. When they came to the Adjustment Service, some had been unemployed for only a few weeks and others for more than four years. About one in four was married. In religion, 39 per cent were classified as Jewish, 33 per cent Protestant, 21 per cent Catholic, and 7 per cent without religious affiliation. They had held almost every type of job from unskilled labor and office boys to managers, executives, actors, engineers, writers, dentists, and professors. They were predominantly New York City young men, who had once had white-collar jobs.

The data of the Adjustment Service were collected with a view to swift, inexpensive appraisal for vocational and educational guidance. They do not represent the selection of factors which one would choose if the work had been set up initially to study morale. There are, nevertheless, in the case records and on the Hollerith cards a number of facts which bear upon some commonly held hypotheses concerning morale. We know for each client his age, birthplace, lineage, length of unemployment, marital status, number of dependents, religious affiliation, years spent on the job held longest, index of employment stability, maximum weekly salary on job held for at least one year, number of years of schooling,

type of course taken at school, club memberships and offices held, avocational activities, the client's statement of reason for coming, the counselor's appraisal of the essential service needed, the modal occupation, the occupation recommended, and scores on tests of intelligence, vocabulary, mechanical ability, nervous stability, attitude toward employer, occupational interests, and radicalism. Some clients were given medical and psychiatric examinations. Some were given an art-judgment test. For those who had held two or more different jobs we have their statement of reasons for preferring one job above another.

From the standpoint of the present study the data are weak in that they do not tell us much about early family life, nutrition, glandular factors, friends, group democracy, and personal emotional experiences, all of which might bear upon ability to sustain morale under trying circumstances.

Indices of Morale

Morale is a multiple-meaning term, and our study is limited to two aspects of it. Morale may (1) stress "a condition of physical and emotional well-being in the individual that makes it possible for him to work and live hopefully and effectively,"* or may (2) place emphasis on the group, its purposes, leadership, integration, implying each individual's sense of "belonging" and sharing in group goals and group activity. It may be, as our study will later suggest, that these two emphases are closely related, but they start from different materials of observation. Our data relate largely to the first, or "individual-organic" aspect of morale.

The first index of morale which we have used in this investigation is the Hall Scale for Measuring Occupational Morale.⁴ Dr. Hall had developed this scale in his study of attitudes of unemployed engineers. Eight items could be answered on a five-point scale ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree." Re-

* Report of a conference on psychological factors in morale, National Research Council, November, 1940.

sponses were scored from 1 (representing highest level of morale) to 5 (for answers indicating poorest morale). The statements of the Hall Scale were as follows:

1. Success is more dependent on luck than on real ability.
2. There is little chance for advancement in industry and business unless a man has an unfair pull.
3. Real ambition is eventually recognized and rewarded.
4. Ambition is all right for youngsters, but a man gets to realize it is all the bunk.
5. Any man with ability and willingness to work hard has a good chance of being successful.
6. The world owes every man a living.
7. When conditions are as bad as they are during a business depression, it sometimes seems foolish for a man to use energy looking for work.
8. There is not much sense in trying very hard to "make good."

Those men with high morale on this scale had somehow managed, in spite of adverse conditions, to sustain their faith in ambition, ability, willingness to work hard, and a chance to succeed. Those with low morale had succumbed to the very natural tendency to feel that efforts no longer counted, that only luck and pull got people ahead, and that the world owed them a living.

The Hall Scale for Occupational Morale reflects attitude toward the job in this competitive economy. It seemed likely that some men might retain occupational morale, in the sense of the Hall Scale, but be disheartened about other aspects of life. Conversely, some who believed the old individualistic economic system had collapsed, might face that prospect with hope and good cheer. We therefore sought a broader measure of morale, and developed what is here called a "Life Satisfaction Index," using items selected from the Bernreuter Personality Inventory and the Strong Vocational Interest Test. These tests had been given during the counseling program, and we have merely re-tabulated the responses to the selected items to obtain our Life-Satisfaction Index.

The largest group of items was selected from the Bernreuter questionnaire.

8. Do you often feel just miserable?
14. Do you consider yourself a rather nervous person?
26. Do you frequently feel grouchy?
39. Do you worry too long over humiliating experiences?
51. Are your feelings easily hurt?
54. Do you often feel lonesome when you are with other people?
72. Are you troubled with feelings of inferiority?
104. Do your feelings alternate between happiness and sadness without apparent reason?

It seemed that poor morale was more likely to lead to answers indicating feeling miserable, nervous, and grouchy, worrying too much, having one's feelings easily hurt, all accompanied by a sense of social isolation, inferiority, and unhappiness. In a previous research¹⁶ we found very high correlation between level of happiness and consistency of mood; wide amplitude of variation between happiness and sadness was characteristic only of the predominantly unhappy. Therefore, question 104 above, about alternation of mood, seemed promising. A preliminary item analysis of these and other items from the Bernreuter, Strong, and Hall tests showed that the above items discriminated consistently in the direction of the total Life Satisfaction battery.

In Part VII of the Strong test we found two items indicative of that phase of morale which reduces worry and hurt feelings:

Worry consid- erably about mistakes ()	Worry very little ()	Do not worry ()
Feelings easily hurt ()	Feelings hurt sometimes ... ()	Feelings rarely hurt ()

It seemed reasonable to conclude that those who worry considerably about mistakes, and whose feelings are easily hurt, are potentially weaker in morale than those who are more tough-minded.

Parts IV and V of the Strong test record the subject's liking

or dislike for 52 kinds of activity (for example: making a radio set, handling horses, giving first-aid assistance, raising flowers and vegetables, making a speech, organizing a play, doing research work, taking responsibility, looking at shop windows, drilling soldiers, or meeting new situations) and for 53 kinds of people (for example: progressive people, conservative people, energetic people, people who are natural leaders, emotional people, gruff men, witty people, Socialists, men who chew tobacco, carelessly dressed people, Negroes, foreigners, and people who have made fortunes in business). It seemed that a high level of *joie de vivre* would be reflected in liking more kinds of people and activities, whereas the unhappy, defeated, frustrated, and resentful unemployed would probably project some of their own dissatisfaction.

The four groups of items: (1) liking for activities; (2) liking for people; (3) tough-mindedness; and (4) freedom from symptoms of misery, worry, loneliness, inferiority, and instability of mood, have been combined for our study into a single Life Satisfaction Index. Table I shows the composition, scoring, range, mean, standard deviation, and reliability for this index. The Bernreuter questions carried a weight of 4.5, each of the Strong liking sections a weight of about 3.0, and the two questions on tough-mindedness of 1.0. Seven other questions which appeared promising and which were included in preliminary explorations were eliminated because item analysis showed inconsistency. The composite index resulted in scores ranging from 2 to the maximum possible, 40, which was achieved in only two instances. The reliability of .82 obtained for both the Hall Scale and for the Life Satisfaction Index seems adequate for the group differentiations here proposed.

Although the four groups of items are all in the general area of life satisfaction, they are not closely correlated with one another, as is shown by the intercorrelations reported in Table II. Although the "liking for activities" and "liking for people" sections have been included in the composite, it appears that they show a negligible correlation with the other measures. The fact

TABLE I. Composition and Reliability of Life Satisfaction Index.

Component	Number of items	Basis for scoring	Range	Mean	S.D.	Reliability (Odd-even, corrected)
Liking for activities Strong, IV	52	L-D; scored as approximate deciles of the distribution	1-10	4.51	3.13	.824
Liking for people Strong, V	53	L-D; scored as approximate deciles of the distribution	1-10	4.54	2.87	.758
Tough-mindedness Strong, VIII	2	0 for unhappy 1 for doubtful 2 for euphoric	0-4	1.48	1.08	.630
Freedom from unhappy symptoms	8	0 for unhappy 1 for ? 2 for euphoric	0-16	8.43	4.53	.774
Total			2-40	22.73	8.35	.815

TABLE II. Reliabilities and intercorrelations of morale measures.

	S.D.	1. L.A.	2. L.P.	3. T.M.	4. F.U.S.	5. Total	6. Hall
Life Satisfaction Index:							
1. Liking for activities (Strong)	3.1	.82	.19	-.04	-.04	.064	.004
2. Liking for people (Strong)	2.9	.19	.76	-.04	-.04	.169	.04
3. Tough-mindedness (Strong)	1.1	-.04	-.04	.63	.54	.47	.04
4. Freedom from unhappy symptoms (Bernreuter)	4.5	-.04	-.04	.54	.77	.71	.23
5. Total Life Satisfaction Index	8.4	.06	.17	.47	.71	.82	.25
6. Hall Scale for occupational morale	0.61	.004	.04	.04	.23	.25	.82

that "liking for activities" shows a correlation of less than .20 with "liking for people" indicates that the tendency to mark likes or dislikes is not very general or very consistent. Taken with the fairly high reliabilities found in Table I, the data seem to show that liking for people is consistent; liking for activities is consistent; but neither is a satisfactory index of the other or of general euphoria. In our interpretation the low correlation with symptom questionnaires is no argument against including these sections in our composite. The characteristics measured by these two portions of the Strong test are distinct from one another and from the attitudes reflected in the other parts of the index, but they are psychologically and socially important. People who tend to dislike most of the activities which bring satisfaction in daily life, or who tend to dislike most of the kinds of people one meets and works with each day, are properly included among the morale problems.

The highest relationship among the parts of the Life Satisfaction Index is found between the tough-mindedness questions on the Strong test and the Bernreuter items about feeling miserable, nervous, grouchy, worried, lonesome, sensitive, etc. Here the correlation is .54.

The Hall Scale for Measuring Occupational Morale shows little relationship to the Life Satisfaction Index ($r = .25$). What little correlation appears seems to come from the Bernreuter questions and may represent a common factor in both tests; namely, the desire of the subject to make a favorable impression.

Limitations of Self-Report

It must be recognized that all of our measures are self-reports. This fact, although it is practically inescapable in attempts to get at subjective attitudes, does introduce certain errors. We must assume in the light of many previous studies that some distortion takes place as a result of the need of some subjects to protect their ego. Some faults they are loathe to admit to themselves, and many

others they might be reluctant to state on psychological test blanks. The investigators did what they could to allay fears and defensive attitudes. The whole procedure was voluntary. The tests were suggested as a part of a counseling procedure designed to help the subject make an honest evaluation of his strong and weak points. Subjects were urged not to take tests at all unless they were free to be quite frank. Undoubtedly many co-operated wholeheartedly. Some, discouraged because they were out of work, may even have exaggerated their faults. It has been previously noted in other studies that the unemployed were more apt to blame themselves than to blame the social order for their failures. Yet we would expect, *a priori*, that these self-reports would be colored by the omission of some admissions which might seem to the subject to discredit him, and by efforts to put the best foot forward.

We may recognize this limitation and still find group comparisons meaningful. For some reason or other some subjects *did* report more dislikes, fears, worries, than others, and more distrust of jobs and employers. The effect of the defensive errors in self-description would be to raise the general score a bit in what would seem the desirable direction, and to obscure a little the differences which a truly valid measure might reveal. If, for example, all young people really had high morale and all old people had poor morale, but the people with poor morale tended to fudge on admitting their state, then the result would be some blurring of the sharp distinction which ought to exist between scores of the young and the old. Hence we conclude that the principal effect of the errors in self-reporting will be to make observed differences among objectively defined subgroups less than the true differences would be.

In case both the morale measure and the factor being studied in relation to morale are contaminated by possible self-protective tendencies, the obtained correlation will be spuriously high, and the more surely valid and significant observations will be those in which the relationship appears, nevertheless, negligible.

Applying our logic to Table II, where all measures are based

upon self-report, the most impressive fact is that the interrelationships are so small. Occupational morale, for example, as measured by the Hall Scale, is quite independent of the other indices. These results do not support those industrial psychologists who have attributed poor morale on the job largely to personal maladjustment.

Case Summaries Show Validity

Case studies were made of 16 men chosen from the highest level of morale, and compared with 16 from the lowest level—as measured, in both cases, by the Life Satisfaction Index.* The data collected in the Adjustment Service are far from adequate for a thorough, intensive case study, but when the available data are put together in unified portrait they do permit some characterization. The 16 cases of low morale all carry internal evidence of personal maladjustment, insecurity, anxiety, unrealistic ambitions, indecision, confused plans, distrust of others, and general discouragement. Among the cases of high morale, however, there were two in which the self-report of high satisfaction was suspect. One was an epileptic who wanted to be a professional baseball player. He was apparently well liked, but seemed perhaps to be bolstering his own self-assurance. Another, who never answered “dislike” to any activity and who answered half of the Bernreuter questions with a question mark, was clearly maladjusted. We may conclude that the low-morale cases are probably not diluted with those who should rate higher, but that the high groups probably include 10 per cent to 15 per cent of cases which do not belong there.

Some flesh and blood to fill out the statistical skeleton may appear in the two following cases, fairly representative of the high and low scores on life satisfaction. (Names and other identifying

* Acknowledgment is made to Mrs. Florence Rosenblatt Miale, who brought to the case records unusual competence in psychological analysis, including graphology.

data have been disguised, but the essential features of each case are unaltered.)

CARL LYND (LOW LIFE SATISFACTION SCORE)

Carl Lynd is an 18-year-old boy who has had two years of high school (general course), and a semester of typing and stenography in evening school. Carl states that he wanted to study a trade but took the commercial work because the trade was impossible. He has had two jobs. One was as newspaper delivery boy, with earnings from \$4 to \$7 a week, from June to September, 1931, the summer after he graduated from elementary school. After the newspaper delivery job he was unemployed until July, 1933, when he had a job delivering dresses at \$10 to \$14 a week, which lasted between one and two months, and which terminated because there was "no work." He had been unemployed since then when he came to the Adjustment Service in January, 1934.

Test results, except for clerical ability, which is in the 70th percentile, are poor. Intelligence and vocabulary are in the 37th percentile, mechanical aptitude in the 3rd, finger dexterity in the 5th.

The major vocational problem, and perhaps the major personality problem, is one of indecision. Carl states his problem to the Adjustment Service as: "What am I best suited for and what shall I study in evening school?" He exhibits no faint glimmer of occupational choice except in answering the question: "What occupations have you frequently daydreamed of entering?" to which he replies: "Airplane mechanic and pilot also." When asked to list six occupations in which he believes he could find satisfaction, he leaves all the spaces blank. Carl says that neither of the jobs he has had appealed to him, and when asked to what he attributes any lack of job success he replies: "I feel I wasn't suited for it because I just didn't like that type of work." Asked "What are your present occupational ambitions? What positions would you like to be holding ten years from now?" he answers "I don't know. A position with a substantial income."

A similar spirit prevails in Carl Lynd's responses to the Bernreuter questions. He says that he is slow in making decisions, that his interests change rapidly, that ideas often run through his head

so that he cannot sleep, that he often finds he cannot make up his mind until the time for action has passed, that some particularly useless thought keeps coming into his mind to bother him, that he lacks self-confidence, that he finds difficulty in making up his mind for himself, that he likes to get many views from others before making an important decision, that he is troubled by the idea that people on the street are watching him. And although he states on one questionnaire that he likes to bear responsibilities alone, on another he encircles "Dislike" for "Taking responsibility." Similarly, on one questionnaire he says that he usually enjoys spending an evening alone, but on the other marks "Dislike" for "Being left to yourself."

The Hall inventory reveals extreme personal pessimism. He underlines "Strongly disagree" for "I feel that my life has been fairly successful so far," and for "I am probably luckier than most people," and "Disagree" for "Misfortunes are seldom as bad as they seem," and "My life is happier than that of most people I know," whereas he agrees with the statement "There is more misery than happiness in life." He agrees, too, that what this country needs is a strong dictator.

ROBERT HUGHES (HIGH LIFE SATISFACTION SCORE)

Robert Hughes is an electrician, married, 25 years old, of English Protestant background. He became an electrician at the age of 17 after two years of vocational high school. Having worked at his first job, at \$35 a week, for four years (until the end of 1929), he was discharged because there was "insufficient work." His next job, which lasted a year, was at \$36 a week, as an installer for a light and power company. He resigned because he "could not get along with superior." He states, however, that this was the job which he liked best of those he has held, "because I understood the work I was doing, it was rather dangerous at times and at the same time it held my interest." After this he worked for two years, at \$27 a week, as collection and meter man and investigator for an electrical company, and from the time this job terminated (again because of "insufficient work") in March,

1933, until December, 1933, he held four jobs, two as salesman on commission, which he left because the returns were too small, one as electrician at \$16 a week for a few weeks ("insufficient work" again), and one two-week job as toy demonstrator (\$15 per week). He came to the Adjustment Service in January, 1934.

Mr. Hughes is very much interested in electrical work and in chemistry, and his ambition is to be an electrical or chemical engineer. Tests indicate good knowledge of his trade, excellent mechanical aptitude (a score in the 94th percentile in the Minnesota Spatial Relations test) and good intellectual ability (84th percentile in the classification test, 60th percentile in vocabulary). He scores high (85th percentile) in finger dexterity, 62nd percentile in tweezer dexterity, and 54th percentile in the Mechanical Assembly test.

On the opinion inventory, Mr. Hughes agrees with the statements, "I feel that my life has been fairly successful so far," "I am probably luckier than most people," and "My life's happier than that of most people I know." He strongly disagrees with the statement, "There is more misery than happiness in life," and agrees that "Perseverance and courage eventually win over misfortunes."

Responses on other blanks reveal a similar high confidence in himself and in life. His answers on the Bernreuter and Strong blanks are almost entirely those that indicate a well-adapted, outgoing personality. The answers are not so consistently "perfect," however, as to suggest a lack of differentiation or a refusal to face weaknesses. He admits to moodiness and indicates that ideas sometimes run through his head so that he cannot sleep. Although he likes to be with people a great deal, prefers to work with others rather than working alone, and is talkative at social gatherings, he tends to keep his feelings to himself, and does not find that people are more stimulating to him than anything else. Although he never answers "no" in the list of positive personal characteristics in Part VIII of the Strong blank, there is not a complete list of "yes." A number of items in the list, like "Am always on time in my work," "Can correct others without giving offense," "Have good judgment in appraising values," and "Stimulate the ambition of my associates" are answered by checking the more modest

question mark. He has a wide variety of avocational interests including active sports and games. His hobby is conducting chemical experiments.

Robert Hughes' handwriting is that of a person who works well with material, who lacks originality, but has a quick mind and an excellent eye for detail. His social adjustment is quite commonplace but very well adapted. He can get along with people in an unoriginal but warm and easy fashion, and his attitude to life is positive and optimistic, even though his optimism is not on a very profound basis. Making a good first impression is important to him, and he usually succeeds in it, but he is rather easily fatigued, and may do much better at the beginning of a job than later on.

Further Evidence for Validity

From the Adjustment Service records certain data are available to show that the Occupational Morale Scale and the Life Satisfaction Index do in general measure what they purport to test.

Chart 1 shows the relationship of morale measures to the client's essential problem as judged by the counselor in the Adjustment Service on the basis of all the interviews, examinations, psychological tests, work records, and other evidence available. Results for both morale measures are shown in separate graphs, the Life Satisfaction Score on the left-hand portion of the chart, and the Hall Occupational Morale Scale on the right-hand portion. Although in both graphs the bottom of the scale is the lowest possible score and the top of the scale the highest possible score, the two scales are not directly comparable. Scores on the Occupational Morale Scale appear higher on the page than do scores on the Life Satisfaction Index, but that does not mean that they represent a higher level of morale. Comparisons are meaningful only within the Life Satisfaction graph or within the Occupational Morale graph; never between the two, except in matters of trend.

The shaded area in each column represents the interquartile range, and the heavy line near the center of the shaded area is the





CHART 1. Morale and service classification.

median. Twenty-five per cent of the responses fall below the shaded area—twenty-five per cent above it. The graph, therefore, portrays the standing of the middle half of the cases in the column subgroup.

The first columns for each graph in Chart 1 include all men whose problem was classified as one of "Threshold Guidance." These were young adults just entering on their occupational career and uncertain what line to follow. The second column in each graph portrays scores for the largest group of cases—those called "Adult Indecision." These were men with some years of work experience, who were uncertain as to whether they should stay in their former type of work or try something more promising. Their morale, both on the Life Satisfaction score and the occupational attitude score, was higher than that of the Threshold Guidance cases. Still higher was the morale for the third column, labeled "Confirm Own Plans." These men had already laid out a course for themselves, but welcomed a chance to check their ideas with the counselor. The column marked "Placement Advice" represents scores of men who presented no problem of vocational uncertainty, but who needed only guidance in how to go about finding job contacts. The test service group, highest of all categories in Life Satisfaction score, represents men sent over from the state work-relief program for testing prior to placement as teachers in the program for adult education. Inasmuch as they not only knew what sort of work they wanted, but had a definite job in sight, it is little wonder that their morale was high. The last column represents the scores of about a dozen men who were recognized to be primarily personality problems. Their maladjustment reflects, as it should, in the Life Satisfaction score, but it is interesting to see that their faith in traditional conservative doctrines of ambition and effort as the ladder to job success was higher than that of any other group.

Although the differences in Occupational Morale score in Chart 1 are not statistically significant, their direction is a challenge to the hypothesis of some industrial personnel authorities³

that radical economic views grow out of personal emotional conflicts. This question of the relation of opinions to morale will be explored later at more length. We shall return also at another time to some of the other complications of Chart 1. For the moment, we are interested mainly in the fact that even with so small a number of cases, a *Chi Square* test indicates that a difference as great as that between Life Satisfaction scores of the personality-problem men and the other men in the study would be expected by chance less than 5 times in 100. The index does agree with counselor judgment.

One study which sheds further light on the meaning of our two morale indices is based on the reasons given by these men for preferring one job rather than another.* This study was necessarily limited to men who had held two or more jobs. They were asked which they liked best, and why. The morale scores of men stressing each type of work satisfaction appear in Table III.†

The highest average Life Satisfaction score was that of the group who could give no reason for their preference except that they liked the work and found it interesting. Their satisfactions were apparently intrinsic. Second in personal morale were those who stressed particularly the service value. These findings may have rather direct implications for morale-building during and after the war. Whatever can be done to make work in and of itself more satisfying will strengthen morale. Partly this is a matter of restructuring jobs to make them more interesting and meaningful, and partly a matter of educating youth to get a maximum of enjoyment from hard work. At the opposite end of the scale, those who preferred the "soft" jobs were the lowest in personal morale.

The meaning of the Hall Occupational Morale score becomes clearer when we note, from Table III, that the highest group consists of those who look at jobs primarily from the conventional

* The writer acknowledges the aid of Jerome Seidman in making this study.

† Some individuals who stressed more than one reason appear under more than one category in the table. Note that high morale in the Occupational Morale scale is indicated by a low score.

angle of money, prestige, and a chance for advancement. They have been thoroughly sold on the ethos of capitalism. A relatively low score on the Occupational Morale scale was made by those who valued most contact with nature or freedom to work in their own way. One can imagine that neither of these types would fit well on the assembly line or in the mail and files department of a large office.

A third check on the validity of the Life Satisfaction Index is presented in Chart 2. Eighty-nine men were referred to a psychiatrist because, at some time during their contact with the Ad-

TABLE III. Relation of morale scores to reasons for preferring jobs.

Reason for preference	Number of mentions	Morale scores			
		Life satisfaction median		Occupational median	
		Score	Rank	Score	Rank
1. Better chance for advancement	78	23.40	4	2.127	3
2. Congenial personal associations	73	22.50	10	2.143	4
3. Greater responsibility	66	23.68	3	2.286	8
4. Variety; novelty; glamor of new experiences	65	22.60	9	2.267	7
5. General: like it; interesting	28	25.00	1	2.250	5½
6. Chance to learn, make contacts, get experience	22	18.75	11	2.350	9
7. More money	21	23.06	7	2.080	1
8. Opportunity to serve society; useful	20	23.75	2	2.250	5½
9. Outdoors; healthy; closer to nature	17	23.13	5½	2.600	12
10. Higher prestige	16	23.13	5½	2.086	2
11. More freedom; work in own way	15	22.92	8	2.533	11
12. Could do it better; easier ..	14	18.33	12	2.400	10

Differences on each scale between groups ranking 1, 2, 3 and those ranking 10, 11, 12 are significant at levels where p is less than .05.

justment Service, some counselor or tester had suspected that there might be some deeper disorder of the personality. Again we discover that these were the men shown by our Life Satisfaction Index to have lower morale. Only once in 100 times would so great a difference appear in chance distributions. Again we observe that these men with problems leading to referral were not significantly different from the other men in their Occupational Morale scores. It should be added that although some 18 per cent of the clients were referred for possible psychiatric help, that figure does not indicate any exceptional degree of maladjustment. Psychiatrists reported only one psychosis in the group; one man was called "prepsychoctic"; four were classed as "psychoneurotics." All together these represent less than 2 per cent of the group—a better than normal expectation. The group referred to psychiatrists was almost entirely composed of persons whose difficulties put them well within the normal limits of personality variation, but only 4 per cent of them made morale scores up alongside the top 20 per cent of the unreferred group.

The importance of personal emotional adjustment for good morale is frequently stressed in literature on mental hygiene today. Two case summaries will help, perhaps, to make it plain that high morale on the Life Satisfaction Index is not merely a matter of favorable economic and social conditions. Those factors in heredity and early home relationships which build *emotional security* rate as of primary importance for later morale.

HARTFORD LEWIS (LOW LIFE SATISFACTION SCORE)

Hartford Lewis is a newspaper man of 43, married (five years ago to a writer who is now unemployed also), with many years of experience in newspaper, magazine, and editorial work. He is of Puritan New England stock. Intelligence-test scores are extremely high. His education ended with high school in 1909, after which he did low-grade clerical and factory work until 1912, when he became a reporter for a New England newspaper. To take this




CHART 2. Morale and psychiatric problems.

first newspaper position at \$8 a week, he left a \$20-a-week job as assistant manager of the printing department of a manufacturing company. He did this, he writes, "for the 'glamour' of newspaper life." He continued working for small newspapers until World War I, when he left a \$35-a-week job as political writer to enlist as an ambulance driver. After 1919 he had several editorial jobs at salaries ranging from \$25 to \$125 per week. Mr. Lewis' last regular job, from December, 1930, to August, 1931, was as contributing editor to an encyclopedia at \$75 a week. Except for a one-month temporary job on a magazine in the summer of 1932, he was unemployed from August, 1931, until January, 1934, when he came to the Adjustment Service. He did free-lance writing during this period but does not indicate what financial returns there were, beyond the definite implication of lack of success.

Mr. Lewis states his problem to the Adjustment Service as follows: "My aptitudes for the work I am doing and a general picture of my future in the writing field." It is noted by counselors and psychiatrist that he is very depressed. He speaks of a great difficulty in meeting people, which he attributes to traumatic war experiences (not specified), and is afraid his "nervousness" may affect his writing.

His Bernreuter responses reflect his emotional disturbances. He indicates inability to stand criticism without feeling hurt, moodiness and grouchiness, shyness, difficulty in sleeping because of unwelcome thoughts, easily hurt feelings, a sense of inferiority, lack of self-confidence, much worry.

Mr. Lewis' handwriting is that of a very depressive person with marked compulsive trends—a person with no genuine relatedness to others, with a negative attitude toward life, irritable, resentful; a person whose intellect is highly developed at the expense of other aspects of development—with strong self-destructive tendencies, and a fear of change, of struggle, of life. The handwriting also indicates metabolic and circulatory disturbances.

He complains of poor health, mainly chronic "stomach trouble," but also rheumatism, kidney trouble, and bladder trouble, and has had earache, bronchitis, severe influenza, and severe gonorrhea. The physical examination revealed a disturbance in blood pressure. He seems to drink considerably, stating on the health ques-

tionnaire that he ordinarily drinks six glasses of beer and six glasses of spirits per day.

In view of much of the foregoing, the psychiatrist's report, which follows, seems somewhat understated:

"Hartford Lewis suffers from being a physician's son. He was brought up in the typical doctor's manner, namely, about as poorly as possible, and this condition was emphasized by too much New England and Pilgrim background, so that the poor man has had a chip on his shoulder ever since. His development, delayed as it was, was rudely interrupted and stirred up by his war service, where he was pressed into leadership which did not fit him at all. He has grown quite a little sense, but has still a more or less hidden fear of inadequacy in front of more successful people. His "nervousness" is not serious enough really to interfere with his work, and I do not think it will affect his writing in any way. Since he has to assume family obligations, his problems at the present time seem to be more economic than anything else, and he might be compelled to change his attitude a little bit from the sense of being forced to ask for assistance, even if it is against his grain."

BENJAMIN HIRSCH (HIGH LIFE SATISFACTION SCORE)

Benjamin Hirsch is 23 years old, of Russian Jewish lineage. Though he is just finishing his senior year in night school at a municipal college, he has had four and a half years of full-time work experience. His father is a tailor working part time, and it seems that both father and son have worked hard at the job of putting Ben through college. His visit to the Adjustment Service in December, 1933, one month prior to his graduation from college, is clearly related to his impending graduation and the need to decide what to do next. He seems to be a solid and responsible person. His personal and occupational records indicate a work history that was deliberately subordinated to the task of completing college. His real job was that of managing to pursue his studies, which he must have done mainly in the late afternoons and evenings while holding regular jobs. Ben's first position,

which he held from February, 1928, when he finished high school, until the following June, when the firm went out of business, was as a clerk, at \$14 a week, for a clothing manufacturer. He at once obtained a similar job, at \$15 a week, which he held for three years, until September, 1931, when he was laid off. From November, 1931, to October, 1932, he worked at \$15 a week in an automobile repair shop. He has been attending school during the day since his loss of this job.

The problem that Benjamin Hirsch presents to the Adjustment Service concerns a choice between research and teaching. His intelligence is very high (93d percentile), and his vocabulary and clerical ability scores are good. There are no evidences in the case material of any personality problems or special difficulties. He exhibits a high degree of self-sufficiency, but at the same time he enjoys social relationships and makes friends easily. The counselor classifies him as an extrovert, and considers him suited to salesmanship.

The opinion inventory discloses an individual who, although avoiding extremes, at the same time does not avoid forceful expression of his opinions. He strongly agrees that there is no justification for a strong radical party in this country, but at the same time strongly agrees that employees should organize into unions as a way of getting fair treatment. His judgment seems selective rather than doctrinaire. Although he has had to work at an uninspiring job for little money in order to help pay his way through college, he considers himself luckier than most people.

Correlation With Morale Scores

Eleven of the variables studied are measured in units which justify the use of the Pearson product-moment coefficient of correlation to express relationships. The results are presented in Table IV.

The highest correlation is that of .62 between the Bernreuter score for nervous stability and the Life Satisfaction Index. This agreement is, however, partially spurious because of identical questions and similar approaches in the two instruments. The cor-

relation of .42 between the Hall Occupational Morale Scale and the Hall Scale measuring Attitude toward Employer is affected by the similarity in form of the two sets of questions, but no items are identical in the two scales. It would be expected, however, that a valid scale of personal morale should correlate with emotional adjustment, and that occupational morale should be related to a favorable attitude toward employers.

TABLE IV Some correlations with morale indices.

	Life Satisfaction Index <i>r</i>	Occupational Morale Scale <i>r</i>
Age05	.04
Maximum weekly wage on previous job held for at least one year08	.10
Index of employment stability (per cent of total working time spent on long- est job)10	.04
Number of avocational interests checked	.08	.08
Other test scores:		
Intelligence (Pressey Classification) ..	-.05	.06
Vocabulary (O'Connor)	-.06	-.03
Mechanical Assembly10	.18*
Art Judgment (Meier-Seashore)01	-.06
Nervous Stability (Bernreuter)62*	.23*
Attitude toward Employer (Hall)15*	.42*
Radicalism	-.12	-.35*

* Correlations starred are three or more times their standard deviation.

The index of radicalism is based on five questions in the Hall scale covering attitude toward a revolution for this country, toward government ownership, socialism, a strong radical party, and the desirability of drastic economic changes. As we have seen earlier, the Hall Scale of Occupational Morale implies faith in the chance to get ahead under traditional capitalist controls, so the negative correlation between occupational morale and radicalism was to be expected. The tendency for low personal morale to

be reflected in radical opinions is much less marked; the correlation of $-.12$ is less than three times its standard error.

So far as the other measures are concerned, correlations are all low. Only one ability test—the Mechanical Assembly test—shows a relationship to morale as high as three times the standard deviation of the correlation coefficient. The correlation of $.18$ between mechanical skill and occupational morale may mean that men who had learned trades were more confident of their chance to get ahead by hard work than were the white-collar men. The direction of other correlations suggests a possible tendency for morale to be higher in the older group, among those with higher previous earnings, with more stable work history, and with more avocational interests, but none of the coefficients is large enough to warrant confidence in the relationship. A study of the actual distributions in some of these measures will bring out the facts more clearly.

AGE AND MORALE

Chart 3 shows the morale scores of various age groups from the late teens to those beyond 45. It is apparent that there is no relationship between morale and age over most of the range, but the men over 45 years of age, on the other hand, did have a morale score higher than that of the rest of the population. Although the difference on the Life Satisfaction Index is not significant statistically, on the Hall Scale for Occupational Morale the difference is greater than would be expected once in one hundred times by chance. During depression years, we conclude, men beyond 45 maintained their traditional faith in American opportunity for ability to bring advancement, better than did younger fellows. The younger group more quickly accepted the idea that luck and pull and hard times generally made effort useless. This finding accords with a more general truth that young people more readily take up new viewpoints; older people hold on to the attitudes formed in youth, even when conditions may change.




CHART 3. Morale and age.

The implication for morale today is that, so far as maintaining a readiness to fight for the traditional American symbols and values is concerned, older men are likely to respond more wholeheartedly than youth. Opinion polls during the period preceding our entry into the war made this quite clear.* If, however, we were to think of morale in terms of effort to build a new and better world after the war, it is quite likely that proposals for social change would find more support among young people and would encounter most resistance in men past 45. This hypothesis, if confirmed, would challenge our present custom of assigning influential roles in government almost exclusively to men beyond their forties. In a period of stability this may be a wise policy; in a period of rapid change the older leaders may find it hard to readjust enough, or swiftly enough.

D. C. Miller,^{8, 9, 10} comparing 100 University of Minnesota alumni of high morale with 100 alumni of low morale, found higher morale for men and women over 30 years of age. Rundquist and Sletto,¹⁴ on the other hand, in a group of men on relief, found lower morale in the older group, a fact we are unable to bring into accord with other results. Sailer's study¹⁵ found 37 per cent of men over 30 claiming to belong in the highest happiness category, whereas only 10 per cent of young men under 21 reported themselves as on that level of life satisfaction.

Hall⁴ in another study observed unemployed engineers, using the Occupational Morale Scale which we have employed, and studied the effect of age when economic conditions are held approximately constant. The results of this especially relevant study are reported in Table V. It will be remembered that high morale is indicated by a low figure. The influence of age is not clear-cut. On the whole the lowest morale is shown by the mid-group: age 31-40. Hall reports no figures corresponding to our group of men beyond 45 when morale was higher. The factor of economic need clearly reveals itself as a morale depressant.

* Cf. Chapter XI, "American morale when the war began," by Donald Rugg.

One curious fact is that in each age group the Occupational Morale scores obtained by Hall showed more discouragement than did our Adjustment Service clients. Not even Hall's "Group A," with no immediate economic need, scored as high in Occupational Morale as did our unemployed men. That this is not an occupational difference is indicated by a mean score of 2.20 obtained for our men whose occupation was "Professional: scientific," a group including engineers, chemists, etc. Perhaps the difference is due

TABLE V. Occupational Morale in Relation to Age and Financial Condition (after O. M. Hall).

Category	Median morale score by age groups			
	21-30 years	31-40 years	41-50 years	over 50 years
A. Unemployed but in no immediate need	2.44	2.52	2.60	—
B. Unemployed; getting help from family or friends	2.62	3.06	2.88	—
C. In desperate straits; getting work relief	2.62	3.10	2.70	—
D. In desperate straits; no work relief at time of study	3.10	3.26	3.06	—
Adjustment Service Clients	2.28	2.19	2.31	1.90 (10 cases only)

to the general state of the nation. Hall's results were obtained a year or so earlier, in the very depth of the depression, and before New Deal activities had begun to stimulate hope. Another influential factor may have been selection: conceivably, more of those men whose morale was high enough to expect something better ahead came voluntarily to the Adjustment Service.

SEX, MARITAL STATUS, AND MORALE

Although most of our study was based upon the records of men only, a comparison was made with morale scores of 92 women





CHART 4. Morale and sex and marital status.

clients of the Adjustment Service. The dotted lines on Chart 4 show that the men scored a little higher on Life Satisfaction, the women very slightly higher on Occupational Morale; but neither difference is large enough to require hypotheses beyond chance. In Chart 4, where the men and women are grouped by marital status, some significant differences do appear.

In another study of happiness some years ago,¹⁶ we found that whereas 36 per cent of the "Happy" group were married, the percentage dropped to 13 per cent of the median group and 8 per cent of the most unhappy population. The vital significance of love adjustment for misery or joy has been sung by all the poets and hardly needs statistical confirmation. The most striking difference, in the study just cited, between the happy and the unhappy groups, was in the greater proportion of the unhappy men and women who yearned to spend a few hours with a certain companion of opposite sex.

In other studies, Miller^{8, 9, 10} found that college graduates who had married had higher morale, but thought this might be largely a reflection of age; Sailer¹⁵ discovered that while 16 per cent of single men rated themselves in the highest category of life happiness, as many as many 38 per cent of married men thought they had reached this acme of bliss.

The married men in our present investigation had a higher Life Satisfaction score than did single men, and the difference is so large as would occur by chance only 4 times in 100. In one sense this result seems surprising. Unemployment must be a more serious threat to a married man than to one still without family responsibilities. There are, however, several plausible lines of explanation. Most of the scores of newspaper editors who commented on this finding when it was released in September, 1941, took the line that the comforting support of a wife is invaluable in times of distress. This is undoubtedly true in many cases. Other explanations may also contribute. Many of the unemployed men wanted to be married; their lack of a job enforced a most distressing delay. Further, it is likely that those men with more opti-

mistic outlook found girl friends more responsive. Again it is almost certain that young men with high morale would be more likely to go ahead with marriage in spite of uncertain times than would those who had been easily disheartened.

It is a little surprising that the 20 men who had been widowed, separated, or divorced should score higher in Life Satisfaction than did the single men. The difference is not statistically significant, but on the basis of other studies, we should have expected lower morale in those whose marriages had been broken. The higher score of the "Separated" group on Occupational Morale may arise in part from the fact that they tend to be older than the single men, and we have already found higher scores on the Hall Scale for those over 45.

Chart 5 shows relationship of morale to number of dependents. Although it might have been anticipated that those with more responsibilities would suffer more from being out of a job, again the reverse fact appears. Men with three or more dependents have the highest morale, on both scales, and in the case of the Life Satisfaction Index a difference of that magnitude might be expected by chance not more than 20 nor less than 10 times in 100. Again we may choose between an explanation which says that families help to sustain morale and one which argues that persons of high morale are more likely to acquire dependents. Rundquist and Sletto¹⁴ found higher morale in students who lived at home in an intact family. In that study the family was probably the cause rather than the effect of the better morale.

There are certainly limits, it must be admitted, to the size of family which is a blessing during unemployment. In another study¹⁷ comparing those families on relief who showed great competence in meeting the hard situation of poverty, with others who were demoralized and helplessly dependent, it was found that families with more than five children were much more common (7 to 2) in the low-morale group.





CHART 5. Morale and number of dependents.

MORALE AND ANCESTRY

Since the Adjustment Service operated in New York City, a substantial number of clients had come as immigrants to the United States; many more were the first generation born in the United States from parents who had been born abroad. Chart 6 indicates that there were no significant differences in morale related to being native-born or foreign-born. There is no justification here for any expectation that descendants of older American stock will keep their courage up in emergencies any better than will those born abroad or whose parents were born abroad.

In our study of relief families¹⁷ we found a somewhat larger proportion (8 to 3) of families of American ancestry in the high-morale group rather than in the low. Those of Austrian background were also predominantly (6 to 1) in the high-morale category. No differences appeared among Russian, Italian, or Polish families.

MORALE AND ABILITY

The low correlations reported in Table IV indicate that morale is not primarily a reflection of intelligence, vocabulary, mechanical skill, or artistic aptitude. In connection with that table, however, we suggested that some relationships appear in the charts that are not evident in the correlation figures. The relationship of morale to intelligence, as measured by the Pressey Classification Test, is shown in Chart 7.

Life Satisfaction score is somewhat higher in the small group with highest intelligence, but the difference is not statistically significant, and there is no general trend in that direction. The Occupational Morale score is lowest for the dumbest men and highest for the brightest, the difference between these two groups being so great that it could be expected less than 5 times in 100 by chance alone. The trend, in the Hall Occupational Morale scores, is also consistent. Our findings distinctly suggest that the men with highest mental ability were best able to meet their difficulties in




CHART 6. Morale and ancestry.





CHART 7. Morale and intelligence.

good spirit. This runs counter to Miller's observation^{8, 9, 10} that twice as many men of low morale as of high morale came from the upper intelligence levels.

Results from the test of mechanical skill are reported in Chart 8. On both of our morale indices we find a better situation among those men with higher scores on the Mechanical Assembly test. In the case of Occupational Morale the difference between groups with highest and lowest mechanical skill is greater than would occur once in 100 times by chance. This finding is consistent with an observation made on a group of educators some years earlier.¹⁶ Competence in fixing a burned-out fuse was claimed by 35 per cent of the happiest group of adults, but by only 8 per cent of the most unhappy.* Tentatively we might propose that morale is fostered by having enough manipulative skills to give one a sense of adequacy in meeting the ordinary breakdowns of our mechanical age.

Although the Meier-Seashore Test of Art Judgment was given to only about 80 of our subjects, it is interesting to observe (Chart 9) that the highest medians on both morale measures are again found in the group scoring highest in artistic judgment. Differences are smaller and less consistent than they were when groups were sorted by mechanical ability. The general hypothesis that high competence in almost any area is associated with better maintenance of morale still seems defensible.

MORALE AND PERIOD OF UNEMPLOYMENT

Bakke has described in case studies the "mental effects of unemployment."² Initially men started out with confidence that alert, active hunting would soon turn up a job. Then, though the hope died, the habit persisted, and men kept on searching blindly, doggedly. Finally, losing all confidence in themselves, they became sullen, despondent, inert.

* Sailer¹⁵ found no significant relationship between happiness and assertion of ability to repair fuse, fix an auto, and repair things around the house.





CHART 8. Morale and mechanical skill.




CHART 9. Morale and art judgment.





CHART 10. Morale and unemployment.

With this hypothesis in mind we explored the relationship of morale to period of unemployment. The results, reported in Charts 10 and 11, surprised us. In Chart 10 no reliable difference appears between four to five hundred unemployed clients of the Adjustment Service and eighty to ninety clients who still had jobs. Of course those men with jobs would not have come to the Adjustment Service unless they wanted some guidance; their jobs, then, it may be presumed, were unsatisfactory. Perhaps in many instances there was an anxiety lest they should become unemployed in the near future. Hall's earlier study of engineers ⁴ showed an Occupational Morale score of 2.60 for 74 men employed but anticipating layoff, whereas 91 men, unemployed but in no immediate financial need, averaged 2.50, a score showing slightly better morale. The evidence indicates that worry about a blow which may fall is, in some instances, as demoralizing as the actual situation after the blow has fallen. Yet students still in school, on both indices of morale, made higher scores. The usual commencement warnings about plunging out into the cold cruel world seem to have some point.

In Chart 11, the surprising fact revealed is that the period of unemployment seemed to be unrelated to morale. Those out of work three years and more seemed quite as hopeful as those who had been unemployed for only a few weeks. Hall's study gave the more expected result: Occupational Morale declined continuously from a score of 2.64 for those out of work less than 20 weeks, to 2.91 for those out of work more than 60 weeks. The approximately comparable figures for our study would be 2.21 for those out of work less than 26 weeks, and 2.36 for those out of work more than 78 weeks. The difference in general level of morale between Hall's findings and ours, mentioned above in discussing relationship to age, seems greater than the difference within either study due to length of time without a job. Although both sets of observations reflect a slight tendency for longer unemployment to lower morale, the general effect is less marked than would have been anticipated from selected case studies. Adaptation takes place





CHART 11. Morale and period of unemployment.

fairly quickly. This generalization may fit in with the reports from England that during prolonged periods of bombing, breakdowns were few. People do get accustomed to hardship, deprivations, and even to threatened destruction.

MORALE AND HEALTH

Most studies have confirmed common-sense expectations that good health is an important foundation for good morale. Or, with some truth, the relationship might be reversed: good morale probably aids in keeping well. Sailer found that the level of general happiness was higher in those young men who reported superior health at present, superior health in childhood, athletic ability above average, and freedom from physical handicaps. Those who had been troubled with constipation, who had physical or nervous handicaps, who rated themselves poor in athletics, and who reported getting tired easily, were low in Life Satisfaction.

Miller's study of college graduates found, in contrast to the usual expectation, no association between health and morale. Our own findings, shown in Chart 12, agree with Miller's. The criterion was, of course, crude. Some clients who reported physical difficulties or whose report led the counselor to suspect physical disorders, were referred for health examinations. The overwhelming majority were accepted without medical review. Those who were sent to doctors were, on both morale indices, slightly lower than the unREFERRED, but differences were small. Those reported by the doctors to have definite physical handicaps which would seriously limit the work clients could do, bore up, in morale, quite as well as those who were given a medical rating of "fit for any work."

One factor may have been that an actual physical disorder is sometimes a welcome "out" for an unemployed man. It relieves the sense of unworthiness and inadequacy which accompanies being able-bodied but idle. This hypothesis would help to account for the apparent discrepancy between earlier studies of normally





CHART 12. Morale and health record.

employed persons and these studies of the unemployed. We might conclude that health is ordinarily an important factor in good morale, but that under depressed conditions, when illness is more acceptable to the ego than other apologies for inadequacy, the relationship between health and morale is obscured.

A similar lack of relationship between health and morale appears in our study of families on relief.¹⁷ Health was rated "good" in 15 of the 35 high-morale families and in 16 of 35 low-morale families. In the high-morale group were 9 with serious cardiac illness, 2 with tuberculosis, and 9 with other ailments each appearing once. Mental disease was more common in the low-morale group, but physical disorders did not seem, in themselves, important factors for morale.

EDUCATION AND MORALE

The extent of one's schooling proves to be an important factor in morale. Those men who finished college surpassed high-school graduates in both life satisfaction and occupational morale (Chart 13). Schooling, indeed, it is interesting to note, is more closely related to happiness than is intelligence. The higher optimism of the better educated must arise in part from their school experience: it is not a simple consequence of the colleges' selecting higher native ability. If morale during the period of sacrifices necessitated by war follows a course parallel to morale during unemployment and depression, we may anticipate most despair among those who never finished high school.

Rundquist and Sletto¹⁴ divided their group of men on relief into those with ninth-grade schooling or less and those who had gone beyond ninth grade. Their finding, like ours, was that the group with more education had higher morale. Sailer's subjects were not unemployed but he likewise found among the emotionally depressed 33 per cent of the young men with less than high-school education and only 11 per cent of those who had finished college. In the Watson-Kirsch study of morale among families on relief,¹⁷





CHART 13. Morale and years of schooling.

those with high-school education were much more apt (6 to 1) to be found in the high-morale group, than those with less.

Not only length but also type of education has a bearing on morale. In Chart 14 the outstanding fact is the high morale of the group educated for teaching. This may, of course, be an artifact, since a number of Adjustment Service clients were teachers referred for testing preliminary to placement in a state work-relief program for adult education. It may also be true, however, as Hoppock has reported,⁶ that teachers have an unusually high level of satisfaction with their life and work.

Another striking fact, shown in Chart 14, is that occupational morale for other professional workers is unusually low. Apparently men educated for professions but out of a job more rapidly lost faith in traditional American doctrines of business success.

Perhaps the most important fact to be noted in Chart 14 is that a general, academic education of the liberal-arts type is not a strikingly good morale-builder. Many teachers educated along traditional classical lines argue otherwise. They look down on trade school, on business and other merely "practical" courses. They praise the general subjects—languages, literature, mathematics, history, etc.—as "education for life rather than merely for making a living." Yet when it comes to the test, their claim seems unproven. Boys with training in commerce or trade training had that inner something which keeps up morale during crisis, quite as evidently as did the boys who had taken the academic, college-preparatory subjects.

OCCUPATION AND MORALE

A number of relationships between occupation and morale are worth exploring. Do persons who have been "permanent fixtures" maintain morale during unemployment better than do those who have been rolling stones? Does unemployment depress more severely those whose wages were formerly high or those who never





CHART 14. Morale and type of education.

earned much? Do people in certain types of work tend to be unusually successful in maintaining morale?

Consider first the question of stability of previous employment. The low correlations ($r = .10$ and $.04$) between morale and the "index of employment stability," reported in Table IV above, lead us to expect little relationship. Chart 15 shows "Time on Longest Job." The highest Life Satisfaction score is found in those men who have spent ten years or more on one job; but the difference is so slight as might occur once in five times by chance alone, and could, moreover, be accounted for in terms of our previous observation that older men achieved a better score for Life Satisfaction. On the Occupational Morale Scale no clear relationship to length of time on a single job can be seen. The data seem to rule out either long-term or short-term jobs as indicators of morale.

Chart 16 presents morale scores for groups whose maximum previous earnings range from less than \$20 a week to more than \$80. The only significant deviation is found in the superior Life Satisfaction score for the group who once had high salaries. At least three plausible explanations may be considered. Perhaps those with former salaries in the upper range, having saved more money, are therefore meeting the situation of unemployment with less immediate financial strain. Perhaps, also, those who have held good positions are more likely to have relatives, friends, and business contacts that are reassuring. Finally, and most important from the psychological angle, the experience of success in the past lays a foundation for courage in meeting new emergencies.

When jobs formerly held by men who came to the Adjustment Service are classified, four major groups are found to be represented; their morale scores appear in Chart 17. Differences are not large or significant, but in both measures the people whose work has been in commerce or the professions show a higher morale than is found among workers in manufacturing, mechanical, or clerical pursuits (p is less than $.05$).

In Chart 18 occupations are classified by socio-economic level





CHART 15. Morale and time on longest job.




CHART 16. Morale and maximum wage previously earned.





CHART 17. Morale and usual occupational area.





CHART 18. Morale and usual occupational level.

from unskilled to managerial. The professional category is divided between scientific (engineering, medicine, research, etc.) and linguistic (law, journalism, education, etc.). Those who have commonly held managerial and executive posts show highest morale on both scales. Professional groups come next, with the linguistic professions markedly above the scientific in Life Satisfaction. Lowest morale is indicated by the labor groups: unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled, and white-collar. A difference as great as that between professionals and managers on the one hand, and laborers on the other, would be expected by chance only 2 times in 100. That morale problems due to unemployment are more serious among working-class people may be asserted with some confidence. Private employers and public agencies concerned with civilian morale during the war may need to be especially alert to sources of discouragement among workers at lower occupational levels.

The facts are brought out more sharply in Table 6, in which occupations are grouped in narrower categories. Highest in average Life Satisfaction scores, despite unemployment, are: (1) writers, (2) salesmen, (3) graduates fresh from school. Teachers, social workers, store owners, and bankers also rate high. At the other end of the scale, the average scores of factory workers indicate most personal maladjustment during unemployment. Insurance and real estate, as occupations adopted by many men when other jobs gave out, show a level far below that of other types of salesmen. Clerks, stenographers, office help, and people in semiskilled trades and personal service also rate low in Life Satisfaction scores.

Two findings from another study¹⁷ may be reported in this connection because they too tend to show relationship of certain occupations and socio-economic levels to morale. A comparison of 35 families on relief but maintaining high morale, with 35 families also on relief but badly disintegrated, showed 6 families in which the occupation of the main breadwinner was "salesman," and all 6 fell in the high-morale group.

Another difference which appeared between families of high

TABLE VI. Level of Life Satisfaction in various occupational groups

Occupational Group	Number of cases	Life Satisfaction median score
1. Editors, reporters, writers, advertising agents, copy writers, layout, radio speakers, lawyers....	26	25.91
2. Salesmen in stores or salesrooms, sales canvassers, solicitors, traveling salesmen, telephone salesmen	92	25.59
3. Students and others not yet employed	73	24.47
4. Teachers, professors, librarians, social workers.	29	23.75
5. Retail storekeepers, bankers and brokers, restaurant owners	16	23.75
6. Engineers: civil, electrical, chemical, mechanical, industrial	17	23.50
7. Factory operatives in iron, steel, machinery, vehicles; building-trades mechanics and helpers; auto, aviation, and railway mechanics; railway and traction operatives	26	23.33
8. Sales managers; production managers and officials; purchasing agents and buyers; managers and executives; office managers and supervisors; credit men; mercantile supervisors; personnel and employment workers	59	23.28
9. Unskilled labor: porters in stores and warehouses; elevator operators; miners	9	23.13
10. Deliverymen; chauffeurs, bus drivers, truck drivers	19	22.91
11. Bookkeepers; accountants; cashiers, tellers; bookkeeping- and billing-machine operators	38	22.50
12. Artists, commercial artists, art teachers, sculptors, models; designers, draftsmen; musicians, teachers of music; photographers	38	22.50
13. Actors, showmen, theater and amusement workers; recreational workers	23	22.50
14. Operatives in electric light and power; telegraph and radio operators; moving-picture operators, radio and phonograph mechanics; jewelry workers	18	22.50
15. Operatives in printing, paper, allied lines, proof-reading, bookbinding; decoration, paper hanging, drapers, windowtrimmers	18	22.50
16. Chemists, physicists, technicians, bacteriologists, assayers, metallurgists; pharmacists, osteopaths, chiropractors, veterinarians; dentists; scientists not otherwise classified	16	22.50

Occupational Group	Number of cases	Life Satisfaction median score
17. Stenographers; stenographic secretaries; typists	16	22.50
18. Office clerks; shipping and stock clerks; office boys, messengers, and runners	129	22.07
19. Semiskilled workers: restaurant workers; domestics, orderlies; hotel-keepers, managers, clerks; shoemakers; bakers; barbers, hairdressers; cleaners, pressers, dyers	16	21.88
20. Insurance agents, salesmen; real estate agents, salesmen, managers; securities salesmen	24	21.43
21. Factory workers; clothing and ready-to-wear apparel; clay, glass, stone; chemical industries and soap; leather and shoes; textile operatives; miscellaneous industries	25	20.94

and low morale was in their housing and physical environment. Of 35 families meeting their problems effectively, 17 had good physical conditions in which to live, whereas only 3 of the 35 low-morale families had decent housing and neighborhood. Obviously, former income and living standards played a part in the ability of these families to weather the storm.

On general psychological grounds higher satisfaction might be expected in occupations offering more pay, more stable employment, more prestige, and greater opportunity for independent work.* Both Miller^{8,9,10} and Sailer¹⁵ report this expected relationship. Our contribution is the discovery that the difference in attitude persists during actual unemployment. The proportion (13 per cent) of men who once held managerial, executive, or professional jobs who hit the highest level of Life Satisfaction score is three times that (4 per cent) of employees in clerical, skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled jobs. Apparently the maintenance of conditions for high morale during pre-emergency periods is one of the best ways in which to provide stamina for carrying on when the going becomes rough.

* A summary of variables related to work satisfaction is given by the writer in Hartmann, G. W., and Newcomb, T. (eds.)⁶

The case which follows may serve to emphasize the significance of previous success for readjustment in time of crisis.

MORTIMER HECHT

Mortimer Hecht is a man of 38, American-born of Russian Jewish parents. His intelligence is high (88th percentile), his vocabulary fair (70th percentile). Scores on the Clerical Ability test are good (71st and 95th percentile); he did well also on the Spatial Relations test (87th percentile) and on the Wiggly Block test (81st percentile.)

Mr. Hecht is married and has a child aged 8. Handicapped by increasing deafness, he came to the Adjustment Service in January, 1934, after a year's unemployment, but when he had just started a C.W.A. job. This man's occupational history, up to the depression, could easily be made to read like a Rotary Club success speech, epitomizing the glories of this land of opportunity. Thus:

Mortimer Hecht, child of immigrant parents living on the Lower East Side of New York City, went to work in 1910 at the age of 14, after one year of high school, for a real-estate company. His job was that of office boy, at \$4 a week. He worked for this company for 10 years, until 1921, studying almost all the while in evening classes: two years of architectural drawing, a year of accounting and business administration, a year of advertising and of business English. At the same time he was studying English usage by himself, and reading and studying subjects pertaining to real estate. And all the while he was advancing in his work: from office boy to clerk, then to bookkeeper, then to collector, and finally to manager, at \$75 a week. In 1921, he left the firm to start his own business in real-estate brokerage and property management. Here all his study of and interest in architecture, engineering, accounting, advertising, administration, and English, as well as his rich, all-round work experience, served him well; and for 12 years, until the beginning of 1933, he earned from \$70 to \$100 a week.

The success story ends, of course, with the Great Depression, yet his background of security and high achievement seems to

have maintained this man's morale even after a year of unemployment. His appearance, it seems, is not prepossessing; the counselor reports him as "inarticulate and rather helpless"—which may merely reflect his defective hearing. Despite unemployment and physical handicap, Mr. Hecht scores among the highest clients of the Adjustment Service in his faith in himself, his confidence in the business situation, his liking for people, and his level of life happiness.

AVOCATIONS AND MORALE

The next four charts (Nos. 19-22) deal with the relationship of interests developed through recreation and leisure time to morale. Many agencies today are seeking to make their contribution to defense by building civilian morale through recreation. We are interested, therefore, to see whether there is any evidence that, during the stress of unemployment, leisure-time activities did contribute to morale.

The most marked relationships are found in Chart 19, which reports club participation. Though mere membership in a club or in several clubs was not a vitally important factor, officeholding was. Morale apparently increases likewise with the number of organizations in which the individual takes an active role. (Committee service is included under the heading "Hold Office.") On the Life-Satisfaction Scale, the morale average is lowest for the group belonging to no clubs, next for those who belong but hold no office, and then increases with number of groups in which the clients hold office. Differences as large as these would not occur once in 100 times by chance alone. Differences on the Occupational Morale Scale are in the same direction, but less marked.

Chart 20 presents the number of avocational interests checked from a long list of suggestions. On both measures of morale the highest scores are obtained by the group with the widest range (16 or more) of leisure-time interests. Those who responded poorly to the list of proposed interests were of the low-morale group. One might argue either that low morale caused the apathy, or that lack





CHART 19. Morale and club participation.





CHART 20. Morale and number of avocational activities.

of positive interests fostered the low morale. Quite possibly, indeed, the relationship is circular.

Various types of avocation are distinguished in the next two charts. The heading "Social and Directed" in Chart 21 includes baseball, tennis, dancing, basketball, bridge, parties, dramatics, and other group affairs. "Unsocial and Undirected" activities include reading, swimming, movies, radio, motoring, studying, lectures, drawing, and a variety of activities which people often engage in alone or with one or two friends.* The chart shows higher morale associated with greater group participation. Differences as great as those found in Occupational Morale might occur by chance 10 times in 100; differences as great as those in Life Satisfaction score would not be expected more than 1 in 100 times by chance. Again the relationship may plausibly be interpreted as circular. Those with low morale avoid social contacts, and those without social contacts lose morale.

Chart 22 shows a few differences in relationship to the type of activity reported in answer to a question about "employment avocationally of aptitudes and interests." The numbers are small, but they would tend to support those who claim that music is an aid to the maintenance of morale. The results for drama, art, and the crafts are negative. Even the matter of music must be treated with some skepticism, since a deviation of that size would be expected, by chance alone, as often as 5 times in 100, and a previous study¹⁶ showed ability to play the piano more common among unhappy than among happier students. In that earlier study, "Good music" was rated 5th among 16 suggested sources of satisfaction by the most unhappy group, and 6th in order by the happiest group. Sailer found 13 per cent of his happiest group able to play a musical instrument well, 6 per cent of his low-satisfaction group claiming such facility. In both the Watson and the Sailer studies, happiness was more markedly associated with ability to lead dis-

* A third category, "doubtful," included 194 clients with no preponderance of social-directed or of unsocial-undirected. The doubtful group came about midway between the other two on morale scores.




CHART 21. Morale and character of avocational interests.





CHART 22. Morale and type of avocational activity.

cussion, talk to groups, to tell jokes effectively, to play bridge well, than with ability to sing or to play musical instruments.

In the comparison of relief families exhibiting different levels of morale,¹⁷ only 1 of the disintegrating families showed participation in organizations, whereas 9 of the high-morale group were active in various social organizations. Social participation is clearly a differentiating factor in all morale studies.

SOCIAL RELATIONS AND MORALE

Evidence concerning clubs, recreational interests, and church participation all points to the importance of social relationships for maintaining morale. A few comparisons between the exceptionally high-morale group and the exceptionally low-morale group of unemployed men on Life Satisfaction scores lend further support. For example, among 16 men of high morale, 14 answer "yes" to the question, "Do you make friends easily?" Only 4 out of 16 comparable men of low morale so answer.

The frustration experienced as a result of poor social adjustment is indicated in response to another question, "Do you enjoy an evening spent by yourself?" The high-morale group, who made friends easily, answered "yes." (11 yes, 2 ?, 3 no). The low-morale group show more "No" answers (8 yes, 1 ?, 7 no).

RELIGION AND MORALE

The subjects of this study included more than one hundred each of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish religious faith. No differences appear, in Chart 23, among the average Life Satisfaction scores of these three great groups. The small group of 35 who answered "no religion," "none," "atheist," or some such response, were markedly below the religious groups in happiness; so great a difference would not be expected 1 in 100 times by chance alone. Differences on the Occupational Morale Scale were less extreme, but there is a high statistical probability (p less than .01) that the

Protestant average exceeds the Jewish. This fact would indicate that trust in our traditional system of enterprise, and in the attitudes of ambition and hard work as adequate to get one ahead, is a little easier for non-Jewish boys than for Jewish boys to retain. Race discrimination in employment, both experienced and suspected, may easily have led more Jews to become discouraged.

Hall⁴ found high morale associated with favorable attitudes toward religion. Miller^{8, 9, 10} likewise found higher moral scores among those with strong religious convictions. Our own¹⁶ earlier study reported that church and church activities rated higher in importance for the happy group than for the most unhappy. The fact of church connection was reported by 65 per cent of the unhappy, 92 per cent of the median group, and 73 per cent of the happiest. Sailer's study¹⁵ has the most complete data on religion. Protestants were relatively more numerous in the high-happiness group, Catholics in the groups with lower satisfaction levels. Of those who attend worship "never" or "seldom," 13 per cent were in the happiest group; of those who attend "regularly," 29 per cent were up in the highest group for enjoyment of life. Those who answered that they had a strong interest in religion were three times as apt to be in the top happiness category as were those who reported no real interest in religion. On the whole, the evidence from research supports the assertion that religion aids morale, both in "good times" and in bad.

Agreement with Sailer's observation in relation to religion and morale appeared in our study of 35 high-morale and 35 low-morale families from relief rolls. In the high-morale group there were 7 Catholic families; in the low-morale group, 11. The difference is not, however, statistically significant.

MORALE AND AMBITION

Case studies of individual men with high morale, compared with those of low morale, bring out another factor of major importance. In only 3 instances out of 16 cases of high morale is there





CHART 23. Morale and religion

evidence of marked discrepancy between aspiration and realistic levels of achievement.* Turning to 16 cases of low morale, we find 10 men whose ambitions are out of all proportion to their actual opportunities. The two cases which follow further illumine the factor of realism in relation to morale. It is hard to know whether the excessive demands of the low-morale group are cause, compensation, or both.

TIMOTHY LAKE (LOW LIFE SATISFACTION SCORE)

Timothy Lake is a man aged 36, who has been out of employment for 1 year, but who has lacked employment in what he considers his real occupation for 8 years. For the past 8 years his salary has averaged \$23 weekly in two jobs as sandwich and soda man in restaurants. His real occupation he still considers to be that of vaudeville musician and dancer; from 1919 to 1924 he earned from \$25 to \$150 a week in vaudeville. He gives as the reason for leaving his last vaudeville job (in 1924), "Talking pictures became popular."

Mr. Lake seems to devote much of his energy to dreaming of past glories, and on the Strong Vocational Interest Test paints a self-portrait that is a picture of a dominant, influential, and successful person—or at least a person who is potentially so and who is prevented from realizing his splendid potentialities only by temporary reverses.

The report of the counselor (who mentions as a probable cause of Timothy Lake's unemployment, "Personality traits inadequate—diffident") and Mr. Lake's own responses to the Bernreuter Personality Inventory paint a different picture. He states that he often feels just miserable, that he doesn't make friends easily, that he is slow in making decisions, cannot be optimistic when others about him are depressed, would feel very self-conscious if he had to volunteer an idea to start a discussion among a group of people, finds difficulty in starting a conversation with a stranger, and is troubled with the idea that people on the street are watching him.

* The thesis that happiness depends on keeping a man's ambition close to his actual possibilities is unusually well developed in Pitkin.¹²

He also admits that his feelings are easily hurt, and that he lacks self-confidence. Against the query, "Are you easily moved to tears?" he checks a question mark.

His highest test scores are in tests of dexterity. He scored in the 88th percentile in the manual dexterity test, and in the 71st in finger dexterity. In the mechanical-assembly test, however, his score was considerably lower: in the 39th percentile. Intelligence-test scores are likewise lower: 28th percentile in the Classification test, and 47th in the vocabulary.

Mr. Lake gives his nationality as American and his religion as Protestant. The counselor describes the family background as "middle class." Timothy's father was a carpenter who died at the age of 62. His mother died at 38. Mr. Lake describes his present marital status as "deserted," 10 years ago. He answers "no" to the question, "Do you feel that marriage is essential to your present or future happiness?" in the Bernreuter questionnaire, and states on the same blank that he is usually considered indifferent to the opposite sex.

Although Timothy Lake's formal education ended after 3 years of high school, there were 2 years of evening study in the playing of piano, violin, and guitar with a private teacher, and 7 months of evening study of musical composition at a school. This was supplemented by home-study courses in salesmanship (course unfinished) and theatre make-up, and by self-training in "art, harmony, ukulele, novelty musical instruments, vocal, dancing, Hawaiian guitar, mandolin." When asked his occupational ambitions, he answers, "To have an orchestra of my own," and, "Concert pianist."

Mr. Lake has a strikingly long list of avocational activities and interests. Under hobbies he lists "making lamp shades, paintings, art novelties, growing plants and flowers, raising fish, making food combinations different from recipes, cooking, planning activities for pleasure of others." His favorite outdoor sports seem as social as his hobbies (except the vague "planning for pleasure of others"): "Swimming, boating, camping out. Enjoying the country and forest and the beautiful things of nature. Motoring and travelling."

With all his application to study, and the multiplicity of his

interests, there are interesting hints as to wide divergence between his goals and his reality. Mr. Lake is asked, "If you feel that you were not entirely successful on some of the jobs you held, to what do you attribute that fact?" His answer is "Backwardness, lack of training, and not meeting the right people." Then he is asked, "Have you failed to gain promotion or attain some desirable end on account of an inadequacy in your education or training? If so, indicate the training in which you were lacking and the nature of the work you wanted to do." Mr. Lake's answer: "I wanted to devote my entire time to music and composing, but the landlady complained about practicing so much and I had to move and have become very discouraged."

From graphological analysis of Timothy Lake is taken the following: "A dreamer . . . wistful, hypersensitive, full of day-dreams, shocked by the ugliness of the world, longing for 'beauty' . . . full of ego dreams—unrelated to the real world . . . very impressionable . . . very anxious . . . there are breaks in the continuity of his thinking and of his relationship to others . . . psychasthenic constitution . . . passive, but with aggressive reactions; he doesn't use aggression purposefully—reacts irritably . . . tremendous ambition, great wish dreams . . . labile, quivering emotions . . . an instrument for every wind that blows."

ADOLPH HAUCK (HIGH LIFE SATISFACTION SCORE)

Adolph Hauck is a man of 35 who has had only two jobs in his 18 years of work. The first, from 1916 to 1929, was as a theatrical booking agent. The second, from 1929, to January 5, 1934 (he came to the Adjustment Service January 9, 1934), was in sales-promotion work for a magazine-publishing company. His salary in both positions was \$30 per week. He is married, and his wife is employed as a nurse at \$30 per week. The couple is living on the wife's salary and on savings.

Mr. Hauck's intelligence and vocabulary test scores are in the 30th and 35th percentiles. The score on the Wiggly Block Test is in the 10th percentile. Clerical-ability scores are better: above the 70th percentile. He completed elementary school, attended eve-

ning high school for 1 year, and studied shorthand and type-writing evenings for 5 months at a business school.

Outstanding in Mr. Hauck's attitude is a lack of pretentiousness. Asked if he had the required training and skill in what jobs he believes he could find the greatest happiness, he gives the following list: "Salesman, Court Attendant, Sales Promotion, Chauffeur, Investigator, Collector." The counselor describes him as an "unimaginative German type—good worker under direction—probably good routine worker."

Questionnaire responses also reveal Mr. Hauck as a friendly, rather modest, stolid individual. It makes him uncomfortable to be unconventional; he dislikes finding his way about in strange places; he tries to avoid bossy people; gets stage fright; is greatly embarrassed if he has greeted a stranger whom he has mistaken for an acquaintance; never argues a point with an older person whom he respects; does not usually try to take added responsibilities on himself. He states that he makes friends easily, usually prefers to work with others, has no difficulty in starting a conversation with a stranger, is not troubled with shyness, does not lack self-confidence. He is not a moody person, nor do his interests change rapidly.

On the whole Mr. Hauck seems to be a man who has accepted his limitations and set up his goals in the light of them. Because of his realistic and perhaps unimaginative attitude, he is able to accept a sort of life which might seem to offer very little to one with a higher level of aspiration.

Other Problems in Morale

We have indicated that our data do not permit analysis of the psychological complications underlying individual cases of low morale. In some instances, however, even a brief report suggests strongly the need for assistance from a counselor well trained in psychology.

S. J. is 21 years of age and has completed 3 years of college. His father, born in Turkey of Jewish ancestry, owns a cafeteria; his mother worked in a dressmaking shop. S. J. has worked as a

delivery boy, and as a cutter in a slipper factory. He is highly intelligent (93rd percentile) but is short, fat, wears glasses, and seems lumpish. He seems to have lost, or never to have had, ambition. He thinks he isn't good for much—has an idea he might be a stenographer. Though in college he majors in physics quite successfully, he has no vocational plans along this line. S. J. explained to the psychiatrist about his "inferiority complex," and tests show timidity, dependence, and lack of social adaptability. He thinks his own life has been a dismal failure and our social order not much better.

J. A. is 26, a high-school graduate, also of Jewish ancestry. His father owns a small business; his mother died about six months before the interview. J. A. likewise has high intelligence (89th percentile). He has worked as messenger, as clerk in a department store, and as an "artist" doing lettering for a catalogue. He seems to have no objective. None of his jobs has been satisfactory. His family can offer him an education and have urged dentistry, but he isn't interested. His reaction to a list of 100 occupations was to dislike 70, and show indifference to 25 more. "Artist," "author," "poet," "sculptor," and "inventor" do have some appeal. Wise psychological counseling might help to release in this young man energies which are now consumed in inner conflict, and in daydreams.

W. L. is 36, unmarried, and living with his parents. He had 3 years of high school, then jobs as clerk and bookkeeper. He says of himself: "Have lost confidence in myself. Cannot do anything well. Have difficulty in learning and remembering." His abilities are average or above, and his interests seem to be like those of other bookkeepers and accountants, but he reports dislike for these occupations. He thinks commercial art or electrical work might be better; he daydreams of jobs on the radio or traveling overseas.

M. K., age 40, married and with 3 children, has been a successful (\$70 a week) electrician, but has done only odd jobs since the depression. His intelligence is exceptionally high—97th percentile.

His ambition is to be a writer or a leader in scientific research. He is nervous, unhappy, and lacking in self-confidence.

Psychological factors are especially evident in the case of Michael O'Leary, given here in more detail.

Michael O'Leary is a young man of 26, of Irish Roman Catholic origin, single (but engaged to be married), who is experiencing considerable conflict over his desire to work in the field of commercial art and his conviction that he should work as an accountant. The counselor's summary of the problem is as follows:

"Experienced in both advertising and brokerage lines. Prefers former but believes work opportunities are greater in accounting field. However, such work is hard and distasteful to him, whereas he thoroughly enjoys advertising. Desires our advice."

Michael has had one year of college. His intelligence scores are very high. His occupational record alternates between work in advertising agencies (earlier as clerk for \$20 a week, later as lay out man for \$25) and bookkeeping and accounting for stock brokers (\$25 to \$30 a week). He has held 7 positions in the seven years since he left school. There were two periods of unemployment—one of 2, the other of 6 months. There were also 3 months of work as salesman for a printing company at \$5 a week plus commission, a job which he left for a temporary accounting job at \$24 per week.

Asked to what he would attribute any lack of success he may have had in any of his jobs, he answers, "Personality." His "self-sufficiency" score on the Bernreuter questionnaire is in the 99th percentile. He says that he is not much affected by the praise or blame of many people, that he usually ignores the feelings of others when accomplishing some end that is important to him, that his ambition does not need occasional stimulation through contact with successful people, that he prefers usually not to work with others, that he is considered critical of other people.

Art samples are included in Michael O'Leary's records. They were done in response to the directions, "Make five simple sketches or drawings of anything you wish, but no two on the same subject." Four of his drawings contain human beings. Two are heads

with strikingly oriental qualities: one is a profile of an Egyptian-looking woman with austere headdress; the other head is of an old oriental-looking man with a long head and tremendous headdress with sunlike radiations. A third drawing is of a man in attitude of combat, holding a sword in one hand and in the other a shield which covers all of his body but the head and one arm. A fourth drawing is of a tiny human figure in a position of supplication before two tremendous shrouded figures. The remaining sketch is of a bleak promontory against a vast empty sky.

A psychologist experienced in the studies which C. G. Jung has made of the collective unconscious, is instantly interested. Has Michael, thwarted by the outer world, turned to strange depths within himself? Could he not be helped to utilize in better living his concern with ancient wisdom and his sense of the Infinite?

These brief sketches, ending with a question, make an appropriate termination for this essentially preliminary study. From our charts and statistics we return for a look at complex human realities and recognize that our knowledge is still too meager and superficial to bring us to the heart of the morale problem in many individuals. In a concluding section of this chapter we shall summarize our tentative conclusions, but with these and other cases in our minds, we shall avoid dogmatism and any pretense of full understanding. The most that we can hope for is that our quantitative comparisons may have indicated some lines of social policy which will do more good than harm.

Concluding Hypotheses

From factors which seem to be related to the maintenance of morale during hard times and unemployment, we draw some conclusions which are put in the form of recommendations. The morale problems of the 1940's will not be identical with those which our clients faced in the 1930's, but from what we know about the psychology of morale in general, we shall try to make our conclusions applicable to coming periods of stress. They are

not "proved" by our study; they remain hypotheses, somewhat clarified and supported, but still hypotheses.

1. *Emotional security in home and early childhood lays a necessary foundation for the maintenance of morale during crises.* Our case studies, even more clearly than our statistics, point to the need in all communities for parent education and individual psychological guidance to prevent personality distortions. If educational budgets must be cut during wartime, we could better afford to forego some of the traditional school curriculum than to dispense with visiting teachers, psychological counselors, and guidance programs.

2. *Success in the past is a good foundation for morale in the future.* We found some tendency for higher morale scores among the more intelligent, the more dexterous, those with better artistic judgment, with better school records, and with higher salaries on previous jobs. It is a fair guess that homes, schools, and industries which minimize criticism, rebuke, and failure, and so adjust their demands that children and youth may have a series of successes as they grow, will contribute to social morale. Definite experimental demonstration of the importance of success for morale in young children has been published in studies by Jack,⁷ Page,¹¹ and Reichenberg.¹³ Reports of experiments both in laboratory and in industry agree in general that a period of successful achievement is one of the best morale-builders for discouraged workers. Unfortunately, during the 1930's many American youth had little opportunity to build self-confidence by vocational achievement. One good by-product of the 100 per cent employment which will be needed to win the war and to rebuild after the war will be opportunity for each to do something necessary at which he can make a successful contribution. The opportunities exist, but good personnel work will be needed to make sure that each individual gets into the kind of work where he can find most success.

3. *Marriage and family life help in sustaining morale.* Those housing developments, for example, which enable workers in defense industries to marry and to have their families with them

near their work, would appear to be helpful in promoting the psychological well-being of America. In Britain, early experiments of breaking up families in order to get children out of danger from bombing have been largely abandoned. Keeping families together seems a better rule. Dependents add more to reassurance than they do to anxiety.

4. *Education is well justified as a morale-building process.* While intelligence and good health are obviously desirable, schooling seems to be more closely related to morale than is either native aptitude or physical well-being. Happily, we can do a great deal to improve education. We can provide opportunity for almost all young people, regardless of race or economic status, at least to finish high school. Our findings indicate that practical vocational education is just as good for building morale as would be the more traditional academic curriculum.

5. *Morale is fostered by work which is intrinsically interesting, which is recognized as rendering needed service.* All-out war effort provides a favorable situation for meeting this demand. Morale problems may arise, however, where the work is tedious and of no clear value in our national struggle. The most severe difficulties are likely to occur after the war. Can we give to all peacetime occupations that sense of being needed which is so stressed during the war?

6. *The greater the indecision, the lower the morale.* The truth of this statement was shown in Chart 2, where those with more definite alternatives had higher morale. Those most "up in the air" about life work were also the most discouraged. Again, it may be that the higher morale of the married men arises in part from the fact that a great choice has been made and the turmoil of uncertainty about a mate and home is ended. We recall also that the threat of an insecure job seemed as demoralizing as the fact of a lost job. The implication for policy is that government shall act, in this war period, with prompt and clear decision. If hard demands must be made, let them come without vague warnings which increase insecurity and injure morale. We must try to see

that as few people as possible—for as little time as possible—are kept on the tenterhooks of uncertainty.

7. *Anticipation of disaster may be quite as demoralizing as the blow itself.* People actually unemployed showed no lower morale than those who feared it. The “strategy of terror” rests in part upon the expectation that we will be weakened by our fears quite as much as by actual disasters. So far as morale is concerned (disregarding here the necessary safeguards on enemy information), those in charge of propaganda may better tell the public the whole truth all the time, sparing nothing, than to permit a situation to develop in which people suspect that much worse news may be hidden from them.

8. *If morale is to be sustained, aspiration must not reach too far beyond realistic opportunities.* Yearning for the moon is characteristic of the low-morale group. The traditional American educational effort to stir ambition in every child can be defended, but the ambition should have a close relationship to his actual possibilities. One of the psychological weaknesses of dictators and revolutionaries is that, promising too much, they awaken false hopes. Aspiration for social gains (e.g., a new world after the war) should be kept realistic too. Epictetus may have gone too far with his doctrine that happiness could be achieved only by keeping desires from going beyond the matters which lie within one’s own power, but this investigation suggests that he may have had a sound principle.

9. *Social participation is a major factor in maintaining good morale.* The isolates break down first. Those who enjoy social recreations, who like people, who belong to organizations and get put into offices, have resources which carry them through times of distress with flying colors.

10. *Religion is properly regarded as making an important contribution to morale.* It is likely that both religious interpretations and the social experience of worship contribute to higher morale. Keeping churches active is important for national well-being in many ways.

11. *The kind of morale which sustains traditional values despite difficulties is more common in older men; the kind of morale which overcomes obstacles in struggles toward improved social conditions is more apt to be found in youth.* The implication, suggested earlier in this chapter, is that during a period which is bringing swift and far-reaching changes, a larger proportion of young leaders should be brought into responsibility in the army, in government, and in business.

CHAPTER XVII

Morale on the Job

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THE purpose of this chapter is threefold: to describe a technique of measuring employee morale and attitudes which is currently being used in business; to present some of the findings resulting from these studies of employee morale; and to suggest certain conclusions as to the nature of employee morale which appear to be evident in the data.

Technique

Data for these studies have been secured by having all members of the employee populations under consideration anonymously answer self-administering, objective questionnaires containing some sixty to eighty separate questions. These items deal with general attitude toward the company or employer and with attitudes toward pay, hours, working conditions, supervision, the kind of work done, and a variety of other specific aspects of the job situation.

Administration of questionnaires. The importance of an anonymous reply is obvious. Employees who have unfavorable attitudes can hardly be expected to answer honestly and without reservation if they feel that their individual schedules will be identified. Yet some control of the conditions under which the schedules are answered is necessary for maximum comparability of results. For these reasons, and in order to secure complete returns, the method of the group interview is the one used. A suitable space is set up as a testing room and groups of employees assembled there to answer

their questionnaires. The forms are distributed by volunteers in a hit-and-miss fashion which makes it obvious that there can be no record of the particular copy which goes to any given individual. Each group is given a detailed, standardized explanation of the purpose of the survey and instructions in the mechanics of answering.

Since the studies discussed here have been made by an independent research organization, it has been possible to give further assurance of anonymity by promising employees that the answered questionnaires will remain in the possession of the "outside" organization, that no one connected with their company will ever see them, and that the report to their company will show only "counts of the answers" and no individual replies.

The Questionnaire. Because the basic elements of the employer-employee relationship are essentially the same in most organizations, it is possible to use many of the same items in any survey situation. A typical questionnaire of seventy items may be made up of perhaps forty-five standard questions and twenty-five reworded or entirely new questions. As will appear in the examples quoted, the items usually have multiple-choice answers.

It is helpful to think of the items as being of three types: (1) Items concerning general morale; all questionnaires contain a standardized battery of ten such items which forms the basis for the "morale score." (2) Items dealing with specific factors such as pay, hours, working conditions, and supervision. (3) Items of information and identification.

A measure of morale. Although the term "employee morale" is widely used, it remains a more or less undefined concept whose meaning, usually, is simply taken for granted. Such definitions as have been offered are of little help to the psychologist in the construction of items designed to measure morale. Thus it was necessary to proceed purely on the basis of subjective judgment.

Morale was assumed to be a function of the worker's general attitude toward his job and toward his company as an employer. That this general attitude would be influenced by attitudes on

specific points such as pay, hours, working conditions, supervision, and personnel policies was recognized; it appears, in fact, that morale is largely a composite of such specific attitudes. What was desired was a measure which would reflect this general, composite attitude but which would not deal directly with the specific attitudes.

A number of multiple-choice items designed for this purpose were constructed and used experimentally. From these, a battery of ten has been selected on the basis of intercorrelations of items and subjective appraisal. Each of these is provided with a series of five graduated answers designed to offer the respondent an opportunity to express varying degrees of favor or disfavor. These ten questions, together with illustrations of the types of answers used, are:

1. Generally speaking, how does [*company name*] compare as a place to work with other companies that you know about or have worked for? (Check ONLY ONE answer.)

- ☐ It is one of the VERY WORST.
- ☐ WORSE than average.
- ☐ Just AVERAGE.
- ☐ BETTER than average.
- ☐ One of the VERY BEST.

2. How much does the management of the company care about the welfare of people in jobs such as yours?

3. Are there other companies in which you would rather work at the same earnings if you could get a job for which you feel equally qualified?

- ☐ I would rather work in ANY of the others.
- ☐ I would rather work in ALMOST ANY of the others.
- ☐ SOME of the others.
- ☐ VERY FEW of the others.
- ☐ NONE of the others.

4. If you have ever been dissatisfied with your job here, how often was it the company's fault?

5. How much does the management do to have good working relationships between you and the people with whom you work?

6. To what extent are you made to feel that you are really a part of the organization?

7. How fair do you feel the top management of the company is with people in jobs such as yours?

() RARELY fair.

() OCCASIONALLY fair.

() ABOUT HALF the time fair.

() USUALLY fair.

() Practically ALWAYS fair.

8. How fair do you feel that the people immediately above you are in their treatment of you?

9. In your opinion, are there other companies which treat their employees better than [company name] does?

10. Are you reasonably sure of being able to keep your job as long as you do good work?

() Doing good work doesn't have anything to do with holding my job.

() Holding my job depends a LITTLE on how good work I do.

() If I do good work I can be FAIRLY SURE of holding my job.

() As long as I do good work I can be ALMOST CERTAIN of holding my job.

() As long as I do good work I can be VERY SURE of holding my job.

Although there is no acceptable external criterion of morale against which the items can be validated, it is assumed that the individual who answers these questions in a generally favorable way has relatively high morale and that the individual who answers in a generally unfavorable way has relatively low morale. Psychologists and industrial relations experts who have reviewed these studies grant that assumption. Strictly speaking, however, the term "morale" as used in subsequent parts of this chapter can be defined only in terms of responses to the ten questions.

For purposes of scoring, varying weights ranging from 0-1-3-5-6 to 0-3-6-9-12 were assigned to the responses for each item,

the proportionate weights being determined on the basis of inter-correlations and frequencies, and the total weights being set in such a way as to provide a total range of one hundred points.*

Each of the completed questionnaires is scored, using the assigned weights for the ten answers checked, and the individual employee is thus given a morale score which is a reflection of the extent to which he checked favorable or unfavorable answers. Those occasional individuals who check the most favorable answer under each of the ten questions earn a morale score of 100. In rare instances individuals have checked the ten most unfavorable answers and so have earned morale scores of zero. Where the third, or middle, answer is checked on each question, the score is 50.

The items were written with the intention of having the middle answers represent a "neutral" attitude, neither favorable nor unfavorable. To the extent that this is true, a score of 50 would indicate that the employee felt his company to be "just average," neither better nor worse than the general run of other places of employment. The majority of employees who have been tested have scored above this mid-point.

Specific attitudes. The second type of question used in the schedules is designed to secure attitudes on specific topics. Typical examples are:

How do you feel that the pay for your job compares with the pay for the same sort of work in other companies?

- () My pay is lower than in any other company for the same sort of work.
- () Lower than in most other companies.
- () About the same as in others.
- () Higher than in most of the others.
- () Higher than in any of the others.

Are you given a clear idea by the people above you as to how

* In one employee population of 835 cases, intercorrelations ranging from +.30 to +.65 were observed, using equal weights of 1-2-3-4-5 for the several responses to each question.

well they like your work and where they think you need improvement?

- ☐ I am told nothing about it.
- ☐ I am told very little.
- ☐ I am told fairly well.
- ☐ I am told fully and completely.

When there is a better job vacant, how often do you feel that the best-qualified person gets promoted to the vacancy?

- ☐ Rarely.
- ☐ Sometimes.
- ☐ Usually.
- ☐ Almost always.
- ☐ Always.

Are employees ever bawled out or criticized when they do not deserve it?

- ☐ Often.
- ☐ Sometimes.
- ☐ Rarely.
- ☐ Never.

If you had any cause for dissatisfaction, what would your chances be of getting a fair hearing and a square deal?

- ☐ Very little chance, if any.
- ☐ Poor.
- ☐ Fair.
- ☐ Reasonably good.
- ☐ Very good.

Items of information and identification. Although the replies are anonymous, it is necessary to have certain information about the individual employees for purposes of analysis. Thus a schedule may contain questions as to department or work group, sex, length of employment, age, and previous employment. Typical wordings are:

Have you ever worked for other companies or stores, or is this your first regular job?

- ☐ This is my first regular job.

() I have worked on other jobs but this is my first job in a store.

() I have worked in one or more other stores.

About how long have you worked here?

() Less than one year.

() More than one year but less than three.

() More than three years but less than five.

() Five years or more.

Information of this type, it is explained, is necessary for purposes of research.

The schedules also offer a convenient opportunity for securing information on questions such as: "Do you have difficulty in cashing your pay check?" or "Would you prefer a shorter (or longer) lunch hour?" "Do you think that you would care to join a Group Hospitalization Insurance Plan which would cost you about fifty cents per month if such insurance were to be offered to employees of this company?"

Findings

Morale scores. The large majority of workers who have answered these questionnaires have had morale scores above 50, the theoretical mid-point on the scale. Although no complete summary of the total experience is available, the mean score observed for a sample of 43,962 cases which results from combining 141 separate employee populations is 69.7. The condensed distribution of these scores is:

<i>Scores</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
0 to 91
10 to 29	2.4
30 to 49	11.6
50 to 69	31.1
70 to 89	41.3
90 to 100	13.5

Figure 1 shows this distribution graphically. Included in this sample are employees of many types: office workers and factory

workers, men and women, skilled workers and unskilled, from all sections of the country, and from large cities and small—but only the “rank and file” of business and industry. Foremen, supervisors, and managers have been studied separately.




FIG. 1. Percentage distribution of 43,962 employee morale scores.

It cannot be assumed that the sample is representative of all workers since opportunities to secure data have been found only in those more substantial organizations which have placed relatively greater emphasis on personnel and industrial relations; but it probably is fairly well representative of “better” companies. This factor of selection may offer a partial explanation of the skew, the piling up toward the high end of the scale, shown in Figure 1; yet it would seem that the distribution must also reflect a sense of identification with and loyalty to the individual’s particular place of employment. The average worker apparently develops a bias in favor of his own company, just as the average citizen may be expected to be biased in his judgment of his school, his home town, and his family.

A skewed distribution of the same general form has been ob-

served in most employee populations studied, although the extent of the skew varies with the mean score of the group. Considering only those employee populations of over 1,000 employees each, average morale scores observed have ranged from 58 to 77. The significance of such a range may be judged from the fact that this difference of 19 points is 28.8 times the standard error of the difference. Average scores as high as 88 have been found in smaller units.

Far greater differences appear among the separate departments or work groups within a single organization. In any organization of moderate size having as many as ten or fifteen separate departments or divisions, it is not unusual to find a spread of as much as 25 points between the highest and lowest departments. Marked variations in average scores occur even among departments working on essentially the same type of operation and with identical hours and pay and in general under identical personnel policies. In such cases the only important variable is found in the nature and quality of immediate supervision. These results would seem to offer conclusive proof that the immediate boss is a tremendously important factor in the determination of employee morale.

As suggested above, the results fail to show any high relationship between morale scores and type of work done, nor does there seem to be any significant correlation between morale and general wage level. The results do suggest, however, that there is some relationship between skill and morale, that is, that a cross section of workers in highly skilled trades would give somewhat higher scores than a cross section of unskilled labor.

There is a definite pattern in the relationship between tenure of employment and morale. In general, employees with less than one year's service have had relatively higher average scores than have those with from one year to five years of service. The trend then reverses at about the five-year point, with employees of more than five or ten years' service having scores somewhat above the average for the entire group.

The averages shown below illustrate the two most commonly observed patterns.

Length of service	Average morale scores	
	Company X	Company Y
Under 6 months	66	75
6 months to 1 year	61	69
1 year to 5 years	58	66
5 years to 10 years	57	69
Over 10 years	64	72

Since length of service and age are highly associated, the same general pattern obtains when age alone is considered, but there is a general tendency for morale to increase with age when length of service is held constant.

Department managers, foremen, and other supervisors usually can be expected to have higher scores than those of rank-and-file employees; usually, indeed, the average morale score increases with the amount of responsibility involved. Some atypical situations have been found, however, in which morale scores of supervisors have actually been lower than those of the workers supervised. No data on relationship between the scores of individual supervisors and their subordinates are available, but the general results would indicate that the correlation would not be as high as has usually been taken for granted. In many cases, individual supervisors have had morale scores lower than the average rank-and-file score for any department within the company. Figure 2 illustrates the degree of overlap in individual scores between a group of 16,000 rank-and-file workers and a group of 1,400 managers, supervisors, and assistants having authority over them. Mean scores for the two groups were 65.1 and 75.1, respectively.

Specific attitudes. Answers to questions dealing with specific factors in the job situation show a pattern of significant variation from organization to organization, but much greater variation from department to department within a given organization—

much the same situation as that described for the morale score. This would be expected, of course, in the answers to items bearing directly on the relationship between the worker and his department manager or foreman, such as, "Are employees ever bawled out or criticized when they do not deserve it?" But the same pattern also obtains in the answers to questions on topics not ordi-




FIG. 2. Distribution of morale scores of rank-and-file employees and of managers, supervisors and assistants having authority over them.

narily under the direct control of departmental supervisors, such, for example, as pay, hours, promotions, and appeal of grievances.

Table I shows this variation in summary form for ten items in two comparable organizations, each of which has twenty-three major departments. The figure called Percentage of Satisfaction is a convenient summary which results from arbitrarily defining certain of the multiple-choice answers provided in the questionnaire as being indicative of satisfactory attitude. If, for example, the two more favorable answers under a question having five possible responses are defined as satisfactory, then the percentage of satisfaction for that item is simply the percentage who checked either one or the other of those two answers. Thus, the result may be influenced both by the wording of the question and the stringency of the definition of "satisfaction." For this reason,

the figures are not to be regarded as absolute measures of satisfaction, and any comparisons of results from topic to topic must be made with extreme care. The principal value of the data lies in comparisons from group to group on a given topic.

TABLE I. Variations in satisfactory attitudes in two comparable organizations of twenty-three departments each.

“Satisfactory” attitude	Total %	Number of departments in which Percentage of Satisfaction is									
		10 to 19	20 to 29	30 to 39	40 to 49	50 to 59	60 to 69	70 to 79	80 to 89	90 to 100	
1. Employees are rarely or never undeservedly bawled out or criticized	A 65 B 57	—	—	2	3	3	4	4	4	3	
2. Employees are praised for good work	A 72 B 67	—	—	—	3	4	2	5	5	4	
3. When I talk with the people above me about my work I feel completely free to say exactly how I feel..	A 66 B 55	—	—	—	2	3	8	7	2	1	
4. When given new work or new methods I get all the instruction that I could wish	A 56 B 38	—	—	1	5	5	11	—	—	1	
5. There is no favoritism shown in my department..	A 44 B 40	—	3	4	8	3	2	2	—	1	
6. When there is a better job open, the best-qualified person almost always, or always, gets promoted	A 41 B 24	—	7	6	7	—	3	—	—	—	
7. If I had cause for dissatisfaction I would have a reasonably good chance of getting a fair hearing and a square deal	A 75 B 68	—	—	—	—	4	2	9	5	3	
8. The volume of work expected of me is reasonable	A 81 B 71	—	—	—	—	—	4	8	4	7	
9. My pay is as high as, or higher than, the pay for the same sort of work elsewhere	A 84 B 60	—	—	1	1	1	4	2	6	8	
10. The management here cares more about employees’ welfare than does the management of most other companies	A 72 B 50	—	—	—	1	2	6	7	6	1	

Relationship of specific attitudes to general morale. The morale score provides a measure of general attitude toward the total job situation, this general attitude presumably being built up as a composite of many specific attitudes and experiences. Some insight into the nature of general morale as defined here may be obtained by examining the relationship between the various specific attitudes and total attitude. Such an examination can be made either through the use of correlation techniques, or, more simply, by dividing the employees into "satisfied" and "not satisfied" groups on each of the specific questions, and comparing the average morale scores of the resulting groups. If, on a given topic, there is a large difference in average morale scores between the two

TABLE II. Difference in average morale score between "satisfied" and "not satisfied" employees—selected specific topics

Topic	Satisfied	Not satisfied	Difference
A fair hearing and square deal on grievances	80.2	59.8	20.4
The prospect of a satisfactory future	80.4	61.6	18.8
Company's knowledge of the employee's qualifications and progress	78.9	60.7	18.2
Recognition of and credit for constructive suggestions offered	78.1	60.4	17.7
Friendly and helpful criticism of work or correction of errors	77.8	60.1	17.7
Pay increases when deserved	83.4	66.8	16.6
Recognition or praise for unusually good work	82.4	66.2	16.2
Selection of best-qualified employee for promotion when vacancies arise	84.7	68.7	16.0
Amount of work required not unreasonable	77.1	62.5	14.6
Pay at least as high as the going rate for the same type of work elsewhere	79.0	64.5	14.5
Freedom to seek help when difficult problems arise in work	79.8	65.5	14.3
Freedom from unjust reprimand	80.2	66.4	13.8
Satisfactory daily working hours	77.4	64.3	13.1
The company's vacation policy	80.8	68.7	12.1
Approval of the company's employee magazine	77.1	72.2	4.9

groups, it can be said that the topic is highly associated with morale; if the difference is small, the topic is relatively unimportant to morale.

That such an analysis almost invariably shows factors having to do with psychological satisfaction for the individual—recognition of his personality, etc.—to be at least as highly associated with morale as are material considerations, such as wages, hours, and physical working conditions seems extremely significant; in the majority of situations, indeed, factors such as fair treatment of grievances, credit for suggestions, and consideration on the part of the immediate supervisor have proved to be more highly associated with morale than are pay and hours.

Although the exact order of importance of the topics will vary from organization to organization, the general pattern is sufficiently consistent to permit generalizations. Typical of the results usually observed are the findings from a composite group of more than ten thousand department-store employees located in various parts of the country. Table II shows the average morale scores of "satisfied" and "not satisfied" groups in this study and the difference between the two figures for a number of items.

Conclusions and Discussion

Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from the data is that industrial morale as defined here and as measured by the battery of ten questions described is not determined simply by such material considerations as pay, hours, working conditions, vacations, and miscellaneous company benefit plans. The extent to which the employee enjoys the psychological satisfactions that come with recognition of and respect for his own personality, day by day and hour by hour on the job, is equally important. Although this is no new or original observation, it is nevertheless a fact to which business and industry have not given sufficient recognition.

The second outstanding conclusion is that foremen, department

managers, and others having direct supervision over workers play a tremendously large part in the determination of employee morale. This fact may be readily understood when it is remembered that the majority of the important intangibles mentioned are so largely in the hands of the employee's immediate supervisor. The worker who has the good fortune to be placed under a boss who is skillful in the art of handling people may be expected to have pleasant experiences and satisfaction on the job and, as a consequence, to develop relatively high morale. On the other hand, the worker who has the misfortune of being placed under a poor boss is not to be blamed if his morale is low despite whatever good intentions or fine paternalistic policies the top management of the company may have.

The quality of immediate supervision, furthermore, appears to create a mental set which carries over to and influences attitudes on factors of the job situation which are not controlled by the supervisor. In one company, for example, there were a number of similar departments doing essentially the same type of work. In one, 54 per cent of the workers said that the people immediately above them were practically always fair in their treatment of employees; only 11 per cent in a second department checked this answer. The percentages of satisfaction on undeserved reprimands were 61 per cent and 14 per cent. On recognition of good work there was a difference of 51 per cent. In the first department 71 per cent felt that they would have at least a reasonably good chance of getting a fair hearing and a square deal on a grievance, whereas only 23 per cent answered so in the other.

Although both of these departments had the same working hours and the same basic pay schedules, 61 per cent of the people in the first group and only 37 per cent of those in the second felt that their pay was at least as good as the going rate elsewhere, and there was a difference of 26 points in their average morale scores.

Under these circumstances it would seem impossible to create high morale in the second department by means of pay increases,

shorter hours, longer vacations, better physical working conditions, or any of the other tangible considerations which are so often the points at issue in labor disputes. Yet it can readily be seen that those employees might express their low morale in terms of such demands.

In the selection of its supervisors business has paid far too little attention to qualifications for personnel administration. A supervisor must have competence in the technical phases of the work which he is to direct, for there are measures of production, costs, spoilage, and physical operating efficiency by which his performance may be judged. The absence of comparable measures of personnel administration and the lack of recognition of the importance of this part of the job have resulted in permitting untold numbers of bosses to remain in positions for which they are not completely suited, either by reason of temperament or lack of training. And, as a consequence, much poor industrial morale has been created even in situations where management has had the best of intentions toward its employees.

Many corporations have established personnel or industrial-relations departments charged with responsibility for employee morale. The typical personnel executive, however, becomes a staff officer and finds that the bulk of his time and effort is devoted to mechanical phases of personnel administration such as employment records, wage, hour, and vacation policies, miscellaneous plans for insurance and benefits, social security records, and matters having to do with labor legislation. All of these things are important in business operations and all of them demand attention, but a complete personnel program must also extend into the field of personal relationships between the worker and his supervisor, must, in short, make provision for giving the individual worker a maximum degree of the intangible satisfactions. Such satisfaction is in the last analysis purely a line function and cannot be guaranteed directly by the personnel executive or his assistants. Each supervisor must also be the personnel officer for his own people.

CHAPTER XVIII

Labor Unions and Morale

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A CARTOON in a British newspaper portrayed a worried workman, whose factory had been exposed to daily bombings, wishing that he could escape to some safe comfortable berth in the army. The heroes of this war are quite as truly men in overalls as men in other service uniforms. During World War I it required the labor of three men behind the lines to furnish equipment and supplies for an average soldier. Today, with mobile, mechanized warfare, that ratio has become eighteen workmen for each combatant.* The United States is serving as the primary arsenal of the democracies, hence the morale of American workers has become an influence to mold destiny.

Labor's Statement

Both CIO and AFL have announced their whole-hearted support of the war. On March 30, 1942, the American Federation of Labor proclaimed its excellent morale in full page advertisements in metropolitan newspapers.

"We are the workers of America, its production soldiers. We are on the job. We have only one aim right now and that is to help America win. We are working night and day to produce the ships, planes, tanks and guns our armed forces need for victory.

"WE ARE GIVING THIS JOB EVERYTHING WE'VE GOT! WE WILL STICK TO THIS JOB, COME HELL OR

* Data from Labor's Monthly Survey, American Federation of Labor, October, 1941.

HIGH WATER, UNTIL THIS WAR IS WON! THAT IS OUR PLEDGE TO AMERICA!"

The Problem

So firm a stand is reassuring, but there are problems not solved by pronouncements. What about strikes? The forty hour week? Slow-downs? Wage demands? The character of labor leaders? The morale of the workers in the factories? What happens when hours of work rise to fifty and sixty and beyond? What has happened to morale in over-crowded regions where men cannot find houses for their families or schools for their children? What will happen to worker morale when tires give out and men are forced to travel miles to work?

One index of morale may be found in output figures—another in voluntary quits. Output figures are military secrets, but the general report is that they are more than satisfactory thus far. Turn-over is a more serious problem. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics in January 1942, the latest report available at this writing, the rate at which workers were leaving jobs had reached the highest level on record. This did not include men leaving for the armed services; it was based wholly on "voluntary quits." The rate of quitting in the spring of 1942 was five times what it had been two years before. According to estimates of the Cleveland Trust Company, the January 1942 rate was the equivalent of the shift of a third of the working force each year. Obvious inefficiency results from the need to train new workers every few months. To some extent the job quitting may have arisen from the change-over process which has moved men with certain skills from one plant to another, but the next year should reveal how much dissatisfaction with working conditions may lie beneath this apparent restlessness.

Most factories have taken some steps to promote better morale. Special attention has been given to Radio Corporation of America, which "has had pep sessions for its workers, with movie actresses sliding from the factory roof in breeches buoys and all the usual

whoop-er-up devices, as well as free mid-winter trips to Miami for workers making the best suggestions toward speeding up the plant's production." (*Nation*, April 4, 1942. p.393). Sidney Hillman and Donald Nelson have proposed posters, stickers, graphic charts of progress, contests, and other such devices for stimulating greater effort. Representative Edith Nourse Rogers has introduced a bill to provide Congressional medals for laborers in war industries.

On a sounder basis are the many plants which, in the spirit of the preceding chapter, have tried to respect the dignity of each worker, to promote friendly democratic relationships, and to give workers an increasing share in determining policy.^{9, 16}

The achievement of stability and high morale is only partly subject to the control of the local factory manager. He can remove certain irritating foremen but he cannot provide new tires for worker's cars. He can adjust inequities, but the division of profits between owners and workers is subject to collective bargaining. He can promote able individuals, but he cannot exorcize the fear in the hearts of the rank and file workers that devastating unemployment may follow the war. Crosser⁸ points out that industry over the past half century has been characterized by "a growing incapacity of the individual to preserve peace in industry by informal, extemporized methods." Government regulation and labor organization have become determining factors in industrial morale. It is the special problem of this chapter to explore what organized labor is now doing, what it might do, and especially what the general public might do in relation to labor unions, to help in the creation of the highest possible level of morale.

Unions Help Foster Morale

Most of the people of America, about 75% according to public opinion polls, say they "believe in unions." If these spokesmen for America are asked why they support organized labor, they are less definite. They certainly don't think well of strikes, the closed shop,

or check-off; they suspect communism, violence and racketeering in unions; in other polls they charge that labor interferes more than any other group with national defense; but still and all they are "for" labor unions.

This inarticulate faith that unions are good for the country rests upon solid truth. The history of what the organized labor movement has done to make possible the higher standards of living which all enjoy, is impressive.² The story of unions is a chapter in the long record of man's struggle for self-respect. There was a time, for example, in the garment industry,⁵ when the boss could play absolute monarch. At a whim he hired or fired; he gave orders and bawled out his help as he saw fit. Girls and young men who would become sycophants were given special favors; those who tried to assert their own rights or dignity were too often persecuted or black-listed. The bitterest fact was that there was no recourse. The boss was law and order incarnate. He ran his business as he pleased, and was free to regard criticism as insubordination. Men with families to support learned quickly to do as they were told, to take what was given to them, to keep their mouths shut, and to put up with whatever insults might be thrown about. They did not and could not learn, of course, to take this all without reaction. Morale suffered. The seeds of class hatred were sown by the defenselessness of employees against petty tyranny.

Not only in the garment industry but almost everywhere, the union was presented to the workers as the road to economic decency and to spiritual independence. Unions were opposed—sometimes with violence and bloodshed—but pioneer fighters like Mother Jones¹² saw in them a chance to lift up the underdog and to befriend the helpless. Usually the establishment and recognition of a union meant both higher standards of living and some advance toward democratic ideals. At the same time, the unions attracted men who wanted power.¹⁵ The fact that the workers had not been trained to democratic forms of action often left them prey to their own leaders, as they formerly had been to the bosses.

It is not yet possible to make any final assessment of the service of unions to the morale of rank and file workers, but a reconsideration of the eleven characteristics of democratic morale, suggested by Professor Allport in the first chapter of this volume, may serve as a kind of scale on which to appraise what unions have done and should do.

1. *Voluntary, wholehearted participation.* "A program is good if it arouses in Americans a sense of personal responsibility for sharing in the task." Because union recognition was seldom offered, and had to be won against odds, the early days of the labor movement brought to almost all participants a very stirring sense of responsibility. If the psychological pattern of political democracy is repeated, we must expect that some day the grandchildren or great-grandchildren of those who led the way, will come to take their union privileges for granted, and will only in crisis remember that freedom must be defended. Today, however, the organized labor movement gives to its leaders and to many of its members an exultant sense of progress toward increasing share in controlling the conditions of their work.^{3, 4}

One of the first demands which American labor made in connection with the conversion of our economy to defense and later to war purposes was for greater participation and responsibility.⁷ At the CIO convention in 1941 Philip Murray, president of the CIO proposed joint planning councils in which representatives of employers and employees could together take responsibility for increasing war production. The proposal sounded to some business men like "Soviets," but more and more employers have come to recognize that there are brains in the labor movement, too, and that cooperation is the better course. The conservative *Washington Post* editorialized (March 24, 1942) . . . "One of the chief criticisms of our industrial system is that there is not enough democracy in it. Donald M. Nelson's plan for joint labor-management war plant committees would be a step to meet such a criticism. To some industrialists the committees smack of a foreign importation.

It is felt that they would be the thin end of the wedge of little soviets, syndicalism, or the corporative state. This is a jaundiced view to take of an experiment in industrial relations which might have socially as well as economically fruitful results." Once the plan became Nelson's instead of Murray's it sounded better, and the experiment is now well along with the sanction of the War Production Board.

In Great Britain also the labor movement's chief demand was opportunity for participation, and there the request has been more fully granted than has thus far occurred in the United States.¹⁷ According to Sir Walter Citrine, General Secretary of the British Trade Unions Congress (N. Y. *Post*, Dec. 20, 1940) "British labor unions are adequately represented on every public and private council from the war cabinet of Prime Minister Churchill to the smallest village group that has to do with the formulation of policy and administration of total defense of Great Britain. . . . There isn't a thing that labor isn't participating in. It ranges from food rationing to aircraft production, to distribution and to priorities."

One word in this criterion for democratic morale deserves special attention—the word "voluntary." Theoretically men are free to join unions or not, as they desire. Sometimes employers interfere to prevent joining; sometimes unions coerce workers into joining up.¹ There is a labor side to this story, as we shall see later, but let us record the question mark here. Insofar as the labor movement can maintain *voluntary* loyalties it will contribute more to morale.

When it comes to coercion by employers or by government, the labor movement is obdurate. Labor in the United States, as in England, was ready voluntarily to relinquish rights and privileges which some wanted to take away by law. The proposal to require labor unions to do what they were willing to do on a voluntary basis has been one of the most damaging attacks on labor morale. Anti-strike legislation was bitterly fought, but both AFL and CIO unions have publicly disavowed strikes of any kind for the dura-

tion of the war. On December 16, 1941, the official statement of the American Federation of Labor was adopted as follows:

"While we reject repressive labor legislation and insist upon the preservation of the essential democratic right of workers to cease work collectively as a last and final resort, we nevertheless pledge ourselves to forego the exercise of this right during the war emergency and to prefer submission of pending differences with employers to approved facilities and processes for voluntary mediation, conciliation and arbitration.

"We most heartily endorse the 'no-strike' policy voluntarily assumed by all divisions and character of labor as announced by the executive council. Labor needs no restrictions upon the right to strike, when to cease production is to strike at the very heart of the nation. Labor will produce and produce without interruption."

A few months later, when industry shifted to a seven-day week, the unfairness of paying men overtime for working on Saturday and Sunday, if they had other days off became patent. Again, however, organized labor insisted that morale depended upon a *voluntary* adjustment of this practice. This time we quote from Mr. Murray of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. He referred to:

"A unanimous action, surrendering our legal and contractual rights to premium payments for work on Saturdays and Sundays and holidays when these do not represent the sixth or seventh working day. We took this action of our own free will, because our President and our production chief recommended this sacrifice to promote increased production.

"Labor's record, and I speak particularly for that of the CIO, has been one of which all Americans can be justly proud. Our members are the men and women who are actually producing the tanks, the planes, the ships and all the other war materials.

"They are working long hours, often at insufficient wages, sparing no effort to increase production to win the war. Strikes have been eliminated and the unions are exerting all their efforts to stimulate morale and enthusiasm for ever greater production for victory."

In a similar mood, labor fought "cooling off" periods on a compulsory basis, but in accord with the no-strike policy, some unions are today suffering discharge of leaders for union activities, and are resorting only to appeals to an overworked War Labor Board which is so busy it cannot consider their case for many weeks. It is interesting to contrast this excellent result of voluntary action with Congressman Thomas Eliot's report that in one state where a cooling-off law was passed, there were eight times as many strikes the year after the law went into effect as there had been the year before.

When we have said that democratic morale depends upon opportunity for *voluntary participation* we have stated a large part of a sound labor program for America.

2. *Respect for the person.* "A program is good if its aim and practice are to further the well-being, growth, and integrity of each individual personality." This would be accepted by most unions as their objective; many could illustrate that their practice does indeed foster respect for individual personality. On the other hand union critics point to practices of unions which tend to subordinate the individual to some sort of mass action. Whenever unions treat members as though they were simply numbers on a card, or sources of dues, or votes to be herded into some political camp, the union fails to contribute what it could to morale. In general, the history of the labor movement has been one of the emergence of the individual workers from a very submerged status, to one in which a working man can think, speak, and act with something more of the independence which we proudly think of as part of the American frontier tradition.

3. *Universalism.* The third demand, that a movement shall seek life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness for all, envisioning a better world after the war, is an excellent characterization of the labor movement in all countries where it has been left free. The central union idea is to obtain more of the good things of life for the group as a whole, rather than for the lucky few. Even some union practices which have aroused considerable opposition—sympathetic

strikes and boycotts, for example—grow out of the sense of solidarity which workmen in one group felt for other groups of less fortunate workers.

Few of us are capable of universal sympathies, and the labor movement has had its limited horizons too. It has been charged, with some truth, that unions have too often sought to advance the profit of their own members rather than the welfare of the country as a whole. Higher wages benefit only the group receiving them—lower prices might help all low-income people to buy more. It is interesting to note in this connection that unions do sometimes act to get prices down. In April, 1941, the United Shoe Workers sent to Leon Henderson a letter protesting against what their research indicated to be excessive prices being charged for shoes ordered by the army. After government investigation the union was found to have been correct; the bids were rejected; and the public saved money.

Another evidence of growing interest in universal welfare rather than just their own group, has been the pressure from the United Automobile Workers to hasten conversion of factories to war production. In December, 1940, union leader Walter P. Reuther first offered his proposal to stop making motor cars, to pool facilities, and to plan the whole gigantic automobile industry for production of war planes. "I say," he said later, "that the skilled man-hours wasted in building a 1942 model car was the most criminal thing ever done against our program, because it represented the greatest waste of skilled man-production and man-hours that has ever taken place in America at a time when we needed every single skilled man-hour we could get. We were wasting it, and the industry came out with a model which we called the 'Christmas Tree' model, filled with gadgets, filled with trimmings, that used up more critical materials than were necessary." No one disputed the statement of the President of General Motors that to follow Reuther's plan would have meant more lay-off of union members, at least during the re-tooling period. Reuther may have been technically correct or in error—we make no attempt to ap-

praise his plan from that angle—but his psychology was interesting. Here was a powerful labor leader, anticipating the needs of the country as a whole, and laying out a plan for the general welfare, even at some cost to his own union. More than a year later many of the principles he had advocated did come into operation.

So far as the effort for a better world after the war is concerned, it would be hard to find a group of America which has gone further than labor. The morale of labor is vitally involved in the question of what is going to happen when millions of men return from the army, and when factories no longer need to make tanks, planes, and munitions. For more than ten years before this war boom, labor lived close to the chronic fear of unemployment. Labor is asking in no uncertain terms that our country shall continue to produce goods in peace-time, directing production then toward higher standards of living.

“While we are strengthening our defense against war,” writes President William Green,¹⁰ “we must begin to prepare for the peace. . . . Every decision and every policy related to our defence program must be tested in terms of their application to the solution of the post-emergency crisis. The American Federation of Labor refuses to accept as inevitable the prospect of our great armory of defense being condemned to abolishment when the war ends. We are determined to convert this armory into a great toolshed for building up the functions of world peace. Unless we prevent a post-war depression with widespread unemployment we shall have failed in our most crucial battle—the fight against privation and want.”

British labor has been even more forthright in demands for economic change to permit abundant production after the war. The Labor Party Conference (reported by the *New York Times*, June 5, 1940) stated frankly: “the price the Labor Party is asking for agreeing to enter the British government and swinging the full Laborite trade-union resources into the war, is a Socialist system after the war. . . . Only bold Socialist planning of the foundations

of our system can give the faith and power to meet the claims of those who will bring us victory."

For America, Socialism, even in the mild sense in which the English labor leaders may have used it, seems no adequate solution. Many of us are suspicious of planning that comes down from the top. Nevertheless, we all recognize that some bold steps are going to have to be taken. While we fight for survival against enemies abroad, our minds do turn to what is coming after. Constructive steps are being taken by Isador Lubin of the President's special committee, the National Resources Planning Board, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Department of Agriculture, and other government agencies. Some officials in government and business are frankly suspicious, preferring to return to economic laissez-faire, rather than to run any risk of socialism. If planning is to be put on an effective democratic basis, the organized labor movement is likely to play a major part in bringing this about.

One criticism which may be directed at the trade unions involves this goal of "universalism." Although the movement professes to speak for the workers of America, it has never included more than about a quarter of the non-agricultural employees. The movement itself has a long history of internal conflicts. "Solidarity forever" has been a favorite song of the unions, but united fronts have been temporary. The American Federation of Labor and the Railway Brotherhoods lived together in more peace than characterized the labor movement during the first years of the life of the Committee (later Congress) on Industrial Organization.

Although the criticism of disunity is well justified, it has been aggravated by unfavorable publicity. Curiosity led the writer to ask a group of co-workers the question, "About what proportion of the strikes by organized labor in the United States during 1941 arose from the claims of rival unions (CIO vs. AFL) or from jurisdictional disputes of some kind?" In a group of eleven social scientists the estimates ranged from 2½% to 60% with a mean estimate of 15%. In the group of a half dozen clerks and secretaries who, as one of them said, "know only what I've happened to see

in the papers," guesses ranged from 15% to 75% with an average of 52%. It seems likely that the general public would be greatly surprised to learn that the correct answer, according to the United States Department of Labor, was only 2.3%.

Recent developments, in response to the war, have shown increasing unity among the branches of organized labor. An opinion poll showed 71% of union members and 87% of union leaders answering "Yes" to the question, "Should the AFL and the CIO get together?" (Again one suspects that the public might be surprised to learn that unity sentiments were stronger in the CIO than in the AFL and stronger among the leaders than in the rank and file.) A "Combined Labor Victory Committee" has been organized, and joint action is increasing. On April 7, 1942, the AFL and the CIO united in a great rally at Pittsburgh, to stimulate maximum war production.

"I ask the people of this country to accept our presence here tonight," said President Green, "as a symbol of the unity and solidarity which must prevail throughout this nation. I come to you without any reservations. I am determined and willing to stand with President Murray and his associates in this fight for the defense of our country and the preservation of the rights of labor."

The audience, according to press reports, responded with enthusiasm. "What a team!" someone shouted.

President Murray declared that "the presence of the presidents of the AFL and the CIO on the same platform tells beyond words that we know this is labor's war. Labor stands together. Labor's ranks are closed against the enemy. Labor faces the foe, the soul-destroying foe of dictatorship and tyranny, as a well-trained army determined that our country shall not suffer the fate of France and Norway through the disruptive efforts of fifth columnists or self-proclaimed patriots who preach disunity."

4. *Economic self respect and social status.* "A program is good if it provides for reasonable security, fair treatment, and honorable status in the group for all individuals." The contribution of the labor movement to winning fair treatment, economic security,

and social status for its members is so evident that no further stress need be given.

5. *Majority rule.* "A program is good if it expresses the majority will of the people, and if it enhances the acceptance of the principle of majority rule. No morale building policy can advocate schemes that would set up rule by an elite, whether of family, of race, or of wealth." When this test is applied to labor unions, the result is a general credit, with a few specific reservations.

The general credit arises from the fact that before unions gained strength, industrial dictatorships, based on wealth and family, were the rule. As unions grow, the workers in an industry have an increasing voice on the matters of most concern to them.

Three reservations seem to be important. One is that unions themselves are not always democratic. This is certainly the exception, but it is a source of serious weakness in the democratic structure of America. There is a job for the schools and also for the unions themselves, to educate members so that majority rule does actually function.

A second reservation is that workers and employers are not the whole set of interests involved in production. The consumer matters, too. In some instances labor and employers have gotten together, but in such a way as to set up a kind of racket which mulcts the consumer. It has been charged, for example, that in one Eastern city, the electrical workers agreed to work only for certain contractors, and those contractors were then free to charge prices far above what competitors would have charged, but the competitors could not get union labor. The principle of majority rule will require that the consumer have not only a voice, but the major voice, in determining many policies. Only in the consumer cooperative movement has this principle had adequate recognition.

A third reservation concerns the principle that an elite of race is repugnant to democratic morale. There are 21 national or international unions (all in the AFL or the Railway Brotherhoods) which exclude Negroes completely. Only 8 of the 102 unions in these old-line groups follow the practice, quite general in the CIO,

of giving full status to Negroes.⁶ As Professor Clark has shown in an earlier chapter, Negro morale represents a serious problem—perhaps the most serious problem—in American fighting spirit. When, as at Tampa, Florida, a Ship-builders Union (AFL) executes a defense contract including a closed shop, and thereby throws out of work 500 competent Negro workmen, previously employed by the concern, then the union has become a destroyer of American morale. Negroes have not unnaturally reacted against the unions, have become strike-breakers, and so made a bad situation worse. In April, 1941, when Henry Ford was fighting the CIO, some 1500 Negro strike-breakers were introduced into the Ford plant. It is very much to the credit of the United Automobile Workers that they did not react by blaming the misled Negroes. The CIO has pledged itself to “uncompromising opposition to any form of discrimination.”

Unions do represent a forward step, but they could take a longer step if they could be rid of race discrimination, could join with consumer organizations, and could demonstrate genuine democratic controls in their own ranks.

6. *Representative and evocative leadership.* “A program is good if it raises the confidence of people in their chosen leaders.” Unlike foremen, vice-presidents, superintendents and managers, labor leaders are chosen by the men and women they lead, and are responsible to their rank and file. There are, it must be admitted, unions which are controlled by a clique of officers who perpetuate their favored status by manipulating elections or by failing to call conventions. These are exceptions to the more general rule. Democratic government, whether in cities, states, or unions, has never been able to free itself wholly from the wiles of politicians. “Bosses” develop from time to time, especially in groups which are educationally and economically backward. Yet few would argue that because our governments do sometimes get taken over by political gangs, the democratic form of government should be abandoned. In our cities and states, and in our unions, the rank and file can eventually get rid of officers who fail to express the

popular will. But in industry, that is more difficult. Even at their worst, labor leaders are somewhat more responsive to worker opinion than are those short-sighted business administrators who think only of their responsibility to the stockholders. Representative leadership is better achieved through unions than without them.

Another important contribution of the labor movement in the area of leadership and morale, is the provision of a new ladder by which the average boy or girl can rise to a position of influence. The average young man or woman from a working class home once had two avenues open. One was through rising to the top in the business hierarchy—a ladder which has now been largely blocked off for those youths without college training or family position. A second has been the ladder of politics but elections, too, are expensive nowadays. The labor movement now offers another line of promotion. Some twenty thousand men and women have risen to full time positions in leading their fellow-workers. Some of these labor officials sit in at the top conferences of government and industry. It may well be that today the average boy has a better chance of reaching a post where he can mold American life, if he becomes a labor leader, than he would have if he aspired to be a legislator or a business mogul. Certainly the morale of America is better because this new chance has been opened up for our youth.

7. *Tolerance.* "A program is good if it recognizes the creative role played by minorities in a democracy, and if it diminishes hostility among the in-groups of the nation." There are many who would argue that because labor unions represent the working class, they inevitably deepen class conflict. This does not necessarily follow. Differences in privilege between owners and workers existed long before the working class was organized, and some of the distinctions were then more aggravated than they are now. In the old days of sweat shops, low wages, industrial accidents, and petty tyranny of the shop, more hostility was engendered than is likely to arise when unions have established decent standards of living, attractive working conditions, respect for individual dignity, and smoothly-working machinery for the adjustment of grievances.

There are good psychological grounds for the belief that when apparent injustices can be expressed to shop stewards and taken up for adjustment, they are less likely to fester into malevolence. In countries like Sweden and Great Britain where labor organization has been longer established, there is probably more rather than less tolerance among classes. In those industries in the United States which have been organized for many years, the experience has been that cooperation is taken for granted. The most violent demonstrations of class feeling have come in connection with the attempt to impede formation of unions.¹

8. *Freedom of Speech.* "A program is good if it respects the principles of freedom of thought and uncensored communication." Labor organizations foster freedom of thought and expression through many channels. The educational classes conducted by unions are usually of the forum or discussion type. Worker representatives are given more place on public platform, in the public press, and over the broadcasting stations, in those communities in which union organization has grown strong. Millions of American citizens get from the labor press * an interpretation of labor news which is quite unlike that given by the big newspapers and radio chains. Whether due to the outlook of owners, managers, advertisers, or influential readers, the bias of most of the sources of news is strongly anti-labor. As a consequence, working people feel that they are being misrepresented and their morale suffers. One of the most serious problems before the American people today, in the attempt to build an effective national unity, is to cope with the gap between the news as presented in the papers and the facts as understood by men close to the situation.

* The United Mine Workers Journal, Steel Labor, and the United Automobile Worker have circulation figures of around half a million each. The Federationist and the CIO News each reach something like a quarter of a million members. Some local papers—e.g. Labor, the organ of the District of Columbia—reach a quarter of a million. There are 250 papers published by various internationals of the AFL. One among them, Justice, reaches a quarter of a million members of the ILGWU. Labor representatives say that the combined circulation of all labor newspapers exceeds 8,000,000; how many family members read papers cannot well be estimated.

Newspaper readers at the present time can recall plenty of headlines about strikes threatening war production. Yet according to the figures of the War Production Board the time lost on war work due to strikes amounted in January, 1942, to four thousandths of one percent of the time worked. Members of the American Federation of Labor may have read in their press that the loss due to strikes averages out at 1.4 hours per man year of work, whereas industrial accidents take 26 hrs. per man year and illness 40 hours per man year. The record of labor in England since Dunkirk shows that time lost through strikes amounts to one day's work per man in fifteen years of constructive contribution. Few readers of the American press would suspect that the American labor record is even better. Since Pearl Harbor the loss of working time due to strikes has been at only half the British rate, or one day's work per man in thirty years. It would not be strange if labor felt it unfair that so insignificant an aspect of their work is considered newsworthy, while labor is seldom credited with the impressive array of tanks rolling off the assembly lines. We read that battleships are ready a year ahead of schedule, and the credit is given to a government official or to a corporation. We read of a fourfold increase in airplane production and a five-fold increase in production of ships, and tribute is paid to Mr. Donald Nelson, or to "industry," but rarely to the men in overalls. They are news only at the rare moment when some little wild-cat strike can be blown up into scare-head proportions.

The attention given by the commercial press and by certain radio commentators to strikes contrasts strangely with their treatment of a much more serious "strike" on the part of industry during 1940-41. Senator Aiken of Vermont recently reported to Congress that "from June, 1940, to May, 1941, 160,000,000 man days were lost to defense by employers negotiating with the government, while only 2,450,000 man days were lost to defense by labor negotiating with employers." This was the period when business refused to accept government contracts until legislation had removed the ceiling over profits, and had provided for the amortiza-

tion of the cost of new plants within five years, out of profits on government orders. These employer demands were criticized by some newspapers and radio programs, but the relative emphasis was not of the same order as the 60 to 1 difference between the losses caused by these delays and the losses caused by strikes. If all delays due to management were known, the discrepancy would be much greater. Never at any time in the last twelve years has the number of men on strike compared with the number of unemployed men whom industry has not yet put to work in war production.

Labor morale does not demand that all strikes should be sanctioned. Organized labor is a parvenu in social power, and mistakes are common. What America should find some way to provide, in the interests of fair play and genuine understanding, is a criticism of strikes which is less biased and emotional. They should be dealt with in rough proportion to their actual significance. The major causes of lag in production should be given a major share of attention. Only rarely should these be laid at the door of organized labor.

Consider another famous newspaper controversy: the campaign (current as this is written) against the forty hour week law. Letters to newspapers, magazines and to Congressmen reveal clearly that the public were led to believe that organized labor was working only forty hours a week in the war industries. Apparently a major campaign to foster this misunderstanding was conducted by the United States Chamber of Commerce, the Southern States Industrial Council, and certain individuals like Mr. E. K. Gaylord who owns some newspapers, a radio station and a paper mill in Oklahoma. Some newspapers carried front page form letters and appeals for citizens to write Congress. In one Western city free stenographic service was offered so citizens could dictate their wrath. A Texas group wired Senator Connally "When we hear of strikes and factories running only five days a week it makes us so mad that we are ready to shoot, kill or murder somebody, if we only knew whom to shoot."

While these protests were piling up, most factories were running not forty but one hundred or even one hundred sixty-eight hours a week. Divided into shifts men were working in the aircraft factories 49 hours a week, and in the machine tool industry where it was harder to get competent employees, 55 hours a week. The issue was never one of how long factories should run. It was not even a question of how long men should work. The debate concerned the point at which men should begin to be paid for overtime work. Making the week nominally longer would reduce somewhat labor's weekly earnings without affecting the hours machines kept going or the hours men worked. The goal of employers in the campaign against the forty-hour week was fourfold: (1) to pay lower wages; (2) to discredit labor; (3) to attack the New Deal; and, (4) to stake a claim to longer working hours, despite possible unemployment, after the war. High government officials protested * that to order a wage decrease now—this was the real import of the proposal for a forty-eight hour week—would set all labor agencies to making demands for increases to keep up with the rising cost of living. That would upset the machinery of production just when it was running smoothly and when it was much needed. It was not surprising to find intelligent labor leaders very hostile to the campaigns which mobilized the anger of America in support of a program which would defeat the very ends sought.

Another illustration of the problem of the news in relation to labor is the case of Genevieve Samp. On March 24, 1942, the Associated Press reported all throughout the country Congressman Rich's (Rep. Penn.) charge that one Genevieve Samp had been dis-

* The statement of Donald Nelson was as follows: "If we abolish the forty-hour week by law, we do not gain one additional hour of work in our war industries, but we create a widespread demand for increases in wage rates, throw the entire wage structure out of adjustment, and remove an important incentive for labor to shift from non-essential industries into war-production jobs." One old-line Congressman sought to make some anti-New Deal capital out of the testimony which was not censuring labor as he had hoped.

"Hasn't it occurred to you, Mr. Nelson," he asked, "that the fact that the Army, the Navy, the White House, and you, all made similar statements is quite a coincidence?"

"Hasn't it occurred to you," retorted Mr. Nelson, "that we're right?"

charged at the demand of a Detroit union affiliated with the CIO, because she tried to do too much work on her war job. Headlines over the story reported that the union fired her for working too hard, and her picture added interest to the front-page display.

The facts, as admitted in an obscure item a week later, were that Miss Samp had been involved in actual fist-fights with other employees; her production record was not in question at all. "She denied she ever had said that fellow workers objected to increasing production and admitted responsibility for disturbances in the plant." (Associated Press, April 1, 1942.) It is a fair conclusion that for every reader who noted the correction, ten have carried the false impression that the union fired somebody for putting forth extra effort. A radio commenorator on April 4 repeated the original uncorrected atrocity story. So labor smarted with resentment under another unjust attack.

Another area in which labor has suffered serious misrepresentation has been in connection with criminals and racketeers in unions. Three-fourths of the public polled by Gallup, believe that "many labor leaders are racketeers." Pegler's muckraking has turned up a few dramatically distasteful mobsters in the unions of motion picture operators, hod carriers, elevator construction workers, and operating engineers. Their exposure has been long overdue and should be welcomed by every friend of democracy, inside or outside the labor movement. But the charges have been publicized in such a way as to give the false impression that these plug-uglies are typical of the thousands of men and women now holding influential posts in the labor movement. A comprehensive survey would doubtless show that for every shady character there are dozens of honest, hard-working, clean living, idealistic labor leaders, devoted to democracy, and that the proportion of scum is no greater than would be found in any other group in American life who have recently gravitated into positions promising some power.

A typical example was the charge made by Congressman Martin Dies that there were 500 criminals in the CIO. He gave the names of twenty, and promised the others later; a promise still unfulfilled.

According to Lewis Booth, associate editor of the *Official Union Journal*, (Cinn.), a careful check-up on the 20 cases named showed that the much-publicized Dies charges were 100% mistaken. The most interesting part of the story was the attempt to get the refutation published. Of twenty big newspapers which had played up the Dies attack, only one was willing to print, even in an obscure place, the facts vindicating the labor leaders.

"Labor," the organ of the conservative Railroad Brotherhoods, published on March 3, 1942, exposure of eleven misrepresentations of labor in the big newspapers of current date. One of the stories, widely printed, called forth denials by Chairman H. S. Mills of the National Labor Relations Board; another was officially denounced by Chairman W. H. Davis of the War Labor Board. A third was denounced by Brigadier General Hershey of the Selective Service. The denials were not given the publicity which the anti-labor stories had, and probably never caught up.

Another example of facts twisted to give an absolutely contradictory impression arose after the CIO survey of New Jersey industry. The labor leaders found that fully half of the machines and machine-tools of that state were still idle, due to failure of government contracts and business management to mobilize the technical resources of the state. Contracts had been given to big new concerns, but many little businesses were unable to get either the raw materials to continue their old line of production or contracts to enter the war-production field. Labor protested in the interests of fuller production. But hear now how the facts reached the ears of the aroused citizens of Enid, Oklahoma. Their resolution (reported by the *Nation*, March 28, 1942, p. 359) read:

"With the head of the New Jersey CIO announcing that a complete investigation shows the war-production plants of that state to be operating at only 50 per cent capacity, and with this same condition prevalent throughout the United States, a Congress bankrupt of public spirit is betraying this country and its armed forces by an abject surrender to conscienceless labor leaders."

What does it do to the morale of a group of American citizens,

as patriotic as any, working hard to earn a wage which is meager enough at best, to find their organization consistently misrepresented and maligned? No very profound psychology is required to understand this problem. None of us likes to be misunderstood. If the union for us had been, as it has been for millions of workers, a means to greater self-respect, more democratic control over conditions of work, and higher standards of living, then how would we react to allegations that we believed unfair and untrue? If the union leaders we knew happened to be conscientious, loyal men whom we fully trusted and were proud to have as spokesmen, how would we feel about the institutions that smear them? Would we not over-react and refuse to admit even the defects and limitations which another approach might have made us willing to recognize and to correct?

Here lie the roots of one of the major morale problems, so far as organized labor is concerned. The morale of labor will improve if labor's side can be guaranteed a fair hearing.

A recent *Fortune* poll (February 1942) has given interesting data on the widespread ignorance concerning organized labor. Three American citizens out of four could not name the president of the CIO and less than half could name the man who, for many years, has held headlines as president of the AFL. Doubtless most of the citizens interviewed had pronounced opinions on open shop, closed shop and union shop, but few could define these terms satisfactorily. Only one in six knew that the unions affiliated with the CIO have much lower initiation fees. The writer in *Fortune* concludes, "About 40% of the public is wholly unequipped to have any opinion about labor problems, and only about 25% really know enough to be intelligent on the subject." Even in the ranks of labor-union members and their families, only about one-third could be considered fairly well-informed about the labor movement.

Obviously there is an educational job to be done. It is partly up to the public schools, for, although the typical union member in America will soon be a high-school graduate, few high schools have yet set aside any part of their curriculum to teach the history,

structure, rights, obligations and problems of the labor movement. The press and radio also face an educational assignment. If labor morale is as vital to winning the war as is soldier morale, and if public ignorance and prejudice are factors which lower the morale of labor, then the great agencies which enlighten adult public opinion can make a very important contribution on the home-front. Organized labor itself must bear a large measure of responsibility. While some unions conduct training courses, they are still too few, and even those do not reach a large proportion of members. For too many rank and file workers today the union is still only an instrument for collecting dues and protecting wages. In many instances union members themselves accept the interpretation of current issues printed in the great newspapers or broadcast over the radio.

The solution is probably not to be found in an extension of the present labor press and radio service, valuable as that would be. The essence of the problem is to get the great instruments of communication out from the control of a single class, representing a small minority of Americans. There will be serious morale problems in our national life until the press and radio achieve at least that measure of impartiality and respect for truth which characterizes the scholars in our universities. The comparison suggests that state-owned newspapers and radio stations, alongside private enterprises in distributing news, might be as wholesome as have been state universities alongside private colleges.

9. *The whole man* "A program is good if it utilizes the full intellectual equipment of each individual, so that his morale may involve the whole man and not merely an emotional segment of his nature."

Unions differ in the extent to which they try to serve all aspects of individual personality. Some conceive their responsibility rather narrowly as related to wages, hours, and working conditions. Even these, however, should not be regarded as wholly materialistic. Shorter working hours means more time for men and women with friends, families, and in a variety of educational and cultural ac-

tivities. Adequate wages may represent freedom from care and have psychological consequences more far-reaching than would be associated with merely buying larger quantities of goods. Some unions have gone in for housing projects; the Amalgamated Clothing Workers developed one of the first and best of these. The same union has gone into the field of banking. Credit unions are common. Probably the most wide-spread union activity outside of the bargaining field is education. Most of the larger unions have educational directors or educational committees and conduct a variety of study classes. Some of these deal directly with labor problems, but others may bring workers into touch with art, music, literature, history, and a variety of cultural concerns. The Workers Education Bureau (AFL) was organized in 1921 to further the educational objectives of this great branch of the labor movement. An outstanding union is the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. One of their locals, the Dressmakers Union, maintains the largest workers' education enterprise in New York City. The I L G W U itself is responsible for staging the highly successful "Pins and Needles." Out in the Poconos the workers maintain one of the finest rest and recreational camps in America, entirely for union members and their families. The following citation from the New York *Herald Tribune* (April 11, 1942) indicates another type of activity:

Music Notes

"*Arthur Schnabel* will play Beethoven's 'Emperor' piano concerto with the I.L.G.W.U. Symphony Orchestra under Eugene Plotnikoff's direction tonight at Town Hall in a concert presented by the Cultural Division of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. The I.L.G.W.U. String Ensemble, conducted by Herman Liebman, will also be heard. Besides the concerto, the program includes Schubert's fifth symphony, Beethoven's 'Prometheus' overture, and a Handel concerto grosso."

A union of this type becomes the center of social and intellectual life for its members, in something the way in which the church

was the center for a more homogeneous community life a century ago in America.

10. *War, never an end in itself.* "A program is good if it recognizes that democracy is not a violent process, but is a matter of 'piecemeal and retail progress.'"

Karl Marx, in the middle of the nineteenth century, anticipated that the reformist demands of the organized labor of that time would become revolutionary because the capitalist economic system would be unable to continue to make concessions. This has not proven to be the case. Despite periods of intense, prolonged depression, the movement of organized labor has never become a threat to the capitalist order. The fears of some members of the Union League Club have not been paralleled by any subversive intentions in the minds of most labor leaders.⁸ If organized labor does contribute to revolutionary change in our economic order, it will be as a result of the unintended consequences of moves which were made wholly in the hope of making progress within the existing order. Union members and union leaders develop an interest in maintaining existing industry which is almost as strong as that of corporation executives. If economic change comes too quickly, plants cannot adjust and men are thrown out of work. This the union tries to prevent. Indeed, it may well be that the stronger criticism of organized labor should be directed at their resistance to change. Unions have often opposed the introduction of labor-saving machinery on the ground that it might throw men out of work. The attitude of labor in the war crisis has been splendid evidence that if there is a prospect of work enough to keep all labor busy, there will be no continuing objection to any techniques for raising efficiency. Some of the most drastic proposals for conversion of plants to a war-time basis have come from labor itself; for example, the Reuther plan. As a rule, labor morale will be highest if the conditions of democratic progress can be maintained. When change is too long delayed, or when it threatens to move too quickly, labor opposition may be expected.

11. *Voluntary coordination, division of labor, and planning.* "A

program is good if it aids in achieving a co-ordinated and voluntary division of labor for the solution of common problems."

The union itself represents for most workers a practical illustration of what it means to cooperate and to achieve voluntary coordination. Many workers get more practice of democracy from the wide range of their committee responsibilities in the union, than they ever obtained at school, in church, or from community government. Labor has an excellent opportunity to contribute further to democratic morale by helping every member to learn the ways of democracy in conducting the affairs of the union.

The development of the CIO represented an important step forward, enabling labor to get out of a narrow rut of selfish thinking. Craft unions tended to see the job in terms of their particular skill. Industrial unions, on the other hand, have forced American workers to consider problems of industry seen as a whole. Both the AFL and the CIO maintain research departments which give labor leaders basic facts about the general progress of American industry and the opportunities for labor in particular fields. Labor bulletins contain graphs and charts which tell the story of economic production, wages, dividends, cost of living, and the trend of other variables. Nevertheless, it was to be expected that most plans for large-scale industrial coordination would come from the CIO rather than the AFL. The Murray Plan, which we discussed above, is a natural outcome of an attempt to improve planning, not just for a particular group of workers or a particular factory, but for industry generally. Joint planning committees have been announced for General Electric Company, Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, and the number of such enterprises is increasing. On March 14, 1942, Sidney Hillman set up in certain picked industries "a Joint Committee to direct the production drive" in each plant. This Joint Committee must "truly represent both management and labor," and it is provided that "union representatives shall constitute the labor half of the Joint Committee wherever the workers belong to a labor organization." This amounts to a sanction by the War Production Board of Murray's

Industrial Council Plan. A pioneer among government agencies so far as cooperation with organized labor is concerned, has been the Federal Communications Commission which (January 12, 1942) granted labor full representation on the seven committees of its Defense Communications Board.

Wherever labor has been given an opportunity to participate, the result has been a greater measure of responsible cooperation. When President C. E. Wilson of General Motors Corporation appeared for the first time before the General Motors Division of the United Automobile Workers Union (February 8, 1942) he was introduced by Walter Reuther: "I hope that the presence of Mr. Wilson will mark the beginning of a better type of relationship and will lay the basis for carrying out our mutual responsibility to the nation. . . . We want to do our part. If given half a chance, we'll come through."

The spirit of both great branches of organized labor in the war effort has been cooperative rather than arbitrary or dictatorial. *Labor's Monthly Survey* expressed the attitude of the American Federation of Labor as follows: "Business men, labor leaders, and city officials in a given community * have found ways to combine forces and pool resources, so that as a group they can accomplish defense work which as separate individuals and groups they could never have accomplished. . . . This is true democratic procedure. In America, the defense program gives us an opportunity to prove the constructive value of our great trade union movement in the nation's time of need." (November, page 4)

Divisive Issues

A review of the eleven characteristics of democratic morale shows that in every instance, the net contribution of the unions is on the side of increasing the welfare and fighting strength of

* An excellent example was the Kokomo, Ind., survey conducted by labor organizations and other community agencies in cooperation. They found skilled machinists working as clerks, janitors, policemen and digging ditches. They estimated that 40% of Kokomo labor could well be up-graded.

America. We have tried not to soft-pedal the justifiable criticisms of labor unions which arose in the same connection: (1) tendency to submerge individuals in mass enterprises; (2) tendency to be coercive rather than to depend on voluntary cooperation; (3) tendency to seek the interests of their own group rather than the welfare of the country as a whole; (4) tendency toward dictatorship within unions; (5) tendency to division and quarrels between unions; (6) race discrimination; and (7) resistance to technological change. Although these are not general characteristics of the trade union movement they do represent problems sufficiently serious so that labor faces a challenge to improve the situation.

The reader, accustomed to think of labor unions in terms of the more dramatic struggles may be surprised that two issues have not emerged more sharply from the discussion. Two of the chief demands of labor have been for higher wages, and for the union shop. An appraisal of the morale of organized labor would be seriously incomplete without a consideration of wage levels and of the security of labor organizations. Employers and the organs of public opinion commonly represent the view that labor's demands for wage increases are so exorbitant as to threaten the nation's financial structure, and that the demand for the closed shop is a subversion of the American way of life. What can be said for the facts?

Wages and Morale

The first and most obvious fact is that despite the gains made in recent years, and despite the favored position of American workers as compared with workers in any other country of the world, labor has not achieved a luxurious standard of living. While a typical family of four requires \$2000 to live in modest comfort, with adequate diet, less than a third of working-class families in 1941 could reach that high. In that same year, according to *Labor's Monthly Survey* (AFL, March 1942, p. 3) 34% of American families received incomes of less than \$1000, an amount below even a bare subsistence level for a typical American home. Some

55% of families in the United States, during the period when war-profits reached an all-time high, received less than \$1500 a year. The Treasury Department reports that 3 million workers earned less than \$10 a week; 8 million less than \$15 a week; and 13 million less than \$20 a week. These figures may not appear when comfortable representatives of more favored economic groups are asking for curbs on labor, but day in and day out the frustrations of low income do injure the morale of millions of American workers.

The next question concerns the increase in labor income during the war period. Wages in most industries have risen, but how much? The average hourly wage for all manufacturing industry in the United States in August 1939 was 64¢. This rose to 78¢ in November, 1941, a gain of 23%.* During the same period, however, prices were also rising, so the gain in real wage was only 10%.

Now if labor alone were profiting during this period, fair-minded American workers would be forced to admit that labor had been taking unwarranted advantage of the national emergency. But consider what happened to net profits of industry from August 1939 to November 1941. The Federal Reserve Board, reporting for 629 industrial corporations, found the average profit 50% higher in 1941 than in 1939. In certain industries the gains were much more striking. Profits in oil industries were up 77%; in iron and steel up 188%, and in railroads up 450%. Leon Henderson testified before a Senate Committee that corporate profits, after taxes, would total \$6 billion for 1941 as compared with \$3 billion in 1939. Note that these profits were all computed *after* the increased Federal taxes had been deducted. "No profits from U. S. Customer No. 1," wrote *Time* magazine as a heading for its story "Management Without Profit." (January 5, 1942) This was both propaganda and misrepresentation. The profits of business did in-

* Incidentally wage rates in Great Britain increased 26% over the same period.

crease, due to our American defense program, at something more than double the rate of increase in labor's pay.

Labor naturally resents proposals to freeze wages while salaries, bonuses and profits mount sky-high. Labor remembers the summer of 1940 when representatives of big business staged their "sit-down strike" and refused to accept defense contracts until a law, setting a ceiling on profits, had been repealed. Labor undoubtedly noted the heat and fervor with which all large newspapers condemned Secretary Morgenthau's off-hand suggestion, in the fall of 1941, that a 6% return on investment might be enough during war-time.

Workmen know, from their own experience, that output per hour has been rising. Labor research papers tell union members that while the wage per hour is 25% above 1929 levels, in the same plants production per hour is 41% above 1929. Even allowing for more expensive machinery, it would seem to labor that the "gravy" goes to the boss. According to *Economic Outlook* (organ of the CIO) for February, 1942, since this war began the wages paid per dollar's worth of steel produced, have fallen 15%, and at the same time the profits, per dollar's worth of steel produced, have risen 300%.

To make the matter more aggravating, stories of profiteering appear from time to time. The Vinson report to the House Committee on Naval Affairs cited a dozen companies which had made profits of more than 20% above the cost of production on war contracts. Bethlehem Steel Company, in December of 1941, was reported to be holding out for better contracts on plant expansion than had been accorded other companies, despite earnings at four times its 1939 rate, and despite profit of 21% above cost on \$19 million worth of ship-repair contracts. Texas Corporation, for 1941, after setting aside money to pay all Federal income and excess profits taxes, and after charging off \$7 million for possible losses on foreign investments, still had a profit 65% above its 1940 earnings. The Truman Committee, in January, 1942, reported, "Nine of the 13 companies which had cost-plus-fixed-fee-contracts

are entitled to receive fees plus possible bonuses which exceed the amount of their net worth on December 31, 1939, as estimated by them." War business meant 20, 30, 40, and in one case 800 times the average profit of former years. James E. Barnes, Washington representative of Todd Shipyards, testified that government contracts were running 50% on invested capital, bringing his company "outrageous profits." Senator Bunken of Nevada charged (April 3, 1942) that Basic Magnesium, Inc. "stands to make a profit of 4280 per cent, or \$2,140,000 in one year on an admitted investment of not more than \$50,000." These stories make *Time's* claim of "No profits on government business" sound hypocritical in the extreme.

Sometimes profits have been disguised as bonuses but their effects on labor morale have not thereby been improved. Representative Gore, before the Naval Affairs Committee of the House on March 24, 1942 cited a bonus for President Dahlbert of Celotex Corporation of \$150,000 in addition to his \$36,000 salary. Mere vice-presidents were given bonuses of \$32,000. Mr. Joseph W. Frazer of Willys-Overland Motors, Inc. had a salary of \$60,000 but received an additional bonus of \$42,000. Workers know these facts and contrast the enormous rake-off of the higher-ups with their own weekly wage which barely covers rent and food. Many a CIO member knows that the salary appropriated by Mr. G. W. Mason of Nash-Kelvinator Corporation in 1941 was \$225,000—or three times that of the president of the United States. To this was added a bonus of \$100,000 for good measure. But every CIO member knows that the press would immediately condemn as "selfish" and "unpatriotic" any attempt by strike to boost a \$35-a-week wage to \$40.

Labor will not quickly forget press revelations of Leon K. Shanack, who made a profit of \$125,000 in ten months as a "defense broker"; or that of Pratt and Whitney with profits 26% of cost on more than \$10,000,000 of airplane engine contracts, or the notorious Jack and Heinz who ran out of a state to escape a Labor Board order to recognize a union, but paid a favorite secretary

\$39,000 bonus to evade taxation! That makes the ordinary pay envelope look so insignificant, that many a hard-pressed family man is ready to fight for a larger share in the take.

In the midst of this quarrel over what seems to be a very unfair distribution of the earnings of industry, the larger issues of the war are easily obscured. Both labor and management tend to resent ceilings over their income, but as the concept of "total war" becomes clearer the demand for some such control increases. The problem, if legislation along this line is attempted, will be to persuade labor 1) that its share is large enough; 2) that capital is likewise restrained with no "loopholes"; and 3) that some adjustment will be made to meet rising costs of living. The American Federation of Labor, on this last point, has proposed a formula as follows: "Every worker's wage shall increase automatically each month by the same amount as the increase in the Labor Department cost of living index." This might be a prelude to continuous rises in both wages and prices, with dangerous inflation. Price control is another, and perhaps better, remedy.

As production shifts to war needs there are going to be fewer and fewer goods for workers to buy. Prices are rising dangerously. It becomes steadily harder for the average working-man to provide comforts for his family. Sacrifice need not destroy morale; it may even strengthen morale, but there must be the conviction that all are sacrificing alike. Wage controls may be needed, but they will not be accepted cheerfully by organized labor until it is clear that profits, salaries and bonuses are also under control. Perhaps the best plan, for total morale, would be to put everyone on "war pay" for the duration. Let the "privates" in the army, in industry, in commerce, in professions and on the farms all serve for approximately the same rate of pay. Let the corporals, petty officers, foremen, and minor supervisors, whatever their field of work, all rate alike in pay. The managers, vice-presidents, staff chiefs, superintendents, etc. may rate as colonels, or even major generals. This is total war, they say. Very well—let us try it that way and treat all workers and soldiers on a comparable scale. The enormous changes

resulting from such a system would be not in the standard of living of ordinary labor, but in the luxuries of the wealthy whose incomes are far above the level of high officers of army and navy. It is too seldom recognized that "dollar a year men" are not those ready to make any sacrifice for their country. In most instances the dollar-a-year big boys are those who prefer to retain the high salaries which industry will continue to pay them, rather than to accept the standard of living which they could earn for their executive work as a Civil Service employee or as an army officer. There may be reasons why—even in a life-and-death struggle—the special privileges of wealth should be continued, but labor finds it increasingly hard to accept that tradition.

The plan drafted by the United Auto Workers Union, CIO, at its conference April 9, 1942, is less drastic. They propose that all overtime pay be given to labor in War Bonds, a provision which would reduce spending at the present time, and release it when it may be needed during a post-war period. They propose a ceiling of 3% profit on capital actually invested. They propose a top ceiling for families of the wealthy class of \$25,000 a year, a level far above the pay of army generals or naval admirals. They want strict price-control and rationing of commodities for which demand exceeds supply. If the war continues long, something of what this union proposes is likely to be the actual state of affairs, although it may prove simpler not to limit profits in advance, but to drain them off through taxation. Wage increases have pretty well stopped now, and are unlikely to be resumed. The wage issue is probably diminishing in importance, if the price control activities of government are effective.

In summary, on the relation of wages to morale three conclusions may be justified. (1) the wage level in American industry as a whole is not high; morale problems are still likely to arise in the third of the working class who receive less than \$1000 a year; (2) wage increases due to the war have been substantially less than the increased return on capital; (3) on the whole, while there have been offenders on both sides, the collective bargaining proc-

ess has worked to maintain for American workers a fair standard of living, without giving labor any unfair advantage. From the standpoint of morale, the worst part of the whole wage-struggle has been the interpretation presented to the public by the American press and radio.

Union Security

The labor issue which has drawn most fire in the last year or two has been that of the desirability of compelling all workers to join a union. Labor leaders have argued for the "closed shop," the "union shop," or "union maintenance" as a necessary condition of union security. They reason that when all workers benefit from the provisions of a union contract, all workers should help to meet the necessary costs and elect the union officials. As they see it, compulsory participation is as necessary in industrial democracy as compulsory taxation and military service are in a political democracy. Remember the young man who returned his income tax blank to the Collector of Internal Revenue with the reply, "I've decided not to join the income tax this year. It costs too much!" Certainly many laborers, if they could have all the benefits of union protection without taking any of the responsibilities of union life might conceivably choose that course. Then the union would dwindle and be unable to maintain the standards for which it has fought. The ideal of voluntary participation is good, say the union leaders, but there comes a point at which everyone has to do his share; otherwise we reward the selfish and penalize those who are conscientious. It has been interesting to review the recent discussions of labor issues in magazines and newspapers, and to see how rarely this labor side of the case is stated. It was omitted from the Gallup poll of pro's and con's on the union shop.

The other side of the argument has become more familiar to Americans outside the labor movement. The employers argue that it is un-American to compel workmen, against their preference, to join labor unions. Westbrook Pegler and Boake Carter have polemized against the "racket," by which men are not permitted to

work, even at defense jobs, unless they pay a rake-off, in the form of dues, to the fat purses of some union. It can easily be shown that there are many good agencies in American life: churches, service clubs, and political parties, for example, which do manage to live on voluntary contributions. The democratic way has sometimes been called government by consent rather than government by force; in that sense the closed shop is totalitarian. While it is true that some organizations of employers, bitterly opposed to the closed shop, maintain essentially the same kind of pressure to keep all the employers in the trade association and to boycott those who violate the agreements set up by organized industry, this type of counter-charge does not, of course, settle the rightness or social desirability of the practice.

It is always precarious to undertake social prediction—the more so in a period like this when social change may be determined by unexpected forces. We venture, however, the guess that the issue of the closed shop is likely to follow the course of our culture as a whole. As the frontier has passed and interdependence has increased, our democracy has taken many steps away from anarchy and individualism in the direction of social control. Men once dug their own wells—today they use the city water. Once they formed volunteer fire-brigades—today they must pay for maintenance of the fire-department. A century ago the struggle over compulsory participation in the support of education was raging. Today it is taken for granted that all must contribute to the public school budget, in some proportion to ability to pay. Once insurance and savings were left to individual discretion—today, through social security, the nation directs compulsory provision for old age. It is not a far step to the conclusion that whereas once it was a matter for individual choice, whether one wished one union or another or no union at all, tomorrow we may see a general acceptance of the idea that whoever chooses to work as a teacher or plumber or coal miner, takes along with the job, a responsibility to participate with his fellow-teachers, fellow-plumbers, or fellow-miners in the union which represents their contribution to planning and control. In

those industries which long have had practically 100% union organization, industrial peace seems best established.^{4, 7, 14}

A danger to morale seems to lie in the bitterness with which some reactionary groups are opposing this probable evolution of the labor movement. Addressing the Sales Executive Club on November 18, 1941, President Walter D. Fuller of the National Association of Manufacturers, condemned the strike of the United Mine Workers for a closed shop in the few remaining mines owned by steel companies, and concluded, "If we can't lick John Lewis, then we'd better lay off Hitler!" The decision of government arbitrators, released the day after Pearl Harbor, granted the miner's demand, and must have seemed to Mr. Fuller a second damaging blow. More recently (March 15, 1942) Roger Babson wrote "Our most dangerous enemy today is not Hitler. It is not Japan. It is our own refusal to give up selfish privilege for the duration of the war. From the evidence at hand I regret to say that labor seems to be one of the worst offenders." An anti-labor editorial in the *Tulsa World* (quoted by the *Nation*, March 28, 1942, p. 358) said, "Customarily the wrath of the people in a war country is against the military enemy. Now the United States faces domestic foes, and wrath is being turned inwardly instead of outwardly." The *New Republic* concludes ominously (March 30, 1942, p. 414): "There is now solid evidence that many American Tories intend to continue to fight the administration and the unions even if it means, as it does mean, the risk of losing the war." Not long ago the writer heard a comfortable group at a dinner party predict that this international war would develop eventually into a bloody civil war between pro-labor and anti-labor factions within the United States. Preposterous as such a conclusion seems, it represents nevertheless a serious problem for agencies concerned to build morale. Speeches like these arouse the fears which Philip Murray expressed dramatically at the Joint Victory Rally in Pittsburgh (April 7, 1942): "With their backs bent over their machines, their hearts and minds devoted to increased and increased production, the workers now look over their shoulders and find behind

them with knife upraised, groups who would renew old attacks upon the workingman and his organizations."

Conclusion

The morale of labor is almost as vital for victory as is the morale of the fighting forces. At present there is little reason to fear for the morale of the workingmen of America. Four steps would help to preserve high morale: (1) insure a fair statement of labor's viewpoint, in the American press, radio, and movies; (2) encourage or require unions to extend democracy within their own ranks, purging organizations of dictators and racketeers; (3) provide such a control of profits and prices and wages, as will demand approximate equality of sacrifice from all groups in American life; and (4) dissuade the anti-labor extremists who are more interested in fighting labor than in winning the War for Democratic Survival.

Part Five: RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER XIX

Essentials for a Civilian Morale Program in American Democracy

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A MORALE program must be based squarely upon a firm and definite idea. Not only must this idea be clear; in order to work, it must be capable of arousing loyalty at a deeper physiological or unconscious level. An American morale program must be based upon something that most Americans really believe. If these conditions are not fulfilled, more and more energy must be spent in trying to "put it over," and the venture will soon become self-defeating. Our first problem, then, in outlining a practical morale program is to define the idea that can be developed to act as a sustaining principle. This idea will be sought in the Jeffersonian tradition. Our second problem will be to define the organizational form which the Jeffersonian tradition demands. Third, we shall try to point out the chief obstacles to American morale; fourth, the ways of overcoming them. Fifth, we shall say a little about health as a sustainer of morale. Sixth, we shall try to formulate a basic objection which can be raised to our whole program, and undertake to meet it. Seventh, the *existing* organization of morale work will be sketched and, in the light of our whole argument, a plea made for a more unified morale leadership. The last and main point will be the central role of *research* in a morale plan.

The Historical Setting of a Present-day Program

The settlement of the American Colonies involved a contrast between aristocratic principles, for the most part supported by

landowners and merchant capitalists, and on the other hand farm and village democracy, a determination to strike out for new freedoms. The struggle of Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians brought this contrast particularly to the surface, and it dominated most of the nineteenth century. Parrington found this dualism in American life—allegiance either to the ideas of an English landed gentry or to the common man's solidarity with his fellows—to be the basic determinant of American nineteenth-century thought.⁴ This conflict of ideas involved the necessity of repeated tests of strength. To simplify rather than be pedantically accurate, one may say that in the economic sphere the Hamiltonians have won more and more of the battles, in the political sphere the Jeffersonians. American economic life has become consolidated in a hierarchical monopolistic form; yet a "New Deal," supported more and more energetically as one goes down the economic ladder,¹ can gain the ascendancy. Masked by all sorts of minor struggles, the central struggle continues and will continue after the War. A morale program based upon central authority of any sort is likely to be seized upon by the economically dominant controls, and to become a Hamiltonian weapon. An approach based upon "grass-roots" ideas, middle- and lower-class determination to maintain and extend the Bill of Rights, can give a Jeffersonian morale program the logical focus and the physical and political power necessary in long-range planning.

If it be objected that to introduce this divisive note at a time when we must all stick together offers a weak spot for an enemy attack, the reply is that the conflict is here, and being honest about it is a way of coping with it; secondly, that owing to the conditions of our own history, Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians have always been willing to accept temporary defeat. Their basic sense of identification with American life has proved sufficient to carry them through periods of economic or political reverse.

Now the practical decision whether we shall use a Hamiltonian or a Jeffersonian program depends upon two very simple things: first, which one we think will carry us through the war and post-

war years with the least danger and the most energy; second, which one will lay the best foundations for an enduring human happiness in this land and in others. I want to rest my case regarding this Jeffersonian message upon the actual contents of this volume,* with all its evidence of the superior human sense of the Jeffersonian message, and, second, upon the specific contents that I shall attempt to incorporate into my delineation of the program.

The decision, then, is not arbitrary. It is not a question of personal taste; it is not a question of the writer's feeling intellectually or emotionally more at home in the democratic tradition than in the aristocratic. If the research data gathered in the last few decades regarding the practical workability of a democratic idea are not in themselves convincing, the present chapter is insufficiently grounded, its foundations inadequate. Whatever strength this program has, lies in the strength of a generalization whose empirical supports are clear.

The Form of a Morale Program

If, then, our Jeffersonian premises are clear, the first question regarding the practical establishment of a morale program is the question of the locus and form of its authority. The spirit of a proposal does not necessarily define its organization and structure. Shall it start in a centralized authority chosen by the group—in the same spirit, for example, as that in which Jefferson without a plebiscite negotiated with foreign powers, not hesitating to use the economic force of the nation to carry through his plans? Or, on the other hand, shall such a program arise as a spontaneous expression of farm, village, or city conversations, mass meetings, newspapers, and those “indigenous” or spontaneous movements of thought which represent common reactions to a sensed situation—unplanned but collectively shared experience? Shall a morale program start with the Administration and work downwards, or shall it start with a collectively sensed need working through larger and

* See especially Chapters VII and VIII.

larger local organizations until the mass effect is evident even at the apex?

Historical and experimental evidence alike indicate clearly that *both* methods need simultaneously to be applied. Central authority must move down to meet the groping hands below; the groping hands must find more and more a way of achieving uniformity of effort, carrying their message upwards to the central authority. We may think of stalactites and stalagmites, which, after a long period of moving towards one another, sometimes actually coalesce. The higher democratic structures are regularly achieved in this way. Thus, for example, the extraordinary democracy of national life achieved by the Norwegians during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was based upon *both* an extremely enlightened government functioning in the spirit of a great tradition of individual liberty *and also* strongly organized regional controls such as health councils, with representation of various occupational groups and a passionate respect for the individual. The practical test of such a stalactite-stalagmite mode of organization was shown in the fact that the land of these health councils, a land poor in foods and unfavored as to climate, had the lowest infant mortality rate and the longest life span to be found anywhere in the world.

In our own country, not only in "Jeffersonian" political periods, such as the epoch of Jackson and the recent New Deal epoch, but even in periods of strong Hamiltonian accent, there has been a steady spread of local, democratically functioning organizations going to meet the authority of a central Administration. American life has often shown extraordinary democracy in its community organization. Farmers' organizations, trade and professional organizations, women's organizations, fraternal, philanthropic, athletic, musical organizations, small and large, lead regularly to a pyramidal but nationally well-unified structure. We have a passionate need to share with others living in the same sort of world; we have to feel ourselves close to others who are thinking and doing the same things. Members of scientific organizations travel

from all over the country to hear one another's papers. The co-operative movement struggles forward on the basis of an idea, often with little or no actual economic gain to the members; the idea pushes up from below and reaches down from a leadership of intellectuals. Baseball clubs begin with village competition, then achieve state, regional, national organization. Typically, such organizations express the mixture of competition and co-operation which is characteristic of the tradition of our Western world; but we are not happy till there is a centred focus of our scattered activities—until we have a national federation of women's clubs, a world series of baseball games, national amateur auditions, and a national radio hookup to hear the girl from Springdale, Maine, who won them. This two-way action of pressure from above and from beneath is so fundamental an aspect of the Jeffersonian tradition that it will be set down as the major premise of a workable program.

The Immediate Psychological Obstacles

Now in the light of this historical setting, what does American war morale look like? On the one hand, we are proud of our tradition, as willing as our fathers were to struggle to maintain it. On the other hand, we have lived through a depression decade of insecurity and confusion; we have seen homeless and despairing youth bumming about and trying unsuccessfully to laugh its way through. We have been realists; we have learned to disbelieve newspapers and speeches; we have learned to hate war and to despise its tinsel. The old appeals that Civil War marching songs could make have lost much of their punch. If we are to have a determined morale, it will not come from refurbishing the heroic trappings of an age that is dead. It will come only if it is clear as daylight that the war can be fought to make life more secure, more abundant for our children. To prove this to the common man and woman is not a verbal task. It goes to the foundations of our leadership both in the Administration and in all the subleaders

of our political, economic, educational life. Let me state the obstacles bluntly; then see if there is a way to overcome them.

To state the obstacles in single words, they consist of *apathy*, a lack of enthusiasm either about the defense of democratic institutions or about the sort of a world which might emerge after the contest; second, a hardy *skepticism*, a disillusioned defeatism which, though very different from apathy, works much to the same end. The man bitten by the sleeping sickness of apathy moves forward with eyes half closed. But the doubting man has eyes wide open, watching for all the difficulties, obstacles, and dead ends.

Though both are extremely serious problems, it is important not to confuse them. Apathy, laziness, laissez-faire, the inability to take the crisis seriously will be steadily reduced both by the inevitable bad news of the next few months, and by a greater and greater insistence upon immediate action, by giving a clearer and clearer picture of the present perils, not only perils of physical defeat, but perils of economic and political disaster if apathy is allowed to continue. But the doubters constitute a completely different problem; they are not going to be reached by any such simple technique. The doubters have an enormous amount of factual material at their disposal, starting with the causes of the 1914 war, the mixed motives involved in American participation, the economic and moral contradictions of the Treaty of Versailles, the stupidity of much Allied and American diplomacy in the post-war period, the ambiguity of the peace which is to be achieved and the uncertainty of maintaining it. These are profound, indeed they may become absolute and inescapable reasons for doubt, even for cynicism.

The techniques of coping with apathy will do nothing with such a temper but accelerate it, although, owing to physical or social hazards, the doubter may temporarily hide or suppress his doubts. A morale program aimed against apathy has nothing whatever to do with a morale program aimed against intelligent, honest, and profound skepticism. The overlooking of this distinction is the

most serious error we can make. We do not even know today the role of these two very different sources of difficulty and consequently know very little about methods of coping with them. We can probably cope with apathy with relatively little trouble. But we do not know the exact form, extent, and depth of the basic skepticism; we know only that it is a major problem which has not been effectually dealt with. When, by opinion polls, clinical interviews, etc., it is properly assessed, it can probably be dealt with in terms of facts, facts of wide and deep personal importance, fact showing the inevitable long-range outcome of various courses of national action.

Just a few examples. We have all read enough in the daily press and in magazines like the *Readers Digest*, and heard enough radio news commentators, to be uneasy about, and to want complete and clear information on many of the national perils which are still rather remote and indistinct. Morale deficiency can be expected as long as there is a shortage of:

(1) Facts about enemy strength: on the sea, in the air, in conquered bases and territories, in natural resources, in man-power, morale and desperate ruthlessness; the imperative of decisive defeat before Triplice potential production becomes actual.

(2) Facts about Nazi plans in Latin America for the establishment of economic, followed by military, pro-Axis cells working up to the Caribbean.

(3) Facts about the rate of development of long-range super-bombers, and damage easily to be inflicted from the West Indies or Lower California bases by 1945 on both American seabords regardless of anti-aircraft or interceptors.

(4) Facts about plans for preventing post-war depression in the United States, and for guaranteeing full employment with rising standards of living.

(5) Facts about the types of civilization—in Germany, Italy, occupied Europe, China, Japan, and the Soviet Union—which our government will smile upon after the victory.

Granted that in realistic practice, the Administration cannot

funnel all their information into the next few fireside chats, the skeptic needs, above all, some facts about *what kind of facts* he can reasonably expect to receive. The majority of us are willing, in such a crisis, to take a lot on faith. *But the skeptic must be honestly dealt with.*

A serious defect in the whole program up to the present is the silence of the federal government regarding the central plans, both as to the war and as to the peace. Granted that military and naval necessity may constrict the President's announcements, they did not constrict the utterances of the Atlantic Charter, and no military secret will be let out if the structure of our life during the war and after the peace is more directly envisaged. One provision of the Atlantic Charter, indeed, involving the destruction of the Axis powers, directly suggested a negative rather than positive plan on the part of the British and American governments, a situation which would have been downright intolerable had not the public doubted whether anything much was to be expected of such a charter except "propaganda." The degree of distrust which has developed towards the Administration with regard to long-range planning is altogether lamentable, especially unnerving when one contemplates that the present Administration is more Jeffersonian than any we have had since the Civil War. The necessity for an all-out effort will, of course, have to take us beyond a patient "Of course, we all want the facts." It is much more than the already available facts—it is the trends, the indications, the likelihoods that we shall have to know. The longer the war, the more certain it is that no really high morale will be achieved except in terms of goals that really activate the deeper Jeffersonian tides of feeling.

The Surmounting of the Obstacles

The need, then, is great. Whose responsibility is it to meet this need—Administration or public? Is this a stalactite or a stalagmite problem? It is both, as are all morale problems. But the time element is critical; leadership can move far faster in war than in

peace. And the imperative need for unity puts further responsibilities upon the Administration. Most of what follows, then, is *primarily* a definition of the opportunity which exists for the President and his cabinet. Such leadership, however, will be ineffective unless met by a sturdy popular response, going to meet, and to coalesce with the effort initiated in Washington.

To define the *opportunities* offered to a morale program we may first simply invert the conditions of *bad* morale and then become more and more specific. We must mobilize personal effort into a national effort which will involve a minimum of friction and confusion, a program taking a realistic view of the existing economic or political structure and making whatever modifications are feasible to move towards the improvement of the level of efficiency, at the same time observing the decencies and amenities which individual Americans assume to be a part of their heritage no matter what the national crisis.

The second opportunity of a morale service arises directly from the fact that a really tough morale will depend a good deal upon whether or not we seize the opportunity to do a much longer and more fundamental job, the planning of a workable peace, a peace which will give some serious likelihood of being—literally—permanent, and liberating the economic world resources for world use, canalizing science and technology in the service of a world standard of living, in other words utilizing an economic and political Allied victory for constructive rather than punitive purposes, and for permanent rather than temporary gain to the individual participants. This job is one which will not automatically be accomplished by the same network of arrangements involved in winning the War. Rather, there need to be two types of morale functions, a temporary and a permanent one, both to be jointly planned in their interrelation and both fully understood and accepted by the American public, one being understood as a necessary preliminary to the other, and receiving its justification largely in terms of the larger whole which our children and grandchildren may hope to enjoy.

This means the need for a clear and convincing vision. Twentieth-century men are capable of visions, and Americans as much as any. They become traumatized if the visions are repeatedly found to be mirages, but the demand for a vision is pretty tough, and even when half dead can be revitalized if the conditions of health are so guaranteed that one is sure something real is there, to be seen in the distance. Putting aside apathy as something we can definitely conquer in a few months, there remains the central problem of guaranteeing the objectivity, the realizability of the thing portrayed in the vision.

When we say that the temporary goal in winning the war and the long-range goal in winning the peace are two different goals, yet for the individual citizen two parts of one program of action, we must stress the fact that the articulation between the two must be absolutely clear. The individual must see the way in which his immediate sacrifices win not only the war but also the peace. He must not be overdosed with restrictions, abrogations of his civil and economic liberties in the name of the ultimate victory for which these are necessary. He can be subjected to these limitations if he sees them being applied universally and if he sees the guarantee of restoration of his privileges written with equal clarity upon the wall. He can give up some of the trappings of democracy if he sees the Administration and indeed the Allied forces throughout the world really aiming at something with which his heart is deeply identified. He can give up, step by step, more and more of the economic and other goods which he has counted his own, if step by step he sees with increasing clarity the security, democracy, and good will which will result from such temporary sacrifices. At the level of intelligence reached with our system of public schooling, he is not going to make these sacrifices willingly if he only half believes that the peace will give him and his children a better protection against ultimate impoverishment or ultimate subjection to an autocracy.

Now there is no sleight of hand, no psychological trick that can be effectively worked against the public in such a case. No

amount of promising, no amount of signing of documents will convince him, will overcome either his apathy or his doubt or both; he must actually see, day by day, the political and institutional progress which he demands, or at least the steps made to implement such guarantees. Instead of more or less secret studies, made in Washington, of the economic and political structure to be achieved after the war, he has to have some knowledge of what is actually being done and what it may yield, and instead of being told only that the Axis is to be crushed, he needs to be told how the populations of these great powers are to be handled in the twenty years after the peace, what method of policing is to be carried out, what guarantee is to be given against a war between Britain and the Soviet Union for the assimilation of China; or, if these horrors are not allowed to happen, just what practical technique for their prevention is envisaged, just what sort of peace is going to exist for men everywhere to reach out for.

If it be objected that all this is more than one harried Administration can be expected to do, the reply is that one chief reason why it is so hard to get spontaneous and energetic action is that the public has not been taken into confidence, the peace has not been clearly discussed, and a real reason for such tremendous sacrifices has been formulated only in negative terms. The fear of losing the war has a good deal of value; the fear of not winning the peace would add enormously.

But this cannot be done all at once. There must be step-by-step progress, the social order moving monthly towards a Jeffersonian goal. Social Security has gone far; there is still much to be done. Protection of women and children in industry still has a long way to go. Aid to education in a time of threatened curtailments is absolutely imperative if common people are really to believe it is democracy that is at stake. Direct aid to urban and rural families with incomes below the subsistence level cannot be kept so scandalously low as at present—let alone cut again—without impairment of both the armed forces and the civilian effort. The outcry of protest against nondefense spending will continue, but if it is

listened to, we shall build beautifully for a fascism nurtured in disease and despair. *Not all the economic gains have to be conserved; temporarily lowered standards of living can, and are, being taken cheerfully in many quarters. But where the danger signs are as clear as they now are in the sick parts of our industrial and agricultural system, a positive program of action, month by month, is the chief instrumentality of morale.* It is a hundred times as important as a nice paneful of morale speeches. If the conservative critic objects that the Administration is using the crisis as a way of accomplishing democratic steps which could not ordinarily be achieved in peace (and this accusation has been voiced more than once) the reply is that that is exactly what must be done. It must, in fact, be done in long-range international terms,² though our job is to begin at home.

If all this had to be mapped out on paper first before any of it were achieved, the initial obstacles might be insurmountable. Fortunately, however, most people learn enormously more by practical confronting of obstacles than they do by studying blueprints. The experience of Canada is a most striking example. It was not merely Churchill's propaganda that led to a more and more tremendous girding of the Canadian to his task; it was the predicament and the promise of the situation itself. Learning by doing means that morale can be built *by the steps taken* if their temporal order is well planned. Confidence and courage come more by action than by precept, more by seeing the consequence of one's daily achievement than by seeing the logically necessary steps which follow from a master plan. The implementation of a grass-roots democracy through co-ordination of local efforts with the national plans will engender the sort of confidence and courage which no message from a leader, no matter how beloved, can guarantee.

Now as to the interrelations among the intellectual, labor, and business fronts in effecting a unified morale. There is doubtless a

tendency in our analysis to overdo the intellectual front, a tendency to build morale in terms of the clarity of the ultimate goal to the thoughtful and educated man. We confess that all the foregoing displays this bias. But what the intellectual sees clearly almost everybody glimpses or gropes at. We believe this bias has its merits.

It is very important, for all that, to show the relation of the intellectual to the other fronts. Americanism as conceived in Jeffersonian fashion is in one sense profoundly conservative. "These are our privileges; nothing can take them away." "These ten specific items in the Bill of Rights have been won and we will die rather than give them up." For most Americans these simple privileges, liberties, guarantees, are interwoven emotionally with slogans, with the flag, with the observance of holidays, with familiar martial music, with a thousand large or small symbols of the great tradition. The intellectual front, the symbolic front, the action front, all these are interdependent. The intellectual front pays more attention to the structure of the future, but for that very reason has less solid roots in the motivating patterns of today. A serious morale program will involve all these fronts and their interrelation. It will not hesitate to utilize primitive and emotional forces *provided* always that these are led by rational and long-range intellectual processes rather than acting for the obfuscation of thought.

The van may go too far ahead of the rear guard if the various aspects of such a program are not articulated. Thus, for example, martial music and camp routine may have some of these conservative values for liberty-loving recruits, but if the intellectual front is not there, e.g., if the officers have no deep conception of what the war is about, the immediate experience in the camp can be one of unwelcome authoritarianism, arbitrary rules, mechanical obedience, officer and soldier class consciousness, and the frustration of the recruit's conception of what democracy means. We are not chiefly concerned here with military morale, but we are concerned with the effect which some conceptions of "discipline" may have

upon the civilian effort. If the boys go to the camps and become disgusted by much that they live through, particularly as to the relations obtaining between the soldiers and officers, the relations obtaining between different racial groups which share the hardships of military life, and the relations obtaining between soldiers and civilians; if they come out of camp, even on a week-end leave, feeling that the Army does not understand the relation of discipline to democracy, the effect on civilian morale can be devastating and there has already been tragic evidence that this is the case.

The labor front is equally important. Labor, after its hard-won gains, has made tremendous sacrifices in submitting more and more of its freedom to arbitration of one form or another. When one gives up in advance the right to strike, the whole economic system is upset. If labor sees industry making a similar guarantee, the situation is tolerable.* For the most part, however, sanctions can be imposed on investing capital only with much more difficulty than upon trade unions. And an industrial morale is just as much a question of long-range security as it is of immediate pay per hour.

It is imperative here that the Jeffersonian be honest about the business group—the large and small manufacturer, the salesman, the advertiser, the shopkeeper. British and Dutch democracy, and the Jeffersonian system, which developed so largely from them, are based on private ownership and private enterprise. The business world has been frightened by much that has happened, and with good reason. For a dozen years much capital has lain idle because the future was so uncertain; and the social cost has been *terrific*. The progressive of every shade must inevitably identify himself with labor and with the small farm; but he cannot forever demand heavier and heavier taxation of business without trying to specify where the trend will lead. To suggest gleefully that the business class will be taxed or frightened to death, at a moment when it is clear as crystal that it will take all sorts of

* See Chapter XVIII.

capital to win the war, *and twice as much again to win the peace*, is to behave in the most fantastically unrealistic manner.

If we reject the Marxist's conception of inevitable catastrophe which, as Jeffersonians, we think would give us a fascist world, we have no choice but to be honest about the business situation. This means making three things absolutely clear: (1) that business will never again be free to go back to the days of the "big killings," the "Gilded Age" of swift exploitation of national resources or of unprotected labor; (2) that a definite sphere of private initiative and private profit, subject to government regulation, will be guaranteed, with all the sacredness of "deposit insurance" or a government bond; (3) that the form and function of such business freedom will be determined by social-science research, not by punitive attitudes.

Up to this point we have suggested a few of the many things which concern the federal government, with all of which it has grappled, and with all of which it needs to grapple more and more effectively. All the morale services so far depend on central federal authority, the stalactite in our earlier figure of speech.

Special work with special groups in terms of age, of sex, of ethnic and religious background, is imperatively needed, too, in the interests of war and peace unity, but except for such examples as the studies of minority-group cultures now in progress in the Department of Justice, such work with special groups is more suited to the combination of stalagmite-stalactite procedures than to either one alone. Such morale efforts, for example, as the Julius Rosenwald Fund, have encouraged many positive morale achievements in the South. Interracial councils, the interfaith conferences of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish religious and social leaders, the development of women's auxiliaries to all sorts of men's social and fraternal groups, a myriad of such opportunities exists for working out a unity based on the frank recognition of differences in taste or aptitudes or aims. A unified long-range morale

program must not only recognize but also emphasize very wide group diversities within the common framework of a reachable goal.

The same principle applies to the individual members of each such social group. The Iowa studies of democratic and autocratic groups, as well as the earlier and more diffuse experience of New England town meetings and party caucuses, have shown that in such a community as ours, healthy morale depends upon the recognition and encouragement of individual differences, even to the point of fierce rivalry. When the organization is free and very democratic, as in the case of French's study of student groups, individuality becomes a demonstrable, important feature in democratic morale. The squelching of dissident elements is the worst possible way to achieve such democratic morale. We have argued that to give the dissident element a clear picture of facts rather than calling names is a fruitful morale procedure. More still, however, needs to be done. The minority-group member can be shown the specific contribution which he can make. His contribution may add to the more placid and bovine contribution of the co-working group. Not only in Congress and in the press, but in the planning of the local morale work itself, there should be some acrid critics, not just to buy off the critics as a group, but to introduce some sulphur into the planning process.

Physical and Mental Health

Up to this point we have dealt with the major problem of democratic goals and means in mobilizing the energies we already have. We come now to another major question, that of the basic physical and mental vitality from which such energies are derived. We confront not just the draftees who are physically unfit, but the vast discrepancy between scientific knowledge of nutrition and what is actually available to most American families, between known means of preventing disease and actual health levels. We face the paradox that occupational diseases and haz-

ards "cost" enormously more than it would "cost" to prevent them—e. g., a cent per ton of coal may stand between the safe coal mine and the mine from which disease and explosion strike without warning. At the psychological level we face the chasm between common-sense clinical knowledge of how to be reasonably sane and happy, and the practical finding that disturbed or even mentally upset children make up a fair proportion of the child population even in favored communities. Local health councils, with the aid of doctors and nurses, can go a small part of the way, but with medicine organized on the basis of private profit, there must be much more than scattered volunteer efforts. It is high time to demand a central co-ordination of health-protecting activity (e.g., on the Norwegian plan), in which nutrition, industrial conditions, school and home, the healthfulness of physical and mental conditions of living, call out the collaboration of a vast number of varied specialists and the widest possible community support. Here, despite the opposition of the chief powers within the American Medical Association and of many individual industrialists and realty owners, the need is so clearcut and the authority so manifestly present in municipal, state, and federal hands, that no delay in action can be permitted without the gravest risks.

Some Objections and Some Answers

Now here we must let the rebuttal from dissenting voices make itself clearly felt. There is a logical and psychological defect in the whole program up to this point which must be faced with the utmost candor. Here we have an Administration already going far beyond traditional prerogatives, and subjecting itself to violent criticisms because of its regimentation of the individual, and yet we are demanding in the name of *democracy* more and more such central *authority*. Here we are as individuals, writing morale programs—we, for the most part, academic psychologists with relatively meager knowledge of American national life, and even

less about world patterns of culture—laying down rules as to what people ought to do. This is not far from W. G. Sumner's recipe: *A* and *B* put their heads together to decide what *C* shall be made to do for *D*.⁶ On what possible basis can a democratic morale program be cooked up, formalized, or offered to the chief executive for implementation?

Now, there are two lines along which an answer may be sketched. The first is the fact that with all the limitations of psychology and the social sciences, the persons in these disciplines have, as a group, somewhat more than the usual awareness of the kinds of things in human beings that have got to be studied if their morale is to be saved and augmented. They have, for example, a much more acute awareness than have the engineers and financiers regarding the ego needs, the sense of worth, the sense of individual respect upon which sound community organization depends, and the price paid by refusal to recognize these "intangible" needs when girding ourselves to a huge task. In the second place, quite aside from the content of their sciences they have perhaps a clearer conception of the role of science in this enterprise than other groups can be expected to have, and are perhaps a little better able to talk about the role of science in democratic morale. It is to these two points that I wish to devote the rest of my space.

Now, with regard to the human needs which actually can be picked out and emphasized by psychology in support of the Jeffersonian tradition. The thing that we call democracy involves a process of interdependent, mutual support and confidence which gives the individual the sense that while he or even the leader may drop out, the group will go on, not as a Hegelian entity, but as a mode of trusting interdependence of individual persons; a naive, and yet, as our history shows, completely workable conception in which the ego, the sense of individual worth of each member, coincides with the fact—shown in experiments in group thinking—that the corporate product of group interstimulation is actually more workable, more satisfying than the product of individual

and isolated activity. When the individual is given a place, when he feels his membership character in the whole, he has greater strength, and he gives more even to the most impersonal industrial process.⁵

Further, one could probably show that the two great intellectual movements of the modern world, science and education, arose as modes of interindividual stimulation under conditions of great individualism and at the same time are guarantees that any contribution, large or small, from any element, whether concurring or dissident, will find its place in the whole. Modern science and universal education have developed from democracy and have returned to it again. But economic centralization constitutes a more and more direct challenge to their integrity. We might use the term "democratic paradox" to describe the fact that this great world movement toward science and education paralleled, and to some degree depended on, not only political democracy but also the movement towards consolidation of economic power; the two great forces, economic autocracy and political-social democracy, still struggling for ultimate victory, have arisen in the same general cultural context, and despite the "economic absurdity" of it all, the democratic process has, in the political field, held its own and even made critical gains. This seems to be because it is rooted in some psychological realities. The psychologist need not call himself sentimental when he discovers in the experimental studies of groups the same principle which the historical panorama reveals. In fact, as an inductive scientist, he must not only point to the fact but must show the relation of his own experimental discipline to the larger social program.

He believes, then, that he can meet thus the first argument raised by the rebuttal (page 421). At this point, he insists that his job is no longer that of maintaining the superiority of democratic over authoritarian controls. Rather, he must show the context and function of authoritarian controls within the democratic structure. He can, on the basis of existing data and fresh experiments, make clear just what sort of authority must remain

and be cultivated. His experimental data show that leaderless groups, formless democracies, are ineffective or even frustrating. His data show that superimposed upon a broad foundation of mutual interindividual trust there must be individual resolution, the individual trying to mold the group to his will under conditions permitting the other members of the group to accept or reject such leadership.

The very contrast of economic and political trends is an immediate challenge. The psychologist must help to discover those forms of economic consolidation which are necessary and essential in a scientific and mechanical world. Instead of shouting down all efforts of a consolidating economy, he must carefully study the gains and the losses. He must study them in relation to the immediate world and in relation to the structure of a world at peace. He must help in the discovery of *a workable amount and form of private property and of private initiative*.³ What we know about individuals in relation to other individuals indicates that intensive study of this problem, including its psychological basis, must precede the completion of an economic plan for a world order, and that when such a world order is established it must continue its psychological investigation if it is to grow and remain healthy.

Such a program is highly dissimilar from a totalitarian plan, a laissez-faire plan, or a Marxist plan. It differs from the totalitarian in that respect for individual differences and the welcoming of criticism are essential. It differs from a laissez-faire plan in that a centralization of authority for short or long periods is recognized as essential. It differs from a Marxist plan chiefly in that the catastrophic phase of Marxism, the insistence on destruction prior to reconstruction, appears from the present viewpoint to be unsound and to make the achievement of a Jeffersonian evolution that much the harder. There is no space to discuss the merits of these systems except to say that the merits of the four plans (the Jeffersonian, totalitarian, laissez-faire, and Marxist) is, from the Jeffersonian point of view itself, a question of re-

search, not dogmatically laid down but offered as a hypothesis, which, with the encouragement of scientific research, should in time make clear the actual merits of such systems. It is only on the basis of unhampered historical, economic, and laboratory research that the precise area of usefulness of the Jeffersonian ideology can be defined, but paradoxically, it is only by proceeding in the Jeffersonian spirit that an answer to such a question can be scientifically sought.

The Existing Organization of Morale Work

We may attempt now a rapid enumeration of some types of morale work now being carried on in the United States. The Office of Facts and Figures under Archibald MacLeish has been entrusted with research on public opinion, the war-time experiences and attitudes of the American people, and with the release to citizens of appropriate information and inspiration. The O.F.F. analyzes also newspaper and radio comment; keeps close contact with organizations which might influence public opinion, but especially those of racial or national minorities; and supervises the speeches and press releases of government leaders. The Committee on War Information has been responsible for information released directly to the public, and it also influences administrative policy in matters which might have an important effect on morale (e.g. treatment of enemy aliens, increased opportunities for Negroes). As this is written a reorganization and unification of information services is in prospect.

The Office of Civilian Defense is concerned with civilian morale as affected by reassurance against aerial attack, but is also organizing Community Councils and encouraging participation on a broad scale. Industrial morale, in so far as it is cared for, is considered to be a by-product of the work of the War Labor Board, the Department of Labor, Sidney Hillman, and the present rapprochement of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and the American Federation of Labor. The morale of minority

groups, in so far as it is studied, is taken care of partly by the minority-group studies in the Department of Justice and by the President's Committee on Fair Employment under Malcolm MacLean. The morale problem of children and of youth groups is shared by various subdepartments of the Federal Security Agency, the Department of Agriculture, the Children's Bureau, the Commissioner of Education (under whom there is a service for the "morale of youth"), etc. and, indirectly, by many such agencies as the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Youth Administration. Army morale is fostered, not only by suggestions from Brigadier General Frederick Osborne, but also by the efforts of the Adjutant General's Office to test abilities of selectees, to provide wise classification and efficient training. Morale in the Navy is partly the function of the Director of Education in the Navy who has given special attention to placing men where they really want to be within the various Navy subdivisions, ascertaining both their technical skills and their interest in shop work, steam fitting, electrical, radio, or at-sea service in one type of vessel or another.

From this brief description, I believe it will be clear that there is no central federal morale service or anything like it. This leads us then to the matter of private services. The Committee for National Morale, organized by Arthur Upham Pope in the summer of 1940, undertook to get together a number of social scientists, psychologists, physicians, educators, journalists, and Army officers, to which were rapidly added representatives of business, labor, women's organizations, etc., with the idea of drawing up a general plan for a federal morale service which, in some form, it was hoped the Administration would accept. In the course of that fall and winter, some hundreds of pages of specialized memoranda on the morale of various groups were prepared, some of which were read by various Cabinet members and to which, in general, there was apparently a rather favorable response. But a negative decision was reached with reference to the establishment of a central morale service. It was evidently felt by many that

the Office of Government Reports, together with other federal agencies, was taking care of the publicity relating to the factual situation of the United States, and that a "morale service" of any sort would be publicly construed as a new effort of the type of the Creel Committee; that is, an attempt at whooping it up for war participation, active propaganda rather than the patient discovery by Americans of what they really thought about the world predicament.

The Council for Democracy established by Henry Luce has quietly accumulated and distributed a number of factual and interpretative documents on the function of a democracy, with special reference to the differences in basic procedure between democratic and authoritarian societies as such differences are manifest in labor relations, legal relations, etc.

Various university and college groups have set up morale agencies of which the one incorporated within the Harvard Defense Council is perhaps the best. A seminar on morale conducted by H. A. Murray and G. W. Allport is an important component in a general program of co-ordinated research, as is a speakers bureau to which many staff members have offered their services. A number of other institutions are, in varying degree, copying the efforts of the Harvard Defense Council. For the most part, these defense councils are concerned with the more obvious and pressing *military* problems, including air-raid defense, but their speakers bureaus necessarily include reference to wider aspects of morale work.

The community defense councils throughout the country show varying degrees of interest in morale. They are for the most part going at the matter realistically by putting people to work on specific jobs (first-aid, air warden, etc.). There seems to be no tendency toward *local* organization of morale committees *as such*, no spontaneous development within communities. The reason seems to be that for civilian morale, in the narrow sense as related to war duties, no morale organizations are needed. There is no panic, no confusion as to individual civilian duties. The public

has had it dinned into its head for a long time that morale is keeping up your spirits; and since spirits are being kept up, the question might arise in any community, "We're doing our job; why the excitement about morale?"

There are, moreover, three points I think that are overlooked when it is expected that *local* morale committees should or could play an important role. In the first place, the problems are not "*local*" but "*horizontal*" problems, having to do with special groups in the population. For example, there are industrial problems, agricultural problems, camp problems, and metropolitan-area problems. In none of these cases can the local community organization work effectively. But in horizontal, or national-group terms, a great deal is being done and a great deal remains to be done. For example:

(1) The C.I.O. and A.F.L. (as, for example, in the Labor Day broadcasts on defense against fascism) are both working to build up a basic morale, not a momentary labor morale in terms of just "sticking at work"; and the unwillingness of the Administration to support extreme antistrike legislation has been a good case of mutual reinforcement of private and Administration efforts.

(2) Many businesses have accepted with little protest those "priorities" which in many cases have made the promised land of recovery recede just as it came to sight, and are adjusting to a constantly shifting and expanding tax program. The willingness to give up big profits appears, in the light of a Senate investigation, reported in the preceding chapter, to be unevenly distributed.

(3) The press, necessarily under our system an organ of business, has reflected the business changes just described. The press has for the most part stopped bickering, accepting not only the necessary central authority, but the various official and unofficial censorship imposed. Three things will need to be closely watched; (*a*) newspaper attitudes toward union labor, (*b*) their willingness to withhold "scoops" when requested for defense reasons, (*c*) their playing up the immediate news and playing down the long-range economic and social changes in progress. Cooperation with

the U.S.S.R. is still more alarming to certain publishers than would be a compromise peace with Hitler. It is too much to hope that all the rabid isolationist newspapers will play clean ball, but on the whole the press has responded with rather decent spirit.

(4) Response to the local defense councils, and to the appeal of the Office of Civilian Defense for air-raid wardens and for co-operation with their plans, has been extraordinarily hearty and spontaneous. Though the New York public, for example, has uttered the usual minor healthy grumblings, because of confusion in air-raid warnings and the inadequacy of the sirens ordered to give air-raid alarms, the general attitude has been very patient, and the energy of a great many wardens has been well nigh spectacular. If attack on the western or eastern coast begins on a large scale, a certain amount of panic can be expected among the emotionally unprepared, but there is no special reason to believe that our response will differ much from that of the British. All these are reasons against *local community organization* of autonomous morale committees. The thing need not be done that way.

The Central Role of Research

This brings us to our last and main point, the place of scientific work in a morale program. How little recognition there is of the vast possibilities is evident in the fact that in most minds, "science" still means physics, chemistry, biology, etc., with almost no interest in the creative possibilities of the social sciences in terms of what can be done for temporary and for permanent morale. When, in November, 1940, a national conference was held on morale, it had to be held under the National Research Council, because the Social Science Research Council had no status with the federal government; and H. A. Murray's plan for a federal department of social science has, like so many carefully planned social-science proposals, gone to Washington and found no door open to it.

It has indeed been a heartbreaking experience throughout re-

cent months to see social-science experts of all sorts offering their services, or trying to offer their services, for specialized jobs, while week by week announcements are coming from Washington that some important task is going to a person scarcely familiar at all with the technical problems and methods required for its solution. This is one of the prices of democracy, of course. In the sense in which democracy is here being discussed, it is a luxury to be given up quickly. The National Roster of Scientific and Professional Personnel is one of the important steps taken and it is hoped that this and others will rapidly be implemented together with civil-service lists and the membership lists of learned societies, to the end that some sort of real utilization be made of our social-science manpower.

A very encouraging sign of progress is the plan for an international conference in Washington of representatives of all the social sciences to cooperate in planning for the post-war world. If there is to be a stable world order based on an economy of abundance, it would be of importance to us to know at the present moment, and not merely after the armistice, what utilization of Chinese, Japanese, German, British, Italian, French, Dutch, and Soviet economists, historians, psychologists, educators is to be made when the peace is actually functioning.

If there is to be an intense and enduring emphasis upon research, both in the techniques of morale-building and in the feasibility of the various goals to which a morale program is directed, there will need to be both privately and publicly a study of the research facilities and an appraisal of the institutional training centers, especially in the social-science fields, in psychology, child study, and education.

In addition to the Roster, another bright spot is offered by the public-opinion polls, which can show the actual temper of the "public mind" at a given moment. Though from such data it is usually impossible to find out much about the deeper wants or long-range hopes, and though in most such polls one does not know which individuals who said yes to question 1 also said yes

to question 3, forward-looking changes are nevertheless being made. Beginning about four years ago, the Department of Agriculture undertook to place its remedial efforts on a broader factual basis than had previously been deemed possible. The idea was to study farmers' ideas, feelings, attitudes, hopes, not by the method of the whirlwind campaign or the stump-speech reaction, but by contact of trained interviewers with individual farmers and by active efforts of each county representative to get farmers to voice their feelings at meetings, collectively thinking about their predicament, their relation to other farming groups and to the urban consumer, as well as their relation to the federal system of credit and marketing services. There developed during Mr. Wallace's incumbency as Secretary of Agriculture a vast and effective system of communication between farmers and the federal government, farmers becoming more and more in the habit of discussing their grievances at the federally stimulated county discussions and more and more taking for granted the conception that the Department of Agriculture was their Department, their sounding board. Late in the second New Deal term, moreover, some striking developments were to be seen, particularly in the methods of ascertaining farmers' attitudes. The new method involved no mere "sampling" of opinion. Rather, a casual but thorough conversational basis for the exchange of ideas was developed between farmer and interviewer. The interviewer was one who knew the area and the farmers' immediate problems. He spent whatever time he needed in getting the feel of the situation. The result has been that opinion polling has been advanced in two striking respects. The interrelation of attitudes has been made much clearer; and the relation of the attitude syndrome to the personality and socio-economic situation of the farmer has been analyzed. We thus have not only the possibility of large-scale statistical comparison of regions and of economic levels, but some conception of the dynamics of attitude and of attitude shift. Obviously, serious morale work must be based not upon knowledge of attitude only, but also upon this sort of knowledge of underlying dynamics. Such knowledge makes, for

example, all the difference between ease and extreme difficulty in shifting attitudes. It will make the difference between *trying to shift them by verbal means* and *getting at the situational circumstances* that will quasi-automatically result in their changing—in other words, the difference between propaganda and rectification of life difficulties. An extension and a deepening of this sort of attitude study may well become a basic bulwark of democratic morale.

It would be pointless to attempt to bring into relation, item by item, all the social-science services mentioned above and all the specific morale research fields just defined. An adequate survey of morale *needs*, short and long, and of *research facilities* and personnel can only be undertaken by the federal government. It can also be undertaken only by utilizing the national or regional organizations, horizontal associations of specialist groups, and leaders of occupational, religious, and ethnic organizations.

The likelihood of persuading the President to establish a central morale service will depend, I believe, very largely upon the amount of emphasis given to the need for *morale research* as such. No chief executive can very well wish to see a thing as basic as national morale put into technical hands for day by day *operation*. If he is a real President, he will want to be the morale leader, and he will want to handle the problem both by what he *does* day by day, and by broadcasts, press conferences, public announcements, and messages relayed through his spokesmen and agencies. When it comes to *research*, however, the case is quite different. The chief executive is in no position to conduct morale research. He has within the United States, by far the best trained personnel that ever existed to carry out basic studies of the conditions of our physical and mental health, and the conditions of our own greatest possible effort both for the immediate winning of the war and for long-range establishment of a decent and workable peace. If he cannot be persuaded to set up a *co-ordinated morale research organization* of this type, much of the morale effort being carried out during this emergency will be abortive and inconsequential.

Failing this, however, one important thing can still be done. Regional, occupational, and other horizontal organizations are working out their own morale research programs. The psychologists, economists, sociologists, political scientists, historians, are making their own surveys of the morale situation. These surveys can actually coalesce, so as to set up a nongovernmental but nevertheless national morale research organization, planning not just in terms of the moment, but in terms of the genuine application of the social sciences to the remaking of the world. Such a national organization, having a pyramidal structure and coming to an apex in some central office, could then function on a national basis. It would ultimately, belatedly, be recognized by the federal government exactly as the various national scientific groups welded together in the American Association for the Advancement of Science have been recognized, and as the various national scientific societies electing their representatives to the National Research Council have a direct opportunity to voice their collective research ideas for any government agency that has a research interest. A national organization of all the sciences having to do with the conditions of temporary and permanent human well-being could, then, make itself valuable; it could in time dominate public opinion, it could in time weaken the resistance of reactionary vested interests; it could in time influence large blocs of voters and finally get federal action on a larger and larger scale. It is only on a *research basis* that any of this can be done. The attempt to organize a national morale service in terms of slogans and rephrasing of our national predicament will never do the job better than the chief executive can, and probably not as well. But to lay the real basis of morale, which is essentially a research job, corporate activity can do very much better than any single individual can, no matter who he may be.

To conclude, then, our stalactite would represent the earnestly desired establishment of a centralized federal morale division, incorporating all the features described above and so organized as to develop rapidly on an international basis in terms of a long-range

plan for a human and workable economic and social world pattern; or, failing that, a federation of social-science organizations (including psychology and medicine) could function as a substitute. The chief stalagmite consists of intensive, week-by-week, concrete, horizontally organized group efforts, based upon specific morale researches—researches on rural and urban children, youth groups in and out of camps, successful and impoverished farmers, union members, labor leaders and petty tradesmen, frightened and confident shopkeepers and small businessmen, big industrialists and financiers; Catholics, Protestants, Jews; doctors, lawyers; German-Americans, share-croppers, whites and blacks.

There is no danger that we shall make the error of too much attention to factual detail. There is, as the foregoing volume will demonstrate, plenty of keen thinking about basic morale hypotheses, and the theoretical standards set in psychology and social science today are such that there is more likelihood of over generalizing than of overfactual emphasis. Actually, the state of affairs as far as research is concerned is quite healthy. Most of the hypotheses in this book, for example, are realistically oriented about problems upon which factual data can be gathered. There is nothing abstract about studying children's clubs and their leaders, the reactions of college women to an announcement of world news, or studies of the morale of workers employed in a factory. Psychology is matter-of-fact enough to offer plenty of large and sweeping hypotheses waiting for genuine tests. The research itself must be local, specific, and capable of giving clearcut factual answers. The S.P.S.S.I. or the A.P.A. or any other central professional organization can consolidate such research as actually exists. Blueprinting is excellent, but actual samples of good morale research are perhaps more important still. It will be on the basis of examples of achievement that useful blueprints can be offered to federal or other authorities.

As an aid to clarification of some of the research problems in individual morale to which the psychologist, physician, social scientist, and educator would be called, a very rough sketch of




FIG. 1. Interrelations in morale research.

some interrelations is given in Figure 1. This is hypothetical; research would be needed to determine how sound it is, and in what way the picture varies from one individual to another. It may help perhaps, nevertheless, to show the *interrelations* between the types of morale research and morale service that the emergency demands.

Summary

A morale program can be founded upon a Jeffersonian basis. The great morale needs have to do with apathy, skepticism, and inadequate health standards. These problems can be dealt with through a central federal morale agency. Failing this, the consolidation of morale work can be achieved through the co-operation of existing private services. In either case, a genuine morale service will be found to depend largely on carefully planned and oriented psychological research.

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Index

A

- Aberhart, Premier, 268
- Ability, morale and, 305-308
- Activity, morale and, 41-43
- Adjustment Service, 273-344
- Adjutant General's Office, 426
- Adolescence, time perspective in, 66-67
- Adult indecision, 287-288
- Advance, sense of, 44-47
- Africa, British defeats, 176
 - British policy in, 242
- Age, morale and, 296-300, 348
 - productivity and, 57
- Agriculture, Department of, 110, 375, 426
 - morale program and, 430
- Aiken, Senator, 381
- Air power, U. S. morale and, 411
- Albert, case report, 97-98
- Alberta, 267-268
- Alexander, F., 78n.
- Allport, Gordon W., 3-18, 120 n., 169 n., 369, 427
- Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 388
- Ambition, morale and, 336-341
- America First Committee, 215
 - Negroes and, 241
- American ancestry, morale and, 305
- American Association for the Advancement of Science, 433
- American Association for Applied Psychology, vi
- American Federation of Labor, 391
 - co-operation with C.I.O., 425
 - morale program and, 425, 428
 - Negro policy, 377-378
 - relation to labor movement, 375
 - war attitude, 365, 370-371, 376-401
- American Institute of Public Opinion, 190-214, 220, 384
 - unions and, 398
- American Medical Association, 421
- American Psychological Association, vi, 30 n.
 - morale program and, 434
- American Revolution, 19, 22, 112
 - army democracy, 36
 - success aspect, 44
- American Youth Congress, 209
- Americans, national character, 74, 83, 85-91
- Ancestry, morale and, 305, 306
- Anderson, Harold, 137
- Annapolis, Negroes excluded, 234
- Antioch College, 33, 107
- Anti-Semitism, 13
 - extent in U. S., 219-226
 - geographical distribution, 223-224
 - Negroes and, 242-243
- Apathy, 410
- Aristotle, 12
- Armed forces, democracy in, 36-37, 68, 417
 - recruiting in Canada, 250-251
 - Negroes in, 233-234, 243
- Armenians, social distance, 223
- Armistice of 1918, 3
- Army, morale program, 426
- Army Air Corps, Negroes in, 241, 244
- Art judgment, morale and, 296, 308, 310
- Aspiration levels, 58-61, 160, 338, 347
- Atlantic Charter, 9
- Attitudes, American, 173
 - propaganda and, 169
 - shifts in, 178-182
- Austrian ancestry, morale and, 305
- Authoritarianism, morale practice, 164
 - youth experience with, 137-138
- Authority, democracy and, 421-425
- Avocations, morale and, 296, 329, 331-335
- Axis, attitudes toward, 189-200
 - Negro attitudes toward, 243
 - strength and U. S. morale, 411

B

- Babson, Roger, 400
 Bakke, E. W., 30
 Bali, 81 n., 86
 Balkan area, German successes, 192
 "Ballad for Americans," Robinson-Latouche, 77
 Barnes, James E., 395
 Baron, Salo, 227
 Basic Magnesium, Inc., 395
 Bateson, Gregory, 30 n., 71-91, 175, 202 n.
 Bavelas, Alex, 64 n., 120 n., 137, 143-165
 Belden, Eugenia, 119 n., 208-218
 Belden, Joe, 119 n., 208-218
 Belgium, 256
 "Believe It or Not," Ripley, 77
 Belonging, 57
 Bennington College, 175-185
 Bernice, case report, 98-99
 Bernreuter Personality Inventory, 276-280, 282-344
 Bethlehem Steel Co., 394
 Betty, migrant child, 102
 Bill of Rights, 417-418
 Billy, nursery child, 104, 105
 Bipolarity, national character and, 79-89
 Blood banks, Canadian, 251
 Negroes and, 244
 Blue Eagle, 273
 Board of Economic Warfare, 375
 Bogardus, E. S., 222
 Bois, J. S. A., 262-270
 Bombing, morale and, 37-38, 168
 Booth, Lewis, 385
 Bourget, Bishop, 264
 Boycotts, labor, 373
 British, national character, 71, 80-83, 86-88
 postwar plans for, 430
 British Columbia, 249
 Brown, J. F., 34
 Bruner, K. L., vii
 Bund of German Girls, 112
 Bunker, Senator, 395
 Bureau of Information, Canadian, 253
 Burrell, migrant child, 102

C

- California, attitudes toward minorities, 222-223
 California, University of, 107
 Canada, French, 262-270
 morale experience, 249-270, 415
 student morale, 259-261
 U. S. relations, 254-255
 Cannon, W. B., 38
 Cantril, Hadley, 196 n., 204 n.
 Capitalism, 31
 democracy and, 11
 postwar plans for, 418-419
 Carl, migrant child, 103
 Carter, Boake, 398
 Carter, Elmer, 239
 Case reports, Adjustment Service, 283-343
 children, 97-105
 Catholics, Adjustment Service observations, 274, 335-337, 343
 attitudes on World War II, 198-200
 French Canadian, 263-264
 morale program and, 419
 Celotex Corporation, 395
 Censorship, morale and, 173
 Chamberlain, Neville, 6, 41
 Charity, 9
 Chi Square test, 289
 Chicago, University of, attitudes toward minorities, 222
Child, The, Children's Bureau bulletin, 108
 Child-guidance centers, in England, 118
 in United States, 107
 Child-study centers, universities having, 107-108
 Child Welfare Station, University of Iowa, 145
 Children, morale responses, 56-58, 95-118
 morale value, 95-118
 needs summarized, 110-111
 place in a democracy, 95-118
 statistics concerning, 110-116
 time perspective, 66-67
 war morale problems, 117-118
 Children's Bureau, 108, 110, 426

- China, 243
 Canadian attitude toward, 256
 postwar plans for, 411, 415
 propaganda approach, 71
 U. S. attitudes, 191
- Chinese, 222 .
 national character, 71
 postwar plans for, 430
- Christian Mobilizers, 221
- Churches (*see* Religious groups)
- Churchill, Winston, 42, 143, 255
 labor and, 370
 news policy, 45
 Roosevelt meeting, 203
- C.I.O. News*, 380n.
- Citrine, Walter, 370
- Civil War, Army democracy, 36
 unity after, 44-45
- Civilian Conservation Corps, 114, 426
- Civilian Defense, Office of, 43, 425, 429
- Clark, Kenneth B., 228-248, 378
- Class conflict, 368-369, 380
 unions and, 379, 389
 union security and, 399-400
- Cleveland Trust Co., 366
- Cliffy, nursery child, 104
- Closed shop, controversy over, 398-400
 public opinion of, 367-368
- Club participation, morale and, 329, 330, 347
- Cohan, George M., 166
- Cole, N. C., 222
- Collectivism, democracy and, 11
- Colleges, attitudes in, 175-185, 259-261
- Colorado, attitudes toward minorities, 222
- "Colored People Have a Stake in the War," 237
- Committee to Defend America, 237
- Communism, 171
 U. S. attitudes, 194
- Communists, 19
- Communities, psychosociological studies, 73
- Competition, 26-27
 national character and, 82-83
- Complementary behavior, national character and, 83-89
- Comsomols, 112
- Conally, Senator, 382
- "Confirm own plans," 287-288
- Conflict, Negro feeling, 246
- Congress, anti-Semitism in, 220
- Congress of Industrial Organizations, breadth of interest, 390
 co-operation with A.F.of L., 425
 morale program and, 425, 428
 production promotion, 369-370
 relation to labor movement, 375 .
 war attitude, 365, 370-372, 376, 384-401
- Connie, nursery child, 104
- Conscientious objectors, 63
- Consumers, labor movement and, 377
- Consumers Research, 166
- Consumers Union, 166
- Co-operation, international, 46
 labor and, 389-391
 national character and, 82n.
- Co-ordination, voluntary, 16-17
- Corporatism, in French Canada, 267-268
- Council for Democracy, 427
- Cousins, Norman, 213
- Creel Committee, 15, 35, 167, 173, 427
- Cresswell, Helen, 145n.
- Crisis, The*, 236, 239-242
- Crosser, Paul K., 367
- Crosswaith, Frank R., 237
- Culture, labor unions and, 387-389
- Culture contacts, national character and, 78-79
- Curfman, M. M., 127, 128, 130
- Czechoslovakia, 256

D

- Dahlbert, industrialist, 395
- Danger, awareness of, 37-40, 168
 French Canadian morale and, 267-268
 morale and, 37-40, 168
 physiology of, 38
- Davis, W. H., 385
- Democracy, 3 *et passim*
- Democratic morale, nature of, 3-18
 unique features, 7-17
- Democrats, confidence in Roosevelt, 202
- Decisiveness, morale and, 346
 persistency and, 54

Defeatism, 41-42
 Defense bonds, public opinion on, 203-205
 Defense Communications Board, 391
 Defense councils, 427-428
 "Defense work," 43
 Developmental experiences, morale and, 100-101
 Dictatorship, morale in, 15-16
 Dies, Martin, 209, 384-385
 Dinaries, gesture, 72
 Discipline, morale and, 417-418
 Discrimination, 10, 230
 (*see also* Segregation)
 Discussion, freedom of, 14, 380-389
 Diversity, unity and, 57
 Divisiveness, 34
 Canadian problem, 252, 265-266
 Doenitz, Karl, 36
 Dollard, J., 79 n.
 Dominion Test of General Intelligence, 266
 Doob, L. W., 169 n.
 Dottie, nursery child, 104-105
 Doukhobors, 249
 Dressmakers Union, I.L.G.W.U., 388
 Dunkirk, 37, 176
 Dutch, postwar plans for, 430
 Duties, morale and, 8, 41-43
 Dynamogenesis, 180

E

Economic Outlook, 394
 Economic environment, morale and, 101-105
 Education, in Canada, 265
 democracy in, 66
 on labor movement, 386-387
 morale and, 316-319, 346
 propaganda as, 166
 segregation in, 230-231
 statistics on, 114-116
 Education, Commissioner of, 426
 Efron, D., 73
 Eldora, migrant child, 102
 Eliot, Thomas, 372
 Elizabeth, queen of England, 266
 Emergencies, group response, 132-136
 Emotion, propaganda and, 173
 Emotional security, morale value, 345
 Employees, morale among, 349-364
 Employer, attitude toward, 296, 350-351
 Employer-employee councils (*see* Murray Plan)
 Employment, duration and morale, 357-358
 Employment stability, morale and, 296, 321
 England (*see* Great Britain)
 Enid, Okla., 385
 Epictetus, 347
 Equality, in armed forces, 36-37
 army and, 36
 leadership and, 24-26
 Negro demand, 247
 political, 23-25
 Erbe, Fred O., 145 n.
Escape from Freedom, Fromm, 73 n.
 Ethics, morale and, 7-17
 Ethiopia, Canadian attitude toward, 256
 Etiquette, Negroes and, 232-233
 Europe, postwar plans for, 411
 Experimental extinction, 39

F

Facts and Figures, Office of, 425-426
 Failure, national character and, 74
 Fair Employment, President's Committee on, 426
 Fairness, children, 66
 Family, morale and, 108-109, 345-346
 Fascism, French-Canadian attitude, 267-268
 Fascists, attitude toward Negroes, 237
 Fear, children and, 98-117
 groups and, 55
 morale and, 347
 Federal Communications Commission, 391
 Federal Security Agency, 426
Federationist, *The*, 380
 Filipinos, social distance, 223
 Food, morale and, 55-56
 Ford, Henry, 378
 Fortune surveys, 31-32, 213 n., 222-224
 on labor, 386-387
 Forty-hour week, 382-384
 Four Freedoms, 9, 31

- Fourteen Points, 31
- France, attitudes toward, 190-200
 - collapse of, 192
 - early republic, 23
 - French Canada and, 266
 - morale experience, 37, 54
 - propaganda approach, 71
- Frank, L. K., 49
- Frazer, J. W., 395
- French, national character, 71
 - postwar plans for, 430
- French, J. R. P., Jr., 137, 420
- French, Thomas M., 19-29
- French Canadians, morale, 252, 262-270
- French Revolution, 19
- Freud, Sigmund, 25-26
- Friendship, 57
- Fries, Margaret, 107
- Fromm, Erich, 73 n.
- Frustration, 57-58, 226
 - group response, 132-136
 - laissez-faire and, 124
 - Negro experience, 244-247
- Fuller, Walter D., 400
- Future, psychological, 48-49

G

- Gallup Poll (*see* American Institute of Public Opinion)
- Gang, morale and, 33-34
- Garibaldi, G., 264
- Garveyism, 246
- Gaylord, E. K., 382
- General Electric Co., Murray Plan in, 390
- General Motors Corporation, 391
- George, problem child, 99
- George VI, 266
- German-American Bund, 221
- Germans, American attitude toward, 171
 - Canadian attitudes toward, 253, 257
 - national character, 71, 74, 80, 83-87, 91
 - postwar plans for, 430
- Germany, Army social status, 36, 68
 - attitudes toward, 184, 185, 190-200
 - Jews' morale, 49
 - leadership in, 143-144
 - morale, theory and practice, 55, 164
 - news programs, 175
 - postwar plans for, 411
 - propaganda approach, 71
 - religious group attitudes, 199-201
 - student attitudes toward, 184-185
 - success claims, 45
- Gesture, national character and, 72
- Ginsburg, Morris, 71 n.
- Glen, nursery child, 104
- Goals, difficulty and morale, 58-61
 - French Canadian, 263-264
 - group and individual, 60-63
 - morale essential, 30-33
 - otherworldly, 263, 265
 - propaganda and, 173
 - psychological distance, 53, 66-67
 - time perspective and, 50-70
 - youth group, 137-142
- Godbout, Premier, 262
- Goebbels, P. J., 15
- Goethe, J. W., von, 171
- Golightly, C. L., 7 n.
- "Good life," morale and, 229-230
- Goodrich, Nathaniel H., 221
- Gordon, Mary Martha, 133-134
- Gore, Representative, 395
- Gould, R., 44n.
- Government Reports, Office of, 426
- Graphology (*see* Handwriting)
- Great Britain, 12
 - African and Indian policy, 242
 - aid sentiment, 175-185, 238
 - attitudes toward, 171, 190-200
 - child-guidance centers, 118
 - employer-employee councils in, 370
 - family morale experience, 346
 - freedom of discussion in, 14
 - labor relations in, 370, 380
 - labor war demands, 374
 - morale experience, 37, 39, 54, 168, 346
 - postwar plans for, 415
 - propaganda approach, 71
 - wage increases in, 393 n.
- Group morale, time perspective and, 54-55, 62-63
 - World War II and, 142
 - youth, 119-142
- Groups, cohesive forces in, 131-136

- face-to-face, 66-67
 fear in, 55
 goals, 62-63
 interpersonal relations in, 127-131
 national, 79-89
 satisfaction with life in, 120-127
 Greece, British defeat in, 176
 Green, William, 374, 376
 Gunther, Hans, 72
- H
- Habe, Hans, 239
 Hall, G. Stanley, 216, 230
 Hall, O. M., 299, 300, 312, 336
 Hall Scale for Measuring Occupational Morale, 275-276, 280-344
 Hamilton, Alexander, tradition of, 406-434
 Hamiltonianism, 405-436
 Hampton Institute Conference, 234
 Handwriting, 294, 340
 Hansen, Alvin H., 33
 Happe, F., 44 n.
 Happiness, as morale measure, 121
 Harlem, children in, 111-112
 Harrisburg, child-guidance centers, 108
 Hartmann, G. W., 327 n.
 Harvard Defense Council, 427
 Harvard University, 107
 Hauck, Adolph, case report, 340-341
 Hawaii, 38, 69, 189
 (*see also* Pearl Harbor)
 Health, morale and, 314-316
 Hecht, Mortimer, case report, 328
 Henderson, Leon, 373, 393
Herald Tribune, New York, 388
 Hershey, Louis B., 385
 Heterogeneity, national character and, 78-79
 Hillman, Sidney, 367, 390, 425
 Hirsch, Benjamin, case report, 294-295
 Hitler, Adolf, 15, 34, 68, 194, 428
 attitudes toward, 170, 237-238, 243, 400
 Babson on, 400
 childhood influence, 112
 democracy and, 36-37
 Negro attitudes toward, 237-238, 243
 psychological war, 41, 56
 religious program, 264
 success propaganda, 44
 Hitler Jugend, 112
 Hope, defined, 48
 morale and, 44-46, 48-70
 Hoppock, R., 318
 Horowitz, E. L., 224
 Hospitals, segregation and, 231
Hour, The, 243
 Hughes, Robert, case report, 284-286
 Hull, Richard L., 349-364
- I
- Iceland, 203
 Income, morale and, 296
 statistics, 392-395
 India, British policy in, 242
 Individuals, national character and, 76-79
 relations within groups, 127-131
 respect for the, 8-9, 372
 Industrial Council Plan (*see* Murray Plan)
 Industry, employer-employee councils, 369-370
 morale in, 273-401
 Initiative, 55-58
 persistence and, 54
 Intelligence, morale and, 64-65, 296, 305, 307
 International Labor Organization, 46
 International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 237
 educational work, 388
 press, 380 n.
 Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 166-167, 211
 Iowa, University of, 107, 145 n.
 Isolationism, anti-Semitism and, 220-221, 224-225
 Negroes and, 237, 241-242
 students and, 212-215
 Italian ancestry, morale and, 305
 Italians, American attitude toward, 171, 223
 national character, 72

social distance, 223
postwar plans for, 430
Italy, Army democracy, 37
news programs, 175
propaganda approach, 71
U. S. attitudes, 192

J

Jack, L. M., 345
Jack & Heinz, 395
Jackson, Andrew, 408
Japan, Army democracy, 37
attacks U. S., vii, 16, 33, 38, 69-70,
119, 193 n., 208 (*see also* Pearl
Harbor)
Babson on, 400
Negro attitudes, 243
news programs, 175
postwar plans for, 411
propaganda approach, 71
U. S. attitudes, 191-194, 196, 243
Japanese, 13
national character, 71
postwar plans for, 430
social distance, 223
Jefferson, Thomas, 3
quoted, 9
tradition, 405-434
Jeffersonianism, 405-436
Jehovah's Witnesses, 250
Jennings, Helen, 128
Jersild, A. T., 40
Jews, 252
Adjustment Service observations,
274, 294, 335-336, 341, 342
as problem group, 223-224
morale in Germany, 49-50
morale in U. S., 218-227
morale program and, 419
national character, 72
Negro attitudes toward, 243
persecution of, 13
social distance, 222-223
Jim Crow, 230-248
Jobs, Negro discrimination in, 233-234
Johnson, Ernest E., 241
Jones, Mary "Mother," 368
Justice, 380
Justice, Department of, 419, 426

K

Keller, George D., 145 n.
Kephart, Newell C., 128
Ketchum, J. D., 249-261
King, Mackenzie, 262, 264
Kirsch, J., 316-318
Klinberg, Otto, 72 n., 218-227
Knights of Columbus, 269
Knox, Frank, 262
Kulp, D. H., 181 n.
Kokomo, Ind., labor survey, 391 n.
Kolstad, Arthur, 349-364

L

Labor, lies about, 380-387
morale of, 365-401
morale program and, 418
propaganda and, 172
public opinion on, 384
turnover and morale, 366
(*see also* Unions)
Labor, 380 n., 385
Labor, Department of, 425
Labor-management councils (*see* Mur-
ray Plan)
Labor Party, British, 374-375
Labor relations, 349-364, 365-401
Labor Statistics, Bureau of, 366
Labor's Monthly Survey, 391-392
Laissez-faire, 424-425
goals and productivity, 63
youth morale under, 124-127
Lake, Timothy, case report, 338-340
Laski, Harold J., 45
Lasswell, H. D., 169
Latin America, propaganda approach,
71
Latins, national character, 71
Latouche, John, 77
Lazarsfeld, Paul F., 30 n., 31
"Leader principle," morale aspects,
164
Leaders, morale of, 64-65
training and morale, 143-165
U. S. confidence in, 200-202
vital importance, 143
Leadership, authoritarian, 121-127,
128-131, 132-133, 137-138
autocratic, 62

- defined, 120 n.
 democratic, 12, 62-63, 121-127, 132-133, 137-138, 141-142, 144
 dictatorial, 12
 equality and, 25-26
 laissez-faire, 122-127, 132-133
 morale response to, 163-165
 quality of, 146-165
 time perspective and, 64-65
 union, 378-379
 withdrawal of, 132-136
 youth attitudes toward, 120-127
 League of Nations, 46
 Learning, national character and, 75
 Lewin, Kurt, vi, 23, 30 n., 48-70, 122, 124, 125, 128, 133, 137, 139, 164 n.
 experiments on national character, 74
 Lewis, Hartford, case report, 291-294
 Lewis, John L., 400
Life, magazine, 262
 Life Satisfaction Index, 276-344
 Likert, Rensis, 30 n.
 Lincoln, Abraham, equality and, 24-25
 on unity, 34
 Lindbergh, C. A., 199, 225, 226
 Lippitt, Ronald, 119-142, 164 n.
 cited, 122, 124, 125, 128, 130, 133, 137, 139
 Loice-Lee, migrant child, 103
 Love, 9
 Lubin, Isador, 375
 Luce, Henry, 427
 Lynd, Carl, case report, 283-284
- M
- McCandless, B. R., 141-142
 McKenzie, Alan B., 238 n.
 McWilliams, Joseph E., 221
 MacLean, Malcolm, 426
 McLeish, Archibald, 425
 Majority rule, 11, 377-378
 Management, labor relations and, 358-364
 production and, 394
 war record, 381-382
 Margaret, migrant child, 103
 Marine Corps, Negroes in, 244
 Marital status, morale and, 300-304, 345-346
 Marrow, Alfred J., 60, 61 n.
 Marshall, Mariann, 137-138
 Marx, Karl, 389
 Marxism, 419, 424-425
 Mary, migrant child, 102
 Mary-Faye, migrant child, 103
 Mason, G. W., 395
 Mayer, Mrs. Max, 145 n.
 Mead, Margaret, 76 n., 78 n., 82 n., 86 n., 108
 Measures of morale, 30, 275-280, 350
 group-life satisfaction, 120-127
 handwriting analysis, 294, 340
 happiness, 121
 initiative, 55-58
 productivity, 55-58
 reliability, table, 279
 self-report and, 280-282
 tenacity, 51, 55
 Mechanical aptitude, morale and, 296, 297, 308, 309
 Mechanical Assembly Test, 308
Mein Kampf, A. Hitler, 46, 112
 Meltzer, H., 223
 Merelene, migrant child, 103
 Mexicans, social distance, 222, 223
 Mexican War, Army democracy, 36
 Miale, Flora R., 282 n.
 Migratory workers, child morale among, 102-105
 Miller, D. C., 299, 302, 308, 314, 327, 336
 Mills, H. S., 385
 Minnesota Spatial Relations Test, 285
 Minnesota, University of, 107
 Minorities, 13
 discrimination against, 230-236, 239-241
 Jews (*see* Jews)
 labor unions and, 379
 morale program and, 419-420, 425
 Negroes, 228-248
 totalitarian treatment, 245
 Monjar, E., 223
 Monroe, James, 6
 Montreal, 262, 268
 Morale, 3 *et passim*
 definitions, 4-5, 55, 119-120, 216, 230, 275
 development of, 95-173

five factors in, 30-47
 group (*see* Group morale)
 indices of (*see* Measures of morale)
 industrial, 273-401
 marginal, 228-229
 nature and importance, v-vii, 3-18, 228-233
 Nazi definition, 55
 program for (*see* Morale program)
 survey of, 189-270
 theory of, 3-93
 youth-group, defined, 119-120
 Morale program, in Army, 426
 essentials for, 405-436
 existing organization, 425-429
 national character and, 71-91
 Navy and, 426
 research in, chart, 435
 Mowrer, O. H., 128, 130
 Morgenthau, Henry, Jr., 394
 Moscow, 168
 Mothers, help for, 111
 working, 105-106
 Motivations, 20-29
 Murphy, Gardner, vi, 405-436
 Murray, H. A., 427, 429
 Murray, Philip, 369, 371, 376, 400
 Murray Plan, 369-370, 390-391
 Murrow, Edward R., 37
 Music, morale and, 332
 Mutual support, 33-37

N

Nash-Kelvinator Corporation, 395
Nation, The, 239, 240, 367, 385, 400
 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 236, 238, 240, 243 n.
 National character, bipolarity, 79-89
 morale and, 71-91
 objections to theories of, 74-79
 National Conference of Jews and Christians, 222-223
 National Labor Relations Board, 385
 National Manufacturers Association, 400
 National Morale, Committee for, 426
 National Recovery Authority, 273
 National Research Council, 429, 433
 National Resources Planning Board, 33, 375
 National Roster of Scientific and Professional Personnel, 429-430
 National Student Council for Democracy and Education, 209
 National Urban League, 236, 238
 National Youth Administration, 113, 114, 426
 Nationalism, 9
 Nationality, 9
 variety of psychology, 71-91
 Naval Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, 394-395
 Naval Reserve, Negro discrimination, 235
 Navy, U. S., 203
 morale program, 426
 Negroes in, 244
 Nazis, 85
 army democracy, 68
 attitude toward Negroes, 237-240
 influence on Negroes, 242-243
 Latin American plans, 411
 morale procedures and theory, 36, 55
 Negro attitudes toward, 237-238, 243
 Nazism, 15-16
 Negative adaptation, 39
Negro in America, The, Fortune survey, 223-224
 Negro Provisional Committee to Defeat Hitler, 238
 Negroes, 16, 226
 accommodation attitudes, 79 n.
 child morale problems, 111-112
 democracy and, 235-248
 democratic morale and, 10
 discrimination against, 10, 230
 morale among, 228-248
 persecution of, 13
 propaganda and, 172
 segregation (*see* Segregation)
 social distance, 223
 statistics on, 115
 unions and, 377-378
 youth morale problems, 115-116
 Negroes against War Committee, 241-242

Nelson, Donald, 367-370, 381
 forty-hour week and, 383 n.
 Neutrality Act, student attitude, 212
 Newcomb, Theodore, vi, 173-185,
 327 n.
 New Deal, 273, 300, 408
 New Guinea, 76
 New Hampshire, child-guidance cen-
 ter, 107
 New Jersey, war industry, 385
New Republic, 400
 New York City, children in, 111-112
 national groups in, 72
 News, 14-15
 confidence in, 45
 favorable and bad, 45-46
 labor and, 380-387
 morale and, 173-185, 206, 411-412
 public opinion on, 202-203
 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 15
 Nordics, gesture, 72
 Norway, British morale and, 37
 Nursery schools, 105-106

O

Occupation, morale and, 318-329, 346
 status and morale, 358-359
 Occupational preference, morale and,
 290
 O'Leary, Michael, case report, 343-344
 Opportunities, in union careers, 379
Opportunity, 236, 239
 Osborne, Frederick, 426
 Otherworldliness, 263, 265
 Ottawa, 253, 266
 "Our America," leaflet, 173 n.

P

Pacifism, in Canada, 256
 Page, M. L., 345
 Papal States, 264
 Parents, education and training, 109
 Participation, morale and, 8, 40-43
 French Canadian feeling of, 268-270
 labor morale and, 369-372
 Pay (*see* Wages)
 Peace, conditions of, 31-33, 411-416
 democracy in, 6
 morale and, 6-8
 social structure diagrammed, 35

Pearl Harbor, vii, 6, 16, 33, 35, 45,
 69-70, 168, 193 n., 206, 208, 216-
 217, 225, 400
 labor attitudes after, 381
 morale results, 38
 Pegler, Westbrook, 384, 398
 Perry, migrant child, 103
 Persistency, decisiveness and, 54
 initiative and, 54
 time perspective and, 52-53
 Person, respect for the, 8-9, 372
 Personality, morale and, 96-118
 Personality problems, 287-288
 Personnel administration, morale and,
 364
 Philippines, Japan attacks, 193 n.
 "Phony war," 192, 259
 "Pins and Needles," 388
 Pitkin, W. B., 338 n.
 Placement advice, 287-288
 Planning, agricultural, 45-46
 democratic approach, 46
 unions and, 389-391
 Pleasure principle, 58
 Poland, 256
 Polish ancestry, morale and, 305
 Political boundaries, national char-
 acter and, 78-79
 Pontifical Zouaves, 264
 Pope, Arthur Upham, 426
 Portugal, propaganda approach, 71
Post, New York, 370
 Postwar plans, 31-33, 45-47, 91
 British labor and, 374-375
 labor and, 374-376
 national character and, 71
 Negroes in, 245
 propaganda and, 171
 social sciences in, 430
 unemployment in, 273
 U. S. morale and, 411-416
 Poverty, child morale and, 101-105
 Negro problem, 233
 Pratt & Whitney, 395
 Predispositions, 170-173
 Press, labor and, 380-387
 morale program and, 428-429
 Prestige, 10-11
 Prices, public opinion on, 203-205
 Privileges, 8

- Production, C.I.O. and, 385
 employer-employee councils, 369-370
 morale and, 366
 strikes and, 381
- Productivity, 55-58
 democracy and, 62-63
 increase of, 61
 leadership and, 62-63
 self government and, 63
 youth group, 137-142
- Profit system, democracy and, 11
- Profits, limitation proposals, 394, 396-397
 statistics on, 393-396
- Progressive Education*, 112
- Propaganda, difficulties of, 255
 morale and, 35-36, 42, 166-174
 national character and, 71
 nature of, 166-167
 objects of, 168-174
 success in, 44-46
- Protestants, Adjustment Service observations, 274, 284, 292, 335-337, 339
 attitudes on World War II, 198-200
 morale program and, 419
- Psychiatry, morale and, 290-292
 morale problems in, 342-344
 morale program and, 420-421
 national character and, 73
- Psychodynamic problems, 19-29
- "Psychological Bases of National Morale," Likert *et al.*, 30 n.
- Psychological future, 53
- Psychological war, 41, 56, 347
- Psychologists, function in a morale program, 423-425
- Psychology, nationality and, 71-91
- Public health, morale program and, 420-421
 statistics on, 113, 115
- Public information (*see* News)
- Public opinion, issues in, 195-198
 Negro, 236
 relation to events, chart, *insert*
 sampling, 190-206, 210-218, 222-224, 249, 268, 384
 trends on war, 189-207
- Public Opinion Research, Office of, 190-207
- Publicity, propaganda and, 166
- Q
- Quebec, 262, 264-269
- Questionnaires, in morale measurement, 349-355
- R
- Race, 9
 morale and, 37
 (*see also* Japanese, Jews, Negroes)
- Radicalism, morale and, 289, 296-297
- Radio, labor and, 380-382, 387
- Radio Corporation of America, morale promotion, 366-367
- Railway Brotherhoods, Negro policy, 377-378
 relation to labor movement, 375
- Rationing, morale and, 37
- Realism, morale and, 54, 65-69, 338, 347
 time perspective and, 65-69
- Reason, recognition of, 69
- Rebellion, 21
- Recreation, 116
 segregation in, 231
 unions and, 388
- Regularity, in national character, 75
- Reichenberg, W., 345
- Relief status, ancestry and morale, 300, 305
 avocations and morale, 335
 social relations and morale, 335
- Religion, morale and, 335-337, 347
- Religious groups, Adjustment Service experience, 274-343
 attitudes on World War II, 198-200
 Canadian morale and, 249-250
 French Canada and, 263-264
 segregation in, 231
 students in, 210
- Representative government, 11
- Republicans, confidence in Roosevelt, 202
- Research, morale program and, 429-436

Reuther, Walter P., 373, 391
 Revolution, unions and, 389
 Rich, Congressman, 383-384
 Ripley, R. L., 77
 Robert, problem child, 117-118
 Robinson, Earl, 77
 Rogers, Edith Nourse, 367
 Roheim, G., 82 n.
 Rome, French Canada and, 266
 Roosevelt, F. D., 14, 143, 171, 220-221, 255
 Churchill meeting, 203
 confidence in, 201-202
 influence in French Canada, 264
 leadership and morale, 163
 news policy, 45
 Victory Program, 41-42
 Rosenwald (Julius) Fund, 419
 Rotary, 17
 Royal Canadian Air Force, 251
 Royal Canadian Army, recruiting, 250-251
 Royal Canadian Navy, 251
 Rugg, Donald, 169 n, 173, 189-207
 Rundquist, E. A., 299, 303, 316
 Russia (*see* U.S.S.R.)
 Russian ancestry, morale and, 305

S

Sacrifice, 172
 mutual, 28-29
 public opinion on, 203-205, 207
 Sailer, R. C., 299, 302, 308 n., 314, 316, 327, 332, 336
 St. Jean Baptiste Society, 262
 St. Louis, Mo., attitudes toward minorities, 223
 Salvation Army, 269
 Samp, Genevieve, 383-384
 Sarah Lawrence College, 107
 Sargent, S. S., 166-174, 202 n.
 Saunders, D. A., 173
 Savings, proposals for, 397
 Schools, Canadian, 265
 Schuyler, George E., 241-242
 Security, 10
 labor morale and, 376
 Segregation, of Negroes, 230-248
 Seidman, Jerome, 289 n.
 Selective Service Act, student attitude, 212, 215
 Self-government, 19-29
 learning, 22-23
 productivity and, 63
 Self-report, morale appraisal by, 280-282
 Sex, morale and, 300-304
 Sex differentiation, national character and, 76
 Shanack, Leon K., 395
 Sherif, M., 35
 Shirer, William L., 36
 Skepticism, 410
 Slavery, 24-25
 Sletto, R. F., 299, 303, 316
 Smith College, 107
 Social Credit, French Canadian attitude, 267
 Social relations, morale and, 330, 335, 347
 Social Science Research Council, 429
 Social sciences, morale program and, 430
 Social Security, postwar plans for, 415
 Social status, labor morale and, 376
 morale and, 10-11, 36-37
 Social structure, war and peace, 35
 Social-welfare measures, morale and, 415
 Socialism, in postwar plans, 375
 Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, vi-vii, 30 n.
 morale program and, 434
 Solidarity, 28-29
 Southern States Industrial Council, 382
 Spain, morale experience, 37
 Speech, freedom of (*see* Discussion, freedom of)
 Spock, Benjamin, 107
 Stalin, J. V., 85
Steel Labor, 380 n.
 Stoddard, George D., 145 n.
 Strikes, in French Canada, 268
 jurisdictional, 376
 moratorium on, 369-371
 production and, 381
 public opinion on, 367-368
 sympathetic, 373

Strong Vocational Interest Test, 276-344
 Student Opinion Surveys, 210-218
 Students, Adjustment Service observations, 294-312
 Canadian, 259-261
 morale, 208-217
 war attitudes, 175-185
 Success, morale and, 41-42, 44-46, 345
 propaganda base, 44-46
 Suffering, prison, 51-52
 Sumner, W. G., 422
 Supervision, morale and, 363-364
 youth attitudes toward, 120-127
 Sweden, labor relations in, 380
 propaganda approach, 71
 Symmetrical relationships, national character and, 82-83

T

Taxes, 8
 in Canada, 250
 Tead, Ordway, 163
 Tenacity, 51-54
 Tennessee Valley Authority, 46
 Ternary relationships, national character and, 81-82
 Terror strategy, 41, 56, 347
 Texas Corporation, 394
 Thurstone, L. L., 222, 223
 Threshold guidance, 287, 288
Time, 393, 395
 Time perspective, 48-70
 adolescent, 66-67
 authoritarian, 139
 children, 66-67
 defined, 49
 democratic, 139-140
 goals in, 50-70
 group morale and, 62-63
 leadership and, 64-65
 realism and, 65-69
 youth group, 137-142
Times-Dispatch, Richmond, 240
 Todd Shipyards, 395
 Togetherness, 33-37
 in French Canada, 265-267
 Tolerance, 13
 labor unions and, 379
 Toronto, 262
 Totalitarianism, morale in, 5-7, 164
 productivity and, 62-63
 Tradition, morale and, 53
 Training, morale and, 143-165
 Travel, segregation in, 230
 Treasury Department, labor statistics, 393
 Truman Committee, 172, 394-395
 Turkey, propaganda approach, 71
 Tyranny, rebellion against, 21-22

U

Unemployment, 16
 Unemployment, morale and, 10, 30-31, 48-70, 273-348
 in 1941-1942, 273
 postwar, 273, 367
 Uniformity, in national character, 75
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, army democracy, 36
 child care in, 108
 morale experience, 168
 morale program and, 429
 national character, 85
 postwar plans for, 411, 415, 430
 propaganda approach, 71
 religious group attitudes, 199-201
 U. S. attitudes, 171, 191, 193, 194
 Union League Club, 389
 Unions, 43
 area of usefulness, 388
 craft, 390
 criticisms of, 391-392
 democracy in, 378-379
 educational activities, 387-388
 industrial, 390
 membership conditions, 370
 membership security, 398-401
 morale and, 365-401
 morale contributions summarized, 391-392
 Negroes and, 377-378
 press circulation, 380 n.
 public opinion on, 367-368
United Automobile Worker, 380 n.
 United Automobile Workers, 373, 391
 Negro policy, 378
 war savings proposal, 397
 United Mine Workers of America, 400

- United Mine Workers Journal*, 380 n.
 United Nations, 46-47
 United Service Organizations, 43
 United Shoe Workers, 373
 United States, army democracy, 36
 Canadian relations, 254-255
 child welfare tasks, 95-118
 Colonial experience, 28
 early democracy, 23-24
 educational democracy, 66
 government child welfare tasks, 110-118
 Japan attacks, 33, 38, 69-70, 119, 208
 (see also Pearl Harbor)
 Japanese relations, 193-194
 leadership in, 143-144
 morale experience, 54
 morale opportunities, 173-174
 United States Chamber of Commerce, 382
 United States Military Academy, 234
 United States Naval Academy, 234
 Unity, 34-37
 Canadian problem, 252, 262, 265-267
 diversity within, 57
 forces making for, 131-136
 in labor movement, 375-376
 Pearl Harbor and, 38, 225
 Universalism, 9
 labor unions and, 372-376
 Universities, morale program and, 427
 Utopianism, 170-171
- V
- Vassar College, 107
 Verdi, G., 171
 Versailles Treaty, 46, 91, 171, 410
 Veterans of Future Wars, 209
 Villeneuve, R., Cardinal, 262
 Vinson Report, 394
 Virginia, child problems, 110
 Vitamins, morale and, 55-56
 Vocabulary, morale and, 296
 Vocational guidance, 274
- W
- Waelder, Robert, 26 n.
 Wages, British rise, 393 n.
 morale and, 322, 361-364, 392-398
 public opinion on, 203-205
 regulation proposals, 396-397
 statistics, 392-395
 union demands, 392-398
 Walworth County, Wisc., child-guidance centers, 107
 Wallace, Henry A., 45, 431
 War, democracy and, 6, 15-16, 27
 morale and, 6-8
 social structure diagrammed, 35
 War bonds (see Defense bonds)
 War information, Committee on, 425
 War Labor Board, 372, 385, 425
 War Production Board, 370, 390-391
 strike statistics, 381
 War stamps (see Defense bonds)
 Warren, migrant child, 103-104
Washington Post, 369
 Watson, Goodwin, vi, 30 n., 273-348, 365-401
 cited, 316-318, 332
 West Point, Negroes in, 234
 Western Hemisphere, co-operation, 46
 Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, Murray Plan in, 390
 White, R. K., cited, 122, 124, 125, 128, 130, 133, 137, 139
 White, Walter, 243 n.
 Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 144
 Williams, Louis, 145 n.
 Willkie, Wendell, quoted, 32
 Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 395
 Wilson, C. E., 391
 Wilson, Woodrow, 31
 Wirth, Louis, 172, 218
 Women, in Canadian war work, 250
 morale maintenance, 31
 Work satisfaction, morale and, 346, 359-362
 Work standards, improvement of, 61
 Workers Education Bureau, 388
 Working conditions, morale and, 349-364
World, Tulsa, 400
 World War I, Canadian armed forces in, 269
 Canadian attitudes toward, 253-257
 disappointments following, 31, 35
 labor in, 365
 morale activity in, 15, 36

pacifist consequences, 170
propaganda in, 167, 169, 173, 255-256
student attitude, 214
World War II, aims, 206
Canadian attitudes toward, 253-270
child morale and, 117-118
chronology, chart, *insert*
French Canadian attitudes, 262-270
goals and prospects, 31-33
group morale and, 142
Jews and, 218-226
labor in, 365
morale trends in, 189-207
Negro attitudes, 236
neutral sentiment, 190-200
peace objectives, 31-33
propaganda in, 167-174
sacrifice in, 172
song symptoms, 166
U. S. sympathies, 190-200
youth morale and, 142
W.P.A., child-directed work, 96-97,
104-107, 110
leader training and morale, 145-165
morale in, 64
Wright, Erik, 131

Y

Yale University, 107
Yorkville, 221
Young Men's Christian Association,
269
Youth, college, 208-217
democracy and, 137-139
morale of, 297-300, 348, 426
Negro, 115
problems bearing on morale, 113-
117
propaganda and, 172
revolutionary potency, 112
rural, 114-115
statistics on, 113-116
Youth Committee Against War, 209
Youth groups, adult guidance, 140-142
authoritarian responses, 127-130
laissez-faire responses, 122-127, 130
morale, 119-142

Z

Zionists, morale in Germany, 49-50